"202 Donald Davidson

asymmetry between how we know our own minds and' howo we kn()w theminds of others:: It is striking, for example, that Burge's explanation of firstperson authority fails to account for the fact that the same thing, namely whatis in one person's mind, can also b~ known by someone else, though'in a verydifferent way. The missing part ofthe explanation is filled in, I think, whenwe recognize the way interaction with other people partly determines thecontents of mental states. Knowledge of one's own mind is personal. But whatindividuates that state at the same time makes it accessible to others, for thestate is individuated by causal interplay among three elements: the thinker,others with whom he communicates, and an objective world they know theyshare.

..

Overcoming "Overcoming Metaphysics Through Logical Analysisof Language" Through Logical Analysis of Language

Jaakko HINTIKKA·Summary

Carnap tried to overcome metaphysics through a distinction between empirical and con-ceptual truths. The distinction has since been challenged, but not on the basis of a systematiclogical analysis of language. It is suggested here that the logical theory of identifiability based onthe author's interrogative model will provide the tools for such a systematic analysis. As anexample of what the model can do, a criticism is offered of Quine's and. Chomsky's implicitassumption that language learning is based on atomistic (quantifier-free) "answers" (input).

ResumeCarnap a essaye de depasser la metaphysique par une distinction entre des \'eriles empiriques

et des verites conceptuelles. Cette distinction a ensuite ete contestee, mais non sur la base d'uneanalyse systematique du langage. On suggere ici que la theorie logique de I'identifiabilite baseesur Ie modele interrogatif de l'auteur fournira les outils d'une telle analyse syslematique. Com meexcmple de ce que peut faire ce modele, on presente une crilique de la supposition implicile deQuine et de Chomsky selon laquelle l'apprentissage du langage repose sur des «reponses» (input)ntomiques (sans quantificateurs).

Zusammenfassllng .Carnap versuchte Metaphysik durch eine Unterscheidung zwischen empirischen und konzep-

luellen Wahrheiten zu Uberwinden. Seither wurde die Unterscheidung immer wieder angegriffen,jedoch nicht auf der Basis einer systematischen logischen Analyse der Sprache. In vorliegendem

'. Artikel witd"vorgeschlagen, dass eine logische Theorie der Idenlifizierbarkeit, welche auf demFrage-Antworl-Modell des Autors grUndet, die lnstrumente fUr eine solche logische Analysebereitstelll. Als Beispiel dafOr, was das Modellieisten kann~ dient eine Kritik an Quines undChomskys impliziter Voraussetzung, dass das Erlernen von Sprache .auf atomaren (quantoren-freien) «Antworten» aufbaut (Input). .

The theme of this meeting is "metaph~sics and science". 1 suppose thatwhat is meant could equally well have been expressed by "the relation ofmetaphysics to science". But before we can discuss what that relation is, wehave to ascertain that there is such a t~ing as metaphysiCs that could bearsome conceivable relation to science or to anything else.

· Boston University

DialecticaVol. 45, N° 2-3 (1991) Dlalectica Vol.45,N°2-3 (1991). . j 3

Jaakko Hintikka .

Historically, metaphysics comes in all sizes and shapes. The definition ofmetaphysics is itself a metaphysical problem. In contrast, the problem of thepossibility of metaphysics is relatively well defined, on one natural interpreta-tion, at least. It is: Can human thought alone, unaided by empirical evidence,produce interesting knowledge? Aristotle's answer was an unqualified yes.His reasons for the answer are highly interesting though insufficiently appre-ciated by scholars. For Aristotle, to think of X is for one's soul to take on theform of X t. (This Aristotelian idea still lingers on in the etymology of our ian-guage, where being cognizant of X is expressed as having information about. .it. This of course ought to mean "to be in the form of X".) Aristotle intendshis idea is to be taken literally; an instantiation of a form in one's soul is on apar with its realizations elsewhere2. From this it follows that allY necessaryconnection between forms can be perceived by realizing them in one's mind.If the form of Y necessarily accompanies the form of X, then it is necessarilyrealized in my mind as soon as I managed to think of X, i.e., as soon as theform of X is realized in my soul. It is thus seen that, even though Aristotle wasin a sense an empiricist, his reliance on experience was of a very special kind.In Aristotelian methodology empirical input is needed only to enable me as itwere to assemble the right forms in mind from bits and pieces given to me bysense-perception. Empirical evidence is not needed to ascertain natural laws;.that is, necessary connections between forms.

This way of thinking colors Aristotle's entire philosophy. It differs soradically from our wanted ways of thought that scholars have not dared ack-nowledge its full consequences in Aristotle. It is among other places reflectedin Aristotle's idea that induction or properly speaking, epagoge, is essentiaIlya matter of concept formation, not of generalization from particulars to uni-versals 3.

Aristotle's way of thinking is relevant to the theme of this meeting becauseit shows in which sense the possibility of metaphysics was unproblematic andin what sense it was problematic for him. The problem for Aristotle was notwhether unaided human thought can recognize general truths. Even the

I Aristotle, De Anima III 6, 43Ial-2: "Actual knowledge is identical with its object." cr.also ibid 8, 43lb24-432a3.

2 This is seen most clearly from Metaphysics Z7, where Aristotle argued for his thesis that"everything comes out of that which actually is" of the same form. This is trivial in the case ofanimals but what about the production artifacts and other products of art? When a doctor heals apatient, that is, produces an instance of the form of health in.a patient, where is the earlier actualexemplification or that form? In the mind of the physician, Aristotle answers, for lJaving thisform is what the medical art consists in. See also Met. Z9, 1034a21-23 and Met. 4, 1070b33-34.

