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Role of the Legislature in the Budget Procedure: The Case of Kosovo Assembly

AbstractFrequent olitical!legal changes as "ell as the form of

organi#ation of the government in Kosovo from $%%% untilthe second art of &''( have been re)ected in thebudget rocedure* Budget rocedure in Kosovo under theadministration of +nited ,ations -issions in Kosovo.+,-/K0 "as a sui generis case ali1e +,-/K administration itself2 "here role of the Kosovo Assembly "as nothing more than symbolic* 3ith declaration of theinde endence on $4 th February &''( and romulgation of the Constitution on ( th A ril &''( de 5ure2 the role of the

Assembly in the budget rocedure has been em o"ered*6o"ever2 regardless im rovements in the constitutional osition of the Assembly2 a survey of the Assembly of Kosovo revealed many shortcomings that are necessary to be addressed in order to increase the role of the

Assembly in the budget rocedure* /n this direction "eshall em hasi#e increasing of the role of the Assembly inaccordance "ith constitutional authori#ations in thebudget rocedure2 increasing of the technical ca acitiesof the Assembly to conduct research and analysis of thebudget and underta1ing ste s on facilitation thecommunication bet"een -7F!8overnment!Assembly!theBudget and Finance Committee*

Keywords : Legislature .Assembly02 budget2 budget rocedure2 Budget and Finance Committee .

1. IntroductionResearch and analyses on budgetary powers of

legislatures are conducted from many authors in many

_____________________________ Iliria International Review 2013/1 FelixVerlag, Holzkirchen, er!an" an# Iliria $ollege, %ri&tina, 'o&ovo

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Role of the Legislature in the BudgetProcedure: The Case of Kosovo Assem l!

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states. They note that budgetary powers of legislature are di erentfrom country to country. Several factors in uence these di eringscore among them; ( ! the type of political system (that is"presidential" parliamentary" or hybrid!; (#! the type of electoralsystem through which representatives are elected ( that is" plurality$ma%ority" propotional" and semipropotional!; (&! the legislature'sformal powers (in this case" the e tent of its powers to amend thee ecutive budget!; ()! the combination of the political environmentwithin which the legislature functions" and the political will of legislators to e ert parliament's powers; and (*! the technicalcapacity of the parliament. (+ohnson and

,a-amura " /ienert #00*" 1ehner" #00):&2" +ohnson #00*!.3bove mentioned factors in uence the budget theory to provide a

simple classi4cation of legislative roles in the budget process"identifying three types of legislatures:

a0 Budget ma1ing legislatures . These legislatures have the ability"possibilities and capacities to amend and refuse draft budgetproposed by the government as well as ability to compile additionaldraft budget in accordance with its own choice. 5n this group we havethe legislatures of the following states; 6S3" 78ech Republic"9enmar-" ungary and inland.

b0 Budget in)uencing legislatures . These legislatures have theability and capacity to change or refuse approval of the draft budget

of the government" however they lac- ability to prepare additionaldraft budget in accordance with their own choice. 5n this group wehave the legislatures of these states: 3ustria" e ico" rance" ,orway" ,etherlands" ?oland" ?ortugal" Spain"Sweden" Swit8erland" and Tur-ey.

c0 Budget a roving legislatures* These legislatures lac- thecapacity to change or refuse draft budget of the government as wellas the ability to prepare additional draft budget in accordance withtheir own choice. The power of these legislatures is limited only to theapproval of the government proposal. 5n this group 4rst of all we havelegislatures of the type of 1estminster" in which presentation of theamendments in the draft budget is implied as loss of trust towardsthe e ecutive branch of the government" thus speeding up theresignation of the government. 5n this group we have legislatures of these states: 3ustralia" 7anada" 5reland" ,ew @eeland" Angland andtwo states that do not belong to the 1estminsterBs type C +apan and

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this budget and budgetary procedure developed. 5ncreasing the roleof legislatures in these states is result of democracy andconstitutional changes C processes which enabled increasing the roleof the legislatures in their political systems that have earlier on beenclosed. Sometime in the states with central planning system therehas not been even a budget oEce (?remchand and " #00*!" in e amining the ne us between theseparation of powers and the legislatureBs budgetary authority andalso in analy8ing the main factors from which the budget power of theparliament in =osovo case depends on. or this purpose two inde es

of /iener are being used. 1e thought to use these inde es asframewor- to calculate a score for the 3ssembly of =osovo whichwould also in uence a comparative perspective for the discussion./ienert established a strong lin- between political and budgetarypowers of legislatures and the degree of separation of the legislativeand e ecutive branches of government. 3nyway he notices thatdi erences between countries with the same form of government canbe at least as great as the di erences across di erent forms of governments because country speci4c factors" rather than form of government are predominant in determining the budgetary powers of the legislatures.

