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CHINA SAYS NO

ContentsCHINA SAYS NO...........................................................................................................................................1

Generic Engagement/Cooperation..........................................................................................................3

ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT - GENERAL....................................................................................................5

DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT - GENERAL..................................................................................................9

ENVIRONMENT......................................................................................................................................12

Generic..............................................................................................................................................13

Climate Change..................................................................................................................................16

Water pollution.................................................................................................................................19

Overfishing........................................................................................................................................21

JUDICIAL REFORM..................................................................................................................................22

HUMAN RIGHTS.....................................................................................................................................28

CYBER SECURITY....................................................................................................................................32

INTERNET FREEDOM..............................................................................................................................36

AGRICULTURE........................................................................................................................................40

PHARMACEUTICALS...............................................................................................................................42

DENUCLEARIZE NORTH KOREA..............................................................................................................45

China Says No....................................................................................................................................46

North Korea Says No..........................................................................................................................49

SOUTH CHINA SEA REFORM..................................................................................................................52

SPACE....................................................................................................................................................60

General Say No..................................................................................................................................61

Human Space Flight...........................................................................................................................65

International Space Station/Cooperative Ventures...........................................................................66

BIT..........................................................................................................................................................70

ARCTIC...................................................................................................................................................72

ORGAN TRAFFICKING.............................................................................................................................75

MSDI 2016 Say No File

#debatelikeabear 2TERRORISM............................................................................................................................................78

TPP.........................................................................................................................................................81

AIIB........................................................................................................................................................85

Afghanistan............................................................................................................................................90

Education Reform..................................................................................................................................91

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Generic Engagement/Cooperation China no longer wants to work together with the United StatesMelinda Liu (Melinda Liu has been Beijing Bureau Chief of Newsweek, Inc. since 1998. One of Newsweek's most experienced foreign

correspondents), 2-4-2010, "Why China Doesn't Care About America," (d.a. 7-4-16) Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/why-china-doesnt-care-about-america-75059

China's America watchers have fallen on tough times. Back in their profession's glory days, in the 1980s and '90s, they were able to spend years in the United States learning about the place, and both Washington and Beijing were eager for them to report home on what they'd discovered in the New World. Chinese leaders were trying to integrate their vast country into a world system dominated by America, and they took particular interest in how Washington viewed their country. But now

U.S. funding for stateside field work has dried up, and Beijing shows little interest in the United States except to complain, threaten, or refuse to work together on global problems. The latest outburst came in response to word from the White House that President Obama still expects to meet with Tibet's exiled Dalai Lama next week. Chinese officials were already in a fury over U.S. plans to sell $6.4 billion worth of Blackhawk helicopters, Patriot missiles, and other military hardware to Taiwan. Beijing suspended military-to-military exchanges, and for the first time publicly

ordered sanctions against U.S. arms makers rather than quietly boycotting them. And that's on top of other slaps at Washington, going back to Premier Wen

Jiabao's public criticism of U.S. economic policy in Davos a year ago. The Chinese press says that things have changed. TheGlobal Times,

a People's Daily affiliate often critical of the West, attributed the "shift in tone" to two factors: "First is changing Chinese public opinion, which long ago got fed up with America's hedging games … The second is China's growing power." That kind of talk may suggest to Westerners that China's new global stature has gone to its head. But what's really driving the country's leaders is a very different emotion: profound insecurity.

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ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT - GENERAL

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China sees plan as a way for the US to upset rise of china – will reject Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, March 2012, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development programs, John L. Thornton China Center, Brookings, President of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Peking University, and professor at the School of International Studies, Peking University, Member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of the Foreign Ministry of China since October 2008, The John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings , from http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/30-us-china-lieberthal/0330_china_lieberthal.pdfChinese strategic distrust of the United States is deeply rooted in history. Four sentiments reflecting recent structural changes in the international system contribute to this distrust: the feeling in China that since 2008 the

PRC has ascended to be a first-class global power; the assessment that the United States, despite ongoing great strength, is

heading for decline; the observation that emerging powers like India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa are increasingly challenging Western dominance and are working more with each other and with China in doing so; and the notion

that China's development model of a strong political leadership that effectively manages social and economic

affairs provides an alternative to Western democracy and market economies for other developing countries to learn from. In combination, these views make many Chinese political elites suspect that it is the United States that is “on the wrong side of history.” Because they believe that the ultimate goal of the U.S. in view of these factors is to maintain its global

hegemony, they conclude that America will seek to constrain or even upset China's rise.

China says no – does not agree with American policiesAndrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, “How China Sees America – The Sum of Beijing’s Fears”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5 (SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2012), pp. 32-47, Published by Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41720859

In each of China's four security rings, the United States is omni- present. It is the most intrusive outside actor in China's internal affairs, the guarantor of the How China Sees America presence in the East China and South China seas, the formal or informal military ally of many of Chinas neighbors, and the primary framer and defender of existing international legal regimes. This omnipresence means that China s understanding of American motives determines how the Chinese deal with most of their security issues. stability are in the

interest of the United States. And in practice, the United States has done more than any other power to contribute to China's modernization. It has drawn China into the global economy; given the Chinese access to markets, capital, and technology; trained Chinese experts in science, technology, and international law; prevented the full remilitarization of Japan; maintained the peace on the

Korean Peninsula; and helped avoid a war over Taiwan. Yet Chinese policymakers are more impressed by policies and

behaviors that they perceive as less benevolent. The American military is deployed all around China's periphery, and the United States maintains a wide network of defense relationships with Chinas neighbors. Washington continues to frustrate Beijing's efforts to gain control over Taiwan. The United States constantly pressures China over its economic policies and maintains a host of government and private programs that seek to influence Chinese civil society and politics. Beijing views this seemingly contradictory set of American actions through three reinforcing perspectives. First, Chinese analysts see their country as heir to an agrarian, eastern strategic tradition that is pacifistic, defense-

minded, nonexpansionist, and ethical. In contrast, they see Western strategic culture - especially that of the United States - as militaristic, offense-minded, expansionist, and selfish. Second, although China has embraced state capitalism

with vigor, the Chinese view of the United States is still informed by Marxist political thought, which posits that capitalist powers seek to exploit the rest of the world. China expects Western powers to resist Chinese competition for resources and higher-value-added markets.

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#debatelikeabear 6Too much of China’s economic future rests on the US – are not willing to take the riskAndrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, “How China Sees America – The Sum of Beijing’s Fears”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5 (SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2012), pp. 32-47, Published by Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41720859Chinese security analysts also take note of the United States' extensive capability to damage Chinese economic interests. The United States is still China's single most important market unless one counts the European Union as a

single entity. And the United States is one of China's largest sources of foreign direct investment and advanced technology. From time to time, Washington has entertained the idea of wielding its economic power coercively. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, the United States imposed some limited diplomatic and economic sanctions on China, including an embargo, which is still in

effect, on the sale of advanced arms. For several years after that, Congress debated whether to punish China further for human

rights violations by canceling the low most-favored-nation tariff rates enjoyed by Chinese imports, although proponents of

the plan could never muster a majority. More recently, U.S. legislators have proposed sanctioning China for artificially keeping the value of the yuan low to the benefit of Chinese exporters, and the Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney has promised that if elected, he will label China a currency manipulator on "day one" of his presidency. Although trade hawks in Washington seldom prevail,

flare-ups such as these remind Beijing how vulnerable China would be if the United States decided to punish it economically. Chinese strategists believe that the United States and its allies would deny supplies of oil and

metal ores to China during a military or economic crisis and that the U.S. Navy could block China's access to strategically crucial sea-lanes. The ubiquity of of the dollar in international trade andfinance also gives the United States the ability to damage Chinese interests, either on purpose or as a result of attempts by the U.S. government to address its fiscal problems by printing dollars and increasing borrowing, acts that drive down the value of China's dollar-denominated exports and foreign exchange reserves. Chinese analysts also believe that the United States possesses potent ideological weapons and the willingness to use them.

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#debatelikeabear 7China will say no to any diplomatic or economic relations. China’s history fuels thisNatalie NougayrèDe (leader writer and foreign affairs commentator for the Guardian), 3-26-2015, "The west is trying to understand China, but don’t expect trust," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/26/west-understand-china-trust-xi-jinping DA 7/4/16

So what is going on in President Xi’s head? Kevin Rudd, the former Australian prime minister, frames the Chinese leader’s priorities this way: first, Xi is obsessed with retaining the central authority of the Chinese Communist party. That authority is being challenged because of endemic corruption, and because of concerns about China’s ability to maintain strong growth.

The flipside of this growth is having to deal with pollution levels that can provoke public outrage. Xi, says Rudd, spends “a huge slice of his energy” on making sure that the party stays on top. Second, Xi wants to re-gear China’s economy from an

old (export-led) economic model to a new (domestic consumption-led) model. That is a huge task, especially when growth rates are slowing

down. Third, China wants to continue to seize what its official lexicon calls a “strategic opportunity” to increase its global influence.

As a result, China is said to be currently working on lowering tensions in Asia. One sign of that was last week’s trilateral

meeting in Seoul, between the foreign ministers of China, Japan and South Korea. China’s dispute with Japan over the Senkaku islands will remain a focus of Chinese territorial claims but in a way that will fall short of fostering a crisis. Equally, a breakthrough can no longer be ruled

out between China and India on their longstanding land border dispute. The bottom line is that China has embarked on a new level of global activism. It has overtaken the United States as the world’s leading trade power . Today 123 countries in

the world have China as their leading trading partner, while the US can count only 64. China is on the lookout for investment opportunities that aren’t just US treasury bonds. It wants to challenge the mighty dollar, and its currency, the renminbi, now accounts for 15% of global trade transactions. China’s objective, says Stapleton Roy, a former US diplomat and Asia specialist, is to reach a GDP per

capita comparable to the European average by 2049 – the 100th anniversary of communist rule in the country. China sees the US as trying to oppose its growing international status. Its success with the Asian Investment Bank is a clear sign of the power of its huge currency reserves. But it would be a mistake to think that China believes the US is in decline. China’s demographic trends aren’t so good, and its military power and innovation capabilities are nowhere near as strong as America’s. Xi’s perception is that US power will continue through the 21st century, which means that common dialogue must somehow be found through creative diplomacy. Last November’s joint US-China statement on

climate change fitted that picture. China sees Russia as a declining power that can eventually be transformed into an economic colony None of this means there will be much trust in the air. China has a 2,500-year history of strategic thinking driven by a deep distrust of external players. Don’t expect a People’s Daily front page proclaiming a new era of Chinese openness towards the west.

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DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT - GENERAL China and the US will not trust each otherMichael Mazza (research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute) 4-23-2013, "Why America and China can’t trust each other," No Publication, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/04/23/why-america-and-china-cant-trust-each-other/

Because the Chinese political system is a closed one, foreign observers can never be sure that Chinese pronouncements on foreign policy, strategy, and intentions are genuine. There is no free press or independent legislature to call Chinese leaders to account or challenge their public statements. Unlike in democracies, it is much easier for China’s leaders to keep the results of their internal deliberations secret and to control the message that is delivered publicly. Due to the nature of the Chinese political system and Beijing’s propensity for secrecy, it would be folly for any country – let alone the United States, which China clearly views as potential adversary – to take Chinese words at face value. Indeed, in his 2011 book, “A Contest Supremacy,” Aaron Friedberg quite clearly explained the link between transparency and China’s closed political system: “Even if Beijing were suddenly to unleash a flood of information, American analysts would regard it with profound skepticism, scrutinizing it carefully for signs of deception and disinformation. And they would be right to do so; the centralized, tightly controlled Chinese government is far better able to carry off such schemes than its open, divided, and leaky American counterpart.” Nor is it easy for Beijing to trust Washington. While America’s open political system makes it difficult for the United States to pull off any sort of strategic surprise – consider how far ahead of time the Bush administration began preparing the American public for the 2003 invasion of Iraq – China’s leaders believe their U.S. counterparts have already aired their malign intentions in public. Successive American presidents have consistently stated their support for the spread of liberty globally and for the development of democracy in China in particular. One of President Bill Clinton’s main arguments for supporting Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization was that trade with China would, over time, lead to greater political freedom in that country. American leaders cannot trust Chinese leaders because the latter’s long-term designs are difficult to discern and clouded in secrecy. Beijing cannot trust Washington because it believes Washington has already made clear U.S. opposition to the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party, even if America’s ultimate plans for bringing down the CCP are unclear. If Beijing felt so inclined, it could publicize all PLA unit designations down to the platoon level, while Americans cheered China on for increasing transparency. Even then, each country would continue to look at the other through a glass, darkly. For the foreseeable future, true Sino-American trust will remain illusory.

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#debatelikeabear 9China Doesn’t Trust the U.S.: History and differing views of government proveMichael Tai, The Diplomat, 9-15-2015, "The Missing Piece of US-China Relations: Trust," Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-missing-piece-of-us-china-relations-trust/

The Diplomat: In your book, you focus on the role of trust in international relations, arguing that such trust is crucial particularly between rising

and established powers. But is it possible for the U.S. and China to build up trust, given the vast differences between their

political systems and values? The problem lies not so much in differences in political systems and values as in Washington’s notion that no one should challenge U.S. supremacy. Washington applies morality selectively. Indeed, it has no problem befriending states with quite different political systems and values, even corrupt and repressive regimes, as long as they serve American interests. Its foreign policy is guided less by moral norms or the vision of a “shining city upon a hill”

than by the self-interest of an elite class. While claiming to champion democracy and freedom, the U.S. has a history of subverting or overthrowing democratically elected governments (in Indonesia, Iran, Guatemala, Chile,

etc.) who choose not to toe Washington’s line. It uses its power in institutions like the IMF and the World Bank to

advance American corporate interests against those of developing countries. Trust is based upon the record of a person’s words

and deeds. When it comes to trust, history matters. The Chinese government (the Chinese Communist Party) is not without blemish either. Economic experimentation and power struggle during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution led to famine, social upheaval, and the tragic loss of millions of innocent lives. Since market reforms began in 1978, however, China has gone from being a poor, backward country to become the world’s biggest economy. Living standards have risen dramatically but so too have pollution and corruption. These are, one might say, the growing pains of an ancient civilization building in 50 years what took the West, with its vast colonial resources, 500 years. China’s external relations, however, have been guided largely by a doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states,

a principle conceived by India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and China’s first premier, Zhou Enlai, in 1954. The Chinese conduct foreign relations with no reference to political systems, and whereas the U.S. operates hundreds of military bases around the world, there are no Chinese soldiers on foreign soil (except on UN peacekeeping duty) and no history of overthrowing foreign governments.

China has an inherent distrust of diplomacy and western powersJingchao Peng & Njord Wegge (Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan; University of Tromsø) “China's bilateral diplomacy in the Arctic” December 11, 2015 Polar Geography, 2015Vol. 38, No. 3, 233–249 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1088937X.2015.1086445

When analyzing the PRC’s diplomacy, different approaches can be selected. In several accounts, issues of identity and China’s historical experiences are emphasized (Zhu 2013: 16). Such approaches build on the idea that a state’s unique historical

experiences should be given attention in an analysis (Bjola and Kornprobst 2013: 104–105). Taking into account China’s millennium-long dynastic past and its self-image as the ‘Middle Kingdom’ has hence become essential. This is also true of its more recent and modern past where the ‘century of national humiliation’ stands out as a defining period. This century, usually referred to as the period between the Opium War in 1839 until the end of the Sino-Japanese war in 1945, was a

period during which China was dominated by several foreign imperialist powers. It has been argued that the suffering felt by the Chinese people during this period still strongly affects the national psyche and identity, particularly of the elite, and it is a sentiment that influences how the elites of the present day relate to foreign states (Gries 2004; Lanteigne 2013: 35; Wang 2013). Moreover, while Mao defeated the western-backed Chiang Kai-shek in 1949, the communist regime was not recognized by several western powers, including its Asian neighbors such as Japan, for over two decades until 1972. Nor was the communist government of the PRC acknowledged in the UN as a representative of China before 1971.

Mistrust toward the international community and especially the diplomatic system has therefore long been a characteristic feature of the ruling communist party’s perceptions of the international diplomatic environment. Only after the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966– 1976) and the introduction of a new area of reform and opening under Deng Xiaoping has China’s relationship towards the foreign world gradually become normalized (Lanteigne 2013; Liu 2011).

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ENVIRONMENT

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Generic There are differences between the United States and China on how they view climate change deals. Lewis in 11 The State of U.S.-China Relations on Climate Change: Examining the Bilateral and Multilateral Relationship By Joanna Lewis https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Feature%20Article%20The%20State%20of%20U.S.-China%20Relations%20on%20Climate%20Change.pdf China environment series 2010/2011 Assistant Professor, Science, Technology and International Affairs Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University Former Fellow at the Wilson Center( da-7/4/16)

Bilateral talks on climate and energy issues between the United States and China are critically important, not just for addressing climate change but for the future of

the U.S.- China relationship. They may also be crucial to facilitating a multilateral climate agreement that involves both countries. Fundamental differences exist, however, between the United States and China in how they each view the U.S.-China bilateral relationship, and how they see their roles in the multilateral system; and these must be carefully navigated. This became plainly evident in the final months of 2009, when despite a successful summit between Presidents Obama and Hu in

Beijing in November, U.S.-China climate change relations ended on a somewhat sour note in December at the close of the Copenhagen climate change negotiations. This article examines the current state of the U.S.-China relationship on climate change in the wake of the Beijing summit and the Copenhagen negotiations. It begins by recapping each country’s role in contributing to and addressing the climate challenge. To provide insights into the ever evolving climate relationship the article then reviews achievements reached through bilateral agreements

between the United States and China over the past two decades, and assesses future prospects for the program of cooperation. Examination of the chain of events in Copenhagen and their likely repercussions help illuminate how the United States and China found themselves at the epicenter of a complex political negotiation involving around 190-plus countries. Finally, the article offers some ideas about how the United States and China could best use bilateral and multilateral forums to more effectively promote future bilateral climate change cooperation in a way that could be agreeable to both countries, while ensuring the rest of the world benefits from such cooperation.

China says no—mistrust because past energy agreements. Lewis in 11 The State of U.S.-China Relations on Climate Change: Examining the Bilateral and Multilateral Relationship By Joanna Lewis https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Feature%20Article%20The%20State%20of%20U.S.-China%20Relations%20on%20Climate%20Change.pdf China environment series 2010/2011 Assistant Professor, Science, Technology and International Affairs Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University Former Fellow at the Wilson Center (da-7/4/16)

While the list of agreements signed has been well documented by both governments, less attention has been paid to the results of these programs. The level of funding support provided to each initiative is generally also quite difficult to track , in many cases because the

MOUs or initiatives signed were not backed by secure funding commitments. As a result, there has been some skepticism surrounding government agreements for bilateral cooperation that are not accompanied by both high-level political support and dedicated funding commitments. This skepticism has played a role in U.S.-China bilateral relations, and has contributed to some mistrust, or at the very least to reluctance to pursue future cooperation initiatives. The cancellation or downscaling by the United States of several key clean energy projects has led to an understandable skepticism in China on the prospects for stronger longterm cooperation. Recent examples include the two-plus year expiration and eventual renewal of the U.S.-China Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, and the postponement and significant restructuring of the FutureGen project to build, in partnership with China, a commercial-scale advanced generation coal plant with carbon capture and storage.2 It is particularly notable that more U.S.- China bilateral clean energy and climate change agreements were signed in the year 2009 than in any prior year. The fact that the majority of these agreements were signed by the President of each country illustrates political support at the highest level on both sides. Many of the details regarding the implementation of these agreements are yet to be worked out, but real challenges remain, particularly

regarding stable funding resources. The agreements outlining the new China-U.S. Clean Energy Center and the Renewable Energy Partnership, for example, both point to existing funding sources for implementing domestic actions in both countries, with minimal additional funding sources for collaborative projects . While it is clearly important that both sides bring some form of resources to the table, if nothing new is allocated for these agreements, it is unclear how they will result in any deviation from current practices. In addition, if both sides are paying their own way and there is no financial incentive for cooperation, activities must be in the clear interest of both sides or there is little reason for either to come to the table.

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#debatelikeabear 12China says no- multiple reasonsBureaucratic tradition- weak agencies- reforms- fiscal authority- rule of law- legal reformsBaldinger, Pamela & Turner, Jennifer L. (2002). Crouching Suspicions, Hidden Potential: United States Environmental and Energy Cooperation with China. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. (da-7/5/16) https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/146308/Crouching%20Suspicions.pdf DIRECTOR, CHINA ENVIRONMENT FORUM & MANAGER, GLOBAL CHOKE POINT INITIATIVE CHINA ENVIRONMENT FORUM-Jennifer L. Turner

Political and economic factors on the Chinese side also act as hindrances to productive bilateral energy and environmental collaboration. Notably, some of these obstacles and political weaknesses represent areas in which U.S. training and exchanges

could help strengthen China’s ability to protect its environment. • Low priority of environmental protection: Traditionally, the Chinese government has paid lip service to environmental protection and has not given this issue the priority it deserves. A 2001 World Bank study stated that China should be spending much more in this area. Though the Chinese leadership and public are beginning to realize the importance of environmental protection work, the government must clearly prioritize environment and sustainable development activities and grant appropriate status and funding. Equal attention needs to be paid to environmental protection at the provincial and local levels.The United States might be more willing to collaborate with China in the environmental and energy

efficiency spheres if the Chinese government showed greater commitment to environmental protection. • Bureaucratic competition: Internal competition among Chinese agencies to manage natural resources and energy policy not only hinders domestic programs, but also limits the effectiveness of U.S.-China bilateral initiatives . For example, sometimes the

Chinese government has difficulty selecting which agency will lead on bilateral environmental or energy initiatives. Once selected, the lead agency in a bilateral agreement often will not “share” the resources and planning responsibilities with other Chinese agencies, to the frustration of the U.S. agency partners.This intergovernmental

competition within China creates a disincentive to bilateral cooperation. • Weak environmental agencies: Although China’s main environmental agency (SEPA) has been raised to the ministerial level, it remains understaffed and under funded. Local government leaders often ignore lower-level Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs). Similar to EPBs, natural resource management agencies at the local level (such as water and forestry bureaus) also face challenges of getting resources and political support. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), which conducts research on new technologies and helps fund scientific initiatives, is another major agency working on environmental issues. MOST is a much

stronger agency than SEPA, but still must compete with other agencies for resources. • Continuing reforms and government reorganization: Constant reforms and periodic reorganization of Chinese government agencies result in U.S. agencies “losing” their counterpart agency or having to deal with staff changes that might negatively impact cooperation . •

Devolution of economic and fiscal authority:The implementation of environmental policies in China has been complicated by the devolution of economic and fiscal authority to lowerlevel governments, some of which lack the understanding, resources, or desire to fully develop and implement environmental regulations or create mechanisms for fairly solving disputes over natural resources. Local governments not only receive less financial support from the central government than in the past but also are prohibited from offering their own debt instruments to finance environmental infrastructure—even though they increasingly bear the financial burden of providing such infrastructure. The number of potential Chinese partners (at both the central and local levels) for U.S. environmental and energy agencies far exceeds current U.S. spending levels. Notably, the lack of capacity at the local

level to implement environmental policies indicates a promising area for SinoU.S. city-to-city or province-to-state cooperative efforts. • Insufficient rule of law: In the 1980s the Chinese government began to shift China’s economy from a command-economy to one dictated by markets and subject to the rule of law. Increasingly, the government has undertaken reforms to promote the rule of

law throughout all segments of Chinese society. However, legal reforms and infrastructure are far from complete, creating problems for inernational cooperation. For example, without better contract and intellectual property rights protection, U.S. energy and environmental technology firms will be unwilling to transfer technology.The Chinese government has taken steps to improve this situation, and China’s accession to WTO should compel further progress. • Reliance on concessionary financing:The Chinese government receives considerable amounts of concessionary financing for environmental and energy projects from Japan and the European Union, and is also a major recipient of multilateral finance. (See Part III for details) Not surprisingly, the Chinese government has come to rely on—and even to demand—concessionary financing from all developed countries. Ultimately, concessionary financing may not be the best way for China to strengthen its environmental protection and energy efficiency infrastructure, for such financing creates market distortions and does not always guarantee projects receive the best equipment and assistance. Demands for concessionary financing limit the ability of the United States to cooperate with China, since Ex-Im Bank can offer only commercial rates and the United States provides no official development assistance (ODA) to China. • Inexperience with

market tools: Among Chinese environmental and energy regulators there is a lack of experience and understanding on how to use market mechanisms as policy tools. Financial authorities, meanwhile, have little experience with environmental projects and are loathe to grant financial concessions (such as tax breaks).This lack of experience hinders effective implementation of bilateral projects that emphasize free-market mechanisms, such as emissions trading. Some of the above statutory and institutional hindrances in the United States and China not only hinder bilateral governmental cooperation, but also act as barriers for U.S.

