(1), 147-168. assessment of the effectiveness of ethical

ArchivesofBusinessResearch–Vol.7,No.1PublicationDate:Jan.25,2019DOI:10.14738/abr.71.5836.

Nwanji,T.I.,Howell,K.E.,Faye,S.,Agba,D.Z.,Adewara,S.O.,Lawal,A.I.,Otekunrin,A.O.,Awonusi,F.D.,&Eluyela,D.F.(2019).AssessmentoftheEffectivenessofEthicalCorporateGovernanceinCorporateDecision-Making:AGroundedTheoryApproach.ArchivesofBusinessResearch,7(1),147-168.

AssessmentoftheEffectivenessofEthicalCorporateGovernanceinCorporateDecision-Making:AGroundedTheoryApproach

TonyIkechukwuNwanji

DepartmentofAccountingandFinance,LandmarkUniversity,OmuAran,Nigeria

KerryE.Howell

PlymouthBusinessSchool,PlymouthUniversity,UK

SaineyFaye

DepartmentofAccountingandFinance,BuckinghamshireNewUniversity,Buckingham,UK

DominicZ.Agba

DepartmentofEconomics,LandmarkUniversity,OmuAran,Nigeria

SundayO.Adewara

DepartmentofEconomics,LandmarkUniversity,OmuAran,Nigeria

AdedoyinIsholaLawal


AdegbolaOlubukolaOtekunrin


FrankD.Awonusi


DamilolaFelixEluyela


ABSTRACT

Thearticle focusedon theeffectivenessof ethical corporategovernance indecisionmakingbythe board of directors of top listed companies. Through the application of grounded theoryapproachinanalysingdatacollectedviathesurveyquestionnaire,asubstantivetheoryofethicalcorporate governance is developed. The substantive theory developed is based on theshareholdership model of empowerment to create wealth and stakeholdership model ofexpectation to shared values. In term of ethical corporate governance, through organisationscode of conduct and corporate social responsibility policies, companies can reach out to theirbroader stakeholdership groups through engagement with stakeholders. Such engagement isongoing with shareholdership groups through boards’ accountability to shareholders — thefindingfromthisstudyfurtherourunderstandingofethicalcorporategovernanceissues.Keywords: Corporate governance, shareholdership and stakeholdership models, business ethics,corporatesocialresponsibility,groundedtheorymethods,qualitativeresearchandsubstantivetheory.

Nwanji,T.I.,Howell,K.E.,Faye,S.,Agba,D.Z.,Adewara,S.O.,Lawal,A.I.,Otekunrin,A.O.,Awonusi,F.D.,&Eluyela,D.F.(2019).AssessmentoftheEffectivenessofEthicalCorporateGovernance inCorporateDecision-Making:AGroundedTheoryApproach.ArchivesofBusinessResearch,7(1),147-168.

URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/abr.71.5836. 148

INTRODUCTIONThe primary aim of this article is to demonstrate how grounded theory methodology wasapplied to the study of corporate governance issues, particularly the practice of topmanagementofcorporations.ThearticleemploysgroundedtheorymethodologyinanalysingdatacollectedthroughCompanySecretariesontheethicalcorporategovernancepracticesofboardsofdirectorsofFTSE-100companies in theUK.Thestudyargues that theobjectiveofgroundedtheoryistoattempttounderstandrealitythroughsocialconstructions.Italsotriesto achieve objectivity through recognising the subjectivity of the researcher(s) and researchregarding their interpretative nature (Howell, 2000). The underlying theme of groundedtheory is thedevelopmentof theory fromdata systematicallyobtained fromsocial research.While many qualitative studies of organisation and management have used the groundedtheory methodology approach, few methodological references use the grounded theoryapproach in the study of ethical corporate governance practices of the board of directors.Hence approach will provide insights and understanding of corporate governance systems,particularly the area of the interface between business ethics and corporate objectives.Corporate governance is an area that has been growing steadily in importance in the lastdecade.(NwanjiandHowell,2007a,2007b;NwagbaraandUgwoji,2015).TheCadburyreportof1992onthefinancialaspectsofcorporategovernanceintheUKlaidthefoundationsofthecurrent corporategovernance regulatory framework in theUK. Indeed, theCadbury report’sinfluencehasnot been limited to theUK, countries all over theworld have incorporated itsmainprinciples intotheircorporategovernancecodes.Corporategovernanceaimstoensurethat theboardsofdirectorscarryout theirdutiescorrectly.Theguidelinesdirect theboardsandmanagementoffirmstoacttoutilisetheassetsofthecompanytoincreasethereturnstothefirm'sshareholders.The questions to answer in this study are as follows (1) how effective is ethical corporategovernanceincorporatedecisionmaking(2)isthereatrade-offbetweenbusinessethicsandcorporateobjectives?(3)Doesanincreasedemphasisonbusinessethicsaffectenterprises?Inline with the research questions above, the primary objective of the study is to assess theeffectivenessofethicalcorporategovernanceoncorporatedecisionmaking.Thisobjectivewillbe achieved through the application of grounded theorymethodology in the context of theethicalbehaviourofboardsofdirectorsandtopmanagementofpubliccompaniesintheUK.

REVIEWINGTHELITERATUREThe current updated UK Corporate Governance Code (the Code 2016:1). states that “thepurpose of corporate governance is to facilitate effective, entrepreneurial and prudentmanagementthatcandeliverthelong-termsuccessofthecompany.”TheCadburyCommitteeReport (1992), is the first version of the UK Corporate Governance Code. (FRC FinancialReportingCouncil 2014). Its paragraph2.5 is still the classicdefinitionof the context of theCode:

“Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed andcontrolled. Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of theircompanies.Theshareholders’roleingovernanceistoappointthedirectorsandthe auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governancestructure is in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting thecompany’s strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect,supervisingthemanagementofthebusinessandreportingtoshareholdersontheirstewardship.Theboard’sactionsaresubjecttolaws,regulationsandtheshareholdersingeneralmeeting.”

