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Modeling social processes with network analysis

Emmanuel Lazega

Institute of sociology

University of Lille 1

European Science Foundation

QMSS Workshop

Ljubljana, July 2005

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Basic neo-structural sociology I • The main concept: resource interdependencies between actors

(individual or collective). • Relationships as resources and commitments. Resources can be

economic and social. Structures as regularities in flows of resources and stable commitments.

• Relational structures as one determinant, out of many, of individual behaviour and of collective behaviour.

• Managing interdependencies in power relationships (for example to escape situation of open competition for resources, to put others in situations of open competition, etc.).

• Actors who manage their interdependencies are also capable of observing them. They can endogenize the structure and politicize their exchanges, i.e. invest in relationships with particularistic interests in mind (social niches, status competition, etc.), but also general interests and derived satisfactions. Hence endogenous change.

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Basic neo-structural sociology II• This management of interdependencies leads to a complex

social discipline (that is recognized as legitimate by the members).

• Social discipline can be approached as a set of social processes or social mechanisms traditionnally studied by sociologists: solidarity, social control, regulation, learning, etc. [See Hedström and Swedberg (1988) for a review].

• Social processes have a relational dimension and can thus be examined by network analysis.

• Network analysis is a method that helps in modeling these processes and in looking at this complex social discipline. [There is no « network theory » per se]. It can be used by institutional, structuralist, or RC theorists alike.

• We are at the beginning of a period of our discipline which will mainly improve modeling and analyses of such processes. And perhaps derive new theory from this work.

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A case study• Deconstructing and modeling social processes at Sue,

Grabbit & Run, a corporate law partnership. Dataset available for reanalyses or further analyses.

• The Collegial phenomenon, OUP, 2001.Background:• What do corporate lawyers do? Litigation and corporate work.• Division of work and resource interdependencies.• Three offices, no departments, built-in pressures to grow, intake and

assignment rules.• Partners and associates: hierarchy, up or out rule, billing targets.• Partnership agreement (sharing benefits equally, 90% exclusion rule,

governance structure, elusive committee system) and incompleteness of the contract.

• Informal, unwritten rules (ex: no moonlighting, no investment in buildings, no nepotism, no borrowing to pay partners, etc.).

• Huge incentives to behave opportunistically and social processes that make cooperation among rival partners possible.

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71 attorneys

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Three social processes at SG&R

• Social processes have a relational dimension that can be used to characterize, model and compare them

-Solidarity-Control -Regulation

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Sociometric name generators used to elicit coworkers, advice, and ‘friendship’ ties at SG&R

 "Here is the list of all the members of your Firm.Strong coworkers network: "Because most firms like yours are also organized very informally, it is difficult to get a clear idea of how the members really work together. Think back over the past year, consider all the lawyers in your Firm. Would you go through this list and check the names of those with whom you have worked with. [By "worked with" I mean that you have spent time together on at least one case, that you have been assigned to the same case, that they read or used your work product or that you have read or used their work product; this includes professional work done within the Firm like Bar association work, administration, etc.]" Basic advice network: "Think back over the past year, consider all the lawyers in your Firm. To whom did you go for basic professional advice? For instance, you want to make sure that you are handling a case right, making a proper decision, and you want to consult someone whose professional opinions are in general of great value to you. By advice I do not mean simply technical advice."

‘Friendship’ network: "Would you go through this list, and check the names of those you socialize with outside work. You know their family, they know yours, for instance. I do not mean all the people you are simply on a friendly level with, or people you happen to meet at Firm functions."

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Day 1. Solidarity

• Measuring the relational dimension of solidarity:

- Cohesion

- Direct and indirect reciprocity

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Cohesion in general

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Cohesion in the firm: relational stitches

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Solidarity via structural equivalence

• Burt’s solution for structural equivalence in Structure (4.2)

• Detector: Euclidean distance

• Social distance, Katz’s (1954) transformation:

N is the number of individuals that i can reach regardless of the number of steps. F is the number of individuals that i can reach by doing the minimum number of steps that are necessary to reach j.

)(1iijij

Nfz

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Solidarity via structural equivalence : welfare and patronage in access to clients and work

• Intake and assignment rule.

• Analysis of strong coworkers network.

• RED sets.

• Access to pools of associate manpower.

• Schedulers vs. rainmakers.

• Competing forms of solidarity (‘welfare’ and clientelism) and firm integration.

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Another example:Structure 4.2. blocks in advice network at SG&R

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Social Niches

• Multiplex, multi-functional blocks

• Dense blocks are called social niches (see diagonal values in density tables)

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Density tables

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Assigning people to blocks via Pajek

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Structural equivalence in advice network at SG&R

Pajek solution (Ward clustering, hierarchical indirect approach) and Structure solution are identical (modulo Katz’s transformation, use of Euclidean distance, and assignments in the residual category in Structure).

