03-titel-1 + boldMaster of Occus03-titel-4 As aliquia natum quo ea que quiae cum rorae.

Informal governance of international climate policy

Axel MichaelowaKatharina MichaelowaChandreyee Bagchi

CIS Working Paper No. 962017

Center for Comparative and International Studies (CIS)

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Informalgovernanceofinternationalclimatepolicy1

AxelMichaelowa,KatharinaMichaelowa,andChandreyeeBagchi

UniversityofZurich

Draft,6October2016

1. Introduction

Scholarlyattentiontoinformalgovernanceininternationalpoliticshassubstantivelyincreasedinrecentyears(WesterwinterandAbbott2016:2).Researchinthisfieldisspurredbytheobservationofariseinthenumberofinformalintergovernmentalorganizations(IIGOs)andtransnationalgovernanceinitiatives(TGIs),bothofwhichthattakeoverpartoftherolestraditionallyhandledbyformalintergovernmentalorganizations (FIGOs). While IIGOs are composed of national governments and thus resemble FIGOsexcept for their informalorganizational structure, TGIs includea varietyofdifferentmembers rangingfrom private firms, over non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to governments at various levels.2Moreover, within FIGOs, formal governance structures have been increasingly challenged by newemergingpowers,andresearchershavebecomeinterestedinassessingtowhatextentformalprocessesaresimplycircumventedbyinformalprocessesto(re)establishthebalanceofcontrolcorrespondingtoactualpowerrelationsbetweencountries(e.g.,Stone2011).Overall,ahostofrecentstudiesdocumentsthe substantial rise of informality in world politics both within and outside of existing formalorganizations.

However, the development of informality differs between different issue areas, and only limitedinformationisavailablesofarontheexplanationofdifferentrolesthatinformalitytakesinthesefields.Thispapercontributestothisknowledgeasoneoutofthreecomparablecasestudiesassessingsimilarquestionswithinthesphereofdifferentregimecomplexes.

The specific issue area consideredhere is international climatepolicy. TheUnitedNations FrameworkConvention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provides the formal organizational structure specificallycreated for the purpose of dealingwith the challenge of global climate change. TheUNFCCC being aUnitedNationsorganization,allmembershaveequal formal rightsso that issuesof struggle regardingthe readjustment of the formal power balance within the organization do not arise. In recent years,notablybeforetheParisAgreementofDecember2015,theUNFCCChaswidelybeenregardedasunableto fulfill its role toprovideauniversallyaccepted international regime formitigationofglobal climatechange,givingrisetoasearchforalternativeorcomplementarysolutions.Climatechangeisalsoanareathathasspurredconsiderablepublic interestandmediaattention,whichmayquitenaturally leadtoastronginvolvementofprivateactorsandtheirengagementwithinTGIs.Formostcountries,internationalclimatepolicyisanareaoflowpolitics,stronglyrelatedtoquestionsofsocialjusticeandredistribution.Nevertheless,due to the threatsof climatechange for survivalof small islandstatesandconflictse.g.generated through migration pressure within and between countries, links to high politics such assecurity policy also exist. From this perspective, the case of international climate policy may be

1FinancialsupportbytheSwissNetworkforInternationalStudies(SNIS)isgratefullyacknowledged.

2Foradetaileddefinitionofthedifferenttypesoforganizations,seeWesterwinterandAbbott(2016:1).

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consideredas situatedsomewhere inbetween theother twocasesconsidered in thisvolume,namelythecaseofdevelopmentfinance(Reinsberg2016)andthecaseofsecuritypolicy(Westerwinter2016).

Inthefollowing,wewilldescribeandexplainthedevelopmentofinformalitywithintheclimatechangeregimecomplex,anddiscuss itseffectontheoverarchinggoalofmitigatingglobalclimatechange.Wewill first consider informality with respect to the actors within the regime complex (Section 2), andsecond, informality of rules andprocesseswithin the formal structureof theUNFCCC (Section3). Theanalysis is based on a review of the existing literature, participant observation at the UNFCCC’sConferencesof theparties (COP) since1995, and specific stakeholder interviewsatCOP21 inParis in20153.Regardingtherelevantactors, italsodrawsuponthedatabaseprovidedbyWesterwinteretal.(2015)onthebasisofpriorworkbyPevehouseetal.(2015),VabulasandSnidal(2013),AbbottandHale(2014),Rogeretal.(2016),andMichaelowaandMichaelowa(2016b),partiallyupdatedforthespecificcontextofthiscasestudythroughourstakeholderinterviewsandinformationonobserverorganizationsavailableontheUNFCCCwebsite(seehttp://maindb.unfccc.int/public/igo.pl?mode=wim).

Overall,ourstudysuggeststhatwhiletherehasbeenasignificantriseofinformalorganizationsinvolvedininternationalclimatepolitics,theygenerallydonotplayanindependentrolewithrespecttothecoreobjectiveoftheclimatechangeregimetomitigateclimatechange,butrathersupporttheUNFCCCinitsattempt to respond to this challenge.Within theUNFCCC, a variety of informal rules and procedureshavedevelopedover time,but someof themwerealsobeenchallenged for lackof transparencyandequity, were abandoned at some point, and have now been replaced by more formal or alternativeinformal procedures. While some informal procedures were clearly instrumental to successfulagreements, others are widely blamed for having contributed to their failure. Hence the appropriatechoice of informal procedures appears to be crucial for the success or the lack thereof within theUNFCCC. This provides a strong role and responsibility for the host country government of each COPsince it is charged with the presidency and hence responsible for a smooth organization of thenegotiationprocessattheCOP.

