1 military history chapter 21 vietnam war. 2 vietnam war- strategic overview vietnam was longest us...
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Military HistoryChapter 21
Vietnam War
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Vietnam War- Strategic Overview • Vietnam was longest US combat
deployment (so far):– US combat units fought hostile actions (1965-72)
– SOF also involved before & after that (1961-73)
– Military advisor role started in 1959
• But no fixed date of start of US involvement– No Lexington & Concord or Pearl Harbor
– or… New York Trade Center Towers
• US entered & left incrementally – In series of incremental steps => 1950s-1970s
• Successive US Administrations actively participated in the War:– From Truman to Nixon
• All tried to save Vietnam from Communist take-over (as part of Containment Policy)
• All would ultimately fail
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Lay of the Land
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Brief Historical Outline • Truman (May 1950)=> authorized $$Mil to aid French=>
– preserve post-WW2 French Indochina colonies (image)
• Ike continued US support, even following Dien Bien Phu – Aim: build Vn Nation out of diverse political factions
– After French defeat, US took control of bad situation
– Deployed military advisors to build SVN’s military
– Tasked CIA to conduct psychological war against NVN
• JFK: tripled $$ aid to SVN & increased military advisors:– Early ‘61 secretly deployed 400 SF & 30 Navy SEALs:
– Tasked to “advise” ARVN & SVN Navy: CI tactics & techniques• Covert direct action against North Vietnam (Oplan 34A) & VC in South
– By Nov ‘63 16,300 advisors operate thru-out N/S Vietnam
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Johnson’s War• After JFK’s assassination, LBJ took over war
– Determined not to “lose” Vietnam like Truman “lost” China
– Embarked on a limited war strategy to convince NVN to cease infiltration of South Vietnam
• After Tonkin Gulf incident & its resolution in Aug 1964:– LBJ secured Congress support (as equivalent of war):
– Authorized by resolution to “take all necessary actions”
– Following his 1964 re-election, LBJ did just that
• Result: US military commitment intensified incrementally:– LBJ personally directed sustained bombing of targets in NVN
– Mar ‘65=> Rolling Thunder began=> would last until 31Oct68
• US also deployed first combat units (USMC) in March 1965*
– US took over war from ‘65-’69 when force levels peak @ 543K+
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Statistics & “Vietnam Syndrome”• Statistic totals: 2.7M served in Vietnam => 1.6 in combat:
– 58K+ KIA & 300,000 WIA, ~ approx 2500 remain MIA
• US spent between $140B to $175B on the war• American outlook deeply influenced by Vietnam War:
– Future Presidential Foreign Policy decisions affected as result
– “Vietnam syndrome” hovered always in background to present
• Not since Civil War has a conflict divided US society so – America’s first war ever lost
– Humiliating political defeat for USG institutions
– Especially for the US military- long time to recover
• VN vets came home as Nation tried to forget & move on– VN Vets were ignored at best & blamed for war at worst
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Vietnam’s History of People’s War • Vietnam has had a long tradition of war
against outsiders– rebellion against China: the Trung sisters;
– Later Trieu Au would lead another revolt in 248 AD
– 10th century: defeated China’s Fleet & won independence
• 13th century: Vietnam repulsed Kublai Khan 3 times– In process became experts in employing GW =>
– Stressed protracted war to wear a superior military power down
– Raid & ambush tactics on the enemy’s over-extended LOCs
• Outlined in Dao’s “Essential Summary of Military Arts”– Strategy: drew enemy into protracted campaign to wear him down
– (Also applied these techniques to 1st & 2nd Indo-China wars)
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Historical Experience with Outside Threats
• Vietnam’s defeat of Mongols & Chinese=> – Now key part of Vietnam’s martial tradition & history:
• i.e. struggle & resistance against superior outside forces