ArchivesofBusinessResearch(ABR) Vol.7,Issue1,Jan-2019

Copyright©SocietyforScienceandEducation,UnitedKingdom 149

Corporate governance also refers to the procedures and instruments that the owners andinterest groups of a company use to influence and monitor management decisions andprocesses.Itiswidelyregardedastheevaluationoftheperformanceoftheexecutivedirectorsofthecompanyby,orforthecompany’sstakeholders’groups.AccordingtoNwanjiandHowell(2005:1)

“Corporategovernanceaimstoensurethattheboardsofdirectorsdotheirjobsproperly. It also protects shareholders’ right, enhances disclosure andtransparency,facilitatestheeffectivefunctioningoftheboardandprovidesanadequatelegalandregulatoryenforcementframework.Itaddressestheagencyproblem throughamix of the company law, stock exchange listing rules andself-regulatoryCodes.”

Corporategovernanceisalsoaboutguidingmanagementthroughmanagingtheaffairsofthecompany which leads to the achievement of the companies’ objectives whether thoseobjectivesareShareholdershiporStakeholdershiponesasfarasmanagementkeptwithintheruleofthegames(Friedman,1970).UKCorporateGovernanceCodeIntheUK,thecollapseoffourcompaniesinthe1990s,(MaxwellCorporation,PollyPeck,BankofCreditandCommerceInternationalBCCI,andtheBaringsBank) ledtothesettingupofthreemajor committees to investigate the effectiveness of corporate governance practices. Sincethen there have been other reports on corporate governance following any significantcorporatecollapse.(Fig.A)Belowshowsthemajorcorporatefailuresleadingtothesettingupof committee reports on different areas of corporate governance issues. The first threecommittees’ reports resulted in the first Combined Code on corporate governance in 1998,whichwasupdated in2003 following the recommendationsof theHiggs andSmithReportsafter the collapse of Enron andWorldCom in theUSA in 2001.TheFig.(A)belowshows thatcorporategovernanceregulations,codesandreportsonlyreactaftermajorcorporatecollapseregatherthanproactivetopreventcorporatefailures.(Chowdhury,etal.,2018).The events on corporations (see, Fig. A) below has led to increased research on corporategovernance systems in theUK,US, EU andmanyother countries. There arenowat least 40countries with published corporate governance codes (Cadbury,2002). Researchers employdatabaseanalysisor,lessfrequently,surveyquestionnairesandtaketheformofeithercross-sectional or event-study research designs (Zajac and Westphal, 1996a, 1996b; Sephered,1999),haveallworkedinthisareaofcorporategovernanceresearch.CookandDeakin,(1999)noted that quantitative methodologies had dominated the study on board structure. Theystated that a quantitative analysis of the relationship between various aspects of boardstructure and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), management power balance assumes anunderlying agency-type relationship. The Hampel Committee, (1998:25) stated, “Corporategovernancemustcontributebothtobusinessprosperityandaccountability.Liao,2010;Cheeretal.,2015;Ogbu,2015).TheUKCombinedCodesofarereviewedbytheFinancialReportingCouncileverytwoyearsandsincetheGlobalBankingandFinancialmeltdownof2009-2011,there has been a review ofwhat is now known as UK Corporate Governance Code in (FRC,2012,2014and2016).



CorporateCollapseandCommitteeReviewsintheUK

Fig.(A):Source:Authors(2018)

Showing the pattern of corporate collapse and committee reports resulting in corporategovernanceissues/regulationsintheUKfrom1990to2016.TheInstituteofDirectors(IOD)hasongoingresearch(Volpin,andClare,2015)onTheGreatGovernance Debate – Towards a Good Governance that focused on FTSE-100 (The top UKcompanies on the London Stock-Exchange) The Institute of Chartered Secretaries and



Administrators (ICSA UK) has its Good Corporate Governance that supports the Board ofDirectors of top companies in the UK. All the UK Six Institute Chartered Accountants arecontinually supporting and funding researchon corporate governance (ICAEW,ACCA, CIMA,ICAS, CIPFA, ICANI). We can say that the UK corporate governance leads the World incorporategovernanceresearch.TheoreticalFrameworkonCorporateGovernanceThe fourmajor corporate governancemodels are outlined below to illustrate the effects ofeach model about the shareholdershipandstakeholdership models of corporate governance.(Fera,1997;Abor,2007;NwanjiandHowell,2007b;Roy,2015;Mitlak,2016;Patel,2018;)i. ThePrincipal-AgentorFinanceModel,(JensenandMeckling,1976;Manne,1965),states

thatthepurposeofthecorporationisthemaximisationofshareholdersprofits,astheshareholdersare theownersof thecorporationsandbear thehighestrisks.However,thismodelcreatesanagencyproblem.

ii. TheMyopicMarketModel,(Charkham,1989;Sykes,1994),alsostatesthatthepurposeof the firm is the maximisation of shareholders profits. However, the model isconcernedwiththepursuitofshort-termmarketvalueattheexpenseoflong-rungoals.

iii. ExecutivePowerModel,(Hutton,1995;KayandSilberston,1995),isconcernedwiththemaximisationofcorporatewealthbutrecognisestheproblemoftheabuseofexecutivepowerformanagers’self-interest.

iv. The Stakeholder model (Freeman, 1984; Blair, 1985), leads to the maximisation ofstakeholders’wealthbutalsocreatesanabsenceofstakeholders’involvement.(Jensen,2001).

