06. cap 6 - operaciones clandestinas

8/13/2019 06. Cap 6 - Operaciones Clandestinas

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CHAPTER

Black ops are used by governments theworld over. They give them the power tostabilize r destabilize a country. They maybe used to remove another governingpower or to make way for an invasion.


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A clandestine operation is any form of operation undertaken by one government against another foreignpower. These operations are normally conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled or politically sensitiveterritory. Operations that are both covert and that entail a final assault mode are known as black ops . Theseare normally carried out by military personnel seconded to an intelligence agency, and are approved with thepurpose of stabilizing or destabilizing the current ruling power, or to prepare the ground for an invasion.

llie means by which this is done may include: supporting an oppositionrlroup, assassination, sabotage, deception or psychological warfare. Most oflliese would be carried out by indigenous forces who are organized,~l~i ined,quipped, supported, and directed to varying degrees by bo th,t{:ents and Special Forces personnel. The overall aims are to weaken theopposing government by seizing m aterial assets, damaging or destroying

installations and changing the political environment. This aim is achieved bypsychological operations that are backed up by subversion, d eception anddirect action - including incursion, ambushes, sabotage, assassination andthe small-scale raids.

As has been seen many times throug hout history, it is sometimesadvantageous to openly show support for the overthrow of a particulargovernment. However, this normally leads to full-scale war, which isextremely costly in terms of both material and manpower. For this reason,clandestine operations remain the instrument of choice for the policymakers as i t remains the best way to avoid all-ou t war. The type o foperation that is undertaken will be determined by the country involvedand that country's current political situation.

On a political level, n o government will ever a dmit to carrying outclandestine operation, and most will adopt the holier-than-thou approach.Despite this facade, the intelligence agencies of many countries havemurdered, raped, lied, cheated and pillaged in order to achieve theirobjectives. They have conduc ted brainw ash ing experiments, spreaddisinformation, carried out massive human-rights violations, establishedbrothels, bribed or assassinated political leaders and supported guerrillagroups in order to topple governments. If the threat is seen to be a clearand present danger , then the appropriate action w ill be sanctioned.

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the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment (DELTA) are used. In 2002,President Bush signed an in telligence order authorizing the CIA and unitssuch as Delta to overthrow, capture or indeed kill the leader of a foreigncountry. Since the 9/11 attack, assassination is very much back in vogue. Aswe saw in the Moscow theatre assault of 2002, the Russians use the Alphateams with great success, while the Israelis have Mossad and othersubordinate groups.

A A member of the Russian Alpha team firing a V-94 large-bore anti-material sniper rifle. Asseen here the rifle can be equipped with a new POS-13x60 telescopic sight.

The new Russian Federation also has a numbe r of small units it can usefor clandestine operations. One is the Special Assignment Centre of theCounter-Terrorist Department of the Federal Security Service. The Centreincludes two special assignment units, Alpha and Vympel, and numbersbetw een 1,500 a nd 2,000 men. The Foreign Intellige nce Service has itsown special forces. The unit was formed in 1998 and is called Zaslon.Different reports estimate that its numerical strength is betwee n 30 0 an d500 servicemen.

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almost identical. Little was k now n abou t Alpha prior to th e coup againstPresident Gorbachev in 1991. During the course of the coup, they reversedthe direction of it by standing alongside Yeltsin rather than attacking him inthe White House of the Russian parliament, as they had been requested todo by the coup directors. As a consequence of their actions, they gained avery high level of access and the unit itself is no longer under the directionof the KGB. A unit known as "Bravo" works under a similar direction, but itsexact role has not been identified.

There are many unconfirmed stories about the Alpha unit, almost all ofwhich have a violent ending. One early story relates how they trickedhijackers into believin g that they had left the Soviet sphere of influence andthat if they landed they wo uld be landing in a neutral country. They ha dnot. As the aircraft came to a halt, it was rushed by members of Alpha. Sofearsome was their reputation, most of the hijackers preferred to commitsuicide rather than surrender.

This hard-line approach has also been effective in other areas. Oneexample is Beirut. While the American and British were spending their timeon elaborate deals - such as the arms-for-hostages debacle Alphaallegedly used a much more direct line of reasoning. When, in October1985, three Russian diplomats were taken hostage by Sunni Muslims, Alphawas dispatched to deal with the situation. Before they reached Beirut, oneof the men, Arkady Katkov, had been shot dead and his body had beendumped on waste ground. It did not take the local KGB agents long toidentify the perpetrators and, once they had don e so, they then spent timetracking down the perpetrators' relatives. Alpha proceeded to arrest some olthese as counter-hostages and, just to show that they could be just asmenacing, they cut off several body parts and sent them to the kidnapperswith a stern warning that other bits would follow if the kidnapped Russian\were not released immediately. The tactic worked and since that time noother Russian has been taken hostage by any of the warring factions in thvMid dle East.

Alpha continues to be a highly secret organization with very littleinformation as to its operation forthcoming. One operation involving Alph,ltook place on the evening of the October 23, 2002, in a Moscow Theatre.Some 50 Chechen guerrillas had sci7c.d llir ~ l ~ c ~ , i l l rnd taken more th a ~ ~600 hostap;cs. The Alpha as~,i1111~ ~ v o l v i ~ t l1 1 1 8 I I ~ . ~ ~l rlc1w lypc. of ~ ~ i~ . ,111tl, i l l l in l~~ l il i c ~ ~ l c o n i i >ela..II ~. .~.1111 o ~ ~ ~ i l1111 II*III)I~,.I*. IVV11i1111#1111i~~l,1 1 0 1 i ' 1 l1 1 1 1,11'1". 11111~


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L NDESTINE OPER TIONSMore recently, on September 3, 2004, in Beslan, southern Russia,

Chechen rebels, a ided by Arab sympathizers, struck again. This time theylook over a school, taking more than 1,500 children and staff hostage. Dayslater and after several hours of confusion, an explosion took place in thecchool gym that caused the roof to collapse. At that point the Alpha unitswere sent in. After 12 hours of gunfire, during which half-naked childrencould be seen running from the building, all resistance was ended. Thedeath toll was put at more than 150 staff and children with 646 (227 oflhem children) hospitalized. Twenty militants were killed, including ten Arabswho had assisted the Chechens.

Officials claimed the high death toll was due to the rebels setting off an~.xplos ive evice in the gym. A Russian bomb expert said the gym hadIwen rigged with explosives packed in plastic bottles strung up around theloom on a cord and stuffed with metal objects. These had been detonatedwhen members of the Alpha team had tried to enter the gym.