• All became part of Vietnam’s military heritage
• (In addition to Vietnam’s civil war that soon followed)
• French involvement came in late 1850s:– Vn persecuted Fr & Euro missionaries & their converts– Gradually (late 1800s) => Fr establish & expand their
colonies – French then expanded throughout all of Indo-China =>
• Also suppressed Vietnam’s civil war in process
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“On Protracted War” – An Overview• Mao’s Guerilla War model:
– “On Protracted War”– Vietnam drew heavily on Mao’s model for war
• Model instructed followers to proceed by 3 stages:– 1st - defensive stage:
• survive, establish base & gain people’s support• conduct hit & run raids & ambush of soft targets
– 2nd - equilibrium: • gradually expand offensive campaigns =>• stage larger battles of a more conventional nature
– 3rd - Counter-Offensive: • Incorporate conventional military ops with guerilla warfare• Then ramp up to full scale conventional war (when ready)
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First Indo-China War • WW2: Japan occupied & controlled
Vietnam since 1940– Vietnamese allied with China to fight Japanese (GW)
• Following Japan’s defeat, Ho Chi Minh asserted his leadership: – Led coalition of Communists Nationalists
– Declared Vietnam independence on 2Sept45
– Began talks with French
– But both sides failed to agree on basic strategic aims
• Nov’46=> Viet Minh attacked French garrisons => – 1st Indochina war began => would last 8 yrs (1946-54)
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Escalation to Major Battle• Jan’48: Viet Minh begin 2nd stage:
– Expand military operations – Conduct bigger battles against French
• Meanwhile (late ’49)=> China became Communist state under Mao: – Result=> China provides Vietnam with
economic & political support– Also sanctuaries within China’s sovereign
territory
• 1951: Vietnam launched stage 3 prematurely:– Result: suffers major conventional defeat – Temporary set back for Viet Minh
• 1953: at China’s insistence Vn lures French Commander (Navarre) into:– Plain of Reeds => near a place called (?) – ?_______ __________ ____________
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Dien Bien Phu (Nov53-May54)
• Gen Navarre established several strong French Firebases on surrounding hills near main base:– All manned by paratroops & Fr Foreign Legion
– supplied thru airstrip by airlift
• 1954: Chinese press Vietnamese to act decisively:– Giap orders arty/ammo towed into surrounding mtns
– Complete surprise (operational and tactical surprise)
• Viet Minh bombard French outposts from mountain sites:– Paratroops forced to abandon outposts 1 by 1 =>
– 13Mar’54: Beatrice falls within hours of attack
– Gabrielle & Anne Marie overrun during next 2 days
– Impact: denied French airfield- key to French defense• Reinforcement & re-supply (also Fr arty suppressed)
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Dien Bien Phu (final assault) • Remaining outposts must be re-supplied by airdrop
(men/supplies):– Drops inaccurate (high altitude drops due to Vn AAA)
• French situation now desperate– French government requests US help – Ike refuses to send US troops or tactical Nukes
• Many French Foreign Legion troops desert– Hide in caves along Nam Yum & scavenge for food– Paratroopers left to fight alone until the end
• 7 May’54: Last French position overrun– Fr survivors marched into captivity & humiliation
• At on going Peace talks in Geneva– French must now accept distasteful political terms– Unfavorable terms a direct result of French tactical defeat– US must now take up containment directly
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Expanded US involvement • By ‘54 US paying close to 80% of War’s cost
– French viewed as containing communism in Asia
• Ike refused to sign Geneva Accords:– Rejects VN’s temporary 2 year partition at 17th parallel
– Wary of nation wide elections to determine fate in 1956
– Well aware of who is most likely to win (who?)
• Instead US used 2 yr time to back separate non-communist Government below 17th parallel– Government in South to be led by who?
– ?________ ______ ________- a Catholic
– What is the faith of Vietnam majority?
