FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. L-42783-85. November 29, 1976.]

CARIDAD CRUZ DE SYQUIA, petitioner, vs. BOARD OF POWER

AND WATER WORKS (formerly Public Service Commission),

RAFAEL J. RUIZ, PETER ENRIQUEZ and CYRIL D. MOSES,

respondents.

Enrique O. Chan for petitioner.

Zosimo Rivas for private respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TEEHANKEE, J p:

The Court sets aside respondent board's orders ruling upon the complaints of the three

private respondents-tenants of petitioner's apartment building that petitioner may not

charge them pro rata the extra cost of electricity consumed for the building's common

areas and facilities such as the elevator and servants' quarters. The question of the

proportionate amount that each tenant should bear for the additional electricity cost for

common facilities of the apartment building used by the tenants in common is purely civil

in character, (involving the conditions of lease between landlord and tenant), to be

adjudged under the applicable civil laws exclusively by the regular courts of general

jurisdiction and is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent board.

In December, 1974, private respondents filed three separate complaints with respondent

Board of Power and Waterworks charging petitioner as administrator of the South Syquia

Apartments at Malate, Manila with the offense of selling electricity without permit or

franchise issued by respondent board, in that petitioner billed respondents-complainants

various specified amounts for their electricity consumption at their respective apartments

for the months of May to September, 1974 in excess of the Meralco rates authorized by

respondent board. LexLib

Petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaints asserting that they involved contractual

obligations of respondents as apartment tenants and were beyond respondent board's

jurisdiction was denied by the latter.

Petitioner thereupon filed her answer, wherein she again questioned the complaints as

beyond the jurisdiction of respondent as a regulatory board, since she is not engaged in

the sale of electric power but merely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users their

legitimate electric current bills in accordance with their lease contracts, and their

relationship is contractual in nature.

Petitioner added that the tenants including respondents had no complaint under the

contractual set-up of billings for water and electric service consumption, whereby while

individual electric meters are installed in each apartment, Meralco billings include all

consumption in the entire compound, including the common areas, servants' quarters and

elevators, the payment for which was advanced by petitioner and later collected by way

of reimbursement from the tenants pro rata; but that respondents alone complained later

when on account of the energy crisis, additional fuel adjustment costs were added by

Meralco to their billings which were likewise passed on by petitioner to all the tenants

pro rata.

As stated in respondent board's questioned order of August 28, 1975, petitioner further

manifested her willingness to abide by such computations as respondent board may

determine to be the correct electric billing that should be charged against complainants-

respondents for their respective electric consumption and submitted pertinent records of

the electrical consumption and Meralco billings. Respondent board in said order however

came up with its computation which would allow petitioner to charge respondents only

the cost of electricity registered in their individual apartment meters and disallow the

actual cost of additional electricity charged them pro rata by petitioner for the cost of

electricity consumed by all tenants in the common areas.

When petitioner pointed out in her motion for reconsideration that respondent board's

computation would not reimburse petitioner for the cost of the electric consumption in

the common areas and elevators with a resultant loss to her at the least of P1,250.00 a

month or P15,000.00 a year and reiterated that this was a contractual obligation of the

tenants over which respondent regulatory board had no jurisdiction, the board, acting

through its Acting Chairman alone, Cesar S. de Guzman, (as seems to be the case with all

the board actions herein involved) denied reconsideration and ruled that

"It is the considered opinion of this Board, that since the tenants complainants)

are already paying rentals for the use of their rooms and for the cost of their

electricity within their rooms, they should no longer be required to pay for the

extra cost of electricity in common areas such as the elevator and the servants'

quarters, for it is only fair and equitable that the cost of electricity for common

areas such as the elevator and servants' quarters be shouldered alone by the

owner of the building as part of the cost for the rentals being paid by the tenants

(complainants). . . ."

Hence, the petition at bar, wherein petitioner raises the basic question of the board's lack

of jurisdiction, aside from the error of its action based on the admitted facts. LLpr

The Court required comment and private respondents as well as respondent board's

counsel filed their comments simply assuming the board's jurisdiction and supported its

questioned orders.

Also required to comment, Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. concurred

with petitioner and submitted that respondent regulatory board acted without jurisdiction

over the subject-matter of the complaints, succinctly stating the State's position as

follows:

"Since the petitioner does not operate, manage or control the power plant and

furthermore, since electricity is directly and uninterruptedly supplied to the end-

user, it cannot be correctly claimed that the petitioner is selling electricity nor

can she be considered a middleman in the electric power business.