The first twocanbegrouped into the shareholdershipmodel and theother twomakeup thestakeholdershipmodel.Thetwoshareholdershipmodel(theprincipal-agentorfinancemodel,and myopic market model) are reviewed below to demonstrate why the shareholdershipmodelof corporategovernance is claimed tobe thebestwayofmeeting corporatebusinessobjectives tomaximise shareholders’wealth.Thecurrent regulatory framework in theUK isderived from the shareholdership approach to corporate governance.Theprincipal-agentorfinancemodel(Manne,1965; JensenandMeckling,1976;Baiman,1990;ShleiferandVishny,1997;Dalton et al., 2003) states that the purpose of the corporation is themaximization ofshareholders’ profits as the shareholders are the owners of the corporations and bear thehighestrisks.Thismodel isseenasthedominantviewofthecorporation.(FamaandJensen,1983a, 1983b).Keasey et al., (1997) state that the model sees a firm's existing corporategovernance arrangements as the outcome of a bargaining process, which has been freelyentered by corporate insiders and outsiders. If difficulties of corporate governance are notresolved these market failures in turn also have implications for corporate finance in thatequitywillbecostlyandoftensubjecttoquantitativerestrictions(Davis,2000;Jalan,2006).The bestway to reflect different preferences and to discover optimummethods of fulfillingsharedpreferencesaretomaketheobjectivesofcorporategovernanceclearandtosubjectthemechanismsforachievingthemtofreecompetitioninthemarketplace(Sternberg2001).Forexample,theintroductionofavoluntarycodesuchasCadburyreport,(Sun2002;Letzaetal.,2004; Sternberg, 2004).Berle andMeans (1932:313) called for the separationof ownershipandcontrolasanecessaryexplanationforcorporatebehaviourandtheproblemsconfrontingowners (fragmentedanddispersedshareholders)whoattempt toexert their rightsover themanagerswhohavegainedcontrolinthe‘modern’corporation.TheAuthorsstatedthat:

“Theriseofthemoderncorporationhasbroughtaconcentrationofeconomicpowerwhich can compete on equal termswith themodern state – economicpowerversuspoliticalpower, each strong in its field.The state seeks in some



aspects to regulate the corporation,while the corporation, steadily becomingmorepowerful,makeseveryefforttoavoidsuchregulation.”

KirkbrideandLetza,(2005a,2005b)statedthat: intheUK, therehasbeenadebateovertherole of the independent non-executive directors, with that debate resulting in changes to arevisedCodeapplicabletocompaniesreport.BusinessEthicsBusinessethicscouldbedefinedasself-critical,well-intended,legitimateanddiscourse-basedbusiness criticism. In contrast to legitimate and conscience criticism and as less formal andpublic, as lessemotionalandprivatebusiness criticismandwith integrating,productiveandconflict-resolvingfunctionsineachstakeholdercontext.

“Businessethics in itsbroadest sensecanbedefinedasbeing the studyof themoraljustificationofeconomicsystemsatboththenationalandinternationalscale. Itwas identifiedasa subjectof studyandresearch in the1970s,andagooddealofworkhasfocusedonthestructures,responsibilities,andactivitiesofmodemdaycorporations.”(InstituteofBusinessEthics2001).

The literature on business ethics about corporate governance is quite extensive. There arethose who argue that business ethics is not suitable for business or that it is not theresponsibilityofcorporationstoactethicallyandhavemoralvalues.Theyclaimthatmanagersconductbusinessbetter if theyputethical concernsasideand single-mindedly attend to thepursuit of profits. Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) stressed the decisive role thatindividualinitiativeandthedesireforprofitsplayineconomicprogress.Smith’spositionwasthat business should be conducted outside ethics. According to this view, commerce is anindependent sector of human activity governed by its own rules and standards. Left tothemselves and allowed to operate freely, directors will produce maximum benefit forshareholdersandsociety.Toimposeethicalnormsandconductisdoomedforfailureandwillonlyimpedeeconomiccreativityandprogress(Green1994;Greenwood2000).ThisviewwastakenupinthemodernbusinessethicsbyFriedmanandothers.Friedman(1970:7)viewwasthattheonlySocialresponsibilityofbusinessistoincreaseitsprofits.

“Inafreesociety,thereisoneandonlyonesocialresponsibilityofbusiness–touseitsresourcesandengageinactivitiesdesignedtoincreaseitsprofitssolongasitstayswithintherulesofthegamewhichistosayengagesinopenandfreecompetitionwithoutdeceptionorfraud,”

On theotherhand,Sternberg (2000:8)didnotagreewithFriedman’sviewabovewhen theauthorsaidthat:

“Business ethics isnotadispensableoption; the choice facingmanagement isnot whether to confront ethical concerns but how. It provides a greaterawareness of what is important in business activities and can, therefore,improve business performances. If management ignores the demands ofbusiness ethics or gets them wrong, they will be unlikely to maximise theirorganisation'slong-termstakeholders’values.”

On the question of the effect of business ethics on corporate objectives,much research hasbeen conducted on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Indeed, the starting point for thisstudy could be Friedman, (1970) claim that the modern corporation has no socialresponsibility to the public, only fiduciary duties to its owners(shareholders). Economists,



philosophers, business ethicists and academia, have since debated Friedman’s famousstatementoverthelast48years.Furthermore,stakeholdershipmodelconcernstheethicalandmoral duties of corporations to all their stakeholders as well as the interest of theirshareholders.Muchresearchhasbeenconductedonthelinkbetweenstakeholdershiptheoryand corporate governance issues over the years. (Freeman, 1984; Blair, 1995; Howell andLetza,2000;Phillips,2003).

RESEARCHQUESTIONSANDRESEARCHPARADIGMThe survey questionnaire was based on the research questions on the ethical corporategovernancepracticeoftheboardunderstudy.Thesearetheresearchquestionsthatthearticlesets out to investigate through the analysis of the results of the data from the surveyquestionnaire.

1. Isthereatrade-offbetweenbusinessethicsandcorporateobjective?2. Isthepurposeofcorporationethical?3. Doesanincreasedemphasisonbusinessethicsaffectenterprise?

Theresearchparadigmforthisstudyiscriticaltheory,theontologyishistoricalrealism,andthroughthis,thethesisobjectiveistoinvestigatethedifferencesbetweendirectors’mindsetsand reality. The ontology is that there is an interaction/limited difference between the two.(DenzinandLincoln,2002,2013;GubaandLincoln,2002).The study explores these linksbetween the corporation as ethical andgoverning actions asethical,examiningthedifferencebetweenthetwo,andfocusingonboardsofdirectorsoftopcompaniesintheUK.Thestudytakesethical,theoreticalperspectivesofcorporategovernancetodecision-makingprocessesandinvestigatesthequestionofwhetherthegoverningactions/behaviourofboardsofdirectorsandtheircompanyisethical?

