01 - american nurses' ass'n v state of ill

8/12/2019 01 - American Nurses' Ass'n v State of Ill

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{\f0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0

}{\f0 \b1 \fs18 \cf1 \i0{\f0 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs18 \cf1 \i02/8/2014}}{\f0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0\par}}{\li0 \f0 \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \qc \i0

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}}{\f0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0}}\f0 \li0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \ql \sb0 \fs18 \ri0 \cf1 \i0 \intbl \cell \intbl{\li0 \f0 \b0 \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \qr \i0}\f0 \li0 \b0 \fs18 \ri0 \cf1 \i0 \qr \intbl \cell \row }{\trowd \lastrow \trleft0\clbrdrb \clbrdrl \trql \clwWidth10080 \cellx10080\intbl{\li0 \f0 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs18 \cf1 \i0{\f0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs18 \cf1 \i040 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 244, 39 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,902, 54 USLW 2448}}\f0 \li0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \ql \sb0 \fs18 \ri0 \cf1 \i0 \intbl \cell \row}}\par }{\footer {{\trowd \lastrow \trleft0\clpadl60 \clpadfl3 \clbrdrt \brdrw20 \brdrcf17 \brdrs \clbrdrb \clbrdrl \trql \clvertalb \clwWidth9300 \cellx9300\clpadl60 \clpadfl3 \clbrdrt \brdrw20 \brdrcf17 \brdrs \clbrdrb \clbrdrr \trql \clwWidth700 \cellx10000\intbl{\li0 \f0 \b0 \ql \ri0 \fs20 \cf17 \i0

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}}{\f0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs20 \cf17 \i0\u169\'3f 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.}}\f0 \li0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \ql \sb0 \fs20 \ri0 \cf17 \i0 \intbl \cell \intbl{\li0 \f0 \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf17 \qr \i0{\b0 \i0 \ul0 \fs20 \f0 \chpgn }}\f0 \li0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \fs20 \ri0 \cf17 \i0 \qr \intbl \cell \row }}\par }{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \par}\sect\sbknone\pgncont\cols1{ \cf1 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_document_1}{\*\bkmkend co_document_1}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\*\bkmkstart I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb95be672_wmKLnW}{\*\bkmkend I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb95be672_wmKLnW}\par}{\li0 \f3 \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \qc \i0

{\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0783 F.2d 716\par}}{\li0 \f3 \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \qc \i0{\li0 \f3 \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \qc \i0{\li0 \f3 \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \qc \i0{\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0United States Court of Appeals,\par}}

{\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0Seventh Circuit.\par}}}{\li130 \f3 \b0 \ri130 \fs26 \cf19 \qc \i0{\li130 \f3 \b0 \ri130 \fs26 \cf19 \qc \i0{\li130 \f3 \b0 \ri130 \fs26 \cf19 \qc \i0{\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf19 \i0AMERICAN NURSES\rquote ASSOCIATION, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,\par}

}{\li130 \f3 \b0 \ri130 \fs26 \cf19 \qc \i0{\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0v.\par}}{\li130 \f3 \b0 \ri130 \fs26 \cf19 \qc \i0{\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa260 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0STATE OF ILLINOIS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.


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\par}}}}{\li0 \f2 \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \qc \i0{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f3 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0No. 85\u8211\'3f1766.}}}{\f3 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f3 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0|}}{\f3 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0Argued Jan. 24, 1986.}}

{\f3 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0|}}{\f3 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0Decided Feb. 18, 1986.}}{\f3 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0|

}}{\f3 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa260 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied April 4, 1986.\par}}}}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0Nurses associations brought sex discrimination action against State, charging that State paid workers in predominantly male job classifications higher wage notjustified by any difference in relative worth. The United States District Courtfor the Northern District of Illinois, Charles P. Kocoras, J.,}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1985121124&pubNum=345&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0


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606 F.Supp. 1313,}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0dismissed complaint, and associations appealed. The Court of Appeals, Posner, Circuit Judge, held that, although associations had no cause of action against State based strictly on \u8220\'3fcomparable worth\u8221\'3f study, associations further alleged intentional discrimination sufficient to state sex discriminationcause of action.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0Reversed and remanded.\par}}}

{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_attorneysAndLawFirms_1}{\*\bkmkend co_attorneysAndLawFirms_1}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa260 \sb260 \fs26 \cf19 \i0Attorneys and Law Firms\par}}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0}{\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_718_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_718_1}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0*718}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0Edith Barnett, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs-appellants.\par}

}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0James I. Rubin, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.\par}}}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0


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{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0Before POSNER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.\par}}}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_opinion_1}{\*\bkmkend co_opinion_1}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf19 \i0Opinion\par}}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa260 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0POSNER, Circuit Judge.\par}}

}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_Ifa188eb1845011e38578f7ccc38dc}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_Ifa188eb1845011e38578f7ccc38dc}\par{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0This class action charges the State of Illinois with sex discrimination in employment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin

dType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=42USCAS2000E&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb95be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i042 U.S.C. \u167\'3f 2000e}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0, and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The named plaintiffs are two associations of nurses plus 21 individuals, mostly but not entirelyfemale, who work for the state in jobs such as nursing and typing that are filled primarily by women. The suit is on behalf of all state employees in these jobclassifications. The precise allegations of the complaint will require our careful attention later, but for now it is enough to note that they include as an ess

ential element the charge that the state pays workers in predominantly male jobclassifications a higher wage not justified by any difference in the relative worth of the predominantly male and the predominantly female jobs in the state\rquote s roster.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f


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\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0}{\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_719_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_719_1}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0*719}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0The complaint was filed in May 1984, and before the state answered, an amendedcomplaint was filed early in July. Less than a month later the state moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. In November the plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to the state\rquote s motion, to which they attached exhibits not obtained in the course of pretrial discovery\u8212\'3ffor there had been no discovery. In April 1985 the district judge dismissed the complaint under}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1004365&cite=USFRCPR12&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb95be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=D

ocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0but without ruling on the state\rquote s alternative request for summary judgment,}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1985121124&pubNum=345&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0606 F.Supp. 1313.