2. Theriseofinformalorganizationsandinitiatives

Ourdiscussionof the relevantactorsbuildsonpriorworknotablybyKeohaneandVictor (2011),whointroduce the concept of the regime complex into climate policy, and provide a differentiatedassessmentoftherolesandobjectivesofdifferentorganizationscreatedandactivewithinthiscontext.Michonski et al. (2010) alsoprovide a detaileddiscussionof selected formal and informalmultilateralorganizations involvedinthefield.Green(2013)takestheseideasforwardwithaspecificfocusontheroleofprivateactors.ThisperspectivealsoplaysanimportantroleinthesubsequentliteraturefocusingonTGIs.Bulkeleyetal.(2014)aswellasAndonovaandHale(2016)provideacomprehensiveoverviewofthe differentiated structure of these initiatives, and combine the contributions of a large number ofscholarstoexplaintheemergence,andtoassesstheroleofTGIsforclimatechangegovernance.

Westartourdiscussionwithanupdatedoverviewofthedevelopmentofthedifferentorganizationsandinitiativesovertime.Thiswillbefollowedbyanattempttoexplainthisdevelopmentandtosummarize

3Foralistofinterviews,seeAnnex1.

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its effects based on existing studies and our additional information from interviews and participantobservationattheCOPs.

2.1.Developmentovertime

International climate policy emerged in the late 1980s and was institutionalized in the early 1990s.Initially, the international process on climate change was driven by single governments organizingconferences on this issue, such as the Toronto conference in 1988 in Canada, and the Nordwijkconference 1989 in the Netherlands. The first FIGO built around climate change issues was theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) set up in 1988. Its reports, especially the FirstAssessmentReportof1990,becamecrucialindevelopmentofinternationalclimatechangegovernance(Johnson 2014). In a relatively short negotiation process spanning 1991 and 1992, the UNFCCC wasagreedupon.SincetheUNFCCC’sentryintoforcein1994itsSecretariatorganizedaformalnegotiationprocessmeetingatleasttwiceayear.

Formal intergovernmentalorganizations likemultilateraldevelopmentbankshaveactivelyparticipatedinUNFCCCnegotiations fromthebeginning.TheWorldBankespeciallyplayedaveryproactive role indeveloping pilot approaches for themarketmechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol aswell as climatefinance after the Copenhagen Accord. The OECD regularly published analyses aiming to “educate”negotiators regarding the rational design of key instruments of the regime. The same applies for theInternational Energy Agency (IEA). Both institutions publish data on CO2 emissions from fossil fuelconsumptionannually,thusprovidingameanstocomparecountryperformancewithregardstoclimatechangemitigation.

Withtheclimatenegotiationsgaininginimportance,furtherFIGOsbecameassociatedwiththeprocess,mostlyasimplementersorfacilitatorsofclimate-relatedprojectsintheirspecificareaofactivity.WithintheUNsystemitbecameimpossibleforFIGOsinrelatedareastoignoretheUNFCCCprocess(interviewswithrepresentativesofUNorganizationspresentatCOP21).Incontrasttothelargescaleinvolvementof existing organizations, only few FIGOs were newly created with a specific focus on internationalclimatepolicy.NotableexceptionsaretheGlobalEnvironmentFacility(GEF)andtheGreenClimateFund(GCF)thatwereestablishedasfinancialmechanismsoftheUNFCCCin1991and2010respectively.

The significant rise of formal intergovernmental organizations involved in the climate change regimecomplexwasparalleledbyasimilarriseof informal intergovernmentalorganizationsandtransnationalgovernanceinitiatives(seeFigure1).Intermsofsheernumbers,notablytherecentriseofthenumberofTGIs is impressive. With an overall number of more than a hundred in 2015, they come close tooutnumberingtheformalintergovernmentalorganizationsactiveinthefield.Incontrast,thenumberofIIGOshasbeengrowingmoreslowly,butalsomoresteadily.Thisisinlinewiththeoveralldevelopmentacrossissueareas(seeWesterwinterandAbbott2016:Figure3).Figure2illustratesthatTGIsandIIGOstogethernowrepresentmorethanhalfoftheorganizationswithintheclimatechangeregimecomplex.Ofcourse,thiskindofpresentationdoesnottakeintoaccountthesizeandtherelevanceofthedifferentorganizations,whichwillbefurtherdiscussedbelow.

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Figure1:TheinvolvementofFIGOs,IIGOsandTGIsinacomparativeperspective

Figure2:TherelativesharesofFIGOs,IIGOsandTGIs

Asopposed to FIGOsmost ofwhich simply started to orient someof their activities towards climate-relevant topics, theoverwhelmingmajorityofnon-formalorganizationsand initiatives inourdatabaseareneworganizations,createdspecifically for thepurposeofactivitiesrelatedto internationalclimatepolicy.HowdidthegrowthprocessofIIGOsandTGIsdevelopovertimeandwhatkindoforganizationsareinvolved?

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JustasFIGOs,IIGOshavebeenanimportantfeatureofinternationalclimatenegotiationsrightfromthebeginning.Thevastmajorityof these informalorganizationsare thecountrynegotiationgroupsactivewithin the frameworkof theUNFCCC. The frontrunnerwas theAllianceof Small Island States (AOSIS)that already emerged in 1990 before the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) started itsdeliberations.IntheperiodleadinguptotheagreementontheKyotoProtocoltotheUNFCCCin1997,thelandscapeofnegotiationgroupswascomparativelysimple.Market-orientedindustrializedcountriesthat were somewhat reluctant to address climate change formed a group called “JUSSCANZ” (theacronymbeingderivedfromtheinitialsoftheoriginalmembersJapan,US,Switzerland,CanadaandNewZealand) while developing countries negotiated through the G77+China, with vocal subsidiary groupsbeing AOSIS and the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Lesolle 2014). AfterRussia joined JUSSCANZ in 1997, the groupwas relabeled as “UmbrellaGroup”. Among these groups,only JUSSCANZ and AOSIS had an informal character, since both OPEC and G77+China had beenestablishedwithaformalgovernancestructureandadministrativeofficeslongbefore.