MERIC N DELT FORCE

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American clandestine operations are normally handled by Delta Force.This unit was started by Colonel "Charlie" Beckwith, an American SpecialForces officer who had served with the British SAS for several years.Beckwith's idea was to raise a unit capable of deep-penetration raids, suchas prisoner-of-war rescues, hostage rescue and intelligence gathering forlarger operations. By early 1978 the unit numbered some 70 men, enough,Beckwith thought, to start counter-terrorist training. This included COBshooting, assault techniques, MOE and medical training and those w howere not parachute-qualified were sent to jump school. special "House ofHorrors", equivalent to the British "killing house" was constructed in order tosimulate rescue hostage scenarios. defunct 727 aircraft was madeavailable, allowing Delta to work on anti-hijack procedures.

On 5 November 1979 the American Embassy in Iran was seized andDelta was ordered to respond. Intelligence for the operation was plentiful,with the CIA and the media b oth produ cing satellite images and filmfootage of the embassy in an effort to highlight the problems involved ifany rescue were attempted. Delta took full advantage of all this andprepared itself accordingly; eventually they came up w ith a workable plan.The rescue attempt failed. The fault, however, lay with the American militaryadministration and not with Delta. Direction and authority for Delta missionshas since been tightened, as one American general put it: "It's no goodhaving the best sword in the world if the user cannot wield it correctly."Things have since improved and Delta has gone on to show its capabilitiesin many roles, including bo th the Gulf and Afghan Wars.

In addition to Delta Force, the Americans also use a unit known as SEALteam 6. Formed in October 1980, the unit totals some 150-170 men, nowbased in Dam Neck, Virginia. They have been fully integrated with Deltasince 1980, but still retain the capability to operate as an individual unit.This unit almost always accompanies Delta on special operations.

INCREMENT - S SThe Increment are a selected group of S S and SBS personnel who areloaned to the intelligence agencies (M151M16) to carry out clandestineopcv;ilions. Most members of the Increment have spent time wi th the SAS

r l l l l l l ~ s licvo l~~l inn; iry ;irf,irrt ll ni l (CRW). This unit can rracc its oripins backIO IIII* l(1~ 1~ 1il1c-11i pr11.11iori..~,;,I~II~,I1 1 ( h ~ 1 1 1 a11 1~1101i*.1~.ll K I ~ I I V~ I ll1'1'. 1 .11111 '.(11'1 1 11 # I t IvIII~".111) ,1111111l11 All1~111 1 1 1 ~A'1 1t111111 11 11 . OWII f l?W


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CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

Cell, with the special purpose of developing techniques to counter terrorism.From its inception, CRW was a vision i n how th e m odern-day SAS soldierwas to develop. The SAS already have some of the best surveillance skillsavailable, and their extensive military skills are fine-tuned by internalcourses. These include the use of improvised explosives and sabotagetechniques, advanced shooting skills and training to support guerrillawarfare. H ighly developed insertion techniques can b e accomplished, usinganything from high-altitude parachuting from commercial aircraft to beinglaunched from the tub e o f a submarine. Today, the duties o f the SAS CRWunits span the world. They infiltrate enemy territory, gather intelligence, carryout ambushes, undertake demolition work and sabotage and act asbodyguards for VIPs. Some of this work is purely military while the rest istasked through the Increment.

Operatives deep within Iraq. Their clandestine operations helped locate many of SaddamHussein s henchmen.

OVERSEEING POWERSIt is often difficult to say wh o actually authorizes a clandestine operation. Intheory, the final decision should rest with the country's leader, with th efactual si~p por t omine from a Rovcrnmcnt body, s~ lc li s the Rririqli lnintI~ l t r~ l l i~ : i~nc i~on~nlillrtc~110 Ill1 1 IC i s 11111 1rl~li11llir I. IIN~ i l ~ ~ l l i ~ ~ r ~ n c ~ ~lntll l ll y / l l i l l~ ( l l l l l l~ ~ l l l \ / l l l l ~1 1 1 ~ ~ l ~ . l ~ l l l l ~Ill1 l l l l l ~ l l l ~ ~ l ~ l Q PtIC#)

which includes M15, MI6 and GCHQ. These three are responsible fordomestic, foreign and signals intelligence respectively. As most clandestineoperations take place overseas, they fall under the control of M16, who, inturn, will task the appropriate agent or the Special Forces (the Increment) tocarry out the operation.

The American equivalen t is the CIA, which, since the collapse ofcommunism, has carried out some major restructuring. Clandestineoperations are normally tasked by the Directorate of Operations (DIC) alongwith the Counter-Intelligence Centre (CIC) and their human intelligence(HUMINT) requirem ent tasking centre. The Clandestine Information TechnicalOffice supports these type of operations and analyses the intelligence.

Once authority for an operation has been received, the next phase is theplanning. While the objective defines the mission, there are othersubordinate aspects to take into account. These are command andcontrol, and the security of the unit. A clandestine unit's plan will take thefollowing factors into consideration:

b All clandestine operations will be based on the best andmost up-to-date information available.The best method of infiltration and exfiltration will be chosento ensure arrival in the operation area is undetected. If thereis any doubt deceptive measures wil l b e considered.Agents make use of the smallest unit possible to accomplishthe mission decreasing the possibility of detection.Agents use all forms of stealth technology to remainundetected. They will remember the basics of camouflage,concealment and light and sound discipline.Agents utilise the cover of darkness and night observationdevices (see Surveillance Section). They know that theenemy w ill also have detection devices.

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clarify points for the team. Contingency plans will also berehearsed.

b Agents make sure that all communication devices areworking. and they make plans for "lost comms".Agents will hold an inspection and purge all team membersof any incriminating evidence. They remove clothing labelsand any items that may lead to identification.

b Agents should isolate photographs and name every memberof the team in the event that they are be captured. This will behanded over personally to the (52) or desk intelligence officer.

RS IN O M NA typical example of a good clandestine operation is illustrated by the


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continents throughou t history, mo st of which were carried out to instil asense of fear within the local community.

Mode rn-day assassination can be described as the plann ed killing of aperson whose death w ould provide positive benefits for society as a w hole- this is termed an "executive action". Assassination may or may not bemorally justifiable, as it depends on the self-preservation of one element ofsociety over another. In general, assassination has done little to change thecourse of history. Even where it has, the change is usually for the worse.The British SOE trained an assassination team that parachuted into Pragueand killed the acting German Governor of Bohemia and Moravia, ReinhardHeydrich. Heydrich was a remarkable linguist, a wonderful musician and asuperb bureaucrat; he was a lso a staunch Nazi. Nevertheless, hisassassination in the spring of 1942 resulted in the deaths of thousands o finnocent Czechs. Likewise, the assass ination of Archduke Francis Ferdinandis reputed to have started the First World War.