}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0The ground for dismissal was that the complaint pleaded a comparable worth caseand that a failure to pay employees in accordance with comparable worth does not violate federal antidiscrimination law. The plaintiffs appeal. They argue thattheir case is not (or perhaps not just) a comparable worth case and that in characterizing the complaint as he did the district judge terminated the lawsuit bya semantic manipulation. The state both defends the judge\rquote s ground for dismissal and argues that we can equally well affirm on the ground that the state\rquote s motion for summary judgment should have been granted.\par}}

}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0Comparable worth is not a legal concept, but a shorthand expression for the movement to raise the ratio of wages in traditionally women\rquote s jobs to wages i


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n traditionally men\rquote s jobs. Its premises are both historical and cognitive.}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0The historical premise is that a society politically and culturally dominated by men steered women into certain jobs and kept the wages in those jobs below what the jobs were worth, precisely because most of the holders were women. The cognitive premise is that analytical techniques exist for determining the relativeworth of jobs that involve different levels of skill, effort, risk, responsibility, etc. These premises are vigorously disputed on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Economists point out that unless employers forbid women to compete for the higher-paying, traditionally men\rquote s jobs\u8212\'3fwhich would violate federal law\u8212\'3fwomen will switch into those jobs until the only difference in wages between traditionally women\rquote s jobs and traditionally men\rquote s jobs will be that necessary to equate the supply of workers in each type ofjob to the demand. Economists have conducted studies which show that virtuallythe entire difference in the average hourly wage of men and women, including that due to the fact that men and women tend to be concentrated in different typesof job, can be explained by the fact that most women take considerable time outof the labor force in order to take care of their children. As a result they tend to invest less in their \u8220\'3fhuman capital\u8221\'3f (earning capacity);and since part of any wage is a return on human capital, they tend therefore tobe found in jobs that pay less. Consistently with this hypothesis, the studies find that women who have never married earn as much as men who have never married

. To all this the advocates of comparable worth reply that although there are nolonger explicit barriers to women\rquote s entering traditionally men\rquote sjobs, cultural and psychological barriers remain as a result of which many though not all women internalize men\rquote s expectations regarding jobs appropriatefor women and therefore invest less in their human capital.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}

{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0On the cognitive question economists point out that the ratio of wages in different jobs is determined by the market rather than by any a priori conception of relative merit, in just the same way that the ratio of the price of caviar to theprice of cabbage is determined by relative scarcity rather than relative importance to human welfare. Upsetting the market equilibrium by imposing such a conception would have costly consequences, some of which might undercut the ultimategoals of the comparable worth movement. If the movement should cause wages in traditionally men\rquote s jobs to be depressed below their market level and wagesin traditionally women\rquote s jobs to be jacked above their market level, women will have less incentive to enter traditionally men\rquote s fields and more

to enter traditionally women\rquote s fields. Analysis cannot stop there, because the change in relative}{\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_720_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_720_1}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0*720}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0


10/49

wages will send men in the same direction: fewer men will enter the traditionally men\rquote s jobs, more the traditionally women\rquote s jobs. As a result there will be more room for women in traditionally men\rquote s jobs and at the same time fewer opportunities for women in traditionally women\rquote s jobs\u8212\'3fespecially since the number of those jobs will shrink as employers are induced by the higher wage to substitute capital for labor inputs (e.g., more word processors, fewer secretaries). Labor will be allocated less efficiently; men andwomen alike may be made worse off.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0Against this the advocates of comparable worth urge that collective bargaining,public regulation of wages and hours, and the lack of information and mobility of some workers make the market model an inaccurate description of how relative wages are determined and how they influence the choice of jobs.}

{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0The point has particular force when applied to a public employer such as the State of Illinois, which does not have the same incentives that a private firm would have to use labor efficiently.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F11986108520_1" }{\fldrslt{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0[1]}}}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B11986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B11986108520_1}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0It should be clear from this brief summary that the issue of comparable worth (on which see the discussion and references in Paul Weiler, The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth in the Pursuit of Pay Equity for Women, Discussion Paper No.15, Program in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School, November 1985) is not of t

he sort that judges are well equipped to resolve intelligently or that we shouldlightly assume has been given to us to resolve by Title VII or the Constitution. An employer (private or public) that simply pays the going wage in each of thedifferent types of job in its establishment, and makes no effort to discouragewomen from applying for particular jobs or to steer them toward particular jobs,would be justifiably surprised to discover that it may be violating federal lawbecause each wage rate and therefore the ratio between them have been found tobe determined by cultural or psychological factors attributable to the history of male domination of society; that it has to hire a consultant to find out how it must, regardless of market conditions, change the wages it pays, in order to a


