0 tech day vi reston, virginia 19 april 2006 ieee computer society identity federation in cancer...

1Tech Day VI

Reston, Virginia19 April 2006

IEEE Computer Society

Identity Federation in Cancer Biomedical Informatics Grid (caBIGTM)A Federated Identity Management Case Study

Tim Weil – CISSP, CISAKen Lin - CISSP

Booz Allen HamiltonIdentity Management Architect

2

Tech Day VI

Agenda

The Evolution of the Cancer Research and the Grid Infrastructure

Grid Security Architecture and Federated Identity Management (FIM)

FIM Use Cases and Architecture

Technology Evaluation and Recommendations

Summary

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Cancer Biomedical Informatics Grid builds the framework for sharing biomedical research information

The deciphering of the human genome offers insight into the development of numerous therapies, predictors, and markers for cancer

Annotated human biospecimens with detailed clinical information offers an unprecedented opportunity for the robust identification and accurate quantitation of molecular signatures of cancer, thereby accelerating the development and implementation of new cancer markers and therapies

The lack of common infrastructure has prevented life science research institutions from being able to mine and analyze disparate data sources

The inability to share technologies and data developed by different cancer research institutions can severely hamper the research process

The NCI Center for Bioinformatics (NCICB) created the project cancer Biomedical Informatics Grid (caBIGTM) and built the caGrid 0.5 prototype to satisfy simple data integration and sharing use cases

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Grid is a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) implementation to enable cross-organizational collaboration

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NCI Mission Statement

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This effort focuses on the authentication and authorization of the Identity and Access Management Operating Model

FocusedStandardization

Integration

INFORMATION SHARING/PROTECTION

Protect Intellectual Property


Protect Privacy Data


Protect Sensitive

Data

Protect Sensitive

Data

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CORE IdAM SUPPORTING

DATA STANDARDS LAYER Electronic Data Identity

CAPSTONE POLICIES

ENABLING IdAM

STANDARS AND

GUIDELINES

ENABLING PROCEDURES

AND MECHANISMS

DATA STANDARDS

BUSINESS DRIVERS

DirectoryServer

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PKI CA

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Domain NameSystem ServerDomain NameSystem Server

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TECHNICAL & SECURITY ARCHITECTUREMedium

Low

High

MaturityMaturity

AssuranceAssurance

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Identity and Access Management Operating Model (Authentication & Authorization)

Protect Privacy

Data

Protect Privacy

Data

Protect Intellectual

Property

Protect Intellectual

Property

Protect Sensitive

Data

Protect Sensitive

Data


BUSINESS DRIVERS CAPSTONE POLICIES

• Capstone policies provide overall guidance for managing compliance risk within the enterprise IT information sharing program.

• Derived from multi-jurisdictional regulations and standards including HSPD-12, FIPS 201, eAuthentication, HIPAA, and FDA 21 CFR Part 11,

• These policies reflect measures established through the best practices suggested by the various regulatory bodies.

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CORE IdAM

SUPPORTING

At the IT security layer, the IdAM Standards and Guidelines drive interoperability and serve as the operational baseline for inserting the capstone policies. Typical standard and guideline categories that apply include: Directory Services (LDAP), Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), Trust Domains (Federation), and Access Control Models (RBAC and ABAC).

Enabling IdAM Standards and GuidelinesBUSINESS DRIVERS

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IdAM Enabling Procedures and Mechanisms are determined by the maturity of the organization, level of assurance and sensitivity of the data.

•Procedures - Key procedures must be identified to support the enterprise IT IdAM operating model. The procedures contain levels of maturity ranging from Low to High consistent with the needs of system information sharing efforts. Enterprise IT should have flexibility in implementing appropriate levels of maturity consistent with the complexity of their efforts.

•Mechanisms – The key mechanisms that must be identified to support the operating model and procedures which contain levels of maturity ranging from Low to High consistent with the needs of the enterprise IT information sharing efforts.