"The dispute between the petitioner landlord and her tenants as to how much

each tenant should be correspondingly billed, for the actual electricity consumed

and as to the proportionate amount each tenant should bear for the common

facilities used in the apartments, if such amounts should be borne by the tenants

at all, is an issue affecting mathematical computations and conditions of lease

between landlord and tenant."

The Court resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action and to grant the petition.

Under the reorganization plan effected by Presidential Decree No. 1 as amended by

Presidential Decree No. 458 issued on May 16, 1974, jurisdiction, supervision and

control over public service related to electric light, power and waterworks utilities

formerly vested in the Public Service Act 1 were transferred to respondent board.

Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking

cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents against petitioner.

Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with

respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public

service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise.

Respondents' complaints against being charged the additional cost of electricity for

common facilities used by the tenants (in addition to those registered in their respective

apartment meters) give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be

adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act)

and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular

courts of general jurisdiction.

Respondent board in resolving the complaints against petitioner and requiring her to

absorb the additional rising costs of electricity consumed for the common areas and

elevator service even at a resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year arrogated the judicial

function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void. prLL

ACCORDINGLY, the questioned orders of respondent board are annulled and the

complaints of private respondents are ordered dismissed, With costs against private

respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Muoz Palma, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Sec. 13(a) of the Public Service Act, C.A. No. 146, provides that: "The Commission shall

have jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all public services and their franchises,

equipment, and other properties, and in the exercise of its authority, it shall have the

necessary powers and the aid of public force".

Sec. 13(b) defines the term "public service" thus: The term 'public service' includes every

person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines,

for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent,

occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes. . . . gas, electric, light,

heat and power, water supply and power . . ."

||| (De Syquia v. Board of Power and Water Works, G.R. Nos. L-42783-85, November 29,

1976)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-27520. January 21, 1987.]

GLOBE WIRELESS LTD., petitioner, vs. PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSION and ANTONIO B. ARNAIZ, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

G.R. No. 27520 [Globe Wireless Ltd., vs. Public Service Commission and Antonio B.

Arnaiz]. Challenged in this petition for certiorari is the jurisdiction of the defunct Public Service Commission [PSC] under Section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as

amended, to discipline and impose a fine upon petitioner, Globe Wireless, Ltd., a duly-

organized Philippine corporation engaged in international telecommunication business

under a franchise granted by Public Acts Nos. 3495, 3692 and 4150, as amended by

Republic Act No. 4630.

A message addressed to Maria Diaz, Monte Esquina 30, Madrid, Spain, filed by private

respondent Antonio B. Arnaiz with the telegraph office of the Bureau of

Telecommunications in Dumaguete City was transmitted to the Bureau of

Telecommunications in Manila. It was forwarded to petitioner Globe Wireless Ltd. for

transmission to Madrid. Petitioner sent the message to the American Cable and Radio

Corporation in New York, which, in turn, transmitted the same to the Empresa Nacional

de Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. The latter, however, mislaid said message, resulting

in its non-delivery to the addressee.

After being informed of said fact, private respondent Arnaiz sent to then Public Service

Commissioner Enrique Medina an unverified letter-complaint relating the incident. The

complaint was docketed as PSC Case No. 65-39-OC and petitioner was required to

answer the same, Petitioner, in its answer, questioned PSC's jurisdiction over the subject

matter of the letter-complaint, even as it denied liability for the non-delivery of the

message to the addressee. prcd

Hearing ensued, after which the PSC issued an order finding petitioner "responsible for

the inadequate and unsatisfactory service complained of, in violation of the Public

Service Act" and ordering it "to pay a fine of TWO HUNDRED [P200.00] PESOS under

Sec. 21 of Com. Act 146, as amended." Petitioner was likewise required to refund the

sum of P19.14 to the remitter of the undelivered message. [Annex "C", Petition, p, 23,

Rollo]

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner instituted the instant

petition.

We find for petitioner.

Verily, Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the

Public Service Act, vested in the Public Service Commission jurisdiction, supervision

and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties.

However, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 4630, the legislative franchise under which

petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commission's jurisdiction over petitioner

only to the rate which petitioner may charge the public. Thus,

"Sec. 5. The Public Service Commission is hereby given jurisdiction over the

grantee only with respect to the rates which the grantee may charge the public

subject to international commitments made or adhered to by the Republic of the

Philippines." (Emphasis supplied.)