11/49

chieve equity between traditionally male and traditionally female jobs; and thatit must pay backpay, to boot. We need not tarry over the question of law presented by this example because as we understand the plaintiffs\rquote position itis not that a mere failure to rectify traditional wage disparities between predominantly male and predominantly female jobs violates federal law. The circuits that have considered this contention have rejected it, see}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1984132597&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_706" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1Spaulding v. University of Washington,}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0740 F.2d 686, 706\u8211\'3f07 (9th Cir.1984)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0;}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1980113034&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1

.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1Lemons v. City & County of Denver,}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.1980)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0;}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin

dType=Y&serNum=1977123951&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1Christensen v. Iowa,}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir.1977)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0, and the}

{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1AFSCME}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0case discussed below; we shall see shortly that this rejection may be compelledby the Supreme Court\rquote s decisions in the}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1


12/49

{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1Davis}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0and}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1Feeney}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0cases.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0The next question is whether a failure to achieve comparable worth\u8212\'3fgranted that it would not itself be a violation of law\u8212\'3fmight permit an inference of deliberate and therefore unlawful discrimination, as distinct from passive acceptance of a market-determined disparity in wages. The starting point foranalyzing this question must be}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1981125303&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1County of Washington v. Gunther,

}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0452 U.S. 161, 101 S.Ct. 2242, 68 L.Ed.2d 751 (1981)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0. Women employed to guard female prisoners were paid less than men employed to guard male prisoners. Since male prison inmates are more dangerous than female ones and since each male guard on average guarded ten times as many prisoners as each female guard, the jobs were not the same. Therefore, paying the male guardsmore could not violate the Equal Pay Act of 1963,}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin

dType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=29USCAS206&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_5ba1000067d06" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i029 U.S.C. \u167\'3f 206(d)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0, which requires equal pay only for equal work. The issue was whether it could violate Title VII, and the Court held that it could. A comparable worth study figured in this conclusion. The plaintiffs had alleged (and the allegation had to b


13/49

e taken as true for purposes of appeal, because the complaint had been dismissed, as in this case, for failure to state a claim) that the county had conducted acomparable worth}{\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_721_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_721_1}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0*721}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0study and had determined that female guards should be paid 95 percent of what male guards were paid; that it had then decided to pay them only 70 percent;}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u8220\'3fand that the failure of the county to pay [the plaintiffs] the full evaluated worth of their jobs can be proved to be attributable to intentional sexdiscrimination. Thus, [the plaintiffs\rquote ] suit does not require a court tomake its own subjective assessment of the value of the male and female guard jobs, or to attempt by statistical technique or other method to quantify the effects of sex discrimination on the wage rates.\u8221\'3f}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1981125303&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1

.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_2253" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0452 U.S. at 181, 101 S.Ct. at 2253\u8211\'3f54}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0(footnote omitted).\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f

\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F21986108520_1" }{\fldrslt{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0[2]}}}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B21986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B21986108520_1}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0All that this seems to mean, as the dissenting Justices pointed out, is \u8220\

'3fthat even absent a showing of equal work, there is a cause of action under Title VII when there is direct evidence that an employer has}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1intentionally}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0depressed a woman\rquote s salary because she is a woman. The decision today do


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es not approve a cause of action based on a}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1comparison}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0of the wage rates of dissimilar jobs.\u8221\'3f}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1Id.}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0at 204,}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1981125303&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_2265" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0101 S.Ct. at 2265

}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0(emphasis in original). The relevance of a comparable worth study in proving sex discrimination is that it may provide the occasion on which the employer is forced to declare his intentions toward his female employees. In}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1Gunther}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0the county accepted (it was alleged) the recommendation of its comparable worth

consultant regarding the male guards\u8212\'3fdecided to pay them \u8220\'3fthefull evaluated worth of their jobs\u8221\'3f\u8212\'3fbut then rejected the recommendation regarding the female guards and did so because of \u8220\'3fintentional sex discrimination,\u8221\'3f that is, because they were female, not becausethey had easier jobs or jobs that, for any reason, the market valued below theguarding of male prisoners (however a comparable worth consultant might value them).\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f

\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F31986108520_1" }{\fldrslt{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0[3]}}}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B31986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B31986108520_1}


15/49


16/49

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees (AFSCME) v. Washington,}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir.1985)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0, suggests the type of evidence that is insufficient. The state\rquote s traditional policy had been to pay state employees the prevailing market rates of pay.Beginning in 1974, however, the state commissioned a series of comparable worthstudies, each of which found that employees in predominantly female job classifications were paid about 20 percent less than employees in predominantly male jobclassifications judged to be of comparable worth. Eventually the state passed legislation providing for the phasing in over a decade of a wage system based oncomparable worth.}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0The suit charged that the state\rquote s failure to act sooner was a form of discrimination. The case was tried and the plaintiffs won in the district court, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that a decision to pay market wages is not discriminatory, that \u8220\'3fcomparable worth statistics alone are insufficient to establish the requisite inference of discriminatory motive,\u8221\'3f}

{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1985144265&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1id.}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0at 1407,}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0and that \u8220\'3fisolated incidents\u8221\'3f (

}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1id.}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0) of intentional}{\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_722_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_722_1}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0*722

}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0discrimination in the form of help-wanted ads specifying the sex of the applicant were not enough to convert the case into one of wage discrimination across different jobs.\par}}}


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{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F41986108520_1" }{\fldrslt{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0[4]}}}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B41986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B41986108520_1}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0The}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1AFSCME}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0case resembles our hypothetical case of the firm accused of sex discriminationmerely because it pays market wages.