The rise of informal negotiation groups started in the year 2000, which saw the formation of theEnvironmentalIntegrityGroup(EIG),consistingofSwitzerland,Liechtenstein,Monaco,MexicoandSouthKorea. Until today, it remains the only group including both industrialized and developing countries(Darby2015). Inthefollowingyears,mainlytriggeredbythefailureof theconference inTheHague inlate 2000, regional groups started to emerge, such as the African Group, the Grupo de IniciativaLatinoamericana(GRILA),CountriesofCentralAsiaandtheCaucasus,AlbaniaandMoldova(CACAM)andCentral Group 11 (CG 11) for Eastern European countries (see Royden 2001 and UNFCCC 2016b).However,someoftheseregionalgroupswererather instableandonlyafewhavesurvivedtodate,asregionalallegianceshavebeensubstitutedbycontent-relatedones(seee.g.Costantinietal.2016:136).The firstof thosewas theCoalition forRainforestNations (CfRN) formed in2005which is fighting forincentives to prevent emissions from forest destruction (CfRN 2016). This group has even set up aSecretariat,thusbecominganFIGO.

The Copenhagen Conference of 2009 and its aftermath led to an open split of G77+China in variousgroupsthatoftenoverlap. Intherun-uptotheconferencethe largeemergingeconomiesBrazil,SouthAfrica,IndiaandChinaformedtheBASICgroup.AfterthefailureofCopenhagen,thesocialistcountriesfrom Latin America and the Caribbean set up the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America(ALBA).Theyear2012sawthebirthoftheprogressivegroup“IndependentAllianceofLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean”(AILAC)whichthentriggeredthe“Like-MindedDevelopingCountriesonClimateChange”(LMDC) bringing together developing countries from all continents reluctant to engage in strongmitigationpolicy.SinceCopenhagen, theLeastDevelopedCountrieshave formedanegotiationgroup,too. The Paris Conference saw the emergence of a “High Ambition Coalition” including over 100countriesandunlikelyto lastduetothevastvariationofpreferencesamongitsmembers.Overall,thelandscapeof country negotiation groups hasmoved from few,mutually exclusive groupswith a largemembershiptoaplethoraofgroupswithoverlappingmembership(seeFigure3).Forfurtherdetailsonthe individual groups, see Blaxekjaer and Nielsen (2015) and Government of France (2015).

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Figure3:Thedevelopmentofnegotiationgroupsovertime

until1997

1997-2000

2000-2005

2005-2009

2009-2012

2012-2016

Notes:Theacronymsreferto:G77+China-Groupof77+China;AOSIS-AllianceofSmallIslandStates;OPEC-OrganisationofthePetroleumExporting

Countries;EU-EuropeanUnion;GRILA-GrupodeIniciativaLatinoamericana;CACAM-CountriesofCentralAsiaandtheCaucasus,AlbaniaandMoldova;EIG-

EnvironmentalIntegrityGroup;CG-11-CentralGroup11;CfRN-CoalitionforRainforestNations;CVF-ClimateVulnerableForum;LMDC-LikeMinded

DevelopingCountries;BASIC-Brazil,SouthAfrica,IndiaandChina;LDCs-LeastDevelopedCountries.Newgroupsarehighlightedbyredcircles.Forthelistof

membersineachofthesegroups,see:https://www.carbonbrief.org/interactive-the-negotiating-alliances-at-the-paris-climate-conference.

Annex1referstothecorrespondingannexoftheConvention,whichlistsallcountriesthatweremembersoftheOECDin1992;theRussianFederationandthe

countrieswitheconomiesintransitionsincludingthosefromCentraltoEasternEurope.NonAnnex1referstoallotherUNFCCCmembercountries.

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Apartfromcountrynegotiationgroupsonlyahandfulofotherinformalintergovernmentalorganizationsarepart of the climate change regime complex. These include the Group of Eight (G8), G8+5 (i.e., G8 incombinationwithBrazil,China,India,MexicoandSouthAfrica),theGroupofTwenty(G20),andtheMajorEconomies Forum (Michonski et al. 2010: 8ff., Keohane and Victor 2011: 10f). The G8 started to debateclimaterelatedtopicsin2005,butthesediscussionswerebroadenedtoincludeothermajoremittersattheleveloftheG8+5andtheG20ortheMajorEconomiesForuminlateryears.TheMajorEconomiesForumisalmostidenticaltoG20initsmembership,butconfinedtothediscussionofclimatepolicy(Michonskietal.2010:10).

AsopposedtoIIGOs,TGIshaveemergedprimarilyaftertheKyotoProtocolwasagreedin1997.Wefurtherobserve an irregular growth trend. There appears to be a steepening of the increase with the KyotoProtocol’sentryintoforcein2005,andaflatteningaftertheCopenhagenconferencein2009followedbyafurtherupwardjumpshortlybeforetheconferenceinParisin2015.TheseshiftsconcerndifferenttypesofTGIs: The TGIs created just after the Kyoto Protocol like the Prototype Carbon Fund and various similarcarbon funds managed by the World Bank focus on the market mechanisms defined under the KyotoProtocol, the Clean DevelopmentMechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). These TGIs include avarietyofgovernmentandnon-governmentactors.TheirmembersprovidethefundingforconcreteclimatechangemitigationprojectsgeneratingemissioncreditsundertheCDMandJIproposedbythemanagerofthefund.

WhentheKyotoProtocolenteredintoforce,andsignaledthatinindustrializedmembercountriessignificantemissionreductionswouldtrulybecomenecessaryandthusemissioncreditswouldhaveasignificantvalue,anumberofnetworksandstandardsforparticipationintheKyotoMechanismswereinitiated,frequentlybyprivateactorsandsub-nationallevelgovernments.TheCopenhagenfailureinlate2009toreachconsensusonasuccessoragreementtotheKyotoProtocoltriggeredacollapseinthedemandforemissioncreditsforthe time after 2012 and thus significantly reduced the development of this type of TGIs. The finalmajorincrease of TGIs in the run-up to the Paris Conference in 2015 ismostly due to newnetworkswith littleemphasis on concrete climate change mitigation measures, primarily signaling the participating actors’willingnesstoavoidatotalstandstilloftheinternationalnegotiationprocess(MichaelowaandMichaelowa2016b). Overall, among the 109 climate-related TGIs in our dataset the majority of 68% focuses onnetworking,20%arestandards,8%arecarbonfunds,4%relatetotechnologydevelopment,and5%havenomitigationrelatedpurpose,butpurelyfocusonadaptation(MichaelowaandMichaelowa2016b).