The act complained of consisted in petitioner having allegedly failed to deliver the

telegraphic message of private respondent to the addressee in Madrid, Spain. Obviously,

such imputed negligence had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of the very

limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.

Moreover, under Section 21 of C.A. No. 146, as amended, the Commission was

empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a public

service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions

or regulations of the Commission. Petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so

there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to violate.

Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the Commission applicable to

petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded. llcd

Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the

jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are

limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the

legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void

and ineffective. The order under consideration belonged to this category.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is hereby granted and the order of respondent

Public Service Commission in PSC Case No. 65-39-OC is set aside for being null and

void.

||| (Globe Wireless Ltd. v. Public Service Commission, G.R. No. L-27520 (Resolution),

January 21, 1987)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-12426. February 16, 1959.]

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs.

CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the

Philippines Patent Office, respondent.

Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for

respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS AT LAW; PRACTICE OF LAW; BEFORE PATENT

OFFICE. Practice of law in the Philippines includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the

prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto or the

enforcement of their rights in patent cases.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WITHOUT FURTHER EXAMINATION. A member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training should be allowed to practice

before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. Under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law, and in good standing,

may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the

business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and

application of the patent law and other laws applicable as well as the presentation of

evidence to establish facts involved. That part of the functions of the Patent Director

are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decision are

under the law taken to the Supreme Court.

D E C I S I O N

MONTEMAYOR, J p:

This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition

and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the

Philippines Patent Office.

On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had

scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are

qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said

examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before

said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and

other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the

said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been

holding similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one of

the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar

examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines

and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent

Office, and that consequently, the act of the respondent Director requiring members of

the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the

Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said

office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of

applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains

that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of

law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so

much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be

handled not only by lawyers, but also by engineers and other persons with sufficient

scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the

Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any

other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from those

who would wish to handle cases before such bodies, as in the prosecution of patent

cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires

more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application

of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with

Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which

is similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States

Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as what prescribed by

respondent. . . . ."

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent Law of the United States of

America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to

determine as to who may practice before the United States Patent Office, the

respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.

Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to

have been holding tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a

required qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is

the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards

members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we

have given it careful thought and consideration.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to

admission to the practice of law in the Philippines 1 and any member of the Philippine

Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether

judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question

arises as to whether or not appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation

and prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of

law.

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in

court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to

actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and

proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,

conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in

matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and

condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the

foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and

insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in

matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as

do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done

involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts

and conditions." (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied)

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of

work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to

proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a

large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments

covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.

Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court

proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They

require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men

and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.

These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate

relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far

as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of

the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which

involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to

the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed

by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character,

and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests

upon all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953

ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N. E. 313,

quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I.) 179 A.

139, 144). (Emphasis supplied)

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office,

the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of

their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their

rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the

Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge

and training, still, all such business has to be conducted and all orders and decisions

of the Director of Patents have to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as

well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent

Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office

involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well

as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and

procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall

not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or

welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if

it was known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the

inventor named in the application for patent, or if it was patented or described in any

printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year

before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in

the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor.

Section 10 provides that the right to the patent belongs to the true and actual inventor,

his heirs, legal representatives or assigns, and Section 12 says that an application for a

patent may be filed only by the inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns.

Section 25 and 26 refer to correction of any mistake in a patent. Section 28

enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may

apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to

petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a

petition for cancellation. Sections 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the

petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said

cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three

years from the day the patent was granted, any person may apply for the grant of a

license under a particular patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention

is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the

patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and

reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on

reasonable terms or by reason of the conditions attached by him to the license,

purchase, lease or use of the patented article or working of the patented process or

machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines

is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to

public health or public safety. All these things involve the application of laws, legal

principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and

experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.

In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the acts,

orders and decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable

and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section

61, provides that:

". . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any

party to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and

any party to any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme

Court from any final order or decision of the Director."

In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in

the Patent Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved

exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically,

the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of

scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the

functions and acts of the Head of the Patent Office.

". . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues,

interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are

public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated

copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees." (40 Am. Jur. 537).

(Emphasis supplied). ". . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory

jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his

duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a

patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In

passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only questions of

law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or

sale of the article invented. . . . ." (60 C. J. S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is

reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and

training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further

examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it

advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him

enlist the assistance of technical men and scientists in the preparation of papers and

documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine

sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the

registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his client, is required to submit a plan and

technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.

