1 final introduction ---- web security, ddos, others cliff c. zou cap6133 04/07/08

12
1 Final Introduction ---- Web Security, DDoS, others Cliff C. Zou CAP6133 04/07/08

Upload: shanon-pearson

Post on 12-Jan-2016

221 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: 1 Final Introduction ---- Web Security, DDoS, others Cliff C. Zou CAP6133 04/07/08

1

Final Introduction ----Web Security, DDoS, others

Cliff C. ZouCAP613304/07/08

Page 2: 1 Final Introduction ---- Web Security, DDoS, others Cliff C. Zou CAP6133 04/07/08

2

Web-based Security Challenge

Trend: all/most applications move to the WWW platform Database, remote configuration, email, data

hosting, video/music on demand, e-commerce… Complicated applications require interactive

web browsers Browsers support downloadable execute, plug-

in. ActiveX, Java script, flash player, …

Many users have no idea of the security of downloadable plug-ins.

Page 3: 1 Final Introduction ---- Web Security, DDoS, others Cliff C. Zou CAP6133 04/07/08

3

Web-based Attacks

Phishing Fake website, collect user account info. Usually correlated with Spam, Botnets

Spyware Secretly installation in form of plug-in. Come with free software/games.

Worm Exploit browser’s vulnerability E.g., Nimda

Page 4: 1 Final Introduction ---- Web Security, DDoS, others Cliff C. Zou CAP6133 04/07/08

4

Crawler-based Security Defense

Central idea: Honeypot

Use VM with vulnerable browser to connect to suspicious web server

Trick malcode to install on VM’s browser Analyze, and then, restart a clean VM for next

round Automatic, active crawling

Actively find web server and connect Automatically execute simple user interaction

For download, install activeX, java script, plug-ins.

Page 5: 1 Final Introduction ---- Web Security, DDoS, others Cliff C. Zou CAP6133 04/07/08

5

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attack

Send large amount of traffic to a server so that the server has no resource to serve normal users

Attacking format: Consume target memory/CPU resource

SYN flood (backscatter paper presented before) Database query…

Congest target Internet connection Many sources attack traffic overwhelm target link Very hard to defend

Page 6: 1 Final Introduction ---- Web Security, DDoS, others Cliff C. Zou CAP6133 04/07/08

6

Why hard to defined DDoS attack?

Internet IP protocol has no built-in security No authentication of source IP

SYN flood with faked source IP However, IP is true after connection is setup

Servers are supposed to accept unsolicited service requests

Lack of collaboration ways among Internet community How can you ask an ISP in another country to

block certain traffic for you?

Page 7: 1 Final Introduction ---- Web Security, DDoS, others Cliff C. Zou CAP6133 04/07/08

7

DDoS Defenses

Increase servers capacity Cluster of machine, Multi-CPUs, larger

Internet access Use Internet web caching service

E.g., Akamai Defense Methods (many in research

stage) SYN cookies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SYN_cookies)

SOS IP traceback

Page 8: 1 Final Introduction ---- Web Security, DDoS, others Cliff C. Zou CAP6133 04/07/08

8

SYN Cookies

SYN flood attack Fill up server’s SYN queue Property: attacker does not respond to

SYN/ACK from victim. Defense

Fact: normal client responds to SYN/ACK Remove initial SYN queue Server encode info in TCP seq. number

Use it to reconstruct the initial SYN

Page 9: 1 Final Introduction ---- Web Security, DDoS, others Cliff C. Zou CAP6133 04/07/08

9

DoS spoofed attack defense: IP traceback

Suppose a victim can call ISPs upstream to block certain traffic

SYN flood: which traffic to block? IP traceback:

Find out the real attacking host for SYN flood Based on large amount of attacking packets Need a little help from routers (packet

marking)

Page 10: 1 Final Introduction ---- Web Security, DDoS, others Cliff C. Zou CAP6133 04/07/08

10

SOS: Secure Overlay Service

Central Idea: Use many TCP connection respondent machines Only setup connections relay to server Identity of server is secrete

Page 11: 1 Final Introduction ---- Web Security, DDoS, others Cliff C. Zou CAP6133 04/07/08

11

Security Patch Issue

Fix vulnerability faster by automatic patching XP

Problem: Patches are not reliable

Crash, disrupt to running applications Many patches require reboot

Not realistic for important servers

Page 12: 1 Final Introduction ---- Web Security, DDoS, others Cliff C. Zou CAP6133 04/07/08

12

Shield

Central Idea: Non-disruptive, temporary defense before

patch Vulnerability-specific, exploit-generic

When known vulnerability, analyze it and develop this shield filter on the vulnerable port

E.g., an overflow of strcpy(), filter any input longer than the defined size