06 network effects 3 aaron schiff econ 204 2009 reading: cabral, ch 17

17
06 Network Effects 3 Aaron Schiff ECON 204 2009 Reading: Cabral, Ch 17

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Page 1: 06 Network Effects 3 Aaron Schiff ECON 204 2009 Reading: Cabral, Ch 17

06 Network Effects 3

Aaron Schiff

ECON 204 2009

Reading: Cabral, Ch 17

Page 2: 06 Network Effects 3 Aaron Schiff ECON 204 2009 Reading: Cabral, Ch 17

Introduction

• Objectives of this lecture: Use the model of demand from the previous lecture to understand how to value networks and analyse a monopoly network. Discuss strategies for getting a new network off the ground.

Page 3: 06 Network Effects 3 Aaron Schiff ECON 204 2009 Reading: Cabral, Ch 17

Consumer Surplus

• In our model of demand, suppose that N = 1 for simplicity.

• For a given price and network size, we can calculate consumer surplus by ‘adding up’ the net utilities of all those consumers who do join the network.

• Recall that a consumer’s net utility from joining a network of size n at price p is given by nx – p, and consumers join the network if x ≥ p / n.

Page 4: 06 Network Effects 3 Aaron Schiff ECON 204 2009 Reading: Cabral, Ch 17

ConsumerSurplus

Consumer Surplus

• Finding consumer surplus for a given n and p (with N = 1):

x

nx

nx – p

1

-p

0

p / n

Consumers who joinConsumers who don’t join

Page 5: 06 Network Effects 3 Aaron Schiff ECON 204 2009 Reading: Cabral, Ch 17

Example 1

• Suppose N = 1 in our model of demand.

• Questions:– What will be the market price if the network

size is n = ¾?– Calculate consumer surplus at this price and

network size.

Page 6: 06 Network Effects 3 Aaron Schiff ECON 204 2009 Reading: Cabral, Ch 17

Value of a Network

• The total economic ‘value’ or ‘welfare’ of the good or service sold in any market is the total value (utility) to consumers from the quantity consumed, minus the costs of producing that quantity.– The market price determines how the total welfare is

split between consumers and producers.

• Recall that Metcalfe’s Law says that the total value of a network is proportional to the square of the network size.– Assuming each connection is equally valuable and no

cost of creating the network.

Page 7: 06 Network Effects 3 Aaron Schiff ECON 204 2009 Reading: Cabral, Ch 17

Value of a Network

• In our model, assuming no costs of creating the network, the total value of the network is just the total gross utility of all consumers who do join the network.

• Suppose n consumers join the network.

• The value to each consumer who joins is nx where x is between 0 and 1.

• If n consumers join, it must be those with the highest values of x.

Page 8: 06 Network Effects 3 Aaron Schiff ECON 204 2009 Reading: Cabral, Ch 17

Value of a Network

nx

x10 1 - n

Consumers who join thenetwork

Value of thenetwork

If n consumers join the network, the total value created is given by:

3212 nnnV

Page 9: 06 Network Effects 3 Aaron Schiff ECON 204 2009 Reading: Cabral, Ch 17

Example 2

• In our model of demand, suppose N = 1 for simplicity.

• Calculate and illustrate the total value of the network at a network size of n = ½, assuming no costs to create the network.

Page 10: 06 Network Effects 3 Aaron Schiff ECON 204 2009 Reading: Cabral, Ch 17

Value of a Network

• Metcalfe’s law overestimates the value of the network compared to our model.

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1n

Value under Metcalfe’s law

Value in our model

Page 11: 06 Network Effects 3 Aaron Schiff ECON 204 2009 Reading: Cabral, Ch 17

Value of a Network• Under Metcalfe’s law, the value of an additional consumer on the

network is 2n

• In our model it is 2

2

32 nn

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1n

Marginal value under Metcalfe’s law

Marginal value in our model

Diminishingmarginalvalue

Page 12: 06 Network Effects 3 Aaron Schiff ECON 204 2009 Reading: Cabral, Ch 17

Value of a Network

• Because Metcalfe’s Law assumes each network connection is equally valuable, it generates increasing returns.

• In our model, additional connections are less valuable.

• In our model there is initially increasing returns, followed by diminishing returns.

Page 13: 06 Network Effects 3 Aaron Schiff ECON 204 2009 Reading: Cabral, Ch 17

Monopoly Network

• Suppose the network good/service is provided by a monopolist.

• Assume there are no costs to keep things simple.– The monopolist just maximises total revenue

• The monopolist faces the network good demand function that we have derived from our demand model:

NnN

nnp

Page 14: 06 Network Effects 3 Aaron Schiff ECON 204 2009 Reading: Cabral, Ch 17

Monopoly Network• Marginal revenue is a quadratic function.• Remember profits are maximised where MR = MC.

n0N2N/3

MRD

Page 15: 06 Network Effects 3 Aaron Schiff ECON 204 2009 Reading: Cabral, Ch 17

Monopoly Network

• Since MC = 0 by assumption, we have MR = MC when n = 2N / 3

• Monopoly’s profit is maximised at this network size

n2N / 3 N0

(n)

Page 16: 06 Network Effects 3 Aaron Schiff ECON 204 2009 Reading: Cabral, Ch 17

Deadweight Loss of Monopoly

• Since there are no costs to connect consumers to the network and all consumers are better off if the network is larger, the socially optimal network size (that maximises the total value of the network) is n = N, i.e. all consumers connected to the network.

• The monopolist sets n < N so as usual the monopolist restricts quantity and welfare is lower than what it could be (there is deadweight loss).

Page 17: 06 Network Effects 3 Aaron Schiff ECON 204 2009 Reading: Cabral, Ch 17

Two Sources of Deadweight Loss

x0 1

1

utility

1/3

2/3

2/9

Network size = 1, u= x

Network size = 2/3, u=2/3x

DWL due to consumers who cannot join the network

DWL due to reduced network size

Model: u(x) = nxwhere x is uniformly distributed from 0 to 1