But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to

require persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit to an

examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent

Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and that

the U. S. Patent Office in its Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in

Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has

prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said

Rules of Practice:

"Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of attorneys and a register of agents are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names

of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent

Office in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent. Registration

in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the

person registered to practice before the Patent Office.

"(a) Attorneys at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United States Court or the highest court of any State or

Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with

the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent

Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.

xxx xxx xxx

"(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in

writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all

requested information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the

Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and

possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to

enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise

competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their

application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may

determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed either of the

registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral

character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical

matters must be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time

must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in the

case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the

Patent Office."

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States

Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself,

which reads as follows:

"The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary

of Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of

agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties

before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before

being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they

shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of

the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other

persons valuable service, and are likewise competent to advise and assist

applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their

applications or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents

may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either

generally or in any particular case, from further practice before his office any

person, agent, or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of

gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations,

or who shall, with intent to defraud in any manner, deceive, mislead, or threaten

any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or

prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by

advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly

recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of

the person so refused recognition or so suspended or excluded by the district

court of the United States for the District of Columbia under such conditions

and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine."

(Emphasis supplied).

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being

similar to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the

rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should

submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No.

165, for purposes of comparison:

"SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations,

not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office."

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the

provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations

to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office.

While the U. S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require

attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to

render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which

showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner,

our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has not

been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to

determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of

bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent

with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the

service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction

of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs

Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to

the approval of the Department Head, make all rules and regulations necessary to

enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue

Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance,

upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all

needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the

code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for

the Bureaus of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the

Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said

bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear

provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and

pass on examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said

Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureaus

of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or

less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,

assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal

Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures,

confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any

lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf

of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine

Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice

their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in

said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application

of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to

establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent Director are judicial or

quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the

law, taken to the Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the

respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine

Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to

appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,

Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.

||| (Philippine Lawyer's Ass'n. v. Agrava, G.R. No. L-12426, February 16, 1959)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-12596. July 31, 1958.]

JOSE L. GUEVARA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondent.

Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.

Dominador D. Dayot for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; JURISDICTION AND POWER TO

PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT. Under section 2, Article X of the Constitution and section 5 of the Revised Election Code, the Commission on Elections not only has the

duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections but the

power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in

connection with the elections. And as an incident of this power, it may also punish for

contempt in those cases provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court under the same

procedure and with the same penalties provided therein. In this sense, the

Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning

of the Constitution (section 13, Art. VIII) for it is merely an independent

administrative body (The Nacionalista Party vs. Vera, 85 Phil., 126), may however

exercise quasi-judicial functions in so far as controversies that by express provision of

the law come under its jurisdiction. As to what questions may come within this

category, neither the Constitution nor the Revised Election Code specifies. The

former merely provides that it shall come under its jurisdiction, saving those

involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including

the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment

of election inspectors and other election officials, while the latter is silent as to what

questions may be brought before it for determination. But it is clear that, to come

under its jurisdiction, the questions should be controversial in nature and must refer to

the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections.

2. ID.; ID.; ON MINISTERIAL ACT; NEWSPAPER COMMENTS ON

REQUISITION FOR BALLOT BOXES. The requisitioning and preparation of the necessary ballot boxes to be used in the elections is an imperative ministerial duty of

the Commission on Elections performed in its administrative capacity in relation to

the conduct of election ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it

only dicharges a ministerial duty; it does not exercise any judicial functions. Such

being the case, it can not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in

the law, for such power is inherently Judicial in nature.

3. ID.; ID.; POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT IS INHERENTLY

JUDICIAL; EXEMPTION. "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings,

and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of Courts, and,

consequently, in the administration of justice" (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons,

58 Phil., 271; U. S. vs. Loo Koe, 36 Phil., 867; In re Sotto 46 Off. Gaz., 2570; In re

Kelly, 35 Phil, 944). The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a

necessary incident and attribute of courts (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, Ibid.)

Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective

the power to elicit testimony (People vs. Swena, 296 p. 271), and the exercise of that

power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been

held invalid (Langenberg vs. Decker, 31 N. E. 190; In re Sims, 37 Phil., 135; Roberts

vs. Hacney, 58 S.W. 180).