Research methodology has been supported on the secondarysources" and analy8ing of all legal documents based on whichbudgetary procedure is developed as well as reports of the >inistry of

inance" laws and constitution of =osovo. Ta-ing into account the factthat until now in =osovo no such analyses have been conducted" wehave also relied our research in interviews (public and anonymous!with members of the Gudget and inance 7ommittee" deputies andoEcials of the >inistry of inance (> !. 5nterviewees have given agreat contribution in enlightening the role of 3ssembly and Gudget


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and inance 7ommittee during legislative phase of the budgetaryprocedure.

A cept introduction paper is laid out as follows. ?art 55 reviewsrelevant literature. ?art 555 belongs to overview of =osovo budgetprocess.. ?art 5J is presents an assessment of the =osovo legislativebudget procedure after independence according to /iener inde es.

irst we have applied the 5nde on separation of political powers of the e ecutive and the legislature in =osovo (?art 3 of 3nne ! and4ve factors of control of e ecutive by the legislature are described(?art G of 3nne !. 3lso" on the basis of 4ve particularly importantcriteria based on /ienert inde we have represented the budgetarypower of the =osovo assembly (3nne #!. 3t the end conclusions aregiven.

2. Literature review and framework for analysis5n the beginning of year 0" when the economical transition in

post communistic countries started" the economical sciences did notrecogni8e in full such practices that would help to developers of economical policies. 1ith time passing and by being introduced to thee perience of some countries that faced this transition before"di erent scientists went into analy8ing economical transition process.(Gird" Abel and 1allich K: 2)L$L0&" ,ord #000" Tan8i &!.Thoughthere were many di erent analyses made by many di erent author

for the economical transit" analyses on budgetary procedures startedlatter. irst discursions about the role of parliament and e ecutiveorgans on budgetary procedure came out from the studies of institutional measures treatment in controlling budgetary de4cit andpublic debts. (e.g. von agen" #!. Than the analy8e focusing therole of parliament in budgetary procedure followed. Dn this settinganalysis of the role of the parliament on budgetary procedure weremore freMuent in individual countries than comparative analyses.

7aiden ( &! treats the comparative aspect of the budgetaryprocedure in 78ech and Slova- Republic by saying the budgetaryprocedures in transitory countries are becoming always more ali-e tothose of developed" democratic countries.

Straussman ( 2! in his comparative analy8e pointed out themeasurements to be underta-en in strengthening the >inistry of

inance" widening the income bases and their classi4cation./e/oup (#00)! analyses in comparative aspect the establishment

and development of the budgetary national system in Slovenia andungary after political changes in these countries" a special accent he

as given to the role of the parliament in the budgetary procedure inthis countries.


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+ohnson and Stapenhurst (#00K! treat the international e perienceof the roles and functions of legislative budget oEces in four regionsof the globe.

1ehner (#002! and /ienert (#00*! developed inde es of thelegislature's budgetary power which would also enable a comparativeperspective for the discussion.

Schic-Bs analy8e (#00#! amongst else represents the role of thecongress in budgetary procedure in 6S3.

1ehnerBs analy8e (#00 ! shows the role of i-sellBs analy8e ( *! tells about the resistance in budgetaryreforms in 6-raine.

Straussman and abianBs analy8e ( )! treats the problems of 4nancing local power in ungary that have to do with changes in thecentral budged of the state.

3lesina" >are" and ?erottiBs analy8e ( *! treats the 5talian budgetprocedure.

Gratic (#00)! has made an analyses of 7roatian parliament (sabor!role in budgetary procedures showing the wee- power of theparliament in this procedure and giving recommendations about this.

3s we said at the beginning the analyses of =osovo 3ssembly rolein budgetary procedure is made by referring to /ienerBs way of analy8e and 5nde es.

. !verview of t"e Kosovo bud#et $rocess3s of the day >inistry of inance ta-es the initiative for preparation

of the budget until the phase of 4nal calculations" many institutionsand state organs underta-e a multitude of legal$procedural actions. 5none word all these activities are called budget procedure. Gudgetprocedure represents a system of main rules (formal and non$formal!which enable e ecutive branch of the

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>ain sta-eholders in the budgetary procedure are the >inistry of inance" 3ssembly" DEce of the inistry guidelines" e penditurepriorities and budget ceilings$ ctober : >inistry of inance consults proposals frombudget from budget organi8ations and organi8es public hearings withbudget organi8ations. This process is usually conducted during +uly$3ugust. ,ot later than & Dctober" the >inistry of inance sends aproposed budget appropriation to each budget organi8ation andtogether with the >edium Term A penditure ramewor- sends it tothe ctober: The inistry of inance.;$ 9ecember: The last deadline when the 3ssembly adopts the=osovo budget.