If we are to believe wha t w e read in the newspapers, President Bushsigned an intelligence order in 2002, authorizing the CIA and related SpecialForces to overthrow, capture or kill President Saddam Hussein. If theAmericans can carry out an assassination, why can't anyone else? It is asubject that provokes all manner of debate, a debate that is hampered bysociety, laws and the will of its people. Some would claim that we shouldnot stoop to the level of terrorists, while others argue that taking a life byassassination smacks of a "big brother government. Terrorist organizationsrely on this irresolution amo ng the general populace to tie the hands ofgovernments and restrict their ability to counter the terrorist problem. Thereis also the argument that, w hile assassination removes certain individualswithin an organization, it does no t guarantee the removal of theorganization itself. Finally, assassination has the ability to bite back, i.e. youkill our leaders and we will kill yours. One nation that has continued torefine the skills of the assassin is Israel. They systematically hunted dow nall of those responsible for the Munich Olympic massacre in 1972 andassassinated them. Israeli policy on assassination continues to this day andmany countries, including the United States and Britain, are requestingcopies of th e Israeli handbo ok on the subject.

For the most part, the general public as a whole is unaware that anassassination has taken place, being led to believe that r ~ictim has diedin a11arrir l~111l nf 1i~i111rala 1 1 ~ 5 .r arlrlitio~i, l I*.~ , o ~ ~ i ( i l i ~ i i e


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Mafart, aged 35, and Captain Dominique Prieur, aged 36. Serving ascommissioned officers in the French Special Forces, they had been detailedto assist members of the DGSE (SDECE) Intelligence Service to ensure tha tthe much-publicized voyage of the Rainbow Warrior to French territorialwaters to disrupt the French nuclear test program simply did not happen.The vessel had to be damaged to such an extent that repairs could not becompleted in time for the voyage to begin.

Though the French operation succeeded in part, it turned out to be apublicity disaster, as the intelligence service had failed to extract Mafart andPrieur directly after the attack, a lthough the French intelligence officers hadapparently flown out the day before the operation. When their arrest waslinked with information obtained by N ew Zealand detectives in NewCaledonia, Norfolk Island, Australia, Switzerland, France and the UK tproved withou t any doubt the major role played by the French Intelligence5ervice and Special Forces in the bom bing and the subsequent death ofrernando Pereira. The positioning and successful detonation of thec*xplosives ndicated that those responsible were trained and expert in~rnderwaterwarfare and it is believed that both French officers were senringrr~embers f the Commando Hubert Underwater Warfare unit.MECHANICS OF ASSASSINATIONIhe mechanics of assassination are fairly simple. Intelligence agencyrbxecutives see a clear case for disposing of a certain person or persons.Once the decision has been taken, the project is then handed over to the.~ppropriate rganization for action. Those responsible for carrying out thea sassin in at ion will plan, organize and execute their orders.The AssassinI IO image of an assassin has changed dramatically over the past century.Wllile many intelligence agencies employ a small section for dirty tricks -11 I( Illding certain types of assassination - these generally only carry outi l j ) ~ ~ ~ a t i onsgainst other spies or agents. The death of a terrorist leader or

I known activist is carried out by Special Forces personnel seconded by11 III ,lfyncy.

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who have shown an aptitude for such work and who treat it very much asa mundane job. However, when it comes to assassinating foreign agents,most of the clandestine work is carried out by Special Forces. They havethe advantage of b eing highly trained in infiltration, camouflage andconcealment and sabotage. For the most part, they are resolute,courageous, intelligent, resourceful and physically fit - attributes that makethem ideal assassins. However, these people see themselves asprofessional soldiers and not assassins.

The assassinAssassination PlanningHaving taken the decision to assassinate a person, the powers that be will~ i t l i r - r~ l t I i o r i 7 ~n individual or a team to carry out the task. At this stage,III(~.:.~~llil 111ll1nrityill incl~rdr l ie mclliorl of ns~nrrsinalion rovcrl or~I\II~II I ~II,I/II/I~IIIII~.I,III(~>*.,I I ~~ - . ( ~I(II~I-.111' f:iv1*11 I~III~III~l ~ i * ,3 ~ ~ v . ~ ~ ~ ~ b s .111. 11 1 1 1 1 ~ 1 ~ . . l 1 . . ~ 1 1 . 1 ~ ~ 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 111 ~ l l s l l / l l l ~1 1Il111~j'.j l l WIOIII Ill' Il'allll 1111'11


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lllsposal Team perationsM,IIIV assassination teams are supported in their operation by a cleaningI I~~I I I I ,. ~ .nce the hit has been carried out then a clean-up team sterilizesIIIIQ ~orly nd ~ h currounding area. A clean-up team may also respondI , ~~ I IQ I IIII~~f ~ l ~ r i rwn nccnts has been killed and the agency wishes toII~IIIII\II 11 i~ i1)o(lv w i ~ l i n t ~ ~ny tr,irc. of lhc fact, likewisp, fo rc i~ n genrx1111111 II.IVI~11~011III~I~)IOII~I~.I~~I1118 of11v1SCI 111) 1111 , j :~ , ,~~~l~ la l ionrirl 101.11I~ ' I I I~ IV, I~r~ l l l .WIIO ll. l\/ll llll 'l l . I 11* .1111 111 111111111 1111 11111'11 l ~~~ ,~ l l l Q l l~11 111

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such a manner. Such clean-up operations are normally left to a specialistunit. Their job is purely one of removing the body and removing any trace ofthe deceased, to make it look as if they had never existed. The two mainaspects of a clean-up operation are disfigurement and disposal.

CASE HISTORYIn July 1973, it was believed that Ali Hassan, a Black September leaderand the organizer of the Munich Olympics massacre, had been trackeddown to the small town of Lillehammer in Norway. The Israelisimmediately assembled and dispatched a hit team to Norway. Using anold photograph, they were convinced that they had located Ali Hassan,also known as the Red Prince . Two days later on a Saturday evening.they shadowed the ir victim as he left the local cinema, together with ablonde Norwegian girl. The couple then caught a local bus that wou ldtake them to their flat on the outskirts of Lillehammer.

Author's Note: I interviewed Torill B ouchiki about the assassination ofher husband Ahmed - his is her story. (She was seven months pregnantat the time of the husband's assassination.)

We left the cinema and walked down to the bus stop. At this stagethe only thing I an recall is that Ahmed spoke of his brief conversationwith another Arab he had met i n the town; neither of us thought anymore abou t it. The bus drove out of tow n to the wooded outskirts,where we got off at the stop opposite our b lock of flats. As the buscontinued up the hi ll we crossed the road, heading for the small graveldrive that led to the ground-floor doors. We had gone no more than 20metres, when, from behind us, there was a lo ud bang. We both%topped, um ing to see what had caused the noise. We had no t noticedthe car that had rolle down the hill towards us, b raking almostparallel; but the slamming of the door made us loo k A man climbedout of the nearside, while at the same time, a wom an got out of theother side. I hought, maybe that the y were loo king for directions, bu tI l i ~ nhmed stepped away from me, crying out, No. No.

