1 8 ostensive definitions, indexicality, and the first person

31
1 8 8 Ostensive Ostensive Definitions, Definitions, Indexicality, and Indexicality, and the First Person the First Person

Upload: jarod-frain

Post on 14-Dec-2015

239 views

Category:

Documents


2 download

TRANSCRIPT

1

88Ostensive Ostensive

Definitions, Definitions, Indexicality, and Indexicality, and the First Personthe First Person

2

Ostensive definitionsOstensive definitions

Wittgenstein’s examination of ostensive Wittgenstein’s examination of ostensive definitions is inseparable from the definitions is inseparable from the criticisms of his logical atomism and the criticisms of his logical atomism and the rejection of the whole framework of rejection of the whole framework of thought about language within the thought about language within the tradition.tradition.

3

Wittgenstein does not aim to show that Wittgenstein does not aim to show that ostensive definitions are defective by ostensive definitions are defective by comparison with other forms of comparison with other forms of explanations of words.explanations of words.

His purpose is to prove that they are His purpose is to prove that they are not not especially privilegedespecially privileged; in particular, that ; in particular, that they they do not lay the foundations of do not lay the foundations of languagelanguage..

4

Difficulties with ostensive definitionsDifficulties with ostensive definitions

Every ostensive definition is open to Every ostensive definition is open to misinterpretation (e.g. “this bottle” misinterpretation (e.g. “this bottle” meaning either the bottle, the colour, the meaning either the bottle, the colour, the content, the shape, etc.)content, the shape, etc.)

““An ostensive definition can be variously An ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in interpreted in every caseevery case.” (.” (PIPI: # 28): # 28)

5

Paradigmatic cases of ostensive definition Paradigmatic cases of ostensive definition involve involve

(i) a deictic gesture, usually a pointing and (i) a deictic gesture, usually a pointing and

(ii) a verbal formula such as “that is …”, (ii) a verbal formula such as “that is …”, “this is called …”.“this is called …”.

6

ProblemsProblems

What counts as a pointing gesture? What counts as a pointing gesture?

E.g. pointing to a space, a noise, a smell, a E.g. pointing to a space, a noise, a smell, a day, etc.day, etc.

7

What count as something pointed at? What count as something pointed at?

E.g. pointing to an object, to its colour, E.g. pointing to an object, to its colour, shape, weight, pointing to an activity/event shape, weight, pointing to an activity/event (a football match), etc.(a football match), etc.

What counts as an admissible form of What counts as an admissible form of words in an ostensive definition? words in an ostensive definition?

E.g. “This is …”, “this is called …”, “this E.g. “This is …”, “this is called …”, “this colour is …”, “‘read’ means this colour” etc.colour is …”, “‘read’ means this colour” etc.

8

““And what does “pointing to the shape”, pointing And what does “pointing to the shape”, pointing to the colour” consist in? Point to a piece of to the colour” consist in? Point to a piece of paper.—And now point to its shape—now its paper.—And now point to its shape—now its colour—now its number (that sound queer)—How colour—now its number (that sound queer)—How did you do it?” (did you do it?” (PIPI: # 33): # 33)

9

The Normativity of Ostensive The Normativity of Ostensive DefinitionsDefinitions

Ostensive definitions are normative. As Ostensive definitions are normative. As such they ought to be understood as rules. such they ought to be understood as rules. Hence because of their normativity, they do Hence because of their normativity, they do not differ from lexical definitions. not differ from lexical definitions.

E.g. “This is a frog” and “Bachelor are E.g. “This is a frog” and “Bachelor are unmarried men”, guide our linguistic unmarried men”, guide our linguistic behaviour by providing standards of behaviour by providing standards of correctness for applying the expressions correctness for applying the expressions whose meaning they explain. whose meaning they explain.

10

Ostensive definitions are like rulesOstensive definitions are like rules

As such, they:As such, they:

(i) are not descriptive,(i) are not descriptive,

(ii) they can be misinterpreted, (ii) they can be misinterpreted,

(iii) they cannot be viewed, (iii) they cannot be viewed, pacepace the the Augustinian picture, as giving a connection Augustinian picture, as giving a connection between language and reality.between language and reality.

11

These features of ostensive definitions go These features of ostensive definitions go hand in hand with Wittgenstein’s idea that hand in hand with Wittgenstein’s idea that meaning is usemeaning is use. .

For, if an ostensive definition is a For, if an ostensive definition is a rulerule, it , it “tells us” how to proceed, i.e. how to use a “tells us” how to proceed, i.e. how to use a given world.given world.

12

Ostensive definitions are sometimes linked Ostensive definitions are sometimes linked with the with the use of objects asuse of objects as samplessamples. .

E.g. “This is red” may be used to pick out E.g. “This is red” may be used to pick out the object as a sample of the colour red. the object as a sample of the colour red.

Samples, and thus ostensive definitions so Samples, and thus ostensive definitions so used, play a crucial role in Wittgenstein’s used, play a crucial role in Wittgenstein’s account of what it is to follow a rule or account of what it is to follow a rule or order. order.