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#debatelikeabear 13companies wishing to break into the energy and environmental technology markets in China. The following section explores more fully the commercial opportunities and challenges for U.S. companies

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Climate Change

China is using the promise of reducing emissions in an attempt to remain in economic power but China has no actual intention of living up to that promise.James Delingpole Dec 2015, , "Paris Climate Talks Are Doomed Because China Knows 'Climate Change' Is A Hoax," Breitbart, http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/12/02/paris-climate-talks-doomed-china-knows-climate-change-hoax//da 7-4-2016

“The fact of the matter is that there’s a reason why you have the largest gathering of world leaders probably in world history here in Paris. Everyone else is taking climate change seriously.” Barack Obama. Like a lot of the president’s statements on climate change this isn’t actually true. In fact there are lots and lots of people in the world who know it’s a hoax. And among them, unfortunately, happen to be the ruling elite of the most significant carbon emitting nation of them all: China. We know this because of a devastating report, released today by the Global Warming Policy Foundation, written by one of the West’s leading experts on the Chinese environmental economy, Patricia Adams. Adams, an economist, executive director of Toronto-based Probe International, who has been working with the Chinese environmental movement since

the mid-Eighties, is under absolutely no illusions about China’s real position on “climate change.” China sees it as a brilliant opportunity to fleece the gullible gwailo for as much money as it can, to burnish its international image by making all the right green noises, and to blackmail the West into providing it with free technology. But it has no intention whatsoever of sacrificing economic growth by reducing its carbon dioxide emissions. China knows this. The West either knows this or strongly suspects this. So any agreement reached next week which pretends

otherwise will either be a fudge, a lie, or an outright capitulation by Western negotiators – because China knows what it wants and it isn’t budging , no sirree. Here’s how Adams puts it: China, the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide, is under intense international pressure to reduce its use of fossil fuels. Although China’s leaders aim to reduce the country’s fossil-fuel consumption to 80% of its energy mix by 2030, they will not forsake national economic growth for the supposed global good. This is because China’s Communist Party knows that to stay in power – its highest priority – it must maintain the economic growth rates that have raised the incomes of much of its population and kept opposition at bay. China’s leaders know that GDP growth is tied to fossil- fuel use. So far so disastrous for the COP21 negotiations. But worse is to come, far worse. Obama and other Western leaders like to pretend that China’s appalling air pollution – the “airpocalypse” afflicting major cities which kills at least half a million a year – gives it a strong incentive to reduce its CO2 levels. But in fact the opposite is true. That’s because China understands – as the West pretends not to – that CO2 and “pollution” are very different things. Not only do the goals of reducing carbon emissions and air pollution not reinforce each other, they conflict. Carbon dioxide is a colourless, odourless, tasteless gas that does not harm health. Efforts to reduce it rely on un-proven abatement technologies, and are prohibitively expensive. In contrast, abating air pollutants such as nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide rely on proven technologies and are relatively inexpensive. In fact many greenies in the West secretly welcome China’s pollution because it makes the Chinese population more restive and environmentally conscious. But this is a delusion: even ordinary Chinese know that CO2 is not pollution. The West’s climate change establishment is worried that if Beijing focuses ‘narrowly’ on eliminating the air pollutants that worry the general population, China will entrench cleaner-burning fossil fuels in its economy, costing the West its leverage over China’s energy policies. Yet the Chinese public is unlikely to tolerate a ‘carbon- first’ abatement strategy while it continues to breathe noxious air. Adams comments: “I have never heard of a public protest in China against carbon dioxide emissions. CO2 is a major concern for Western NGOs with offices in Beijing but it’s a non-issue for Chinese citizens and environmentalists at the grassroots.” Also, the measures China wants to take to deal with pollution – “scrubbers” on power plants, for example – will actually increase CO2 because they are more energy-intensive. The solution to this apparently insoluble conflict of interests is very simple. China will be allowed by the Western negotiators to do and say whatever it wants because China has them by the balls and there’s not a damn thing they can do about it. The apparent contradiction between what the West wants and what China’s leadership needs is easily resolved. China’s leadership knows that what China says to the West is more important than what China does, absolving it of the need to make any binding commitment to reduce its carbon dioxide emissions. China also knows that Western leaders’ have no firm expectation of concrete commitments in Paris. Rather, their paramount goal is to maintain face at the Paris talks, which would collapse without China’s presence. Not that we couldn’t have seen this coming. We reported on this a few weeks ago in a piece entitled China shows how much it cares about climate change: with a single upraised finger. Adams’s report is worth reading in full not just because of the fascinating light it casts on the Chinese, their economy, their corruption, their political mindset and the tensions between the populace and the Communist party but also because of the very basic fact it underlines about Paris – and about all future COP negotiations. Where international global warming negotiations are concerned, China – and developing nations like India, which is similarly reluctant to sacrifice economic growth for meaningless green targets – wears the trousers. Even if China believed in keeping to emission targets, which it doesn’t, its officials are so corrupt, uninterested and growth-driven they would never police them. China is leading demands from developing nations that the Western nations pay them $100 billion annually into a climate fund – and after 2020 – contribute 1 percent of their GDP to compensate them for the damage allegedly caused by their years of industrialization. This won’t happen. In return, nor will the developing nations halt or hamper their economic growth for the sake of green flag waving. So it will be stalemate. Any agreement reached in Paris will be meaningless and toothless. And thank goodness for that. Or rather, thank China.

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China says no – internal and external pressures are incompatibleAdams, Patricia, 11-30-2015, " Global Warming Policy Foundation, http://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2015/12/Truth-about-China.pdf//da 7-4-2016

To stay in power, the Chinese Communist Party believes it must appease the public by quickly reducing the country’s deadly smog. To save the planet, the West believes it must persuade China to contain the country’s carbon dioxide emissions. Both parties will claim in Paris that the two goals overlap. And they do, to a point. But in practice,

they strategically conflict. Policies and technologies designed to reduce carbon dioxide face sobering hurdles. Some, such as hydro dams and nuclear power stations, have long lead times. Some, such as carbon markets, hydro, solar and wind, have limited success at achieving carbon dioxide reductions. Others,

such as carbon sequestration plants, are entirely unproven or experimental. Even if the Chinese government can bring all its hoped-for-plans to fruition – something few observers believe likely – in all likelihood, fossil fuel consumption will continue to grow, at least until 2030, when the Chinese leaders say emissions might flatline. In contrast to this time-consuming obstacle course to reduce carbon dioxide using unproven policies and technologies, the route required to combat smog is direct and free of technological unknowns. The abatement technologies are proven and available, if only China had the wherewithal to employ them. As is well understood in China, the West solved the problem of smog

many decades ago through efficiency improvements, replacing dirty fossil fuels with clean ones, as well as introducing smokestack scrubbers. But the West doesn’t want China to tackle its smog without also tackling carbon dioxide: to the extent that China succeeds in reducing its smog – its overriding environmental priority – the West loses its leverage over China.

China skeptical about their role in climate change – won’t follow through Allan10 (Nicole Allan Stanford Law Student and former senior editor at The Atlantic., 3-10-2010, "China's Climate Change Skepticism," Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/03/chinas-climate-change-skepticism/37282/ accessed 7/4/16)

In yet another unnerving sign that China may not be on the same page as other major countries combating climate change, its top climate negotiator said there was still uncertainty about the causes of global warming. "There are still two different viewpoints in the scientific field," said Xie Zhenhua, citing human activities and the scientifically scoffed-at sunspot theory . This is not the first time Xie has revealed his skeptical stance. At a meeting in India in January, he made similar comments about the causes of warming and asked

the UN's climate panel to conduct further research. Xie does not dispute that the climate is changing, however, and said Wednesday that the

consequences of this change are alarming enough that countries should cut emissions anyway. Skepticism from such a key player on the global stage has surprised China's peers. Similar views abound in the U.S., but they have not infiltrated the diplomatic ranks responsible for negotiating climate change tactics at Copenhagen last December and in Cancun this year. China was not the most popular player in Copenhagen (though neither, admittedly, was the U.S.) and was even accused of "sabotaging" the talks. By questioning the science, Xie could be attempting to lay the groundwork for a less stringent global agreement, thus taking the pressure off China's growing, and energy-intensive, industries . Sarah Ladislaw, a senior fellow in energy and national security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, points out that "a lot of what China is going to do in terms of reductions are things that have co-benefits for them in terms of local pollution and technology growth

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#debatelikeabear 16China says no to emissions monitoring provisions Wlody14,(Janet Wlody former contributing writer of the Century Foundation., 6-3-2014, "China’s

Climate Solution," Century Foundation, https://tcf.org/content/commentary/chinas-climate-solution/

accessed 7/4/16)Climate change knows no national boundaries, as made clear by the recent news that Antarctic glaciers will inevitably collapse. It is a global crisis requiring global attention, cooperation, and legislation. Unfortunately our battle against environmental degradation has not been marked historically by a spirit of partnership. Rather, governments point fingers at each others’ legislative efforts, criticizing approaches that seem lax or laws that fall short. As the world’s largest economy, the United States is often central to these politicized quarrels. In 2009, President Obama’s announcement of the Copenhagen climate deal “included remarks that appeared pointed at China’s resistance to mechanisms for monitoring emissions reductions.” The climate deal between five major nations “did not come easily,” President Obama said at the time. Negotiations were tense and rifts particularly deep between developed and developing countries.

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Water pollution China says no, economy profits from pollutionEimer (David Eimer is the China correspondent of the Sunday Telegraph In Beijing, 2-1-2012, "China's

disregard for the environment shows no sign of improving " Telegraph.co.uk,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/environment/9053866/Chinas-disregard-for-the-environment-

shows-no-sign-of-improving.html accessed 7/4/16)

China continues to struggle to balance the demands of growing its economy and lifting more of its 1.3 billion-plus people out of poverty, with

the need to protect what is left of its environment. Decades of loosely-regulated industrialisation has rendered vast swathes of China's land and

waterways toxic. One-third of the Yellow River is not only incapable of supporting marine life but is so deadly it can't be used even for industrial

purposes. The pollution that belches from coal-fired power plants and an ever-increasing number of cars has resulted in air quality in Beijing

and other cities plunging. Fields across the country are contaminated by the discharge from factories, while China's seas are also suffering. The

massive oil spill in the Bohai Sea off the east coast last summer affected an area of 2400 square miles. That's despite an increased recognition

by China's leaders that there is an urgent need to conserve the environment. Every year, a raft of new regulations designed to enhance and

enforce environmental protection are unveiled. The problem is that there is a huge disconnect between central and local governments. In China, local officials are judged first and foremost by their success at improving the GDP of their

regions. And no official seeking promotion wants to shut down a factory that is making money, even if it is spewing out pollution. It is likely that the desire to increase economic output lies behind the failure of the authorities in Guangxi

Province to monitor the metal-producing factories that line the Longjiang River. Worse still, is the possibility that local officials knew cadmium was being discharged but turned a blind eye to it. Until the rewards for

protecting the environment equal those given for boosting provincial economies, it is a scenario that will be repeated again.

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Overfishing Historically, China refuses to back down from environmental fights. Fishing is too important for their economy to back downGwynn Guilford (reporter for Quartz who writes about the US elections, China, and her obsession with the sea. Before joining Quartz, she spent six years in China researching the economy) “China is plundering the planet’s seas—and it’s doing it 12 times more than it’s telling anybody” April 30, 2013 http://qz.com/78803/china-fishing-more-than-its-telling-anybody/

But it’s not just “medicinal” fish. China is catching 12 times more fish in foreign waters than it’s reporting. China is dramatically under-reporting what it’s taking from the world’s seas. The average it told the UN Food and Agriciluture Organization over the last decade was 368,000 tonnes each year. A recent European Parliament report puts that number at 4.6 million tonnes—around 12 times more than what China reported (pdf). Here’s a look at that, with the waters where it says it’s “landing” fish: By far the biggest focus of its extraction is Africa, bringing in 3.1 million tonnes a year from African waters—and up to 2.5 million tonnes of that is likely to be illegal (pdf, p.25). Here’s a look at the geographic breakdown: But this aggressive fishing isn’t because Chinese people are suddenly eating a lot more fish. Though China produces 32% of the world’s fish products, by weight—the most in the world—it only contributes about 25% of global demand (pdf, p.16). In fact, it’s a net exporter of fish and fishery products:That amounted to $13.2 billion—about 4.6 million tonnes—in exports in 2010. That number is growing fast, even relative to its imports. Much of that comes from aquaculture, but it’s hard to tell exactly how much. China already overexploited its own waters years ago (pdf, p.22), and leading scientists (pdf) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation deem China’s data on domestic catches unreliable due to persistent overstatement (pdf). These hazy data invite the question of whether China might be selling at least some of everyone else’s fish back to them. More of a concern, though, is the degree to which that understatement of catches in foreign waters is contributing to overfishing, which is already becoming an acute problem in many seas around the globe. Not that any of this would seem likely to change any time soon. As we’ve seen time and again with air pollution and other environmental issues, when China bumps up against the global commons, it usually doesn’t back down without a fight.

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JUDICIAL REFORM Say no – Fear of regime collapse stops judicial reform effortsReuters, 2015 Reuters In Beijing, 2-25-2015, "China's top court rejects judicial independence as 'erroneous thought'," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/26/chinas-top-court-rejects-judicial-independence-as-erroneous-thought, DA 7-04-2016

China’s top court has urged officials from the ruling Communist party to shun western-style judicial independence and reject “erroneous western thought”, state media has said, as controls over the media, dissent and the

internet are tightened. The comments by China’s supreme court constitute Beijing’s latest attack on western ideology and

are another sign of President Xi Jinping’s conservative political agenda. The party has signalled it will not embark on

political reform despite hopes that Xi, the son of a former liberal-minded vice-premier, might relax tight central controls. A meeting of the supreme court’s party committee on Wednesday said China would draw boundaries with the west’s notion of “judicial independence” and “separation of powers”, the state-run China News Service said. “Resolutely resist the influence of the west’s erroneous thought and mistaken viewpoints,” it said on its

website, citing the meeting. China’s top judge, Zhou Qiang, “stressed the need to unswervingly take the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics”, it said, reiterating Beijing’s stance that it is the best way to govern the world’s most

populous nation. The party has long railed against western values, including concepts like multi-party democracy and

universal human rights. The tenor has become more shrill under Xi, who has urged more “ideological guidance” at universities as well as the study of Marxism. The minister of education said in January that China must keep educational materials that promote “western values” out of its classrooms. Last year the party pledged to speed up legislation to fight corruption and make it tougher for officials to exert control over the judiciary, even as it stressed full control over the courts. Xi has espoused old school Maoism as he seeks to court powerful conservative elements in the party. Like many

officials before him Xi is steeped in the party’s long-held belief that loosening control too quickly, or even at all, could lead to chaos and the break-up of the country.

China says no- wants to be the leaderSino-US.com 16, 7-5-2016, "What to expect from China’s judicial reform in 2016?-Sino-US," No Publication, http://www.sino-us.com/43/20150692692.html (da-7/5/16)

China will set up an international maritime judicial center in its latest bid to protect national sovereignty and maritime rights, according to the SPC work report. “Courts across China shall work to implement the national strategy of building the country into a ‘maritime power’,” said Zhou, “We must resolutely safeguard China's national sovereignty, maritime rights and other core interests, and improve the work of maritime courts and build an international maritime judicial center.” According to Zhou, some 16,000 maritime cases were concluded by Chinese courts last year, the largest number in the world. China is also home to the largest number of maritime courts worldwide, he added. One notable case, Zhou said, involved a Chinese fishing boat Minxiayu 01971 which was damaged in a collision with a Panama-flagged cargo ship in waters off the Diaoyu Islands in September 2014. The owner of the Chinese ship brought the case to Xiamen maritime court in southeastern China which was closed via mediation. The case clearly demonstrated China's jurisdiction over the region, he said.

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#debatelikeabear 20China says no- Western ideals slow the reformStanley Lubman 16, 5-25-2016, "China’s New Law on International NGOs – And Questions about Legal Reform," WSJ, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/05/25/chinas-new-law-on-international-ngos-and-questions-about-legal-reform/ (da-7/5/16) a long-time specialist on Chinese law, is Distinguished Lecturer in Residence (ret.) at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. He is the author of “Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China After Mao” (Stanford University Press, 1999) and editor of “The Evolution of Law Reform in China: An Uncertain Path” (Elgar, 2012).

Judicial reform has been in the works since late 2013, even though harassment and criminal punishment of activists and dissenters continues. The Supreme People’s Court “ Court Reform Plan Outline ” issued in February 2015 aims at “diminishing control over the courts by local party and government officials” and establishing a “hearing-controlled procedural system.” Progress toward these goals would improve system’s operation, professionalism and autonomy in most cases. Judicial reform is a special and limited sphere, but as long as neo-Maoist authoritarianism inhibits reflection and discussion on China’s governance, especially when Western ideas and institutions are positively mentioned, other law-related reforms may be slowed. The major obstacle is that Mao’s legacy and the party’s role in Chinese history cannot be objectively reexamined under the present rule of Xi Jinping. China’s leader today continues to reinforce Mao’s basic distinction between friends and enemies, with no one in between . More fundamentally, columnist Andrew Browne emphasizes the link between Mao and Xi: “Like Mao [Xi] believes in the power not of institutional constraints but of ideology to mold human nature and reform behavior.” As long as Xi insists on the primacy of this adherence to ideology, the neo-Maoism to which he clings will reign supreme over reform. How the new law will be applied for punishing threats to “state security” and “the national interest” can’t be predicted, although the current political atmosphere is not hospitable to foreign thought and practice “contaminated” by the feared Western ideology. Consistent with this attitude, we can expect a continued government posture hostile to INGOs that work on law reform.

China says no- US and China are fundamentally differentStanley Lubman 15, 12-1-2015, "China’s Criminal Law Once Again Used as Political Tool," WSJ, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/12/01/chinas-criminal-law-once-again-used-as-political-tool/ (da-7/5/16) a long-time specialist on Chinese law, is Distinguished Lecturer in Residence (ret.) at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. He is the author of “Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China After Mao” (Stanford University Press, 1999) and editor of “The Evolution of Law Reform in China: An Uncertain Path” (Elgar, 2012).

The treatment of these two men demonstrates the continuing use of authoritarian and arbitrary punishment of alleged sources of social unrest. The use of the courts to punish activists is part of the broader campaign by the party-state to tighten control over society. Its focus on the media is clear: China was ranked 176th out of 180 countries in Reporters Without Borders’ 2015 index of worldwide press freedom. Censorship of the internet has increased: earlier this year of a number of “virtual private networks” (VPNs), which are used to bypass Internet filtering and censorship, were blocked. And in August, nearly 200 people were punished for posting rumors on the Web that “misled society and the public, generated and spread fearful sentiment, and even used the opportunity to maliciously concoct rumors to attack [Communist] Party and national leaders.” The anxiety over control may provide the answer to a question: Why has handling the activists’ cases taken so long? One possible reason is that the party became preoccupied with the threatened collapse of the stock market and other financial problems, and the leadership did not want to risk raising social discontent in a society already beset with anxiety and doubts about prevailing policies. Whatever the cause, the handling of these cases demonstrates China’s use of the courts for purely political purposes.

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#debatelikeabear 21China works around the legal reformStanley Lubman 15, 10-7-2015, "‘Harmonious Demolition’ and Chinese Legal Reform," WSJ, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/10/07/harmonious-demolition-and-chinese-legal-reform/ (da-7/5/16) a long-time specialist on Chinese law, is Distinguished Lecturer in Residence (ret.) at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. He is the author of “Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China After Mao” (Stanford University Press, 1999) and editor of “The Evolution of Law Reform in China: An Uncertain Path” (Elgar, 2012).

Outside the courts, however, the Party-state continues to silence and punish anyone identified as a threat to stability. The use of extra-legal soft repression, a technique of authoritarian power that echoes the Maoist era, has recently been analyzed by two China scholars, Yanhua Deng of the Southwestern University of Finance and Economics and Kevin O’Brien of the

University of California, Berkeley. Based on a sample of cases reported in the Chinese press from 2010 to 2013, the authors describe the methods used to organize social pressure, including the mobilization of government employees to suppress protest and inhibit speech. One prominent example is the oxymoron of “harmonious demolition,” which refers to removal by local governments of houses targeted for sale to developers. When local governments decide to expropriate land occupied by residents, they must obtain their agreement, but the result is often far from harmonious. As the authors detail, if local authorities perceive that residents oppose a proposed taking of the land on which they live, they often prefer to use flexible extra-legal coercion to force residents’ surrender rather than more formal and public

means that might attract media attention. Many times, they arrange a “demolition headquarters” in the county or township involved. Such ad hoc offices are staffed by personnel from local government work units—bureaus, hospitals, schools and, sometimes, state-owned or large collective enterprises. Staff whose relatives live in houses selected for demolition are obvious potential recruits due to the opportunity for the government to use

those family ties as leverage, Deng and O’Brien note. When staff members are reluctant to participate in the conflict, local officials may use public shaming to compel their cooperation. If staff fail to convince residents to surrender, they could be fined or threatened with loss of their year-end bonuses or even loss of their jobs. Confronted by such threats, some staff members may conclude that they have no choice but to pressure their relatives to sign a demolition agreement, while others may quit their jobs, the authors write.

China says no – Xi is shunning erroneous western thoughtReuters, 2015 Reuters In Beijing, 2-25-2015, "China's top court rejects judicial independence as 'erroneous thought'," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/26/chinas-top-court-rejects-judicial-independence-as-erroneous-thought, DA 7-04-2016

China’s top court has urged officials from the ruling Communist party to shun western-style judicial independence and reject “erroneous western thought” , state media has said, as controls over the media, dissent and the internet

are tightened. The comments by China’s supreme court constitute Beijing’s latest attack on western ideology and are another sign of President Xi Jinping’s conservative political agenda. The party has signalled it will not embark on political reform despite

hopes that Xi, the son of a former liberal-minded vice-premier, might relax tight central controls. A meeting of the supreme court’s party committee on Wednesday said China would draw boundaries with the west’s notion of “judicial independence” and “separation of powers”, the state-run China News Service said. “Resolutely resist the influence of the west’s erroneous thought and mistaken viewpoints,” it said on its website, citing the meeting.

China’s top judge, Zhou Qiang, “stressed the need to unswervingly take the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics”, it said, reiterating Beijing’s stance that it is the best way to govern the world’s most populous nation. The party has long railed against western values, including concepts like multi-party democracy and universal human rights. The tenor has become more shrill under Xi, who has urged more “ideological guidance” at universities as well as the study of Marxism. The minister of education said in January that China must keep educational materials that promote “western values” out of its classrooms. Last year the party pledged to speed up legislation to fight corruption and make it tougher for officials to exert control over the judiciary, even as it stressed full control over the courts. Xi has espoused old school Maoism as he seeks to court

powerful conservative elements in the party. Like many officials before him Xi is steeped in the party’s long-held belief that loosening control too quickly, or even at all, could lead to chaos and the break-up of the country.

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#debatelikeabear 22China says no - ‘Rule of law’ is already a priority on President Xi’s agenda. He doesn’t need U.S. interference.Yongnian 2016Zheng Yongnian, Professor and Director of East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, 2-16-2016, "How to Square Xi's 'Rule of Law' Campaign With China's Crackdown on Lawyers," Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/zheng-yongnian/rule-of-law-china-crackdown-lawyers_b_9238644.html, DA 7-04-2016

SINGAPORE — At its fourth plenary session of the 18th congress in October 2014, the Chinese Communist Party leadership passed an ambitious reform plan on the legal system. The party devoted this entire plenary session to discuss “rule of law” — something unprecedented in the history of the party’s plenary sessions. This act was widely interpreted as the Xi Jinping leadership’s determination to build a system of “rule of law” in the country. Indeed, Beijing’s reform initiatives are part of a long-term endeavor to build a system of “rule of law” since the late Deng Xiaoping. When the victims of the lawless Cultural Revolution, such as Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen, became the party’s senior leaders

in the late 1970s they believed that without laws, both the ruler and the ruled could not be protected from the arbitrary behavior of individual leaders. With their efforts, concepts such as “equality before the law,” “the supremacy of the law,” “the rule-of-law-state” and “judicial independence“ began to appear in the party’s official documents, became popular in the discourse of legal development and produced profound and lasting impact on Chinese society over

the years. In 1997, pushed very hard by the reformist leader Qiao Shi, “rule of law” was formally written into the party congress document at the 15th Party Congress. Xi now wants to make it the party’s top priority.

No solvency – even if China says yes, historical roots prevents China from having true political reform. Gives pretty good warrants.Yongnian 2016Zheng Yongnian, Professor and Director of East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, 2-16-2016, "How to Square Xi's 'Rule of Law' Campaign With China's Crackdown on Lawyers," Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/zheng-yongnian/rule-of-law-china-crackdown-lawyers_b_9238644.html, DA 7-04-2016

First, China’s legal reform is constrained greatly by its historical and cultural past. Ancient China’s legal system was characterized as the “Rule of Man” or “Rule by Law” because it was designed for the emperor/ruler to ensure that decrees were faithfully implemented by government officials . The emperor was regarded as the “Son of Heaven” and rules “all

under heaven.” The emperor was not subject to legal restrictions and legalism served as a tool for government efficiency. Furthermore, courts were simply another division of the state bureaucracy and there was no separation between the judiciary and the state.