While the increase in TGInumbers is impressive, theabovecategorizationmayalready suggest that theirrelevanceforactualinternationalclimatepolicyvariesconsiderably.WhenexaminingorganizationaldesignfeaturesensuringthatTGImemberseffectivelytakeactionforemissionsreductions,weseethat,infact,thebulk of initiatives cannot be expected to induce significant climate change mitigation: Only 11% of theinitiatives formulate any mitigation target, and only 13% provide some kind of financial incentives formitigationactivitiesoftheirmembers.46%oftheinitiativesforeseesomekindofmonitoring,reportingandverification(MRV),butonly27%defineabaselineagainstwhichtomeasurepotentialchange.Almosthalfofthe initiativesdonot showanyof theseprovisions (seeAnnex2,TableA1, last row,andMichaelowaandMichaelowa2016b,AppendixTableA1).

Actors participating in TGIs are mainly from industrialized countries. According to our data not even aquarteroftheinitiativeshaveamajorityofmembersfromdevelopingcountries.Furthermore,whileonlyasingleinitiative(the“AsianCitiesClimateChangeResilienceNetwork”focusingonadaptation)iscomposed

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of developing country actors alone, almost 40% have members only from industrialized countries. Inaddition,onlyinthreeoutof109cases,thefoundingcountry(i.e.thehomecountryofthefoundingactororthecountryinwhichthefoundationtookplace)isnotanOECDcountry.Thesearethe“CleanAirInitiative”founded in the Philippines in 2001, “Socialcarbon” founded in Brazil in 2008, and the “Panda Standard”founded inChina in2009.AllofthemfocusonMRV,theChineseoneadditionallyrequiresabaseline,butnone of them have mitigation targets or incentives provided by the initiative. No significant mitigation-relatedinitiativehasbeencreatedbyordominatedbyvulnerablelow-incomecountries.TGIsdonotseemtoprovideanappropriatevehicleforthemtopromotetheirinterestsandtoovercometheirlimitedpowerintheformalnegotiationprocess.Theseresultsconfirmtheprioranalysisoftransnationalclimategovernanceinitiatives in Bulkeley et al. (2012). They are further reinforced by the finding that there is no positivecorrelation(infact,nosignificantcorrelationatall)betweentheshareofdevelopingcountryactorsandthepresence of the different mitigation-related features of organizational design in these initiatives (seeAnnex2,TableA1).

2.2.Explainingtheriseofinformalorganizationsandinitiatives

TakingtogetherthetimingoftheemergenceofIIGOsandTGIsandtheirpurposediscussedabovesuggeststhat the dynamics of theUNFCCCprocess itself has beendriving the development of these organizationsover time. This is most obvious for the vast majority of IIGOs established as negotiation groups whencountries noticed that given the development of the negotiations, coalitions with new partners wouldfurther their interests.Whileexternal to thenegotiations, TGIshavealsobeen responsive to theUNFCCCprocess. The different typologies discussed above reflect their different purposes, namely sharinginformation(networks),developingandimplementingcost-effectivemeanstodealwithupcomingornewlyintroducedrequirements(carbonfunds,technologydevelopmentinitiatives),lobbyinginordertoinfluencethe negotiation outcomes (networks), improving the members’ public image and enhancing theircompetitivenessthroughtransparencyabouttheirmitigationaction(networks,standards).TheyallrelateinsomewayortheothertotheUNFCCCprocessandtheirprevalenceamongnewlycreatedinitiativesdirectlycorresponds to the signals provided there. Thus TGIs with a clear focus on concrete mitigation actionemergedprimarily in thecontextof theKyotoProtocol (seealso theeconometricanalysisbyMichaelowaandMichaelowa2016b:Table3),initiallymainlydrivenbytheinterestoftheprivatesectortoinfluencethedesignofcriticalpolicyinstruments,andlater,tofindefficientmeanstodealwiththeKyotoemissiontargetsthatwouldnothamperinternationalcompetitiveness.Suchproactiveinterestfromtheprivatesectorwanedafter the failure of the Copenhagen conference in 2009 that signaled that no stringent emission targetswouldbetakenupbygovernmentsintheforeseeablefuture.Sincethen,however,somegovernmentshavebecomeinterestedtoengagetheprivatesectorandNGOsinclimatechangemitigation,giventhatnolegallybindingframeworkforgovernment-ledmitigationexistedafter2012.Intherun-uptotheParisConferencein2015,theUNSecretaryGeneralhimselfengagedinthisprocesstogarnersupportforinternationalclimatepolicybycallingasummitinviting“worldleaders,fromgovernment,finance,business,andcivilsociety[…]to galvanize and catalyze climate action. He has asked these leaders to bring bold announcements andactionstotheSummitthatwillreduceemissions”(UnitedNations2014).HisinterventionwasakeyfeatureofthisphaseandtriggeredthestrongincreaseinTGIsin2014.

Theseobservations correspond to theanalysisbyGreen (2013:2)whopresents theUNFCCCas the “coralreef”oftheclimatechangeregimecomplex.Thecoralreefprovidesthebackboneofthewholeecosystem

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andwhateverdevelopsinthissystemdependsonthereef.Similarly,KeohaneandVictor(2011)speakaboutconcentricrings.Inthelightoftheabovediscussion,wewouldslightlyadjustandupdatetheirpresentationbyplacingtheUNFCCCandaswellas IIGOs in formofnegotiationgroupsat thecore,anumberofhighlyinfluentialFIGOsliketheWorldBankandnegotiationforalikeG8,G20andtheMEFaswellasthefewnewFIGOscreatedwithin thenegotiationprocess (GEFandGCF) in thesecondring,andotherFIGOs trying toinfluence the negotiations and/or to understandwhich part of the agreement could be relevant for theirownmandatealongwithTGIsinathirdring.Thisthirdandmostperipheralringhadthegreatestpartinthestrong rise of the number of organizations within the regime complex. Environmental NGOs, businesslobbies and research institutions participating as accredited observers in the negotiation process can beconsideredasparticipantsatthesamelevel.