.1. %"e $"ase of $re$aration of t"e draft bud#et Gudget preparation starts with pro%ection of the 4scal policy for

the coming year by the >inistry of inance. Gudget procedure withregard to budget preparation begins with sending of the Gudget7ircular by > to the budget organi8ations.

Gudget calendar for preparation of the draft budget doesnBt haveconstant timetable each year. Gudget calendar was not de4ned in


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detail in none of the budget steps neither by any 3dministrative5nstruction and neither by /aw until year #00K. A.g. 4rst Gudget7ircular for budget planning for the year #00K was sent on th 3pril#00L (> Gudget 7ircular #00 N0 !" while the 4rst Gudget 7ircular forbudget planning for the year #00 has been sent on & th +une #00K(> Gudget 7ircular #00KN0 !. This should have been e actlyregulated by the /aw on ?ublic inancial >anagement and3ccountability. rom #* th until & st of Dctober 4nal approval of thedraft budget shall be made in the inistry of inance isresponsible for cash and debt management and is the main contactpoint between the Gudget 9epartment and budget users.

'o( . %"e bud#et e(ecution $rocess. The approval of =osovo 7onsolidated Gudget by =osovo

assembly;#. 3fter the promulgation of the budget based on the law for

budgetary divisions from the 3ssembly" the >inister of Aconomyand inance enters these budgetary divisions on the appropriatesoftware for public funds management;


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&. 3t the beginning of each year" budgetary organi8ations(>inistries and >unicipalities!" are obliged to submit the plan of money ow to the Treasure 9epartment;

). Treasure 9epartment considering the money ow plan made bybudgetary organi8ations ma-es the allocation of founds. 6suallyfunds allocation is made for a period of three months" e cept forwages and salaries fund allocation of which is done each month;

*. 1hen budgetary organi8ations receive the funds allocated tothem " they may proceed by ma-ing use of this moneyapproved by the Treasure;

Though ways of managing public funds are not satisfactory" =osovohas got a very good system of budget e ecution characteri8ed byintegrated control" authori8ations" payments" and the accountingsystem managed by the Treasure. 7entrali8ing the ma%ority of moneyavailable from the government on a single account of the Treasure"but with a number of sub$accounts and the presence of a centrali8edaccounting system at Treasure 9epartment helps a lot on the eMualityof governmental accounts and ban- operations. This is furthersupported by good ban- operations and income accounts. Ouarterlyand yearly reports are based on the 5nternational Standards for ?ublicSector 3ccount of available money represented in a variety of dimensions and are much more informative than budget documents.

.). Internal control5n #000 the 9epartment of 5nternal 3udit (953! in the >inistry of

inance was established. 5ts duty is distributing internal audits inGudgetary Drgani8ations (GD!. /aw on ?ublic inancial >anagementand 3ccountability (/? >3! is the legal base of internal audit.Regarding internal audits /? >3 is highly based on 5nternationalStandards for ?rofessional ?ractices in 5nternal 3udit (5S??53!. 3ll GDshave their own yearly audit plan" but none of them communicatesthis to the >inistry of inance while some of them do report to theDEce of

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3ssembly of the Republic of =osovo" the DEce of the ?resident of theRepublic of =osovo" each >inistry and e ecutive agency"municipalities" independent bodies" the 7entral Gan- of the Republicof =osovo (7G=!" and other entities that are either more than *0 Ppublicly owned or receive funding from" or provide dividends or othernon ta revenue to" the =osovo 7onsolidated und including but notlimited the =osovo 7ustoms Service" the =osovo ?rivati8ation 3gencyand the DmbudspersonI. 3ctually D

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revenue" total e penditure" level of debt or is including in allocation of spendingH

3 second very important Muestion is F7an =osovo 3ssemblyamends the budget without restrictionsIH

3 third very important Muestion for e ante budgetary powers isF9oes =osovo 3ssembly has enough time to e amine the budget andpropose changesIH

9uring budget e ecution phase the important Muestion is Fdoes the3ssembly oblige the government to implement its e penditureprogramme e actly as adoptedIH 5f not" what are the restrictionsH

The most important Muestion in e post phase is Fdoes =osovo3ssembly have such a strong power to follow up vis$Q$vis e ecutiveaudit recommendations and desirable changes in public 4nancemanagementIH

3ccording to /ienert inde =osovo legislative power overbudget based on 4ve particularly criteria is presented in 3nne #.3fter you will see in detail traits of 4ve factors on which budget powerof =osovo 3ssembly is based.

).1. -edium %erm +($enditure ramework /-%+

3ny e ective government should wor- on an all inclusive framewhere long and midterm policies and priorities are de4ned" and whereresources are divided according to such policies and priorities in orderto insure a better future for the citi8ens. 9espite some di erentattempts =osovo has not yet a long term strategy of economicaldevelopment and this is an obstacle for long and midterm budgetaryplanning. Some attempts for creating the =osovo long term economicdevelopment strategy are made; a draft document is drown but is notyet approved by the government" so it serves only as an informationdocument.