China never developed an independent judiciary as did its counterparts in the West. The Chinese Communist Party today inherits the legacy of the past and acts like an “organizational emperor.” The CCP as

the organizational emperor connotes that the party is the personification of a modern emperor, in which the party dominates over the state, and the party and state dominate over the society. There are different “technologies of power” by which the CCP exercises in

relation to the state and society such as coercion, bargaining and reciprocity. In order to maintain the party’s supremacy, assimilation of different elements and adoption of diversifying concepts through negotiation and persuasion are plausible. In order to maintain the legitimacy that enables it to remain in power the party responsively adapts to social demands from cleaning up the environment to cracking down on corruption. In this sense, its hegemony is “inclusive.” But there are red lines that can’t be crossed. While contradictions within the party are acceptable, any actions or mobilization that challenge the narrative of party rule will be deemed as subversive and unforgivable, which leads to coercion. China never developed an independent judiciary as did its counterparts in the West. In this sense, the CCP’s crackdown on high-profile attorneys and NGOs resembles the mechanism in Chinese ancient legalism ,

MSDI 2016 Say No File

#debatelikeabear 23embedded in and employed by the CCP, to choke off sources of potential dissent. It is aimed at guaranteeing the party’s domination

over society, and strengthening the organizational emperorship. Second, China’s legal reform still suffers profoundly by Mao’s legacy. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the legal system was severely impaired and abandoned. Law schools were shut down and the legal profession came to a near obliteration during the 1960s. Efforts to rebuild the judiciary and legal profession were resumed after Deng Xiaoping came to power in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but the leadership faced a big problem in recruiting human capital and establishing legal professions. The adversarial relationship between judges, who represent the party, and legal professions, who represent the people and fight for individual right, leads to conflicting

interests and results in collision. Prior to the 1995 Judges’ Law, the admission and legal training of China’s judges and procurators were less stringent. There were no requirements to be a judge except that one had to be a cadre. In the 1980s and 1990s, a large number of demobilized army soldiers with little formal legal background entered into courts. Party cadres from government institutions, usually public security, or party organs, such as the Political-Legal

Committee, have also been recruited as judges. While judges tend to develop a close connection with the party, the CCP exerts

deep influence in the areas of ideology, decision-making and personnel matters. In contrast to judges, lawyers and attorneys undertake a duty to represent his (her) individual clients. In the 1980s, professional services were in high demand to facilitate economic reform. Legal expertise was much in demand in this period. Trained professionals were equipped with critical reasoning and analytical skills to practice

law through better and formal legal training and education. Following the promulgation of Lawyer Law in 1996, not only legal

education has improved; lawyers and legal expertise have gained greater independence and autonomy and were redefined in a “less politically charged way.” When legal practitioners leave the court and go onto the street, resorting to politically sensitive activities, they step on the bottom line of the party. Having received formal education in the legal system and

equipped with Western legal philosophies and ideas, the legal community was instilled with zealous passion and consciousness on liberal democracy. Lawyers and attorneys often go beyond their legal profession to advocate the virtues of democracy, individual right and rule of law, aiming to gradually influence China’s legal culture and push forward its legal reform. The adversarial relationship between judges, who represent the party, and legal professions, who represent the people and fight for individual right, leads to conflicting interests and results in collision. Often, because of undue party interference on the judiciary system, judges who wear two hats resort to political means to deal with legal practitioners. Lawyers who are incapacitated in court thus often resort to championing social

mobilization as an effective method to win appeals and litigation. However, when legal practitioners leave the court and go onto the street, resorting to politically sensitive activities, they step on the bottom line of the party and could be charged in suspicion of “subversion of state power” as exemplified in the recent “709 crackdown.” “Politicalization” is now a widespread phenomenon in China’s legal community. Once legal practitioners leave the court and go on street, they are doomed to be the losers since, at this point, they have transformed a legal battle into a political one. China’s relationship between the state and NGOs has been in a similar dilemma. During China’s modernization process, Chinese society has undergone remarkable changes, spurring the development of NGOs. However, the relationship between NGOs and the state has yet to be institutionalized.

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HUMAN RIGHTS China refuses human rights reforms until United States does the same[Ben Blanchard, Journalist at Reuters, Reuters, "China says U.S. can't slam others on rights when it has racism problems at home|

Reuters," 12/11/16, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-rights-idUSKBN0JP0S820141211]

China's foreign ministry said on Thursday that the United States has no right to confront other countries on their human rights records when it faces problems with racism and mistreatment of prisoners at home. Both U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and U.S. ambassador to China Max Baucus issued statements on Wednesday to mark International Human

Rights Day in which they mentioned cases such as the imprisoned Chinese Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo. Chinese Foreign Ministry

spokesman Hong Lei said it was hypocritical of the United States to do this considering its own poor record, in apparent reference to recent protests over the killings of unarmed black men and a U.S. Senate report on the torture of detainees after the Sept. 11 attacks. "The United States has no right to pose as arbiters and at every turn point their fingers at other countries' human rights as racism and mistreatment of prisoners and other serious problems in the United States are facts now known to all," Hong told a daily news briefing. China and the United States often spar about each other's human rights records, and on Wednesday, Beijing urged Washington to "correct its ways" following the torture report. China's criticism of the United States has come in the same week that a Chinese court handed down sentences of up to eight years in prison to seven students of jailed scholar Ilham Tohti, a member of the Muslim Uighur minority, in the western region of Xinjiang, in a case that has attracted concern in

the West. The United States was ignoring the facts about the great strides China has made to improve human rights, Hong said. "The United States is not looking at the facts and intentionally smearing China's rights situation, exposing even more the U.S. hypocrisy and double standards on the issue of human rights," he added. "We advise the U.S. side to reflect on and correct its own human rights problems and stop their unwarranted attacks on China."

American Hypocrisy prevents negotiations Tom Miles and Stephanie Nebehay, Journalist at Reuters, Reuters, " China blasts U.S. 'rape and murder' at U.N. Human Rights Council| Reuters," 03/10/16, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-rights-un-usa-idUSKCN0WC1VB

China strongly rejected U.S.-led criticism of its human rights record at the U.N. Human Rights Council on Thursday,

saying the United States was hypocritical and guilty of crimes including the rape and murder of civilians. "The U.S. is notorious for prison abuse at Guantanamo prison, its gun violence is rampant, racism is its deep-rooted malaise," Chinese diplomat Fu Cong told the Council, using unusually blunt language. "The United States conducts large-scale extra-territorial eavesdropping, uses drones to attack other countries' innocent civilians, its troops on foreign soil commit rape and murder of local people. It conducts kidnapping overseas and uses black prisons." Fu was responding to a joint statement by the United States and 11 other countries, who criticised China's crackdown on human rights and its detentions of lawyers and activists.

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#debatelikeabear 25China is suspicious of motives behind the push for human rights

Catharin E. Dalpino, Former Brookings Institution Fellos, The Brookings Institution, " Human Rights in China | Brookings Institution," 06/01/99, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/1999/06/china-dalpino

China's seeming intransigence is rooted in more than the regime's determination to maintain political control. Washington and Beijing disagree on issues of both priority and proportion in human rights. American concerns about Chinese human rights include religious and reproductive rights, but the overwhelming focus remains on the right to political expression and activity. In contrast, Beijing gives highest priority to raising the living standards of its citizens, on which the party's popular support now depends. Exacerbating the difference in priorities, some Americans believe China should follow the path of the Soviet bloc in the 1980s, when political change preceded economic reform and led to the collapse of communism. The Chinese government and many ordinary Chinese stress the negative outcomes of that transition: economic chaos in Russia and communal violence in the former Yugoslavia. Some Chinese are also bewildered by the growing emphasis of human rights in U.S.-Chinese relations after the cold war. The U.S.-Chinese rapprochement took place during the last years of the Cultural Revolution, but Washington did not protest the widespread abuses of Maoist rule at that time. By U.S. count, approximately 2,000 political prisoners remain in China, 7 percent of whom were imprisoned during the Tiananmen crackdown. But during the Anti-Rightist campaign of the late 1950s, more than 800,000 Chinese were sentenced to "reform through labor" for political crimes. At the height of the Cultural Revolution, 400,000 people were jailed for political offenses, and one out of every three Chinese inmates was a political prisoner. This problem of proportion puzzles even ordinary Chinese. Although the shift in U.S. policy toward greater priority on rights is found in numerous countries, Beijing regards the heightened U.S. concern for rights as an attempt to undermine Chinese prestige and power in the international community. Suspicions about the underlying motives of U.S. human rights policy are not confined to old-guard ideologues who waged anti-Western campaigns decades ago. They are evidence of a wide vein in the Chinese psyche which has been ambivalent about close relations with the West since the Opium Wars of the 1840s. Many Americans were startled when Peking University students, who had been the standard bearers in Tiananmen Square, probed for the "hidden agenda" behind U.S. human rights policy during President Clinton's address there last year. More significantly, the anti-American demonstrations in the wake of the Belgrade embassy bombing were based in the Chinese university population. Because of the Tiananmen Square movement and the replica of the Statue of Liberty brandished at that time, the American public had been inclined--incorrectly--to view Chinese students as uniformly pro-American.

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#debatelikeabear 26Fundamental disagreements about the nature of human rights makes negotiations inevitableKaiyu Shao, pursuing a Master’s in Science of Global Studies, International School of Social Science at the Lund University, “EU, China, and the Concept of Human Rights: from a Cultural Relativism Perspective”, August 2013, [http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=4001011&fileOId=4001012] (DA 7/4/15)

As demonstrated above, the cultural gap between China and the West is concrete and ingrained. This divergence has led to different interpretation on human rights, and therefore has a significant influence on their human rights practice. Even though the notion of human rights has increasingly appeared in the Chinese discourse, the content of human rights remains obscure to the public. For Chinese, the idea of human rights is seen as an imported good that has no counterpart in either the Chinese tradition or their communist experience. It must be noted that the Chinese adoption of the concept is not to completely copy the Western interpretation and utilization of human rights. Through a process of localization, a unique Chinese human rights view is gradually formed. In this process of localization, culture, as an independent variable, has greatly influenced and even shaped the Chinese view. It has caused significant disagreements among China and the West mainly on two levels, which will be discussed as follow. Even though Western scholars like Donnelly and Talbott have endeavored to distinguish the concept of human rights from human well-being or human dignity (Donnelly, 2003; Talbott, 2010), it has hardly any influence on the Chinese people, who, in most cases, unconsciously deem these concepts as the same thing. Due to the absence of a ‘rights’ tradition, the majority of Chinese find it hard to accept the idea that there are certain rights people are born with. Very often Chinese people attempt to interpret the notion of human rights from their own life experience, and get to a 55 very intuitive and naïve understanding on human rights that it is equal to better lives. What’s more, both the Confucian tradition, which put emphasis on the material well-being of people, and the collective experience of rapid economic development and dramatic improvement of living standards after the Opening-Up, lead Chinese to interpret human rights primarily from an economic perspective, while the political and civil perspectives are tend to be overlooked. This greatly accounts for why even though its human rights record is seen as appalling by the West, the Chinese government could still confidently declare that “the human rights situation in China is in its historical best”—the economy of China is beyond doubts in its best state ever. The disagreement in defining the concept of human rights has directly led to conflicts between the EU and China over human rights issue. As described above, Chinese have never considered the justifiability of the death penalty through a human rights perspective before pressured by the West. Even until now, the majority of the people resist the idea that the death penalty is a violation of human rights. The divergence is even more prominent on the Tibet issue—both the Chinese government and its people refuse to discuss the Tibet issue in the human rights discourse, but rather insist it is all about sovereignty. However, it also needs to be admitted that as China becomes more involved with the international society, and the perception of its citizens are increasingly influenced by the West, the cultural gap on the content of human rights between China and the West is slowly closing. There have already been growing voices calling for complete human rights in China, and the government is facing more domestic pressure for change. Even though the transforming would take a relatively long period, it could be predicted that the discrepancy between the EU and China on the content of human rights is very likely to be reconcilable in the future. Donnelly rebuts the validity of cultural relativism in the discussion of human rights by arguing: 56 “In twenty years of working with issues of cultural relativism, I have developed a simple test that I pose to skeptical audiences45. Which rights in the Universal Declaration, I ask, does your society or culture reject? Rarely has a single full right (other than the right to private property) been rejected” (Donnelly, 2003:94). For him, the logic is straightforward—since the rights currently recognized as human rights are not denied in most cultures, then the universality of human rights are therefore proved. However, this argument is in fact built on the hypothesis that there are no conflicts either among different aspects of human rights, or between human rights and other things that are found desirable by people. However this is not always true. The possible collision between sovereignty and human rights is the most prominent example. The balance between personal freedom and social stability is another trade-off. In every society, even in the West, to guarantee human rights often means to set up a balance between different aspects of rights—priorities are given to

certain rights. The problem is that Europeans and Chinese do not always have the same priorities, resulting in many conflicts. In general, Chinese tend to give priority to collective interests, social stability and economic benefits while the West put more emphases on individual rights, personal freedom, and civil and political rights. Such divergence in priorities directly leads to disagreement on specific human rights issue as demonstrated in Chapter 4. It is felt by Chinese that the European propositions on human rights do not promote human rights, but challenges the well-being of people since it might damage the social order and stability. People are offended by the EU’s position on the Tibet issue, which is seen as a violation to the Chinese sovereignty. After all, due to the culture gap between the EU and China, the union fails to provoke wide sympathy among Chinese

on its standing point. Meanwhile, it should be taken into consideration that due to their historical experience Chinese are extremely sensitive towards external interference in the first place. As a result, the motivation of EU’s solicitude on Chinese human rights situation is seriously doubted. Not only has 45 It refers to the people who hold a skeptical attitude towards the

universality of human rights. 57 the EU’s continuous criticisms on human rights issues leave Chinese with a strong impression that the union is forcing its values on China, but also it is felt that EU is adopting human rights as an excuse to interfere Chinese domestic issues. Adopting a cultural relativist approach, this study has demonstrated that culture, as an independent variable, has considerable influence on the Chinese understanding on human rights. The cultural factor also has significant explaining power in analysis the cause of the EU-China conflict over human rights issue. Compared with the West, the Chinese culture has the following characteristics: firstly, it is more concerned with order and well-being of the society rather than the rights and freedom of individual. Secondly, the Chinese culture tends to deny the absoluteness of rights, but deem it could only be obtained by assuming certain responsibilities. Thirdly, among different aspects of rights, economic right has been given priority over civil and political rights. Lastly,

sovereignty remains the greatest concern of China, and it is believed by the majority of Chinese that the national government rather international institution should settle human rights problems. Through an empirical analysis on the EU and China’s positions on three intensely debated human rights issues, namely the death penalty issue, the Tibet issue, and freedom of expression, this study shows that the cultural characteristics of China greatly account for the disagreements between the EU and China on these issues. Europeans and Chinese have different view on what should be counted as human rights issues. Their priorities for different aspects of human rights are dissimilar. This study does not argue that culture is the only valid factor in analyzing the EU-China disagreement over human rights issues. But it is argued that the cultural gap between Europe and China partly explained the research question that why the EU’s persistent criticism on Chinese human rights situation fails to provoke sympathy among Chinese citizen but leads to antipathy towards the EU’s external human rights policy in China.

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CYBER SECURITY China won’t uphold their side of cooperation.Aisha Chowdhry 16, March 31, 2016 "U.S.-China still at odds on cybersecurity issues," Aisha Chowdhry is a staff writer covering Congress, the State Department, the Department of Veteran Affairs and the Department of Homeland Security. Prior to joining FCW, Chowdhry covered foreign policy for CQ Roll Call. Her overseas work prior to that took her to Pakistan and Afghanistan. She has worked as a correspondent for Reuters based out of Islamabad. Chowdhry has also worked at the CBS affiliate in Washington as a multimedia journalist. She began her career as a freelance reporter for USA Today and covered stories from conflict zones. Her work has appeared in the New York Times, Foreign Policy, and Voice of America, among others. Chowdhry received her masters in broadcast journalism from American University in Washington, D.C. FCW, https://fcw.com/Articles/2016/03/31/obama-xi-cyber.aspx (da-6/8/16)In the fall of 2015, the two countries agreed that they will not "conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors," according to the White House. But it remains to be seen if China has followed through on that promise. "It doesn’t seem like much has really happened since the agreement in September," Sarah Granger, a fellow at the Truman National Security Project, told FCW. "I haven’t seen any evidence of increased arrests in China for 'cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property' outlined in the agreement, even though the idea was for more cooperation on investigating crimes. The number of incidents reported in recent months looks to be similar to those before the agreement, so we have no real evidence of any changes yet." China has been unofficially tagged as the country responsible for the massive Office of Personnel Management hack that compromised the personal information of more than 22 million Americans, including federal employees. "I think China has not let up on cyberattacks, and this is Obama's silent war," Jason Maloni, leader of the data security and privacy team at LEVICK, told FCW. "I think Obama will be pressing them harder to curtail the cyberattacks coming from the region, and that’s just not China -- it's [also] North Korea." Maloni said one of the reasons why it's difficult for China to restrain those activities is because many hackers' livelihoods depend on it. "They are not doing the minimum, and I'm sure that’s what President Obama is going to press Xi on," Maloni said. Rep. Chris Smith (R-N.J.), whose computer and committee networks were hacked by someone traced back to Beijing, told FCW that "not even a little bit" has been done when it comes to the cybersecurity agreement. Smith is a senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and co-chairman of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China.

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#debatelikeabear 28China is more advanced and has no reason to communicate with the USJohn Mcafee 16, 3-23-2016, "JOHN McAFEE: The US should subcontract its cybersecurity to China," Founder of world's first public cyber security company. Has founded four other cybetsecurity companies and now is CEO of Future Tense Central - the world's leading mobile device, corporate network and secure communications company.Business Insider,http://www.businessinsider.com/john-mcafee-us-should-subcontract-cybersecurity-to-china-2016-3

China, by any cybersecurity measures is 20 years ahead of the US . So advanced, that the White House voiced open frustration at our inability to stop or even slow down China’s increasing invasion of our cyberspace. China is not concerned about encryption because it's capable of gathering all inputs prior to encryption and capturing screen shots after data has been decrypted. They don't care what encryption techniques are used. Why should they waste time on the interim communication step? If the American government could grasp this powerful departure from our archaic cybersecurity paradigm, then we might have a chance of survival in this technological world for which we have entirely missed the boat. How does China achieve such dramatic results compared to the US? The answer is through a brilliant application of the foundation upon which digital science rests - mathematics. One of the most powerful tools of intelligence gathering in this new age of digital communications is a nearly forgotten field of mathematics called “Point Set Topology”. I chose this field as my specialty in grad school because it was trivially easy and I was lazy. At the time it had absolutely no practical use, about which I cared little. I was simply enjoying college life for as long as possible, and it's simplicity gave me lots of free time. Topology deals with the relations between and among sets, or collections of things. The things can be anything, fish, buttons, shoelaces, or…People. Let me give you an oversimplified example of how it can be used in intelligence gathering: Imagine that I am a terrorist (not difficult for my detractors within the FBI), and I have a set (collection) of people that I frequently or infrequent call in my phone. If China suspects me it will first plant spyware on my phone that merely transmits the phone numbers of my contacts and the frequency and duration of my calls. Nothing else. The spyware planting is trivial for the Chinese and they can do it from halfway around the world. They then plant the same spyware on the phones of everyone I contact, and then everyone that they contact, and so on down the line until upwards of 100,000 phones or more are infected. Since the software is merely transmitting interactions, each individual phone is minimally impacted and few, ever detect the spyware.

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#debatelikeabear 29After the previous agreement made, analyst agree that it won’t improve cooperation. Doug Bernard 15, 9-25-2015, "US, China Have Dueling Definitions of Cybersecurity," VOA, http://www.voanews.com/content/us-china-cyber-agreeement-finds-little-to-agree-upon/2993431.html (da-6/8/16) Doug Bernard covers cyber-issues for VOA, focusing on Internet privacy, security and censorship circumvention. Previously he edited VOA’s “Digital Frontiers” blog, produced the “Daily Download” webcast and hosted “Talk to America”, for which he won the International Presenter of the Year award from the Association for International Broadcasting

One of the most-anticipated outcomes of the president of China’s recent state visit to the United States was an agreement between the two countries on beefing up cybersecurity and putting a halt to economic espionage. But analysts question whether the deal actually can deliver. In a September 25 ceremony on the White House lawn, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged that China would not participate in cyber espionage. U.S. President Barack Obama announced that both leaders had promised their respective countries’ increased cooperation in fighting corruption, money laundering and terrorist financing online. "This is progress,” Obama said of the agreement, “but I have to insist that our work is not yet done." Yet less than a week after Xi’s departure, James Clapper, the top U.S. intelligence official, appeared to throw cold water on the agreement. When asked at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing whether the framework agreement could prevent Chinese hacking, Clapper gave a one-word answer: “No.” A growing number of analysts are questioning whether the framework is substantive enough to improve cybersecurity cooperation between China and the U.S. – or whether any such agreement is even possible, particularly when it comes to the theft of intellectual property.

China will find a way to work around the cooperation agreementsRichard Bejtlich 15, 9-28-2015, "U.S.-China cybersecurity: To hack, or not to hack?," Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2015/09/28-us-china-hacking-agreement-bejtlich (da-6/8/16) Bejtlich’s research focuses on integrating strategic thought into private sector cyber defense Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence

What does this mean for victims of Chinese hacking? First, consider President Xi’s posture prior to the September 25th press conference. In written answers to questions posed by the Wall Street Journal, President Xi claimed, “The Chinese government does not engage in theft of commercial secrets in any form, nor does it encourage or support Chinese companies to engage in such practices in any way.” Combining this statement with his later declarations, it is possible President Xi is professing that the Chinese government does not hack because he does not consider the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Ministry of State Security, or other organizations conducting hacking operations to be part of his definition of “Chinese government.” Therefore, PLA units such as 61398—revealed by Mandiant as a source of Chinese computer hacking attacks in 2013—will continue to raid American companies since Xi does not count them as government forces.

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#debatelikeabear 30China will not follow through on cybersecurity agreements.Kim R. Holmes, Washington Times, Washingtontimes.com, 9-28-2015, "KIM HOLMES: Xi Jinping’s U.S. ‘engagement’ benefits China with Obama’s approval," Washingtion Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/28/kim-holmes-xi-jinpings-us-engagement-benefits-chin/

Yes, there is something new in the agreement on economic cyberespionage, but even the administration is skeptical of the follow-through. Notwithstanding the new hotlines and high-level “working groups,” serious doubts exist that Mr. Xi will make good on his promises. In addition, nothing was said about stopping China’s cyberespionage attacks against

U.S. government agencies, which some have likened to acts of war. All this adds up to one thing: Whatever minor agreements are reached, the United States is tacitly accepting China’s new definition of “great power relations.” When Mr. Xi says he wants to avoid confrontation, he doesn’t mean he should stop his confrontational behavior. He means the U.S. must not be “confrontational” in opposing his.

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INTERNET FREEDOM China has said before that they should be allowed to treat their internet as they wishTom Banse 15, September 23, 2015, "U.S., China Discuss 'Free And Open Internet,' Mostly Behind Closed Doors," No Publication, http://nwnewsnetwork.org/post/us-china-discuss-free-and-open-internet-mostly-behind-closed-doors (da- 6/16/16)

Software giant Microsoft had several chances Wednesday to impress Chinese leaders with the company's vision of a "free and open" Internet. Chinese and American industry and government executives huddled behind closed doors at Microsoft headquarters for much of the day to talk about how to improve business conditions. Meanwhile, Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived at the Microsoft campus in mid-afternoon, in time to have his picture taken with U.S.-China Internet Industry Forum attendees and tech titans such as Apple CEO Tim Cook, Amazon’s Jeff Bezos, Alibaba’s Jack Ma and Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg. He chatted with Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella and company co-founder Bill Gates before receiving a demonstration of several new gadgets including virtual reality goggles called HoloLens. Xi did not try the glasses on. In brief remarks to a crowd, Xi defended his nation’s technology policies. He said countries should be able to promulgate domestic internet rules “in line with their national realities.” Earlier, Microsoft Executive VP Harry Shum welcomed more than 200 high-tech executives, government regulators and leading academic thinkers from the world's two largest economies to the eighth annual Sino-U.S. internet forum. “Microsoft is committed to being a catalyst for breakthroughs with the potential for global impact on society,” Shum said. “At the heart of this is a free and open internet.” Shum shared the stage with Chinese government minister Lu Wei, commonly referred to as China's internet czar. Minister Lu spoke emphatically about cooperating on issues such as cybersecurity and greater market opening in an effort "to achieve mutual benefit and mutual victory." In the audience were several companies that have had a rough go in China including Facebook and Uber. Only the first hour of the day-long U.S.-China Internet Industry Forum was open to the media. Among the subsequent closed sessions was one devoted to an emerging bilateral challenge, cloud computing and Big Data. In the opening session, Shum brought up the issue of "data residency/data sovereignty," an apparent reference to expected Chinese requirements that foreign companies locate data centers containing information about Chinese citizens on Chinese soil. "Cross-border data flows are so critical to a free and open internet," U.S. Deputy Secretary of Commerce Bruce Andrews said. He added that he hoped to discuss how to keep national security laws "as narrow as possible to not impede the ability of companies to compete and frankly, to collaborate and to work together. We do not want to give new tools to bureaucrats to use to block the entrance of products and services."