2.3.Effectsoftheriseofinformalorganizationsandinitiatives

Negotiation groups are directly involved in rulemaking and thus highly influential within the UNFCCCprocess. Some groups have been particularly successful in this respect. AOSIS for instance, managed tobundle the preferences of the vulnerable small island states at an early point in time and to jointlydemonstratethedramaticconsequencesofclimatechange.Giventhesaliencetheissuehadforthem,theyweregrantedaseat incertainUNFCCCcommittees, inwhichgiventheirsizeandhardpower, theywouldusuallynothavebeenpermittedtosendadelegate(Benwell2016:70,Betzoldetal.2012:594).Attheotherendof thedevelopingcountry spectrum,BASICwasalsoquite successful.Thecommon interestsofBASICmember countries were to avoid the introduction of commitments for emerging economies and to gainvisibilityandreputationintheinternationalarena.IndeedtheParisAgreementnowisbasedonabottom-upsysteminwhicheachcountrycanitselfdefinewhatitwillcontributetoglobalmitigationeffortsandcanalsoconditionanyactivityonfundingbyindustrializedcountries.Intermsofinternationalreputation,theBASICcountries, notably India and China were often presented as spoilers of the negotiation process (see e.g.MichaelowaandMichaelowa2012 for India, Conrad2012 forChina),but at the same time, started tobeinvolvedinallhigh-leveldiscussions(seealsoSection3below)andtobenamedalongwithmajorpowers,notablytheUnitedStates.ItisnodoubtnotcoincidentalthattheUSandChinaalsojointlysignedtheParisAgreementattheG20meetingon2ndSeptember2016.

Whether theriseofnegotiationgroupsandtheirsubstantial influenceonthenegotiations isadvancingorhindering a global effort towards climate change mitigation obviously depends on the balance betweenopposing groups within the process. It could be argued, however, that the break-up of G77+China intovarioussub-groupsmayhavehelpedtounblockthestalemateregardingtheinterpretationoftheUNFCCC’s‘common,butdifferentiatedresponsibilities’principleandsupportedthemovefromarigidlistofcountrieswithandwithoutcommitmentstothemoredynamicapproachembodiedintheParisAgreementinwhicheach country participates in away consistent with its (self-perceived) capacities (see Michaelowa andMichaelowa2015).Theeventualclimatechangemitigationachievedbythisapproachwilldependonhowcountries’ ambitions evolve over time. The current engagements presented in the form of each party’s‘Nationally determined contribution’) leave a substantial gap with respect to the simultaneously agreedobjectivetokeepglobaltemperaturerise“wellbelow2°C”(UNFCCC2015).

AsopposedtoIIGOs,todate,onlyfewTGIshavebeenabletodirectlyinfluencerulemakingattheUNFCCC.This has only been the case when TGIs combined highly reputed think tanks with governments and keyprivate companies. For example, in such a strong coalition the US-based think tank “World Resources

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Institute”wasabletoinfluenceaccountingrulesthroughtheGreenhouseGasProtocolinitiative.Apartfromsuch exceptional cases, TGIs have had some indirect effects through standard setting, lobbying, andinfluencing public opinion in themembers’ countries of origin. Just as for the IIGOs discussed above, theeffect on climate change mitigation is not unambiguously positive, but depends on the balance ofpreferencesamongTGImembers.Giventhelimitedorientationtowardsmitigationintheirowndesign,highexpectationsabouttheircontributiontoclosingtheParisAgreement’sambitionsgaparecertainlynotveryrealistic(MichaelowaandMichaelowa2016b).Yet,asdiscussedabove,someTGIssuchascarbonfundshavebeen very successful at supporting the implementationof theKyotoProtocol and could become similarlyrelevantfortheimplementationoftheParisAgreement.

Overall, our main conclusion is that the informal organizations and initiatives involved in internationalclimatepoliticsgenerallydidnotplayanindependentrolewithrespecttothecoreobjectiveoftheclimatechange regime to mitigate climate change, but rather worked either in response to outcomes from theUNFCCC or tried to influence these outcomes in the first place. Despite the substantial increase in thenumberoforganizationsandinitiativespopulatingtheclimatechangeregimecomplex,theUNFCCCclearlyremains at its core, and further developments of international climate policy will continue to dependcruciallyonthesuccessofthisinternationalregime.

3.InformalityofrulesandprocedureswithintheUNFCCC

Given the central roleof theUNFCCC,wewill nowexaminehow informalityhas affected thenegotiationoutcomes within this international regime. In this context, we will consider the informality of rules andproceduresandhowtheyevolvedovertime.Thegeneralimportanceofrulesandprocedures,bothformaland informal,hasbeendiscussed indetail intheextant literature,notablybyYaminandDepledge(2004),Depledge (2005) andMonheim (2015). The following discussionwill build on this literature adding someinsightsfromthesuccessfulnegotiationoftheParisAgreementinDecember2015.Thediscussionwillagainbestructuredbyfirstdescribingthechangeobservedovertime, thenexplainingthesedevelopments,andfinally,discussingtheireffect.

3.1.Thedevelopmentofinformalrulesandproceduresovertime

Eversincethebeginningoftheinternationalclimatenegotiationsinformalityhasplayedanimportantrole.InhercomprehensivemonographonthemanagementofinternationalclimatenegotiationsDepledge(2005:85ff.)providesnumerousexamplesonpragmaticinterpretations,bypassingandevensomecasesofexplicitrelaxation of formal rules and regulations (see also Yamin and Depledge 2004). She also distinguishesbetweenanumberofarenasofdifferentdegreeof informalitythatprovideopportunitiesfordelegatestodiscuss more freely (Depledge 2005: 108ff.). Their range covers everything between informal plenarymeetings that only differ from formal plenaries by a corresponding declaration by the President of theconference, to informal consultations between the President and selected countries or broader but stillhighlyinformalworkinggroupsonspecifictechnicalissues.Duetotheirstrongdegreeofinformality,someof the smaller technical working groups have later even been coined as “informal informals” (Monheim2015:31).Intheclimateregimeaselsewhere,andeversinceitsstart,informalnegotiations—attimesvery

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informally“inthecorridorsandhotelbarsofconferencevenues”(Bauer2006,p.34)—havebeenconsideredascrucialtoeventuallyachieveanyprogress.