Then I saw the bright flashes coming from both the m an and thewoman. They were so close, but I ouldn't hear any noise. Shocked, Iwatched as Ahm eds body twitched before falling to the ground. Idropped to the ground, hugging my arms around my swo llen belly -waitin g for death to come. The man stopped firing, but the womanwalked up to Ahmed, who by this time had rolled over onto his bellyas he tried to c rawl away. She deliberately fired tw o bu llets into theback of h is neck Then they w ere gone. To this day, if I lose my eyes,I ee it as if it was happening a ll over again.

Listening to Torill and watching her expressions, I felt sad. She hadsuffered so much with the loss of Ahmed, but the sadness did not comefrom that alone; it came from the loss of love, a love that had beenstolen from her. Two weeks after his death and heavily pregnant, shewas forced to return to work in order to support herself.

I wonder i f the Mossad assassins would like to go a nd see thedamage they have caused to an innocent family. At the time, verypleased with themselves, the hit team returned to Oslo and reportedtheir success to Israel. The Mossad members that had actually pulled thetrigger left that night, while the rest of the team plann ed to leave thefollowing morning. Itwas the biggest mistake that Mossad has evermade - next morning six of them were caught. Although the Israeliswere held for questioning and ad mitted to having made a mistake inmurdering the wrong man, their prison sentences were reduced to twoyears, just because they were members of Mossad. Even though theyadmitted their mistake, Mossad have never paid a penny incompensation to Torill.


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on record, such as fingerprints, iris and retina.scans, teeth or any other I may be befriended by the team or team member using seiual favours.distinguishing body marks, such as tattoos, and full-facial scans. Any trace I Once a team member has gained access to the target's home then anyof one or more of these methods wi ll allow the public autho rities to number of assassination ploys are possible. If, for example, the target isidentify the dead body. Total disfigurement is the only way to overcome I lured away from his home and plied with drink, a team member enters thethese ide ntity biometrics. The most comm on meth od is to use acid. If astrong solution of sulphuric acid is poured over the hands and face o f thebody, it wil l tota lly eradicate the facial structure, including the eyes, bu rnin goff the finger tips and eroding the enamel from the teeth. An alternative toacid is burning; before this is done, however, the teeth have to beremoved with a hammer.DisposalIn addition to disfigurement, the long-term disposal of a body is alsodesirable. This will be achieved in any number of ways, with the followingmethods top of the list.

A shallow grave in an isolated area, preferably in a thicklyforested area.In a bona fi e graveyard, hidden in a legitimate, freshly dug gravetogether with another corpse.Weighted and dropped overboard, out at sea.Weighted and thrown into a large lake.Placed in the foundations of a n ew b uilding or a m otorway.

b Cremated dow n to ashes.ExplosivesUsing a booby trap for assassination requires a lot of skill and a detaileditinerary of the target. Depending on the amount of explosive used, a well-thought-out booby trap stands a good chance of success. While letterbombs have been used by assassins for many years, they are notparticularly accurate, i.e. the re is no guarantee that the target wi ll actuallyopen the letter. If someone else is killed, all the assassin has done is tip offthe target.HomeAssassinations in the h ome w ill tiy to be passed off as accidents. Thesecan b r ra ~l zr cl y [:a Icakc, liro, clrclr ici~y r Li1a1 1,111. In ~ i i o ~ , ~aws, I rnplnc~lvorlall 11nntl I~CV tool 1111II~~III~I~~IIII~~IIII,~ ~ l IIII~I IA ~IIIIII11 IIII~Q S i l l l l ~ r r lnl)irl I 111.. *I... 111111111111111 I1111 111111111 111


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premises and switches on all the gas appliances while he is out. Beforeleaving, the team member turns off the gas at the outside main incomingsupply. The target returns home drunk and the n goes to bed. .Once thetarget is asleep, the team reconnect the incoming gas supply. At six in themorning, hungover and drowsy, the target wakes up and switches on hisbedroom light - boom.

Getting someone very drunk is also a common spy ploy. After severalhours, the target will become unconscious, leaving the assassination teamto create a natural fire that gets out of hand and consumes both the roomand the target. Alternatively, if the target lives in a block of flats, they couldfall do wn the stairs or, better still, off th e balcony. A fall is an efficientaccident; agents will th row their victims onto a hard surface, bu t they willbe wary of throwing people off bridges, as the victim may fall into water.

MIY vlctlm~ f ~88~8slnat10nave been fou nh ea d in their own swimming pools

can be witnessed by others. Many other methods of killing the target in hisvehicle have been tried over the years - rom plying him with alcohol ordrugs to wrapping him in cling film. A very effective method that has beenused by spies is when they choose a spot along a route driven regularly bytheir target, like a sharp corner, a river bridge or a motorway. The spy gainscovert access to the target s car and fixes a device that w ill blow off awheel, lock the doors and increase the vehicle s speed. The spy will s implyfollow the target s car to the point of attack and then press a b utton. Theywill organize for a tow truck to be passing the scene several minutes afterthe accident and thus will be able to retrieve the car and remove anytelltale signs of their device from under the nose of any police investigation.

An assassination using a vehicle can be made to look like an accident

Medical AccidentsMcdical accidents, such as an overdose of medicine, can be used by,I~;OIII . o L i k ~ suicide.

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assassination by spies in the past, b ut generally they are selected andadministered by a medical professional. If the target is a heavy drinker, anoverdose of certain drugs can be administered; the cause of death will beput do wn to acute alcoholism. Other drugs, such as LSD, have been used inthe past to cause the target to committee suicide either of their own accordor with a little help.

utdoorsIf an agent's target lives or goes on the water, be it a river or in the open scar,then various opportunities arise. Swimming accidents are common, al t h o t~ ~ l itcan take a great deal of effort from the agent to make the death look na t i ~ r ~ ~ lLikewise, boating accidents have been linkvtl lo ,~ v~ ,i c~ in at io nor many yr,ll*.ac rhcy offer a very ~l on tl ppn rt~ltlity 1 ~I~.~~~I~: .~I I . I I~I I I II)o,it ,)I S P ~a l l I)rlIIIII< willlo~~tI,I(V IV I *,I)v ~ ~III*II IIIIIII 11 I 8 ~ ~ o ~ , ~ . l l ) l l ~ t i i ~ .11111 III* II~

1111'

CASE HISTORYSome time after the Korean War, the CIA became obsessed with the ideathat the Soviets or the Chinese might employ methods of brainwashingto recruit double agents or that they w ould find a way to manipulate anentire po pula tion . To counter this, the CIA init iated a series ofprogrammes, one of which was Operation Artichoke. Artichoke involvedthe use of torture and drugs to interrogate people. The effects ofsubstances such as LSD, hero in and marijuana were studied by us ingunsuspecting individuals as human guinea pigs. Artichoke also includedthe development of poisons that take immediate effect. Thesesubstances were later used in attempts on the lives of a number offoreign leaders, such as Abdul Karim Kassem (Iraq), Patrice Lumumba(Congo) and Fidel Castro (Cuba).