J See here my paper "Aristotelian Induction", Revue Internationale de Philosophie vol. 34 ",(1980), pp. 422-39. Cf. also "The Concept of Induction in the Light of the Interrogative l'Approach to Inquiry", forthcoming.

Overcoming "Overcoming Metaphysics Through Logical Analysisof Language"ThroughLogicalAnalysisof Language

. 205

departmental sciences do that all the time according to him. The problem waswhether there is any subject matter left to metaphysics over and above thesubject matter of the different particular sciences. Aristotle argued for anaffirmative answer by arguing that a complctely general science, a science of"being qua being", is possible4.

This Aristotelian foundation of metaphysics has been given up fairly uni-versally. }<'ewpeople seriously think that by just putting my mind to it I canobtain.ki10wledge of the objective reality. My historical working hypothesis at.this moment is that the demolition job on Aristotelian methodology wasstarted by the medieval nominalists5.

Of course, the rejection of the Aristotelian theory did not put an end toother forms of the belief that somehow we could reach substantial truths bymeans of pure thinking alone. Other suitable metaphysical (or empirical)assumptions concerning the world might serve the same purpose as Aristotle'spsychology of thought here. By the nineteenth century, there was even a nameavailable for one such internal source of truths: intuition. (This, by the way, isnot what the word meant earlier6.) But by 1990 most philosophers no longerhav~ the courage of their intuitions. They no longer believe that our intuitionscan .yield objective knowledge of any independent reality. Consequently, thefunction of intuition-based theorizing has now become conceived as one Ofmerely systematizing our intuitions as such, without assigning them any rolewhatsoever as giving information about anything beyond themselves 7. Thecorrespondence theory of intuition has been replaced. by a coherence theory,so to speak. This marks the effective end of intuitionistic metaphysics.

Does.. this mean that metaphysics has been found impossible? No,metaphysics is alive if not particularly well in KOnigsberg or wherever thespirit of Immanuel Kant is currently moving. For one can still argl!e, as Kantin effect did, that pure (i.e., nonempirical) thought can reveal the way in whichour knowledge is grounded in our own thinking, in our own activities, and int.he conceptual tools they are using 8. This kind of knowledge can certainly be

v4 See Metaphysics 1-2 and cf. G. E. L. Owen, "Logic and l\-Ietaphysics in some Earlier

Works of Aristotle", in G. E. L. Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic: Collected Papers on GreekI'hilo.rophy, Duckworth, London, 1986, pp. 180-99.

5 For a preliminary discussion, see my paper, "Conceptions of Scientific Method from Aris-totle to Newton", in Monika Asztalos et al., eds. Knowledge and the Sciences in MedieI'Q1 Philo-sophy, vol. I, Philosophical Society of Finland, Helsinki 1990, pp. 72-84.

6 In the early modern period, "intuitive knowledge" meant merely immediate knowledge,with no assumption of any special source of knowledge. For a glimpse of this kind of meaning.see my paper, "On Kant's Notion of Intuition", in The First Critique, ed. by T. Penelhum and J.J. Mcintosh, Wadsworth, Belmont, CA, 1969, pp. 38-53.

7 This idea is an extension of Chomsky's earlier approach to syntactical theorizing, wherethe rock bottom of the enterprise were competent speakers' Intuitions about grammaticality.

8 This is perhaps seen most clearly from Kant's preface to the second edition of the Critiqueof Pure Reason, especially pp. XII-XVIII.

Jaakko Hintikka

substantial and informative. One particularly interesting twentieth-centuryvariant of this kind of critical, metaphysics is R. G. Collingwood's idea thatmetaphysics is "the attempt to find out what" absolute presuppositions havebeen made by this or that person or group of persons, on this or that occasionor groups of occasions" 9. Whether or not it is always called "metaphysics",such an examination of the basic conceptual assumptions of patticularsciences, or even of our thought at large, seems to be big business. even in thetwentieth century. And even when the label "metaphysics" is not applied, itmight as well have been. For instance, the speculations of twentieth-centuryphysicists about the foundations of their own science are full of claims thatare much more blatantly metaphysical than any contemporary analytic phi-losopher (assuming that that species is not extinct) would dare to make..

However, even the possibility of critical metaphysics has been denied inour century. The classk document in this respect is Rudolf Carnap's 1931paper "Die Oberwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analysis derSprache", misleadingly translated ,as "Elimination of Metaphysics ThroughLogical Analysis of Language" 10.In it, Carnap relied in effect on two theses.They are, first, a sharp separation of empirical and conceptual truths (includ-ing truths about the meanings of our words and phrases) and, second, aninterpretation of conceptual (analytical) truths as being vacuous, (tau-tological) II. The former thesis relegates metaphysics to the study of merelyour conceptual system, and the latter deprives metaphysics of any substantialsubject matter. For statements about what our words and phrases mean are onthis view empty or "tautological". To deny one is merely to talk nonsense, andto assert one therefore is not to make a meaningful statement. Finismetaphysics - according to Carnap.

It is interesting to note in the passing that there is relatively little else inCarnap's philosophy which would have ruled out some sort of criticalmetaphysics. For instance, Aristotle's problem of whether there can be a gen-eral study of being as being was no difficulty for a defender of the unity ofscience and of the physicalistic language as the universal language of science 12;

9 Sce R. G. Collingwood. E.~ay 011Metaphysics. Clarcndon Press, Oxford. 1940, chaplcrs4-7, especially p. 47.

\0 Erkenntnis, vol. 2 (1932), pp. 432-65. English translation in A. J. Ayer, editor, LogicalPositivism, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1959, pp. 60-81.