D E C I S I O N

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J p:

Petitioner was ordered by the Commissioner on Elections to show cause why

he should not be punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times

issue of June 2, 1957 an article entitled "Ballot Boxes Contract Hit", which tended to

interfere with and influence the Commission on Elections and its members in the

adjudication of a controversy then pending investigation and determination before

said body "arising from the third petition for reconsideration of May 20, 1957 and the

supplementary petition thereof of June 1, 1957 filed by Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc.,

praying for reconsideration of the resolutions of the Commission of May 4 and 13,

1957, awarding the contracts for the manufacture and supply of 34,000 ballot boxes to

the National Shipyards & Steel Corporation and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. and

the respective answers of the latter two corporations to said petitions; and which

article likewise tended to degrade, bring into disrepute, and undermine the exclusive

constitutional function of this Commission and its Chairman Domingo Imperial and

Member Sixto Brillantes in the administration of all the laws relative to the conduct of

elections."

Petitioner, answering the summons issued to him by the Commission, appeared

and filed a motion to quash on the following grounds:

"a) The Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the

publication of the alleged contemptuous article, as neither in the Constitution

nor in statutes is the Commission granted a power to so punish the same, for

should Section 5 of Republic Act No. 180, vesting the Commission with 'power

to punish contempts provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court under the

same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein,' be applied to the

case at hand, said provision would be unconstitutional.

"b) Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists,

the same cannot be applied to the instant case, where the Commission is

exercising a purely administrative function of purchasing ballot boxes.

"c) Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists,

said power cannot apply to the present case because the matter of purchasing the

ballot boxes was already a closed case when the article in question was

published.

"d) Assuming that controversy contemplated by the law was still

pending, the article in question was a fair report because it could be assumed

that the news report of the respondent was based on the motion for

reconsideration filed by the Acme Steel where there was an allegation of fraud,

etc."

The Commission, after hearing, denied the motion to quash but granted

petitioner a period of fifteen (15) days within which to elevate the matter to the

Supreme Court in view of the issue raised which assails the jurisdiction of the

Commission to investigate and punish petitioner for contempt in connection with the

alleged publication. Hence the present petition for prohibition with preliminary

injunction.

The facts which gave rise to the present contemptuous incident are: The

Commission on Elections, on May 4, 1957, after proper negotiations, awarded to the

National Shipyards & Steel Corporation (NASSCO), the Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc.

(ACME), and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ASIATIC), the contracts to

manufacture and supply the Commission 12,000, 11,000 and 11,000 ballot boxes at

P17.64, P14.00 and P17.00 each, respectively. On May 8, 1957, both the NASSCO

and the ASIATIC signed with the Commission on Elections the corresponding

contracts thereon. On May 13, 1957, the Commission cancelled the award to the

ACME for failure of the latter to sign the contract within the designated time and

awarded to the NASSCO and the ASIATIC, one-half each, the 11,000 ballot boxes

originally alloted to the ACME. The corresponding contracts thereon were signed on

May 16, 1957.

Then followed a series of petitions filed by the ACME for the reconsideration

of the resolution of the Commission of May 13, 1957. The first of these petitions was

filed on May 14, 1957 which, after hearing, was denied by the Commission in its

resolution of May 16, 1957. The second petition was filed on May 16, 1957 and was

denied on May 17, 1957. The third petition was filed on May 20, 1957, and because

of the seriousness of the grounds alleged therein for the annulment of its previous

resolutions, the Commission resolved to conduct a formal investigation on the matter

ordering the NASSCO and the ASIATIC to file their respective answers. Thereafter,

after these corporations had filed their answers, the Commission held a formal hearing

thereon on May 24, 1957. On May 28, 1957, the ACME filed a memorandum on the

points adduced during the hearing, and on June 4, 1957, the Commission issued its

resolution denying the third motion for reconsideration. The article signed by

petitioner was published in the June 2, 1957 issue of the Sunday Times, a newspaper

of nationwide circulation.

The question to be determined is whether the Commission on Elections has the

power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings against petitioner with a view

to imposing upon him the necessary disciplinary penalty in connection with the

publication of an article in the Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957 which, according

to the charge, tended to interfere with and influence said Commission in the

adjudication of a controversy then pending determination and to degrade and

undermine the function of the Commission and its members in the administration of

all laws relative to the conduct of elections.