– ?_________________
• 1956 elections overwhelmingly favor Ho Chi Minh:– Vote results ignored by US & new RVN Gov
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Second Indochina War• Following South Vietnam refusal to allow
free election=>– Ho Chi Minh began modernization of his forces– Prepares to deploy NVN advisors south– Begins armed struggle in South Vietnam (SVN)
• Diem starts search to rout out Viet Minh south in 1956– Included all viewed as opposed to his rule:– i.e. All non-Catholics & minorities alike
• By ’57: Viet Minh in South close to all but eliminated– Result: Viet Minh launched major rebellion
against Diem’s Government– Initiate guerilla warfare, intelligence ops,
propaganda– Focus: develop support base in rural villages– Diem’s harsh policies facilitate Viet Minh efforts
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Violence Escalates• Raids & assassinations escalate
between 1958 => 1960:– 1958: 700 gov. officials killed– 1960: 2500 killed
• By 1960: National Liberation Front (NLF) established– (Political arm of Viet Minh rebellion)– By Dec’63: PAVN (NVA) escalated
infiltration/support to Viet Minh – Ho Chi Minh Trail established– NVN sends men & supplies south
• By 1965: full blown insurgency was established in SVN:– US concludes Diem’s regime will fall
without direct military support
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NLF’s War Aims & Strategy • Political Aim:
– Unite South under NVN government of Ho Chi Minh
• NLF Grand Strategy:– Combine political & military aspects of struggle– Undermine SVN political & military positions– Rally people & popular support for NLF cause
• Political Tactics:– Conduct “Agitprop” – Tactical focus: village level
• Establish a tight political & military structure
– By’63: NLF was successful =>• Signed up 300K supporters in countryside
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NLF Military Strategy & Tactics
• Tactics formulated to serve strategic & political ends:– 1st stage: hit & run raids & just survive
– Targets selected for maximum psychological impact
• Assassination: target most effective & most despised– Mayors, village chiefs, teachers
– Ambush ARVN troops & government strategic Hamlets
– Sabotage commercial transport infrastructure
• Strategic Objective:– Provoke government to react w/repressive actions:
– Aim: alienate the very people government is suppose to protect
– Demonstrate to people ineffectiveness of Gov efforts
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Chinese Tactical Model• By’65: PAVN provided direct support to SVN insurgents:
– Employed Chinese model, tactics, & techniques
– Totaled 500K troops with 500K in reserve
– Divisions comprised 10K Troops:• Used 7.62 AK-47s w/3-5 grenades each member
– 3 infantry regiments in South:• Weapons company attached: 60/82 mm mortars
• 57/75mm recoilless rifles, RPGs & Machine Guns
• Train extensively in night ops & effective concealment– Small unit tactics employing stealth
– Meticulous planning & full scale rehearsals
– Detailed withdrawal plans & back-up contingencies
– Preposition supplies & ammo & escape routes
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Tactical Focus• Bottom line:
– a well respected opponent:– NVA soldier was good, dedicated,– Well trained & highly motivated troop:– Extensive training & battlefield prep
• NVA tactics & doctrine’s focus:– Raid & ambush=> (became experts at)– Small unit mobility to minimize US technology:
• Extreme close contact • (often at “Danger Close” ranges)
– Concentrate on weak point, overwhelm & encircle– Then quickly withdraw => rarely held territory
• Key Lesson Learned: – Never follow a blood trail – why? ?_________________
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US Counter Insurgency (CI) & Limited War • US foreign policy (FP) focused on Containment:
– Halt communist expansion directed from Moscow
– Main focus of US FP throughout Cold War (CW)
• Vietnam War viewed as just another communist threat of attempted expansion:– Specific attempt at communist expansion in SE Asia
– Ho Chi Minh & NVN inspired by Moscow & Beijing
• During’60s=> Vietnam became test case for JFK’s CI doctrine:– JFK campaigned to replace
Ike’s massive retaliation=>
• Replacement National Security Strategy?
