1 15 november 2004 ccsds security architecture 15 th november 2004 toulouse
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115 November 2004CCSDS Security Architecture
CCSDS Security Architecture
15th November 2004
Toulouse
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2 CCSDS Security Architecture
Security Principles
• Open standards based
• No protection by obscurity
• Expandable
• Flexible
• Includes Key Management
• Allows for fault management.
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3 CCSDS Security Architecture
Mission Profiles
• Manned Space
• Weather– LEO
– GEO
• Communications– LEO Constellation
– GEO
• Science– Near Earth/ Earth Orbit
– Lunar
– Deep Space
• Navigation
• Mixed-organisational Vehicles
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4 CCSDS Security Architecture
Communications Scenario
Satellite owned by company A
Instrument owned by Agency B
OBDH
RF
Relay Satellite owned by company B
RF RF
RF
SGSSpacecraft Control Centre
Owned by Agency A
Ground Tracking Network
SLE
Agency B
Instrument Control Centre
SLE
University A
Science FacilityFTP
Owned by Company B
Instrument owned by Agency F
Bus TT&C
Jammingeavesdropping
ReplayUnathorised access
Traffic analysisData Modification
ReplayUnathorised access
Software threatsEavesdropping
DoSData Modification
Jammingeavesdropping
ReplayUnathorised access
Traffic analysisData Modification
DoSeavesdropping
ReplayUnathorised access
Traffic analysisData Modification
DoSeavesdropping
ReplayUnathorised access
Traffic analysisData Modification
ReplayUnathorised access
Software threats
ReplayUnathorised access
Software threatsDoS
ReplayUnathorised accessSoftware threatsDoS
ReplayUnathorised accessSoftware threats
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5 CCSDS Security Architecture
Architecture Requirements
• Systems resulting from the application of the security architecture should be modular.
• The architecture must support layering.
• The core architecture must be inexpensive to build and run.
• Systems resulting from the application of the security architecture must be upgradeable to allow for long lasting missions.
• Systems resulting from the application of the core architecture must make efficient use of available computing and communications resources.
• Architecture must support non-continuous communications links.
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6 CCSDS Security Architecture
Architecture Requirements (Cont.)
• Architecture must support large delays in communication links.
• Architecture must be fault tolerant
• Architecture must allow for intermediate communication nodes - both planned and unplanned.
• Architecture must support mixed security domains onboard a spacecraft or ground facility.
• Architecture must support the use of common infrastructure.
• Architecture must be robust and reliable.
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7 CCSDS Security Architecture
Proposed Architecture
• 3 Types of Security
– Discreet Message – based on PKI concepts, used for CFDP
– Streaming packet – based on SCPS
– Link level – Link level encryption
• All types can work independantly and be layered
• Core algorithms will be mandated
– However extra/new algorthims can be added
• Current decision on whether a null algorithm will be allowed for missions where the overhead is too high.
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8 CCSDS Security Architecture
Key Management
• Pre-Load
– Needs prior planning – inflexible
• Key Agreement
– Very Flexible but takes time before each communication can occur.
• Public Key
– Flexible and efficient
• Identity based Encryption
– Almost limitlessly flexible but very new technology.
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9 CCSDS Security Architecture
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