The Commission on Elections is an independent administrative body which

was established by our Constitution to take charge of the enforcement of all laws

relative to the conduct of elections and devise means and methods that will insure the

accomplishment of free, orderly, and honest elections (Sumulong vs. Commission on

Elections, 73 Phil., 288; Nacionalista Party vs. The Solicitor General, 85 Phil., 101; 47

Off. Gaz. 2356). Its powers are defined in the Constitution. It provides that it "shall

have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the

conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred

upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all

administrative questions, affecting elections, including the determination of the

number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and

of other election officials" (Section 2, Article X). The Revised Election Code

supplements what other powers may be exercised by said Commission. Among these

powers are those embodied in Section 5 thereof which, for ready reference, we quote:

"SEC. 5. Powers of Commission. The Commission on Elections or any of the members thereof shall have the power to summon the parties to a

controversy pending before it, issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and

otherwise take testimony in any investigation or hearing pending before it, and

delegate such power to any officer. Any controversy submitted to the

Commission on Elections shall be tried, heard and decided by it within fifteen

days counted from the time the corresponding petition giving rise to said

controversy is filed. The Commission or any of the members thereof shall have

the power to punish contempts provided for in rule sixty-four of the Rules of

Court, under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.

"Any violation of any final and executory decision, order or ruling of the

Commission shall constitute contempt of the Commission.

"Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission on Elections may be

reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in accordance with the

Rules of Court or with such rules as may be promulgated by the Supreme

Court."

It would therefore appear that the Commission on Elections not only has the

duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections but the

power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in

connection with the elections. And as an incident of this power, it may also punish for

contempt in those cases provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court under the same

procedure and with the same penalties provided therein. In this sense, the

Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning

of the Constitution (Section 13, Article VIII), for it is merely an independent

administrative body (The Nacionalista Party vs. Vera, 85 Phil., 126; 47 Off. Gaz.

2375), may however exercise quasi-judicial functions in so far as controversies that

by express provision of the law come under its jurisdiction. As to what questions may

come within this category, neither the Constitution nor the Revised Election Code

specifies. The former merely provides that it shall come under its jurisdiction, saving

those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections,

including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the

appointment of election inspectors and other election officials, while the latter is

silent as to what questions may be brought before it for determination. But it is clear

that, to come under its jurisdiction, the questions should be controversial in nature and

must refer to the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of

election. The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between a duty which

inherently is administrative in character and a function which is justiciable and which

would therefore call for judicial action by the Commission. But this much depends

upon the factors that may intervene when a controversy should arise.

Thus, it has been held that the Commission has no power to annul an election

which might not have been free, orderly and honest for such matter devolves upon

other agencies of the Government (Nacionalista Party vs. Commission on Elections,

85 Phil., 148; 47 Off. Gaz. 2851); neither does it have the power to decide the validity

or invalidity of votes cast in an election for such devolves upon the courts or the

electoral tribunals (Ibid.); it does not also have the power to order a recounting of the

votes before the proclamation of election even if there are discrepancies in the

election returns for it is a function of our courts of justice (Ramos vs. Commission on

Elections, 80 Phil., 722); nor does it have the power to order the correction of a

certificate of canvass after a candidate had been proclaimed and assumed office (De

Leon vs. Imperial, 94 Phil., 680); and only very recently this Court has held that the

Commission has no power to reject a certificate of candidacy except only when its

purpose is to create confusion in the minds of the electors (Abcede vs. Imperial, 103

Phil., 136).

On the other hand, it has been held that the Commission has the power to annul

an illegal registry list of voters (Feliciano, et al. vs. Lugay, et al., 93 Phil., 744; 49 Off.

Gaz. 3863); to annul an election canvass made by a municipal board of canvassers

(Mintu vs. Enage, et al., G. R. No. L-1834); and to investigate and act on the illegality

of a canvass of election made by a municipal board of canvassers (Ramos vs.

Commission on Elections, 80 Phil., 722). And as to what are the ministerial duties

which the Commission on Elections must perform in connection with the conduct of

elections, the following resume made by the Commission itself in a controversy

which was submitted to it for determination is very enlightening:

