1 an expanding trade agenda of the eu and possible implications for turkey’s trade policy, with...
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An expanding trade agenda of the EU and possible implications for Turkey’s trade policy, with special reference to free trade agreements
Dr. M. Sait AKMANMarmara University EU Institute and TEPAV
14 - 15 May 2010, Istanbul
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Outline
Changing nature of EU trade policy (Global Europe strategy)
Turkey’s alignment with the EU’s preferential trade regime
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) impact on Turkey?
Which criteria for a sustainable relationship between TR-EU in FTA issue
What to do in FTA issue?
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Changing nature of EU trade policy
(Global Europe strategy)
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EU Trade Strategy: Global Europe
Lisbon Strategy (2000) to make the EU the most competitive economy in the world (EU growth and job strategy) with a mid-term review in 2005.
Complement Lisbon agenda by introducing an external dimension: Global Europe Strategy (2006) a trade policy complying with the objectives of growth and
employment. a trade policy adopted to the changing global context
Emergence of new powers Fragmented and globalised production process Need for innovation and R&D
Europe 2020 Strategy (2010) (for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth); and its new trade strategy for EU2020, to assess implementation and explore new directions based on priorities announced and considering recent economic and trade policy developments such as the global crisis.
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Key facts on EU tradeKey facts on EU tradeEEU exports:U exports:
EU (27) is the leading exporter (16.2% in goods in 2009)EU (27) is the leading exporter (16.2% in goods in 2009) Over 2/3rds EU exports are Over 2/3rds EU exports are intra-EUintra-EU (of which 90% is among (of which 90% is among
EU15) EU15) North America and Asia are the EU27’s main markets outside North America and Asia are the EU27’s main markets outside
Europe, each accounts less than 1/10Europe, each accounts less than 1/10thth EU exports. EU exports. Africa, Latin America and the Middle East Africa, Latin America and the Middle East have marginal shareshave marginal shares
EU imports:EU imports: EU (27) is the leading importer (17.4% in goods in 2009)EU (27) is the leading importer (17.4% in goods in 2009) The pattern on the import side is very similar to the export sideThe pattern on the import side is very similar to the export side Main difference is trade deficit with Asia (12% imports vs. 7% Main difference is trade deficit with Asia (12% imports vs. 7%
exports)exports) EU average tariff is low (average EU average tariff is low (average bound ratebound rate is about 3.5%) is about 3.5%)
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Market share in value terms (1995-2005)
source: BACI and CEPII, see E. Commission Global Europe
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EU trade deficit rises EU trade deficit rises since 1995since 1995
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EU tariffs are low in EU tariffs are low in manufacturing goodsmanufacturing goods
197676
2671
150114
75192
101210
101010121414
2317
2212
0 50 100 150 200 250
Cut flowers and plantsOther agricultural products
Oil seeds, fats, oils and their productsFish and fishery products
Beverages and spiritsFruit and vegetables
Coffee and tea, cocoa, sugar, etc.Tobacco
Live animals and products thereofGrains
Dairy products
Wood, pulp, paper and furnitureNon-electric machinery
MetalsMineral products, precious stones
Non-agricultural articles n.e.s.Electric machinery
Chemicals and photographic suppliesLeather, rubber, shoes & travel gds
Transport equipmentTextiles and clothing
Average
High
Source: WTO’s Trade Policy Review, EU 2007
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EU exports are destined to less dynamic EU exports are destined to less dynamic markets compared to the US and JAPmarkets compared to the US and JAP
EU has to export to more ‘dynamic markets’EU has to export to more ‘dynamic markets’
% of total % of total exportsexports going to the going to the most/least dynamic marketsmost/least dynamic markets
Contribution Contribution to the rise of to the rise of
world world imports over imports over
a ten year a ten year periodperiod
USUS JapanJapan EU25EU2567.6%67.6%
0.7%0.7%
On On 10 most10 most dynamicdynamic markets markets
78%78% 76%76% 46.9%46.9%
On On 20 least 20 least dynamicdynamic markets markets
1.8%1.8% 3.3%3.3% 5.3%5.3%
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EU is competitive in up-EU is competitive in up-market goodsmarket goods EU EU investment in high-quality goodsinvestment in high-quality goods is key to is key to
growth and jobsgrowth and jobs Intellectual property protectionIntellectual property protection is important for EU firms is important for EU firms
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EU high-tech product EU high-tech product exports lose share in totalexports lose share in total
World Market Sharefor High-Tech Products
(2005)
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
EU Japan US China
All products
High-Tech products
Innovation and high-tech goods are essential for Innovation and high-tech goods are essential for EU competitivenessEU competitiveness
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EU performs well in EU performs well in services exportsservices exports
EU needs liberalisation in ‘trade in services’EU needs liberalisation in ‘trade in services’
World Market Sharein Commercial Services
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
EU US Japan China
2001
2007
131313
Asian share is high in EU Asian share is high in EU importsimports
EU needs to export more to Asian markets: EU needs to export more to Asian markets: (Korea, India, ASEAN...) (Korea, India, ASEAN...)