One of the leading scientists who was carrying out research in thefield of biological weapons and wh o had been working for ten years inthe biologica l warfare facilities at Maryland Camp Detrick (today FortDetrick) near Washing ias Dr Frank Olson. Olson was abiochemist and occupied a leading pos ition in Operation Artichoke.However, on 28 November 1953, Olsen threw himself out of the 13thfloor of the Hotel Pennsylvania in New York City.

Before Frank Olson plung ed to h is death, o thers in the room say heexhibited symptoms of behavioural disturbance. His death was officiallydescribed as suicide due to depression. Only in the mid-1970s, when theCIA secret activities were scru tinized in the wake o f the Watergatescandal, did th e government admit to a certain degree of responsibility.Ten days before his death, the CIA had administered LSD to Olsonwith out his know ledge. President Gerald Ford subsequently apologizedto his family and the CIA paid compensation to his widow.

I .IIV will


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Concealed Weapons

There is often a need for the assassin to concealhis weapons

Agents operating in foreign countries are sometimes required to carry aweapon, which, for the most part, would be concealed. These types ofweapon fall into two main categories: knives and pistols. The amount ofconcealed weapons available would fill several volumes. Knives can bedisguised as combs, keys and belt buckles, while pistols take the form ofrings, phones and pens. A complete range of concealed weapons can befound in the Manu al of Prohibited and Concealed Weapons published byParadigm Partners Limited in Britain, or by visiting the FBI Guide toConcealed Weapons at the following website:

ExplosivesExplosives are also major assets for any assassin as they provide numerousways of killing people (see section on Sabotage).Operational Executive ActionLawful killings can be carried out in several situations. For the most part,t h ~rt~r;ll nci d~ nr an be pr~dctermined, ivinf rhc op~ riit ion alm m th rl i l i i~ t 0 r)Irili ,iIir ~,~ (I01 PX,II~I~>~I~, if i l i o w l ~I IIOI/~.I1 ~1111~1 /I (I/*.I~vPI(~c~it,I (1111.il1i)I jce,ucll d *1 rllllild~y licck 11ol1il II : CI_IIIIIJ1'~ .IIOI wI~I II*

resisting arrest. If the terrorist is armed, a ll the bettei, if not, those thatactually do the shooting simply state that they thought he was armed. Thelegal or illegal shooting of a suspect in a war zone generally causes little or Ino political problems for the intelligen ce agencies.

CASE HISTORYIn March 1988, information filtered through the security screen that theIRA was planning to detonate a bomb in Gibraltar. The IRA teamconsisted of three people, Sean Savage, Daniel McCann and a woman,Mairead Farrell, each of whom had a history of terrorist activity. Thethree, later acknowledged by the IRA as an active cell, had been spottedby British intelligence agencies, who had trailed them for months,recording many of their conversations. Surveillance paid off when thetarget identity was discovered - Gibraltafs British garrison. The methodof attack was to be a car bomb. As events unfolded, the target was aceremony with military bands parading. It was also known that the IRAhad developed a device that could remotely detonate a car bomb.

In late 1982 a well-know n IRA bomb-maker, Sean Savage, had beenlocated in Spain. Another IRA suspect, Daniel McCann, was with him. MI5spent six months watching the two, gathering information that they werecertain was leading to a bom bing. When, on 4 March 1988, MaireadFarrell arrived in Malaga airport and was met by the two men, it seemedlikely that it was on. At this stage, the SAS were invited to send in anIncrement team. The Gibraltar police were informed and were instructedthat the IRA active service unit was to be apprehended. For a while,contact with the IRA cell was lost, but, by this time, the target had beendefined. It was suspected that one car would be delivered onto the Rockand parked in a position along the route taken by the parade. This carwould be clean - a dummy to guarantee a parking space for the real carbomb. The plaza where the troops and public would assemble wasconsidered as the best spot to cause the most damage. This proved tobe correct. At 2 pm on the afternoon of 5 March, a report was receivedthat Savage had been spotted in a p a rk ~d liitc. Rcnault 5. There was asuspicion that he was setting ilp IIIP I)IIIII~)lir ~ c*lirlr:lcvicc.. Not lonqa f t~r ,l n o l h ~ report wil5 rrcc>ivcttl 11 ~ n I 1 11 Q ~ ~ ~ ~ l l l111(1 c( 1111111,1 1 ( l ~ ~ , ' , l \ dll (> 01(1(Y ,11111 WIBl lQ1 1 ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ 1 1 1 ~1 1 1 ~ ~ 1 l.lV /11111 low11 O N t )

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CL NDESTINE OPER TIONS

way back into the town - he SAS team split accordingly; twowith Savage and two staying on McCann and Farrell.

A few moments later, fate took a hand. A local policeman,driving in heavy traffic, was recalled to the station. Itwas saidlater that his car was required; to expedite his orders heactivated his siren. This action happened close to McCannand Farrell, making the pair turn nervously. McCann made eyecontact with one of the SAS soldiers, who w as no more thanten metres away. In response to this, the soldier, who wasMcCann's arm moved distinctly across his body. Fearing tha the might detonate the bomb, the soldier fired. McCann washit in the back and went down. Farrell, it is said, made amovement for her bag, she was shot with a single round. Bythis time, th e second soldier had drawn his pistol andopened fire, hitti ng bo th terrorists. On hearin g the shots,Savage turned to be confronted by the other two SAS men. Ahe bodies of Daniel McCann and Mairead Farrell, shot by the S S in Gibraltar. warning was shouted this time, but Savage continued to

The Increment were immediately deployed and, once Savage was ou t reach into his pocket - both SAS men fired and Savage was killed.of the way, an explosives expert did a walk past of the Renault. No s the first news of the event hit the media it looked like a -professional

job, but the euphoria was short lived. No bomb was found in the car, anddepressed - hat wo uld indicate the presence of a bomb. However, if all three terrorists were found to be unarmed. Although a bomb was laterthey were using Semtex, 15 kilos or more cou ld easily be concealed from discovered in Malaga, the press and the IRA had a field day. Allegationsthe naked eye. After consultation, it was considered probable that the car were made and witnesses were found who claimed to have seen the(lid contain a bom b. At this stage, the local police chief, Joseph Canepa, whole thing. The trio had surrendered; their arms had been in the air; they.;iened an order pass ing control to the SAS. Operation Favius, as it was had been shot a t point-blank range while the y lay on the ground and sokliown, was abou t to b e concluded. The orders given to th e SAS me n on. Once again, the S S were held up as state-authorized killers. Nowere to capture the three bombers if possible, but, as in all such matter that they had probably saved the lives of many people and+,iluations, f there is a direct threat to life, be it to the SAS or anyone dispatched three well-known IRA terrorists hey wou ld na nd trial.olw, they hold the right to shoot. It was stressed that the bomb would In September 1988, after a two-week inquest and by a m ajority of ninetltore than likely be fired via a push -butto n detonator. to two, a verdict was passed of lawfu l killing. Although this satisfied most