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Result: Flexible Response • JFK placed major emphasis on CI:
– To counter Mao’s guerilla warfare in SE Asia
– Carried out by SOF advisors• 400 SF & 30 SEALs May 1961
• 16,300 military advisors by Nov 1963
• Also JFK ordered covert actions against NVN – (OPLAN 34A) by SOG Teams
• CI Strategy against NLF:– Build-up of military support to ARVN:
• APCs, CV air support, Helos, TACAIR
– SF advisors conducted training & civic action:
– US Helo support to ARVN:• Infiltration/extraction & Medivac
– Direct support, to include “advising” SVN SOF teams into enemy held areas
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Strategic Hamlet Program • Another attempt to protect people from insurgents by
isolating them• Theory: serve as instrument of $$ & social reform &
security:– Attract the people to SVN gov programs– Convince peasant SVN gov better than NLF
• Objective: relegate insurgents to outlaw status– Lose support of masses => force revised NLF aims:– Return insurgent to Survival mode (stage 1)
• Reality: program failed in both concept & execution:– Dislocated peasants from village bred resentment– SVN Government (not NLF) viewed as bad guy– Poor security => vulnerable villages easy to overrun
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Factors in Failure• Result: opposite of desired government objective
– People’s discontent rose while security & safety fell
– Atrocious execution by Nhu alienated peasants
• Another factor – conventional military mindset:– Conventional US Army leaders resisted CI
– Did not support CI concept
– Conflict in philosophies of war: Clausewitz vs. Sun Tzu
• Conventional military preferred conventional methods:– Bigger = better mindset employing modern weapons
– Even though jungle warfare very tough environment
– Conventional infantry & armor profile ineffective
– Tactical surprise unlikely – operational surprise hard
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Battle of Ap Bac (2 Jan 1963) • LTC John Paul Vann:
– Pressed IV Corps tactical zone Cmdr MG Cao, & Col Dam, Cmdr of 7th ARVN, to attack 3 VC radio companies (350 men) near hamlet of Ap Bac
– Located 65 KM southwest of Saigon in the Mekong Delta
– Plan: 3 pronged pincer attack from different directions by 3 Battalions of 7th Infantry,
• Supported by regional units, 13 APCs (3500 men), ABN & US Helos (CH-21s & UH-1s)
– Objective: Surprise & overwhelm enemy with numbers
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Execution• Execution badly flawed:
– ARVN commander delayed attack too long
– Allowed enemy to discover Cmdr’s intent:
– Time to prepare defense to receive attack
• No tactical surprise => – First sign of resistance ARVN froze
– 1 prong of offense refused to even attack
– Remaining units purposely failed to block enemy’s escape
• Result: numerous ARVN casualties (friendly fire):– 61 KIA & 100 WIA
– Viet Cong slip away undetected (3 KIA)
• Victory claimed anyway (why?) – Rationale: conventionally- held ground
– ARVN performance does not bold well for future
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Tonkin Gulf Incident • SVN maritime sea commandos & advisors
– Conduct sea-borne & raids on NVN radar
– Raids conducted in/around Tonkin gulf op area
• Objective: – Force NVN to light off radar’s ELINT
– Permit US DDs w/special ELINT collection
• NVN Response:– Torpedo boats attack SVN commandos:
– SOF insertion craft (NASTIES) in vicinity
• NVN craft see US DD Maddox & engage:– Result: 3 enemy PT sunk or damaged
• 2 days later- NVN PT appear to fire on US DDs:– USS Maddox & Turner Joy call for CV air CAS
• Who find nothing
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Tonkin Gulf Resolution• Capt of USS Maddox not sure second
NVN attack actually occurred, but...– Files report to CINCPAC via chain of command
• LBJ sees opportunity to exploit NVN “attack”:– Applies much political pressure to confirm attack
– Meanwhile=> Admin prepared draft resolution for Congress:• Resolved for President to “take all action necessary”
• Protect US forces & its allies
• While Navy still try to figure out what really occurred:– LBJ exploits incident: Tonkin Gulf Resolution
– Passed unanimously by House & all but 2 in Senate
– (Just as administration drafted it) => significance?
– Future impact on US involvement?
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NLF Threat Grows• By 1965 => NLF secured
Mekong Delta (Map) =>– Appeared to have gained
both momentum & initiative, especially in the Delta
– Appeared to US that SVN Gov about to fail
• US concluded it must send massive assistance to prevent its collapse– Specially configured
armored landing craft were deployed
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Operation Rolling Thunder (Mar’65- Nov‘68) • Mar ‘65 (after LBJ safely
re-elected)=> US strikes:– Launched massive strategic
bombing of North
– Longest sustained air bombing campaign in US history
• Targets primarily along northern areas of DMZ:– Included bridges, railheads,
& logistic supply dumps
– Also re-supply routes along Ho Chi Minh Trail
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Major US Ground Combat Introduced • LBJ also deployed USMC to DaNang
in late July’65:– Two Battalion Landing Teams
waded ashore
– Prepare to conduct active forward defense & search & destroy ops
• From then on, US begins to take direct control of war =>– Major ground combat & key battles
conducted by US
– More US combat units deploy
– ARVN relegated primarily to garrison defense duties as the US directly takes over the War
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Theory & Practice of Limited War • Flexible Response (review):
– Tailored action required only to meet political aim– Avoids dilemma of massive retaliation as only option– Result: military instruments limited to minimum needed
to send the enemy a message• Target hit to modify enemy’s behavior (political end)
• Limited War theories & civilian theorists:– Flexible Response provided basis of limited war theories– Ltd War Theories provide set of broad guidelines:
• Focused on attaining US political objectives• Military considerations not taken into account
– Craft military response to send clear signal to enemy• Convey political intent to attain desired enemy response
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Theory vs. Reality• Result in practice:
– Political considerations dominated military actions
– Military responses limited to minimum required
– Civilian leadership prevalent thru-out all operations• LBJ selected many of the bomb targets personally
• Limited geographic battle areas of operations
– BDA unimportant =>only political message sent is central
• Theory’s Flaw? – Reality of war - military factors do count:
– Assumption regarding enemy’s response & friction’s role?