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EU needs a deeper agenda (WTO +)
1. Insufficient market access: services
2. Insufficient protection of EU interests: Intellectual property (TRIPS); Investment (TRIM); technical barriers (TBT)
3. Need for new multilateral regulations (competition): Competition; govn. procurement;
4. Need for new multilateral regulations (market failures): environment; labour standards
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WTO+ topics in selected EU FTAs source:
Source: Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir (2009)
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EU policy change towards regionalismLamy argued, in his Trade Policy Assessment document that:
“our arguments in favour of a better regulated multilateral world have been less effective. Indeed, arguably as a result, trade policy or the WTO has too often been the sole focus for efforts to strengthen international governance, which risks weakening its legitimacy both internally within the Union, and in the outside world. I don’t believe the WTO can or should remain the sole island of governance in a sea of unregulated globalization.”
(European Commission, 2004, p. 5)
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Different terms, similar objective, varying pathsDifferent terms, similar objective, varying paths
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Terms EU document
WTO event aims /emphasis
hot topics Path
Santer-Brittan1995-1999
1996 communic.
1996 Singapore
Market access (non-reciprocal)
NTBsNew Rules
Singapor issuesBuilt-in agenda
WTOWTO+
Prodi-Lamy1999-2004
Lisbon Strategy
Seattle Summit ‘99
Doha R. ’01Cancun ’03July 2004
Market opening is not enough but
right internal policies
Business supportSocietal needs
Built-in
Development
WTOWTO+
RTAs
2004-2009Barrosso-MandelsonBarrosso-Ashton ‘08
2006 Global Europe
ReviewLisbon
Hong Kong 2005
2006 Doha suspended
Market access (reciprocal)New Rules
Jobs and growth
Investm.IPR
Gov.Pro.RTAs
RTAs
WTO
2010-Barrosso II-de Gucht
EU 2020Trade
strategy for EU 2020
-Assess progress in Global Europe-Sustainable and inclusive growth-Global crisis eff.
high-tech‘green’ g.ServicesRaw mat.Climate c.
RTAs
WTO
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Turkey’s alignment with EU’s preferential trade
regime
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Article 16 of Association Council Decision No 1/95:
“With a view to harmonizing its commercial policy with that of the Community, Turkey shall align itself progressively with the preferential customs regime of the Community within five years as from the date of entry into force of this Decision. This alignment will concern both the autonomous regimes and preferential agreements with third countries. To this end, Turkey will take the necessary measures and negotiate agreements on mutually advantageous basis with the countries concerned. The Association Council shall periodically review the progress made.”