Yetalreadyfortheearly2000s,Depledge(2005:86)notesthatinformalityappearstobeontherisetoanextent that some participants consider the formal plenaries and subsidiary bodies to have become of a“moreritualistic”nature.Shefurthernotesthattherisingnumberofspecializedtopicstobenegotiatedalsoincreasesthenumberofinformalmeetings.Thelattertrendhasprobablycontinuedoverthelastdecade.Inaddition,thegreaterdifferentiationofnegotiationgroupsdiscussedabovesuggeststhatagreaternumberofinformalbilateralnegotiationsbetweenmembersofthesegroupswillnowhavetotakeplacebeforeanyagreement.IndeedintherunuptotheParisAgreementin2015,thereweresomanybilateralconsultationsthatnobodywasable tokeep track (Bodansky2016), indeed theFrenchPresidencyvirtuallyhadbilaterallast-minutetalkswithallindividualgroups(Brun2016:120).ThisiswhatDepledge(2005:131)referstoas“shuttlediplomacy”.

At the same time—in contrast to the development of informal organizations and initiatives discussed inSection2—thedevelopmentofinformalitywithintheUNFCCCnegotiationshascertainlynotsimplybeenanuninterruptedincrease,butanupanddowndependingontheissueareastobediscussed,andalsoonthewillingnessofthepartiestoacceptcomplementarynegotiationsbehindthescene.Informalmeetingshaveat times been heavily contested due to the lack of inclusiveness and transparency resulting thereof. AtCopenhagenboththehand-picked“Friendsof theChair”andthesmall informalmeetingbetweenObamaandtheheadsofstateoftheBASICcountriesthatcameupwiththedraftofthedocumentlater“takennoteof”asthe“CopenhagenAccord”wereheavilycriticizedinthisrespect.Thisledtoconsiderablemistrustandcontributedtothefailureoftheconference(Monheim2015:37ff.,seealsoVihmaetal.2011:325).

Henceratherthantoalwaysbecomemoreinformal,informalprocedureshaveattimesbeenreplacedagainbymoreformalapproaches,orbyother,moreinnovativeinformalapproaches.

InadditiontoinformalmeetingsduringtheUNFCCCconferenceitself,thepresidenciesusuallyorganizeaninformal negotiation process throughout the preceding year meeting individual groups and membercountries.Theirintensityandstructurealsovariedovertime.

When it comes to the interpretation of rules, informality can become similarly controversial. Amatter incaseistheinterpretationoftheconsensusprincipleforthefinalagreement.Theconsensusprincipleitselfisnot formally anchored in the Convention, but results from the lack of agreement on specific votingprovisions (Monheim2015:31).EversincetheagreementtotheKyotoProtocol in1997, therehavebeeninstances where a consensus was declared despite disagreement by some of the parties. At Kyoto, thePresident read out the controversial paragraph and askedwhether therewere any objections. ButwhenIndia,ChinaandtheEUraisedtheirflags,hequicklywentonwiththenextparagraph.Therewerenootherobjections.Hadanyonecomplainedatthispoint,hewouldhavebeenheldresponsibleforthefailureofthenegotiations. So the agreement passed (Grubb et al. 1999: 96). In other instances, parties did formallycomplain.InGeneva1996andinCopenhagen2009thisledtotheparties’decisiontomerely“takenoteof”rather than to agree upon the final document. One year after Copenhagen at the Cancun conference,however, the agreement was gaveled through against the explicit objection by Bolivia4 and the same

4ItisnoteworthythatPresidentEspinosaprovidedapeculiardefinitionof“consensus”asfollows:"ConsensusrequiresthateveryoneisgiventherighttobeheardandhavetheirviewsgivendueconsiderationandBoliviahasbeengiventhisopportunity.Consensusdoesnotmeanthatonecountryhastherightofveto,andcanprevent193others from

12

happened again one year later in Doha against the explicit objection by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus(Rajamani2016:212).AfterCancun,thepressreportedthatBoliviamightconsiderchallengingtheCancundecisionat the InternationalCourtof Justice,but thiswouldhavehad littlechanceof success (Werksman2010).Andinthefollowingyear,despitethebluntignoranceoftheobjectionofamajorpowerlikeRussia,thenegotiationprocesscontinuedbasedonthe‘agreement’atDoha.However,toretaliate,Russiablockedthemeetings of theUNFCCC subsidiary bodies at the following Bonnmeeting in spring 2012 for awholeweek.Thequestionariseshowfartheconsensusinterpretationcanbestretchedinthefuturewhenmajorpartiesflagtheirobjections.InParis,thiswasnotnecessaryasonlyNicaraguavoicedsomeobjection,butdidnotinsistonthematter.

However, in Paris, the agreementwas at risk just before its conclusion, due to an error in the draft thatstated “shall” instead of “should” with respect to the increasing ambition of emission reductions by theUnitedStates. Legally, thiswouldhave turneda recommendation intoanobligation.The issuewashighlycritical as the new formulationwould have implied that President Obama could not himself approve theagreement, but would have required congressional agreement, and in fact a two-thirds majority in theSenate(Bodansky2016,BodanskyandSpiro2016).ConferencePresidentLaurentFabiuseventuallydecidedtoreturntotheterm“should”andtoincludethischangeinalistof“smalltechnicalissuesandtranslationerrors”thatremainedtobeaddressed.Thelistwasveryquicklyreadoutintheplenary,andhardlyanyonecouldverifythedifferentpointssofast.Nobodyobjected.