The SAS men, dressed in casual clothes, were kept in contact through people, the story did not end there. The SAS soldiers that took part in theo . ~ ~ ~ , ~ I Iadios hidden about their persons. Each soldier was also armedwit11 9 mm Browning Hi-Power. Savage met up with McCann and Farrell.IIII~, ,i1 1(~ 1~~hort discussion, a11 three made their way back towards the.JI.III~*.~I)01(1i11. 10111' 1 111~AF lcam shadowed the trio. Suddenly, for

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shooting in Gibraltar were taken to court by relatives of the three IRAmembers killed. The European Commission of Human Rights in Strasbourgdecided, 11votes to six, that the SAS did not .use unnecessary force. Theye;;iitl ll ~ i i lhc soldiers wcrc ji~stifc d n op ~n in qiro, as rhcy tho ~tqht hcIKA IIII~II\I)I\I*.w(*r(' ,iOn11l (11~1011,itr~ 11ot110.- - I\


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CL4NDESTINE OPERATIONS

SniperThe lone sniper has lon g been used for assassination, the most famouscase being the death of President Kennedy, on 22 November 1963 inDallas, Texas and there have been many other attempts from lone gunmenthroughout history.

Records show some 26,000 VC were executed, many by sniper fire, during Operation Phoenix.On the other side, literally, at the start of 1965, the American intelligence

services in Saigon created a list of Vietcong cadre that it wished to disposeof. Special teams were draw n up; these were mainly recruited from theGreen Berets or N a y SEALs and worked under the direction of t he CIA.

A similar unit has been established in Iraq called Task Force 121. Theirmain task objective is to track dow n and capture hard-core Baathists whothey believe are behind the insurgency against the US soldiers and theirallies. Task Force 121 comprises elements of Delta Force, N a y SEAL andthe CIA. The unit's priority is the neutralization of the Baathist insurgents bycapture or assassination.

The sniper provides a long-range capability for taking o ut targets. In manycases, a sniper will carry at least two rifles, one for short distance (300metres or less, with day-night capability) and one for lon g range (300-600rnrlrcs lor d;iylinir rlsc nnly) Th(3 ron ihin,i linn of sn ip rl ri flr ,lri rl .;ic111r wi llrl~llrc*li(lil Il1r8 JII~ ~I\III~ II~I~I~II*111~~I I I IV11 1 1 ~ 1 0 ~I I I~ I~ II.I-, II(~I*I,1 (II~III~IIII~

4 Task Force 121 is ajoint Special Forcesoperation to trackdown members of thehard-core Ba athistparty in Iraq.

for h e a y calibre (50) sniper rifles that provide extreme-range accuracy.Snipers wear camouflaged Gilly suits that blend with the surroundingterrain. At present, a new range of stealth clothing is bein g developed,which will allow the snipers to approach the target unseen to infra-redor night-vision equipment.Psychological Operations


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Psychologica l warfare, or "Psy-Ops" as it is bette r known, is used tomentally persuade an enemy to conform and surrender. Although the basicidea has been around for many years, its full potential was not recognizedunt il the Second World War. For example, German propaganda played onthe fact that American soldiers were having a wonderful time in England,having sex with the girls, while the British soldiers suffered on the front line.

When done professionally, Psy-Ops has the ability to influence an entirepopulation. For instance, in 1970, after Sultan Qaboos ousted his father inOman, the SAS operated a full-scale Psy-Ops war. This included the settingup of a radio station and the distribution of thousands of free radios to theJebel people. Mil lions of leaflets nform ing the rebels of the recent coupand offering them am nesty were dropped by Shyvan aircraft acrossenemy-held locations. SAS Psy-Ops teams would also dis tribute T-shirts andflags for the children prior to the new Sultan visiting many of the outlyingtowns and villages. One SAS soldier, Corporal John Ward, who arrived i n theregiment via 2 1 SAS, became so professional at his wo rk tha t he remainedIn Oman to continue his Psy-Ops work

Hearts and Mindsg9"Hearts and Minds" is a tactic that is integral to the way th e m odern SASfights. It was a term originally coined by General Sir Gerald Templar, theMil itary High Commissioner in Malaya, dur ing the "Emergency". In Jun e 1952,he was asked whether he had sufficient soldiers for the job. He replied: "Theanswer lies not in pourin g more soldiers into the jungle, but rests in thehearts and minds of the Malayan people." Templar took measures to winover the Malayans, with policies such as building forts in the jungle andwinning over the indigenous aboriginal tribes. From 1953, the SASparticipated in the building of these forts and lived with the aborigines,learning their language, their customs and their way of life. It soon becameclear that medical facilities, however primitive, were integral to win ning thetrust of the locals it is important to n ote that aid of any kind had to bereal and beneficial; in n o way were locals treated patronisingly. Thus SASsoldiers started to acquire midw ifery and veterinary skills. A simple aspirincould cure a toothache and would make a friend for life. However simplethis may seem, it worked in the jungles of Malaya, Borneo and in thedeserts of Oman. Among the benefits of "hearts and minds" was theintelligence gained from the locals. Of course, living with locals could beinfuriatin g and SAS soldiers had to learn the qualities of patience and tact.

It is now common policy for the SAS to conduct a "hearts-and-minds"campaign in a ll theatres of war, as it provides "eyes and ears" intelligencethat is otherwise unobtainable and the rewards of which are incalculable.Basic Propaganda Principles an agent will use:

They will get the attention of the people. Organize rallies,marches and meetings and get media-friendly attention.

b They will be wary of supporting a weak cause, as the people willnot follow and the agent will not gain media interest.

b They will make their issues clear and factual, and keep theirpropaganda peaceful, on the surface at least.b Clearly target and identify their adversaries he government, the

army or foreign invaders.b Always have answers prepared. If they are asked a question, they

will turn it around by saying, Yes,bur first lot me explain this,"111~1hcn co inlo i 1c4icl,11~.c~rl~ ~ i ~ . w c ~ r11,t 1 1 1 1 ~ ~ icrot.r t l ic* i~ oi~ ltnf v l ~ w n lltlrlnn.. II~IVII l ~ ~ v r ~lnlnf II1I1. h~ r,ir*.