6ntil now a fundamental wea-ness on the system of =osovoBspublic funds management is the lac- of long term orientation. 3s longas the /aw on ?ublic inancial >anagement and 3ccountability of each year has foreseen a three year budgetary perspective" de factthe 4scal perspective until #00K was a yearly one. irst attempt waspresenting >TA on donorBs conference in 9ecember #00* and wasrevised in #002. This was -nown by the government as Fwor- incontinuityI and was not included in the budget formulation processuntil year #00 .5n the absence of this" midterm budgetary plan layson >id Term A penditure ramewor- (>TA ! and ?ublic 5nvestments


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?rogram (?5?!. So" though =osovo since years is on the process of developing a long$lived access on the budget the 4rst >TA wasintroduced in the budget formulation process for #00 and coveredthe period #00 $ . 3 parallel process to >TA is even thedevelopment of ?ublic 5nvestment ?rogram (?5?! which is going onsince years. ?5? is a multi$annual plan of budgetary process withfocus in identi4cation of needs and 4nding of funds for capital articlesthat could attract investments and help in building the economy ordecrease unemployment or help in any other way for reaching themain aims of the country. The idea is that through ?5? we can as-budgetary organi8ations to prepare investment pro%ects which wouldbe funded by governments own income or =osovo foreign partners.

inally" in #00K =osovo government presented an enhanced >id Term A penditure ramewor- for #00 $#0 (>TA ! which sets policypriorities" including economic growth and good governance. Theintroduction of the medium$term e penditure framewor- (>TA ! wasthe driving force of the reform in budget management ande penditure policy.


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'o( ). -edium %erm +($enditure ramework The >TA shall containa! >acroeconomic and 4scal forecasts for the >TA Gudget ?eriod"

inclu$ding main economic indicators such as in ation" TA Gudget ?eriod;d! Astimated resources reMuired to service internal and e ternal

debt during the >TA Gudget ?eriod;

e! 3n analysis of capital investment tendencies 4nanced from thebudget and an assessment of their volume for the >TA Gudget?eriod;

f! 3 review of salary policy for the >TA Gudget ?eriod;g! 3n analysis of the tendencies in the employment and wage bill in

the budget sector and an assessment of the impact of any wagereform policy;

h! 3 proposal for ad%usting wage bill policy to the general macro$4scal framewor- set in the >TA for the purpose of assuringcorresponding 4nancial support;

i! Astimated e penditure ceilings for each budget organi8ation thatis not a municipality or an independent agency with dedicated

revenue; %! Astimated grant levels for each municipality calculated inaccordance with the formulae established in the /aw on /ocalinistry may desire to include.

The >TA aims to ensure targeted spending of scarce stateresources in line with government priorities" and to strengthen thelin- between policies and e penditure estimates over a period of three years. 5n spite of some shortcomings in the 4rst year of application" the introduction of the >TA in the =osovo budgetprocess is a ma%or step forwards. 5t brings the consideration of policies and e penditures together in a multi$annual perspective. The>inister of inances should submit >TA to the 3ssembly each yearuntil &0 3pril. The legislative is only informed of the governmentBsmedium$term strategy" but not as-ed for its approval. The 3ssemblyapproves only the law on budgetary divisions of each year by meansof which budget is approved as foreseen on general forecasts of >TAin case of formulation by the e ecutive.


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).2. Le#islature &ower to amend t"e annual bud#et.3ccording to the 7onstitution" 3ssembly has to approve the

budget" which has the legal character of a draft law or bill. or thatpurpose 3ssembly must receive the budget bill at least two monthsprior to the beginning of the 4scal year. /? >3 states that the 4scalyear is the calendar year" so the budget must be submitted latest on& of Dctober.

=osovo 3ssembly power to amend the annual budget under 6,>5= administration has been more 4ctional than realistic. Gudgetprocedure in =osovo under the 6,N6,>5= administration has been suigeneris case" same as the 6,>5= administration itself. Gudgetprocedure in =osovo has been e clusively e ecutive" fragmented andwith no in uence by the 3ssembly.

Gesides the fact 7onstitutional ramewor- established theinstitution of 3ssembly" 4nal authori8ations to set 4nancial andpolitical parameters and approve Gudget of =osovo remaincompetence of the SRSanagement of ?ublicinance; this law was in principle adopted by the 3ssembly; howeverSRS< refused to sign it" respectively to render it e ective. This lawwas adopted by the SRS< only after it was amended.