Enabling Procedures and MechanismsBUSINESS DRIVERS

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Focused

Standardization

Integration

DirectoryServer

UserWorkstation


PKI CA

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MaturityMaturity

TECHNICAL & SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Medium

Low

High

AssuranceAssurance

Enabling Procedures and MechanismsBUSINESS DRIVERS

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Identity DATA STANDARDS LAYER Electronic Data

Data Standards for Identity ManagementBUSINESS DRIVERS

The IdAM Data Standards layer represents Identity and Electronic Data which may be modeled as business transaction data (SOAP messages), metadata (XML Schemas), or metalanguages (Data Dictionaries, Logical Data Model). Enterprise IT should leverage the data standards for identity management such as federated identity standards (i.e. SAML, Shibboleth, WS-*) and cryptography standards (i.e. PKIX - X.509 )

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This effort focuses on the authentication and authorization of the Identity and Access Management Operating Model

FocusedStandardization

Integration






Protect Sensitive

Data

Protect Sensitive

Data

Phy

sica

l

Ent

ity

Man

agem

ent

Cre

dent

ial

Man

agem

ent

Sto

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CORE IdAM SUPPORTING

DATA STANDARDS LAYER Electronic Data Identity

CAPSTONE POLICIES

ENABLING IdAM

STANDARS AND

GUIDELINES

ENABLING PROCEDURES

AND MECHANISMS

DATA STANDARDS

BUSINESS DRIVERS

DirectoryServer

UserWorkstation


PKI CA

UserWorkstation

SONETMux

ATMSwitch

Router

DirectoryServer

UserWorkstation


DirectoryServer

DirectoryServer

UserWorkstation

UserWorkstation


PKI CA

UserWorkstation

PKI CAPKI CA

UserWorkstation

UserWorkstation

SONETMux

ATMSwitch

Router

SONETMux

ATMSwitch

Router

DirectoryServer

UserWorkstation


PKI CA

UserWorkstation

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DirectoryServer

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DirectoryServer

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UserWorkstation

PKI CAPKI CA

UserWorkstation

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TECHNICAL & SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

MediumLow

High

MaturityMaturity

AssuranceAssurance

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Identity and Access Management – Evolutionary Model

IdAM Requirements

Develop the IdAM capability requirements and assurance levels to support business capabilities

Maturity Assessment

Assess the maturity level of an organization’s IdAM capability

Establish an organizational wide trusted identity and identity proofing process

Trusted Identity

Integrated Provisioning

Provision entity attributes from various authoritative sources to the trusted identity

Enterprise Portal

Simplified Sign On, credential based authentication, centralized privilege management

Federated Identity

Cross enterprise information sharing with trusted identity and access policies

Bus

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Focused Capabilities

Standardization

Cost and Complexity

Integration

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caGrid 0.5 Identity and Access Management (IdAM) Architecture

GUMS

Ohio State

User A

User B

User C

User D

Usernam

e/P

assword

Secure Communication

Single Sign On

Delegation

…..

Proxy Cert

Proxy Cert

caBIG

NCI

GUMS

Proxy Cert

Proxy Cert

Usernam

e/P

assword

Use

rnam

e/P

assw

ord

Proxy Cer

Use

rnam

e/P

assw

ord

Proxy Cert

GUMS: Grid User Management Service

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Federated Authentication Scenarios

Non-caGrid Certificate. John Smith wants to use the X.509 certificate obtained from a 3rd party Certification Authority to access caBIG services

caGrid-Certificate. John Smith uses caGrid X.509 certificate to access caBIG services

No Certificate. John Smith wants to use the Email username and password to access caBIG services

Implications

– caGrid needs to accept credentials of different assurance levels

– Assurance levels are defined by 1) the identity proofing process, AND 2) the credential itself

– In the identity federation environment, the architecture needs to accommodate existing credentials rather than creating new credentials

– Credential management will fall on the organization who issues the credential

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Federated Authentication Architecture leveraging the EAuthentication architecture

caBIG

Federated Authentication Architecture

Georgetown NCI

UPMCFox Chase Certification

AuthorityFox Chase Certificate

Grid Certificate

Georgetown LDAP

UPMC Hardware Token

Certification AuthorityService

Identity Federation Service (IFS)


