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1111The Private The Private Language Language

Argument and the Argument and the Philosophy of Philosophy of PsychologyPsychology

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Private LanguagePrivate Language A plausible example of a private language A plausible example of a private language

would be our language for sensations. would be our language for sensations.

Why? Because is through Why? Because is through introspectionintrospection that we grasp the essence of our particular that we grasp the essence of our particular psychological states. psychological states.

The essentiality of such a language is an The essentiality of such a language is an inward pointing (ostension) referring to inward pointing (ostension) referring to our immediate (private) sensations.our immediate (private) sensations.

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Eight main arguments against the idea of Eight main arguments against the idea of a private language.a private language.

See Wilson, B. 1998. See Wilson, B. 1998. Wittgenstein’s Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.Philosophical Investigations. Edinburgh UP Edinburgh UP

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1. The Consequence Argument1. The Consequence Argument

A private definition is not a real definition A private definition is not a real definition of a world, for it is impossible for it to have of a world, for it is impossible for it to have a practical consequence, i.e. a genuine a practical consequence, i.e. a genuine practical use. practical use.

Let say that I name “S” a given sensation: Let say that I name “S” a given sensation: How can “S” have a practical use?How can “S” have a practical use?

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2. The Stage-Setting Argument2. The Stage-Setting Argument

There is a gap between knowing a There is a gap between knowing a correlation and possessing a definition. correlation and possessing a definition.

One could not use “S” as a name unless One could not use “S” as a name unless one already possesses a language in which one already possesses a language in which “S” has already a role. “S” has already a role.

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Privately established correlations could not Privately established correlations could not be the basis of a language because they be the basis of a language because they could count as definitions only for could count as definitions only for someone who already has a language.someone who already has a language.

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3. The Practice Argument3. The Practice Argument

A person could not obey a rule only once. A person could not obey a rule only once.

And an individual cannot be the only And an individual cannot be the only arbiter of the correctness of her own arbiter of the correctness of her own usage.usage.

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4. The Interpretation Argument4. The Interpretation Argument

Without a degree of regularity, of Without a degree of regularity, of correlations between utterances and correlations between utterances and action, there is nothing we can call a action, there is nothing we can call a language. language.

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So in the case of an agent writing “S” in So in the case of an agent writing “S” in her own diary we do not find the required her own diary we do not find the required regularity. regularity.

Hence “S” would not be a sign of a Hence “S” would not be a sign of a language and, therefore, a private language and, therefore, a private language cannot be possible.language cannot be possible.

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5. The Identification Argument5. The Identification Argument

If a private language were to exist a If a private language were to exist a criterion of identity for my sensation would criterion of identity for my sensation would be needed. be needed.

How do I know that my last week How do I know that my last week headache is the same as this week headache is the same as this week headache without mastering the word headache without mastering the word “headache”?“headache”?

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6. The Verificationist Argument6. The Verificationist Argument

If a private language were possible, a If a private language were possible, a private language user would be required to private language user would be required to check each time she uses “S” whether or check each time she uses “S” whether or not it means the same today as it meant not it means the same today as it meant yesterday. yesterday.

That is, for an appropriate use of “S” it That is, for an appropriate use of “S” it would be necessary to be able to check any would be necessary to be able to check any present utterance against the original present utterance against the original definition: if this check is impossible, “S” is definition: if this check is impossible, “S” is meaningless.meaningless.

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7. The Beetle-in-the-box Argument7. The Beetle-in-the-box Argument

If I name what I have in my box “beetle” If I name what I have in my box “beetle” and you name what you have in your box and you name what you have in your box “beetle”, how do we know what we are “beetle”, how do we know what we are naming the same thing? naming the same thing?

This also suggests that the language of This also suggests that the language of sensations cannot be understood on the sensations cannot be understood on the model of the name-object relation.model of the name-object relation.

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8. The Use Argument8. The Use Argument

Questions about meaning can often be Questions about meaning can often be replaced by questions about use.replaced by questions about use.

Meaning and understanding do not consist Meaning and understanding do not consist in any experience of fitness or mental act in any experience of fitness or mental act of grasping.of grasping.

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They have to be understood as practical They have to be understood as practical abilities. abilities.

As such meanings do not have to be As such meanings do not have to be reified as abstract entities reified as abstract entities

E.g. what gets named by a numerical) or E.g. what gets named by a numerical) or mental entities (e.g. what gets named by a mental entities (e.g. what gets named by a colour or sensations word).colour or sensations word).

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General remarks against the General remarks against the possibility of a private languagepossibility of a private language

In looking at how we teach a child the In looking at how we teach a child the world “pain”, Wittgenstein draws our world “pain”, Wittgenstein draws our attention to the fact that we teach the use attention to the fact that we teach the use of the word without ever attempting to of the word without ever attempting to direct the child’s attention inwards. direct the child’s attention inwards.