– Precision of message sent & how it is received & interpreted
– How the enemy will respond remains uncertain
– Gradual escalation in attempt to get desired response flawed
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Modern Hi-tech Military Advances
• Flexible Response strategy => conventional forces– SECDEF McNamara modernized US forces
– Established “Brush War” capability (for Vietnam)
• USAF & USN build-up:– WWII BBs refitted & updated
– CV/CVN on Yankee Station in Tokin Gulf launch F-4/A-4 strikes
– B-52 (Guam) & F105/F-4 (Thailand): Rolling Thunder
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Weapons Technology Advances
• High Tech Equipment:– Radar units small & portable developed
– Sniffers attached to skids of UH-1s to detect infiltrators’ odors
– Sensors & passive transmitters alert SF teams
– IBM computers predict enemy movements
– Puff (AC-47 gunships) &
– AFSOC AC-130 Specter Gunships • provide devastating fire support
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Troops, Weapons, & Equipment
• Troops: best ever trained & equipped to date:– 1 Million men combat ready & divisions expand:11 to 16
– Airlift & equipment stockpiles expanded
– Army reorganization:
• Task oriented for specific jobs
• Direct ground support weapons & equipment:– Armor Personnel Carriers
– Weapon advances: (M-60, M-16, Stoner LMG, M-79)
– Helo & its role: UH-1, Cobra, CH-47, 1st Air Cavalry
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Next: Military History Chapter 21b Vietnam War
(to be continued)
Back-up Slides
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US Combat Units: Direct Ground Operations • US also deployed first full
combat units in March 1965:– 3500 USMCs land on DaNang
beaches for combat ops– Key US threshold passed – (Many to follow incrementally)
• From then until April 1969, US commitment gradually increased: – US ground troop levels &
combat units grew steadily– US combat actions rose
incrementally for next 4 yrs– Operation Starlite was typical
• From ‘65-69: US took over most fighting from ARVN– US troop levels peaked at
543,400 troops by early 1969
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Conflicting post-War Analysis • Several hard lessons were learned as a result of Vietnam• For some=> we simply backed the wrong horse:
– US Military power & $$$ support never be enough regardless=>
– Military & $ pwr couldn’t prop up RVN’s corrupt & failed regime
– Local revolutionary war fought for nationalistic & political aims• Therefore US caught in middle of bitter civil war
• For others: war too hard to win under political constraints:– War considered integral part of global Cold War threat
– Key political concern for LBJ administration: avoid escalation• Both in intensity of fighting & geographic region
• Result: US attempted to fight limited conventional war – Without a coherent & realistic operational strategy
– While applying separate poorly chosen tactics to support it
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Serious Strategic Disconnect• US approach to war appeared to have serious disconnects:
– Political Aims were unrealistic given military constraints
– Operational Strategy poorly matched to those strategic aims
– Tactics employed served a failing strategy
• Result: Tactical success served poor operational strategy – Which in turn attempted to achieve Unrealistic strategic aims =>
– Which ultimately resulted in political failure at the end of the day
• Political decisions makers failed to realize until too late:– That superior American military power can’t make up for what?
– American people’s lack of political will to continue war indefinitely!
• These failures would affect many in different ways– Including foreign policy decisions taken following the Cold War