}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1AFSCME}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0shows that such a case is not actionable under Title VII even if the employer is made aware that its pattern of wages departs from the principle of comparableworth to the disadvantage of women (plus the occasional male occupant of a traditionally woman\rquote s job) and even if the employer is not so much a prisonerof the market that it cannot alter its wages in the direction of comparable worth, as eventually the State of Washington did. The critical thing lacking in

}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1AFSCME}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0was evidence that the state decided not to raise the wages of particular workers}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1because

}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0most of those workers were female. Without such evidence, to infer a violationof Title VII from the fact that the state had conducted a comparable worth studywould, again, just discourage such studies.\par}}}


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{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F51986108520_1" }{\fldrslt{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0[5]}}}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B51986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B51986108520_1}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0The plaintiffs can get no mileage out of casting a comparable worth case as anequal protection case. The Supreme Court held in}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976142392&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1Washington v. Davis,}

}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0, that the equal protection clause is violated only by intentional discrimination; the fact that a law or official practice adopted for a lawful purpose has a racially differential impact is not enough. The Court applied this principle to sex discrimination in}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1979135134&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt

{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0. Massachusetts had a law giving preference in state employment to veterans. Thepreference was applicable to female as well as male veterans but of course mostveterans are male. But as the purpose of the law was to benefit veterans of either sex rather than to favor men over women, the plaintiff\rquote s constitution

al challenge failed. \u8220\'3f \u8216\'3f[D]iscriminatory purpose\u8217\'3f ...implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. Itimplies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part \u8216\'3fbecause of,\u8217\'3f not merely \u8216\'3fin spite of,\u8217\'3f its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.\u8221\'3f}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1979135134&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_2296" }{\fldrslt


19/49

{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1Id.}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0at 279, 99 S.Ct. at 2296}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0(citation and footnotes omitted).\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F61986108520_1" }{\fldrslt{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0[6]}}}

{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B61986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B61986108520_1}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0These holdings cast additional light on the contention that intentional discrimination can be inferred from the state\rquote s failure to eliminate wage disparities shown by the comparable worth report. Knowledge of a disparity is not thesame thing as an intent to cause or maintain it; if for example the state\rquotes intention was to pay market wages, its knowledge that the consequence would be that men got higher wages on average than women and that the difference mightexceed any premium attributable to a difference in relative worth would not makeit guilty of intentionally discriminating against women. Similarly, even if thefailure to act on the comparable worth study could be regarded as \u8220\'3frea

ffirming\u8221\'3f the state\rquote s commitment to pay market wages, this wouldnot be enough to demonstrate discriminatory purpose.}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0To demonstrate such a purpose the failure to act would have to be motivated atleast in part by a desire to benefit men at the expense of women.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par

}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F71986108520_1" }{\fldrslt{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0[7]}}}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B71986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B71986108520_1}}


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{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0Neither}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1Davis}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0nor}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1Feeney}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0were Title VII cases, a point emphasized in}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976142392&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_2046" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1

{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1Davis.}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0See 426 U.S. at 238\u8211\'3f39, 96 S.Ct. at 2046\u8211\'3f47.}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0But when intentional discrimination is charged under Title VII the inquiry is the same as in an equal protection case. The difference between the statutory andconstitutional prohibitions becomes important only when a practice is challenged not because it is intended to hurt women (say), but because it hurts them inadvertently and is not justified by the employer\rquote s needs\u8212\'3fwhen, in

short, the challenge is based on a theory of \u8220\'3fdisparate impact,\u8221\'3f as distinct from \u8220\'3fdisparate treatment\u8221\'3f (= intentional discrimination). The plaintiffs in this case, however, have said that they are proceeding on the basis of disparate treatment rather than disparate impact. Their decision is understandable. In the usual disparate-impact case the plaintiff challenges}{\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_723_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_723_1}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0*723}}

{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0some job qualification\u8212\'3ffor example, that the applicant have a high-school diploma, or pass an entrance exam\u8212\'3fas disproportionately excluding blacks or some other protected group, and the issue is whether the qualificationis reasonably necessary for the job, in which event it is lawful notwithstandingits exclusionary effect. See, e.g.,}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1985122151&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_846" }{\fld


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rslt{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1Aguilera v. Cook County Police & Corrections Merit Bd.,}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0760 F.2d 844, 846\u8211\'3f47 (7th Cir.1985)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0, and cases cited there. It is not apparent what the analogy to an exclusionaryjob qualification would be in this case.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0Another point is that the Bennett Amendment to Title VII (the last sentence in

}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=42USCAS2000E-2&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_f383000077b35" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i042 U.S.C. \u167\'3f 2000e\u8211\'3f2(h)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0) authorizes employers to pay different wages to men and women provided that thedifference would be lawful under the Equal Pay Act, which allows unequal pay for equal work if the inequality results from \u8220\'3fany ... factor other thansex,\u8221\'3f

}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=29USCAS206&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_e07e0000a9f57" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i029 U.S.C. \u167\'3f 206(d)(1)(iv)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0. The Supreme Court in}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1

Gunther}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0assumed without quite deciding that the Bennett Amendment allows an employer charged (necessarily under Title VII rather than the Equal Pay Act) with paying unequal wages for unequal work to defend by showing that the inequality is based on something other than sex, even if the result is a disparate impact. See}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin


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dType=Y&serNum=1981125303&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_2249" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0452 U.S. at 171, 101 S.Ct. at 2249.}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0This reading would confine the scope of Title VII in a case such as the presentto intentional discrimination.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F81986108520_1" }{\fldrslt{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0[8]}}}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0