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FTAs Turkey had concluded:Turkey has completed 26 Free Trade Area
agreements in conformity with the EU’s FTAs:
10 of these lapsed due to the accession of these countries in the EU (Poland, Hungary, Czech Rep., Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania)
13 of the FTAs are in force (EFTA, Israel, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia-H, Palestine, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, Egypt, Albania, Georgia, Montonegro)
3 are waiting for ratificiation of the Parliament (Serbia, Chile, Jordan)
‘In all of these agreements, Turkey already achieved the concessions which the EU had secured previously in FTAs with the said countries’
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Current State of the EU and Turkish FTAsEU’s Free Trade Agreements (in force and in the pipeline) Status of Turkey’s FTA
EFTA In force (1992)Israel In force (1997)FYROM -Macedonia In force (2000)Croatia In force (2003)Bosnia and Herzegovina In force (2003)Palestine In force (2005)Tunisia In force (2005)Morocco In force (2006)Syria In force (2007)Egypt In force (2007)Albania In force (2008)Chile Agreement signed in 2010Montenegro Agreement Signed in 2008Serbia Agreement Signed in 2009South Africa Exploratory talksJordan Agreement Signed in 2009Mauritius NegotiatingLebanon NegotiatingFaroe Islands NegotiatingMexico Attempted to negotiateAlgeria Attempted to negotiateSouth Korea Negotiations to start in April 2010Ukraine Exploratory talksIndia Negotiations startedGulfCooperationCouncil NegotiatingMERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay,Uruguay) NegotiatingACP (Africa, Carribean and Pacific) Attempted to negotiate Central America Attempted to negotiateANDEAN (Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador)(Talks with Colombia and Peru are finalized) Attempted to negotiateASEAN (South East Asia) Attempted to negotiateLibya Negotiating
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Turkey’s trade with the FTA partners (as a % of its total trade, 2008)
TR import from.. TR Exports to.. TR trade with
EFTA 3.10 2.50 2.90Israel 0.70 1.50 1.00FYROM -Macedonia >.10 0.20 >.10Croatia >.10 0.30 0.10Bosnia and Herz. >.10 0.40 0.20Palestine >.10 >.10 >.10 Tunisia 0.20 0.60 0.30Morocco 0.20 0.70 0.40Syria 0.30 0.80 0.50Egypt 0.50 1.10 0.70Albania >.10 0.20 >.10Georgia 0.30 0.80 0.50Montenegro >.10 >.10 >.10 Chile 0.20 >.10 0.10Serbia >.10 >.10 >.10 Jordan >.10 0.30 0.10
TOTAL (appr.) 6.0 9.70 7.0
MEXICO 0.20 >.10 0.20S. KOREA 2.00 0.20 1.30LEBANON >.10 0.50 0.30ALGERIA 1.60 1.20 1.50S. AFRICA 0.80 0.90 0.80
TOTAL -potential FTAs (appr.) 4.65 2.90 4.10
SUB-TOTAL (appr.) 10.65 12.60 11.10
Source: IMF (DoTS), 2008
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Turkey’s preferential trade (as a % of its total trade, 2008)
TR imports from
TR exports
to
TR trade
with
EU 37.4 48.3 41.7
16 FTA partners (appr.)
6.0 9.7 7.0
Total 43.4 58.0 48.7
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The impact of EU Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
on Turkey: Main arguments
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EU’s FTA strategy: What impact on Turkey?
1. Preference erosion for Turkey in the EU market:
Turkey loses its share in EU markets as other partners of the EU secured improved access by means of FTAs. Being Turkey’s most stable and largest export market, the EU’s preferential advantage under the CU is decreasing.
- This argument is not convincing against the EU, as the latter can legitimately claim that it has freedom to regulate its bilateral trade relations with third countries;
- nor it is economically rationale from the vintage of competitiveness and free trade
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EU’s FTA strategy: What impact on Turkey?
2. FTA partners of the EU have the opportunity to have an easier access to Turkish market:
FTAs with the EU allow them a tariff- free (circumvention) access to Turkey, of FTA partners’ goods, once entering into free circulation within the EU.
This will be more visible in indirect imports from more competitive countries like S. Korea, India and ASEAN whose exports may hit several labour and capital intensive sectors.
- This argument is correct, but it depends on the potential volume of trade that can be deflected into Turkey via the EU.
- the argument must also consider that this is a result of ‘competitiveness problem’ and Turkey must develop an ‘adjustment strategy’.
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EU’s FTA strategy: What impact on Turkey?3. FTA partners do not have the obligation to
negotiate with Turkey an FTA despite ‘Turkey clause’:
These countries with which the EU has FTAs do not reciprocate because Turkish goods cannot have preferential access in their markets via the EU
- To counter this argument the EU has added ‘Turkey clause’ in its FTAs.
- In practice, Turkey had concluded FTAs with several of these countries, or started negotiations recently like Korea and India. But, not effective in the cases of Mexico or S. Africa).
- The argument is more convincing if formulated as such:
Reluctant behaviour by third countries cause substantial delay, and disadvantages to Turkey. This must be compensated.