\I This thesis \yas in different variants held by most members of the Vienna Circle and theirallies.See,e.g.,A. J. Ayer,Language Truth and Logic, Victor Gollancz, London, 1936,chapter 4.

For the difficulties involved with this idea, cf. my paper "G. H. von Wright on Logical Truthand Distributive Normal Forms": in The Philosopl,y ofG. H. von Wright (Library of Living Phi-losophers), Open Court, LaSalle, Illinois, 1990l' PP. 517-37. '

Cf. also Burton Dreben and Juliet Floyd, 'Tautology: How Not to Use a Word", Synthese,vol. 89 (1990), pp. 23-49.

12 Both ideas are strikingly In evidence in Carnap's paper, op. eit., note 10 above"

Overcoming "Overcoming Metaphysics Through Logical Analysisof Language" Through Logical Analysis of Language

207

, .

It is this Carnapian of denial of the possibiJity of metaphysics that I wa,nt todiscuss in this paper. Prima/ode, my enterprise might seem,to be seriously outof date, for the theses on which Carnap's attempted "Oberwindung der)

,

Metaphysik" rests have been rejected by a number of prominent philosophers,present company not excepted. First, Quine and others began to challenge Car-nap's sharp dichotomy of questions of fact and questions of meaning 13.

, Quine's rejeetion of the analytic-synthetic distinction was an early form of thechallenge. Later, several philosophers have in different ways defended the,theory-Iadenness and fact-Iadenness of meaning 14.On such a view, no sharpdistinction can be made between questions of fact and questions of meaning.Consequently, it looks possible in principle that a conceptual analysis mightuncover factual presuppositions of our language and our discourse, or of thediscourse .of some other group of people. This seems to open the doors tometaphysics at least in the "critical" Collingwoodian spirit.

In a sense, many philosophers already have entered through these doors.Indeed, probably the best known scholar professing to have been influencedby Quine, Thomas Kuhn, can be viewed as having done just that IS.The factthat he is talking about paradigms instead of ultimate presuppositions makes

"no difference. And Kuhn's relegation of problem-solving and question-answering to normal science, instead of their Collingwoodian pride of place,merely reflects, I believe, a deeply ingrained restrictive presupposition ofKuhn's own t6.

But who is right, Carnap or his latter-day critics? ,Is there a sharp distinc-tion between fact and meaning? Are meanings really theory-laden and fact-

, laden? At first sight, it might be completely hopeless to try to answer. thesequestions in one paper. In order to do so, I would apparently have to slirveyand to evaluate nearly forty years of intensive and intricate discussion. Thislask I obviously cannot take on here. '

,

IJ Cf. here W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". in From Q Logical Poilll of View.Harvard U.P., Cambridge, MA, 1953, pp. 20-46.

"14 These terms are not usually used in the literature. Instead, terms like "antirealism" areIypically cmployed. This terminology is nol accidental. It seems to me to renecl a genuine confu-sion as to what is really involved.

15 Cf. T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, second ed., Univcrsity or Chi-cago Press, Chicago, 1970. A brief survey of the problems Kuhn is dealing with, see Ian Hacking,editor, Scientific Revolutions, Oxford U.P., Oxford, 1981. ,

"f In spiteof the voluminousliteratureKuhn'sbook has prompted,therestillexistsneitherai satisfactory analysis of his main concepts nor a close analysis of his argumentation.

'16 This presupposition is expressed most naturally by reference to my interrogative model'ofinquiry. It amounts to assuring that the "answers" nature can give 10 a scientist are all particular(i.e., quantifier-free) truths. Kuhn's strong emphasis that theories are not derived from, orotherwise determined by, evidence does not have plausibility without this assumption. For a dis-cussion of what happens when this assumption is given up, see my paper, "What Is the Logic ofExpe.rimentallnquirY7", Synthese vol. 74 (1988), pp. 173-90. "

.lOB

"Jaakko Hintikka Overcoming "Overcoming Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis

of Language" Through Logical Analysisof Language ,209

Instead, I will challenge the methodology of this entire discussion. Sup-pose, 'for the sake of argument, that meanings are theory-laden. Sincemeanings determine reference, the references of a language user's words andphrases likewise depend on the theory he or she has adopted or, more likely,on the proto-theory his or her linguistic community has tacitly developed.Now how is such a matter to be studied? The first answer that comes to yourmind is the best one. This obvious answer is: by logical means. Or, if we wantto be more precise, by means of logical semantics. For what kinds of questionsare we supposed to be studying here? There is a great deal of fuzziness in theliterature, but a representative kind of question surely could be something likethis: Given a theory T[P) containing a term, say a one-place predicate P, whatdoes it tell us about the applicability of P to already different cases? Here T[Pl'gives us a certain amount of information about some cases to which P appliesor does not apply, but at triost it tells us something about the relationships be-tween P and the other concepts employed in T[P). Here it might even seemthat the entire problem reduces to good old-fashioned logic. For is not thequestion whether P applies to a given individuall? simply the question whetherT[P] logically implies Tb? No, it is not, because 'in answering such a questionwe typically have an additional source of information at our disposal. It is ourknowledge of how the other concepts occurring in T[P] apply to the indi-viduals in our domain. Later in this paper, I shall show such prima facie iII-defined knowledge can be brought to the purview of explicit logico-semanticaltheory. '

Of course we cannot hope to have a formal theory that could be applieddirectly to actual natural languages, including our own "limpid vernacular" ,to use Quine's sometime phrase. However, we can try to develop structuralanalyses which show what the conceptual situation is and thereby what wehave to be on a lookout for in real-life situations. '

Notice that this way of construing representative problems in the theory ofempirical meaning (reference) determination is' not subject to Quine'scriticisms of Carnap 17.Carnap's mistake, according to Quine, is to label cer-tain rules as being "analytic" or "meaning rules", without sketching in thebehavioral or societal facts that characterize such a special status. In mysample problem, all assumptions can be expressed by straightforward factualpropositions.