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#debatelikeabear 32China sees open internet as a threat to legitimacy.Lindsay in 15 International Security, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Winter 2014/15), pp. 7–47, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00189 © 2015 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Impact of China on Cybersecurity Jon R. Lindsay Fiction and Friction (da-6/15/16) http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3903_pp007-047.pdf

Almost from its inception, the internet fostered hopeful expectations that connectivity might deliver economic and political liberalization for user populations, if not the outright transformation of digital society into a cosmopolitan utopia.19 Economic drag from criminal hacking and information control by governments, however, challenge the techno-libertarian ideal. In particular, state censorship and surveillance target domestic and expatriate dissidents and minority groups, thus posing a digital threat to human rights.20 As China uses the internet more intensively and as the internet becomes increasingly Chinese, the global internet provides a channel for China’s illiberal domestic politics to challenge liberal interests abroad.21 These are important concerns, but they are only part of the picture: state internet control efforts do generate limited threats to civil society, but they can also inadvertently undermine the state’s defense against other types of threats. Economic openness promotes growth, but China sees political openness as a threat to its legitimacy. As President Xi Jinping states, development and security go together like “two wings of a bird and two wheels of an engine,” and therefore “[c]yberspace should be made clean and chipper.”22 In advanced industrial countries, networked computers have enhanced proªt and performance in every sector from manufacturing to transportation, service, entertainment, governance, and public safety.23 Similarly for China, internetenabled supply chains tie its production lines into the global economy while information technology facilitates the modernization of infrastructure and boosts export-led growth.24 Chinese “netizens” (wangmin)—more than600 million users as of 2013—enjoy expanded access to entertainment, shopping, gossip, and news.25 To the degree that civil society exists in China, it does so predominantly online. As a 2010 State Council white paper asserts, however, “China advocates the rational use of technology to curb dissemination of illegal information online.”26 The result is the most sophisticated internet censorship architecture in the world (i.e., “the Great Firewall of China”). The government requires internet service providers to block politically sensitive websites and searches and to employ human censors to remove offending social media posts or guide discussion in more politically acceptable directions. Domestic security services often single out dissidents, domestic and expatriate alike, for more aggressive online harassment and service denial attacks.27 China is the foremost counterexample to the myth that the borderless internet undermines the power of the state.28 Whereas the Western notion of cybersecurity emphasizes technical threats, China places greater weight on ideological threats. The Chinese notion of information security (xinxi anquan), accordingly, includes control of information content as well as, if not more than, technical network security (wangluo anquan) against malware. In 2010 the director of the State Council Information Ofªce and External Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) linked “hostile foreign forces” and subversive “universal values” to internet penetration: “As long as our country’s internet is linked to the global internet, there will be channels and means for all sorts of harmful foreign information to appear on our domestic internet.”29 An authoritative 2013 CCPdirective “on the current state of the ideological sphere” warns more pointedly of “accelerating inªltration of the internet” by “Western anti-China forces and internal ‘dissidents.’”

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#debatelikeabear 33China places high value on control of the internet. Lindsay in 15 International Security, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Winter 2014/15), pp. 7–47, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00189 © 2015 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Impact of China on Cybersecurity Jon R. Lindsay Fiction and Friction (da-6/15/16) http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3903_pp007-047.pdf

China’s prioritization of political control over technical defense also creates incentives for hacking by foreign activists. From a Chinese perspective, state sponsored internet freedom activism undermines Chinese cybersecurity, even as the ideological concept of information security encourages foreign efforts to do so. In a January 2010 speech on internet freedom following a major penetration of Google China, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for the development of “new tools that enable citizens to exercise their rights of free expression by circumventing politically motivated censorship.”41 Between 2008 and 2012, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development provided approximately $100 million for internet freedom initiatives.42 Subversion of the Great Firewall is a major ideological threat for the CCP as well as official U.S. policy. China’s considerable investment in internet control is a signal that the regime places great value on it. Therefore, during a crisis the architecture of control would become a tempting counter value target for Western information operations planners. The disruption of censorship and internet propaganda might encourage CCP paranoia about civil unrest or uncontrollable nationalism. The prospect of the disintegration of the Great Firewall would present the CCP with a dilemma of either accepting reduced ideological control at home or reducing economic connectivity abroad (by unplugging international connections); both options are potentially more costly to the CCP’s legitimacy than is backing down in a limited crisis. At the same time, however, ideological attack could feed CCP fears of “hostile foreign forces” and encourage a stiffening of Chinese resolve in even a minor crisis. These trade-offs deserve further analysis. I mention them here only to highlight how Chinese challenges to human rights online create challenges in cybersecurity for China as well.

China too Paranoid to Allow Internet Rights – knows it means regime collapseJames Mcbride, 4-7-2015, "Media Censorship in China," Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/china/media-censorship-china/p11515

China's constitution affords its citizens freedom of speech and press , but the opacity of Chinese media regulations allows authorities to crack down on news stories by claiming that they expose state secrets and endanger the country. The definition of state secrets in China remains vague, facilitating censorship of any information that authorities deem harmful (PDF) to their political or economic interests. CFR Senior Fellow Elizabeth C. Economy says the Chinese government is in a state of “schizophrenia” about media policy as it “goes back and forth, testing the line, knowing they need press freedom and the information it provides, but worried about opening the door to the type of freedoms that could lead to the regime's downfall.”

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AGRICULTURE China says no to foreign GMO imports – counter to their long term economic strategyDan Harris 8-9-2014, "Hit Us Where It Hurts: China’s Ban on U.S. Agricultural Products Grows," No Publication, [http://www.chinalawblog.com/2014/08/hit-us-where-it-hurts-chinas-ban-on-u-s-agricultural-products-grows.html] Dan Harris is internationally regarded as a leading authority on legal matters related to doing business in China and in other emerging economies in Asia.

U.S. agricultural exports to China have increased by 120% since 2008, to nearly 28.9 billion dollars in 2013. Agriculture now accounts for nearly 24% of US-China trade. Since China’s admittance to the World Trade Organization (WTO), China and the United States have increasingly traded their comparative advantages. Daily, Chinese made iPads, Lenovo computers, Nike sneakers, and other material trappings of American consumerism arrive in U.S. ports, where they are unloaded and then returned filled with U.S. grain products like soybeans and corn. But in November 2013 the system began to break down, as corn exports to China came to a

halt. What caused this halt was the discovery by China’s Inspection and Quarantine Services (CIQS) of an unapproved genetically modified corn varietal called MIR-162 in imported shipments. Import permits began to be denied, and US corn exports to China gradually decreased to nothing. Grain merchandisers and U.S. farmers were horrified, as the fastest growing market for U.S. corn closed its doors. Agribusiness companies and Chinese importers were quick to react, replacing corn grain as the number one U.S. export to China with a corn based ethanol byproduct called

distiller dried grain with solubles (DDGs). For a time it seemed that American grain merchandisers had found a solution to China’s ban on U.S. corn with DDGs, but this “solution” was short-lived. In the spring of this year China stopped returning import permits for DDGs. After months of confusion, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing on July 24 received a short message stating that “U.S. DDGs imports must now be tested at origination for the unapproved gene MIR-162.” In the space of a day, traded corn prices dropped by more than half. Shortly thereafter the USDA issued a statement asserting that there is no reliable, affordable method of testing for MIR-162 in DDGs, nor is there even a regulatory body in the United States with the manpower or funding to conduct such a test, even if one existed. In

other words, what China did on July 24 was to ban importation of all U.S. corn based products. Why did China do this?

Sino-U.S. relations are at one of their lowest point s since before China’s period of great opening up . In light of recent events involving Apple, Microsoft, GSK, Cisco, KFC, Starbucks and many other American businesses in China, it would not be out of bounds to view China’s ban on U.S. corn imports as punishment for worsening relations. The National Grain and Feed Association (NGFA) estimates that China’s ban has cost U.S. farmers and agribusiness firms nearly three billion dollars. U.S. farmers could be hit especially hard during the upcoming year, with larger than average corn yields anticipated, and more new unapproved GMO varietals in the ground. But what is often lost from the punitive argument is the Chinese side of this story. In 2,500 years of historical records, famines were observed in at least one Chinese province every year up until the mid-20th century. While in modern times greetings like, “你吃饭了吗”？, or “have you eaten?” have become a signal of a person’s rural upbringing, they are still indicative of the powerful impact of food insecurity on

Chinese psychology. It is this history that leads China continue to emphasize food security in its annual No. 1 Document, which this year made clear that “China should take good control of its own bowl,” by “intensifying support and protection for [domestic]

agriculture.” There are three parts to China’s food security policy: 1) invest in modern agricultural practices and grain storage capacity; 2) develop local GMO varietals to increase crop yields; and 3) protect local grain farmers. Through investments in modern agricultural practices, total corn production in China has risen rapidly from 165 to 205 million metric tons, a near a 25% increase from 2008 to 2012. China has also built an enormous network of modern computerized grain storage facilities, with nearly 300 million metric tons of storage available. China was a net corn exporter from 2002 to 2006. China knows GMO technology is critical to increasing crop yields, so investment in GMO technology has surged, despite public fears over negative health effects.

Chinese officials are wary of becoming overly reliant on genetically modified seeds from the Western world. Within the last six months eight Chinese Americans and nationals have been arrested on accusations of corporate espionage and theft of American seeds. MIR-162 grain imports may not be allowed into China, but China desperately wants access to the technology that produced the MIR-162 strain. With lower input costs and better technology, world corn prices have been lower than China’s domestic corn prices for years. For this reason, Chinese companies have imported significant amounts of corn. The easiest way for China to protect local farmers is to

force the purchasing of Chinese corn by limiting the amount of foreign corn that enters the Chinese market. Protection for local farmers, fear of reliance on foreign GMOs, and investments in agriculture are all part of China’s broader food security strategy. Banning U.S. corn for food security reasons is probably as strong an argument for why China banned U.S. corn as punishment for worsening relations. With Sino-U.S. relations still very poor, another record corn crop this year in China, as well as Ukrainian, Brazilian, and Argentinian corn imports approved, no matter which reason you favor

for the ban on American corn products, there is little reason to believe China will lift that import ban any time soon . Every day it becomes more likely that only a significant and public response from the United States government, or litigation in the World Trade Organization, will open China back up to US corn product imports.

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PHARMACEUTICALS Counterfeit drugs too important to the economy to be rejectedNatasha Wong, (Natasha Wong is a lawyer from San Diego, California. She is the Executive Director of Chinese Professional Services. She is also serving on the Board of Directors of the Chinese Social Service Center of San Diego and the vice principal of the Chinese School of San Diego. She received her B.A. from the University of California at Berkeley, J.D. from Whittier Law School, and LL.M. from the University of

San Diego. Her education includes studies at Shi-Da University, Taiwan, and at Oxford University, England), (d.a 7-4-16), “Counterfeit Medicine: Is it Curing China?”, Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal, Vol 5, pg. 156-157, http://blog.hawaii.edu/aplpj/files/2011/11/APLPJ_05.1_wong.pdf

Historically, the People’s Republic of China (China) has been a major source of counterfeit goods.2 For many Chinese, counterfeiting is not a foreign or unacceptable reality. 3 In a recent survey in China, 84 percent of the respondents admitted purchasing counterfeit goods.4 To the average Chinese consumer, buying counterfeit “Calvin Clone” jeans might seem innocent enough, but over the last decade, consumers have been purchasing a less innocent and more dangerous, and yet more lucrative,

product—counterfeit medicine. As early as 1998, China’s pharmaceutical industry was already at a booming $22.5 billion and by 2010, China’s pharmaceutical industry is expected to be the fifth largest in the world.5

Because the pharmaceutical industry estimates that there are about 10-15 percent of the circulating drugs are fakes, these counterfeit medications account for about $3 trillion of annual pharmaceutical sales.6

Because of its moneymaking allure, the growth of this trade is not surprising. With a growing migratory population seeking job opportunities across China,7 a growing elderly population, 8 and a government that is notorious for corruption, 9 China is an easy breeding ground for counterfeit medicine manufacturers.

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#debatelikeabear 36China says no- working with Cuba Chen Xieyuan 16, 7-5-2016, "Cuba to Cooperate with China on Biotechnology, Pharmaceuticals," No Publication, http://english.cri.cn/12394/2016/05/03/4161s926348.htm (Da-7/5/16)

Cuba is looking forward to further enhancing strategic cooperation with China in the biotechnology and

pharmaceutical industries. Carlos Manuel Gutierrez Calzado is the president of BioCubaFarma, a global biotechnology and

pharmaceutical group whose main research areas cover vaccines and the prevention, control and survey of cancers, and of

diabetes and its complication. Calzado is scheduled to pay a two-week visit to China starting from May 2. He said he was looking

forward to attracting foreign investors to Cuba to produce biological products. "Everything has so far been going smoothly (in cooperation with China). We believe that it is conducive to strengthening the bilateral relationship and maintaining proper relations. That is the main purpose of our visit." Calzado will hold talks with Chinese officials in the pharmaceutical industry, and visit some enterprises and attend an enterprise forum. He expects that his trip to China could push forward cooperation, technology transfer, technology research and development, investment, and exchange of personnel between research institutes and enterprises of the two countries in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical areas. According to Calzado, there are 100 million people suffering from diabetes in

China and 8 million of them may have diabetic foot complications, with half of those cases being severe. "They have to opt for

amputation. If they use the world's only patented medicine for diabetic foot, produced in Cuba, at least 70 percent of the diabetic

foot patients would be free from amputation." China is the second largest medicine consumption country in the world, promising

huge potential for Cuba.

China says no—increasing restrictions and qualityThe Economist 14Foreign drug firms face a severe profit squeeze Jun 14th 2014 http://www.economist.com/news/business/21604178-foreign-drug-firms-face-severe-profit-squeeze-so-long-easy-money The Economist (da-7/5/16)

One reform aims to remove some perverse incentives in the health system. The peddling of overpriced pills has long lined the pockets of underpaid doctors and padded the profits of underfunded hospitals. Selling drugs to patients at a markup, especially foreign firms’ branded, off-patent ones, provides 40% of Chinese hospitals’ revenues and nearly all their profits. Now, officials are instituting a “zero markup” policy on drugs at hospitals, and cracking down on unnecessary prescriptions. They are pushing to improve the quality of Chinese-made generics, thus taking away the justification for the price premium enjoyed by foreign branded drugs. Even the expansion of state health insurance, which will soon cover nearly everyone in China, is not the good news it seems for drugs firms. The government will become a near-monopsony buyer, and is determined to use the power this brings, as well as explicit price controls, to rein in the cost of all but the most innovative treatments. Another reform that will hit foreign drug firms is President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive. GlaxoSmithKline, a British firm, has been accused by Chinese officials of orchestrating “massive and systemic bribery” to get doctors and hospitals to overpay and overprescribe. The firm, which acknowledges local employees acted outside its “processes and controls”, has suffered a sharp drop in sales in China. With investigations into other foreign firms rumoured to be under way, the freewheeling marketing practices that have propped up the industry’s business model in China surely cannot last.

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#debatelikeabear 37China says no—the two countries are too differentAdam Powell 12, 7-12-2012, "The Changing Role of Pharmaceuticals in China and the United States," Fair Observer, http://www.fairobserver.com/region/north_america/changing-role-pharmaceuticals-china-and-united-states/ (da-7/5/16) Partner and President of Payer+Provider, a consulting firm which uses teams of economists, health services researchers, and physicians to provide precise answers to operational challenges faced by health insurance companies and hospitals.

The way that the United States and China currently spend their healthcare dollars differs sharply. In China, about half of healthcare spending is on pharmaceuticals, while in the United States only 10% is. Both nations are in the process of undergoing healthcare reform. While America is implementing the

Affordable Care Act, aimed at decreasing healthcare utilization, China is implementing its 12th Five-Year Plan, which contains a number of healthcare provisions aimed at increasing healthcare utilization. Given the policies currently being pursued by both nations, it is likely that their pharmaceutical spending patterns will head towards convergence, with Americans spending a relatively larger share on pharmaceuticals, and Chinese spending a relatively smaller share. Historically, the American and Chinese healthcare systems have had somewhat different strengths. The American system has relied on using highly-trained clinicians to provide expensive reactive care to a small percentage of the population, while the Chinese system has relied on using clinicians with wider variation in training to provide care that is more focused on prevention and is more affordable. This dissimilarity in provider infrastructure is one of the causes of the different use of pharmaceuticals in the two countries.

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DENUCLEARIZE NORTH KOREA

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China Says No Too much distrust and lack of consistency doom pressure. China will never push hard enough to cause instabilityShen Dingli (professor and associate dean at Fudan University's Institute of International Studies in Shanghai, China. He has taught international security and China-US relations in both China and the United States) “Acknowledging reality: A pragmatic approach to Pyongyang” June 1, 2016 http://thebulletin.org/north-koreas-nuclear-weapons-what-now

With North Korea having conducted its fourth nuclear test in January, the Korean Peninsula seems more distant than ever from denuclearization. Given this reality, what's the most effective way to approach the nuclear problem? The obstacles to progress are enormous. Pyongyang's inclinations are strongly realist, and the country's leadership sees nuclear deterrence as the ultimate guarantee of security. It will likely continue to see things that way for some time. The North perceives Washington's attitude as essentially realist as well—so Pyongyang is likely betting that US policy toward North Korea will eventually change direction . This is especially true considering that Washington experiences regime change every four or eight years. The North may in fact believe that Washington, once it accepts the nuclear reality on the Korean Peninsula, will ease sanctions. This calculus may make sense. The United States never approved of Israel's possession of nuclear weapons, but it has had to live with the hard reality of a nuclear Israel—and protect Tel Aviv from the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon free zone. Nor does Washington approve of a nuclear India, and indeed it imposed sanctions on New Delhi following India's 1998 nuclear test. But those sanctions were lifted within days of the 9/11 terror attacks. In 2008 the United States even waived its ban on civilian nuclear cooperation with India—a ban it had imposed through the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which it helped create in 1975 precisely to punish India for its "peaceful" nuclear test in 1974. As for Pakistan, the United States designated that country a major non-NATO ally in 2004 in order to gain Islamabad's cooperation in the fight against terrorism—despite Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, President Obama is pursuing normalized relations with Cuba after decades of hostility between Washington and Havana. All this may encourage Pyongyang to believe that Washington will not wait additional decades to normalize relations with North Korea. Meanwhile, China and North Korea have been allies for decades . But China has been cooperating more closely with the United States on sanctions against North Korea, so Pyongyang likely feels betrayed by Beijing. Then again, considering the rising distrust that characterizes Washington and Beijing's relationship, the North may be betting that China will hedge against any future possibility of US reconciliation with the North. North Korea has certainly noted China's insistence that sanctions against Pyongyang must not generate instability on the Peninsula, risk war, or create humanitarian problems. China is simply unwilling, whether Pyongyang has nuclear weapons or not, to see North Korea collapse . This stance would seem to ensure North Korea's survival. In fact, Beijing may be more concerned about Washington's "rebalancing" in Asia than it is about Pyongyang's nuclear program. Beijing and Washington may cooperate on North Korea to some degree, but they don't trust each other, and both sides will hedge their bets . This could well play into North Korea's hands, and compromise the effectiveness of US-China collaboration

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#debatelikeabear 40China won’t push hard enough to be effective because of fear of regime collapseCouncil on Foreign Relations “The China-North Korea Relationship” February 8, 2016 http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097

“North Korea is in a category all its own,” writes the Brookings Institution’s Jonathan Pollack. “The North Korean leadership has thus convinced itself (if not others) that its existence as an autonomous state derives directly from its possession of nuclear weapons.” Though China may be unhappy about North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship, analysts say it will avoid moves that could cause a sudden regime collapse . A Japanese media outlet leaked alleged Chinese military contingency plans in 2014, but Beijing denied the validity of the documents. “It’s clear that the Chinese have enormous leverage over North Korea in many respects,” says Stanford’s Sneider. “But can China actually try to exercise that influence without destabilizing the regime? Probably not .”

China doesn’t trust the United StatesWang Junsheng (Associate Professor and Executive Director, Department of China’s Regional Strategy, National Institute of International Strategy, China Academy of Social Sciences) “The DPRK’s Fourth Nuclear Test and the Situation on the Korean Peninsula” June 2016

One fundamental principle in China’s adoption of sanctions is that sanctions cannot exclude or preempt efforts for dialogue. North Korea’s denuclearization cannot be achieved without easing Pyongyang’s security concerns. For the US and South Korea to insist on denuclearization without addressing North Korea’s security concerns is not only unrealistic but also highly unconstructive. When the American and South Korean approach failed, they then turned to China to pressure and coerce North Korea into unconditionally accepting their demands . From China’s perspective, the sole goal of the American and South Korean strategy seems to be the collapse of the North Korean regime. This is not an agenda that China can or will support . In the case of regime collapse in North Korea, China would be at the front lines in dealing with the crisis, managing border security, refugee inflows, humanitarian concerns, potential loose weapons of mass destruction, as well as other major causes for regional instability. In this sense, China’s implementation of sanctions is a pragmatic move to punish the North Korean government, but within conditions that would not cause internal instability .

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#debatelikeabear 41China is too soft and will never push hard enough to effect North Korean nuclearizationAndrei Nikolaevich Lankov (Russian scholar of Asia and a specialist in Korean studies) “China’s position on North Korea hasn’t changed: Despite sanctions support Beijing’s long-term interests dictate a soft approach” June 08, 2016 https://www.nknews.org/2016/06/chinas-position-on-north-korea-hasnt-changed/

However, whatever made China support Resolution 2270, things are seemingly changing now. Recent reports indicate that China’s initial support for the tough policy is beginning to evaporate . One of the most visual signs was the visit of Ri Su Yong, North Korea’s chief foreign policy specialist, to Beijing . This was the second visit by such a high-level dignitary in the nearly five years of Kim Jong Un’s rule. Remarkably, in Beijing Ri Su Yong got a rather warm welcome and, among other things, was given an audience with Xi Jinping. Admittedly, the audience lasted for a mere 20 minutes. Since their exchanges had to be interpreted, it means that the Chinese leader and the North Korean official had less than 10 minutes to deliver their messages – hardly enough for anything but a rather meaningless interchange of diplomatic niceties. However, the fact that Ri Su Yong got an audience on such a level speaks volumes about the current changes in China’s attitude. This is also indirectly demonstrated by the willingness of the Chinese official press to dedicate space to Ri Su Yong’s visit. At the same time, Chinese officials openly expressed their concerns about the new set of unilateral measures, introduced by President Obama in early June, targeting North Korean financial transactions. On June 2, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson said: “China opposes any country’s unilateral sanctions.” These measures are going to create significant problems for the Chinese banks which, in most cases, act as intermediaries between North Korean companies and the outside world. The new American policy implies that all foreign banks and credit institutions which interact with North Koreans will be banned from dealing with American banks. If this threat is carried out, it will be a serious blow to many Chinese banks. So the Chinese negative reaction is understandable. Finally, we have a Huawei affair: U.S. authorities subpoenaed Huawei, the largest Chinese telecommunication company, over its dealings with Iran and North Korea. All these recent events seemingly show that relations between China and North Korea are going to warm up . Frankly speaking, this is by no means surprising. Actually, it was surprising that the Chinese, however briefly, supported their American hard-liners in dealing with North Korea. There is a hard fact China has to face when it comes to dealing with North Korea: In the long run, stability in the region is more important for Beijing than denuclearization of North Korea. Contrary to what many Western hardliners believe, North Koreans are not going to consider denuclearization if they are merely exposed to outside pressure. The only situation when the North Korean government is likely to start thinking about denuclearization seriously is a situation when it faces an existential threat, when its very survival (not just their well-being!) is endangered. However, such pressure is not what China wants to bring because such pressure is equally likely to destabilize North Korea, thus pushing the northern part of the Korean Peninsula into a state of anarchy or civil war.

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North Korea Says No Nuclearization is foundational to the existence of North Korea. Nothing can change thatNile Bowie (columnist with Russia Today (RT) and a research assistant with the International Movement for a Just World) “When Sanctions Fail, Will the US Concede it Cannot Roll Back North Korea’s Nuclear Program?” March 16, 2016 http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/03/16/when-sanctions-fail-will-the-us-concede-it-cannot-roll-back-n-koreas-nuclear-program/

For North Koreans , the nuclear question is one of ensuring a basic political existence – they believe their nuclear program has staved off an Iraq-style invasion and prevents limited strikes on their military assets. The window has closed on North Korea dismantling its program , especially against the backdrop of foes and even allies who are increasingly hostile to it. While the latest sanctions will further impede the modest growth North Korea has achieved in the last five years and pose an obstacle to the country’s wider development objectives if stringently

implemented, Pyongyang is more likely to accept heavier sanctions as the cost maintaining a nuclear deterrent, the ultimate guarantor of national security. It will eventually become clear that Pyongyang will not yield to being sanctioned or threatened into dismantling its nuclear program . At some point, the United

States will have to concede to what it cannot change: that North Korea is a nuclear state irrespective of whether it has achieved a certain means of delivery.

Only global disarm can persuade North Korea to end its nuclear weapons testingThe Korean Herald “N.K. nuclear envoy says six-party talks are 'dead'” June 22, 2016 http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160622001094

A North Korean nuclear envoy attending a security forum in Beijing said Wednesday that the long-stalled negotiations on the North's nuclear weapons program are "dead ," dashing hope that Pyongyang might change its course on its nuclear ambition. Choe Son-hui , deputy director for North American affairs at North Korea's foreign ministry and the North's deputy chief nuclear envoy, made the remarks during the closed-door forum, according to a diplomatic source who attended the forum. "The six-party talks are dead," Choe was quoted as saying by the source, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the forum was not open to the public. It was not the first time that North Korea, which has conducted four nuclear tests since 2006, said the six-party talks were all but dead. Pyongyang has said the country's nuclear program is not a bargaining chip . However, the remarks by Choe further complicate diplomatic efforts by South Korea, the United States and China to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program . During a question-and-answer session at the forum, Choe reaffirmed that North Korea will not give up its nuclear ambition . "We could not give up our nuclear (weapons program), unless the world gives up nuclear (weapons)," Choe was quoted as saying. Participants at the forum were "frustrated" by the North Korean envoy's remarks, the source said.