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EU’s FTA strategy: What impact on Turkey?4. Asymmetry effect in trade agreements:
A. Turkey is not as forceful as the EU in negotiations
- This argument can be invalidated as Turkey already secured many concessions in its first-generation FTAs, that the EU had obtained.
- However, this may be more challenging issue in second-generation FTAs
B. liberalisation is asymmetrical in FTAs at Turkey’s expense.
- Turkey abolished tariffs upon entry into force of the Agreement, while has to wait for progressive dismantling from partners. (Morocco 9 years, Tunisia 9 years, Egypt until 2020 in List 4, Syria 12 years).
- However, limited competitiveness of these countries’ industries, this helped Turkey to persuade them conclude FTAs. In the case of Jordan, for example, the non-simultaneous reductions in tariff schedules were included in the Preamble!
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EU’s FTA strategy: What impact on Turkey?
5. Turkey enters in FTA markets later than the EU (the latecomer effect):
Turkey has to follow the EU to make FTAs, sometimes a couple of years later, hence putting Turkish exporters into a disadvantageous position with regards to EU exporters who has a preferential status in third country markets much before.
- This is a convincing argument, as the EU does not allow Turkey to negotiate jointly, or ask for its partner to continue parallel negotiations with Turkey. This argument is commercially sensible in markets where the EU and Turkish exporters have rivalry (e.g. Lebanon, Jordan...)
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EU’s FTA strategy: What impact on Turkey?
6. Tariff-revenue loss for Turkey:
Circumvention of exports not directly from third countries, but by way of trade deflection via the EU, induce a tariff-revenue loss for Turkey
- This argument has a ground, but especially in sectors with tariff peaks and for imports originating from countries that constitute a significant share in Turkish market.
- In 2008, the largest-share country in Turkish imports (that has an FTA with the EU) was Algeria (1.6%). TUR mainly imports energy goods with low tariffs.
- If the aim is no circumvention, and import via the EU is not especially destined to Turkish market → The side that has the right to collect the customs revenue will be the EU anyway, but not Turkey
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EU’s FTA strategy: What impact on Turkey?7. Preferential agreements shift attention away from
the Doha Round and multilateral WTO rules:
“Turkey's FTAs makes its trade regime complex and difficult to manage. Future trade agreements could further complicate the trading environment creating a web of incoherent rules and detract from multilateral efforts, given the limited resources available” Turkey TPRM Report (WTO, 2003: 17).
- This is a forceful argument. The regional agreements are only second-best and can only be accepted if they do not undermine the WTO and Doha Round.
- Turkey may have disadvantages in liberalising trade by means of FTAs, rather than the WTO.
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Tariffs before and after NAMA
Calculation by UFT Economic Research Section based on the formulas and coefficients suggested in the latest Draft on NAMA Modalities (4th Rev.) where the coefficients are assumed to be 8 and 25 for the developed and the developing countries respectively where the formula is (i.e. t1= [a or (x,y or z)]*t0 / [a or (x,y,or z)]+t0 )
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EU’s FTA strategy: What impact on Turkey?
8. Turkey cannot have its own FTAs independently of the EU:
Turkey cannot negotiate preferential agreements and has to refrain from negotiating with third countries with which the EU has not accorded yet
- Legally, this argument is open to challenge.
- Is there any specific country with which Turkey desires a preferential link, but cannot make due to EU opposition!
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EU’s FTA strategy: What impact on Turkey?
9. EU priorities do not match Turkish trade strategy:
EU has its own priorities and normative concerns to reflect in FTAs without taking into account Turkey’s priorities
- This is a major argument when one considers that Global Europe strategy is more keen on preserving the interests of European multinationals in third country markets, especially concerning investments, non-tariff barriers, intellectual property rights, competition rules and government procurement as well as other regulatory areas such as environmental and labour standards.
- The negotiations do not necessarily reflect Turkish inerests and, nor they may match priority areas in Turkish strategy.
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Criteria for a sustainable relationship between TR-
EU in FTA issue
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Customs Union Decision 1/95Turkey has aligned its trade policy to EU’s past
trade policy arrangements
Turkey also pledged to align its policy to EU’s future trade strategy
The future shape of EU’s trade strategy depends on several unforseen developments. Thus, Turkey currently is, and in the future will be exposed to any change and shifts in EU trade strategy. But TR cannot participate in decision-making of EU directly. Therefore, it seems that the current state of affairs will only be acceptable in Turkey, if at least some of the following criteria are satisfied:
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Certainty criterium 1. If the EU trade strategy is sufficiently
clear, transparent and foreseeable for Turkey amidst global challenges and developments:
Turkey has the disadvantages because it has little possibility to predict the next EU step. The uncertainty can only be mitigated if Turkey is allowed to participate in decision making, or it is sufficiently consulted and informed by the EU.