13

This contributes in undermining the This contributes in undermining the Augustinian picture, for ostensive definitions Augustinian picture, for ostensive definitions linked with the use of objects as sample sets linked with the use of objects as sample sets the standard of use, they do not link the standard of use, they do not link language with reality. language with reality.

An explanation of an expression by An explanation of an expression by reference to a sample does not forge a link reference to a sample does not forge a link between language and reality: the sample between language and reality: the sample itself is best conceived as a sign and hence itself is best conceived as a sign and hence as a part of grammar. As such it has, like a as a part of grammar. As such it has, like a rule, a normative role.rule, a normative role.

14

IndexialityIndexiality

For the traditional, contemporary For the traditional, contemporary treatment of indexicals, see Kaplan 1977, treatment of indexicals, see Kaplan 1977, “Demonstratives”, in Almog et als. eds., “Demonstratives”, in Almog et als. eds., 1989, 1989, Themes from KaplanThemes from Kaplan, Oxford UP, Oxford UP

15

Indexicals qua token-reflexivesIndexicals qua token-reflexives

Reichenbach (1947) characterized Reichenbach (1947) characterized indexicals as indexicals as token reflexive.token reflexive.

As such they can be defined in terms of As such they can be defined in terms of the locution “this token”, where the latter the locution “this token”, where the latter (reflexively) self-refers to the very token (reflexively) self-refers to the very token used. used.

16

Token reflexivesToken reflexives

““I” can be defined in terms of “the person I” can be defined in terms of “the person who utters this token”, “now” in terms of who utters this token”, “now” in terms of “the time at which this token is uttered”, “the time at which this token is uttered”, “this table” in terms of “the table pointed “this table” in terms of “the table pointed by a gesture accompanying this token”, by a gesture accompanying this token”, etc.etc.

17

The content-character distinctionThe content-character distinction

Indexicals and referents; sentences Indexicals and referents; sentences and singular propositionsand singular propositions

The character of an indexical is its The character of an indexical is its linguistic meaning while the content is the linguistic meaning while the content is the referent picked out in a given occasion of referent picked out in a given occasion of use. use.

18

The content of a sentence is the (singular) The content of a sentence is the (singular) proposition expressed. The latter contains proposition expressed. The latter contains the object(s) referred to and the the object(s) referred to and the property(ies) expressed by the linguistic property(ies) expressed by the linguistic elements of the sentence. elements of the sentence.

Singular propositions are structured Singular propositions are structured entities reflecting the structure of the entities reflecting the structure of the sentence expressing them.sentence expressing them.

19

CharacterCharacter

It can be represented by a function from It can be represented by a function from context to content, i.e. the character context to content, i.e. the character quaqua meaning takes as argument the context of meaning takes as argument the context of utterance and gives as value the contentutterance and gives as value the content

ContextualContextual parametersparameters

agent, time, place, possible world. They agent, time, place, possible world. They are technical notions. As we’ll see the are technical notions. As we’ll see the agent may not be, pace Kaplan (1977), the agent may not be, pace Kaplan (1977), the speaker (e.g.: answering machines).speaker (e.g.: answering machines).

20

Pure indexicals vs. demonstrativesPure indexicals vs. demonstratives

The meaning of a demonstrative (“this”, The meaning of a demonstrative (“this”, “that”, ...), unlike the character of a pure “that”, ...), unlike the character of a pure indexical (“I”, “now”, “today”, “here”, …), indexical (“I”, “now”, “today”, “here”, …), is incomplete and must be completed by a is incomplete and must be completed by a demonstration. The content is the object demonstration. The content is the object demonstrated.demonstrated.

21

The cognitive significance problemThe cognitive significance problem

The character gives us the cognitive The character gives us the cognitive significance while the content (proposition) significance while the content (proposition) gives us the truth value. gives us the truth value.

Unlike Fregean thoughts which give us both. Unlike Fregean thoughts which give us both.

Kaplan claims that the character Kaplan claims that the character isis the the cognitive significance, but we can be more cognitive significance, but we can be more cautious and say that the character helps cautious and say that the character helps classifying the cognitive significance.classifying the cognitive significance.

22

On the basis of these distinctions and On the basis of these distinctions and clarifications we can appreciate clarifications we can appreciate Wittgenstein’s discussion of the first Wittgenstein’s discussion of the first person.person.

Wittgenstein distinguishes between the Wittgenstein distinguishes between the use of ‘I’ as subject and the use of ‘I’ as use of ‘I’ as subject and the use of ‘I’ as object.object.