/egislature with no powers to approve the budget doesnBt deserveto be called legislature at all. 3ssembly of =osovo had the right toonly formally review and stamp a budget" which 4nally could of couldnBt be signed by the SRS

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presented by the 3ssembly was ) " for #0 # was *L" while for #0was #L (Reports with recommendations related to 9raft /aw onGudget of Republic of =osovo for #0 &" #0 # and #0 !.

>oreover" these amendments were more technical in characterthan substantial. Time for draft$budget review was limited because of chain holdups that in years had characteri8ed the budgetaryprocedure in =osovo.

9evelopment of the budget procedure only in the line of e ecutiveorgans cased negative e ects on many directions" but above all itmade that Gudget of =osovo is not transparent. /et us remember thatvery important factor which impacted the need to increase the role of legislatures in budget procedure in all South$Aastern countries"respectively increasing of the budget transparency in these countriesis the need of countries in development and those in transition tohave access to international 4nancial institutions in order decreasepoverty. Receiving 4nancial assistance from international 4nancialinstitutions is conditioned with certain obligations for the developingand countries in transition" out of which most important is having aMualitative and transparent budget procedure (1ehner" #00):#L!.1ith declaration of independence the legal basis for more active roleof the 3ssembly in budget procedure has been created. 3fter the9eclaration of 5ndependence and the 7onstitution the role of the3ssembly in budget procedure de 5ure has improved a lot. 1hile de

facto its role is still small and symbolic. The assessment of =osovo3ssembly role in budget procedure" presented in /inerBs inde " ismade relying more on %uridical and constitutional dispositions thatrefer to the lin- between the division of power and roles of theparliament on budget and budget procedure. Though from the

%uridical and constitutional point of view the 3ssembly has theunlimited right to ma-e the budged amendment" de fact the situationstands fare more di erent and the 3ssembly has a very wee- role onit. Ta-ing into account the new system of governance andauthori8ations provided by the 7onstitution" the 3ssembly has theright to amend the draft budget presented by the

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/ienert 5nde alignment (3nne 55! technical capacity of parliament toconduct research and analysis is treated such a fourth factor(subsection ).)!.

).2.1. Ability of t"e Le#islature to access im$ortant bud#etrelated documents.

?resent$day legislatures pay a particular regard to the informationon the e penditure ows granted by the e ecutive bodies thatimplement the budget and" also from the audit authorities. DA79 hasevolved so$called the best practices for budget transparency (DA79b" #00#:L$ )! (Gest ?ractices for Gudget Transparency! that renderthe issues of comprehensive budget information" publication of thespeci4c budget reMuirements as well as the integrity and the liabilityof the central budget institutions. ereinto" DA79 recommends theconclusion of these budgetary documents and their publicationdesigned for the ful4llment of the best practices for budgettransparency;

'o( . 'ud#etary documents t"at insure 'ud#et%rans$arencyCom rehensive Budget ; includes the stateBs entire incomes ande penditures by providing data on the current situation and mid$term pro%ects.

Preliminary Budget Re ort ; points out the long$term targets of the4scal and economic policies" such are 4scal and economic mid$termoversights.-onthly Re ort ; reveals the improvements on the budget e ecutionby including the e planation on the di erence between the real andpresumptive sum of the budget.?emiannual Re ort ; enables comprehensive and accurate data onthe budget e penditures including mid$term oversights on thebudget e ecution.

Annual Re ort ; shall be revised by the revision body and publishedwithin the si months after the end of a 4scal year.Pre!election Re ort@ tells overall public 4nancial situation prior to theelections.

9eliberation of the parliamentarian decisions over the budget in=osovo sustains in information and budgetary documents that areway far from the standards stipulated from DA79 for e act andcomprehensive information provided from the e ecutive branch andrevision authorities according to /? >3.


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This is presented de %ure while de facto e ecutiveBs reports oftenwere delayed and fail to be submitted within the reMuired deadlinesas overseen by law.

).2.2. 3ole of t"e Assembly committees on bud#et control5t is often thought that the e istence of a strong system for the

3ssembly operational committees is a guarantee for an increase of /egislatureBs role on the decision$ta-ing (/eloup" #00):*#!.Dperational committees of the 3ssembly of =osovo for 4rst time wereestablished under the provisions . .#2.f of the 7onstitutional

ramewor- (6,>5= Regulation #00 N ! and according to Regulation).) of the Rules of ?rocedure of the 3ssembly. Gudget and inance7ommittee consists of members appointed proportionally by theparties and coalitions represented in the 3ssembly (3rticle . . of 6,>5= Regulation #00 N !. The selection principle of the members of the Gudget and inance 7ommittee very often is in demur withprofessional reMuirements that one member of the Gudget and

inance 7ommittee should meet. 3ccording to budget theory it is verywell -nown that the responsibilities of the budget committees aredi erent in every country. 5n some countries they have generalresponsibilities for budget approval. owever" in di erent countriescommittees have the responsibility only on reviewing the draft$budget while in some countries committees on budget and 4nances

only wor- on resemblance of section committees on proposals of budget users. ?ursuant to article * of the Rules of ?rocedure of the3ssembly the structure of the responsibilities of the Gudget and

inance 7ommittee of the 3ssembly of =osovo is consisted on the:review of di erent budgetary and 4nancial issues; review of annualbudget; review of budgetary implications for the current year and thecoming years that follow the draft$budget and thus to ma-erecommendations to the respective committee or the 3ssembly.

