1 proactive “intelligence-led” policing : learning from indonesia proactive...
TRANSCRIPT
1
PROACTIVEPROACTIVE “INTELLIGENCE-LED” “INTELLIGENCE-LED”
POLICING : POLICING : Learning from IndonesiaLearning from Indonesia
ADRIANUS MELIALA
University of Indonesia
2
““The approach constitutes the The approach constitutes the beginning of the most beginning of the most
significant redefinition of police significant redefinition of police work in the past half century...”work in the past half century...”
(Willson & Kelling, 1989; p. 48)(Willson & Kelling, 1989; p. 48)
3
““We should not be fighting the We should not be fighting the crime of the twenty-first crime of the twenty-first
century with the tools of the century with the tools of the nineteenth.”nineteenth.”
((Jack Straw, Home Secretary, United Kingdom, 1997)Jack Straw, Home Secretary, United Kingdom, 1997)
4
The truth about The truth about proactive policingproactive policing
11
Traditional reactive models of policing have been outdated. Alternatives, either good or relatively good, are then required.
5
The truth about The truth about proactive policingproactive policing
22
The idea of “new-managerialism” and “good governance”. Policing is basically similar to any other public-related activities taken by public institutions.
6
The truth about The truth about proactive policingproactive policing
33
Increasing role of technology in policing and awareness toward the benefits given by information system.
7
First story:First story:
Riots occurred since 1997,
Armed bank robbery increased since 1999,
Bomb exploded since 2000.
People criticized the role of Intelligence.
8
Second story:Second story:
A member of the public reported the police about somebody who have allegedly committed fraud. The responding officer seemed confused to where he should pass the report, whether to
the intelligence office or to the detective office. Surprisingly, both offices claimed as the right
party to process it.
9
Third Story:Third Story:The Directorate of Intelligence regularly issued reports on security profile followed
by its analysis. When comparing two reports (the first made during Soeharto’s era and the second made just recently),
what regarded as “threat, enemy or source of instability” are similar
10
Before intelligence Before intelligence community has been healed community has been healed
from its organizational from its organizational problems, it is no point problems, it is no point saying intelligence-led saying intelligence-led
policingpolicing
What problems?
11
Problem on strict divisionProblem on strict division of assignments of assignments
Criminogenic
Factors
Police
Hazard
Factual
Threat
Intelligence’s Role Detective’s Role
Strategic Level Tactical Level
12
Problem on policing style Problem on policing style taken by the INPtaken by the INP
Law
Enforcement
Crime Prevention and
Public OrderPreemptive Efforts in Maintaining Peace and Security
Intelligence & CPO Beat & Paramilitary CID
13
Problem on the job overlapProblem on the job overlapbetween Intelligence and CIDbetween Intelligence and CID
INFORMATION
INTELLIGENCE
CID
14
Problem of the past times Problem of the past times
State and Government
INTELLIGENCEMILITARY
THE PUBLIC
POLICE
15
Problem of controlProblem of control
So far, there’s a few intelligence -related legal infrastructure.
Having no public access to control how intelligence people work
16
Problem of ‘militaristic’ habitProblem of ‘militaristic’ habit
Being used to practice the principles of combat intelligence, including all dirty and gross practices
Strong role identification with espionage and undercover activities
17
Problem of internal cultureProblem of internal culture
The fearful image is still managed on purposely
No accountability when producing a wrong forecast or analysis
Be implicated with “wet and dry” terrain in relation to the possibility of accepting extra money
18
Recent development after the Recent development after the exclusion of the INP from militaryexclusion of the INP from military
Restructuring intelligence directorate at Police HQ by improving its operational capability
Consistently deploying resources in some conflict areas or highlighted crimes
19
It’s not enough since:It’s not enough since:11
The ‘activity approach’ is still there. Any elements within the INP would get yearly
allocation based on activity as defined in traditional sense
20
It’s not enough since:It’s not enough since:22
There’s no management decision and support to let intelligence playing
significant role. The detective community is still regarded the core
business of the INP
21
It’s not enough since:It’s not enough since:33
Intelligence community still uses its outdated approach and
working method. Enhancing capacity is compulsory.
22
End of presentationEnd of presentation
Terima kasih, sampai jumpaTerima kasih, sampai jumpa