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#debatelikeabear 43North Korea and China are both unwilling to negotiate over weapons John Grady (retired as director of communications for the Association of the United States Army) “Panel: North Korea Unwilling to Give Up Nuclear Weapons, Democratize in Ongoing Negotiations” June 3, 2015 https://news.usni.org/2015/06/03/panel-north-korea-unwilling-to-give-up-nuclear-weapons-democratize-in-ongoing-negotiations

Kim Jong Un only wants talks under terms and conditions that don’t require him to democratize or scuttle his nuclear weapons program, a former top security adviser to the Republic of Korea’s president said Wednesday. Speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington think tank, Chun Yung-wo said the North Korean leader is

pursuing a two-track policy — economic development and nuclear armament. “He’s making progress” in both areas despite sanctions levied against the regime over its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs , he said. North Korea is believed to have between 20 to 100 nuclear weapons, a number below Pakistan’s stockpile. It also has been identified as a nation willing to proliferate weapons’ technology — as it tried to do with Syria. Stephen Bosworth, a former senior representative for Korean policy in the State Department, said one reason sanctions have not had made much effect on the regime is that the nation lacks a middle class — the sector of Iran’s population hardest hit by the sanctions imposed on Teheran by the United States — European Union and the United Nations. While there were “two brief periods of success” in 1994 and in 2005 in negotiating with the North Koreans over nuclear weapons, he described the relationship between Washington and Pyongyang as one of “unrelenting failure” with the “principal culprit on the Korean Peninsula [being] North Korea.” In the mid 1990s and 20 years later, Robert Gallucci, former special envoy for nonproliferation in the State Department, said the question U.S. administrations were asking themselves was: “Could we have a relationship with them?… [but] we don’t know what the North Koreans want now” or then but regime survival. For its part the United States dropped the ball when it didn’t follow through for years with North Korea after achieving a basic framework for later negotiations, he said. Later negotiations did take place with Russia, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea also taking part, but they led nowhere. Christopher Hill, who led the negotiations in 2004 as an assistant secretary of State, said, “The problem was [the Bush administration] didn’t replace [the basic framework] with anything” when it came into office. He added before walking away from any future talks the United States “better think in terms of what’s you’re going to replace it with.” After re-engaging the Republic of Korea, Hill said, the first step in the 2004-2005 negotiations with the North Koreans was to “shut down the plutonium program” and then “to keep the door open [for later talks] on uranium enrichment” that could be used in a weapons program. The goal was to “edge people in the right direction.” But in the end, “North Korea never gave us the verification” the United States and others wanted that it was ending its nuclear weapons program. When the Obama administration expressed its interest in new talks, North Korea embarked on a program “to

make sure everyone understood that the United States was the enemy” by testing ballistic missiles and nuclear devices. Two myths surround North Korea, the panelists agreed. They are the regime is going to collapse and that China singlehandedly can change its behavior. While the Chinese “are tougher to North Korea ,” especially when it affects Beijing’s strategic interests, Chun said he “didn’t think they are willing to use the leverage they have to push North Korea to change its behavior. ” While North Korea’s leader has yet to make a state visit to China, Chun said

relations between Seoul and Beijing are improving. Hill said the Chinese now see that the Republic of Korea “can be a good neighbor.” As for imminent collapse , Bosworth said the better approach is to learn “to deal with it as is.”

No de-nuclearization without regime change Zhe Feng (Executive Director of the China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea and a Professor of International Relations at Nanjing University) “What New Approach Should the U.S. and China Take to North Korea?” February 10, 2016

Pyongyang’s imperviousness to diplomatic pressures and economic sanctions stems largely from its regime type—a vicious combination of personality cult, totalitarianism, and a “military first” domestic power structure. Kim Jong-un cares little about the suffering of his people , and instead attempts , as usual, to maintain his grip on power through nuclear desperation . There is little hope that North Korea will abandon its nuclear capability as long as the regime type remains unchanged. In addition, Kim Jong-un asks for international recognition of North Korea as a “nuclear status power,” a status few other powers in the world are willing to concede. “Engagement doves” are confident their path will alter North Korea’s regime type. Perhaps. But how patient are we as Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons pose a serious threat to the region?

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SOUTH CHINA SEA REFORM China says no – rejected it decades agoKim International Security Program research fellow at the Belfer Center and a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University 2016 (Patricia Kim, "Grand bargain or bad idea? US relations with China and Taiwan," International Security, v. 40 #4, Spring 2016, p.178-191)

Even if one were to set aside all of the above concerns, history shows that Glaser’s proposal is infeasible, because Chinese leaders do not see the abrogation of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan as an issue over which they must bargain and offer concessions. For example, President Richard Nixon attempted a similar grand bargain while negotiating the opening of Sino-U.S. relations from 1971 to 1972. At the time, one of the Nixon administration’s greatest concerns was ending the Vietnam War. Beijing’s greatest priority was obtaining U.S. recognition of Taiwan as a part of

the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and securing the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the island.2 Understanding Beijing’s desires, President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger strategized that they would offer to remove U.S. troops in exchange for China’s help in achieving peace with honor in Vietnam. Nixon’s handwritten notes for his historic trip to China demonstrate the bargain he wanted to strike: Taiwan = Vietnam = trade off 1. Your people expect action on Taiwan 2. Our people expect action on VN Neither can act immediately—But both are inevitable—let us not embarrass each other. In preparation for Nixon’s official visit, Kissinger made a secret trip to Beijing in July 1971 and proposed the bargain to the Chinese leadership. In a meeting with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, Kissinger stated that because two-thirds of the U.S. forces in Taiwan were related to American efforts in the Indochina

theater, the withdrawal of those troops would depend on the resolution of the Vietnam War.4 He reasoned that although the United States was sincere in wanting to end the war, several issues— ranging from war reparations to the North Vietnamese government’s refusal to talk with the South Vietnamese government—stood in the way of an “honorable” exit.5 Kissinger implied that China’s help in pressuring its North Vietnamese ally to accept the administration’s peace terms would speed the exit of U.S. troops from Taiwan . Chinese leaders, however, refused to strike such a bargain. In their eyes, Taiwan was a rightful part of the PRC and they did not owe the United States anything in exchange for a withdrawal of U.S. forces from territory they

considered theirs. Zhou, for example, told Kissinger during their July 1971 meeting that attempting to attach conditions to the recognition of China’s sovereignty over Taiwan was as absurd as China questioning U.S. sovereignty over Hawaii or Long Island. He emphasized that the United States should “unreservedly” recognize the PRC’s sovereignty and withdraw all U.S. troops, as this was “the natural logic of the matter.”6 Again when Nixon suggested during his trip to Beijing in February 1972 that ending the war in Vietnam would “help the direction

on Taiwan,”7 Zhou replied subtly that China was willing to “wait a little while,” and that because Taiwan was China’s “internal affair,” Beijing could not “place too much hope on the U.S. and Mr. President to achieve this.”8 Moreover, China continued to

fund North Vietnam’s war efforts in the name of aiding nationalist revolutions abroad. Instead of pressuring its ally, Beijing sent unprecedented amounts of military assistance to North Vietnam between 1971 and 1973.9 China today is much more

confident and ambitious than the China Nixon visited in 1972. There is little reason to believe that Beijing would entertain a bargain similar to the one it rejected decades ago.

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#debatelikeabear 45China says no

Van Jackson, The Diplomat, 8-6-2015, Associate Professor in the College of Security Studies at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and Senior Editor for War on the Rocks, "The Myth of a US-China Grand Bargain," Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-myth-of-a-us-china-grand-bargain/

A number of scholars have tried to advance the well-intentioned proposal that U.S. concessions to China’s many concerns will somehow facilitate a peaceful order

in Asia. While I agree with the sentiment and recognize that there are areas of international life where Sino-U.S. cooperation is essential, the idea that U.S. accommodation of China will produce a peaceful and stable order in Asia isn’t just unrealistic; it’s irresponsible. Though it wasn’t the first, Hugh White’s China Choice was an early and pointed call for the United States to form a “G-2” with China in which the two countries would work together to set the terms of the regional order, requiring that the United States accommodate the demands of a rising China. Jim Steinberg’s and Michael O’Hanlon’s Strategic Reassurance and Resolve reiterates many of White’s points, but with better theoretical grounding. Lyle Goldstein’s Meeting China Halfway argues far more persuasively than many in this lineage, and some of his specific recommendations merit serious consideration—not least because they would incur no great cost to try. But there are equally serious reasons to doubt the transformative ambitions attached to U.S. concessions. The latest salvo in this “America must accommodate China” literature hails from an accomplished political scientist at George Washington University, Charles Glaser, writing in the most recent issue of International Security. Glaser makes the sweeping and somewhat unhelpful claim that military competition is risky and therefore undesirable. As an alternative he suggests that if only the United States would abandon commitments to Taiwan, China would be willing to resolve its territorial

disputes in the East and South China Sea, thereby sidestepping military competition. Prior to around 2008, proposals for U.S. accommodation of a rising China made much more sense, or at least could be taken more seriously. But times have changed. China’s ambitions have changed . And so has its foreign policy behavior. These contextual changes matter for whether and when accommodation can have the desired effect. More to the point though, there are a number of problems with the grand bargain line of argumentation. First, any proposal for a Sino-U.S. solution to regional problems is by definition taking a great power view of Asia that marginalizes the agency and strategic relevance of U.S. allies and the region’s middle powers. In the brief period (five to ten years ago) when a G-2 concept was taken semi-seriously in Washington, allies—especially South Korea and Japan—chafed. The region’s middle powers would be unlikely to simply follow the joint dictates of China and the United States without being part of it, and attempting a G-2 could ironically create a more fragmented order as a result. Including others, at any rate, is antithetical to the concept of a Sino-U.S. G-2 arrangement. As early as the 1960s U.S. officials tried to rely on China to deal with regional issues spanning from North Korea to Vietnam. It was almost always to no avail. Second, and as I’ve

written about extensively elsewhere, Asia is rife with security concerns that have nothing to do with China directly, so any understanding reached with China would leave unresolved many of the region’s latent sources of potential conflict. Sino-U.S. grand bargain proponents forget that China and the United States only have real conflicts of interest by proxy. Every conceivable conflict scenario involves China and some other Asian state—Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, Korea. The United States only becomes part of the picture

because of a commitment to regional order, including its alliance network. Third, as its recent stock market crash makes all too obvious, China remains a “fragile superpower,” to quote Susan Shirk. Many factors in its domestic political situation —corruption, growing wealth disparities, and many forms of civil challenges to government legitimacy— make it an unpredictable player. Nor is China showing meaningful signs of political liberalization. There’s so much brewing underneath the surface in China that dealing with China today as if it were a hegemon tomorrow assumes too

much, and grants China too much credit too soon. Fourth, there’s a defunct theory that’s been smuggled into arguments about changing Chinese behavior through U.S. accommodation. Political scientists call it “neofunctionalism,” a term rarely used these days, even though its spirit is pervasive in grand bargain arguments. Neofunctionalism came about in the 1950s as a failed way to account for and push for European integration. The basic idea involved an assumption that low level and innocuous types of cooperation would “spillover” into still more and better quality cooperation. Comity among nations, it was thought, would be the eventual outcome of mundane socioeconomic interactions. But by the 1970s, the theory had become largely discredited . Nevertheless, echoes of neofunctionalism remain in contemporary claims that properly calibrated restraint, accommodation, or appeasement can have a transformative effect on a relationship.

Ironically, these arguments tend to come from scholars, not policymakers. The idea that the United States can induce China into resolving its East and South China Sea disputes by “giving” it Taiwan reflects precisely this type of expectation, as do calls for the United States to make small concessions to China in hopes that it will enable a more stable situation. None of this means that accommodative gestures or strategies should be outright dismissed. There were numerous periods of detente with the Soviet

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#debatelikeabear 46Union during the Cold War, and that rivalry was much more confrontational. China and the United States, moreover, have a number of overlapping—not just conflicting—interests. I might even go as far as saying that neofunctionalism has a bit of a bad rap; there are times when trivial or non-costly forms of cooperation can lead to greater and deeper cooperation, but political scientists haven’t convincingly figured out

what those conditions are. But grand bargains rarely work. There’s a dangerous naivete in abandoning U.S. commitments on the hope that China will then be more willing to resolve its other disputes . And policies of accommodation will not suspend military competition because that involves more than present day concerns with surveillance overflight missions, territorial disputes, and current political commitments .

Regardless of the policy and crisis management decisions we make today, military competition plays out over years and decades; it relates to force structure investment and doctrinal decisions that can’t be sacrificed for political promises. China’s concerns will only be assuaged when the United States divests of the military force structure that makes it possible to project power globally, uphold its commitments, and bolster the regional order. The U.S. military will be unable to pursue such a course as long as China maintains openly expansionist geopolitical ambitions and a force structure designed to achieve it. Competition, it seems, is the logic of the situation. We ignore that at our own peril.

China claims all of the SCS and doesn’t plan on giving it up anytime soonJohn Pike 2016, (1-27-2016, "South China Sea,", http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/south-china-sea.htm)

Deng Xiaoping said "since we can't solve the South China Sea issue, we can leave it to the next generation which will be smarter." It is impossible to resolve the disputes over the South China Sea to the mutual benefit of all. Hypothetically, the claims of other littoral states could be reconciled by sectoral extensions of the Exclusive Economic Zones [as was done in the Gulf of Guinea]. China's claims cannot be so reconciled, since China claims virtually the entire South China Sea, which it views as internal waters.

China claims most of the South China Sea as either territorial water or Exclusive Economic Zone. China's claims cannot be reconciled with the claims of other states in the South China Sea area. The other states have conflicting claims that can be harmonized, the way there were compromises among the conflicting claims for the Gulf of Guinea in Africa. In the South China Sea, each of the littoral states claims areas that are immediately contiguous to their territorial seas, and it would be possible to "split the difference" on competing claims. But China claims the entirety of the South China Sea, so there is no possibility of compromise with China's position, since it is all or nothing.

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#debatelikeabear 47China has incentives to keep SCS for multiple reasons, doesn’t want to increase US powerHoward W French July 28 2015 teaches at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. His next book, Everything Under the Heavens: Empire, Tribute, and the Future of Chinese Power, will be published in February 2017 Acessed from the Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/28/whats-behind-beijings-drive-control-south-china-sea-hainan

There is no single explanation for why asserting its authority over the South China Sea now matters so much to China. Controlling the many tiny islands is in part a matter of controlling of the wealth assumed to lay beneath the sea in the form of unexploited minerals and oil and gas, not to mention the immense fisheries that exist in these waters. It is in part a matter of increasing the country’s sense of security, by dominating the maritime approaches to its long coast, and securing sea lanes to the open Pacific. It is in part a matter of overcoming historical grievances. And finally, it is about becoming a power at least on par with the US: a goal that Chinese leaders are themselves somewhat coy about, but which is now increasingly entering the public discourse.

China will say No – No matter the Court ruling on the SCS Erik Slavin, 6-30-2016, "Chinese statement rejects any ruling over South China Sea dispute," Stars and Stripes, http://www.stripes.com/news/chinese-statement-rejects-any-ruling-over-south-china-sea-dispute-1.416934

Chinese and Philippine ships have engaged in low-level showdowns at sea over territory and fishing rights. Such actions concern the U.S., which is allied to the Philippines under a defense treaty. It remains unclear how the court will rule on the nine-dash line, but other aspects appear to be in the Philippines’ favor, Paul Gewirtz, constitutional law professor and director of the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale, wrote in a Brookings report in May. One such argument is that Fiery Cross Reef, an artificial island where China has built a military-grade airfield and added self-propelled artillery, doesn’t gain some of the economic and territorial benefits associated with islands and continental shelves. Gewirtz dismissed Beijing’s assertion that the disputes could only be settled privately between it and Manila. “The agreements with the Philippines that China has invoked are vague political statements,” he said. “The arbitration tribunal has already rejected China’s arguments based on this exception, and properly so.” Although China hasn’t agreed to participate in the case, it has issued public position papers the court has considered in its deliberations. China reiterated Thursday it would not consider any ruling from the court as valid. The U.S., which the court considers a member state, disagrees.

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#debatelikeabear 48China will say No – China has invested too much into the SCS Ron Huisken, (adjunct associate professor at the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University) 1-14-2016, "What’s Really Behind China’s Island Building?," National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/whats-really-behind-chinas-island-building-14900

The U.S. Navy and the Australian Air Force have recently been at pains to proclaim certain activities in the South China Sea as pursuant to their right to international freedom of navigation . This new twist on familiar activities stems from China’s spectacular creation of seven new islands in this enclosed sea. The new islands undoubtedly symbolize China’s claim to exclusive privileges in this area, but they also invite a question: when was China’s Politburo persuaded that they needed a shock-and-awe event in the South China Sea to secure a positive outcome, that is, to finally suppress resistance to China’s ‘historical’ claim to the greater part of this sea? The features in the South China Sea—predominantly located in two clusters called the Paracel Islands in the north and the Spratly Islands in the southeast—are too insignificant to have ever naturally attracted permanent inhabitants. Indeed, most of them are below water, permanently or at high tide. As such, they’ve been of keen interest to fishermen and other mariners,

especially from littoral communities, as hazards to avoid or take advantage of as circumstances required. China contends that the first of its imperial dynasties—the Han dynasty, roughly 200 BC to 200 AD—took note of those features and that a mindset of ownership toward the South China Sea emerged over the centuries. In other words, China progressively concluded (or confirmed) that its right to or need for ownership of those features (and/or the

sea space they inhabited) surpassed that of the other littoral communities. That sounds like a rather precious posture, even from our present vantage point, although no evidence survives from those ancient times that China imposed its claim in a manner that made other communities aware that such a claim existed. The years haven’t been kind: the claim looks no more natural or understandable now than it would have two millennia ago. Today, China’s claim is expressed as a dashed line that made its debut in the late 1930s, slipped into circulation by the then Nationalist government. China had at last stepped away from the imperial system in 1911 but its first ‘modern’ government soon found itself in a civil war with the newly-established Chinese Communist Party, to which the Japanese invasion, starting in 1937, was added. This dashed line envelopes some 90 percent of the South China Sea and now takes away most of the exclusive economic zones granted to the other littoral states under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The status of the features within the sea in contemporary legal terms is rather obscure, and the relevance of an imperial attitude toward this body of water by the most distant of the littoral states is, at

the very least, contestable. The People’s Republic of China has nonetheless progressively intensified its campaign to secure acceptance of its claim. It has alternated between phases of inducement and coercion as well as signaling, as it became wealthier, that its capacity to bring pressure to bear was, for all practical purposes, destined to become unlimited. Beijing has had ample opportunity—even since the end of the Cold War focused more attention on those ‘regional’ issues—to assess the costs and risks of its policy settings on the South China Sea. We can infer that, for some considerable time, the occasional policy review concluded that the established instruments of policy implementation—both carrots and sticks, all of which were growing in weight and effectiveness—could be expected to suppress opposition to China’s objectives at an acceptable cost and in an acceptable timeframe. It seems, however, that something happened that shattered political confidence in getting that timely and cost-effective outcome. Something persuaded the Politburo that the parameters of the issue needed a profound shake-up to accelerate progress toward the desired outcome. The Politburo was attracted to a spectacular blizzard of island building as the transformative development. Planning was conducted in complete secrecy. One can assume that the Politburo had to decide what island-building program was neither too small nor too big to achieve its psychological, political and security objectives, and how quickly it had to be put in place to preclude countervailing action. It would also have had to choose which features to transform into islands; decisions that would have been informed by the feasibility of transforming particular features, prospective economic rewards, military considerations stemming from the location of features occupied by other claimants and the full scope of the rights and privileges within its dashed line that China intends, eventually, to claim (but which it has steadfastly declined to

elaborate on thus far). Not long before this development, and possibly even coincident with it, the more strategically-minded within the Party leadership might have lamented that China was now so strongly associated with that claim, had committed so much political capital to it, that failure was no longer an option. It might now be clearer that China’s

proximity and the sheer weight of its activities in and around the South China Sea would have delivered de facto ‘ownership’ but it was too late for this: China had at that point no choice but to press its expansive claim and make it stick.

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#debatelikeabear 49China will never allow free navigation near “their islands” in the SCSAdam Rose, Michael Martina, (M.M. reporter for Reuters, covering politics and trade, A.R. Energy correspondent at Reuters) Reuters, 10-9-2015, (d.a. 7-3-16) "China doesn't want the US to have 'freedom of navigation' near its artificial islands," Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/r-china-says-opposed-to-parties-entering-territorial-waters-2015-10

China claims most of the South China Sea, though Washington has signaled it does not recognize Beijing's territorial claims and

that the U.S. navy will continue to operate wherever international law allows. "We will never allow any country to violate China's territorial waters and airspace in the Spratly Islands, in the name of protecting freedom of navigation and overflight," Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying told a regular news briefing. "We urge the related parties not to take any provocative actions, and genuinely take a responsible stance on regional peace and stability," Hua said in response to a question about possible U.S. patrols. The United States and its allies in Asia, including Japan, have called on Beijing to halt construction on its man-made islands and the issue is central to increasingly tense U.S.-China relations.

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#debatelikeabear 50China says no – doesn’t believe conflict can happen and think it is vital to their economic interest. Zero chance of backing downFrederick Kuo (writer for the diplomat) “Why China Won’t Stop Island Building in the South China Sea” July 2, 2016 http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/why-china-wont-stop-island-building-in-the-south-china-sea/

A cursory analysis of China’s growing trade and investment patterns points to two primary motivations underpinning its South China Sea strategy: China’s commercial ambitions and its relative naval weakness. China’s growing commercial empire, bolstered by trade with Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, possesses one

glaring weak link — that much of its maritime borders are vulnerable to the control of foreign powers. This reality guarantees that tensions in the region will undoubtedly continue to rise, though the chances of full blown conflict remain slim. After two decades of rapid industrialization and economic growth, China has emerged as the world’s largest trading nation, registering a combined volume of over $4.3 trillion dollars in 2015. Chinese outward foreign investment has soared from a trickle ten years ago to nearly $120 billion in 2015. China has become the largest trading partner in Africa, with trade passing $160 billion in 2015. China ranks as the second largest trading partner to Europe, with trade standing near $580 billion annually. Meanwhile, China has also made significant headway in trade and investment into the Middle East and South Asia. In order to consolidate and link its massive and continually expanding commercial empire, China has promoted the strategy of “One Belt, One Road,” a resurrection of the ancient Silk Road. If it succeeds, this project will fundamentally shift the global balance of power in China’s favor, substantially building an infrastructure of trade throughout Eurasia and Africa with all roads ultimately leading to China. With current projected spending surpassing $1.3 trillion, the new Silk Road will link over 60 nations throughout Eurasia and Africa with a combined population of 4.4 billion through a colossal number of infrastructure projects from rail and pipelines to ports and maritime infrastructure. China’s brimming ambition seeks to facilitate the development of cohesive infrastructure linking three continents and uniting them into a trade empire unrivaled in history. China’s One Belt, One Road project is composed of two primary routes. One is a land route that winds through the great Eurasian hinterland linking China with its ancient trading partners in Central Asia and the Middle East and then on to Europe. The other route is the maritime route, which runs through the South China Sea and the Malacca Straits, and onward through the Indian Ocean to Africa and to the Middle East and Europe. China’s rapidly growing commercial empire presents it with immense security challenges. While China has traditionally been a continental power, it has not fielded a great navy since the 15th century when Zheng He’s gargantuan fleet sailed to Africa. In the modern era, China went from defeat at the hands of Western gunboats to imperial collapse and then the chaos of the

Maoist era. Since China is a latecomer to the modern arena of great power politics, it has found its maritime borders to be dominated by foreign powers, from the United States to regional Asian states. This fact leaves China’s colossal investments and trade vulnerable to the whims of foreign navies, a situation which is the cause of anxiety in Beijing. This insecurity has driven China’s substantial focus in modernizing and upgrading its navy, which now boasts of one aircraft carrier, with another currently being built and two more planned in the next decade. In the South China Sea, China’s claims have existed since

at least the Republican era. However, beset by domestic problems, China has been slow to enforce its claims. China’s recent actions reflect a significant increase in investment on the contested islands within its control . These are all part and parcel of

China’s attempts to establish a beachhead of control in order to monitor and protect the trade routes that it increasingly depends on. To put it simply, China’s obsession with building up fortifications in the South China Sea is driven by its fear of losing control over its vital trade routes and thus having its national interests effectively denied by use of naval force. As China moves forward with its ambitious Silk Road project, its sense of urgency has kept pace to make sure it will have the naval infrastructure to protect its commercial interests from the South China Sea to Djibouti, where China has established its first overseas military base. Inarguably, China’s continued development of its naval capabilities in the South China Sea, through which $5.3 trillion of global trade passes each year, has raised the ire of rival claimants to the Spratly and Paracel Islands. China has managed to push both the Philippines and Vietnam into the arms of the United States. The Philippines have signed new pacts with the U.S. navy, upgrading its presence in its military bases, while Obama’s recent visit to Vietnam signaled a new era of cooperation with the lifting of the arms embargo. In addition, American jets continually cross into spheres around China’s artificial islands, which heighten the possibilities of potential conflict. At the same time, a “hot war” with the U.S. navy would be potentially disastrous for China’s economy. Therefore, the likelihood of China taking over the

islands controlled by rival claimants and exacerbating tensions are low. China does not need to take more islands in order to establish effective dominance of the waters. China’s control of this key gateway can be secured by the expansion of its current islands and their increasing fortifications. Therefore, Beijing will likely continue to walk a fine balance where it can incrementally gain the strategic upper hand without letting tensions spill over

into a direct military confrontation. and Clearly, these events ultimately hurt China’s attempts at promoting an image of its “peaceful rise” itself as a partner for development in Southeast Asia. However, despite frayed relationships with the Philippines and Vietnam, and a potentially disastrous military clash with the U.S. navy, there is little doubt that these risks are a price that China is willing to pay in order to establish effective control over vital maritime links to its vast commercial empire beyond the Indian Ocean. Therefore, the region is likely to head towards more tensions before a status quo will be reached.