Username and password

Authentication Assertion

Authentication Authority Registry

Certification Authority

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Assertion Based Scenario (Users without X.509 certificates)

Assertion Based Authentication

Georgetown User


Credential Service Provider (Georgetown LDAP)

8. The IFS generates a X.509 certificate for the user

1. Request Access to caBIG

4. Redirect Users to Georgetown LDAP

5. Submit Username and Password

7. Georgetown LDAP generates an authentication assertion

6. Georgetown LDAP authenticates the user

caBIG


2. Where is Georgetown’s Authentication Authority?

3. URL of Georgetown’s Authentication Authority

9. The IFS generates proxy certificates for the user

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Certificate Based Scenario (Users with X.509 certificates)

Certificate Based Authentication

Fox Chase User


6. The IFS generates a X.509 certificate for the user

1. Request Access to caBIG with a Fox Chase certificate

4. Is this certificate still valid (Not expired)?

5. Yes, the certificate is valid

caBIG


2. Where is Fox Chase’s Authentication Authority?

3. URL of Fox Chase’s Authentication Authority

7. The IFS generates proxy certificates for the user

Credential Service Provider (Fox Chase Validation Service)

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Federated Authorization Scenarios

Mary Smith owns the Protein Database System (PDBS) at Rutgers University.

– caBIG Users Access Policy. caBIG users must be Medical Doctors with 10 years of experience approved to be qualified PDBS users

– Local Access Policy. caBIG qualified users can only use PDBS from 10:00am to 11:00am EST everyday. Other timeslots are reserved for Rutgers users.

Joan Taylor owns the Cell Attachment Analytical Service (CAAS) at University of Pittsburgh. The CAAS is used in the Hope research project with participants from different organizations in caBIG.

– Privilege Delegation and Group Membership. Only Hope project manager from caBIG have read and write privileges to the CAAS. The Hope project manager can delegate read and write privileges to Hope project members.

– Provisioning/Auditing. The IRB at University of Pittsburgh needs to know who has read and write privileges to CAAS on the weekly basis.

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Federated Authorization Architecture using the attribute based authorization

Fox ChaseClinical Trial

Management System

Federated Authorization Architecture

Georgetown User

PEP: Policy Enforcement Point

PDP: Policy Decision Point

ADS: Attribute Discovery Service

10:30 am ESTGeorgetownEntity Attribute

Authority

Hope Project Membership

UPMCProject Attribute

Authority

PDP/ADS

PDP/ADS

PDP/ADS

PEPMedical Doctor

10 years of Experience

Hope Project Member Privileges

Attribute Authority Registry Fox Chase

Time Server

Hope Project Owner

caBIG

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An illustrative example of federated identity management

AuthenticationService

ValidationService

Attribute DiscoveryService

AuthorizationService

Credential ServiceProvider

Credential Service Provider

Credential ServiceProvider

Userid/passwordX.509 CertsSmartcards

Tokens

Users

Varying assurance level credentials

Userid/passwordX.509 CertsSmartcards

Tokens

GRID Service

…

NCICB Fox Chase

…

User

Project

Attribute

Org.

…

…

Virtual Organization

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The following open source technologies were evaluated based on the notional architecture

Technology Version Purpose

Globus Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) 4.0.1Provide service delegation, single-sign-on, and PDP chaining for grid infrastructure

Shibboleth/GridShib1.3 / Beta

Providing attribute authority services with Web based authentication

Pulling authorization attributes from the Shibboleth attribute authority service to grid services

SAML (OpenSAML) 1.xProvide authentication, authorization decisions and attribute assertions

Grid User Management Service 0.5 User account management tool

caGrid Authorization Management Service

0.5 User attributes management tool

Grouper 0.5.6 Enterprise group management tool

Signet 0.5 Enterprise privilege management tool

SAFE 2.0 FDA 21 CFR Part 11 compliance credential

Common Security Module (CSM) 3.0.1 NCI security library for developers

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Illustrative mapping of authentication technologies

caBIG

Federated Authentication Architecture

Georgetown NCI

UPMCFox Chase Certification

AuthorityFox Chase Certificate

Grid Certificate

Georgetown LDAP

UPMC Hardware Token

Certification AuthorityService



Username and password

Authentication Assertion

SAML

SAFE Credential

GSI Proxy Certificate

GridLogon / GUMS

GridLogon / GUMS


Certification Authority

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Illustrative mapping of authorization technologies