GROUNDEDTHEORYMETHODOLOGYGroundedtheoryisintendedasamethodologyfordevelopingtheorythatisgroundedindata,whichissystematicallygatheredandanalysed.Thetheoryevolvesduringtheresearchprocessandisaproductofthecontinuousinterplaybetweenanalysisanddatacollection.Itrequirestherecognitionthatknowledgeisactivelyconstructedwithmeaningsofexistencerelevanttoanexperientialworld.Grounded theoryasamethodologywas firstdevelopedbyGlaserandStrauss,(1967)forthestudyofsociology.Sincethenithasbeenusedforqualitativestudiesinorganizationandmanagement,education,corporategovernance,nursingandpoliticalscience.(Strauss, 1987; Glaser, 1992, 1998; Charmaz,2000, 2014; Locke,2001; Howell, 2003; 2013;Nwanji and Howell, 2005, 2007b; John, 2013). Grounded theory methodology offers acomprehensive and systematic framework for inductively building of theory. The researchdesign in this study is a survey questionnaire, and the instrument of data collection is aquestionnaire.ThesurveywasconductedwithCompanySecretariesfromtopcompaniesintheUK, toascertain theirviewson theethical corporategovernancepracticesof theirboardsofdirectors.Thequestionnairewasmadeupoftenstatementswithfivepossibleanswersineachstatement requiring the respondents to opt for one response based on the Likert format ofquestionnairedesign,withvaryingdegreesofagreementstodisagreements.

RESEARCHMETHODSSURVEYAsGoulding,(2002:42)pointsout:

“Knowledgeandtheoryareusedasiftheywereanotherinformant,for,withoutthisgrounding inexistingknowledge,patternrecognitionwouldbe limitedtotheobviousandthesuperficial,deprivingtheanalystoftheconceptualleveragefromwhichtocommencetheorising.”



This isan importantpoint,as theultimategoalofusinggrounded theory for thisstudy is todevelop a substantive theory of ethical corporate governance. Qualitative research isconsidered as being valid according to quasi-positivistic criteria within the field ofmanagement.Questionnaireformat:The questionnairewas developed based on the ethical perspective oncorporategovernanceaboutboardsofdirectors’behaviourswhendecidingonbusinessethics.Itcontainstenstatementswitheachstatementfocusingonthecorporategovernancepracticesofboardsofdirectors.ThequestionnairerequiresparticipantstopickoneansweroutoffivebasedontheLikertscalemethodwhere(SA)representsstronglyagree,(A)representsagree,(NV)representsno-view,(D)representsdisagreeand(SD)representsstronglydisagree.

TheStatementoftheSurveyQuestionnaireKEY: StronglyAgree,(SA) Agree(A) NoView(NV) Disagree(D) StronglyDisagree(SD)

NO STATEMENTS SA A NV D SD Total1 YourBoardofDirectorshavemadechangestoenhancetheirGovernance

practicessincetheintroductionoftheCombinedCode43 16 4 3 0 66

2 YourBoardhasaCommitteeresponsibleforareviewofitsGovernancepractices.

42 18 3 2 1 66

3 Yourorganisation’sCorporateGovernancepracticescompareactivelywithICSAGoodGovernanceBestPractices

46 19 1 0 0 66

4 Yourorganisation’sGovernancepracticescompareactivelywiththeCombinedCodeofBestPractices.

33 29 2 2 0 66

5 YourcompanyhasconsistentlycompliedwiththeCombinedCodeonCorporateGovernanceoverthepastfiveyears

50 14 0 2 0 66

6 AsaCompanySecretary,youareresponsibleforriskmanagementinyourorganisation.

38 23 3 2 0 66

7 Yourorganisationalcodeisseenasastatementoftheorganisation’sethicalvalues

38 25 2 1 0 66

8 Iconsidermyorganisationtohavehighethicalvaluesaboutitsstakeholders. 32 20 7 5 2 669 YourboardconsidersBusinessEthicswhensettingthecompany’sbusiness

objectives.30 24 10 2 0 66

10 Yourorganisation’sCorporateGovernancepracticesfocusonmeetingthebusinessobjectivesofmaximisingshareholderswealth.

40 21 4 1 0 66

11 ThefinancialmeltdownindicatesthatreliableandeffectiveCorporateGovernanceisrequiredifcompaniesaretomeettheirshareholders’needs.

46 13 5 1 0 66

12 GoodpracticeofCorporateSocialResponsibility(CSR)thattakestheneedsofacompany’sstakeholdergroupsintoconsiderationcreates

40 20 3 2 1 66

Table(1):Source:Authors’Fieldwork(2018):SurveyofcharteredsecretariesontheregardingthecorporategovernancepracticesofTheir

organisationsbasedonLikertScale1-5

DATAANALYSISTheanalysisoftheresultsofthesurveyusedgroundedtheorycodingprocedurestodevelopcategoriesfromthedata.Glaser(1992)definedcategoriesasanareaofhigherorderconcepts.Theyhavemuchmorefullexplanatorypowerandpulltogetheralltheidentifiedideasintoatheoreticalframework.Theanalysisisbasedontheresultsoftherespondentsoneachofthetenstatementsof thequestionnaireusingaLikert scale to identifycategories.TheresultsofthesurveyquestionnairewereconvertedintoatablebasedontheLikertscaleformatshowninthe(Table2)below.Ascanbeseen,66respondentsstatedthattheyworkfortopcompanieswhichindicatedthat66%ofcompanysecretariesfromthetopUKcompaniestookpartinthesurvey.(Harvey,2012;MENAReport,2016).Asummaryof(Table2)belowshowsthatmostoftherespondentsoverall,eitherstrongly–agreeoragreewitheachofthetenstatementsonthe



survey.ThisisnotsurprisingascompliancewiththeCombinedCodeprovisionsisrequiredfortopcompaniesundertheListingRulesoftheLondonStockExchange.Itisapre-conditionforlistingon theExchange thatboardsofdirectorsof topcompaniesmuststate in theirAnnualReportsandAccountshowtheircompanieshavecompliedwiththeCombinedCodeprovisionsorexplaintheirreasonsfornon-compliance,(ComplyorExplainRule).TheotherfactoristhatcompliancewiththeCombinedCode’sreviewed2012,requirementsoncorporategovernanceareviewednotonlyas an indication thatboardsofdirectors aremeeting theneedsof theirshareholdersbutalsoasanevaluationoftheboard’sperformances.ThereisalsothepressurefromincreasingshareholdersactivismparticularlytheInstitutionalShareholders,whichforcesthe board to providemore andbetter information onhow it hasmanaged the affairs of thecompany.