{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B81986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B81986108520_1}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F91986108520_1" }{\fldrslt{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0[9]}}}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B91986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B91986108520_1}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

So if all that the plaintiffs in this case are complaining about is the State of Illinois\rquote failure to implement a comparable worth study, they have no case and it was properly dismissed. We must therefore consider what precisely they are complaining about. Our task would be easier if the complaint had been drafted with the brevity that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure envisage though do not require. Before the era of modern pleading ushered in by the promulgationof the rules in 1938, a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss the complaint had to plead facts which if true showed that his legal rights had been invaded. The problem was that without pretrial discovery, which ordinarily could not be conducted before the complaint was filed, the plaintiff might not know enough facts to be able to make the required showing. For fact pleading the federal rules substituted notice pleading. The complaint would have to indicate the nature of the plaintiff\rquote s claim with only enough specificity to enable the parties t

o determine the preclusive effect of a judgment disposing of the claim (}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u8220\'3fa short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,\u8221\'3f}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1004365&cite=USFRCPR8&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb95be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt


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{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0Rule 8(a)(2)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0). The Appendix of Forms to the federal rules illustrates with a complaint for negligence that, so far as the invasion of the plaintiff\rquote s legal rights are concerned, says only: \u8220\'3fOn June 1, 1936, in a public highway called Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing said highway.\u8221\'3f Form 9, \u182\'3f 2; and see Rule 84 (\u8220\'3fthe forms contained in the Appendix of Formsare sufficient under the rules and are intended to indicate the simplicity andbrevity of statement which the rules contemplate\u8221\'3f). The plaintiff was expected to use pretrial discovery to gather the facts showing the defendant\rquote s negligence and the defendant could serve contention interrogatories on theplaintiff to learn the theory behind the claim. See}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1004365&cite=USFRCPR33&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb95be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0Rule 33(b)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

, and Note of Advisory Committee to the 1970 amendment thereto. When discovery was complete, a pretrial order would be issued formulating the issues for trial;this order would perform many of the functions of the complaint in a system of fact pleading. See}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1004365&cite=USFRCPR16&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb95be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0Rule 16}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

. See generally Wright, The Law of Federal Courts \u167\'3f 68 (4th ed. 1983).\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0The idea of \u8220\'3fa plain and short statement of the claim\u8221\'3f has not

caught on. Few complaints follow the models in the Appendix of Forms. Plaintiffs\rquote lawyers, knowing that some judges read a complaint as soon as it is filed in order to get a sense of the suit, hope by pleading facts to \u8220\'3feducate\u8221\'3f (that is to say, influence) the judge with regard to the nature and probable merits of the case, and also hope to set the stage for an advantageous settlement by showing the defendant what a powerful case they}{\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_724_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_724_1}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0


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*724}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0intend to prove. The pleading of facts is well illustrated by the present case.The complaint is twenty pages long and has a hundred page appendix (the comparable worth study).\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F101986108520_1" }{\fldrslt{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0[10]}}}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B101986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B101986108520_1}}

{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0A plaintiff who files a long and detailed complaint may plead himself out of court by including factual allegations which if true show that his legal rights were not invaded.}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982122600&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_1050" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.,}

}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir.1982)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0;}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1974112494&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_100" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1

Associated Builders, Inc. v. Alabama Power Co.,}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0505 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir.1974)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0;}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin


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dType=Y&serNum=1985114695&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_915" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc.,}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0757 F.2d 909, 915 (7th Cir.1985)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0(dictum);}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=0299701639&pubNum=0102228&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i05 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure \u167\'3f 1357}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0, at p. 604 (1969). The district judge thought the plaintiffs had done that here. Let us see.\par

}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0The key paragraph of the complaint is paragraph 9, which reads as follows:\par}

}{\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0Defendants State of Illinois, its Departments and other Agencies subject to theState Personnel Code, and State Officials, have intentionally discriminated andcontinue to intentionally discriminate against female state employees in the terms and conditions of their employment because of their sex and because of theiremployment in historically female-dominated sex-segregated job classifications.Defendants have intentionally discriminated and continue to discriminate againstmale state employees because of their employment in historically female-dominated sex-segregated job classifications. The acts, practices and policies of discrimination for which defendants are responsible include, but are not limited to,

the following:\par}}}{\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0(a) Use of a sex-biased system of pay and classification which results in and perpetuates discrimination in compensation against women employed in historically


26/49

female-dominated sex-segregated job classifications;\par}}}{\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0(b) Use of a sex-biased system of pay and classification which, because it results in and perpetuates discrimination in compensation against women employed in historically female-dominated sex-segregated job classifications, adversely affects males employed in such historically female-dominated sex-segregated job classifications;\par}}}{\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0(c) Compensation at lower rates of pay of female employees in historically female-dominated sex-segregated job classifications which are or have been evaluatedas being of comparable, equal, or greater worth than historically male-dominatedsex-segregated job classifications which receive higher rates of pay;

\par}}}{\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0(d) Compensation at lower rates of pay of male employees in historically female-dominated sex-segregated job classifications which are or have been evaluated asbeing of comparable, equal, or greater worth than historically male sex-segregated job classifications which receive higher rates of pay;\par}

}}{\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0(e) Compensation at lower rates of pay of female employees than male employees performing work of equal skill, effort and responsibility under similar working conditions;\par}}}{\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

{\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0(f) More favorable treatment in compensation of male state employees than of similarly situated female employees;\par}}}{\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0


