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Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw Hill

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Page 1: Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw

Mergers

Principles of Corporate FinanceBrealey and Myers Sixth Edition

Slides by

Matthew Will Chapter 33

©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000Irwin/McGraw Hill

Page 2: Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw

©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000Irwin/McGraw Hill

33- 2

Topics Covered

Sensible Motives for Mergers Some Dubious Reasons for Mergers Estimating Merger Gains and Costs The Mechanics of a Merger Takeover Battles Mergers and the Economy

Page 3: Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw

©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000Irwin/McGraw Hill

33- 3

1997 and 1998 Mergers

Selling Company Acquiring Company Payment, billions of dollars

NYNEX Bell Atlantic 21.0McDonnell Douglas Boeing 13.4Digital Equipment Compaq Computer 9.1Schweizerischer Union Bank of Swiz. 23.0Energy Group PCC Texas Utilities 11.0Amoco Corp. British Petroleum 48.2Sun America American Intl. 18.0BankAmerica Corp. Nationsbank Corp. 61.6Chrysler Daimler-Benz 38.3Bankers Trust Corp. Deutsche Bank AG 9.7Netscape America Online 4.2Citicorp Travelers Group Inc. 83.0

Page 4: Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw

©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000Irwin/McGraw Hill

33- 4

Sensible Reasons for Mergers

Economies of Scale

A larger firm may be able to reduce its per unit cost by using excess capacity or spreading fixed costs across more units.

$ $$Reduces costsReduces costs

Page 5: Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw

©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000Irwin/McGraw Hill

33- 5

Sensible Reasons for Mergers

Economies of Vertical Integration Control over suppliers “may” reduce costs. Over integration can cause the opposite effect.

Page 6: Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw

©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000Irwin/McGraw Hill

33- 6

Sensible Reasons for Mergers

Economies of Vertical Integration Control over suppliers “may” reduce costs. Over integration can cause the opposite effect.

Pre-integration (less efficient)

Company

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

Page 7: Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw

©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000Irwin/McGraw Hill

33- 7

Sensible Reasons for Mergers

Economies of Vertical Integration Control over suppliers “may” reduce costs. Over integration can cause the opposite effect.

Pre-integration (less efficient)

Company

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

Post-integration (more efficient)

Company

S

Page 8: Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw

©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000Irwin/McGraw Hill

33- 8

Sensible Reasons for Mergers

Combining Complementary Resources

Merging may result in each firm filling in the “missing pieces” of their firm with pieces from the other firm.

Firm A

Firm B

Page 9: Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw

©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000Irwin/McGraw Hill

33- 9

Sensible Reasons for Mergers

Combining Complementary Resources

Merging may result in each firm filling in the “missing pieces” of their firm with pieces from the other firm.

Firm A

Firm B

Page 10: Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw

©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000Irwin/McGraw Hill

33- 10

Sensible Reasons for Mergers

Mergers as a Use for Surplus Funds

If your firm is in a mature industry with few, if any, positive NPV projects available, acquisition may be the best use of your funds.

Page 11: Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw

©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000Irwin/McGraw Hill

33- 11

Dubious Reasons for Mergers

Diversification Investors should not pay a premium for

diversification since they can do it themselves.

Page 12: Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw

©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000Irwin/McGraw Hill

33- 12

Dubious Reasons for Mergers

The Bootstrap Game

Acquiring Firm has high P/E ratio

Page 13: Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw

©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000Irwin/McGraw Hill

33- 13

Dubious Reasons for Mergers

The Bootstrap Game

Acquiring Firm has high P/E ratio

Selling firm has low P/E ratio (due to low number of shares)

Page 14: Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw

©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000Irwin/McGraw Hill

33- 14

Dubious Reasons for Mergers

The Bootstrap Game

Acquiring Firm has high P/E ratio

Selling firm has low P/E ratio (due to low number of shares)

After merger, acquiring firm has short term EPS rise

Page 15: Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw

©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000Irwin/McGraw Hill

33- 15

Dubious Reasons for Mergers

The Bootstrap Game

Acquiring Firm has high P/E ratio

Selling firm has low P/E ratio (due to low number of shares)

After merger, acquiring firm has short term EPS rise

Long term, acquirer will have slower than normal EPS growth due to share dilution.

Page 16: Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw

©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000Irwin/McGraw Hill

33- 16

Dubious Reasons for Mergers

Earnings per dollar invested

(log scale)

NowTime

.10

.067

.05

Muck & Slurry

World Enterprises (before merger)

World Enterprises (after merger)

Page 17: Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw

©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000Irwin/McGraw Hill

33- 17

Estimating Merger Gains

Questions Is there an overall economic gain to the merger? Do the terms of the merger make the company

and its shareholders better off?

????

PV(AB) > PV(A) + PV(B)

Page 18: Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw

©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000Irwin/McGraw Hill

33- 18

Estimating Merger Gains

Economic Gain

Economic Gain = PV(increased earnings)

= New cash flows from synergies

discount rate

Page 19: Mergers Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers Sixth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Chapter 33 © The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000 Irwin/McGraw

©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000Irwin/McGraw Hill

33- 19

Takeover Defenses

White Knight - Friendly potential acquirer sought by a target company threatened by an unwelcome suitor.

Shark Repellent - Amendments to a company charter made to forestall takeover attempts.

Poison Pill - Measure taken by a target firm to avoid acquisition; for example, the right for existing shareholders to buy additional shares at an attractive price if a bidder acquires a large holding.