SurveyofCompaniesintheUKStatements Strongly

AgreeAgree NoView Disagree

StronglyDisagree

1 43 65% 16 24% 4 6% 3 5% 0 02 42 64% 18 27% 3 5% 2 3% 1 1%3 46 70% 19 29% 1 1% 0 0 0 04 33 50% 29 44% 2 3% 2 3% 0 05 50 76% 14 21% 0 0 2 3% 0 06 38 58% 23 35% 3 4% 2 3% 0 07 38 58% 25 38% 2 3% 1 1% 0 08 32 48% 20 30% 7 11% 5 8% 2 3%9 30 46% 24 36% 10 15% 2 3% 0 010 40 61% 21 32% 4 6% 1 1% 0 011 46 70% 13 20% 5 8% 1 1% 0 012 40 60% 20 30% 3 5% 2 3% 1 2%TotalNo.ofRespondents66

Table(2):Note:(Thepercentageshereareroundedtothewholenumberineachstatement).Thesummaryofdatacollectedforthisstudy.

OpenCodingCategoriesTo identify categories tables(2)aboveis constructed intobar chartmodelswith eachmodelfocusingontheresultsofeachstatementfromthesurveyquestionnaire.Usingthegroundedtheory coding procedures, we develop categories that are common to each other from thesurvey data. This is shown below in (Fig. 1 to12). The charts show the analysis of therespondents’viewsbasedonLikertscale1-5.Thisprocessprovidesthebasisforgeneratinganemergentsetofcategoriesandtheirpropertiesthatfitandarerelevantforintegratingtheory.AccordingtoGlaser(1978:56)“toachievethegoaltheanalystbeginswithopeningcoding.”

GovernancePractice

Fig.(1):Statement1:TheBoardofDirectorshavemadechangestoenhancetheirGovernance

practicessincetheintroductionoftheNewCombinedCode:Respondentsanswersonascaleof1-5

65%

24%

6% 5% 0% 0

20

40

60

80

100

STRONGLY AGREE

AGREE NO V I EW D I SAGREE STRONGLY -D I SAGREE



Statement(1):Ascanbeseenfrom(fig.1),above,65%oftherespondentsstronglyagreethattheirboardsofdirectorsmadesomechanges to theirgovernancepracticesasaresultof theCombined Code on corporate governance and other financial regulations, with 24% of therespondentsstatingthattheirboardsmadesomechangestotheirgovernancepractices.6%ofthe respondents had no-view, with only 5% disagreeing with the statement (1). The resultindicates that boards of directors take their governance practices as an essential part ofproviding shareholders with information on how the board has managed the affairs of thecompany.Accordingtotheprinciplesofcorporategovernancepublishedbythe(OECD,2004),a company’s corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of thecompany,theactivemonitoringofmanagementbytheboardandtheboard’saccountabilitytothe company and its shareholders. The high number of agreements with the statement (1)furtherconfirmedtheviewsthatmostcorporationsexpecttheirboardsofdirectorstocomplywith the combined code on good corporate governance provisions as part of theiraccountability to shareholdership and other stakeholdership groups of the company. (Bar,2017;Evans,2016).Statement(2)ofthesurveyquestionnairealsofocusedonthegovernancepracticesofboardsof directors in which the participants were asked if their companies’ boards of directorsappointed committees to help themwith evaluation of their performances. Shown in (Fig.2)below,64%oftherespondentsstronglyagreethatsuchcommitteesexistintheirorganisation,and27%agreewith thestatementwhileonly5%hadno-viewwithanother3%disagreeingwiththestatement.Afurther2%oftherespondentsstronglydisagreewiththestatement(2).Boardcommitteesadvisetheboardontheefficientandeffectiveimplementationofstrategieswhichcanoftenbethemostdifficultandchallengingaspectoftheentireprocess.

BoardCommitteeresponsibility

Fig.(2):onStatement(2)ofBoardCommitteeresponsibleforareviewofitsgovernance

practices.

PricewaterhouseCoopers‘ShareholderQuestions2003’claimedthat:“Thegovernanceframeworkshouldnotbea“straightjacket”–itshouldallowthe company to be responsive to the increasingly fast-changing commercialenvironment.Theaimistocreatealong-termstrategy,whichwillresultinthecreation of greater value for shareholders, alongside associated benefits foremployees,customers,andotherstakeholders.”(PWC,2003:8)

Goodpracticesforanactiveboardinclude:

• Reviewingandchallengingmanagement’sstrategicoptions• Thinkingsufficientlywidelywhenreviewingstrategyproposals• Takingstepstoreducerisksinplanningmergersoracquisitions

64%

27%

5% 3% 2% 0

20

40

60

80

100

StronglyAgree NoView Strongly-Disagree



Statement(3) of the survey relates to the issue of compliancewith the Combined Code andother corporate governance regulations. On this statement,70%of the respondents stronglyagreeand29%respectivelythatthecorporategovernancepracticesoftheirorganisationmeetthe standardof the ICSAGoodGovernancePractices.Moreover, only1%of the respondentshad no-view, while none of them disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement.Theresultisshownin(Fig.3)below.TheinstituteCharteredSecretariesandAdministrators(ICSA)have a range of programmes to suit those requirements of the Combined Code, namely: (i)Whole Board Evaluation, (ii) Evaluation of Principal Committees and (iii) An Evaluation ofIndividual Director. Through its work and its members, the Institute has direct knowledge,current experience and an instructive understanding of the operation of boards and thechallengesfacingdirectors.(seeICSA,2012;Yahaya,2016)

GovernancePracticescomparewithBestPractices.