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{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0(g) Discrimination in classification.\par}}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F111986108520_1" }{\fldrslt{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0[11]}}}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B111986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B111986108520_1}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0If this were the entire charging part of the complaint, there would be no question of dismissing it for failure to state a claim. The paragraph initially charges the state with intentional discrimination against its female employees, becau

se of their sex; and this, standing alone, would be quite enough to state a claim under Title VII. It continues, \u8220\'3fand because of their employment in historically female-dominated sex-segregated job classifications,\u8221\'3f and then adds a claim on behalf of male employees in those classifications. The continuation could be interpreted as an allegation that the state\rquote s failure toadopt a wage scale based on the principle of comparable worth violates Title VII, and if so fails to state a claim. But the mention of \u8220\'3fsex-segregated\u8221\'3f blurs the picture. If the state has deliberately segregated jobs by sex, it has violated Title VII. Anyway a complaint}{\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_725_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_725_1}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

*725}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0cannot be dismissed merely because it includes invalid claims along with a valid one. Nothing is more common.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par

}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0Subparagraphs (a) through (g) present a list of particular discriminatory practices; and since they are merely illustrative (\u8220\'3fnot limited to\u8221\'3f), the complaint would not fail even if none of them were actionable. Some are, some aren\rquote t. If (a), the \u8220\'3fuse of a sex-biased system for pay andclassification which results in and perpetuates discrimination in compensation against women employed in historically female-dominated sex-segregated job classi


28/49

fications,\u8221\'3f just means that the state is paying wages determined by themarket rather than by the principle of comparable worth, it states no claim. But if it means to allege that the state has departed from the market measure on grounds of sex\u8212\'3fnot only paying higher than market wages in predominantlymale job classifications and only market wages in predominantly female classifications, but keeping women from entering the predominantly male jobs (\u8220\'3fsex-segregated\u8221\'3f)\u8212\'3fit states a claim. Subparagraph (b) adds nothing. If the state is discriminating against women by maintaining unwarranted wage differentials between predominantly male and predominantly female jobs, any men who happen to find themselves in predominantly female jobs will be, as it were, dragged down with the women\u8212\'3fwill be incidental victims of a discrimination targeted against others.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0Subparagraph (c) is an effort to fit the case to the mold of

}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1Gunther.}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0The critical difference, however, is that here the}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1state}

}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0is not alleged to have \u8220\'3fevaluated\u8221\'3f any of the predominantly female job classifications as being of comparable worth to predominantly male classifications. The Illinois Commission on the Status of Women, a public body, commissioned a comparable worth study which found the same sort of disparities thatother comparable worth studies have found. The state itself\u8212\'3fmeaning the officials responsible for setting wage rates\u8212\'3fhas yet to reconfigure its wage system in accordance with the findings of the study, which is attached as an appendix to the complaint and is the evaluation to which paragraph 9(c) refers. But as we said earlier, the failure to accept the recommendations in a comparable worth study is not actionable. Paragraph 9(c) thus fails to state a claim\u8212\'3fas does (d), which is the same as (c) except that it, like subparagrap

h (b), complains on behalf of male occupants of predominantly female jobs.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0


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{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F121986108520_1" }{\fldrslt{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0[12]}}}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B121986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B121986108520_1}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0Subparagraphs (e) and (f) are inscrutable. If they complained about payment ofunequal pay for the same work they would state a claim under the Equal Pay Act.But that Act is not cited in the complaint, perhaps deliberately, and the substitution of \u8220\'3fwork of equal skill\u8221\'3f etc. for \u8220\'3fequal work... of equal skill\u8221\'3f etc. may also be deliberate. The intention may be to claim that different pay for different}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1but comparable}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0work violates Title VII\u8212\'3fand if so this is a comparable worth claim bya different name, and fails. However, when a defendant is unclear about the mean

ing of a particular allegation in the complaint, the proper course is not to move to dismiss but to move for a more definite statement. See}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1004365&cite=USFRCPR12&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb95be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0;}

{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1954120832&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_454" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass\rquote n,}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0347 U.S. 186, 189, 74 S.Ct. 452, 454, 98 L.Ed. 618 (1954)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0


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{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0That leaves subparagraph (g)\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fDiscrimination in classification.\u8221\'3f This could be a reprise of the comparable worth allegations or it could mean that in classifying jobs for pay purposes the responsible state officials had used the fraction of men in each job as a factor in deciding how high a wage to pay\u8212\'3fwhich would be intentional discrimination.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0Maybe the allegations in paragraph 9 are illuminated by subsequent paragraphs ofthe complaint. Paragraph 10, after summarizing the comparable worth study, says, \u8220\'3fDefendants knew or should have known of the historical and continuing existence of patterns and practices of discrimination in compensation and classification, as documented at least in part by the State of Illinois Study.\u8221\'3f All that the study \u8220\'3fdocuments,\u8221\'3f however, is that 28 perce

nt of the}{\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_726_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_726_1}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0*726}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0employees subject to the state\rquote s personnel code are employed in 24 job classifications, in each of which at least 80 percent of the employees are of thesame sex, and that based on the principles of comparable worth the 12 predominantly female job classifications are underpaid by between 29 and 56 percent. For

example, an electrician whose job is rated in the study at only 274 points in skill, responsibility, etc. has an average monthly salary of $2,826, compared to $2,104 for a nurse whose job is rated at 480 points. These disparities are consistent, however, with the state\rquote s paying market wages, and of course the fact that the state knew that market wages do not always comport with the principles of comparable worth would not make a refusal to abandon the market actionableunder Title VII. But at the very end of paragraph 10 we read,}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u8220\'3fMoreover, defendants have knowingly and}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1

willfully}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0failed to take any action to correct such discrimination\u8221\'3f (emphasis added), and in the word \u8220\'3fwillfully\u8221\'3f can perhaps be seen the glimmerings of another theory of violation that could survive a motion to dismiss. Suppose the state has declined to act on the results of the comparable worth study not because it prefers to pay (perhaps is forced by labor-market or fiscal constraints to pay) market wages but because it thinks men deserve to be paid more