"In the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the

conduct of elections, the first duty of the Commission is to set in motion all the

multifarious preparatory processes ranging from the purchase of election

supplies, printing of election forms and ballots, appointments of members of the

boards of inspectors, establishment of precincts and designation of polling

places to the preparation of the registry lists of voters, so as to put in readiness

on election day the election machinery in order that the people who are legally

qualified to exercise the right of suffrage may be able to cast their votes to

express their sovereign will. It is incumbent upon the Commission to see that all

these preparatory acts will insure free, orderly and honest elections. All

provisions of the Revised Election Code contain regulations relative to these

processes preparatory for election day. It is incumbent upon the Commission on

Elections to see that all these preparatory acts are carried out freely, honestly

and in an orderly manner. It is essential that the Commission or its authorized

representatives, in establishing precincts or designating polling places, must act

freely, honestly and in an orderly manner. It is also essential that the printing of

election forms and the purchase of election supplies and their distribution are

done freely, honestly and in an orderly manner. It is further essential that the

political parties or their duly authorized representatives who are entitled to be

represented in the boards of inspectors must have the freedom to choose the

person who will represent them in each precinct throughout the country. It is

further essential that once organized, the boards of inspectors shall be given all

the opportunity to be able to perform their duties in accordance with law freely,

honestly and in an orderly manner, individually and as a whole. In other words,

it is the duty of the Commission to see that the boards of inspectors, in all their

sessions, are placed in an atmosphere whereby they can fulfill their duties

without any pressure, influence and interference from any private person or

public official. All these preparatory steps are administrative in nature and all

questions arising therefrom are within the exclusive powers of the Commission

to resolve. All irregularities, anomalies and misconduct committed by any

election official in these preparatory steps are within the exclusive power of the

Commission to correct. Any erring official must respond to the Commission for

investigation. Of these preparatory acts, the preparation of the permanent list of

voters is the matter involved in this case, which to our mind is completely an

administrative matter." (Decision of the Commission on Elections, October 28,

1951, In Re Petition of Angel Genuino vs. Prudente, et al., Case No. 196) 1

Considering that the paramount administrative duty of the Commission is to set

in motion all the multifarious preparatory processes ranging from the purchase of

election supplies, printing of election forms and ballots, appointments of members of

the board of inspectors, establishment of precincts and designation of polling places to

the preparation of registry lists of voters, so as to put in readiness on election day the

election machinery, it may also be reasonably said that the requisitioning and

preparation of the necessary ballot boxes to be used in the elections is by the same

token an imperative ministerial duty which the Commission is bound to perform if the

elections are to be held. Such is the incident which gave rise to the contempt case

before us. It stems from the ministerial act of the Commission in requisitioning for the

necessary ballot boxes in connection with the last elections and in so proceeding it

provoked a dispute between several dealers who offered to do the job.

Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in

controversy between several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty

which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the

conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it

only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such

being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in

the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said:

"The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to

the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of

judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of

justice" (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U. S. vs. Loo Hoe, 36

Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 Off. Gaz. 2570; In Re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944). The exercise of

this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts

(Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by administrative bodies has

been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony (People vs.

Swena, 296 P., 271). And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in

furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid (Langenberg vs.

Decker, 31 N.E. 190; In Re Sims 37 P., 135; Roberts vs. Hacney, 58 S.W., 810). We

are therefore persuaded to conclude that the Commission on Elections has no power

nor authority to submit petitioner to contempt proceedings if its purpose is to

discipline him because of the publication of the article mentioned in the charge under

consideration.

Wherefore, petition is granted. Respondent Commission is hereby enjoined

from proceeding with the contempt case set forth in its resolution of June 20, 1957,

without pronouncement as to costs.

The preliminary injunction issued by this Court is made permanent.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and

Felix, JJ., concur.

||| (Guevara v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-12596, July 31, 1958)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 46496. February 27, 1940.]

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and

proprietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS' BROTHERHOOD,

petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and

NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.

Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of

Industrial Relations.

Antonio D. Paguia; for National Labor Union.

Claro M. Recto; for petitioner "Ang Tibay".

Jose M. Casal; for National Workers' Brotherhood.

SYLLABUS

1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; POWER. The nature of the Court of Industrial Relations and of its power is extensively discussed in the decision.

2. ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS OF

LAW. The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to

justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or

legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and

equitable (Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673). The fact,

however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity

of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases

coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential

requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The

first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party

interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce

evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider

the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to

decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of

having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to

support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision

must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the

record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any

of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the

law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in

arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controvercial

questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can

know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The

performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

4. ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.; CASE AT BAR ; NEW TRIAL GRANTED. In the light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that,

except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Workers'

Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a

factual basis upon which to predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of law. This

result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for by the

respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest of justice would be better served

if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to

in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved.

The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts

is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable

to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial

should be, and the same is hereby, granted, and the entire record of this' case shall be

remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it re-open the case,

receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance

with the requirements set forth in the decision.