Fox ChaseClinical Trial

Management System

Federated Authorization Architecture

Georgetown User

PEP: Policy Enforcement Point

PDP: Policy Decision Point

ADS: Attribute Discovery Service

10:30 am ESTGeorgetown

Entity AttributeAuthority

Hope Project Membership

UPMCProject Attribute

Authority

PDP/ADS

PDP/ADS

PDP/ADS

PEPMedical Doctor

10 years of Experience

Hope Project Member Privileges

Attribute Authority Registry Fox Chase

Time Server

Hope Project Owner

caBIG

GridShib(SAML)

Shibboleth Attribute Authority

Service

GSI PDP Chaining

Grouper/Signet CSMCAMS

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The evaluation shows many technologies are still in early development stages

Technology Status of Current Release

Globus GSI Proxy Certificate 4.0 is available

Globus GridLogon/MyProxy Cannot generate end entity certificates (EECs) in our testing release. Importing a SAFE credential will violate the non-repudiation requirement in the SAFE Standard. Does not support assertion based authentication method.

Globus GSI PDP Chaining 4.0 is available

Shibboleth Attribute Authority Service 1.3 is available

GridShib Beta. “Pull” mode is ready at the current release.

SAML 1.1 is available

GUMS 0.5 is available. Already runs as a caBIG service. Does not support assertion based authentication method. Cannot accept SAFE credentials.

CAMS 0.5 is available. Already runs as a caBIG service. Integrates with caBIG data standards. Does not support SAML attribute assertion.

Grouper & Signet 0.5.6 Pre-Beta, does not have a grid service interface

CSM 3.0.1 works with LDAP and relational database as the back end. Cannot work with certificate back end currently.

SAFE 2.0 is available

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Identity and Access Management – Evolutionary Model

IdAM Requirements

Develop the IdAM capability requirements and assurance levels to support business capabilities

Maturity Assessment

Assess the maturity level of an organization’s IdAM capability

Establish an organizational wide trusted identity and identity proofing process

Trusted Identity

Integrated Provisioning

Provision entity attributes from various authoritative sources to the trusted identity

Enterprise Portal

Simplified Sign On, credential based authentication, centralized privilege management

Federated Identity

Cross enterprise information sharing with trusted identity and access policies

Bus

ines

s V

alue

Focused Capabilities

Standardization

Cost and Complexity

Integration

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Identity and Access Management (IdAM Framework)

Credentialing

Entity Management

Assurance Level

Business Events

Human Resource

Business Partner

CRM

Identity Proofing

Authoritative Sources

Storage

Trusted Identity

Provisioning

Attribute

Attribute

Attribute

Attribute

Attribute

Attribute

Attribute

Attribute

Attribute

Authentication

Credential

Authorization

Attribute

Attribute

Attribute

Attributes

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Architecture and Technology Recommendations

Develop “business-oriented” security use and abuse cases. caBIG™ should develop “business-oriented” security use cases to represent community processes. The technical focus of the current security use cases (iteration 2) does not represent the actual security requirements from the caBIG™ community. Since identity federation relies more on process than technology, this white paper defines a set of federated authentication and authorization scenarios as a basis to develop the notional architecture. The caBIG™ community should conduct further scenario definition and refinement to promote a more comprehensive federation architecture.

Vet the Federated Identity Management (FIM) requirements and the notional architecture. The FIM requirements and the notional architecture are straw man efforts that the caBIG™ community should vet extensively to validate that all security use cases are satisfied before the production implementation. The proposed notional architecture focuses solely on authentication and authorization. Other core identity and access management (IdAM) and supporting services will evolve as the “business-oriented” security use cases are developed.