In view of this prima facie logico-semantical character of the kinds ofquestions Quine and others have raised, it blows my mind that in practicallythe entire discussion he provoked these questions have been dealt with by

17 cr. w. V. Quine, op. cit., p. 36; also Word and Object, MIT Press Cambridge MA1960,especiallych. I. ' ,.

means of armchair psychology, cute artificial examples (you have heard of,gavagai and of the twin earth, haven't you?), a couple of natural languageillustrations, and so on, in short, by everything but honest logical means. Wehear in these days a great deal about naturalistic epistemology. This termnevertheless hides a serious confusion. What naturalizes an approach toepistemology, we are told, is the rejection of all normative considerations. Butmost practitioners of naturalized epistemology and naturalized semanticshave nevertheless thrown out the methodological baby with the normativebathwater. Not only have they rejected normative considerations; they have

, foresworn the use of all explicit formal methods. This is a mistake; non-normative semantics need not be informal, \vithout recourse to logical andother formal methods. Surely non-normative even fully scientific and natura-listic approaches can employ mathematical and logical models. Indeed, insome cases, logico-semantical conceptualizations have turned out to be muchmore closely related to actual neuroscience thari the bulk of literature on"naturalized epistemology". ,

We can thus express concisely what the trouble is with post-Carnapian phi-losophy of language. It tries to overcome "Overcoming Metaphysics ThroughLogical Analysis of Language", but not through logical analysis of language.Instead, we are treated to armchair psycliology and armchair sociology of lan-gu<~,ge.In my opinion, this 'constitutes a major paradox in the history of twen-tieth ce~ltury philosophy, for severai of the main figures involved in thosedevelopments are or have been practicing logicians.

The ,historical roots of this massive failure of famous logicians to ~se ~he .tools of their own trade when they are doing semantics are highly interesting. Ihave touched upon them elsewhere, and I wiII soon return to them.

At this point I can announce my main new result. I cannot explain it fully,and it has not yet been published, but I can briefly explain it here. ~n the broad-est possible terms, I can teIl you that a powerfullogico-semantical tlleOty ofempirica./ meaning (reference) determination is possible, because it is actual.

What is this theory? The answer is simple: it is the theory of identifiabilitythat can be developed on the basis of my interrogative model of inquiry 18.As.1 said, this theory has not yet been published, but an outline will soon be

available. Here, only a quick sketch is possible.First, a few words about the interrogative modeP9.. In it, two players,

called the Inquirer and Nature playa 'game on some given model M of the

18 See here my paper, "Toward a General Theory of Identifiability", in J. Felzer, D. Shatzand G. Schlesinger, editors, Definitions and Definability, Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, 1991,pp. 161-183.

19 See op. cit., note 16 above, and the literature referred to there.

4J Jaakko Hintikka/'

lnderlying first-order language. The bookkeeping method employ~d is theBeth tableall method 20. The game begins like a Beth tableau, with an initialpremise T in the left column and the ultimate eonclusion C in the right one.There are two kinds of moves, both initiated by the Inquirer, logical moveslIld interrogative moves. A logical move is simply a tableau-building move'

(with the rules slightly modified from Beth's)21. In an interrogative move, the

, 1nquirer addresses a question to Nature, and if an answer is forthcoming, it is;dded to the sub tableau that is being constructed. A full definition of such an

mterrogative game includes a specification of which answers Nature will yieldand which ones she will not give. An interrogative move is allowed only whenhe presupposition of the question has already been established, i.e., is present

./1 the left column of the subtableau'in question" In the games studied here,Nature'sanswersare assumedto be all true about M. .

We can thus define a relation

(1) M: T I- C

Ihich expresses the fact that the Inq'uirer has a winning strategy)n the inter-;,gative game, i.e., can close the tableau no matter what (true) answers

Nature gives (subject to certain unspecified restrictions).I This relation (1) is precisely as "logical" as the relation of deductive deriv-

bility

(2)T I- C

It is in fact interesting to compare (1) and (2). At first sight, there does notseem to be much hope of developing a general theory for (1), for whether or

"ot (1) holds in a given case depends crucially on a further parameter, viz. on

:

le class of available answers, which can be chosen in a bewildering variety ofways. The real prime time news here is that one can develop a theory for (I)

Iwhich is independent of this parameter. One can even develop it in partial

, nalogy to (or extension 00 the metatheory of the usual relation (2) of deduc-live provability. This is the rock-solid basis of saying that interrogative deriv-ability is just as "logical" a concept as deductive derivability.

'

:w E. W. Beth, "Semantic Entailment and Formal Derivabllity", Mededelingen van deKoninklijke Nederlandse Akademie, van Wetenschappen, Aid, Letterkunde N. R. vol. 13(1953),pp. 309-42. ,

'r T,his ~ethodis o~ course ~ut~ m~rror I.mage of a Gentzen-type sequent technique, the only, sentlal difference bemg the duectlon m which the applications of the technique proceed.