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SPACE

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General Say No China says No: They don’t need the US’s help technologically and is emboldened by the support their early successes have gained them domesticallyDean Cheng 2014. Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center Asian Studies Center “Prospects for U.S.-China Space Cooperation” Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United States Senate. April 9, 2014 <http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2014/04/prospects-for-us-china--space-cooperation> accessed May 20, 2016

In the case of the PRC, the combination of an opaque Chinese space management structure, a heavy military role in what has been observed, and an asymmetric set of capabilities and interests raise fundamental questions about the potential benefits from cooperation between the two countries in this vital arena. To this end, it is essential to recognize a few key characteristics of China’s space program. First, that China possesses a significant space capability in its own right, and therefore is not necessarily in need of cooperation with the United States. Too often, there is an assumption that the PRC is still in the early stages of space development, and that we are doing them a favor by cooperating with them. Second, that the Chinese space program is closely tied to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), their military. Therefore, any cooperation with the PRC in terms of space must mean interacting, at some level, with the PLA. Third, that the Chinese space program has enjoyed high-level political support, is a source of national pride, and is therefore not likely to be easily swayed or influenced by the United States, or any other foreign actor. These three issues, in combination, suggest that any effort at cooperation between the United States and the PRC will confront serious obstacles, and entail significant risks.

Chinese Space professionals don’t trust American politicians to see the programs to completion and feel American Scientists will only slow them downListner and Johnson-Freese 2014. Michael J. Listner is an attorney and the founder and principal of Space Law and Policy Solutions, a think tank and consultation firm that concentrates on legal and policy matters relating to space security and development. Joan Johnson-Freese is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. “Two Perspectives on U.S.-China Space Cooperation” July 14, 2014. SpaceNews Since 1989 dedicated to covering the business and politics of the global space industry. <http://spacenews.com/41256two-perspectives-on-us-china-space-cooperation/> Accessed May 20, 2016

In terms of the U.S. doing China a favor, Chinese politicians are still interested in the ISS for symbolic reasons, specifically, being accepted as part of the international family of spacefaring nations. But many Chinese space professionals fear that cooperation with the United States would just slow them down. American politicians are viewed as fickle and without the political will to see programs to completion, a view not exclusive to China. Further, other countries, including U.S. allies, regularly work with and sell aerospace technology to China. China has not been isolated.

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#debatelikeabear 53China wants to develop tech independently.Pollpeter et al—no date

China Dream, Space Dream China’s Progress in Space Technologies and Implications for the United States U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Kevin Pollpeter Eric Anderson Jordan Wilson Fan Yang http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20Dream%20Space%20Dream_Report.pdf (da-6/26/16)

A critical part of China’s quest to increase its CNP and become a world power is the ability to develop high technology independently. China’s leadership understands that its growth model based on being the world’s low cost manufacturer is not sustainable over the long term and that it must move up the value chain by being able to manufacture its own high technology products. The importance of technological innovation was highlighted in a June 2014 speech by Xi Jinping in which he urged China’s scientists and engineers to “innovate, innovate, and innovate again.” 31 According to Xi, China “is closer than at any other time in its history of reaching its mighty goal of the rejuvenation of the Chinese people” and that China “must continue by resolutely implementing the strategy of using science and education to rejuvenate the country and innovation to drive development and unswervingly continue on the road of making China into a strong science and technology power.” 32 Drawing on lessons from history, Xi statesthat science and technology are the basis of a strong and prosperous country and that since the sixteenth century every science and technology revolution has influenced the global power structure. Drawing on China’s own history since the end of the Ming Dynasty, Xi states that the strength of a country cannot simply be based on the size of its population or territory and that the reason China “took a beating” between 1839 and 1949 was that it was backwards in science and technology. Xi concludes that China “cannot lag in the competitive arena of science and technology” and must catch up to and eventually surpass the current science and technology leaders by first focusing on core technologies. Consequently, China can only maintain its economic and military security through original innovation and not on relying on “dressing up” foreign technologies into Chinese products.33

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#debatelikeabear 54China and the US are not interested in working with each other in spaceReuters Editorial, 1-2-2011, (d.a 7-4-16) "Analysis: Space: a frontier too far for U.S.-China cooperation," Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-space-idUSTRE7010E520110102

The prospects for cooperation between the United States and China in space are fading even as proponents say working together in the heavens could help build bridges in often-testy relations on Earth. The idea of joint ventures in space, including spacewalks, explorations and

symbolic "feel good" projects, have been floated from time to time by leaders on both sides. Efforts have gone nowhere over the past decade, swamped by economic, diplomatic and security tensions, despite a 2009 attempt by President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, to kick-start the bureaucracies. U.S. domestic politics make the issue unlikely to advance when Obama hosts Hu at the White House on January 19. Washington is at odds with Beijing over its currency policies and huge trade surplus but needs China's help to deter North Korea and Iran's nuclear ambitions and advance global climate and trade talks, among other matters. Hu's state visit will highlight the importance of

expanding cooperation on "bilateral, regional and global issues," the White House said. But space appears to be a frontier too far for now,

partly due to U.S. fears of an inadvertent technology transfer. China may no longer be much interested in any event, reckoning it does not need U.S. expertise for its space program . New obstacles to cooperation have come from the Republicans capturing control of the U.S. House of Representatives in the November 2 congressional elections from Obama's Democrats. Representative Frank Wolf, for instance, is set to take over as chairman of the appropriations subcommittee that funds the U.S. space agency in the House. A China critic and human rights firebrand, the Republican congressman has faulted NASA's chief for meeting leaders of China's Manned Space Engineering Office in October. "As you know, we have serious concerns about the nature and goals of China's space program and strongly oppose any cooperation between NASA and China," Wolf and three fellow Republicans wrote NASA Administrator Charles Bolden on October 15 as he left for China.

Military control of space means China says no. Don’t want to reveal sensitive military tech in spaceKeith B. Richburg (B.A. from the University of Michigan, and a master’s degree in international relations from The London School of

Economics. He was Journalist In Residence at the East-West Center in Honolulu in 1990-91.), 1-23-2011 (d.a. 7-4-16) , "Mistrust stalls U.S.-China space cooperation," The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012104480.html

China's grand ambitions extend literally to the moon, with the country now embarked on a multi-pronged program to establish its own global navigational system, launch a space laboratory and put a Chinese astronaut on the moon within the next decade. The Obama administration views space as ripe territory for cooperation with China. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has called it one of four potential areas of "strategic dialogue," along with cybersecurity, missile defense and nuclear weapons. And President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao vowed after their White House summit last week to "deepen dialogue and exchanges" in the field.

But as China ramps up its space initiatives, the diplomatic talk of cooperation has so far found little traction. The Chinese leadership has shown scant interest in opening up the most sensitive details of its program, much of which is controlled by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). At the same time, Chinese scientists and space officials say that Washington's wariness of China's intentions in space, as well as U.S. bans on some high-technology exports, makes cooperation problematic. For now, the U.S.-China relationship in space appears to mirror the one on Earth - a still-dominant but fading superpower facing a new and ambitious rival, with suspicion on both sides. "What you have are two major powers, both of whom use space for military, civilian and commercial purposes," said Dean Cheng, a researcher with the Washington-based Heritage Foundation and an expert on the Chinese military and space program. NASA's human spaceflight program has been in flux in recent years, fueling particular concern among some U.S. observers about the challenge posed by China's initiatives in that area. There is "a lot of very wary, careful, mutual watching," Cheng said. Song Xiaojun, a military expert and commentator on China's CCTV, said that substantial cooperation in the space field is impossible without mutual trust. Achieving that, he said, "depends on whether the U.S. can put away its pride and treat China as a partner to cooperate on equal terms. But I don't see that happening in the near future, since the U.S. is experiencing menopause while China is going through puberty." But while China may still be an adolescent in terms of space exploration - launching its first astronaut in 2003 - it has made some notable strides in recent months and years, and plans seem on track for some major breakthroughs. On the day Hu left for his U.S. trip, Chinese news media reported the inauguration of a new program to train astronauts - called taikonauts here - for eventual deployment to the first Chinese space station, planned for 2015. As part of the project, two launches are planned for this year, that of an unmanned space module, called Tiangong-1, or "Heavenly Palace," by summer, and later an unmanned Shenzhou spacecraft that will attempt to dock with it. On a separate track, China is also working through a three-stage process for carrying out its first manned moon landing. The first stage was completed in October with the successful launch of a Chang'e-2 lunar orbiter. In 2012 or 2013, an unmanned landing craft is scheduled to take a rover to the moon to collect rock and soil samples. By 2020, according to the plan, a taikonaut could land on the moon.

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Human Space Flight China would prefer to keep working alone, they don’t see what the US brings to the tablePhil McKenna, Staff Writer, New Scientist. “Red Star Rising.” 2/15/2014, New Scientist Vol. 221 Issue 2956, p.42-45. Accessed June 6, 2016.

And even as China is busy developing its capacity in space, the abilities of existing space powers are on the wane. "It is not clear that the United States' rate of technological improvement will continue as you look 10 to 20 year out into the future," McDowell says. He cites budget cuts, political gridlock, and failing educational systems. Much existing US and European space infrastructure is also ageing. To hedge its bets, ESA is now positioning itself to partner with China in human space flight. "We have currently three or four astronauts and astronaut trainers who are in language training," says ESA's human spaceflight director Thomas Reiter. "We are taking steps to intensify our links with the Chinese Space Agency." But what's in it for China? After decades of being shut out of collaboration, Cheng says China may be at a point where it would prefer to continue going it alone. "It's not at all a given that China wants to cooperate with us. Given the US hiatus on manned space flight, it's not at all clear what we would bring to the table," he says. Collaboration with Russia may be equally unattractive. In 2011, Russia launched a Chinese space probe to Mars as part of its Phobus-Grunt mission, but the Russian spacecraft never made it out of Earth's orbit. "From the Chinese perspective, it was a high-visibility, high-prestige project that failed because of the Russians," Cheng says.

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International Space Station/Cooperative Ventures

China says no to the plan, 3 reasons: leery of engagement with the US, lack of Civil-Military engagement within China, prefers secrecy Michael Krepon 2016. Co-Founder of the Stimson Center. He worked previously at the Carnegie Endowment, the State Department, and on Capitol Hill. “Waiting for Trouble” SpaceNews Since 1989 dedicated to covering the business and politics of the global space industry. March 31, 2014. <http://spacenews.com/40055waiting-for-trouble/> Accessed May 18, 2016.

The superpower competition in space included intense chapters but was moderated by cooperation, most symbolically in the 1975 docking of the Apollo and Soyuz spacecraft and on the international space station. Cooperation in space between the United States and China is minimal in part because Beijing is leery of engagement, and in part because Congress has forbidden NASA from bilateral engagement with Chinese counterparts. There is an ongoing strategic and economic dialogue, but space issues do not figure in these talks. After several close calls at sea, Washington and Moscow negotiated the Incidents at Sea Agreement in 1972. A companion agreement was negotiated in 1989 to prevent escalation arising from dangerous military practices involving ground and air forces operating in close proximity. These codes of conduct didn’t stop competitive practices or the potential for crises, but they provided mechanisms to prevent incidents from spiraling out of control. China isn’t a party to incidents at sea agreements. Both bilateral and regional agreements are worth pursuing, but the Obama administration hasn’t championed them and China’s leadership is leery of codes of conduct. If the United States and China clash, it will most likely be in a global commons. China’s leaders have not dealt with incidents at sea, and no one has experience in managing the escalatory potential of space and cyber warfare. One prerequisite of successful crisis prevention and management is close coordination between civil and military leaders on national security issues. The notion of a National Security Council, where government leaders confer with senior Cabinet officers and military leaders, is alien to China, where the party rules. A National Security Council-type body is just now being set up within the Politburo. The absence of coordination was apparent when the PLA tested an anti-satellite weapon in 2007, creating a debris field endangering China’s own and 200 other satellites and all human spaceflight. After this test, China’s Foreign Ministry was silent for two weeks. The PLA views secrecy as an asset while playing catch-up with the United States. It is as wary of interaction with the U.S. military as the Soviet General Staff was at the outset of nuclear negotiations in 1969.

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#debatelikeabear 58China will only cooperate with the US if we have robust space policy, which we lackLeonard David 2013. Reporter on space activities for nearly 50 years. He is the 2010 winner of the prestigious National Space Club Press Award “Security Fears Impede U.S. Space Cooperation with Rising China” December 2, 2013. SpaceNews Since 1989 dedicated to covering the business and politics of the global space industry. <http://spacenews.com/38450security-fears-impede-us-space-cooperation-with-rising-china/> accessed May 20, 2016

Seven years ago this fall, Mike Griffin led NASA’s first high-level delegation to China. Upon his return, Griffin — who had become NASA administrator the previous year — said he had learned a lot during his five-day trip but that human spaceflight cooperation would have to wait until there was more openness and trust between the United States and China. “My thought back then is the same as it is now. The Chinese are obviously intending to have a fully loaded space program,” Griffin told SpaceNews in September. “[T]hough their tone toward us is certainly adversarial, that should not deter efforts on our part to cooperate with them in space.” The United States and the Soviet Union were Cold War adversaries looking for a thaw when the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project culminated in 1975 with the first international handshake in space through the open hatch of the two docked spacecraft. Twenty years later, the Shuttle-Mir program saw NASA astronauts and Russian cosmonauts working side by side in space, setting the stage for the international space station (ISS) in orbit today. Griffin said what worked for the United States and Russia could work with China. “But — and this is a key ‘but’ — China will not cooperate with us because they think we’re such good guys,” Griffin said. “They will want to do so if, and only if, we have a space program sufficiently grand in its scope and goals that it is clearly in their interest to work with us. Right now, we have little to offer. … We have no sensible overarching civil space policy, no grand goals, no compelling plans. Why would they want to work with us?”

China has no need to engage the US on space, it will only lead to mutual backlashJordan Foley 2014. Naval Liaison to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory’s Space Systems Analysis Group “A New Look at Cooperation on the Chinese Space Station” SpaceNews Since 1989 dedicated to covering the business and politics of the global space industry. June 9, 2014. <http://spacenews.com/40852a-new-look-at-cooperation-on-the-chinese-space-station/> Accessed May 20, 2016

Military control of China’s space program and related transparency issues make Sino-U.S. cooperation difficult. Other factors play into the lack of bilateral exchanges, but China could take steps to appear to improve its image internationally while not sacrificing much in terms of revealing sensitive information. In fact, cooperating with the United States on CSS might do more harm than good for China. There is no precedent for high-technology space cooperation between the two countries and the mere act of cooperating would cause significant backlash in both. In the near future, China would be better off pursuing agreements with the United Nations.

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#debatelikeabear 59No chance China cooperates in Space. Dominance, tech coop failures, and no financial needDean Cheng 2014. Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center Asian Studies Center “Prospects for U.S.-China Space Cooperation” Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United States Senate. April 9, 2014 <http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2014/04/prospects-for-us-china--space-cooperation> accessed May 20, 2016

Moreover, in keeping with the Chinese memory of the “Century of Humiliation,” Beijing will want any cooperative venture to be, at a minimum, on a co-equal basis. For the PRC to be treated as anything other than a full member in any program or effort would smack of the “unequal treaties” that marked China’s interactions with the rest of the world between 1839 and 1949. For the same reason, China has generally been reluctant to join any organization or regime in which it was not party to negotiating. For the CCP, whose political legitimacy rests, in part, on the idea that it has restored Chinese pride and greatness, this is likely to be a significant part of any calculation. At the same time, space is now a sector that enjoys significant political support within the Chinese political system. Based on their writings, the PLA is clearly intent upon developing the ability to establish “space dominance,” in order to fight and win “local wars under informationized conditions.”[8] The two SOEs are seen as key parts of the larger military-industrial complex, providing the opportunities to expose a large workforce to such areas as systems engineering and systems integration. It is no accident that China’s commercial airliner development effort tapped the top leadership of China’s aerospace corporations for managerial and design talent.[9] From a bureaucratic perspective, this is a powerful lobby, intent on preserving its interests. China’s space efforts should therefore be seen as political, as much as military or economic, statements, directed at both domestic and foreign audiences. Insofar as the PRC has scored major achievements in space, these reflect positively on both China’s growing power and respect (internationally) and the CCP’s legitimacy (internally). Efforts at inducing Chinese cooperation in space, then, are likely to be viewed in terms of whether they promote one or both objectives. As China has progressed to the point of being the world’s second-largest economy (in gross domestic product terms), it becomes less clear as to why China would necessarily want to cooperate with other countries on anything other than its own terms. Prospects for Cooperation Within this context, then, the prospects for meaningful cooperation with the PRC in the area of space would seem to be extremely limited. China’s past experience of major high-technology cooperative ventures (Sino–Soviet cooperation in the 1950s, U.S.–China cooperation in the 1980s until Tiananmen, and Sino–European space cooperation on the Galileo satellite program) is an unhappy one, at best. The failure of the joint Russian–Chinese Phobos–Grunt mission is likely seen in Beijing as further evidence that a “go-it-alone” approach is preferable. Nor is it clear that, bureaucratically, there is significant interest from key players such as the PLA or the military industrial complex in expanding cooperation.[10] Moreover, as long as China’s economy continues to expand, and the top political leadership values space efforts, there is little prospect of a reduction in space expenditures—making international cooperation far less urgent for the PRC than most other spacefaring states.

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#debatelikeabear 60Including the US in Chinese space ventures will be seen as unnecessary unless the Chinese set the terms for engagementJordan Foley 2014. Naval Liaison to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory’s Space Systems Analysis Group “A New Look at Cooperation on the Chinese Space Station” SpaceNews Since 1989 dedicated to covering the business and politics of the global space industry. June 9, 2014. <http://spacenews.com/40852a-new-look-at-cooperation-on-the-chinese-space-station/> Accessed May 20, 2016

As for Sino-U.S. cooperation on CSS, it is not that the United States will receive the same exclusionary treatment it gave to China, but rather U.S. inclusion at this time might not be worth the effort for either side. Of course, China would be open and willing to cooperate with the United States, but the most realistic depiction of a cooperative framework on CSS in the 2020s does not include the major space powers on the same space station. CSS will remain a China-led regional platform for cooperation during its time in orbit. Incremental steps toward cooperating bilaterally can be made between the two spacefaring nations in the meantime, but China has no dire need to include the United States on this specific project. There are many forms of cooperation, and CSS remains flexible enough to accommodate the United States if there is a change of heart in the next decade. However, China can achieve its strategic goals of operating an international space research platform without U.S. involvement. When the time finally comes for the decommissioning of ISS, China will own the only operating space station, so the question becomes: Why would it include the U.S. on anything but Chinese terms?

China doesn’t want to join ISS.Chen Lan, independent Chinese space analyst, 3-14-2016, "The Space Review: One track, two stations: A proposal for cooperation on the ISS and the Chinese Space Station," No Publication, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2944/1

It is too late now. The Chinese government approved the Chinese Space Station (CSS) plan in 2010. Five years later, the design has been frozen, hardware development is in full swing, and supporting projects like new launchers and launch site are near completion. There is less than three years until the 2018 launch of the core module. Also, China has a very good track record in executing its long-term space plan. Abandoning the current plan or significantly changing it means not only a great loss of all that has been invested, but also a major shift in the course of the long-term plan. It would cost too much. If it had happened 15 years, or even 10 years ago when the CSS was still in its conceptual phase and China’s long -term station plan still just an outline, it would have been very welcomed by the Chinese side. In fact, China expressed a willingness to join ISS many times during those days, but all those attempts were rejected by the US side. China must have concerns about its independence and the planned retirement of the ISS in 2024 or maybe 2028. It would be too risky to bind China’s future human spaceflight activities with the ISS. Russia’s plan to separate its segment from the ISS, and the problems caused by the Ukraine crisis, also reminds the Chinese not to repeat Russia’s path. There are potential conflicts of interest, global or regional, between China and the US, and China may face a similar or more serious situation than Russia is facing today. The US, specifically the US Congress, is always the main obstacle for China to join the ISS, and there is no sign that the situation will change in the near future. As long as China continues to grow in its current direction, members of Congress will not change their minds. ESA may be able to influence NASA, but not Congress.

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BIT China says no – concerned about FRB rate hikesReuters, Jun 5, 2016,

Reuters, 6-5-2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/r-chinas-xi-says-important-to-conclude-investment-treaty-with-us-2016-6, "China's Xi says important to conclude investment treaty with U.S.," Business Insider, Acc 6-28-2016

Lew also urged China to remain clear in its communications about foreign exchange policy and implementation.

"A market-determined exchange rate with two-way flexibility will help foster a more efficient allocation of capital," he said. Lew said earlier he hoped the two countries would make progress on market access issues as well as the problem of excess industrial capacity in China during this

week's talks. Wang highlighted the difficulties arising from the rising interest-rate trend in the United States .

"Expectations on interest rate rises by the U.S. Federal Reserve have increased uncertainties on economic growth of emerging market economies," Wang said.

China believes that the United States seeks to bring down their influence, harm their interest and pose threats – leads them to reject the plan Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, “How China Sees America – The Sum of Beijing’s Fears”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5 (SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2012), pp. 32-47, Published by Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41720859

Most Americans would be surprised to learn the degree to which the Chinese believe the United States is a revisionist power that seeks to curtail China's political influence and harm China's interests. This view is shaped not only by Beijing's understanding of Washington but also by the broader Chinese view of the international system and China's place in it, a view determined in large part by Chinas acute sense of its own vulnerability The world as seen from Beijing is a terrain of hazards, beginning with the streets outside the policymaker's window, to land borders and sea-lanes thousands of miles away, to the mines and oil fields of distant continents. These threats can be described in four concentric rings. In the first ring, the entire territory that China administers or claims, Beijing believes that China's political stability and territorial integrity are threatened by foreign actors and forces. Compared with other large countries, China must deal with an unparalleled number of outside actors trying to influence its evolution, often in ways the regime considers detrimental to its survival. Foreign investor Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell development advisers, tourists, and students swarm the country, all with their own ideas about how China should change. Foreign foundations and governments give financial and technical support to Chinese groups promoting civil society. Dissidents in Tibet and Xinjiang receive moral and diplomatic support and sometimes material assistance from ethnic diasporas and sympathetic governments abroad. Along the coast, neighbors contest maritime territories that Beijing claims. Taiwan is ruled by its own government, which enjoys diplomatic recognition from 23 states and a security guarantee from the United States. At China's borders, policymakers face a second ring of security concerns, involving China's relations with 14 adjacent countries. No other country except Russia has as many contiguous neighbors. They include five countries with which China has fought wars in the past 70 years (India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and Vietnam) and a number of states ruled by unstable regimes. None of China's neighbors perceives its core national interests as congruent with Beijing's. But China seldom has the luxury of dealing with any of its neigh- bors in a purely bilateral context. The third ring of Chinese security concerns consists of the politics of the six distinct geopolitical re- gions that surround China: Northeast Asia, Oceania, continental Southeast Asia, maritime Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia. Each of these areas presents complex regional diplomatic and security problems. Finally, there is the fourth ring: the world far beyond China's immediate neighborhood. China has truly entered this farthest circle only since the late 1990s and so far for limited purposes: to secure sources of commodities, such as petroleum; to gain access to markets and investments; to get diplomatic support for isolating Taiwan and Tibet's Dalai Lama; and to recruit allies for China's positions on international norms and legal regimes.

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#debatelikeabear 63China sees that the United states will do anything to stay in power and will drive away because of this.Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, “How China Sees America – The Sum of Beijing’s Fears”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5 (SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2012), pp. 32-47, Published by Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41720859

Whether they see the United States primarily through a culturalist, Marxist, or realist lens, most Chinese strategists assume that a country as powerful as the United States will use its power to preserve and enhance its privileges and will treat efforts by other countries to protect their interests as threats to its own security. This assumption leads to a pessimistic conclusion: as China rises, the United States will resist. The United States uses soothing words; casts its actions as a search for peace, human rights, and a level playing field; and sometimes offers China genuine assistance. But the United States is two-faced. It intends to remain the global hegemon and prevent China from growing strong enough to challenge it. In a 2011 interview with Liaowang, a state-run Chinese newsmagazine, Ni Feng, the deputy director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of American Studies, summed up this view. "On the one hand, the United States realizes that it needs China's help on many regional and global issues," he said. "On the other hand, the United States is worried about a more powerful China and uses multiple means to delay its development and to remake China with U.S. values.

China’s BIT History Shows Cheating Amos Irwin, May 2014 A Research assistant at the Global Development And Environment Institute at Tufts

University, “Crossing the Ocean By Feeling For the BITs: Investor-State Arbitration in China’s Bilateral Investment Treaties”, http://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2014/11/China%E2%80%99s-Bilateral-Investment-Treaties-Working-Paper.pdf

Although China began to sign bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in the 1970s, it refused to grant foreign investors the right to sue their host government in international arbitration tribunals. Few realize that China’s treaty negotiators have in fact abandoned this restriction in almost every Chinese BIT signed since 1998, including those with Latin America. Scholars have suggested that China reversed its policy in order to support Chinese overseas investors or to fit its general economic liberalization strategy. However, China’s BITs with Mexico, Peru, and Colombia as well as its arbitration case with Peru contradict these theories. I argue that China began signing open BITs to test the risks of granting open access to European countries and the United States, for whom open access is a key condition. China experimented gradually with open arbitration, just as it has experimented gradually with many economic changes since Reform and Opening began in 1978. This theory has interesting implications for China’s future BITs—as international arbitration tribunals threaten to make this experiment permanent, China has added new restrictions that bring China’s BITs closer to the US model and make a US-China BIT more likely. However, the US avoids BITs with capital-exporting countries, and China is now a large capital-exporter. The main obstacle to US-China BIT negotiations may no longer be the two nations’ differences, but rather their similarities.