Proof-of-concept (POC) implementation. Due to the complexity of the evaluated technologies, a POC implementation of the notional architecture would provide greater clarity into the accuracy of the security use case development and how the notional architecture best applies. The POC should be built on top of the caBIG™ 0.5 release, however, many implementation requirements need to be evaluated.

Consider the maturity of technologies. Very few technologies in the evaluation list have been deployed in a large scale of production environment. Many evaluated technologies have very limited development resources that would impact the quality and the capability of production support once the software is released.

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Policy and Regulatory Environment Recommendations

Develop caBIG™ Governance Policies. A successful security implementation requires policies in many layers. For example, the capstone policies (e.g. HIPAA, 21 CFR Part 11 compliance, trust agreements), the enabling standards, guidelines, procedures (e.g. Identity proofing), and data standards (e.g. Authorization Attributes) should be developed along with the IdAM mechanism.

Facilitate Cross-Cutting Policy Development. A successful security implementation requires policies in many layers. For example, the capstone policies (e.g. HIPAA, 21 CFR Part 11 compliance, trust agreements), the enabling standards, guidelines, procedures (e.g. Identity proofing), and data standards (e.g. Authorization Attributes) should be developed along with the IdAM mechanism.

Identify the minimum security requirements from the regulatory mandates. Security and privacy requirements from regulatory mandates are the minimum security requirements caBIG needs to comply. Although HIPAA and 21 CFR Part 11 were reviewed in this whitepaper, it’s strictly from the identity federation point of view. A comprehensive review should be conducted to capture all security and privacy requirements. It is likely those requirements will impact many workspaces and working groups in caBIG.

Consider separating regulated and non-regulated environments. Ensure a non-grid application to comply with regulatory requirements takes significant efforts and cost. Mixing regulatory and non-regulatory applications will elevate the required security controls, which is not necessary for many non-regulatory applications. caBIG should consider the design option of separating the technical architecture layer of regulated and non-regulated environments and enabling the data sharing at the semantic layer.

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Process and Execution Recommendations

Create an “Independent and Integrated” cross-cutting security working group.

– Domain workspaces are disconnected from security implementation

– No consolidated (from domain workspaces) security requirements

– Inconsistent security messages from different domain workspaces

– Lack of resource for security architecture to bridge the caBIG™ security principles an implementation

Develop a security engineering process.

– The security engineering process (SEP) will specify roles and responsibilities, identify process steps, and define inputs and deliverables. The security working group (if created) should use the SEP to ensure security is integrated into domain workspaces, security architecture is defined and vetted, and implementation is aligned.

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Security Engineering Process

()

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Security Engineering Process (cont)

()

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The real challenges of cross-institutional data sharing is political and cultural not technical

The Institutional Review Board (IRB) is the ultimate authority for defining security and privacy compliance policies. To share sensitive medical information among institutions would require IRBs’ approval and an individual trust agreement needs to be established (n^2 problem)

Currently, two data sharing mechanisms among institutions:

– Public data, no access control is required

– Sensitive data, access control is required

The concept of assurance level does not exist in the current practices of healthcare industry

Healthcare SOA security problems are complex as epitomized by

– Infrastructure Gaps: Some institutions are using Excel sharing data while some are using biomedical informatics systems

– Scientific vs. Engineering Mindset: Enthusiastic about technologies, needs to understand the importance of having an integrated engineering process

– Regulatory Compliance: IRBs are very conservative in crafting data sharing policies. Large scale agreement is difficult

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Thank you for joining us!

For BAH Identity and Access Management Identity Federation

Kenneth LinSenior Consultant

Booz | Allen | Hamilton

Tel (703) [email protected]

Kenneth LinSenior Consultant

Booz | Allen | Hamilton

Tel (703) [email protected]

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Example Security Architecture – SAFE

From caBIG™ security whitepaper

0 tech day vi reston, virginia 19 april 2006 ieee computer society identity federation in cancer...

Documents

tech day

privacy data

idam data standard

idam standards

simple data integration

procedures key procedures

mechanisms business

disparate data sources