01a intro to itc and depo - sandia.gov · april 29 –may 18, 2018 albuquerque, new mexico, usa ......

1 – Introduction to ITC-27

The Twenty-Seventh International Training Course

1. In t roduc t ion to the ITC and DEPO

April 29 – May 18, 2018Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA

Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia LLC,a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc. for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration undercontract DE-NA0003525.

SAND2015-1984 TR

Introduction to ITC and DEPO

Learn ing Object ives

After completing this module, you should be able to:• Recognize the basic goal and structure of ITC• List the objectives of a State’s physical protection regime• List the three basic steps in the Design and Evaluation

Process Outline (DEPO)• Identify the approach used in ITC to design and evaluate

PPS

2




Course Goal

At the end of this training course, participants will be able to: • Apply the principles of a performance-based

methodology to design and evaluate a physical protection system (PPS) for nuclear facilities and materials against the threat of theft or sabotage Principles and methods are taught in each subject module Learning objectives and daily quizzes focus on these principles

and methods

3


Course Structure

The course consists of:• Lecture sessions (30)• Subgroup exercise sessions (20)

Application of lecture material through practical exercises Final exercise is a comprehensive design and evaluation problem

• Field trips for equipment demonstration, performance testing, and implementation examples

• Guest lectures Physical protection experts from the US and other countries

4




Course Sect ions

I. Defining Physical Protection System Requirements II. Designing a Physical Protection System III. Evaluating the Physical Protection System Design IV. Guest Lectures and Supporting Information

Hypothetical Facility and Exercise Data

5


Course Sect ions (cont ’d)

• Each section in the menu is a subject module that has 3 subsections: Copy of viewgraphs from lectures Subgroup exercises Text with additional information

• Hypothetical Facility and Exercise Data are used in all subgroup exercises

6




Typica l Dai ly Act iv i t ies at ITC

• Breakfast• Review of previous day’s lessons• Review of current day’s schedule• Lecture• Subgroup• Lunch• Lecture• Subgroup

7


Course Exper ience Feedback

• Students will be asked for their feedback on the course focusing on the following aspects: Experience Technology Content Instructors

• Short feedback questionnaires will be given throughout the course

• All feedback is completely anonymous• This feedback will allow the staff to address issues and

improve the course for future participants

8




Module Knowledge Assessment Quiz• A short quiz is given at the end of each module• Quiz results provide feedback to staff and participants on

training effectiveness• Results will be discussed real time with the subject

matter expert providing the module material9

Pre and Post Course Quiz• A short quiz will be given at the beginning of the course,

and the same quiz will be repeated at the end of week 2• Quiz results provide feedback to staff on training

effectiveness and knowledge increased over time


Other C lass Act iv i t ies

• Weekly off-site dinners• Class team building picnic• Weekend cultural activities• Evening shopping trips

10




Administrat ive Requirements

• Attendance is required for all lectures, subgroup exercises, and field trips

• Completion of daily module quizzes is required• Be on time after breaks and lunches, and for the bus in

the morning• Turn off all personal wireless communication devices

during lectures and subgroups

11


Br ief History of the ITC

1. In the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, the US made a commitment to conduct training for other IAEA Member States on the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities

2. First ITC was conducted in November 19783. ITC has been conducted approximately every 18

months since then4. As of the end of ITC-26 in 2016, there have been 842

participants from 73 Member States

12




Part ic ipat ing Member States in Past ITCs

13

Albania (1)

Algeria (4)

Argentina (24)

Armenia (5)

Australia (18)

Austria (2)

Bangladesh (10)

Belarus (12)

Belgium (5)

Brazil (31)

Bulgaria (17)

Canada (53)

Chile (11)

China (22)

Croatia (5)

Cuba (2)

Czech Republic (21)

Denmark (1)

DR of Congo (2)

Egypt (25)

Finland (11)

France (19)

Germany (17)

Ghana (9)

Greece (3)

Hungary (14)

India (30)

Indonesia (25)

Iran (1)

Iraq (5)

Israel (5)

Italy (6)

Jamaica (1)

Japan (30)

Jordan (1)

Kazakhstan (8)

Korea (21)

Latvia (2)

Libya (1)

Lithuania (20)

Malaysia (13)

Mexico (27)

Morocco (6)

Netherlands (6)

Nigeria (3)

Norway (2)

“Observers” (14)

Pakistan (17)

Philippines (16)

Poland (18)

Portugal (2)

Romania (24)

Russia (23)

Saudi Arabia (1)

Serbia (3)

Slovakia (19)

Slovenia (15)

South Africa (22)

South Korea (1)

Spain (12)

Sweden (19)

Switzerland (7)

Syria (1)

Thailand (17)

Tunisia (4)

Turkey (11)

Ukraine (19)

United Arab Emirates (3)

United Kingdom (1)