Fig.(3):onStatement3:TheOrganisation'sGovernancePracticescompareactivelywith

ICSAGoodGovernanceBestPractices.

Statement (4) of the survey focuses on compliance with the Combined Code and othercorporategovernanceregulations.Therespondentswereaskediftheircompanies’governancepracticessharplycomparedwith theCombinedCodebestpractices.Theresultof thesurveyconfirmedthatthecorporategovernancepracticesoftheboardsofdirectorsoftopcompaniesmeasureuptothestandardoftheCombinedCodeofBestPractices.Inthiscase,75%and19%oftherespondentsstronglyagreeoragreerespectivelywithstatement4.Only3%ofthemhadno-viewwithanother3%disagreeingwiththestatementnonestronglydisagree,andthiscanbeseenin(Fig.4)below.TheCombinedCode(2003:1)statesthat:

“The board’s role is to provide entrepreneurial leadership of the companywithinaframeworkofprudentandeffectivecontrolswhichenablesrisktobeassessed and managed. The board should set the company’s strategic aims,ensure that thenecessary financialandhuman resourcesare inplace for thecompanytomeetitsobjectivesandreviewmanagementperformance.

Organisation’sGovernancePracticesandCombinedCode

Fig.(4)Statement4onTheOrganisation'sGovernancePracticescompareactively

withtheCombinedCodeofBestPractices.

75%

19% 3% 3% 0% 0

20

40

60

80

100




Statement (5) on compliance with the Combined Code and other corporate governanceregulations, 76% of the respondents strongly agree that their company has consistentlycomplied with the Code for the past years, with just 21% admitting to this and only 3%disagreed.Theresultoftheanalysisisrepresentedinfigure(5)below

No company can expect to manage risk efficiently without first creating aprimary system of internal controls, designed to safeguard shareholders’investmentandthecompany’sassets.Thecontrolsneedtoconsidertheriskofnon-compliancewith regulationsaffecting the industry. (PricewaterhouseCoopers,2003).

The combined code of corporate governance (2012) had clear ethical dimensions when itstated: that “…designed to achieve the necessary high standards of corporate behavior.” Ifcorporate governance is to contribute to business prosperity and accountability, then acompanywillneedeffectiveinternalcontrol,financialreportingandriskmanagementsystemsinwhichan independent audit committeewill help theboard to achieve. (Volpin, andClare,2015).

CompanyCompliedwiththeCombinedCode

Fig.(5): Statement5:onthecompanyhasconsistentlycompliedwiththeCombinedCodeon

corporategovernanceoverthepast10years.Statement (6) below on risk management and internal control, 58% of the respondentsstronglyagreethattheyareresponsiblefortheriskmanagementoftheirorganizations,while35%saidthattheyplaysomepartonriskmanagementoftheircompanies.However,4%and3%respectivelyhadno-viewordisagreethattheyplayanyroleintheriskmanagementandinternalcontroloftheirorganizations.Theresultrepresentedinfigure(6)below.Inmosttopcompanies,riskmanagementisbyusuallyoverseenbyaboardmemberofmanagementwiththecompanysecretaryprovidingadviceortechnicalsupporttothedirectorasrequired.

Management should identifyandevaluate the risks facedby the company forconsiderationbytheboardanddesign,operateandmonitorasuitablesystemof internal control which implements the policies adopted by the board.”(TurnbullReport,2005).

Corporategovernanceisseenasarisk,whichboardsofdirectorsshouldmanagewelltomeetthe business and financial objectives of their companies. The image and reputation of theorganization to its broader stakeholdership groups can affect the maximization ofshareholdership values if they are not handled in a betterway. Regarding stakeholdershipvalues,boardsofdirectorswouldprojectthecompanies’ imagethroughcorporatecodesthattheboard,managementandstaffshouldobserve.Decisionsthattakebusinessethicsandmoralvalues into consideration can significantly improve the company’s standing to bothshareholdership and stakeholdership groups. Unethical behavior by directors could lead to

76%

21%

0% 3% 0% StronglyAgree NoView Strongly-Disagree



financial risk as the cases of Enron and WorldCom in 2001 have shown. (Combined Code,2003).

RiskManagementandCorporateCodeofConduct

Fig.(6):Statements6:onCompanySecretaryyouareresponsibleforriskmanagementand

internalcontrolinyourOrganisation.Statement(7): on the organisational code is an essential part ofmanaging the affairs of thecompany.Theorganisationalcodeofconductclarifiesthepolicyofacompany.Itshowswhatthecompanyexpectsfromitsmanagementandemployees.Thereflectiononvaluesandnormswill also help to reduce inconsistencies in the policy of the company. As shown in (Fig. 7),(58%)oftherespondentsstronglyagreethatorganisationalcodeisseenasastatementofitsethical values, and a further (38%) agree with this statement. Fewer than (5%) of therespondentshadno-viewsordisagreethattheircompany’scodeisitsethicalvalues.

OrganizationalCodeasOrganization’sEthicalValues.

Fig.(7):Statement7:ontheOrganizationalCodeisseenasastatement

oftheOrganization'sEthicalValues.

Thismayindicatetheimportanceamultinationalcorporationattachestothedevelopmentofitscodeofethics,asthecodeisthemeansofexpressionofthecorporation’sethicalvaluestothe world. It can be seen from the analysis of the result that having a code of ethics isconsidered a good corporate governance practice. Codes should not develop merely as areactiontoareputationcrisis.Withproperleadershipandsupportfromtheboard,thestaffatall levels andall jurisdictionsof the corporation shouldbe involved inboth the content andimplementationof a corporate code tobeeffective.Pressuresonboardsofdirectors to takecorporatecodeconductseriouslyhavegrowninthepast26yearssincetheCadburyReportof1992.Statement (8) on the organisation’s ethical values about its stakeholdership groups. Asindicated fromthesurveyresult represented in(Fig.8)below,only (48%)of therespondentsstrongly agree, with a further (30%) acknowledging that their organisations have higherethicalvaluesabouttheneedsofitsdifferentstakeholdershipgroups.However,(11%)oftherespondentshadno-view,while(8%)disagreeandafurther(3%)stronglydisagree.