I 21 Essentially, no traffic between the two columns (sides)ora tableau Isallowed.'

Overcoming "Overcoming MetaphysicsThrough Logical Analysis 211of Language" Through LogicalAnalysisof Language

An example of a result from proof theory which can be extended to thethcory of interrogative games is William' Craig's famous interpolationtheorem 22.It holds here in the following forrri23.

, .

Extended Interpolation Theorem

Assume (i) M: T I- C, (ii) Not T I- C

(Hi) Not M: t I- (8 & - 8)

Then thGfc is a formula I (the interpolation formula) such that(a) M: T I- I(b) I I- C(c) Each predicate, dummy name and free variable of I occurs in

both T and C.'

'

(d) Each proper name (individual constant) of I either occurs inhoth T and C or was introduced in the proof of (i) for the first time by an an-swer to awh-question or was imported in the same proof from the rightcolumn into left column by universal instantiation on the left.

(e) All the answers to questions in the derivation of (a) are usedalready in the derivation (i).

This extcnsion of the interpolation theorem is much more than a mere'illustration here. Once we have the interpolation' theorem, we can use it toprove an interrogative generalization of Beth's theorem concerning definabil-ity24, in. the same way as the original theorem is proved in the usualmetatheory of first-order logic2s. The availability of (an extension 00 Beth'stheorem means in turn that we can develop a big brother of the usual logicaltheory of definability, viz. a theory of "interrogative definahility". If you

." think for a moment what this concept amounts to, you will have a deja vuexpcrience. You will realize that such "empirical definability" has a well-established :name in the methodology of several actual s.ciences,viz. idemi-fiability26, What I have just said can be summed up by saying that the inter-

..

22 See William Craig, "Three U~es of the Herorand-Gentzcn Theorcm in Rclation ModelTheory and ProorTheory", Journal 01 Symbolic Log;c vol. 22 (1957) pp. 269-85.

23 Cr,:here op. cit., note 18. I am here looking away from certain nontrivial assumptions onwhich the Extended Interpolation Theorem rests. Cf. note 29 below.

24 See E. W. Beth, "On Padua's Method in the Theory or Definition", {/ndagatiolles Mathe-maticae vol. 15 (1953), pp. 330-9., ,

2~ Beth's theorem is virtually a corollary to the interpolation theorem. The .same relationholds bctween thc generalizations of these two theorems to idenlifiability and interrogative inter-polation, respectively.

26 For this concept, see e.g., Cheng Hsiao, "Identification", in Z. Griliches and M. D. Intri-ligator, editors, Handbook 01 Econometrics, vol. I, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1983, ch. 4;Franklin Fisher, The Identification Problem in Ecollometrics, McGraw-Hili, New York, 1966.

/ Jaakko Hintikka ./

'ogative counterpart of the usual theory of definability is nothing less than a~enerallogical theory of identifiability.

But what does the theory of identifiability have to do with the theory of'heory-Iadenness and fact-Iadenness of meaning? I suspect that by this timeny clever audience has already seen what is coming and wiII answer, correctly:

everything. The logical theory of identifiability is (or perhaps I should say,~an be viewed as) a general logical theory of empirical reference determina-ion. It is obviously the right conceptual tool in trying to answer systematically

questions of the kind indicated above.In this way, we can among other things eliminate all vagueness from the

ypical questions in the theory of theory-Iadenness and fact-Iadenness of.neaning sketched above. This vagueness was due to the lack of specificationof what the relevant empirical evidence is and of how precisely it enters intohe determination of the extension o,r reference of P. The theoretical deter-Ilination of reference comes from the initial theory T[P] and the factual deter-

mination comes from the answers to the identifying inquirer's questions. The.pparent vagueness of such factual determination does not matter, for it only.',ffects the restrictions that ttave to be imposed on Nature's answers, while the

theory itself is independent 'Of such restrictions. The role of tacit background'nowledge requires some additional discussion, but it would not affect what isaid in this paper.

Here i~ the main message of this paper. Ther~is a logical medium for the""Iurpose of discussing meaning determination by theories and facts. ThisJgical theory enables us in principle to discuss in precise logical terms most"of

the issues that have been discussed in the tradition which Quine started andwhich emphasizes the theory-Iadenness a\ld fact-Iadenness of meanings. Thisntire discussion thus has to be re-evaluated. .

I cannot undertake such a global re-evaluation here. I wiII restrict myselfto a few general points. -

First, the question you have been wanting to raise all the time is: Who is.ight, Carnap or Quine? Do we really have to countenance a massive deter-mination of meanings by theories and facts? The resounding, albeit qualified,!nswer that I am giving to you is: Quine is right in the sense that we can make

.!erfect sense of empirical meaning determination to the extent of being ableto spell out the logical structure of this determination. The Carnapian ideahat the meanings (and afortior; references) of our words and expressions are

Jredetermined by a set of meaning rules (whatever they are or may be) isunrealistic. What Quine has completely correctly tried to get at is a muchnore realistic picture of how the semantics of our actual language reallyyorks.