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than women. Cf.}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982129340&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_3218" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1Crawford v. Board of Education,}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0458 U.S. 527, 539 n. 21, 102 S.Ct. 3211, 3218 n. 21, 73 L.Ed.2d 948 (1982)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0. This would be the kind of deliberate sex discrimination that Title VII forbids, once the statute is understood to allow wage disparities between dissimilar jobs to be challenged (}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1Gunther}}

{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0).\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

\u8220\'3fWillfully\u8221\'3f is, however, a classic legal weasel word. Sometimes it means with wrongful intent but often it just means with knowledge of something or other. Willful evasion of taxes means not paying when you know you owe tax. After reading the comparable worth study the responsible state officials knewthat the state\rquote s compensation system might not be consistent with the principles of comparable worth (\u8220\'3fmight\u8221\'3f because there has been no determination that the comparable worth study is valid even on its own terms\u8212\'3fmaybe it\rquote s a lousy comparable worth study). But it would not follow that their failure to implement the study was willful in a sense relevant toliability under Title VII. They may have decided not to implement it because implementation would cost too much or lead to excess demand for some jobs and insufficient demand for others. The only thing that would make the failure a form ofintentional and therefore actionable sex discrimination would be if the motivati

on for not implementing the study was the sex of the employees\u8212\'3fif for example the officials thought that men ought to be paid more than women even if there is no difference in skill or effort or in the conditions of work.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par


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}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0Paragraphs 11 through 31 of the complaint present the specific claims of each ofthe 21 named individual plaintiffs. In materially identical language each paragraph complains that the wage rate in the plaintiff\rquote s \u8220\'3fjob classification is discriminatorily depressed because it is historically female-dominated and because of defendants\rquote continuing use of a sex-biased system of pay and classification,\u8221\'3f and that the \u8220\'3fDefendants continue to pay discriminatorily low wages to plaintiff [name] because she [in one case he] works in a historically female-dominated job classification.\u8221\'3f Standing alone these allegations would appear to state merely a comparable worth claim. Butthey do not stand alone. In light of paragraphs 9 and 10, each of paragraphs 12through 31 may conceivably (if somewhat improbably) be intended merely to identify each of the named plaintiffs as a victim of the discriminations alleged in the earlier paragraphs.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par

}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F131986108520_1" }{\fldrslt{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0[13]}}}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B131986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B131986108520_1}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

}

{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F141986108520_1" }{\fldrslt{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0[14]}}}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B141986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B141986108520_1}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F151986108520_1" }{\fldrslt{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0[15]

}}}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B151986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B151986108520_1}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F161986108520_1" }{\fldrslt{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0[16]


33/49

}}}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B161986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B161986108520_1}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0We have said that a plaintiff can plead himself right out of court. But the court is not to pounce on the plaintiff and by a crabbed and literal reading of thecomplaint strain to find that he has pleaded facts which show that his claim isnot actionable, and then dismiss the complaint on the merits so that the plaintiff cannot replead. (The dismissal would preclude another suit based on any theory that the}{\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_727_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_727_1}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0*727}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0plaintiff could have advanced on the basis of the facts giving rise to the first suit.}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1985147192&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1

.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_854" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1Alexander v. Chicago Park District,}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0773 F.2d 850, 854 (7th Cir.1985)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0;}

{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1983135335&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_1277" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc.,}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0713 F.2d 1272, 1277 (7th Cir.1983)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

.) The district judge did not quite do that here, because this complaint can easily be read to allege a departure from the principles of comparable worth, and no more. But that reading is not inevitable, and the fact that it is logical andunstrained is not enough to warrant dismissal. In the system created by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a complaint \u8220\'3fshould not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.\u8221\'3f}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin


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dType=Y&serNum=1957120403&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_102" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1Conley v. Gibson,}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0355 U.S. 41, 45\u8211\'3f46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0. This language, repeated though it has been in countless later cases (see, e.g.,}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1984124905&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_2233" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1Hishon v. King & Spaulding,}}

{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0467 U.S. 69, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2233, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0), should not be taken literally; for taken literally it would permit dismissalonly in frivolous cases. As we said earlier, if the plaintiff, though not required to do so, pleads facts, and the facts show that he is entitled to no relief,the complaint should be dismissed. There would be no point in allowing such a lawsuit to go any further; its doom is foretold. But this is not such a case. Although the complaint tries to make too much out of a comparable worth study that,standing alone, cannot provide a basis for a claim under Title VII\u8212\'3falthough the complaint appears to include the theory of violation that the Ninth Circuit later and rightly rejected\u8212\'3fa complaint cannot be dismissed merely

because one of the theories on which it proceeds, and the facts alleged in support of that theory, do not make out a claim for relief. A complaint that allegesintentional sex discrimination, which}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1Gunther}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0makes actionable even though the discrimination is between different job classifications rather than within the same classification, cannot be dismissed just because one of the practices, indeed the principal practice, instanced as intenti

onal sex discrimination\u8212\'3fthe employer\rquote s failure to implement comparable worth\u8212\'3fis lawful.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}