Uzbekistan (1)

Venezuela (3)

Vietnam (7)

Zaire (3)

Total Participants: 842


# ITC-27 Part ic ipants from # States

14

• Will update slide information when ITC27 participant information is received




Sponsors

• US Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security

• Office of Global Material Security

• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Nuclear Safety and Security

• Office of Nuclear Security

15


Presenters

• Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Developed the methodology used in this course, beginning in the

1970s Have extensive experience in using this methodology for the

design and evaluation of our domestic physical protection systems

Work closely with the IAEA and Member States on international physical protection, using this same methodology

16




Scope

• The ITC material Is designed for security professionals who work in physical

protection of nuclear facilities and materials• Government officials and competent authorities• Facility operators and transport shippers and carriers

Uses an approach consistent with the recommendations in:• Physical Protection Objectives and Fundamental Principles,

GOV/2001/41 • The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities,

IAEA NSS-13

17


Technology and Software

• Participants will view various technologies and use software during the class, especially during the exercises Not all technology and software will be available for use by all

participants after the class due to export restrictions and/or software licensing requirements

18




Introduct ions

• Each participant will tell (in 1 minute): Name Country Job responsibility Your ITC expectations “Icebreaker”

• What is your favorite activity when you are not working?

19


Objec t ives o f a S ta te ’s Phys ica l P rotec t ion Reg ime• Protect against theft and other unlawful taking of nuclear

material in use, storage, and transport Ensure the implementation of rapid and comprehensive

measures to locate and, where appropriate, recover missing or stolen nuclear material

• Protect nuclear material and nuclear facilities against sabotage Mitigate or minimize the radiological consequences of sabotage

Note: In this course “sabotage” means radiological sabotage.

20




Introduct ion to the DEPO Methodology

• The DEPO methodology is a systematic approach with three major steps:1. Define the PPS requirements2. Design a new, or characterize an existing, PPS3. Evaluate the PPS

21


Final PPS Design

Evaluate PPS

Response(14)

Access Delay(13)

Intrusion Detection Systems

(9)

Alarm Assessment

(12)

Alarm Communication and Display

(15)

Entry Control(10)

Design PPS

Physical Protection Systems(8)

Delay ResponseDetection

Define PPS Requirements

Risk Management/ Regulatory

Requirements

(6)

Facility Characterization/

Target Identification

(3)

Threat Definition(5)

Redesign PPS

Evaluation of PPS(18)

Introduction to DEPO(1)

Adversary Sequence Diagrams

(19)

Insider Analysis(25)

Contraband Detection

(11)

Neutralization Analysis(22)

Scenario Analysis(23)

Performance Testing (16 and 17)

Path Interruption Analysis

(20)

Multipath Analysis (21)

Information Security (27)

Introduction to Hypothetical

Facility

Tabletop Analysis (24)

Note: Numbers refer to lecture sessions

Transportation Security

NSS-13(2)

Contingency Planning

(28)

Insider Design(25)

Des ign and Eva lua t ion Process Out l ine (DEPO)

22

Nuclear Material Accounting &

Control

(7) Human Reliability Programs & Security

Culture(28)

(4)

(26)




PPS Design and Evaluat ion Approaches

• Expert approach PPS design and evaluation is conducted using subject matter

expertise • Prescriptive features approach

PPS design and evaluation is conducted based on specifications and implementation of a required set of features

• Component criteria approach PPS design and evaluation is conducted using performance

criteria for some required security features • System performance approach

PPS design and evaluation is conducted using a systems engineering approach based on specifying and achieving an overall level of system effectiveness against Design Basis Threat

23


ITC Design and Evaluat ion Approach

• ITC emphasizes the performance-based PPS effectiveness, design, and evaluation approach (DEPO)

• In practice, State physical protection regimes generally include a mixture of performance-based and prescriptive approaches

24




Regulatory Requirements

• Physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials is the right and responsibility of every sovereign state Stated in Amended CPPNM

• State government establishes laws for the state’s physical protection regime Risk management

• Competent authority(ies) establishes regulations and is responsible for oversight of physical protection Prescriptive and performance-base requirements

• Facility operators implement physical protection and are responsible for satisfying state requirements Resource management

25


Key Takeaways• ITC objective

Apply the principles of a performance-based methodology to design and evaluate a physical protection system for nuclear facilities and materials against the threat of theft or sabotage

• Objectives of a State’s physical protection regime Protect against theft of nuclear material Protect against radiological sabotage of nuclear facilities and

material• Three basic steps of DEPO are (1) define PPS

requirements, (2) design PPS, and (3) evaluate PPS• ITC emphasizes a performance-based approach of

evaluating PPS effectiveness against DBT26

01a intro to itc and depo - sandia.gov · april 29 –may 18, 2018 albuquerque, new mexico, usa ......

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