1 critical mass governance: reforming environmental multilateralism to fit the new world order luke...
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Critical Mass Governance: Reforming Environmental Multilateralism to Fit the New World Order
Luke Kemp, PhD Candidate
Panel:Prof. Janette Lindesay (Panel Chair)Dr. Karen HusseyDr. Rob Dyball
The Failings of Multilateralism
• A lack of leadership.
• A lack of ‘fit’.
• What happened to the ‘Global Deal’?
• A tale of two protocols….
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United we Stand, Divided we Stall
• The US Ratification Straitjacket.
• Directional Leadership.
• A world without a Hegemon.
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A Multipolar World
• Rise of the BRICs.
• A change in norms and rules.
• A shift to consensus.
• Specific reciprocity and ‘the global package’.
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The Alternatives
• Retreat to the Region!
• Muddle through with Multilateralism.
• Minilateralism: “an idea whose time has come”(Dryzek 2012)
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Research Questions
1. How can the issue of US ratification and/or participation be effectively addressed within an effective international architecture for environmental governance?
2. How can effective environmental governance without the United States (or other recalcitrant states) be enabled though; major international institutions, decision making processes, and an operational legal treaty.
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Thesis Structure
• Introduction.
• Article 1- Realpolitik and reform (UNEP).
• Article 2- Voting in the UNFCCC.
• Article 3- Weighted voting in MEAs.
• Article 4- A 2015 Agreement Without the US
• Conclusion
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Methods
• Participant observation (Rio+20, COP18, COP19 and numerous others).
• Interviewees with key, informed stakeholders.
• Literature review.
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Methodolgoy
• Systems thinking- influence diagrams.
• Political feasibility- output legitimacy.
• Scenario building.
• Hegemonic projects (Elkers et al 2009).
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Realpolitik and Reform
• The Debate over a World Environment Organisation (WEO).
• Function- to implement or not to implement?
• Form- Whither the WEO?
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POSITIVE PERCEPTION OFUNEP'S EFFICACY
LEVEL OFFINANCING
LEVEL OFAUTHORITY
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LEVEL OF UNEPSUCCESS IN
OPERATIONS +
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WILLINGNESS TOCHANGE UNEP'S
FORM
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US WILLINGNESS TORATIFY
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNALMANAGEMENT AND POLICY
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FinancialFeedback
AuthorityFeedback
The UNEP Conundrum: Failure to the Failures
Scenarios for UNEP after Rio
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• Incremental upgrade (and hope).
• UNEP Unknown
• A Critical Mass WEO
• A Critical Mass WSDO
Framework for the Future
• Consensus, rule-beating and failure.
• Voting as a consensus-builder.
• Is globalism necessary?
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Implementing Voting
• Blockers and pushers.
• To amend or not to amend?
• Adopt the Rules of Procedure?
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Institutional Dimensions
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LEVEL OF POLITICALFAILURES FROM
CONSENSUS
LEVEL OF PATHDEPENDENCY
LEVEL OFPOLITICALPRESSURE
USE AND/OR DISMISSALOF VETO RIGHTS
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DESIRE FOR CHANGE IN UNFCCCDECISION MAKING
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FAMILIARITY OFALTERNATIVES
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LEVEL OFINSTITUTIONAL
MEMORY
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LEVEL OF INFORMATION ABOUTDECISION MAKING
ALTERNATIVES
USE OF VOTING INRELATED BODIES
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LIKELIHOOD OFINSTITUTIONAL
LEARNING
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2015 Feedback
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FamiliarityFeedback
DISMISSAL OF VETO RIGHTS(OCCURRENCE OF RULE
BEATING)
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Scenarios for Decision Making Change
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AMENDMENTS TO THECONVENTION
ADOPTION OF RULES OFPROCEDURE
3/4 MAJORITY VOTE
CONSENSUS
NON-UNIVERSALRATIFICATION
UNIVERSAL RATIFICATION
DUAL INSTITUTIONS
MAJORITYVOTING
ALTERNATIVE A OFDRAFT RULE 42.1
ALTERNATIVE B(CONSENSUS) OFDRAFT RULE 42.1
LAYERED VOTING
DOUBLE QUALIFIEDMAJORITY VOTING
PANDORA'SBOX FEARS
INTERESTS OF THEPOWERFUL
COMPLEXITY OFNEGOTIATING
PROCESS
LEVEL OF DEBATE OVERANNEX SYSTEM
LIKELINESS OF BLOCKSOCCURRING
COMMON BUTDIFFERENTIATED VOTING
LEVEL OFFAMILIARITY
PERCEPTION OFPOLITICAL
FLEXIBILITY
LEVEL OF CONCERNOVER FINANCIAL
MATTERS
Consensus as a Fix that Fails
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LEVEL OF AGREEMENTUSE OF INTERLINKED
CONSENSUS DECISIONMAKING
LEVEL OFGEOPOLITICAL
DIVISIONS
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R
B
Giving Environmental Negotiations Weight• The alternatives to multilateralism:
- Regionalism isn’t ready.
- ‘Minilateralism’= a false interpretation.
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Common but Differentiated Voting
• Mitigation and Population and vulnerability.
• Leadership, democracy and legitimacy.
• A contagion for MEAs?
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Common but Differentiated Voting
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Blocs Weighted Vote
EU 25.298%
The Umbrella Group 9.467%
AOSIS 1.979%
BASIC 20.678%
EIG 2.817%
LDCs 16.562%
AILAC 0.859%
ALBA 0.698%
G-77 49.052%
With or Without (the) US
• US participation: the elephant in the plenary.
• Treaties and executive agreements.
• Options for:- Ratification.- Non-ratification.
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A Toolbox for Paris
• Pledge and review?
• Measures against non-parties
- Penalties.
- Incentives.
• From the bottom-up?
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A Critical Mass Movement
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THE CORE- Pledges- Review Process-Financing-Adaptation-Consensual-Legally Binding?
Opt-Out Protocols
REDD+
Market Based Mechanisms
Loss and Damages
Research and Development
Short-term Pollutants
Strong and Weak CMG
• Strong CMG:- Avoids US participation.
- EU and Chinese leadership.
• Weak CMG: - Fragmented approach with voting.
- Unblock the issues, build momentum.
- Avoids US ratification.
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The Common Threads
• Moving without the US (sort of).
• Breaking interlinked consensus.
• A dynamic view of international agreements.
• Politically feasible at all levels.
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A New Multilateralism
• Minilateral speed, multilateral frame.
• Coalitions of the willing.
• From Hegemon to Hegemons.
• Participation= most dynamic.
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As the World Changes
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EFFECTIVENESS OF CRITICAL MASSGOVERNANCE
IMPACTS OF GLOBALENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
STATE OF HUMAN HEALTH ANDWELLBEING IN DOMESTIC
CONSTITUENCIES
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NATION-STATEWILLINGNESS TO JOIN
CRITICAL MASSAGREEMENTS
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