58%

35%

4% 3% 0% 0

20

40

60

80

100


58%

38%

3% 1% 0% 0

20

40

60

80

100




OrganisationhighEthicalValuesaboutitsStakeholders.

Fig.(8):Statement8:onIconsidermyOrganisationtohavehighEthicalValuesaboutits

Stakeholders.

Statement(9)ofthesurveyresultsfocusedonbusinessethicsandcorporateobjectivesandithighlights strategic issues, which boards of directors may wish to address. The literatureshowsthatsomeboardmembersappearnottogivededicatedsupporttobusinessethicswhensetting the company’s corporate objectives. As the results of the analysis shown in (Fig.9)below, (46%) of the respondents strongly agree, while a further (36%) agree that theirboardtakesbusinessethicsintoaccountswhensettingthebusinessobjectivesofthecompany.(15%) of the respondents expressed no-views on the matter while 3% disagree and nonestronglydisagree.

BusinessEthicsandCompany'sBusinessObjectives.

Fig.(9):Statement9:onYourBoardconsidersBusinessEthicswhensettingthe

Company'sBusinessObjectives.

Statement (10) on the maximization of shareholder's wealth shows that (61%) of therespondents strongly agree that maximising shareholders’ wealth is the focal point of thecorporate governance practices of their companies, and (32%) of them agreed with thestatement.Only(6%)hadno-viewandjust1%disagreeandnoneoftherespondentsstronglydisagree with statement 10, which is shown in (Fig.10) below. This result supports theliterature thatmostof theBusinessorganisationsee theAnglo-Americanmodelofcorporategovernance as the primary way of creating shareholders wealth. However, the result alsoindicatedthatmanycompaniesareconsideringotherissuessuchasbusinessethics,corporatesocial responsibility (CSR) and stakeholder issues. The Combined Code provisions providedcompaniesandtheirboardswithwhattheyneedtodotopracticegoodcorporategovernance.Theboardshouldbeindependentofmanagement,andthereshouldbeindependentdirectorson the board (NEDs). The Combined Code (2003) stats that: “The board should include abalance of executive and non-executive directors (and in particular independent non-executivedirectors)suchthatnoindividualorsmallgroupofindividualscandominatetheboard’sdecisionmaking.”(A.3,2003,FRC,2016)

48%

30% 11% 8% 3%

0

20

40

60

80

100


46% 36%

15% 3% 0% 0

20

40

60

80

100

STRONGLY AGREE

AGREE NO V I EW D I SAGREE STRONGLY -D I SAGREE



CorporateGovernanceandMaximisingShareholders'Wealth.

Fig.(10):Statement10:onyourorganisation’scorporategovernancepracticesfocuson

meetingthebusinessobjectiveofmaximisingshareholders’wealth.

Althoughmostofthecompaniesinthissurveyhaveorganizationalcodesandethicalvalues,inpractice this is not so as companies still see shareholders’ interests as themain reason forrunningthebusiness.Wecanalsoacknowledgethatwithoutmaximizingshareholders’wealth,thecompanymaygooutofbusinesswithoperatinglossesthatmayresultinmergerandtake-over.Withthepossiblelossofjobswhichmayaffectsomestakeholdersofthecompanyaswell,(e.g.,employees,customers,suppliers,thegeneralcommunities).This statement (11) was about reliable and effective corporate governance regulation ifcompanies are to meet the interest of their shareholdership and the needs of theirstakeholdership, which will contribute, to good corporate governance in the banking andfinancial sectors. The results of the survey shown in Fig. (11)below shows that 70%of therespondents strongly agree and 20% agree that valid and reliable corporate governance isrequired in the banking and financial sectors to avoid or prevent the banking and financialmeltdownof2008–2011.Fig.(11)Alsoshowsthat8%oftherespondentshadnoviewwhile2%disagreewithstatement11.ThecollapsedofNorthernRockBankintheUK(2008/2009)led to theglobal financialmeltdownof2009/2011and show theweaknessof the corporategovernancesysteminguidingboardsofdirectorsinmakingbusinessdecisionsthatmeettheshareholdershipandstakeholdershipofthecompanies.Sincethefinancialmeltdown,therehasbeenanimprovementinthedevelopmentofethicalcorporategovernanceinbothdevelopedand developing countries. In theUK for example, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) hascarriedoutareviewoftheUKcorporategovernancecodesin2012,2014and2016resultinginthe current UK Corporate Governance Code. As indicated on (page 4) of this study otherreviews and update on corporate governance system have been carried out. Research oncorporategovernanceisontheupsurgeinareasofpolicyanddevelopment.

ReliableandEffectiveCorporateGovernance

Fig.(11):Statement11:onthefinancialmeltdownindicatesthatreliableandeffectivecorporategovernanceisrequiredifcompaniesaretomeettheirshareholders’needs.

61%

32%

6% 1… 0% 0

20

40

60

80

100


7…

20% 8% 2% 0%

0

20

40

60

80

100




The finalsurveyquestionnairestatement(12)with theresultsshown in(Fig.12)below,wasthe issues of taking the needs of stakeholdership groups into consideration by publiccorporations,which in turn contribute tomeeting the interest of the shareholdership in thelong-run.The results above show that60%of the respondents in the survey strongly-agree,with30%agreeingwiththestatement.However,whilemostoftherespondents,(60%+30%)representing90%oftherespondentsstronglyagreeoragree,5%oftherespondentshadno-view, 3% disagree and 2% strongly disagree. In the literature, the issue of companiescontributing to the needs of their stakeholdership groups through corporate socialresponsibility (CSR) is essential to the growthof shareholdershipwealth. Some research inthis areas shows the importance of engagementwith stakeholders through corporate socialresponsibility,businessethicsandenvironmentalresponsibility.Throughcommunitysupportscompanies can contribute to the needs of the local communitieswhere they carry out theirbusinesses.“Goodbusinessethicsdogoodbusiness”(Friedman,1970).