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We We traintrain the child in the use/exploit of a the child in the use/exploit of a linguistic technique which enables her to linguistic technique which enables her to express what she feels, not merely in cries express what she feels, not merely in cries and exclamations, but in articulate and exclamations, but in articulate language.language.

The verbal expression of pain replaces The verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it. (crying and does not describe it. (PIPI: # 244): # 244)

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The grammar of “pain”.The grammar of “pain”.

The connection between the word “pain” The connection between the word “pain” and the relevant sensation is not secured and the relevant sensation is not secured by an inner ostension, but by the fact that by an inner ostension, but by the fact that this word is used as a mean to express this word is used as a mean to express what it is felt.what it is felt.

It is by making ourselves aware of how we It is by making ourselves aware of how we use words such as “pain” that we articulate use words such as “pain” that we articulate the criterion of identity for pain, and not by the criterion of identity for pain, and not by looking inwards and saying “this”.looking inwards and saying “this”.

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The act of naming presupposes a grammar The act of naming presupposes a grammar or technique of employing a word within a or technique of employing a word within a language game. language game.

The mere act of looking inside or inwards The mere act of looking inside or inwards does neither supply this grammar nor does neither supply this grammar nor provide a technique of employment.provide a technique of employment.

For “sensation” is a word of our common For “sensation” is a word of our common language, not one intelligible to me alone. So the language, not one intelligible to me alone. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification use of this word stands in need of a justification which everybody understand. (which everybody understand. (PIPI: # 261): # 261)

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General moralGeneral moral

(i)(i) Introspection plays no role in defining Introspection plays no role in defining psychological concepts. psychological concepts.

(ii)(ii) The distinction between The distinction between psychological states psychological states and behaviour, and behaviour, which the appeal to which the appeal to introspection aimed to introspection aimed to capture, is a capture, is a grammatical distinction grammatical distinction which is properly which is properly understood through a understood through a careful attention to careful attention to the differences in how the differences in how we use the relevant we use the relevant concepts.concepts.

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The Philosophy of The Philosophy of PsychologyPsychology

The Cartesian pictureThe Cartesian picture

It pictures sensations as inner processes. It pictures sensations as inner processes.

So if one, God, could see into human So if one, God, could see into human consciousness, she would know what we consciousness, she would know what we can only guess is happening. Humans can only guess is happening. Humans cannot penetrate what lies behind cannot penetrate what lies behind behaviour. behaviour.

So our use of psychological expression, So our use of psychological expression, unlike God’s use, is indirect. unlike God’s use, is indirect.

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The Cartesian picture legitimates the The Cartesian picture legitimates the following question:following question:

What is the connection between a What is the connection between a sensation, S, which is supposed to lies sensation, S, which is supposed to lies inside us and the behaviour triggered by S?inside us and the behaviour triggered by S?

This question suggests a kind of This question suggests a kind of spatialspatial

distinction between a sensation and the distinction between a sensation and the behaviour, a distinction between what is behaviour, a distinction between what is insideinside (S) and what is (S) and what is outsideoutside (the (the behaviour triggered by S).behaviour triggered by S).

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To understand the connection or link To understand the connection or link between S and S-behaviour merely on the between S and S-behaviour merely on the basis of S causing S-behaviour, would be to basis of S causing S-behaviour, would be to oversimplify the phenomenon. oversimplify the phenomenon.

For there is also conceptual (or For there is also conceptual (or grammatical) connection between the grammatical) connection between the concept of S and S-behaviour.concept of S and S-behaviour.

It comes to this: only of a living human being and It comes to this: only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees, is being can one say: it has sensations; it sees, is blind, hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious. blind, hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious. ((PIPI: # 281): # 281)

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When we investigate psychological When we investigate psychological concepts and the way they are used in our concepts and the way they are used in our language games, we see that they do not language games, we see that they do not work on the basis of a distinction between work on the basis of a distinction between what is inside (private) and what is outside what is inside (private) and what is outside (public). (public).

We do not say that a stone does not feel We do not say that a stone does not feel pain because we have been able to pain because we have been able to investigate what is inside the stone. investigate what is inside the stone.

It does not make sense in our language It does not make sense in our language game to speak of a stone feeling pain.game to speak of a stone feeling pain.

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These are These are conceptual dataconceptual data. .

Our linguistic practice describes living Our linguistic practice describes living human beings: it does not describe bodies. human beings: it does not describe bodies.

We do not say that a body feels pain, we We do not say that a body feels pain, we do not attribute pain to a hand. do not attribute pain to a hand.