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CLANDESTINE OPERAllONS

b Always condemn the enemy. Name the leaders and hold thempersonally responsible.

b Use insiders to pass them secret government information anduse this at any major international press interview. Anythingthat is true or half true and can be testified serves to weakena government.Research examples of previous government follies. They will usethese generalities to accuse the government of stupidity,corruption and nepotism.Use facts about the government that frighten people. e.g thenumber of people the state intelligence agency has taken intocustody and have simply disappeared. Agents could unmask amass grave - covert subversion un it can easily organize this -and they will then blame the current government for human-rights violations.

SUBVERSIONSubversion is a difficult word to define, but in the context of clandestineoperations it means subverting the people against their own leadership. Forthe agent or Special Forces unit, clandestine operations can involvesupporting a guerrilla movement in its quest to overthrow its owngovernment. While military training and equipment provide the muscle, thewar is propagated by the use of subversion and psychological warfare. Inorder to succeed, the subversive organization must adopt a policy that isrelevant to the current politica l situation. To do this, it will establish an ovenbody, such as a political party that openly subverts the people against thepresent ruling government. At the same time, it will also opt to organize acovert apparatus that, a lthough hidden, controls the real power. Thisorganization may well be an armed subversive group that is distant fromthe overt organization. On the surface, both parties can publicly denounceeach other; in reality, they act as one.

CASE HISTONIn 1997, the CIA released 1,400 pages ot secret nles on their first covertoperation in Latin America. This operation had been such a success thatit became th e blue print for similar CIA operations and many of the sametechniques are used today. Today, in an atmosphere of openness,everyone is free to examine these documents and they should, for theyexpose the horrific details of what we would now call "acts of terrorism".

Jacobo Arbenz Guzman became the second legally electedPI Guatemala. His first task was to change the rules underwhich a minority, select elite had previously governed the country. Thesechanges included the recognition of the Guatemalan Communists andsome serious land reforms that threatened US companies, such as thepowerful United Fruit Co. The United States did not consider thedemocratically elected president to be an ally and set about organizinghis downfall. This task was given to the CIA and a plan of action wasdeveloped that included assassination plots and sabotage. The CIAplanned to attack jacobo Arbenz Guzman from a ll angles, bu t thecampaign was mainly aimed at undermining h e ba cking of theGuatemalan military, which Arbenz needed in order to control thecountry. The CIA succeeded and, in 1954, Arbenz relinquished power tothe military, the only power that the US deemed capable of maintainingorder. The m ilitary leaders formed little more than a dictatorship. When asmall insurgency developed, Guatemala's US-equipped-and-trainedmilitary would let loose a savage wave of repression that left thousandsof peasants dead. The oppression lasted 40 years, totally destroying thefabric o f Guatemalan society and causing the death or disappearance ofalmost a quarter of a million people. This type of story is not new. Askany Special Forces soldier and he will tell you that they have allparticipated in similar scenarios.

As a CIA operative, I rained Guatemalan exiles in Honduras to invadctheir own country and unseat the elected president The coup I helpctlengineer in 1954 inaugurated an unprecedented era of intransigentmilitary rule in Central America. Generals and colonels acted with ,impunity to wipe out dissent and garner wcaltli for themselves and ~llt;ir-cronies.. Larer, I reali7ed we w crni 'l lir:ll~i~ll:IIIIIIIIII~~ITI ;II ,ill, Wwerr fir:Iililir lhv pco[)lc ." ll( ,*. (- 111~111,wo~t l* ,11 I ' l l i l i l ) Koc~ t~ i~~~ c~~ ,1I I I~ I~~I~lc M,II~II~~rllp-. o1011(*1111llI IA IIIII~I.I~I\II~ _


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pillage, destruction, captures and murder. These reprisals for providinghospitality to the guerrillas only serve to alienate the people from thegovernment even more.

Agents will then wait until the government troops have done their dirtywork, and plan an attack Once they have enough numbers to overcomethe troops it will be time to send some of the recently recruited villagers toestablish troop dispositions. During the attack, the agents will kill as manytroops as possible, but not the commanders. They will place any seniorofficers on trial and then execute them. They will inform surroundingvillages of government troops atrocities and know that timely interventionhelped save many lives. Careful agents will apply this same strategy within

A FARC ~lrnrllln rotlpwl l l l I r l~ l~~c~t lnllI11111111IIIIII I I X ~ I I ~ I I I Illll llllll 1.1111~lllllllll.

a given area until they are strong enough in both manpower andequipment to do serious damage.

An agent may also decide to p lay the tit-for-tat reprisal game. If thegovernment hits a village that is friendly to them, they will hit thegovernment back where it hurts and make sure that they know thereason for it. This can be done by attacking the government s assetssuch as the military and their main sources of revenue. The abductionand execu tion of selective govern ment ministers, cou rt judges, statesecurity officials and senior military personnel wil l all intimidate thegovernment. Agents will, however, make sure that any official politicalgovernment opposition m embers are left untouched, as this a ffiliatesthem with the guerrillas.

The full support of the common people is vital to any resistancecampaign. This can only be done by entw ining the revolution with t hepeople. Agents will recruit from the people; use their sons and daughters tofight for the cause as family ties are always strong. Live, eat, and work withthe people; find out what the people really want. Positively identify therevolution with the people, so that they feel part of it. Here are some dosand don ts that agents use.

Win hearts and minds.Show respect for human rights.Help protect families and homes.Respect religious beliefs and customs.Help the people in community projects.Protect the people from government attacks.In poor areas, set up schools for the people s children.Develop animal husbandry techniques in rural areas.Develop better hygiene to prevent diseases.Hold regular clinics.Never touch their women (other than for medical reasons).Never discuss military operations with the common people.Recruit trustees to act as spies in the towns and villages. iu



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several people by mistake, the people would be against them. A politicalwing would endorse the people's feelings in order to gain public supportfor their movement. On the other hand, the political wing may request theparamilitaries to plant a bomb just prior to a crucial meeting with thegovernment to improve their bargaining position. This approachencapsulates the benefits of an overt and covert subversive campaign.

One of th e basic forms o f subversion is agitation. The agitator picks on;Isubject and seeks to exploit it with the people in support of the overtmovement. In N orthern Ireland, this was a simple m atter of asking theCatholic people, "Why are your lives controlled by the British~ overnment?" r "Why are there armed British soldiers on our streets inIlelfast?" These are bo th comprehensible and irrefutable facts that theit tor t or wil l seize on in order to w hip up support. They are facts that1)eople can relate to; they create a moo d of doubt, fear or hatred andwaken feelings of rebellion.

Once the seeds of rebellion have been planted, the next subversive stageI., propaganda. Propaganda capitalizes on the fears of the peop le and.oc~ckso convert a peaceful population into a controllable mob. The

I plinciple behind propaganda is to convince people that they are acting in~.olf-defence, hile in reality these actions are being dictated to them by the~ .~~ l~vers i veroup. People will often see these actions as a means ofI)lolccting heir own society.