Ovcrcoming "Ovcrcoming MctaphysicsThrough LogicalAnalysis 213of Languagc" Through Logical Analysisof Languagc

Second., large segments of recent discussions in the philosophy of languageare immediately thrown into a sharper relief. For instance, from the vantagepoint we have reached we can' understand part of the argumentation of thelikes of Putnam. He argues to the effect that the meaning or words like

., "water" are determined by the actual chemical structure of water; not by itsobservable behavior or by the practicable method of its identification. Thereis little in such arguments that cannot be captured by saying that the meaningof "water" is partly determined by the scientific (chemical) theory in' which itoccurs. This conclusion I can certainly agree with. But what happens in phi-losophers like Putnam is that the theory-Iadenncss of meanings is not ~ecog-nized as such, and is embellished with alleged consequences which make sense

; only if we have a sense of "meaning", "pecessity", "essence", or some relatedterm which is not relative toa theory. For instance, if the crux of the matter isthe theory-Iadenness of the meaning of "water", it is at best a misleading

. ; . iIIustratiQn and a worst bad metaphysics to go on to say that'the meaning of

"water" is determined by what water is (Putnam) or to say that the chemicalproperties of water (its atomic structural) necessary, not contingent (Kripke).Such theses make sense only on a theory-independent concept of meaning orof necessity, respectively.

In general, many of the questions that have been asked in recent discus-sions can be accommodated within my framework. For instance, it is oftenasked (as, e.g., in Putnam's notorious "twin earth" example) "what we wouldsay" in certain circumstances. Those circumstances can be specified by spe-cifyjng the model M and the theory T relied on. In this way, we can elimina.temuch of the arbitrariness. inherent in the all-too-common appeals to our"semantical intuitions" which are in reality just as theory-laden as the con-cepts which philosophers have tried to explicate by their means.

But what is the moral of my story so far, as for Carnap's criticisms ofmetaphysics are concerned? It seems to me that we .have indeed overcome .them through logical analysis of language, at. least insofar as criticalmetaphysics is concerned. There is no longer in principle "any theoreticalobstacle. of taking a piece of discourse and through a logico-semantical

Ianalysis reveal its theoretical and factual presuppositions. And Collingwood

! was even right in claiming that in that enterprise "the logic of questions andI. answers".plays a crucial role27.

Indeed, I happen to believe that Collingwood was right also about thehistory of thought to a greater extent than he himself managed to demonstrate

27 R. G. Collingwood, op. Cit., note 9 above. Cf. also, R. G. Collingwood. The Idea ofHistory, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1946, Part V, sec. 3.

\ //' , Jaakko Hintikka'

r"y example. Collingwood's notion of ultimate presupposition is too sim~listic) be realistic. However, I do believe that it is in fact possible to locate impor-

tant large-scale presuppositions that have been, made by different philoso-

!

:ters, different philosophical traditions, and philosophers of different pe-, ods. I am on the record as offering specific examples of such (usually tacit)p'resuppositions28. And at least heuristically the discovery of such presupposi-

j

" :ms is greatly facilitated by a conceptual analysis of ideas in question. ThelSic assumption of Aristotle's metaphysics which was sketched briefly above

provides a modest case in point.

{

We have thus literally overcome "Overcoming Metaphysics Through;,gical,Analysis of Language" through logical analysis of language. A couple

of,things nevertheless remain to be done in order to spell out a little bit moreflilly what 1 have done and in order to put it in a perspective.

!

First, let me try to remove a feeling of intellectual discomfort which manyVI' you have undoubtedly felt. My story is too good to be true or, rather, is toosimple to be true, you are likely to have felt. If the logical treatment of the

I

,eory-ladenness and fact-Iadenness of meaning is really as simple as that, it is_.llikely that first-rate logician-philosophers like Quine or Putnam shouldhave missed it, you may think.

!

Part of the answer is that the theory of identification (of which the theory.

theory-ladenness is a part) is a much more difficult subject intrinsicallythan my outline exposition might su~gest. Results like my extension of the

I

' terpolation theorem are perhaps not very hard to prove, but they are in aeoretical perspective not trivial, either. In particular, the dependence of the

theorem on the rules of the interrogative games is a su btJe matter hideed 29.

I

There is a deeper assumption at work.here, however. My formulation ofe interrogative model was in a certain sense in terms of language use. 1pos-

tulated certain games played by two players. This seems to put us back on the

1

~I~pperY'slope which eventually leads all the way to psychologism and,ciologism. For who are the players, realistically speaking? Some of my

friends'have been greatly worried by my apparent personification of Nature in

',' Overcoming "Overcoming MetaphysicsThrough Logical Analysis 215'

of Language" Through Logical Analysisof Language

the interrogative model. More importantly, speaking of language-using agentsseems to relativize everything to the psychological characteristics, backgroundknowledge, early childhood training, idiosyncracies and' prejudices of these

"agents. Or, to generalize the issue, the study of the use of language apparentlybelongs to pragmatics, not semantics, and pragmatics'is (didn't Morris tell usthat?) is a part of the psychology and sociology of language 30.

This Ii~e of thought is nevertheless an unmitigated fallacy. If you stop andthink for a minute of what is going on, you wiII see that (I) is just as an objec-tive relation, as (2), as completely independent of the idiosyncracies and indeed,of the actual identify of the players postulated. My heuristic term "Nature"docs not involve any more any personification of nature than ,an applied gametheorist's talk about "games against nature". An analogy should: make mypoint clear. If it is relevant in the theory of interrogative games to ask: Butwho are the players? then by the same token it must be relevant to ask inlogical syntax: Who is supposed to write or to have written these syntacticalsymbols? If the,theory of interrogative games is part of psychology, then for-:malsyntax is part of graphology. '

We are dealing here with one of the most harmful prejudices of recent phi-losophy of language. I hope I can exorcise it for good 31.