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{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F171986108520_1" }{\fldrslt{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0[17]}}}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B171986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B171986108520_1}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0Furthermore, a complaint is not required to allege all, or any, of the facts logically entailed by the claim. If Illinois is overpaying men relative to women,this must mean\u8212\'3funless the market model is entirely inapplicable to labor markets\u8212\'3fthat it is paying women at least their market wage (and therefore men more), for women wouldn\rquote t work for less than they could get in the market; and if so the state must also be refusing to hire women in the men\rquote s jobs, for above-market wages in those jobs would be a magnet drawing thewomen from their lower-paying jobs. Maybe the references in the complaint to thesegregation of jobs by sex are meant to allege such refusals but if not this pleading omission would not be critical. A plaintiff does not have to plead evidence. If these plaintiffs admitted or the defendants proved that there was no steering or other method of segregating jobs by sex, the plaintiffs\rquote theory of discrimination might be incoherent, and fail. But a complaint does not fail tostate a claim merely because it does not set forth a complete and convincing pi

cture of the alleged wrongdoing. So the plaintiffs do not have to allege steering even if it is in some sense implicit in their claim.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

Before concluding that the district court should not have dismissed the complaint we must consider whether anything happened between the filing of the complaintand the district court\rquote s decision to show that the plaintiffs really were pleading just a comparable worth case.}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0The first thing that happened was that the state filed its motion to dismiss orin the alternative for summary judgment. Attached to the motion were two affidavits, one from a state official attesting that the Illinois Nurses\rquote Association had not pressed for comparable worth in collective bargaining negotiations involving some of the job classifications to which the named plaintiffs belong, the other from an economist attacking the concept of comparable worth. In response the plaintiffs argued that their case was not a comparable worth case but a

n intentional}{\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_728_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_728_1}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0*728}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0discrimination case. This response is less decisive on the meaning of the compl


36/49

aint than our summary might suggest. The plaintiffs seem to understand by a comparable worth case one in which the only evidence of discrimination is that wagesdepart from the principle of comparable worth to the prejudice (mostly) of female employees. They seem to think\u8212\'3fwrongly in our view\u8212\'3fthat thestate\rquote s refusal to accept the recommendations of a comparable worth studythat a state agency had commissioned takes the case out of the category of comparable worth and puts it into that of intentional discrimination.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0But there was more to the plaintiffs\rquote memorandum in opposition. Several pages were devoted to arguing that there was additional evidence of discrimination besides the results of the comparable worth study and the refusal to take corrective measures in accordance with the study. If these pages had been submittedin the form of a motion to amend the complaint, then, even though the judge\rquote s leave to amend would have been required (the plaintiffs had amended the com

plaint once, and that was the only amendment they were permitted to make withoutthe judge\rquote s permission or the written consent of the defendants), he would have had to grant it. Leave to amend the complaint \u8220\'3fshall be freelygiven when justice so requires,\u8221\'3f}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1004365&cite=USFRCPR15&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb95be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

, and there could have been no prejudice to the defendants here, when the motionwould have come so soon after the filing of the original complaint and before discovery had begun.\par}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0\u160\'3f\par}{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F181986108520_1" }{\fldrslt{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0[18]}}}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B181986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B181986108520_1}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

}


37/49

{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F191986108520_1" }{\fldrslt{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0[19]}}}{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B191986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B191986108520_1}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0The plaintiffs attached to their memorandum more than 200 pages of exhibits. Much of this documentation is devoted to showing that the fraction of women variesacross jobs and that the higher the fraction the lower the wage, and thus duplicates the comparable worth study. But some of it is relevant to showing deliberate discrimination. Some of it indicates or asserts that women are not classifiedin accordance with the work they actually do and as a result are paid less thanthe state\rquote s own rules entitle them to; that appointing \u8220\'3fhand picked\u8221\'3f successors when jobs become vacant and disseminating news of jobopenings by word of mouth rather than by public notice prevent women from competing for the higher-paid, predominantly male jobs; that women have been excludedfrom some job categories altogether, even though they are capable of performingthe jobs; that predominantly female jobs have sometimes been abolished when layoffs were necessary, in order to spare men from being laid off; and that sometimes the same jobs have been given two classifications (e.g., Prison Clerk and Clerk Typist), one for men and one for women, with the former being paid more even though the work is identical. Much of this \u8220\'3fevidence\u8221\'3f would not

be admissible at trial; some is outside the statute of limitations (and hence \u8220\'3fmerely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal consequences,\u8221\'3f}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1977118787&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_1889" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,}}

{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 1889, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0); some is from before 1972, when Title VII was made applicable to state employees\u8212\'3fand there is no legal duty to undo the effects of previous discrimination (see}{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1977118842&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_2742" }{\fldrslt{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1

{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1Hazelwood School District v. United States,}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0433 U.S. 299, 309, 97 S.Ct. 2736, 2742, 53 L.Ed.2d 768 (1977)}}}{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0). But we are not at the moment interested in whether the plaintiffs have produced any evidence of unlawful discrimination. That is the issue with regard to the


38/49

propriety of summary judgment. The present issue is whether, even though the judge could not properly dismiss the complaint because it did not state a claim onits face, the plaintiffs may have put themselves out of court by their subsequent filing\u8212\'3fa filing that might be compared to a response to a

01 - american nurses' ass'n v state of ill

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