The Gudget and inance 7ommittee has also the responsibility forsupervision of annual reports and revised 4nancial statements of the=osovo Gudget. This is presented according to the right" howeverthroughout all legislations from ' and present" the activity of theGudget and inance 7ommittee was more technical thanfundamental. Role of the budget committees includes also informingthe parliaments for budget revenues and e penditures. 5n one$partygovernments budget committees are wea-er in scope of informingthe parliament and budget e ploiters" while in multi$partygovernments their role is much greater in this direction (/upia and>c7ubbins" ):&2 $&K)!. 5n =osovo" although the government isbuild upon bi$partisan coalition" the role of Gudget and inance


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7ommittee in informing the 3ssembly and the citi8ens on the budgetissues remains minor because of the committeeBs inability to havetimely and constant access on the records on budget e ecutions.

).2. . 4ynamics of t"e $olitical $artiesGudgetary theory and practice leads us to understand that if one

parliament is constituted of several political parties and none of themhave the ma%ority of seats than the e ecutive power (government!has to put a lot of e orts on granting the ma%ority for approval of thedraft$budget (1ehner" #00):&K!. 5n such cases the debate over thebudget is overwhelming and in scope of critical scrutiny of the draft$budget C coverage which indirectly contributes to budgettransparency. ?arty discipline in countries with fragile democracies isthe main cause that leads house representatives to build up theiropinions on budget issues and this has a negative e ect on thebudget transparency. 6nfortunately" in such cases the representativesFare more loyal to party setting than their callingI (Sil-" KL: #!.3tthis picture" budgetary procedure in =osovo is a classic e pression of the political proportion that does ta-e account in. Shortage of open"detailed and transparent review in the 3ssembly remained and still isindirectly preconditioned by the de4ciency of the dynamic of thepolitical parties on the budget issues during process over budget.

5n principle ma%ority in the parliament is a prime indicator for the

voting results on the budget. 9uring all mandates" the budgetendorsement was ta-en in absentia of the political parties dynamics"represented in the 3ssembly. Aach of the governments beingsafeguarded with the ma%ority in the 3ssembly had no doubt for thebudget approval. 5n the other side" the opposition shrun- from theawareness with the power of the government's ma%ority in the3ssembly thus the draft$budget would be approved through thevoting machine.

Those colorless debates did not ta-e place for improvements in thebudget proposals but only for instant political calculations. ormationof such practices steers not only towards absence of Muali4ed andvital debate on the budget during its oversight and approval" but alsoin cases of the control of the budget e ecution.

).2.). %ime allowed for discussion of annual bud#et The budgetary theory and practice teach us that amongst all the

legislature's strength is determined by suEcient time limit for thebudget review.

The time span for budget review in the 3ssembly of =osovo by theGudget and inance 7ommittee has often been limited because of


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chain delays and legal$politic events that have portrayed during yearsthe budgetary policy and budgetary procedure in =osovo from until independence; a ecting the Gudget and inance 7ommittee nothaving time neither for its review of the draft$budget" not evenattempting on in uencing on its amendment. 3ccording to /? >3" thebudget draft should be submitted to legislative at least two monthbefore the beginning of the new 4scal year. 3fter its approval by the

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domestic permanent e pert for professional e pertise on the budget.,or the 3ssembly nor the Gudget and inance 7ommittee werefunded by the budget for trainings in the budget 4eld of e pertise.A ternal professional assistance was given solely from 6S359" DS7A",95" etc. The absence of technical power directly impacted andcontinues to hinder the representatives on their Muality performanceof their %ob as the representatives in the 3ssembly and in theirresponsibility towards their body of voters.

).*. 3estrictions durin# bud#et e(ecutions.3 general restriction is the fact that in conformity with provisions of

the /? >3 the budget may only be amended by the 3ssembly of theRepublic of =osovo. 9espite this /? >3 de4nes the cases when theA ecutive may reallocateNtransfer funds" sub%ect to certain limits"without 3ssembly approval" as is presented below:

3 budget organi8ation may" without obtaining the approval of the>inister" transfer up to 4ve percent (*P! of one appropriation of thatbudget organi8ation to another appropriation of that budgetorgani8ation during any 4scal year; provided" however" that no suchtransfer may be made into the wages and salaries appropriationwithout the approval of the >inister and" if applicable" theinister may" if provided with a valid %usti4cation by the head

of a budget organi8ation" authori8e the transfer of part of oneappropriation of that budget organi8ation to another appropriation of that budget organi8ation; provided" however" that the part sotransferred shall not e ceed 4fteen percent ( *P! of the negativelya ected appropriation.