Itshouldbenotedthatthewholeset-upoftheAgreementhadalreadybeenorientedattheideatomakeitlooklikeanordinaryconferencedecision,ratherthanabindinginternationalagreement.HencetherelevanttextoftheAgreementishiddenintheannexofthe—otherwisebrief—decisiondocument.

3.2.Explainingchangesininformalityofrulesandprocedures

Itappearsthattheinformalinterpretationandattimescircumventionofformalrulesandprocessescanbehelpfultoforgeafinaldecisionandcompromise,butatthesametime,itcanbeover-stretched,hurtcertainparties,destroytrustand leadtoanunnecessarystalemate.Thisseemstohavehappened inCopenhagenand the Presidencies of subsequent conferences had to make a substantial effort to restore some trustamong parties. During all these conferences from Cancun in 2010 to Paris in 2015, the constantmantraiteratedbythePresidencywastransparencyand inclusiveness.Monheim(2015)comparesCopenhagentoCancunbasedonnumerousinterviewsandfindsthatdelegatesbroadlyagreethatCopenhagencompletelyfailedinthisrespect,whileCancunworkedoutverywell.Forinstance,insteadoforganizingthetraditional“FriendsoftheChair”meetingswithparticipantsselectedbythePresident,regionsthemselvesnominatedtheirparticipants.Whilethiswasmoreinclusiveandtransparent,itturnedouttobeasuboptimalframeforefficientexchangebecausethenumberofparticipantswasoftentoohigh,goingupto70persons(Monheim2015:54).Asaconsequence,SouthAfricapioneeredthe“Indaba”(=”business”inZulu)approachinDurban2011. In principle every country could still send a minister, but the overall number of participants wasconstraint to about 40 peoplewho could be seated around a square table. Ever since, this approach hasbeen applied as governments have been able to informally agreewhichministers should take the scarceseatsatthetable.Especiallyifaccompaniedbyawiseinformationpolicybythepresidentwhereresultsof

movingforwardafteryearsofnegotiationsonsomethingthatoursocietiesandfuturegenerationsexpect."(IISD2010:28).

13

the Indaba are communicated to the formal plenary every day, the approach was seen as sufficientlyinclusivetoallowanefficientnegotiation.LaurentFabiusveryskillfullyappliedthisapproachduringtheParisConferencetoachieveaconstructivemixofinformalityandtransparency(SouthAfrica2015).

Whenobserving the increaseand then fall in informality, one could thinkof a formality-informality cycle.Thecycleisbasedonanexperimentaltestingoftheextenttowhichrulesandprocedurescanberenderedmoreflexibleandhenceefficient,butwiththeriskofsuddenfallbackandheavycriticism.Findingacceptableand efficient procedural innovation is to a large extent a matter of the creativity and sensitivity of thepresidency.

Formality-informalitycyclesalsooccurwithoutanycrisisorcriticism, in thecontextof the introductionofnew issues to be explored. An instructive example is the introduction of themarketmechanisms of theKyotoProtocol,theCleanDevelopmentMechanism(CDM)andJointImplementation(JI).Theyemergedasareal surprise during the Kyoto Conference of 1997 (Grubb et al. 1999: 97ff.), but a long discussion hadpreceded this decision. After theBerlin Conferenceof 1995had agreed to testmarket-based approachesthroughapilotphaseof“ActivitiesImplementedJointly”(AIJ),anumberofcountriesandprivateactorshadstarted to experimentwithmitigation projects.While formally such projects could not generate emissioncredits,theundeclaredaimofthepioneerswastoeventuallyachievethis,andtheydidsoinKyoto.Astheseinstrumentswere highly innovative, the subsequent setting of ruleswas challenging and involved varyingdegreesofinformality.

TheWorldBankespecially felt that itwaswellplacedtoplayakeyrole indefining therulesof theKyotoMechanisms. Therefore, in 1999 it set up the “Prototype Carbon Fund” (PCF) open for government andprivatesubscriptions(MichaelowaandMichaelowa2011:263).Atthesametime,privatesectorplayerssetup the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) as a lobby group to influence design of themechanisms.TheformalnegotiationsontherulesforCDMandJIwereonlydraggingonslowly.

TheMarrakech Conference in 2001 then formally agreed on a set of rules for CDM and JI aswell as theinstitutionsoverseeingthesemechanisms(CDMExecutiveBoardandJISupervisoryCommittee).However,their detailed interpretation, for example regarding the methodologies for defining project baselines,remained unclear. Building on the first lessons from the PCF, theWorld Bank engagedwith a number ofgovernmentstosetupspecificfundsforCDMandJIinvestments,e.g.withtheNetherlands,SpainandItaly(Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2011: 263). The World Bank was quite clear that it expected the specificbaselineandmonitoringmethodologiestobethosethatithaddevelopedforitsfunds.TheCDMExecutiveBoard did, however, not accept this reasoning and rejected several of the World Bank’s methodologyproposals(MichaelowaandMichaelowa2016a).

Only after 2005 when the Kyoto Protocol had become operational, all major elements of the marketmechanismshadbeenformallydefined.Aftertheyhaveworkedwellforawhile,theParisAgreementnowsuggeststhattherewillbenewmechanisms.Againthefloor isopenfornew ideas.Hencethecyclestartsanew.

AkeyinformalwayfortheemergenceofnewtopicsistheirdiscussionthroughsideeventsattheUNFCCCnegotiationsessions.SuchsideeventshavetraditionallybeenorganizedbyaccreditedobserverNGOs(seeHjerpeandBuhr2014,SchröderandLovell2012).TheUNFCCCSecretariatadministerstheallocationoftimeslotstoorganizationsproposingasideevent.Giventhatthesignalingfunctionofsideeventshasincreasinglybeenrecognized,sincethemid-2000sthedemandforslotshasexceededsupply.Therefore,theSecretariat

14

has developed an increasingly elaborate set of principles for prioritizing side event applications. TheseincentivizedcollaborationbetweengovernmentsandNGOs.Forthelastyears,asignificantnumberofsideevents have been held regarding the design of new market mechanisms, and negotiation positions ofgovernmentshavebeeninfluencedbytheseevents.