,

Of course I am claiming that the structures exemplified by the interroga- ,

tive model are not only instantiated in some Platonic, or G6delian heaveninhabited by abstract structures as such, but are also instantiated (albeit in bits

",nnd pieces))n actual human "langu,,:ge games". But the question whether theydo so is' completely independent of the question as to how the structures inquestion were defined in the first place.

,

More constructively, we can ask: What is the impact of the logical theoryof identification on the entire tradition in the philosophy of language that waslargely started by Quine?, Needless to say (or, rather, to repeat), a full analysisis impossible within the confines of one paper. Let me nevertheless indicate..one important perspective that opens here.

I

28 Cases in point are the ancient Greek treatment of time, the contrast between the two over-views that I have called the universality of language and language as calculus, belief in the

I-rege-Russell claim that natural language words like "is" are ambiguous. What might be calledthe statistical interpretation of modalities, and what I have dubbed the recursive paradigrn in lan-

I

age theory. In all these cases, uncovering the tacit presupposition has been helped by a logicald conceptual analysis of the situation.

'29 The crucial parameter here turns 'out to be which tautological disjunctions (S v -S) areadmitted to the left column. They have on intuitive meaning: the inquirer's range of attentioncomprises the question whether S or not-S iff he or she is prepared to add the tautology (~v -S)

lithe list of (known or assumed) truths. Cf. here my paper, "Knowledge Representation and theterrogative Model of Inquiry", in Marjorie Clay and Keith Lehrer, editors, Knowledge and

,:epticism, Westview Press, Boulder, 1989, pp. ISS-IS3.

30 One serious fallacy here is a confusion as to what is involved in the use of language. It isoften thought that all use of languag~ depends on the peculiarities of language users, and that allpragmatics !s.therefore a part of the psychology and sociology. This is a fallacy, for it is possibleto study the'abstract rules of language use on a purely logical and semanticallevel. Cf. here mypapcr "Game-Theoretical Semantics as a Synthesis of Verificationist and Truth-ConditionalMeaning Tbeories", in Ernest LePore, editor, New Directions ill Semantics. Academic ~ress,London, 1987, pp. 23S-S8.

31 The same bias has made the understanding of Wittgenstein's language-games unneces-sarily difficult. (It Is of course compounded by the later Wittgenstein's own arltisystematic atti-tude.) Cf. here Merrill B. Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka, Investiga/ing, Wit/gens/ein, Basil'Blackwell, OJ,(ford, 1986. ..

Jaakko Hintikka . Overcoming "Overcoming Metaphysics Through Logical Analysisof Language" Through Logical Analysis of Language 217

.

First, we nevertheless need a preliminary observation. Let us go back tothe general ideas of the interrogative model. Another way of looking at thelogical theory of identifiability is to view it as a general logical model of lan-guage learning. The Inquirer then becomes a language learner, and the an-swers to the Inquirer's. questions become the input of the linguistic communityinto the learning process. The initial premise T corresponds to the learner'sinnate linguistic ability.

It may seem that this is far too schematic a model to enable us to establishinteresting specific results concerning language learning of the theory-Iaden-ness and fact-ladenness of meaning. Maybe so;. But certain importantobservations can nevertheless be made here. My interrogative model is notfully defined before it is specified what the answers are that the Inquirer (the,learner) can receive, Le., what the possible inputs into the learning processare. And as soon as this question is raised, we become aware of a highlyimportant fact. Almost everybody has assumed, both in the philosophical dis-cussion and in linguistic theorizing, that (in the jargon of my-interrogativemodel) the answers the Inquirer can receive are particular (Le., quantifier-free) propositions. In other words, the input into the process of languageacquisition are particular truths about the language. I have called this assump-tion (strictly speaking, a closely related and nearly equivalent one) the Ato-mistic Postulate 32.

The Atomistic Postulate has been assumed virtually universally: by phi-losophers and linguists alike. It is in effect adopted by Quine when he choosesas his starting point "sensory stimuli" or "surface irritations" which he says"exhaust our clues to an external world" 33. It is in effect assumed byChomsky when he takes the startingpoi'nt of linguistic theorizing competentspeakers' intuitions.about the grammaticality or ungrammaticality of particu-lar strings of symbols 34.And it is explicitly assumed in most formal models of.language learning 35.

This general acceptance of the Atomistic Postulate in the philosophy oflanguage and methodology of linguistics has its counterpart in the philosophyand methodology of science. As I have shown elsewhere36,some of the mostimportant approaches to the philosophy of science have been motivated (not:

32 The atomistic postulate is the assumption mentioned in note 16above.33 Cf. Word and Object, op. cit., sees. 5-6.34 Cf. Noam Chomsky, Syntactic Stn/ctures, Mouton, The Hague, 1957, and Chomsky's

papers in Jerry A. Fodor and Jerrold J. Katz, editors, The Structure of Language, Prentice-Hall,EngelwoodCliffs,NJ, 1964. .

3' Cf., e.g. Kenneth Wexler and Peter W. Culicover, Formal Principles of LanguageAcquisition, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1980.- 36 Op. cit., note 16above. Cf. also "The Concept of Induction in the Light of the Interroga-tive Approach to Inquiry," in J. Fetzer, D. Shatz and G. Schlesinger, editors, Definitions andDefinability, Kluwer Academie, Dordrecht, 1991.

determined) by the assumption of the Atomistic Postulate. This is most con-spicuous in the case of the hypothetico-d~ductive modei an.d the indu<::tuisticmodel of science, but in subtler ways the same postulate has colored alsoThoma~ Kuhn's theorizing. I hav.e also argue~ and, I dare say, shown that thereal logic of experimental science cannot be understood on the basis of the .

