Plato, Sophist 231 a, etc.Author(s): N. B. BoothSource: The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 6, No. 1/2 (Jan. - Apr., 1956), pp. 89-90Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/636974Accessed: 12/06/2009 13:42

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PLATO, SOPHIST 23I a, ETC. MR. G. B. KERFERD, in C. Q. xlviii (I954), 84 ff. writes of 'Plato's Noble Art of Sophistry'. He suggests that Plato thought there was a 'Noble Art' of sophistry, other than philosophy itself; and he seeks to find this Art in the better and worse arguments of Protagoras. This suggestion is, unfortunately, based on a mistranslation of Plato, Sophist 231 a: ov0 yap 7repL cf!LKpWv o'pav Trrv adLbL/qBtr,TravC oloLat, yevrjaEcOaT TOTE o7roTav tiCav)S ' vAaTTWrcoa. Mr. Kerferd supposes that this can mean: 'For I do not think there will be dispute about distinctions which are of little importance when men are sufficiently on guard in the case of resemblances.' He takes the ov with T?7V Jctir7tqVwTv o'tovat y7ev-roEOat, and not with aOrTKpCOv.

This is a curious translation in view of the word order (ov yap r1Epi atLLKPWV opcov) and in view of the article used with aqLoaf37TloCrv. On grounds of language alone, ov must go with arulcpWv. But further, what are these distinctions which, if we accept Mr. Kerferd's view, are 'of little importance'? They are distinc- tions on the one hand between tame and fierce, and on the other hand between the cathartic process of dialectic and sophistry. The 'tame' and 'fierce' dis- tinction is not between tame and fierce merely; it is a distinction between the very tamest and the very fiercest of animals (Plato uses superlatives at the beginning of 231 a). How Plato could have in the same paragraph stressed the vastness of the difference by means of superlatives and then spoken of 'small distinctions', is more than I can see. I also fail to see how Plato could ever have thought the distinction between sophistry and healing dialectic to be a small one; that would be saying that there was little to choose between Socrates and Thrasymachus. No: Plato is saying here that there is a certain superficial resemblance between healing dialectic and sophistry, but we must beware of that resemblance; in fact the one is a tame watch-dog, the other a ravening wolf, and 'we shall find in the course of our discussion, once we take adequate precautions, that there is no small distinction between the two'.

I think Plato rejected utterly and uncompromisingly all doctrines that were not founded on conceptions of absolute Truth and absolute Knowledge; he simply cannot have approved of Protagoras' arguments. It would be more interesting to discuss Plato's attitude towards the Eleatics. Zeno was said to have invented dialectic; and Parmenides, Zeno, and the Eleatic Stranger, figure prominently in some of Plato's later dialogues. No doubt Plato intro- duced them because he wished to quarrel with their rejection of 'Not-Being', and to show how Being and Not-Being may be interwoven; no doubt, also, Plato made them better in his dialogues than they really were: but it is still possible that Plato had considerable respect for their methods.

Mr. Kerferd in the same article suggests that the division of 'evil in the soul' into two classes, in Sophist 226 ff., has no significance for the development of Plato's ethical thinking. He seems not to realize that the analysis of virtues in the Republic necessitated a division of evil in the soul. In the Republic (and still more in the Laws), the main virtue is Wisdom; but it has three handmaids, Justice, Temperance, and Courage, which look to Wisdom as their leader. Wisdom is concerned with the right functioning of the reason; the other three virtues are more concerned with the harmony of the soul, which must be such

that Reason rules over Spirit and Passion. The corresponding faults are bound to be Ignorance and Faction.' These faults may both arise from some kind of disharmony or disproportion within the soul, but that does not invalidate the distinction between them. It seems to me that the whole irony of Plato's Republic and Laws, and indeed of his whole life, was the inadequacy of Reason by itself, if it had not power and dominion.

N. B. BOOTH

See Hackforth, 'Moral Evil and Ignor- etc. It should not be supposed, however, that ance in Plato's Ethics', C.Q. xl (I946), 18- I accept all the conclusions of the first two 20; Dodds, 'Plato and the Irrational', J.H.S. writers, or that I commit myself to a view on lxv (1945), 18-19; Aristotle, Magna Moralia the authorship of the Magna Moralia. I I82aI 1-30; Plato, Laws 631 d, 644 d ff.,

THE PROSODY OF GREEK PROPER NAMES IN EARLY LATIN COMEDY

(cf. C.Q. v [1955], 206 if.)

IT is inherent in the nature of early Latin verse that no dactylic word, be it Phaedria or omnia or accipe, can in any single instance be shown to be dactylic rather than cretic. Mr. Martin seems to have overlooked this fact when he writes: 'But the significant thing is that in no line is the scansion -d necessary' (loc. cit., p. 208). Only indirect evidence can reveal short quantity of the final. If Phaedria behaves like Phaedriae or Parmeno it is a cretic; if it behaves like Pamphile it is a dactyl.