But consultation mechanism does not work properly and Turkey’s access to detailed information has limitations
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Compatibility criterium
2. If the EU trade strategy matches Turkey’s trade policy priorities
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EU and Turkish Trade Strategies: Are they compatible?
Priority topics EU Global Europe Strategy Turkish Export Strategy Plan
Market Access:
High-tech goods
Services
‘ensuring greater openness in other markets’...
Innovation and high-tech goods; investment in high-quality goods
Essential for EU market strategy
‘export structure conducive towards sustainable export increase’
High-quality products
Services are considered
Access to input markets EU access to resources and cheap global sourcing in third country markets
Provide exporters with inputs at internationally competitive prices via domestic resources
WTO + issues Deeper trade agenda to include competition, TRIPs, investment, regulatory standards and govn. proc.
No specific emphasis on a deeper agenda (except the inclusion of services and investment in part.)
Priority markets Korea, India, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, ANDEAN, Canada...
Neighbouring and surrounding countries essentially
Negotiation forum Preferential trade (FTAs…) and bilateral relations have priority
Preferential trade (due to the ‘EU effect’ - Art. 16 of CU Decision)
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WTO criterium3. If the EU is committed to, and a firm defender of
the WTO, and if multilateral negotiations have the primacy in EU trade strategy
The EU gives only a ‘lip service’ to the completion of Doha Round and the WTO as a forum for trade negotiations.
Furthermore, ‘many FTAs have adverse effects on the multilateral trading system’ (EU Trade Study Group Report, ECIPE 2010)
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Hegemony/leadership criterium
4. If the EU is a ‘normative hegemon’ which has the ability to urge Turkey (and almost all of its spokes) to behave in harmony with the rules and norms it sets out.
However, the EU’s normative and hegemonic role to provide stability in the world trading system is problematic
see next page
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Does Global Europe Does Global Europe strategy make the EU a strategy make the EU a ‘‘normative powernormative power’? (1)’? (1)
1.1. The EU is not an angel itself:The EU is not an angel itself: Protectionism in CAPProtectionism in CAP Trade defense instruments (i.e. anti-dumping..)Trade defense instruments (i.e. anti-dumping..) Standards protectionism!Standards protectionism!
2.2. Enlarged EU dilutes single entity in external Enlarged EU dilutes single entity in external action: action: not all MS are interested in market not all MS are interested in market opening abroad for FDI, services etc.opening abroad for FDI, services etc.
3.3. ‘‘behind-the-border’ issues and globalisation behind-the-border’ issues and globalisation process makes trade policy politically process makes trade policy politically contentious: contentious: not only between the EU- third c., but not only between the EU- third c., but domestic divison on Singapore issuesdomestic divison on Singapore issues
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Does Global Europe Does Global Europe strategy make the EU a strategy make the EU a ‘‘normative powernormative power’? (2)’? (2)
4. EU competence on many trade-related matters is weak: That puts the E. Commission in difficulty in external negotiations in new areas (energy, investment, services (partly), environment, social clause...)
5. Export of European social and regulatory model (European norms, values, domestic rules...) is in many cases confronted with the WTO jurisdiction: DS rulings against the EU measures)
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Compensation criterium5. If Turkey’s perceived loss is
compensated to satisfy Turkey under institutional, procedural and/or financial mechanisms; or if the customs union is extended to areas where Turkey can obtain extra benefits
services agriculture
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AgricultureOnly ‘processed agricultural products’ are included in CU
regime;
Expansion of Customs Union regime to agricultural goods would lead to noticeable increase of Turkish agricultural exports into the EU market (by 14% in vegetables; 12.5% in fruits; 38.5% in processed agr.) (Lehmann et.al. 2007); see also Eruygur and Çakmak (2005).
Cost of Turkey’s adoption of the CAP must be considered
Turkey’s position in Doha Round diverges as it supports G-33 and developing c. position in sensitive goods and SSM; and G-20 and Cairns group position on domestic subsidies.