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ARCTIC China says no – freedom of navigation concerns, fear of alienating Russia, and lack of interestJingchao Peng & Njord Wegge (Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan; University of Tromsø) “China's bilateral diplomacy in the Arctic” December 11, 2015 Polar Geography, 2015Vol. 38, No. 3, 233–249 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1088937X.2015.1086445

The Arctic issue remains a marginal one in the overall complex of Sino-US relations . The US undoubtedly retains a central role in the changing foreign policy calculations of Beijing (Sutter 2013). Yet when it comes to the Arctic, the bilateral relationship to

the US has not played a major role in China’s Arctic diplomacy. Nor does China consider US a key partner to promoting Chinese interests. One explanation could be that Chinese policymakers do not consider the US an opponent to China’s Arctic interests. Nevertheless, since the US has taken over as chairman of the Arctic Council as of April 2015, renewed interest has been put on the US’s role in Arctic governance, promoting science and international research in the region. Yet, as both the publication of the US National Strategy for the Arctic Region in May 2013, as well as the Executive Order: Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic from 21 January 2015 declare that Washington will seek to work with other states and entities to advance common objectives in the Arctic region (White House 2015), China may have felt it has little to fear from the US in its campaign to enhance its Arctic presence and relevance. Still, there could also be other explanations for the apparent lack of specifically Sino-US diplomatic exchanges on Arctic issues. As Arctic issues are largely overshadowed by other more pressing topics in bilateral negotiations, such as trade frictions, China’s increasing maritime assertiveness and opaque military buildup, and increasingly strong-willed military posturing in the Asia-Pacific, Arctic issues might have been shuffled down the mutual priority list of the two great powers (The Diplomat 2015; Peng and Wegge 2014). The Arctic has been included in the annual US-Sino Strategic and Economic Dialogue since 2011, but it has appeared as a topic that merely deserved an exchange of opinions (US Department of State 2013; Sun and Wang 2014). The US is naturally an Arctic state due to the state of Alaska being situated partly to the north of the Arctic

Circle. Concerning the Arctic waterways, the US holds that freedom of navigation should be applied according to the law of the Sea, which is understood as customary international law, as the US is not a party to the UNCLOS. According to the Law of the Sea Convention, freedom of passage in Exclusive Economic Zones and high seas should be granted to ships of all nations. The 2013 White House National Strategy for the Arctic Region also announces that the US ‘has a national interest in preserving all of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace recognized under international law’ (White House 2013). Yet even with regard to these apparently favorable

policy principles, Chinese officials and Arctic specialists remain reluctant to respond. Beijing’s reluctance to engage more positively with the US in the Arctic seems to reflect the Chinese leadership’s deep-rooted suspicion of American ocean domination. Such caution is even more palpable among academics. Hence, it may not be advisable for China to express too much support for the US on this point, as in doing so it might risk alienating Russia and thus potentially undermine the Sino-Russian relationship (Li 2014). Further, if China were to publicly embrace the American concept of ‘freedom of navigation’, this might put more pressure on China to relax its more restrictive ‘freedom of navigation’ policies that it has imposed on China’s home seas. In this respect, China might have to confront the fact that its assertion of rights in utilizing Arctic shipping routes is inconsistent with Beijing’s marine policies in its regional waters . Yet, Sino-US Arctic relations may improve during the ongoing US Arctic Council Chairmanship; in 15–17 May 2015, the first China–US Arctic Policy Workshop was held in Shanghai (among academics and government ministerial experts at Tongji University). Annual meetings are also planned with the next in

Washington, DC in April/May 2016. In sum, China’s Arctic diplomacy with the US contains an unspoken impasse .

Although the US maintains a positive attitude towards Chinese participation in Arctic affairs, Beijing would be reluctant to engage further with the US in order to prevent itself from becoming the target of debate whenever the concept of ‘freedom of navigation’ is evoked in Arctic governance.

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#debatelikeabear 65Will say no to any agreement that doesn’t allow substantial commercial fishing effortsMary Sweeters (Greenpeace writer) “Meeting to Determine Future of Arctic Fishing Delivers Mixed Results” December 03, 2015 http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/meeting-to-determine-future-of-arctic-fishing-delivers-mixed-results/

Last week, while countries were negotiating commitments to reduce their carbon emissions to combat climate change in Paris, several

nations met in Washington D.C. to discuss the warming Arctic Ocean. The delegations in D.C. considered the declaration,

currently signed by the five Arctic coastal states, to prevent unregulated commercial fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean — the area beyond national jurisdiction that will see increasingly open waters in coming decades, enticing commercial fishing fleets to move farther north. The meetings, convened by the U.S. State Department, brought the five

Arctic coastal nations together with five additional stakeholders with significant fishing interests: China, the European Union, Iceland, Japan,

and South Korea. Unfortunately, from the U.S. State Department’s statement from the meeting, the participants seemed to focus on the potential to exploit the Arctic Ocean rather than protect it. The fact that several of the delegations present did not have a mandate to negotiate any particular instrument to the topic reveals the low level of commitment that powerful fishing nations have in terms of ensuring a sustainable future for the Arctic . According to the notes, the U.S. demonstrated some responsibility at the meeting by presenting a proposal for an international binding agreement to prevent any unregulated fishing, pending the establishment of future management regimes in the area, similar to the non-binding declaration signed by the five nations with Arctic coastline earlier this year. It is somewhat positive to see that the meeting participants identified the need for a precautionary approach to fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean. This is a region that is warming at twice the rate as the rest of the planet, is changing drastically, and is inadequately studied — all of which point to the need for for extra attention and thoughtful

international collaboration. However, the policy suggestions in the meeting do not reflect the severity of the situation or answer to the opportunity that is presented to the participating nations .

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#debatelikeabear 66China says no to arctic negotiations because they see it as a core interest. Won’t shareAndreas Kuersten “Russian Sanctions, China, and the Arctic” January 03, 2015 http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/russian-sanctions-china-and-the-arctic/

Concerns Over a Chinese Arctic What is concerning about the impact of Western sanctions on China’s entry into the Arctic is not the

PRC potentially “locking up” a substantial portion of the Earth’s untapped resources. Rather, the issue is the introduction of a large, assertive, and potentially combative actor into already tense Arctic relations where Arctic states have a host of conflicting claims to the region that will likely only be exacerbated as global warming opens it up. China declares itself to be a “near Arctic state” and an “Arctic stakeholder,” even though its northernmost territory lies more than 1,000 miles south of the Arctic Circle. As the most populous country in the world, China claims that it should have a say in Arctic policy and disagrees with Arctic issues being decided by Arctic states alone. More broadly, given the region’s resource reserves, shipping lanes, and implications for global warming, China argues that Arctic state interests and claims must be balanced against international interests in the seas and resources of the region. Very prominent and influential Chinese scholars and officials push this rhetoric. For example, the head of the European department of the China Institute for International Studies recently pronounced: “Countries closer to the Arctic, such as Iceland, Russia, Canada, and a few other European countries may tend to wish the Arctic were private or that they had priority to develop it, but China insists that the Arctic belongs to everyone just like the Moon.” Similarly, the director of the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration has stated that “Arctic resources…will be allocated according to the needs of the

world, not only owned by certain countries.” And in response to Russian Arctic territorial claims, Chinese Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo declared that “the Arctic belongs to all the people around the world as no nation has sovereignty over it.” In the context of the country’s quest for natural resources, Chinese attitudes toward the Arctic are unprecedented. While it has been aggressive in pursuing resources around the globe, China has also maintained a clear respect for sovereign claims in doing so. Its rhetoric concerning the Arctic diverges from this practice . Moreover, the PRC has become increasingly bellicose over issues it considers to be “core interests.” Nowhere is this more vivid than in the South China Sea, where Chinese maritime claims go well beyond what can be realistically

claimed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which it is a party. China’s growing physical presence in the Arctic, the statements of prominent government officials, and the region’s significant potential benefits encourage the sense that China may label its activity in the region as a core interest . The introduction of such a large actor into Arctic international relations with interests beyond mere investment and trade – i.e., claims and ownership – is a recipe for elevated conflict in a region that already possesses its share of tension due to the often incompatible claims of Arctic littoral states.

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ORGAN TRAFFICKING China says no – Organ Transplant Norms are too heavily engrained into social tradition

Lily Kuo, 4-5-2014, Lily Kuo covers East Africa and China in Africa from Nairobi. She previously reported for Quartz from Hong Kong. Before that she covered general news for Reuters in New York and the Los Angeles Times in Beijing. , "China wants an end to prisoner organ transplants, but tradition still discourages donors," Quartz, http://qz.com/195678/china-wants-an-end-to-prisoner-organ-transplants-but-tradition-still-discourages-donors/

China has one of the lowest rates of organ transplants in the world — 2.4 or fewer transplants per million residents in 2012, compared to 75 or more transplants per million residents in the US, Spain, and Norway. Even Party officials concede that 20 or more transplants are needed for every one that takes place. Amid the shortage, China has used organs from executed prisoners for transplants. As of the end of 2012, some 64% of organ transplants in China were from executed inmates. That practice is a controversial one on ethical grounds. And this week, Chinese health officials and surgeons signed a resolution to stop the use of prisoners’ organs. In March, China launched its first official organ donation registration site. But making up for the even-larger organ transplant shortfall will mean changing Chinese views of death and distrust of a system that has been rife with corruption. Chinese tradition holds that a person’s body must remain intact after death so that their soul can be reincarnated. Taboos surrounding speaking about death and organ donation are another obstacle. In one study of 298 adults, 88% said they did not want to talk about their organ donation preferences with family members. Without knowing their relatives’ preferences, families of the deceased are more likely to reject requests for organs, experts believe. Chinese officials have made progress in updating other traditional customs surrounding death, like promoting sea burials to save space. To promote the practice of organ donation, state-run media cover donors and their stories extensively. This week, three Chinese party officials promised to donate, after a directive was circulated encouraging party members to lead the way in reform and donate their organs after they die. Views toward death may be changing. According to a poll in 2012 (link in Chinese) of 1,012 residents in Guangzhou, 79% of them said that “organ donation after death is noble.” But many more are still put off by China’s underground trade in organs—kidneys can sell for as much as 200,000 yuan ($32,000)—and a lack of transparency. The Red Cross Society of China, which is helping run the country’s organ donor system, is wildly unpopular after it was accused of misusing funds. In the Guangzhou poll, 81% of respondents said they worried that their donated organs would wind up traded for money.

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#debatelikeabear 68China cheats even if they say yes – Record revisions proveLarry Ong and Matthew Robertson, 4-10-2015, Both are correspondents for Epoch Times Reporting on an international Doctors organization’s statements regarding china’s organ policy, "Doctors Cast Doubt on China's Promises of Organ Transplant Reform," Epoch Times, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1314023-doctors-cast-doubt-on-chinese-promises-of-organ-transplant-reform/

Recent promises by Chinese officials to cease the use of executed prisoners as a source for transplant organs has attracted the scrutiny of a Washington, D.C.-based organization of medical doctors and professionals. Doctors Against Forced Organ Harvesting (DAFOH), the medical ethics advocacy group, has challenged the Chinese regime’s

latest claims to have stopped using organs from prisoners, and have demanded that Chinese transplant officials provide proof of their claims. It has been known for over a decade that the vast majority of transplant organs in China come from executed prisoners, a state of affairs that violates widely held ethical organ sourcing standards. Increased international criticism in recent years impelled new pledges by the Chinese regime’s organ transplant czar, Huang Jiefu, that China would end the controversial practice by Jan. 1, 2015 . The normally quiet Huang, formerly the deputy health minister, gave a number of widely publicized interviews in March, publicizing the Party’s decision and announcing that the regime had turned a new leaf. He pointedly discouraged reporters from digging into the recent past. Read More Chinese Prison Guard’s Revelations of Organ Harvesting Attract Official Censure Former Chinese Hospital Intern Recounts a Live Organ Harvest

DAFOH, however, urges extreme caution about the content of the new promises, and calls for transparency about the organ harvesting that has already taken place. In a press release on April 7 it said that the international community “should not find relief” in the new pledges, given that Chinese authorities have a “lengthy record of secrecy, misleading numbers, and contradictory statements.” The confusing nature of official policy was on full display in some of Huang’s own remarks. On March 13, for example, he repudiated the closest thing China has had to a legal justification for the use of prisoners organs: a secret 1984 regulation under the aegis of the Supreme People’s Court, the Procuratorate, and public security bureau, and three other agencies. The regulations state that hospitals may use the organs from prisoners as long as family members agree, but that “use of dead bodies or organs from condemned criminals must be kept strictly confidential.” Huang’s repudiation of these regulations means that “tens of thousands of organ procurements” made since the regulation was enacted are thus illegal and unethical, and the medical staff responsible for those transplants should be prosecuted. Huang seems aware of the difficulties of the official stance. On March 16 he called the harvesting of prisoners’ organs a “filthy, intractable, sensitive and forbidden area” before hinting strongly that purged Chinese security chief Zhou Yongkang was behind the operations. In this, he effectively backtracked on earlier comments he made to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and state-run China Daily, where he claimed that the use of organs from executed criminals was ethical by

Chinese standards—and even the right thing to do. As evidence that the new policy of “sunshine and transparency,” in Huang’s words, is highly questionable, DAFOH points to Chinese hospitals that have recently begun scrubbing their websites of incriminating transplant numbers, and in some cases revising downward—by 50 percent—the number of transplants they did two years previously. “It is evident that China is not ready to join the ethical value-based transplant community as an equal, trusted partner,” DAFOH said. The doctors said that other international and medical watchdog groups should demand greater transparency from the Chinese regime on the issue of organ transplantation. Instead, DAFOH said that China needs to provide “full disclosure of the use of prisoners of conscience as organ source,” and full transparency and access to the country’s organ procurement system. The first injunction seems unlikely to be fulfilled, judging by Huang Jiefu’s remarks in March. “We shouldn’t always dwell in the past, always concerned about the page of death row inmates,” he said. “Flip over the page and look at the future. … There is nothing interesting to pay attention to in this.

We should pay attention to the future, not the past.” Researchers, meanwhile, estimate that tens of thousands of prisoners of conscience, the vast majority practitioners of Falun Gong, a spiritual discipline that has been persecuted since 1999, have been executed for their organs. In many cases they are thought to have had their organs removed while they were still alive, and died from the procedure itself. The journalist Ethan Gutmann and two Canadian researchers, David Matas and David Kilgour, a respected human rights lawyer and a former member of the

Canadian parliament respectively, used different methodologies to reach similar numbers for how many Falun Gong adherents have likely been killed through harvesting between 2000 and 2008 alone: over 60,000.

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TERRORISM China says no-already working with Russia on counter-terrorismRussian Politics & Diplomacy, News source 15Russian Politics & Diplomacy, Russian News source on Russian politics and diplomacy Accessed 7/4/16, 12-31-2015, "Russia, China ready for joint anti-terror measures — Russian Foreign Ministry," TASS, http://tass.ru/en/politics/848064

Moscow welcomes the adoption by the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress on December 27 of the Law "On Combating Terrorism," the Russian Foreign Ministry said on Thursday. "We proceed from the fact that the Chinese partners have taken an important step towards the creation of a solid legal framework to effectively combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations," the ministry said. "The contents of the document, in our view, testify to the fact that China in its development relied on the basic norms and principles of international law, as well as take into account the experience of other countries, including Russia, in the sphere of organizing counter-terrorism

activity." "We express our confidence that the adoption of this legal act will promote the further strengthening of the dynamic Russian-Chinese counter-terrorism cooperation within the framework of our two countries’ privileged strategic partnership," the ministry said. "Moscow and Beijing together stand for the preservation of the central coordinating role of the United Nations in global anti-terrorism efforts, which should be free from politicization and preconditions, for the creation of a broad antiterrorist coalition against the Islamic State terrorist organization (outlawed in Russia), for the adoption of comprehensive measures to counteract the phenomenon of foreign terrorists-militants, including in the context of reduction of risks for the Central Asian region," the Russian Foreign Ministry said. According to the ministry, the Russian-Chinese Counter-Terrorism Working Group meets on a regular basis. In late October, consultations at the level of deputy foreign ministers in charge of cooperation in the fight against international terrorism were held in Beijing. "The bilateral cooperation at the key international venues - the UN, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Eurasian Group on combating money laundering and financing of

terrorism (EAG) is progressively expanding," the Russian Foreign Ministry said. "Russia and China not only objectively assess the difficult global terrorism situation, but also demonstrate their willingness to take joint action for its improvement."

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#debatelikeabear 70China-U.S. relations are damaged because of Dalai Lama meeting, China won’t trust the U.S.Arnold NPR correspondent 16Chris Arnold, Correspondent with NPR since 1996, accessed 7/4/16 6-15-2016, "Dalai Lama Meets With President Obama; China Objects," NPR.org, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/06/15/482200079/dalai-lama-meets-with-president-obama-china-objects

The Dalai Lama, visiting the White House today, offered President Obama condolences for the Orlando shootings. The president and the Tibetan spiritual leader also talked about issues facing Tibetans living within China. The White House said in a statement: "The President emphasized his strong support for the preservation of Tibet's unique religious, cultural, and linguistic traditions and the equal protection of human rights of Tibetans in China." The White House also said that the president "reiterated the longstanding U.S. position that Tibet is a part of the People's Republic of China, and the United States does not support Tibetan independence." The meeting, significantly, took

place in the White House Map Room, not the Oval Office where the president meets with foreign heads of state. Still, despite the president's efforts over the years to reassure China on this issue, Chinese officials expressed consternation over the meeting. During a press conference earlier in the day, China's Foreign Ministry Spokesman Lu Kang said : "The 14th Dalai Lama is not a pure religious figure, but a political exile who has long been engaged in anti-China separatist plots under the cloak of religion. If the US arranges such a meeting, it will send a wrong signal to the separatist forces trumpeting "Tibetan independence", and jeopardize China-US mutual trust and cooperation. China urges the US to honor its commitment of "recognizing Tibet as part of China and not supporting Tibetan independence", and stop supporting any Tibetan-independence forces." After a failed uprising in 1959, the Dalai Lama fled to India from Tibet. Today, the religious leader says he supports greater autonomy for Tibet but not outright independence from China. The White House says the president expressed support for this "middle way" approach to Tibet. The meeting comes amid somewhat strained relations between the world's two largest economies. U.S. officials have called on China to halt its controversial island-building and land-reclamation projects in the South China Sea. There have also been repeated instances wherehackers thought to be linked to the Chinese government have gained access to the computer systems of private U.S. companies and the U.S. government. For its part, China has objected to, among other things, the recent decision by the U.S. to authorize arms sales to China's neighbor Vietnam.

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#debatelikeabear 71Trust is key to counter terrorism McGill and Gray International studies professors 12Anna-Katherine Staser McGill, School of Graduate and Continuing Studies in Diplomacy, David H. Gray who specializes in international and national security affairs. His expertise includes U.S. and international security and strategic studies; current global security issues; U.S. foreign and national security policy formulation and strategy; intelligence; political violence and insurgency; international terrorism; and international weapons proliferation., Accessed 7/4/16, Summer 2012, “Challenges to International Counterterrorism Intelligence Sharing”, Global security studies. http://globalsecuritystudies.com/McGill%20Intel%20Share.pdf

Mutual trust is fundamental in international relations and critical in intelligence sharing. Sharing sensitive information also exposes nations to a certain degree of vulnerability, whether it is an outed source, a blown operation, or a threat to national interests. Furthermore, the receiver of intelligence must be able to trust the validity of the intelligence it is given or else it is useless unless corroborated by a third party. According to James Walsh, “trust exists when the interests of a first actor are ‘encapsulated’ in or congruent with the interests of a

second actor” (628). While this trust is more readily found amongst traditional allies who have supported and defended the US and share many political and cultural values, and through their democratic institutions or common histories, it is far more scarce and thinly developed amongst new allies. Saudi Arabia’s alliance with the US in the war on terror is based on the shared interest in undermining a common foe. However, as illustrated previously, when they did not share this interest there could be no real trust nor progress. In the Pakistan situation, US distrust over the treatment of diplomats and Pakistan’s nefarious relationships with other terrorist networks coupled with the Pakistani populace’s distrust of US intentions has created a crisis in US-Pakistani relations. Prior to the Davis case, Pakistani distrust of the Americans stems from the perceived “history of [US] friends being treated worse than enemies” (Ullman 1). This perception has only worsened with allegations of America’s heavy-

handedness with regards to the Davis case. Although the US has faced rows with its traditional partners, it is far more likely that disagreements in new ally relationships will result in dissolution of ties.

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TPP China will never say yes to the TPP – Multiple warrantsRamasamy, Bala. "Why China could never sign on to the Trans-Pacific Partnership." The Conversation. April 13, 2016. Web. 4 Jul. 2016. <http://theconversation.com/why-china-could-never-sign-on-to-the-trans-pacific-partnership-56361>

The TPP requires that no subsidies should be provided to an SOE for its international business expansion. The goal: to ensure competition between an SOE and a private enterprise takes place on a level playing field inside the host country. But China’s 150,000 SOEs form the bedrock of the Chinese economy and therefore have certain privileges. About a thousand SOEs are listed in the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, indicating they are commercial in nature. More than 150 of these are managed by the central SASAC, and the list includes some of the largest companies in the world. The Chinese government assists these SOEs in various ways, including preferential interest rates. Although there have

been exceptions under the TPP (for example New Zealand was able to get exemptions for its powerful cooperative Fonterra), it would have been an uphill battle for China to negotiate exemptions for so many of its SOEs engaged in various international operations within TPP member countries. Transparency and anti-corruption The TPP commits partners to writing and enforcing anti-bribery laws. It can be argued that enforcement would have been a challenge for China. In Transparency International’s Corruption Perception index, which ranks countries based on the degree of corruption in the public sector, only two TPP countries ranked below China in 2014 – Vietnam and Mexico. Although one can argue that

membership in the TPP could raise the bar for China’s efforts at eradicating corruption, the gap between China and important partners (the US and Japan) is significant. The TPP could have been yet another platform for critics to accuse China of lacklustre anti-corruption efforts. Labour The inclusion of labour issues in an FTA is rare since labour rights are considered “domestic issues” and interference by external parties jeopardises the sovereignty of individual members. In this regard, the TPP

can be considered bold. The chapter on labour would have been a contentious issue between China and the US . For

example China’s labour laws, while allowing freedom of association, require all trade unions to be affiliated with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, which is an agency of the Chinese Communist Party. The agreement, meanwhile, requires TPP partners to adopt a legal framework that upholds fundamental labour rights as recognised by the International Labour Organization. Free and open competition A common philosophy within the TPP agreement is free competition among signatories. Firms from any TPP country will be allowed to bid for government contracts in another, for example. Testing and certification awarded by an assessment body in one country should be accepted in other countries as well. The chapter on

competition generally calls for member countries to reach the standards practised in countries like Singapore and

New Zealand, known for their ease of doing business. But in the World Bank’s Doing Business rankings for

2016, China was lower than all TPP partners, except Vietnam. China would have had to negotiate hard to get exemptions for its SOEs and SMEs from these open competition clauses and chapters. Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) While it has its critics, the ISDS – a system under which an investing company can seek compensation from a host country if its property rights are violated – has been included in several FTAs recently. This is because it offers an assurance to multinational corporations that expropriation by host governments is only a remote possibility. Over the last 15 years China has been signing agreements containing the ISDS clause as it has been effective in protecting the country’s investments abroad. However the World Justice Project, which ranks countries on the rule of law – and regulatory enforcement in particular – shows that China fares miserably when compared with other TPP countries. Only Mexico is marginally below it. It’s

very likely the ISDS would have been a heated issue for China, and it is possible tha t like Australia, Mexico, Peru

and Vietnam, China would have fought for many exemptions. Opportunity cost limited, for now China’s other international initiatives, as well as its sheer size, reduce the losses of being a TPP outsider. But it has lost an opportunity to commit to an improvement in the general trading and investment climate and drive new impetus to its dwindling export sector. The agreement offers member countries a road map and a schedule to reform the business environment and make it more competitive. Countries with similar capabilities, like Japan and South Korea on the higher end and Vietnam on the lower end, will be able to divert some trade away from China. It is therefore important for China to build up its productivity to ensure it is able to compete with TPP members for market share. China has also lost an opportunity to sign an FTA with the US, but following a specified TPP schedule would be seen as the US dictating the reforms in China. And the US is hardly likely to

penalise China given its importance to world trade. China has always reformed using its own timetable. For a country that is

establishing its legitimacy as a global economic power, it has to write its own future. The rules of the TPP may not fit the current state of the Chinese economy. China has to mould a domestic economy that is large enough to withstand any global economic slowdown. To create that domestic economy, certain features of the “old” economy may still be required.