D E C I S I O N

LAUREL, J p:

The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations

in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for

the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the

majority opinion of this Court:

"1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin

termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una determinada, termina o bien por

voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que llega el plazo fijado para el

pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cuando se termine la

obra;

"2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato,

ya individual ya colectivamente, con ella, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto

obligados a cesar en sus trabajos por haberse declarado paro forzoso en la

fabrica en la cual trabajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;

"3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de

trabajo con sus obreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra

determinada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como

consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta ni incurre en

la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su

negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado

organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado de ser empleados suyos por

terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro."

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the

vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of

the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:

"1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26,1938, there was

shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to

temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely

false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books

of Accounts of native dealers in leather.

"2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio

Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members

of the National Labor Union, Inc., from work.

"3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated

September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was

but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the

breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.

"4. That the National Workers' Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a

company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and

functions of which are illegal. (281 U. S., 548, petitioner's printed

memorandum, p. 25.)

"5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective

bargaining, majority rule and elective representation are highly essential and

indispensable. ( Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)

"6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the)

principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and

should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary

provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where industrial

peace has always been the rule.

"7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor

practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly

favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.

"8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the

respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be

expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of

Industrial Relations.

"9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching

importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the

modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein."

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for

reconsideration of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion for

new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein- after stated with

reference to the motion for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.,

we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for

reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion

for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it

necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several

observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations

and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of

cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had

before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial

evidence to indicate that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union

affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the

hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of

opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is

evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary

value.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are

specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more

an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is

not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice

which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding

only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of

Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,

affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the

determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far

more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to

consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute

arising between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords

and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and

in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall

take cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of

any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout,

arising from differences as regards wageshares or compensation, hours of labor or

conditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and employees or laborers

and between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of

employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such

industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or

by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor

as existing and proper to be death with by the Court for the sake of public interest.

(Section A, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing,

endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable

agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the

Philippines, it shall investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry

concerned or to the industries established in a designated locality, with a view to

determining the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or

locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or

rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section 5,

ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial

disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more

effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to

determine specific controversies between labor and capital in industry and in

agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions,

which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673,

promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of

Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and

the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the

case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any

technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may

deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be

restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the

industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any

matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose

of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes.

(Section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have

been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into

effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial

Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements

does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or

disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due Process in trials and

investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which

must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing which includes the right of

the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support

thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 58

S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be

protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play."

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to

adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must

consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U. S. 298 U. S.

468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this Court in Edwards vs.

McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty

on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the

person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice

or consideration."

(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right,

it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having

something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a

nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle

emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional

government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a

grant and a limitation upon power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion

(City of Manila vs. Agustin, G. R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937,

XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia &

Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct.

648, 650, 81 Law ed 965.) Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion."

(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F.

2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d

13, 15; Ballston-stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98

F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in

courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and

similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical

rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in

judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate

Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed.

860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S.

88, 93, 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry.

Co., 265 U. S. 274, 288, 44 S. Ct. 565, 569, 68 Law. ed. lola; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead

v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 442, 50 S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this

assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to

justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere

uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.

(Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law.

ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or

at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate

Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed.

431.)Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the

parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against

them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is

enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing

evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards

of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts

in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9,

Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any

industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter under its consideration or advisement

to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public

official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation,

and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the

said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not

affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers (Section 10, ibid.)

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on

its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and

not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that

the volume of work is such that it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the

Court of Industrial Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before

them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory

authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with

right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory

authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions,

render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the

vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of

this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

In the light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe

here that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National

Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the

thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of

law.

This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial

prayed for by the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. In the portion of the petition

hereinabove quoted of the National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed

lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to

systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor Union, Inc., from

work" and this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of

the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that

"the National Workers' Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer

union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are

illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition

to prove his substantial averments "are so inaccessible to the respondents that even

with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them

and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents

attached to the petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that their

admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment

rendered therein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments

against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussion, we have come to the

conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given

opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such

other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which

created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to

grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties

adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be,

and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to

the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all

such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the

requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ.,

concur.

||| (Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 46496, February 27, 1940)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000.]

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C.

LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch

25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.

Estelito P. Mendoza for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

The United States Government, on June 17, 1999, through Department of Foreign Affairs

U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522, requested the Philippine Government for the extradition of

Mark Jimenez, herein private respondent, to the United