Fig.(12);Statement12:Companiesthatincorporatetheneedsoftheirbroaderstakeholder

groupscanattractandcreatewealthfortheirshareholdersinthelong-term.

According to (Browne and Nuttall, 2013), executives need a new approach to engaging theexternalenvironment.Webelievethatthebestoneistointegrateexternalengagementdeeplyintotheirbusinessdecision-makingateverylevelofthecompany.Arecompaniesdoingwellatexternal engagement? “Properly understood, external engagement means the efforts acompanymakestomanageitsrelationshipwiththeexternalworld.Inpractice,however,mostcompanieshavereliedonthreetoolsforexternalengagement:afull-timeCSRteamintheheadoffice, some high-profile (but relatively cheap) initiatives, and a glossy annual review ofprogress.”(BrowneandNuttall,2013:3).

CATEGORIESFROMTHERESULTSOFDATAANALYSISThe analysis of data from the 12 survey statements resulted in 8main categories of ethicalcorporate governance issues, see (Fig.13) below for data categorisation on ShareholdershipModeland(Fig.14)on StakeholdershipModel. The bar charts constructed to help further anunderstandingofthedata.

60% 30%

5% 3% 2% 0

20

40

60

80

100




TheSubstantiveTheoryonShareholdershipModelofEthicalCorporateGovernance

Fig.(13):OnShareholdershipModel-empowermenttocreatewealthcommunicatedthroughaccountabilitytoshareholdersaboutshareholdertheory.

Thesubstantivetheoryisdevelopedaroundtheethicalissuesofcorporategovernanceinthedecision-making process of corporate governance practices of boards of directors of publiclimitedcompanies.Thesubstantivetheorydevelopedoncorporategovernancecanbestatedas:

(i) On Shareholdership Model - empowerment to create wealth communicated throughaccountabilitytoshareholdersaboutshareholdertheory.

(ii) On Stakeholdership Model-the expectation to shared values communicated throughjustificationtostakeholdersaboutstakeholdertheory.

TheSubstantiveTheoryonStakeholdershipModelofEthicalCorporateGovernance

Fig.(14):OnStakeholdershipModel-theexpectationtosharedvaluescommunicated

throughjustificationtostakeholdersaboutstakeholdertheory.The article presents an understanding of the debut and knowledge on ethical issues oncorporategovernanceandhowtohelptheBoardofDirectorsondecisionmakinginmeetingthe needs and expectations of the company’s different shareholdership groups andstakeholdershipgroups.

Corporate Governace

Issues

Stakeholdership Model

Expectation to share value

Business EthicsOrganisational codes

Corporate Social Resresponsibility

(CSR)

Communicated through justification

to stakeholders

Corporate Governace

IssuesShareholdership

Model

Empowerment to create wealth

Internal Control & Risk Management

Masmaximisation of shareholders profits

Communicated through accountability

to shareholders



DISCUSSIONOFTHEFINDINGSThefindingsfromthisstudyonexpectations,perceptionsbehaviuorandaccountabilityoftheboards of directors towards their shareholdership and stakeholdership groups, show thatwhen it comes to the issues of shareholders,most of the respondents supported theAnglo-Americansystemsof corporategovernance.However,asexplainedby themodelsdevelopedfromtheanalysisofdatacollectedthroughsurveyquestionnairethereistherecognitionthatboards of directors are taking the issues of their companies’ stakeholdership groups intoconsiderationwhensettingtheirbusinessobjectives.Intermofethicalcorporategovernance,throughorganisationscodeofconductandcorporatesocialresponsibilitypolicies,companiesnow reach out to their broader stakeholdership groups through engagement withstakeholders. Such engagement is ongoing with shareholders groups through boardsaccountabilitytoshareholdershipandexpectationsfromstakeholdership.Ingeneral,thetablesandchartsdevelopedfromtheanalysisoftheresultsofthesurveyquestionnairewereusedasmodels for analysing the survey results. The tables and diagrams help further ourunderstandingof the views that the shareholdersmodel of corporate governance is still thebestwayofmanagingtheaffairsofcorporationsandprovidetheplatformforboardstomeetthebusinessobjectivesofmaximisingtheshareholder'swealthandconsiderthestakeholder'sneeds.Ascouldbeseenfromthetablesandmodelsmostoftherespondentsagreethattheirboardsofdirectorsfocusonthecategoriesidentifiedfromtheresultsoftheanalysis,(seeFig.13andFig.14).ItenablesthemtomanagetheaffairsofthecompanyincompliancewiththeNewUKCorporateGovernanceCode.BusinessEthicsorOrganisationalCodeshelpcompanieswithmaintaining their reputations and corporate values or brands. The Substantive Theoryfromdataanalysisthroughitscodingmethods,opencoding,axialcodingandselectivecoding.

CONCLUSION

This study provided an assessment of the effectiveness of ethical corporate governancepracticesoftheboardsofdirectorsofftse-100companiesasrepresentedbytheviewsoftheircompanysecretaries.companysecretariesplayasignificantroleinthecorporategovernancepracticesoftheircompaniesbyadvisingtheboards,boardcommitteesandindividualdirectorsandmanagementcompliancewiththecombinedcodeandukcorporategovernance.companysecretariesalsoplayasignificantroleinriskmanagementoftheirorganisations.itistheirroleto make sure that the boards and individual directors carry out their duties andresponsibilities as specified in the combined code and company law regulations. the articleillustratedand throw lighton theeffectivenessof ethical corporategovernance in corporatedecisionmaking.impactofthecombinedcodeprovisionsontheboardroom’sdecision-makingprocessandboards’effectiveness.Thisarticleshowsthatintegratingexternalengagementisareality for active corporate governance policies. We set out to answer three questions. Arecompaniesdoingwell at external engagement?Wheremight theybegoingwrong?Howcanthey do better? The answers to these questions result to ethical corporate governancepracticeswhichbenefitbothshareholdershipandstakeholdershipgroupofcorporations.



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