23

The First PersonThe First Person

The point on which he [Wittgenstein] seemed The point on which he [Wittgenstein] seemed most anxious to insists was that we shall call most anxious to insists was that we shall call ‘having toothache’ is what he called ‘a private ‘having toothache’ is what he called ‘a private experience […]’; and he said that “what experience […]’; and he said that “what characterises ‘primary experience’ is that in this characterises ‘primary experience’ is that in this case, ‘I’ does not denote a possessor.” […] He case, ‘I’ does not denote a possessor.” […] He said that ‘Just as no (physical) eye is involved in said that ‘Just as no (physical) eye is involved in seeing, no Ego is involved in thinking or having seeing, no Ego is involved in thinking or having toothache’; and he quoted, with apparent toothache’; and he quoted, with apparent approval, Lichtenberg’s saying, “Instead of ‘I approval, Lichtenberg’s saying, “Instead of ‘I think’ we ought to say ‘It thinks’ (Moore 1959: think’ we ought to say ‘It thinks’ (Moore 1959: 302-3).302-3).

24

Anscombe’s argumentAnscombe’s argument

Anscombe argues that “I” is not, contrary to Anscombe argues that “I” is not, contrary to appearances, a referential expression. Her appearances, a referential expression. Her argument is a argument is a reductionreduction::

A1.A1. “I” is a referential term. “I” is a referential term.

A2.A2. A referential term refers A referential term refers viavia the the mediation of a Fregean sense or mode of mediation of a Fregean sense or mode of presentation.presentation.

25

Acceptance of A1 commits us toAcceptance of A1 commits us to

A3A3 “I” has a referent.“I” has a referent.

A4A4 “I” is either a name or a demonstrative.“I” is either a name or a demonstrative.

From A4 and A3 Anscombe goes on to infer From A4 and A3 Anscombe goes on to infer

A5A5 The referent of “I” is an object or body.The referent of “I” is an object or body.

26

From A5 and A2, we getFrom A5 and A2, we get

A6A6 “I” is associated with an egocentric “I” is associated with an egocentric and unsharable mode of presentation.and unsharable mode of presentation.

27

The use of a name for an object is connected with The use of a name for an object is connected with a conception of that object. And so we are driven a conception of that object. And so we are driven to look for something that, for each ‘I’-user, will to look for something that, for each ‘I’-user, will be the conception related to the supposed name be the conception related to the supposed name ‘I’, as the conception of a city is to the names ‘I’, as the conception of a city is to the names ‘London’ and ‘Chicago’, that of a river to ‘Thames’ ‘London’ and ‘Chicago’, that of a river to ‘Thames’ and ‘Nile’, that of a man to ‘John’ and ‘Pat’. Such and ‘Nile’, that of a man to ‘John’ and ‘Pat’. Such a conception is requisite if ‘I’ is a name, and there a conception is requisite if ‘I’ is a name, and there is no conception that can claim to do the job is no conception that can claim to do the job except one suggested by ‘self-consciousness’ except one suggested by ‘self-consciousness’ (Anscombe 1975: 141).(Anscombe 1975: 141).

28

For, from A4 we can also infer,For, from A4 we can also infer,

A7A7 “I” can be an empty term.“I” can be an empty term.

““I”, though, never misses the referent. I”, though, never misses the referent.

We cannot imagine a situation when We cannot imagine a situation when someone using the first person pronoun someone using the first person pronoun does not pick out herself as the referent.does not pick out herself as the referent.

29

Just thinking ‘I …’ guarantees not only the Just thinking ‘I …’ guarantees not only the existence but the presence of its referent. It existence but the presence of its referent. It guarantees the existence because it guarantees guarantees the existence because it guarantees the presence, which is presence to the presence, which is presence to consciousness. But note that here ‘presence to consciousness. But note that here ‘presence to consciousness’ means physical or real presence, consciousness’ means physical or real presence, not just that one is thinking of the thing. For if the not just that one is thinking of the thing. For if the thing did not guarantee the presence, the thing did not guarantee the presence, the existence of the referent cannot be doubted. For existence of the referent cannot be doubted. For the same reason, if ‘I’ is a name it cannot be an the same reason, if ‘I’ is a name it cannot be an empty name. I’s existence is existence in the empty name. I’s existence is existence in the thinking of the thought expressed by ‘I …’ thinking of the thought expressed by ‘I …’ (Anscombe 1975: 143-4).(Anscombe 1975: 143-4).

30

Since names and demonstratives can be Since names and demonstratives can be empty terms we can infer:empty terms we can infer:

A8A8 “I” is neither a name, nor a “I” is neither a name, nor a demonstrative.demonstrative.

A8 contradicts A4. A8 contradicts A4.

So, by So, by reductioreductio, Anscombe rejects A1 and , Anscombe rejects A1 and claims that “I” is not a referring expressionclaims that “I” is not a referring expression

31

See Anscombe’s classical paper “The First See Anscombe’s classical paper “The First Person”, Person”, in: P. Yourgrau (ed.) (1990), in: P. Yourgrau (ed.) (1990), DemonstrativesDemonstratives, Oxford: Oxford UP, 135-, Oxford: Oxford UP, 135-153153

For a critique of Anscombe’s discussion, For a critique of Anscombe’s discussion, see Corazza, “Understanding ‘I’: A see Corazza, “Understanding ‘I’: A Wittgensteinian Perspective”, Wittgensteinian Perspective”, Wittgenstein Wittgenstein StudiesStudies, 2001, No. 2, 23-33, 2001, No. 2, 23-33