5f the head of the budget organi8ation reMuests the >inister toauthori8e the transfer of an amount greater than 4fteen percent( *P! but less than twenty$4ve percent (#*P! of the negativelya ected appropriation" the >inister may authori8e such a transferonly after 4rst obtaining the written approval of the inister to

authori8e the transfer of an amount eMual to twenty$4ve percent(#*P! or more of the negatively a ected appropriation" the >inistermay authori8e such a transfer only after 4rst obtaining the approvalof the 3ssembly.

*. 4iscussion and conclusionGudget procedure in =osovo under the administration of 6,N6,>5=

(phase $#00K! was a sui generis case ali-e 6,>5= administrationitself. 5n such composition of power the budgetary procedure was


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entirely e ecutive and way to far from the balance between the3ssembly and e ecutive$governmental bodies and the >inistry of Aconomy and inance. Gesides the fact that the institution of the3ssembly is founded by the 7onstitutional ramewor-" 4nal power fordetermining 4nancial and political parameters on the approval of theGudget of =osovo remained under SRS

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and the %urists are e pected to give inputs on the budgetary issues.A ternal professional assistance was given solely from 6S359" DS7A",95" etc. 9uring all mandates the budget approval was ta-en in theabsent of the political partiesB dynamics. Those colorless debates didnot occur for enhancement in the budget proposals but only forinstant political calculations.

3s for the increase of the role of the 3ssembly on budgetaryprocedures these measures should be underta-en:

! 5ncrease of the 3ssemblyBs technical and 4nancial capacities forproducing vaster outcome in budgetary procedure" speci4cally: a!establishment of an oEce for the budget analysis would be in hand toproviding professional e pertise for the members of the assembly onbudgetary issues" b! budget funding for the Gudget and inance7ommittee for engagement of e perts and parallel to that" widen the

%ob responsibilities of the Gudget and inance 7ommittee" c! fundingthe training for representatives in the 4eld of budget and budgetaryprocedures and publication of di erent guidance regarding thebudget.

&! 6nderta-ing steps on facilitation the communication between> $

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A55+6 IIndices on t"e e$aration of &owers and t"e ontrol by t"e

Le#islature in Kosovo after inde$endence This anne describes the overall inde on the separation of powers"

based on twelve indicators of the separation of political powers andthe control of the e ecutive by the legislature. Gased on forms ofgovernment" Muantitative values are assigned" as follows:

Lienert Inde( of t"e e$aration of &owers and t"eLe#islature s &olitical ontrol : Kosovo case afterinde$endence

4escri$tion of variable ;uanti

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con4denceI in the government(e ecutive!

0= @es

&art '. Limitations on +(ecutive &ower by t"e Le#islatureK. 7an the government (e ecutive!determine the timing of sessions ofthe legislatureH

1= 5o0 es

. 7an the head of the State orgovernment veto bills modi4ed (andpossibly approved! by the legislatureH

0= @es es" provided the veto is not

re%ected by superma%ority in thelegislature # ,o" not under anycircumstances

0. 7an the e ecutive adoptsecondary laws with the same force asprimary lawsH

1= 5o 0 es" some secondary laws arenot reviewed by the legislature

. 9o nearly all draft laws originatein the e ecutiveH

1= 5o0 es

#. 7an the legislature bloc- theappointment of political appointeesthat are nominated by e ecutiveH

es 0= 5o


0

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Source: 3nalyses of =osovo case is conducted by author according to /ienerBsinde (F1ho 7ontrols the GudgetH The /egislature or the A ecutiveHI 5> " #00*!based on laws and constitution of =osovo.


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e ecutiveH*. Restrictions during budgete ecution. 9oes the legislatureoblige the government toimplement its e penditure programse actly as adoptedH 5f not" whatrestrictions are there on thegovernments powers to modify thebudget during implementationH

# A ecutive may neither withholdnor reallocate funds withoutlegislative approval.1 = +(ecutive may wit""old orreallocate funds> subBect tocertain limits.0 A ecutive has unlimited powersto limit e penditures in order toachieve overall budget ob%ectives.

A55+6 II

Table #. 5ndices for the /egislatureBs Gudget 3uthority in #K 7ountriesand =osovo 7ase

%y$e of#overnment

1 .

- e

d i u m C t e r m

f r a m e w o r k

2 .

A m e n

d m e

n t $ o w e r s

.

% i m e

f o r s c r u

t i n y o

f b u

d # e

t

) .