Atomistic Postulate. Instead, we have to assume that a class of answers isavailable to an experimental scientist which are general (not quantifier-free).More fully expressed, they have at least the AE complexity (existential quan-

.tifier governed by. a universal one). These answers express. the functionaldependencies which a controlled experiment can reveal to a scientific inquirer.

This results necessitates a re-evaluation of much of the current philosophyof science, a re-evaluation which largely remains to be carried out. The point Iam making here is that the situation is analogous in the philosophy of lan-guage. The Atomistic Postulate is an unrealistic assumption also in languagetheory.. There is no valid reason to assume that a ianguage. learner cannot usein his or her acquisition process general linguistic regularities without derivingthem inductively from a number of special cases. A suitable collection of\\'hat-are usually considered as particular cases can inste.ad be viewed as collectivelyrevealing a functional dependence of the. same kind as a contr'olled experimentcan yield 37.

Wh~t is less clear on the side of philosophy of language than on the side ofthe philosophy of science is precisely what it is that has to be rejected. Furtherpatient work is undoubtedly needed here. Let me nevertheless put forwardone specific problem. One place where the Atomistic Postulate has tacitlyinfluenced linguists' reasoning is in Chomsky's arguments for his universal

. ..grammar. The basic logic of his argument is naturally formulated by reference

to the interrogative model. Chomsky argues in effect that inductive learningfrom particular cases is far too slow a process to account for theJacts of lan-guage acquisition in children. This corresponds to a case where the AtomisticPostulate is applicable. No general laws follow from such particular answersalone, and consequently Chomsky envisages the model to have bee~ e~richedby suitable inductive rules. Chomsky argues, undoubtedly correctly, thatthey, too, are insufficient to account for the facts, especially for the speed ofactual learning by children. Hence the only way out is to postulate a strong

37 Interim generalizations are known to play an important role in language learning. Theyare usually thought of as inductive generalizations from particular examples. It is in ma~y waysmore natural logically speaking to consider them as answers to the language learner's tacit ques-tions, however, just like nature's answers to experimental questions.

/~ ,

218 Jaakko Hintikka

initial premise T. What that is in Chomsky's scheme is precisely the universalgrammar 38.

'

. ::,.

Chomsky is right in thinking that the poverty of available answers can becompensated for by a rich initial premise T. But, by the same token, tJIere isno need to assume a strong initial premise T if enough logically stronger an-swers are available to the Inquirer (learnel\ Thus Chomsky'~ argumentdepends crucially on the assumptions a linguist can make about the avail~bi~-ity of different kinds of "answers" to the language learner. If the AtomIsticPostulate must be given up, as I have suggested, then Chomsky's argumenta-tion loses most of its prima facie plausibility.

Perhaps this line of thought can serve as an example of the way in whichthe critical examination of an important theory".can enable a philosopher (orshouid I say ,a metaphysician?) to uncover substantial hidden presuppositionsof ~minteresting theory.

38 For Chomsky's notion of universal grammar, see the symposium with Chomsky, Put.namand Goodman in Syntlrese vol. 17 (1967), pp. 2-28 (with further references).

Dialectica Vol. 45, N° 2-3 (t991)

Overcoming "Overcoming Metaphysics Through Logical Analysisof Language" Through Logical Analysis of Language

Jaakko H1NTIKKA.

SummaryCarnap tried to overcome metaphysics through a distinction between empirical and con-

ceptual truths. The distinction has since been challenged, but not on the basis of a systematiclogical analysis of language. It is suggested here that the logical theory of identifiability based onthe author's interrogative model will provide the tools for such a systematic analysis. As anexample of what the model can do, a criticism is offered of Quine's and. Chomsky's implicitassumption that language learning is based on atomistic (quantifier-free) "answers" (input).

ResumeCarnap a essaye de depasser la metaphysique par une distinction entre des veriles empiriques

.. et des verites conceptuelles. Cette distinction a ensuite ete contestee, mais non sur la base d'uneanalyse systematique du langage. On suggere ici que la theorie logique de I'identiriabilite baseesur Ie modele il1terrogatif de I'auteur fournira les outils d'une telle analyse systematique. Commeexemple de ce que peut faire ce modele, on presente une critique de la supposition implicite deQuine et de Chomsky selon laquelle I'apprentissage du langage repose sur des <m!ponses» (input)atomiques (sans quantificateurs).

ZusammenfassungCarnap.versuchte Metaphysik durch eine Unterscheidung zwischen elJ)pirischen und konzep-

. tuellen Wahrheiten zu Uberwinden. Seither wurde die Unterscheidung immer wieder angegriffen,jedoch nicht auf der Basis einer systematischen logischen Analyse der Sprache. In vorliegendemArtikel wird vorgeschlagen, dass eine logische Theorie der Identifizierbarkeit, welche auf demFrage-Antwort-Modell des Autors grUndet, die Instrumente fUr eine solche logische Analysebereitstellt. Als Beispiel dafUr, was das Modell leisten kann, dient eine Kritik an Quines undChomskys impliziter Voraussetzung, dass das Erlernen von Sprache .auf atomaren (quantoren-freien)«Antworten»aufbaut (Input). ' .

The "theme of this meeting is "metaph~sics and science". 1 suppose thatwhat is meant could equally well have been expressed by "the relatiol) ofmet.aphysicsto science". But before we can discuss what that relation is, wehave to ascertain that there is such a t~ing as metaphysics that could bearsome conceivable relation to science or to anything else.

· Boston University

Dialectica Vol. 45, N° 2-3 (1991)