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Accession negotiations criterium6. If the accession process goes smoothly:
But remember the difficulties in opening chapters;
8 chapters are suspended (although they are concerned with trade issues) due to Cyprus issue.
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Political belief criterium
7. If the EU accession process continues to be politically a prevailing idea in Turkish public (or at least in the policy-making circles) despite all uncertainties.
It is visible that this has lost ground among several circles/elites in Turkey which once adhered to EU’s anchoring role or its ‘conditionality’, but became disappointed due to ‘open-endedness’ of the accession process.
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‘Turkey now stands between the CU that cannot be rolled back and the full membership that is not conceivable in a foreseeable future’
My intention here is not to frame a pessimistic scenario; but to make a concise analysis of the current case of TR-EU relations, considering the global and domestic factors that may cause a convergency between Turkish and EU trade strategies.
It should also be noted that it is not clear even for the EU itself;- how its internal reshuffling affects its external action and its global role
- how the new Lisbon Treaty will shift the power among domestic actors (e.g. institutions and others)
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What to do in FTA issue?
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What to do in FTAs issue? (1)
INSTITUTIONALLY:
1. A Free Trade Agreement Study Group under the CU Joint Committee to be established in order to discuss technically challenging issues.
This may help Turkey to recieve regular and comprehensive information about EU’s FTA negotiations.
Turkey already offered a trade policy study group and E. Commission welcomed the idea.
2. An informal sub-committee under Article 133 Committee (under the initiative of trio Presidency) where TR business community and NGOs can express their concern on EU trade agreements.
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What to do in FTAs issue? (2)
TURKEY TO REMIND THE EU:
3. to apply key economic criteria → ‘while making FTAs the EU should consider risk that preferential access to EU markets currently enjoyed by our neighbouring and DC partners may be erodod’.
This criterium is not instrumentalised (for TR). EU must consider the likely impact on Turkey of its FTAs strategy by adding Turkey into its impact analysis.
4. EU should not ask for concrete examples of injury in TR industries as a result of its FTAs, as injury from FTAs can be hypothetical now but more physical in the future.
5. EU not to ratify its FTA until the third country starts negotiations with Turkey
This idea was not welcomed by the EU at all.
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What to do in FTAs issue? (3)
COUNTER MEASURE AS A COMPENSATION:
6. Article 58(2) of the Decision 1/95 should be applicable: If discrepancies between Community and Turkish
legislation or differences in their implementation in an area of direct relevance to the functioning of the Customs Union, cause of threaten to cause impairment of the free movement of goods or deflections of trade and the affected Party considers that immediate action is required, it may itself take the necessary protection measures...
Article XXIV ad. Para. 9 of GATT can be applicable.
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What to do in FTAs issue? (4)
MULTILATERAL (OUTSIDE THE BILATERAL):
7 TR must insist on the multilateral path and completion of Doha (most EU FTA partners will be unwilling on Doha if they achieve preferential access in EU and US markets).
8 Use dispute settlement mechanism if the EU FTAs harm Turkey’s rights deriving from the WTO rules and agreements
It is not practical nor friendly among Customs Union partners, and considering Turkey’s accession process.
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Round’, paper presented in 3rd ECPR Pan-European Conference, Istanbul, 2006. Checkel, J. (2000), Compliance and Conditionality, ARENA Working Papers WP 00/18, Oslo. ECIPE (2010), A Modern Trade Policy for then EU: A Report to the New European Commission and Parliament from the EU Trade PolicyStudy Group. ECIPE Publication. Eruygur, O. and E. Çakmak (2005), ‘Trade Implications of Extending the Turkey-EU Customs Union Agreement to Agricultural
Products, Munich Personal RePEc Archive, MPRA Paper no. 12438. Evenett, S. (2007) ‘The Trade Strategy of the European Union: Time for a Rethink?’ Discussion Paper 2007-14, Un. St. Gallen. Evenett, S. (2007), ‘Trade Policy: Time for a Rethink’, in A. Sapir (ed.) Fragmented Power: Europe and the Global Economy, Bruegel
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Thank you!
Dr. M. Sait AKMANMarmara University and TEPAV
Tel. +90 312 292 55 05Fax. +90 312 292 55 55