% e c " n

i c a

l s u $ $ o r t

t o l e #

i s l a t u r e

* .

3 e s t r i c t

i o n s d u r i n # e ( e c u

t i o n

T o t a l i n

d e (

Kosovo ?arlia. Republic 2 * 1 0 1 7Ar#entina ?residential 0 # 0 )Australia 1estminister 0 0 0 0 1Austria Semipresidential 0 & 0 #'el#ium ?arlia. >onarchy 0 & 0 0 )'olivia ?residential 0 & 0 *

anada 1estminister 0 0 0 0 14enmark ?arlia. >onarchy 0 & 0 *

inland Semipresidential 0 & 0 #

) 5ndices # is assigned because the /aw on Gudgetary 9ivisions is approved eachyear from the 3ssembly and is applied during >id $Term Strategy of A penditure.>id$ Term Strategy of A penditure is needed to be submitted to the 3ssembly until&0 3pril of the year before $ %ust for information without as-ing for its approval.


)

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rance Semipresidential 0 # 0 )Dermany ?arliam. Republic 0 & 0 0 )Dreece Semipresidential 0 0 0 0 0 0

un#ary Semipresidential 0 & 0 #Iceland ?arliam. Republic 0 & 0 #Indonesia ?residential 0 # #Ireland Semipresidential 0 0 0 0 0 0Italy ?arliam. Republic # & 0 7

Ea$an ?arliam.>onarchy

0 & # 7

Korea Semipresidential 0 0 # )-e(ico ?residential 0 0 # 05et"erland ?arlia. >onarchy 0 &5ew Fealand 1estminister 0 0 0 0 0 05orway ?arlia. >onarchy 0 & 0 #&ortu#al Semipresidential & 0 0 *

$ain ?arlia. >onarchy 0 0weden ?arlia. >onarchy & # 9

%urkey ?arlia. >onarchy 0 0GnitedKin#dom

1estminister 0 0 0 0 1

Gnited tates ?residential & # # # 10


*

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!tt> K.> 2000. ?roraUuns-i vodic 8a gradane" @agreb: 5nstitut 8a +avneinanci%e.

!+ 4> 2002a. FThe DA79 Gudgeting 9atabaseI. DA79 +ournal onGudgeting" (&! **$ L .!+ 4> 2002b. FDA79 Gest ?ractices for Gudget TransparencyI. DA79

+ournal on Gudgeting" (&!" L$ ).&remc"and A.> L. Daranival 1992. F 1998. iscal9ecentrali$8ation rom 7ommand to >ar-et" in; 1allace A. Dates" p. 2)L$L0& (The Aconomics of iscal ederalism and /ocal inance">assachusetts!. 3e#ulation on ?rocedure of the 3ssembly of =osovo"?ristine #0 >ay #00*" amended on +une #002.

3a$ort with amendments to draft law no. 0)N/$ 2* on the Gudget of theRepublic of =osovo for #0 &.

3e$ort with recommendations on the 9raft /aw of the Republic of =osovoGudget for #0 #.

3e$ort with recommendations on the 9raft /aw of the Republic of =osovoGudget for #0 .

ilk> &aul. 1987 . 6o" Parliament 3or1s . /ondon" ,ew or-: /ongman.traussman> E.4.> 199 . V 5deals and Reality in the Avolution of iscal

Reform in 7entral and Aastern AuropeF. ?ublic Gudgeting and inance )(Summer!" L $ * .

traussman> E.4. and abian> K.> 199). V/ocal 2001 FReconciling 3ccountability and iscal ?rudence: 37ase study of the Gudgetary Role and 5mpact of the Eoac"im> 200 F3ssessing the ?ower of the ?urse: 3n 5nde of /egislative Gudget 5nstitutionsI" ?olitical studies" Jol. *)" L2L$LK*.e"ner> E.> 200) I?ovrata- s margineH Rede4nisan%e doprinosa parlamenta

proraUuns$-om ci-lusuI (online! inanci%s-a Teori%a i ?ra-sa #K ( ! str. L$#&. 3vailable from http:NNwww.i%f.hrN T?N#00)N Nwehner.pdfc

orld 'ank Report no. #)$ =" Review of ?ublic A penditure and5nstitutions in =osovo" ## +une #00*.

Law ,o. 0&N/$0)K on ?ublic inancial >anagement and 3ccountability.Law 5o. 200 ?2 on ?ublic inancial >anagement and 3ccountability

announced with Regulation nr. #00& N L on the promulgation of a law


7
http://www.ijf.hr/FTP/2004/1/wehner.pdfchttp://www.ijf.hr/FTP/2004/1/wehner.pdfc

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adopted by the assembly of =osovo on public 4nancial management andaccountability.Law no. 0&N/$## for amendment of /aw no. 0&N/$0)K for the managementof public 4nances.


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