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Comparing Pajek-Structure solutions

• Anuska’s comment: The fact that the hierarchical indirect approach of blockmodeling that is run on Pajek is so similar to the Structure approach is due to the fact that both approaches have the same 'greedy' effect. When two units are merged together they stay together in the later stage regardless of the fact that it could be better if they could be assigned to another cluster. See about this effect the chapter on cluster analysis in the Blockmodeling book or on the indirect aproach to blockmodeling.

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Pajek pictures of the decomposition of the three networks into social niches ?

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Structure 4.2. blocks in advice network at SG&R

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Solidarity at the local level

• p2 models for statistical analyses at the dyadic level (Van Duijn and Snijders)

• p* models higher order (especially triadic level) statistical analysis (Pattison, Robbins, Wasserman, et al.)

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p2 models and solidarity

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Reciprocity and economic performance:Example of Blau ties

• Dyadic decomposition of a network can be useful for all sorts of purposes.

• Blau’s exchange of advice for recognition of status

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Confirmation: variables explaining performance

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Using p* models and their nomenclature for detection of solidarity (especially indirect reciprocity)

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Symbols a, b, c, d, e and f refer to any uniplex or multiplex tie.Symbols i, j and k represent any three actors, with i j k.

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Example: the coworkers’ network at SG&R

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Some substructures from the univariate model for the cowork relation

(extracted from Table 3.4)

WW

W

   

W W

W

 

(Generalized exchange in Levi-Strauss’ terms)

.30 (.06)

-3.49 (.25) 4.45 (.47)

(Restricted exchange in Levi-Strauss’ terms)

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More complex forms of reciprocity: Configurations corresponding to multivariate p* parameters W (cowork), A (advice), F (friendship), WA (cowork and advice), WF (cowork and friendship), AF (advice and friendship), WAF (cowork, advice and friendship) 

Cowork and Advice: Advice and Friendship: Cowork and Friendship: Strong interdependence Strong interdependence Weak interdependence   

2.44 (.13) 2.42 (.22) .56 (.17)    

.61 (.21)      

-1.13 (.23) .13 (.02)

WA

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Summary of p* results on solidarity

• Solidarity is partly based on the possibility of multiplex exchanges (which take different forms in different contexts).

• The interplay of relationships among members helps in cultivating and mitigating status competition among peers.

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Back to the specific example of advice network at SG&R

Blockmodels, p2 and p* models show that solidarity exists in transfers of advice and that it takes several forms.

Advice relationships have special characteristics:• Flows are very centralized (status games) and one rarely

seeks advice from people « below » in the pecking order.• There are ‘lateral’ exchanges of advice and reciprocity (but

no generalized exchange).• Advice, collaboration, and friendship : complex

interdependencies showing role and embeddedness of advice ties in other kinds of ties.

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p* decomposititon in Pajek?

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Triads counts for pattern search

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Vlado’s solutions for direct and indirect reciprocity

Representing the number of cycles each relation belongs to and the people who are most active in generalized exchange.

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Day 2. Social control• Social control as a generic process: dealing with

opportunistic behaviour, a decisive dimension of collective action.

• Partners locked themselves in a cooperative situation. This creates enormous incentives for opportunistic behaviour, and a need for self-policing.

• Opportunistic behaviour at SG&R: shirking, grabbing, leaving (anything that is perceived by members as betraying the definiton of relationships as commitments).

• Control in a bureaucracy (Bentham’s panopticon) vs. among control among peers among whom direct command is considered inappropriate.

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Recall general principles

• Actors who manage their interdependencies are also capable of observing them. They can endogenize the structure and politicize their exchanges, i.e. invest in relationships with particularistic interests in mind (social niches, status competition, etc.), but also general interests and derived satisfactions.

• This management of interdependencies leads to a complex social discipline (that is recognized as legitimate by the members).

• The social mechanism observed here is an illustration of this complexity.

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Second-order free rider problem

• Main insight: control among peers is based on this management and use of interdependencies.

• But then, who will bear the costs of control (see the literature on the second order free-rider issue (Coleman, Ostrom, Wittek)) ?

• My hypothesis: there is a « lateral control regime » (a form of indirect control) at SG&R that spreads and shifts the costs of control among partners. It helps them pressure each other back to good order.

• My goal : describe this lateral control regime as a social mechanism.

• Theoretical hypothesis: driving the process are individual actors spending their own relational capital for the protection of the common good.

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A structural approach to social control among collectively responsible partners at SG&R

(or what happens when we are at the same time the victim, the deviant, the police agent, and the judge?)