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#debatelikeabear 73China says no because no need and country of origin requirements Hjelmgaard, Kim. "Why China doesn’t mind being left out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership." USA TODAY. 9 Oct. 2015. Web. 4 Jul. 2016. <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/10/09/why-china-doesnt-mind-being-left-out-trans-pacific-partnership/73640192/>

Given the importance of the accord, which is designed to boost cross-border trade and investment among member countries and, ultimately, economic growth, it might seem strange that China, the world’s second largest economy and biggest trading nation on the planet, has been left out. While a lot of the details of the deal are still secret, the TPP is clearly more than just a free trade agreement. In addition to slashing or eliminating 98% of tariffs on thousands of goods including dairy, beef, sugar, cars, tractors and chemicals, it also establishes common rules and regulations for trade and investment across member countries as well as external tribunals to sort out disputes. TPP member states will include the United States, Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Brunei, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Chile and Peru. More countries are

expected to join the exclusive trading club, but given the tough membership rules, China is not expected to sign up any time soon. Perhaps never. Excluding China has been widely interpreted as an attempt by the United States to curtail Beijing’s growing political and economic might in the Asia Pacific region, and some experts have described it as a “terrible mistake.” But does Beijing really care?

Possibly not as much as you might think. For starters, China doesn’t need to belong to the TPP to enjoy some of the perks that come with being a member. Beijing already has free trade agreements with more than half of the TPP countries, including Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Peru, Singapore, Brunei and Vietnam, and it can exploit those arrangements to minimize or avoid import duties that would normally apply to made-in-China products. Felipe Caro and Christopher Tang of UCLA's Anderson

School of Management explained in Fortune magazine this week how that could work. “To satisfy certain country -of- origin conditions stipulated in TPP, China can manage the supply chain operations of cotton shirts by importing cotton from Pakistan (via its existing free trade agreement with China) and conduct 'upstream' operations, such as fabric design, knitting and dyeing at home. "Then China can ship the fabric to Vietnam (via an existing free trade

agreement with China). At the same time, Japan can ship the buttons to Vietnam (via the TPP). Vietnam can perform 'downstream' operations (sewing) and then ship the finished shirts via TPP agreement to Australia, Japan and the United States,

cutting off the 5%, 10.9% and 16.5% import duties that would have applied if China had dealt directly with these countries.” And China clearly doesn’t require the TPP to enhance its already sizeable influence in the world. Beijing is a card-carrying member of the World Trade Organization, has a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and is the driving force behind the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which could potentially become a rival to theWorld Bank and Asia Development Bank once it gets going. The China-led AIIB, which has the support of dozens of countries, aims to fund infrastructure

projects in the region and could help Beijing buy the support of its neighbors. China is also on track to become one of the world’s biggest overseas investors by 2020, with outbound foreign direct investment already topping $100 billion a year. In some countries, China’s investment is actually bigger than the loans they get from the International Monetary Fund, and that gives Beijing a lot of economic and political clout. On top of that

China is busy negotiating its own free-trade pact with 15 countries in the Asia Pacific region and is expected to become the world's largest economy in the next decade. “That preponderance is driven by China’s sheer size, its continued growth — which though slower than in the past is still faster than that of most other Asian economies— and its increasing centrality in global supply chains,” Arthur Kroeber, managing director of Gavekal Dragonomics and editor of China Economic

Quarterly, toldForeign Policy. Missing out on a TPP membership card won't change that.

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#debatelikeabear 74China says no – business protections and political concernsProf. B. R. Deepak "Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP): Responses from China and options for India | South Asia Analysis

Group." Southasiaanalysis.org. 12-Oct-2015 Web. 4 Jul. 2016. <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1877>

Another article of 5 October 2015 titled “TPP more dreadful than the stock crash” on micro blogs across China but was instantly removed for ‘violating law’ portrays the TPP a disaster for China. It says that in foreseeable future TPP - world’s largest economic block, will redraw the global economic map, will fundamentally change the global economic structure and modus operandi of the global economy. The anonymous

writer posits that developed countries have denounced China as the violator of the WTO rules – they have deemed China the biggest currency manipulator, violator of the copyright laws, provider of huge subsidies to its enterprises, manipulator of the big ticket project auctions, manipulator of the export prices etc. and therefore, would like to get rid of this manipulator who has been a free rider but shirked global responsibilities; it is in this light they wish to establish a new trading system – the TPP that has no role for China. According to the analyst, investment in infrastructure and foreign trade has been the only drivers that have kept the Chinese economy going. Quoting an interview Bank of China Governor, Zhou Xiaochuan gave to the CCTV, he says foreign trade so far has accounted 60% of the Chinese economy, and the investment in the infrastructure sector has almost saturated. And if, there is a further slump in the exports, the impact on

Chinese economy would be dangerously adverse. He argues that even if China would like to enter the TPP, it would be just a wishful thinking, for the political system of the member states must respect freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law etc. established value systems, can China do that? Moreover, it stipulates equal benefits to public and private enterprises, and the privatization of the state owned enterprises, can China do that? Other areas such as free trade, liberalization of agricultural markets, finance, logistics, environmental protection etc. are equally difficult to conform to for China. TPP will stop the free ride for China. It is obvious that some of the concerns have been exaggerated by the anonymous writer, while others hold true.

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AIIB China says no – it will impose looser environmental standards to attract more projects and compete with the World Bank and IMF Chow 16 [Daniel C.K, professor at University of Maryland, writes and teaches about international business, trade, and Chinese law, “Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank”, Public Law and Legal Theory Working, No. 333, 2/25/16, SSRN]

Will the AIIB follow international best practices, i.e. condition its loans on the western values of the Washington Consensus or will the AIIB espouse a doctrine of non-interference and attach few , if any,

conditions to its loans? Nowhere in its Articles of Agreement does the AIIB allude to the doctrine of conditionality. Article 13 does state

that the AIIB will ensure that its operation complies with “policies addressing environmental and social impacts,”223 but Indonesia has reported that the AIIB has already approved a $1 billion loan for coal-fired power plants ,224 projects blocked by the World Bank for their harmful environmental impact .225 The Indonesian government then issued a statement that “AIIB imposes looser environment requirements in disbursing its loans, making it the preferred creditor for financing Indonesia’s coal-fired power plant projects .”226 Sensing the political fallout

from such a candid statement, Indonesia retracted this statement and replaced it with the less provocative statement that “AIIB – as opposed to other multilateral lenders like Asian Development Bank or the World Bank – allowed its financing to be used for Indonesia’s coal-fired power plant projects .”227 The Indonesian project prompted a Bank

Watch Group to warn that “the new beginnings under way at the AIIB threaten to see a return to the darkest, unregulated days of international development finance.”228 Indonesia’s posture raises the question of whether AIIB’s Asian borrowers would prefer to have looser controls on environmental impacts since coal-fired power plants are far less expensive than alternatives that do less damage to the environment. India, for example, has huge coal reserves and had also expressed the hope that the AIIB will approve loans for India

to use its coal-fired power plants, which will put the AIIB in direct conflict with the World Bank.229 The reaction of Asian nations to what they hope will be looser standards by the AIIB should not be surprising given how developing nations have in the past expressed resentment at the World Bank and IMF’s bullying and arrogance in imposing conditions on loans in ways that humiliated the recipients .230 Nothing in the AIIB refers to human

rights or workers’ rights. Further support for a doctrine of non-interference is contained in Article 31(2), which states that the “the Bank, its President, officers and staff shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions.” Members of the AIIB, of course, such as Indonesia, itself with a

checkered history in human rights,231 will also be loan recipients. China’s track record in its recent international trade treaties may also provide an indication of how the AIIB will function . As noted earlier, all recent U.S. free trade agreements contain requirements related to the environment, labor, and transparency.232 In the past decade, China has entered into free trade agreements its strategic partners, including Costa Rica (2011), Peru (2009), Singapore (2009), New Zealand (2008) Chile (2006), and Pakistan (2006 and 2009).233 On November 22, 2015 China signed a Protocol to Upgrade the China Free Trade Agreement with

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore Thailand, Brunei Darusssalam, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia).234

Many more China free trade agreements are under negotiation.235 A hallmark of these agreements – in contrast to U.S. free trade agreements – is that they do not contain any clauses that pertain to the environment, human rights, or labor rights.236 China’s refusal to link environmental sustainability and

workers’ rights to trade may be one reason why the United States has excluded China from the U.S.-led negotiations for the Trans- Pacific Partnership, a vast free trade agreement with many of the most powerful economies of (including Japan, Singapore, Australia, Vietnam).237 The United States may believe that China might balk at provisions imposing certain requirements concerning environmental sustainability and workers’ rights. Of course, China has interpreted its exclusion from the TPP negotiations as shoddy

treatment by the United States, consistent with China’s poor treatment in the World Bank and the IMF. Ultimately, no parsing of the

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#debatelikeabear 76text of the AIIB or China’s free trade agreements will determine whether the AIIB will adhere to the doctrine of conditionality as currently embodied in the Washington Consensus employed by the World Bank and the IMF or whether the AIIB will

actively promote the doctrine of non-interference. The AIIB’s position can only be determined by an examination of its actual practices, which may take some years to become clear. It is a safe assumption, however, that the AIIB will not adopt the Washington Consensus laden with its western values. Rather, all indications are that the AIIB will adopt a different approach, one that may become known as the “Beijing Consensus.” Beyond the doctrine of non-interference, what are some of the other policies that might comprise the Beijing Consensus?

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#debatelikeabear 77US can’t influence AIIB development – China will limit US influence in the bank Chow 16 [Daniel C.K, professor at University of Maryland, writes and teaches about international business, trade, and Chinese law, “Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank”, Public Law and Legal Theory Working, No. 333, 2/25/16, SSRN] MG

The establishment of the AIIB as a multilateral institution represents a diplomatic triumph as China was able to attract dozens of the United States’ closest allies in defiance of U.S. opposition. Beyond this diplomatic coup, however, there are larger potential consequences for the

future of the international global system. Despite China’s own assertions to the contrary, the AIIB might emerge as a direct rival to the World Bank and the International Monetary system. This rivalry will consist not only in

the amounts of loans made, but also in the rules of international lending and the rule of international trade in general. Will China use the AIIB to counter the Washington Consensus, laden with its western values, with its own approach that pursues China’s own policy goals under what might become known as the Beijing Consensus? Aside from the doctrine of

non-interference, the Beijing Consensus might include policies intended to promote SOEs and the use of the RMB as a regularly used currency for international transactions. In addition to these policies, the Party may well have

other goals in mind. The governance structure of the AIIB, the role of the Party, and China’s own global ambitions suggest that China is posed to use the AIIB as a policy tool just as the United States and its closest allies

have used the World Bank and the IMF as a policy tool. This potential conflict represents for the future a clash between rival multilateral financial institutions led by the United States and by China. The clash could elevate the longstanding conflict between the United States and China over the rules governing international trade to the multilateral policy level for the

first time. This portends a larger struggle over who will write the rules for international trade in the future. One option for the United States is to join the AIIB and attempt to stem the AIIB’s influence from the inside. This option, however, is unrealistic. The United States has indicated that it will not join the AIIB and political realities suggest that such an option would not pass muster in the U.S. Congress . Joining the AIIB requires a capital contribution in the billions of dollars to a Chinese controlled bank, a move not likely to be approved by Congress.259 Even if the United States did join the AIIB, its role will be carefully limited by the State-Party. No one in the Executive or the Congress of the United States should have any illusions to the contrary.

The purpose of this article is not to choose sides between the doctrine of conditionality, favored by the United States, and the doctrine of non-interference, favored by China. Whether one approach is superior to the other involves a debate about philosophy, politics, and morality far beyond the scope of this article. The arguments made in this article point out that this debate has been elevated to the multilateral level and that the State-Party has achieved a breakthrough in gaining control over a prestigious multilateral peer to the World Bank. Whether China will attempt to use the AIIB to further the goals of the State-Party seems to be a foregone conclusion. It is simply a political reality that nations often use multilateral institutions that they control as policy tools to further their own national interests. Why should anyone expect China to behave otherwise? This article also points out the most evident policies that China might wish to promote through the AIIB. It would be unrealistic to believe that while the United States uses the World Bank and the IMF to promote the Washington Consensus and U.S. goals, that China will not attempt to do the same in using the AIIB, under its firm control, to further China’s policy goals. Of course, it is possible that China will not succeed in its efforts because China might meet effective opposition from other members of the AIIB. This possibility seems unlikely but at this point, at the infancy of the AIIB, it is not possible to see exactly how the AIIB’s development will unfold. Yet, it is a development is worth watching because it will indicate whether China will begin to succeed in displacing the United States as the final arbiter of the rules of international trade in the modern global economy.

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#debatelikeabear 78China will resist sustainability standards – environmental conditions contradict China’s doctrine of non-interference Chow 16 [Daniel C.K, professor at University of Maryland, writes and teaches about international business, trade, and Chinese law, “Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank”, Public Law and Legal Theory Working, No. 333, 2/25/16, SSRN] MG

China’s doctrine of non-interference is fundamentally at odds with the doctrine of conditionality that underlies the Washington Consensus and a great deal of U.S. trade policy. Outside of its work in the Work Bank and the IMF, the United States now includes provisions relating to environmental sustainability, transparency, and workers’ rights in all of its free trade agreements. The U.S. practice of including provisions related to the environment and labor begun with the North American Free Trade Agreement, which entered into effect in 1994.153 Along with the main NAFTA agreement, the parties also entered into two side agreements: the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, which aims to improve conditions for workers, 154 and the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, which provides for obligations to enforce environmental protection standards.155 Subsequently, in 2011, Congress approved the U.S. South Korean Free Trade Agreement (known as KORUS). KORUS includes a reciprocal obligation to enforce domestic environmental laws as well as obligations under the seven covered multilateral environmental agreements.156 KORUS also includes a reciprocal obligation to adopt and enforce the basic rights of workers as contained in the 1998 International Labor Organization Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.157 The current 2012 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, drafted by the U.S. Department of State, which serves as a template for all future U.S. BITs with its trading partners, also includes provisions related to transparency, the environment, and labor.158

Why would China object to policies that tie trade obligations to protection of the environment? There is, of course, the issue of national sovereignty alluded to above. China believes that policies related to the balance between industrial development and protection of the environment is an issue that each nation needs to decide for itself. Beyond this ideological point, however, is the political reality that China continues to conduct its industrial development using means that are harmful to the environment, such as using coal-powered factories, a source of “dirty fuel” that causes significant air pollution.159 China is also the biggest producer of greenhouse gases in the world and the main driver of climate change.160 According to the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), climate change could lead to serious, permanent, and dangerous changes to the earth’s environment.161 If the World Bank, the IMF, and the United States are able to create an expectation that international financial obligations and international trade must be tied to the enforcement of environmental standards,

China could find itself bound to make legal commitments to the environment in its transactions with the World Bank, the IMF, or with international trade partners. It should be emphasized that China does not object to environmental protection – to the contrary it is a national priority162 – but China does object to the notion that environmental protection should be a condition of conducting trade with the United States and objects to the notion that multilateral financial institutions dominated by the United States should be dictating the terms of that environmental protection as a cost of obtaining a loan. Each nation should be able to decide, as matter of sovereign right, how to deal with environmental protection issues on its own. Such a decision might include joining multilateral environmental treaties that create international obligations, but that too involves a voluntary decision to join and differs from being forced to accept environmental obligations as a cost of doing business. Even more important and sensitive to China is the issue of multilateral financial institutions and the United States dictating the protection of workers’ rights as a condition of doing business. Workers’ rights are closely related to human rights; China insists that each nation has the sovereign right to decide for itself how to protect human rights.163 Furthermore, China believes that human rights are not absolute and universal but are derivative from the State;164 human rights are relative and need to be determined in accordance with a country’s economy and political stage of development.165 Perhaps the most important corollary to China’s basic view on human rights is the principle that the sovereign has the right to use force, including deadly force, against its own citizens when the State finds that it is under threat.166 This is not an abstract debate for China, but a core national security

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#debatelikeabear 79interest and a core issue of sovereignty.167 Unlike the United States, China has significant areas of contested sovereignty involving populations in the tens of millions of people and active uprisings in some of these areas. 168 Xinjiang Autonomous Province, a region in northwestern China with a population of over twenty one million, is an area subject to frequent incidents of political unrest.169 Xinjiang is home to the Uyghurs, an ethnic minority of Turkish origin and of Muslim faith.170 Many Uyghurs feel mistreated by the Chinese ethnic majority (the Han) and violent clashes resulting in many deaths have erupted.171 The State-Party considers the Ugyhur Independence Movement to be a separatist movement and attacks on the Han majority instigated by Uyghurs to be terrorist acts that are to be suppressed with merciless force resulting in many deaths.172 Another area of contention is Xizang Province, also known as Tibet, a territory of three million people in southwestern China.173 Both the Tibetans, an ethnic minority with a population of about three million people, and the Uyghurs, have their own languages but are subject to compulsory education in Chinese,174 leading many to believe that China would like to erase their languages and their cultures.175 The Dalai Lama, Tibet’s spiritual leader, fled from Tibet and Chinese rule into exile many decades ago.176 To China’s exasperation, the Dalai Lama has since become an international celebrity and icon whose reception by foreign nations (such the United Kingdom)177 always provokes a furious response by China. Inflicting the most grievous wound of all to China is Taiwan, an island off the eastern coast of China with a population of twenty-three and a half million people178 who share the same ethnic origin as the majority of people on Mainland China.179 Taiwan serves as the last painful reminder of the long period of China’s weakness and domination by foreign powers that lasted for one hundred and fifty years until the middle of the twentieth century.180 For fifty years until the end of the Second World War, China ceded sovereignty over Taiwan to Japan as a spoil of war.181 At the end of the Second World War, China was ravaged by a brutal civil war between the Nationalists headed by Chiang Kai-shek, with the strong backing of the United States, and the Communists, led by Mao Zedong.182 For a brief period (from about 1927 to 1948), Chiang had a tenuous hold on the leadership of China after having had established a new government, the Republic of China in 1927.183 Despite having overwhelming advantages in troops and U.S.-provided military equipment, Chiang lost to Mao and fled to the island of Taiwan where he installed the seat of government for the Republic of China.184 Implacable enemies to the end, Mao and Chiang vowed to destroy the other.185 Without the intervention of the Korean War and the protection of the United States, it is likely that Taiwan would have long ago returned to Chinese sovereignty.186 Although relations between China and Taiwan have improved in recent years, the separation of Taiwan from the motherland and the U.S. role in protecting Taiwan continues to be deeply painful for the Party.187 A mark of the depth of China’s pain is China’s vow to reunite Taiwan with the mainland by force if necessary.188 China has also repeatedly insisted that the issue of Taiwan reunification is an internal issue and not subject to external interference.189 No doubt a military conflict in the Taiwan Straits could result in a huge cost in human lives. China’s insistence that it has the right to use force to reunify Taiwan with the mainland is a core issue of sovereignty for China on which there can be no compromise. China’s insistence that it has the right to use force against its own citizens is one major reason why China objects to the western view of human rights promoted by the United States and other western nations. The U.S. view of human rights as universal and above the State allows human rights to serve as a shield against the use of arbitrary power by the State.190 Human rights can also create a right of peoples to self-determination, a view that bolsters Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan’s claims for

independence and self-rule. Aside from workers’ rights, human rights, and the environment, there are other policies in in the Washington Consensus that are inconsistent with China’s policies. For example, the privatization of state-owned enterprises runs directly counter to China’s insistence that the state-owned enterprise must be the centerpiece of the economy.191 While there yet other policies of the Washington Consensus that conflict with China’s own policies, the merits of each policy is less important than

China’s fundamental objection to the overall approach of the United States and its allies in using the Bretton Woods institutions as policy tools to impose western political and economic values on countries as a condition of doing business . By contrast, China’s doctrine of non-interference supports its core view that the

State has the right to use force against its own citizens when the State is threatened. With the establishment of the AIIB, China now has a multilateral financial institution that espouses China’s own doctrine of non-interference to serve as a counterweight to Washington’s conditionality approach as embodied in the World Bank and the IMF. China’s doctrine of non-interference might soon become known as the Beijing Consensus.

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A FGHANISTAN China says no—empirics prove they don’t like to get involved in AfghanistanGodehardt and Shim 14 –Nadine, research fellow at the German Institute for International Sand Security Affairs specializing in China’s foreign policy, particularly regional challenges in Asia and David, assistant professor in the Department of International relations and International Organization at the University of Groningen, Netherlands, and associate research fellow at the GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, Hamburg, "Post-2014 Afghanistan and Its Impact on Northeast Asia," Asian Perspective, October-December 2014 http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1628232817?pq-origsite=summon&amp;accountid=14667

Afghanistan has not been a top priority in China's diplomacy . In crucial moments of modem Afghan history, such as during the Soviet occupation (1979-1989), the coming to power of the Tal- iban in 1996, and the new war led by the United States and its NATO allies since 2001, China took a low-profile stand on Afghanistan. As Zhao Huasheng

(2012, 2) rightly argues, China has only " very limited goals in Afghanistan" and is not interested in getting militarily involved there. Since Chinese leaders still espouse the principle of nonintervention, they do not see China's main task as rebuilding Afghanistan politically. In addition, China's economic interests are rather specific and tightly focused on exploitation of energy resources and rare earths.

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E DUCATION REFORM China says no—doesn’t want foreign ideas in schoolsJOEL ALEXANDER, and SOPHIE SITE JIA MAY 20, 2015, "U.S.-China MOOC Cooperation: Toward Educational Advancement," https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/734 Joel Alexander graduated with a bachelor's degree in political science from Columbia University in 2014. He is currently pursuing a master's degree in global affairs at New York University's Center for Global Affairs in the international business and economics (private sector) concentration. Sophie Site Jia graduated in 2015 with a Master of Science (MS) in global affairs from the Global Affairs Program at New York University, and is currently working as an intern for an investment company in China. She has been studying and working outside of China for more than ten years and gained insights into both eastern and western culture.

While there are many potential opportunities for U.S.-China cooperation in MOOCs, China's MOOC development has several domestic limitations. First, even though top-tier Chinese universities have tapped into the online educational market, many of the universities' leaders are still nervous about foreign ideas flooding their schools . Second, the effectiveness of

MOOCs requires students to have strong self-discipline and an exceptional moral compass. Hence, it is hard for MOOC platforms to monitor the integrity and fairness of student's performance. This could lead to fraud. Third, the Chinese employers have not been entirely open about MOOCs, and many regard MOOCs as an "informal" education that does not have enough credibility. Fourth, MOOCs generally face low retention rates, reducing student "stickiness" to the platform and making learning a temporary task rather than a lifetime process. Lastly, MOOCs can be a direct threat to non-elite universities, as some Chinese students have already opted out of those schools to pursue direct employment . Externally, China has strict regulations on foreign online businesses trying to penetrate into the Chinese market. All Internet content providers are prohibited from producing, copying, publishing, or distributing information, which may threaten China's domestic stability. Because of these limitations, it is important for U.S. organizations to engage with the

Chinese government to establish an online education environment in China. Currently, circumventing these regulations only creates disadvantages to those who need free and accessible education the most, because the Chinese government will limit the distribution of such programs. Through the process of collaboration, there will be more intellectual exchange, further facilitating cultural understanding, and diversity.

*MOOC=Massive Open Online Courses

China says no—new regulations restrict cooperation of foreign actorsElizabeth Redden 16, 5-11-2016, "China's strict new law regulating foreign NGO raises questions for universities," Inside Higher Ed https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/05/11/chinas-strict-new-law-regulating-foreign-ngo-raises-questions-universities Correspondent at Inside Higher Ed, covering international higher education. (da-7/5/16)

China's foreign NGO law was first introduced as part of a suite of three bills focused on national security and counterterrorism. It was passed at a time of tightening political controls and heightened suspicion of Western influences within China, including in the higher education sphere . “Universities are not the direct target of this particular law, but some of the projects that universities are engaged in could easily be collateral damage. I don’t think it’s unintentional,” said Carl Minzner, a professor of law at Fordham University and an expert on Chinese law. Minzner said he worries about a potential “chilling effect where U.S. schools decide out of self-preservation to limit their presence in China because they're worried about the potential impact. That is a very real possibility.” “The reaction I hear from Chinese authorities is ‘don’t worry, this won’t be used against you.’ I’m not sure they understand that many U.S. actors, general counsels for U.S. schools, would say because we’re uncertain about where the line is we would rather not take the risk.”

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#debatelikeabear 82China says no—the law requires constant approval.Elizabeth Redden 15, 7-31-2015, "Draft law to regulate foreign NGOs in China could have serious effects for educational exchanges," Inside Higher Ed https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/07/31/draft-law-regulate-foreign-ngos-china-could-have-serious-effects-educational Correspondent at Inside Higher Ed, covering international higher education

The question for universities even if they are able to gain registration is “what will the Chinese authorities allow you to do?” said Anthony J. Spires, an associate professor of sociology and associate director of the Center for Civil Society Studies

at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. “Every activity will have to receive approval not only from the supervisory agency but also from the public security bureau. That surely will make people think twice about developing new projects.” Scholars at NYU have also drawn attention to another aspect of the law -- a provision restricting foreign NGOs from subverting state power, undermining ethnic harmony or engaging in separatism, or disseminating information deemed to endanger state security or damage the national interest. In an op-ed in The New York Times, Ira Belkin and Jerome A. Cohen, directors of NYU’s U.S.-Asia Law Institute, argue that the draft law would extend

these prohibitions outside China’s borders. “In other words, if a student group on an American campus protests against Chinese government treatment of Tibetans, the university could be barred from activities in China, and its representatives in China could be detained and prosecuted ,” they write.