We say that a person feels pain, we do not We say that a person feels pain, we do not comfort a person’s hand, …comfort a person’s hand, …

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When a child comes to When a child comes to learnlearn how to use how to use sensation conceptssensation concepts she does not learn it she does not learn it on the basis of what is inside, a hidden on the basis of what is inside, a hidden object. object.

She does not learn it using ostensive She does not learn it using ostensive definitions, etc.. definitions, etc..

So the Cartesian picture, which rests on the So the Cartesian picture, which rests on the distinction between what is inside and what distinction between what is inside and what is outside, is not relevant and cannot be is outside, is not relevant and cannot be applied in describing the learning process.applied in describing the learning process.

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SensationsSensations

The must The must not not be conceived as objectsbe conceived as objects. .

This, though, does not entail that This, though, does not entail that sensations do not exist, i.e. that a sensations do not exist, i.e. that a sensation is a nothing, i.e. that there is sensation is a nothing, i.e. that there is nothing behind behaviour.nothing behind behaviour.

It is not a rejection of It is not a rejection of qualiaqualia. It is a mere . It is a mere rejection of the latter as objects.rejection of the latter as objects.

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““But you will surely admit that there is a difference But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?”—Admit it? What pain-behaviour without any pain?”—Admit it? What greater difference could there be?—“And yet you greater difference could there be?—“And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a sensation itself is a nothingnothing.”—Not at all. It is not a .”—Not at all. It is not a somethingsomething, but not a , but not a nothingnothing either! The conclusion either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here. itself on us here. The paradox disappears only if we make a radical The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts—which may be about houses, pains, good thoughts—which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please. (and evil, or anything else you please. (PIPI: # 304): # 304)

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Visual experienceVisual experience

If we focus on If we focus on what it is likewhat it is like to see to see something, we tend to think of visual something, we tend to think of visual experiences as images we know directly experiences as images we know directly by introspection. by introspection.

This, though, is not the right picture.This, though, is not the right picture.

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For the visual impression as a private For the visual impression as a private object of experience is a philosophical object of experience is a philosophical illusion. illusion.

To overcome this illusion Wittgenstein To overcome this illusion Wittgenstein invites us to investigate visual experiences invites us to investigate visual experiences in a different way, i.e. as a grammatical in a different way, i.e. as a grammatical investigation on the way this concept investigation on the way this concept actually works within our language game.actually works within our language game.

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GoalsGoals

(i)(i) To overcome the exaggerated sense of To overcome the exaggerated sense of the the importance of introspection in importance of introspection in understanding understanding the nature of visual the nature of visual experience.experience.

(ii) (ii) To reveal the grammatical links To reveal the grammatical links existing existing between this concept and the way between this concept and the way agents agents behave and react, i.e. to underline behave and react, i.e. to underline the link the link between visual experience and between visual experience and being able to being able to do something.do something.

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Seeing and seeing asSeeing and seeing as

E.g. the rabbit-duck picture. E.g. the rabbit-duck picture.

Without noticing the ambiguity I see either Without noticing the ambiguity I see either a picture-rabbit or a picture-duck, while a picture-rabbit or a picture-duck, while noticing the ambiguity I see the picture noticing the ambiguity I see the picture asas a a picture-rabbitpicture-rabbit or or as a picture-duckas a picture-duck. .

It is only when one knows that she is It is only when one knows that she is presented with an ambiguous picture that presented with an ambiguous picture that one can answer the question “what do you one can answer the question “what do you see?” with “I see?” with “I see it assee it as a rabbit or as a a rabbit or as a duck”.duck”.

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The difference involved in seeing the picture The difference involved in seeing the picture as a rabbit and as a duck can be captured as a rabbit and as a duck can be captured neither in invoking two different (inner) neither in invoking two different (inner) pictures one can point to when saying “Now I pictures one can point to when saying “Now I see it as a duck” and “Now I see it as a see it as a duck” and “Now I see it as a rabbit”, nor in the objective world (the picture rabbit”, nor in the objective world (the picture itself). itself).

The difference ought to come from elsewhere. The difference ought to come from elsewhere. The difference in the two visual experiences The difference in the two visual experiences arises from a difference in how the agent arises from a difference in how the agent places the pictures in two different contexts, places the pictures in two different contexts, i.e. in the way she makes reference to other i.e. in the way she makes reference to other pictures of rabbits or duck, etc.pictures of rabbits or duck, etc.

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General MoralGeneral Moral

Introspection is of no help in characterising the Introspection is of no help in characterising the difference between seeing and seeing as.difference between seeing and seeing as.

The same happens with The same happens with sudden recognitionsudden recognition..

Our visual experience is not linked with a Our visual experience is not linked with a change in the object perceived, but with a change in the object perceived, but with a change in how the perceiver is situated or change in how the perceiver is situated or disposed to act disposed to act vis-à-visvis-à-vis the object perceived. the object perceived.