Here is the evidence from Terence:

Phaedria Phaedria Parmeno (nom., voc.) Pamphile (oblique cases) (nom., voc.)

Total of occurrences . . 33 39 i8 44 At end of line . . . 22 21 I 17 In elision . . . . 8 15 I 4 Followed by disyll. thesis . 3 3 I 5 Cretic . . ... .o o 52 83

This is a fair sample, and Phaedria is proved to be a dactyl because, like Pamphile and unlike Phaedriae and Parmeno, it is never used as a cretic. The vocative Clinia is once so used (Heaut. 406) but that single exception faces overwhelming odds in cretic Antiphos, Ctesisphos etc., and the oblique cases of Chaerea, Clinia, and the rest.

University College London 0. SKUTSCH

I The ablative in Eun. 465 is by inadvertence listed as a nominative or vocative, loc. cit., p. 208.

2 Eun. 354; 440; 465; Ph. 778; 886. 3 Eun. 307; 351; 1034; Hec. 320; 340; 409; 416; 878.

that Reason rules over Spirit and Passion. The corresponding faults are bound to be Ignorance and Faction.' These faults may both arise from some kind of disharmony or disproportion within the soul, but that does not invalidate the distinction between them. It seems to me that the whole irony of Plato's Republic and Laws, and indeed of his whole life, was the inadequacy of Reason by itself, if it had not power and dominion.

N. B. BOOTH

See Hackforth, 'Moral Evil and Ignor- etc. It should not be supposed, however, that ance in Plato's Ethics', C.Q. xl (I946), 18- I accept all the conclusions of the first two 20; Dodds, 'Plato and the Irrational', J.H.S. writers, or that I commit myself to a view on lxv (1945), 18-19; Aristotle, Magna Moralia the authorship of the Magna Moralia. I I82aI 1-30; Plato, Laws 631 d, 644 d ff.,

THE PROSODY OF GREEK PROPER NAMES IN EARLY LATIN COMEDY

(cf. C.Q. v [1955], 206 if.)

IT is inherent in the nature of early Latin verse that no dactylic word, be it Phaedria or omnia or accipe, can in any single instance be shown to be dactylic rather than cretic. Mr. Martin seems to have overlooked this fact when he writes: 'But the significant thing is that in no line is the scansion -d necessary' (loc. cit., p. 208). Only indirect evidence can reveal short quantity of the final. If Phaedria behaves like Phaedriae or Parmeno it is a cretic; if it behaves like Pamphile it is a dactyl.

Here is the evidence from Terence:

Phaedria Phaedria Parmeno (nom., voc.) Pamphile (oblique cases) (nom., voc.)

Total of occurrences . . 33 39 i8 44 At end of line . . . 22 21 I 17 In elision . . . . 8 15 I 4 Followed by disyll. thesis . 3 3 I 5 Cretic . . ... .o o 52 83

This is a fair sample, and Phaedria is proved to be a dactyl because, like Pamphile and unlike Phaedriae and Parmeno, it is never used as a cretic. The vocative Clinia is once so used (Heaut. 406) but that single exception faces overwhelming odds in cretic Antiphos, Ctesisphos etc., and the oblique cases of Chaerea, Clinia, and the rest.

University College London 0. SKUTSCH

I The ablative in Eun. 465 is by inadvertence listed as a nominative or vocative, loc. cit., p. 208.

2 Eun. 354; 440; 465; Ph. 778; 886. 3 Eun. 307; 351; 1034; Hec. 320; 340; 409; 416; 878.

N. B. BOOTH N. B. BOOTH 90 90

Article Contentsp. [89]p. 90

Issue Table of ContentsThe Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 6, No. 1/2 (Jan. - Apr., 1956), pp. 1-4+1-112Front Matter [pp. 1 - 4]A Fragment of the Arimaspea [pp. 1 - 10]The Economic Background to Solon's Reforms [pp. 11 - 25]Aeschylus, Agamemnon 555-62 [pp. 26 - 28]The Parmenides and the 'Third Man' [pp. 29 - 37]Notes on Sophocles' Electra [pp. 38 - 39]Anaximenes and [pp. 40 - 44]The Family of Orthagoras [pp. 45 - 53]Sophocles, O. T. 220-1: Corrigenda [pp. 54 - 55]Notes on Euripides' Bacchae [pp. 56 - 67]Erratum: The Text of Aristotle's Topics [p. 67]The Assisi Fragments of the Apologia of Apuleius [pp. 68 - 80]Maniliana [pp. 81 - 86]Three Notes on Plutarch's Moralia [pp. 87 - 88]Plato, Sophist 231 a, etc. [pp. 89 - 90]The Prosody of Greek Proper Names in Early Latin Comedy (Continued) [p. 90]Some Fragments of Galen's on Dispositions ( ) in Arabic [pp. 91 - 101] with the Future in Lucian and the Solecist [pp. 102 - 111]A Note on Lucian [p. 112]Back Matter