1\11 example of this could be seen in Northern Ireland during the earlyI')/Os. When an IRA gunman had taken a pot shot at a British patrol, hewc l~~ ldt?en run for cover. Any chase by the British would be hampered by1111% ocal women, w ho would bang dustbin lids against the walls of theirI I I I I I~ .~~ .nce started, almost every house in the area would take up theIo ~ I Ihis a llowed the gunman to run through the houses, dispose of hiswll,ll)on and make good his escape. This simple system also brought the

11 people together in support of their armed resistance.~above example highlights the definitive goal of the subversive group:

1 1 1 ~rlltl~trrninehe government and to demonstrate the solidarity of theI 1 ~1111 This type of propaganda is commonly referred to as "white"~IIII~I.I :,III~,Iit is suggested and contro lled by the overt group. "Grey"IIIII~I,II ,II~(I~I:r~ncrally omes from the media. All instances of violence areI.I~.~.IIII~II1 I ) I~I~I ~~ ( ~ w s ,lnd whilc rhc some people may look an in horrorII WII,II 1l111y111 II) ,~IlocIV, 111o*,vpclnplr\


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their own department of "artists" who acquire documents that can betailored to fit the agent for any special operation. Of these, by far the mostimportant document is the passport.

PassportsIt is fairly easy for an agency to obtain blank passports in their ow ncountry; it is even possible to build a com plete identity for the agent.However, this is not so easy to achieve when the agent is forced to operatewi th a foreign passport. Outside of the in telligen ce agency's specializedstaff, it is not easy to make a forged foreign passport the best method is toobtain a legitimate one.A New PassportThe ideal way, and one that a spy will try to use on order to obtain anew identify, is to "steal" one from someone who is dead. The morerecent the death, th e better a spy's chances are of accomp lishing this.They will scour the obituaries and look for someone of the same race,age an d gender as them's.elves. They will try to look in a large city, w herethe death rate is greater thdn in, say, a country village. Once a spy haslocated a match, they w ill attemp t to gather as much information aboutthe deceased as they possibly can, and, if possible, obtain a photograph.The deceased's address can normally be gleaned from a newspaper, andif the death is very recent there is nothing to stop a spy from going alongto the house and pretending to b e a n old friend. Once there, they willsimp ly ask for a recent photog raph as a keepsake. If a spy discovers thatthe deceased lived alone, they might try a little burglary; if they are luckythey might even turn up the passport or birth certificate (relatives normallydig these out when someone has died). But a spy will be careful not tosteal anything else. Another scam that a spy will use is to pretend to bea representative of the local coroner's ofice - they will have a fake I -and m ake an appo intment to visit the family. If a spy does this, they willmake sure that their telephone call is made just after the coroner's officeclosing time, so that no o ne can check up on them. They will mentionthat they will need to see any relevant documents the family can find,such as the social security number, passport or birth certificate etc. Asmost peoplc rarely deal wirh tho coroner's officc thcy will think rhal tliisis 11 tio~lii,il1)1oc(~~1~11(~

11(11~~1181 ~IIIIJ ~~~IVIIII I .I .I111 ~ 1 1 1 1 ~ ~ 1 1 1' a 111/1(( 0111 11 I Iltl'.'.llllll

then a spy will have to think abo ut making and ob taining false documents.This is n ot as big a problem as it might seem. Once a spy has obtained aphotograph of the deceased and has established their details it is a fairlysimple matter; it is a task that comes with risks, however. They will need toobtain a legitimate copy of the deceased's birth certificate and then applyfor a n ew passport, this time using their ow n photographs.

In many cases, the deceased may not lo ok anything like the spy, bu t thisis not a real problem. The spy will use a computer-morphing graphicsprogramme. They will scan a facial picture of both themself and thedeceased, then, using the morphing programme, merge them halfway. Thefinal result should look som ething like the spy. They will then p rint outpassport photographs using photographic quality paper and include thesewith their n ew passport application.

CASE HISTORYIn March 2004, two Mossad agents, Uriel Kelman, 30, and Eli Cara, 50,were jailed for six m onths in New Zealand for trying to obtain falsepassports. The plot was discovered when a passport officer noticed thata passport applicant was speaking with a Canadian or American accent.The clue led to an investigation that uncovered a complex conspiracyinvolv ing up to four Israeli agents. Using a fraudu lent birth certificate,they w ere attempting to create a false identity for 36-year-old ZevBarkan, another suspected Israeli spy. Officers planned to arrest the sp iesas they picked up the completed passport. However, Cara hadpreempted this by having it sent by courier to an apartment block, whereit was to be collected by a taxi driver and taken to a rendezvous withKelman. Police surveillance a acting suspiciously, close to thecentral Auckland apartment block, while Kelman was arrested afterfleeing the other rendezvous and throwing his mobile phone into ahedge. Both men were sentenced to six months in prison for theirinvolvement in the p lot. ,\,

Mossad has frequently been accused of)urinr fake passports tolaunch its operations. An incident in 1992 in wliicli Mnssnd agents usc.rlfnkc Canadian passports in an nllcnil,l I r t ,I-....I*:.~II~II(\ll \ l,i~n;l~~,ir1(~1,5li(~ikli li;ll~rlM,i~,Ii,il, (~C.IIII(~Ill IIII* IU)(I)II~*.II III 11111 l . ,~,~(~l i


24/25

CLANDESTIME OPERATIONS


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Money can be made in the same way and while every effort is made toprotect paper currency, i t remains one o f the easiest objects to copy.However, to make an undetectable copy requires a great deal of skill andvery advanced machinery. One of the major problems that a spy wh o wantsto indulge in counterfeiting. especially bank notes, is the use of RadioFrequency ldentification RFID).

Leaving paper i nthe sun causes it toage rapidly.

Radio Frequency ldentificationRFID tags are regarded as either active or passive. Active RFID tags arepowe red by an intern al battery and are typically used to track anything frompallets to dogs.

The white spotsindicate the RFID.These passivedevices preventpeople from copyingbank notes. Mostmodem computergraphics programswill not allow you toscan a bank note ifit is tagged with anRFID and will referyou to theappropriate countryfor authorization.

Passive RFI tags operate withou t a separate external power source andobtain operating power generated from the reader. Passive tags areconsequently much lighter than active tags, are much cheaper to produceand offer an unlimited operationa l lifetime. One of their new uses istracking bank notes around the world. The new European euro notes havethe traditional metal strip, into which are placed two RFID tags. Each tagcan trace its whereabouts from its origin to the present day. The absence 1a tag means that the money is counterfeit. Similar tags can be found in Icards, d riving licences and credit cards.

06. cap 6 - operaciones clandestinas

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