 

Triplets representing lateral pressure :

Lever Respondent Target

At each step we know what the relationship is: between respondent and lever, respondent and target, and lever and target

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Methodology:Name generator for eliciting choices of levers for each target

[20% of corporate lawyers in the U.S. have an alcohol and/or drugs problem]

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Individual conceptions of how social control operates among partners

(partner 32’s view)

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Individual conceptions of how social control operates among partners

(partner 35’s view)

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Individual conceptions of how social control operates among partners

(partner 18’s view)

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Individual conceptions of how social control operates among partners

(partner 20’s view)

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Combining sociometric data and leverage data Typology of pathways of lateral control

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Analysis of the typology of paths• The vast majority of paths are partly personalized paths, a

sort of privatization of social control.• There are nevertheless many completely impersonal paths

(13.5 %).• There are some completely personalized and saturated

paths (3.3 %).• Question: Do partners spend their own relational capital or

do they borrow others’ connections?• To answer this question: an analysis of the ways in which

partners manage their ties and interdependencies for the collective good.

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This is where the identification of social niches (dense, multiplex, multi-functional blocks) becomes very useful.

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Combining sociometric data and leverage data

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Lateral control occurs in social niches:Their existence reduces the costs of control

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Lateral control occurs in social niches:Their existence reduces the costs of control

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Lateral control occurs in social niches

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Problem with reduction of cost of control via social niches

• Reduction of costs of control via personalized ties and social niches raises the issue of ‘oppositional solidarity’ (Wittek). Infractors may be too close to pressure, and may be reserved preferential treatment.

• How does the firm deal with the niche-induced risk of personal loyalty of the lever to the target?

• Answer: by legitimizing paths of lateral control that do not use personal ties, i.e. creating a specialized and more impersonal form of status.

• The ‘protector of the common good’.

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Lateral control also depends on a specific form of status:The ‘protectors of the common good’

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Who are the ‘multi-target’ levers or ‘protectors of the common good’?

Answer: Uncontroversial partners

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Who are these uncontroversial partners?

A specific form of status

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Who guards the guardians at SG&R?Using strucural equivalence on leverage data

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The social structure of collective responsibility

• Quasi-voluntary compliance depends on lateral control which itself depends on social niches (its is ‘privatized’) and on status inconsisency (the existence of ‘protectors of the common good’ who are uncontroversial partners avoiding conflict escalation).

• Counter-intuitive complementarity between status competition and niche-seeking for social control.

• We thought that the process was driven by individual actors spending their own relational capital for the protection of the common good.

• We realize that they also borrow other people’s relational capital for that purpose, then find partners with a special kind of status to finish the job.

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What would happen in less collegial settings?

• Hypotheses:– Social control would be shared between hierarchy

and peers?– Use of relationships would become more brutal?– Multi-target levers (if they exist) would have more

threatening power?– The organization would move to court proceedings

more quickly?

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Analyses of leverage data on Pajek

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Day 3. Regulation• Solidarity, control and redefining the rules of the

game (regulatory activity).• Contribution of neo-structural sociology to the

study of regulatory activity.• Recall that strategic actors politicize their

exchanges. • For the study of the regulatory process, it is useful

to look at a specific dimension of this politicization : status competition (Festinger, Frank).

• Actors as status competitors and social discipline.

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Status• Relative position in the group (formal hierarchy and

networks of exchange). • Extensive mandate to participate in regulation of

community. • This mandate provides legitimacy for speaking on

behalf of general interests in the regulatory process.• ‘Multi-dimensionality of status’ or ‘status

heterogeneity’.• Now you see it, now you don’t.• Importance of multiplexity.• The concept of status inconsistency (Lenski) and its

network indicators.

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Finders, minders and grinders:status heterogeneity at SG&R

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Finders, minders, and grinders(associates included)

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Regulatory process among heterogeneous peers

• Policy issues underlying controversies at SG&R: – Workflow– Compensation– Markering– Peer review.

• Position in the structure and policy preferences.• Two useful concepts:

– Precarious values (Selznick).– ‘Multi-status oligarchs’.

• Polarization of policy preferences and the reasons for the absence of change.

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Polarization of policy preferences among partners

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Status inconsistency and policy preferences

The majority of partners with inconsistent forms of status favor the status quo.

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Multi-status ‘oligarchs’

• Multi-status oligarchs framing deliberation on precarious values.

• Status inconsistency and the special influence of ‘improbable’ actors.

• Partners with several and inconsistent forms of status carry a special weight: they can ‘sacrifice’ one dimension of status (for the common good) without losing other dimensions of status.

• They tend to be radical conservatives at SG&R.• Explanation of inertia in collegial organizations?

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Summary of neo-structural approach to regulation

• Change as betrayed promises.

• A complex structural basis of normative order.

• Relational structures, especially status heterogeneity / inconsistency, are invisible ingredients of regulatory processes -the reformulation and interpretation of rules.

• All this with simple correlation tables.

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Representing status inconsistency with Pajek?

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Difficulties related to sociological knowledge on social processes

• Limits with ou capacity to observe and reconstitute interactions and social networks: exploring simulation ?

• Better probabilistic reasoning for social networks in small populations ?

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Questions to students

• How does one approach forms of solidarity using network analysis?

• How can social control depend on relational structures?

• How can regulation (in the sense of (re)definition of the rules of the game) depend on relational structures?

• How can economic performance depend on relational structures?