As the negotiations in the subsidiary bodies of the UNFCCC inMay 2016 revealed significant differencesbetweengovernmentpositionsonthemarketmechanisms,governmentswereaskedtoprovidesubmissionsontheirviewsuntilendofSeptember2016.Atthesametime,initiativesareemergingtotestapproachestothemechanisms.Forexample,theWorldBankissettingupa“TransformativeCarbonAssetFacility”forthispurpose. This mirrors the approach undertaken by the World Bank in the first years of the KyotoMechanisms(seeMichaelowaandMichaelowa2011).

3.3.Theeffectofinformalrulesandprocedures

The above discussion shows that the use of informal rules and procedures can have both positive andnegativeeffects,dependingon therightbalance in response toparticipants’willingness toeitherproceedfast or first remove remaining stumbling blocks, to the general atmosphere of trust or mistrust, to thespecifictopicatstakeandtothequestionhowripeitisforfinaldecision.Thejudgementofwhichinformalrules andprocedures are ‘good’or ‘bad’ cannotbemade in general terms as it dependson the concretesituation. Bodansky (2016) for instance argues that if countries had been as familiarwith the bottom-upsystemofnationallydeterminedcontributionsastheyarenow,theconferenceinCopenhagenmightalreadyhave led toanagreement.The judgementofwhethera specificapproachor interpretation isappropriateand will be accepted by the parties lies in the responsibility of the Presidency. This implies that thediplomaticskillsandthemanagementcapacityofthePresidentandhisorherteamhaveamajorimpactonthe overall outcomes of the negotiation process and hence for the effectivemitigation of global climatechange.

4.Conclusion

The number of informal organizations involved in international climate politics has significantly increasedover time. They generally fulfil a contributing role to the UNFCCC process, like the country negotiationgroupsandgroupssetuptoengageinoperationalizationoftheKyotoMechanisms.OnlyintimeswhentheUNFCCCprocesshadstalled, someof themtried toserveasalternative.Thiswasparticularly thecase fororganizationssetupinthecontextoftheBanKiMoonSummitof2014.ButoncetheUNFCCCprocesscameback on track through the Paris Agreement, these institutions have acknowledged the primacy of theUNFCCC.

Due to the need for consensus, the UNFCCC process has developed a number of informal processes toremain operational. Some of these processes have beenmore successful than others—e.g. the “Indaba”approach pioneered by South Africa at the Durban conference, which served as a model for the FrenchapproachinParis2015.TheCopenhagenconferenceof2009hadbeenahighprofilecaseoffailureduetoinformal procedures seen as exclusionaryby relevant parties.Given the key roleof thehost countryof aCOP, its choice of the appropriate informal procedure is critical for the COP’s success. Not only theprocedureitselfbutalsothewayofcommunicatingitsoutcomesisimportant,asagainshownbytheParis

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conference.ThemoststrikinginformalapproachintheUNFCCCcontextistheinterpretationofconsensus,which was stretched considerably in 2010 and 2012. Especially in the latter case, where Russia wasoverridden,thelimitationsofthisapproachbecameapparent.

Inanumberof cases, forexample in thecontextofmarketmechanisms,a formality-informality cyclehasemergedwhere a formal decision by the UNFCCC process triggers informal activities that in turn lead toformalizationintheformofrules.Suchcyclescanrepeatthemselvesovertime.

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Annex1:ListofinterviewsattheUNFCCCnegotiationsinParis,10thDecember,2015

Organization

Name and function of person interviewed

International Union for Conservation of

Nature (IUCN)

Patrick Andrew Wylie

(Senior REDD+ Advisor / Climate Change Mitigation

Policy Officer)

European Patent Office (EPO)

Dr. Ilja Rudyck

(Senior Economist)

International Fund for Agricultural

Development (IFAD)

Alessia Valentini

(Program Assistant)

Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)

Dr. Martin Frick

(Director of Climate, Energy and Tenure Division)

International Civil Aviation Organization

(ICAO)

Blandine Ferrier

(Associate Environment Officer)

International Maritime Organisation (IMO)

Stefan Micallef

(Director, Marine Environment Division)

International Labour Organisation (ILO)

Jessika Berns

(Junior Technical Officer)

United Nations Educational, Scientific and

Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

Julia Heiss

(Programme Specialist)

United Nations Development Program

(UNDP)

Verania Chao Rebolledo

(Officer of Energy and Environmental Programmes)

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Annex2:Descriptivestatistics

TableA1:DevelopingcountryparticipationandmitigationorientationofTGIdesign

Shareofnon-AnnexImembers

Sumofdesigncriteriamet

0 1 2 3 4 Total

Zero 14 7 6 10 1 38

(37%) (18%) (16%) (26%) (3%) (100%)

Low 13 9 4 1 0 27

(48%) (33%) (15%) (4%) (0%) (100%)

medium 13 6 2 0 0 21

(62%) (29%) (10%) (0%) (0%) (100%)

High 10 5 4 3 0 22

(45%) (23%) (18%) (14%) (0%) (100%)

Only 1 0 0 0 0 1

(100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (100%)

Total 51 27 16 14 1 109

(47%) (25%) (15%) (13%) (1%) (100%)

Notes:Numbersinbracketsrefertorowpercentages.Thecategoriesfortheshare(s)ofnon-AnnexImembershipare:‘only’:s=100%,‘high’:100%>s>50%,‘medium’:50%≥s>25%,‘low’:25%≥s>0%,‘zero’:s=0%.Theassociationbetweenthetwovariablesisinsignificant(Cramer’sV=0.20,p-value=0.40).DesigncriteriaasdefinedinMichaelowaandMichaelowa(2016)includetheexistenceof1)amitigationtarget,2)financialincentives,3)aclearlydefinedbaseline,and4)somemechanismforMRV.