Reyes vs. Court of Appeals216 SCRA 25 (1993)

Rule 128, Sec. 1-4

FACTS:Juan Mendoza, the father of defendant Olympio, is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and

106, devoted to the production of palay. The lots are tenanted and cultivated by Julian de la Cruz, the husband of plaintiff Eufrocina de la Cruz.

In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of her husband, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant. However, Olympio in conspiracy with the other defendants prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers from entering and working on the farm lots. Defendants likewise refused to vacate and surrender the lots, which prompted Eufrocina to file a case for the recover of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the meantime.

The petitioners in this case, the defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya, are duly elected and appointed barangay officials of the locality, who denied their interference in the tenancy relationship existing between Olympio and Eufrocina. Olympio, for his part, raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent, and non-payment of rentals as his defenses.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the agrarian court’s decision with modification, which ordered the defendants to restore possession of the farm lots to plaintiff Eufrocina. The CA likewise ruled that the petitioners are solidarily liable to pay to Eufrocina the value of cavans of palay until they have vacated the area.

On appeal, the petitioners questioned the favorable consideration given to the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson, since the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the trial court erred when it gave favorable consideration to the affidavits

of plaintiff, even if the affiant was not presented and subjected to cross-examination.

RULING: The judgment is affirmed. The trial court did not err when it favorable considered the

affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the “Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character.” The same provision states that “In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence,” Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more than substantial evidence. Thus, this case is an application of the rule with regard the scope of the Rules on Evidence which states that “The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings except as otherwise provided by law (ex. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946) or these rules.”

People vs. Turco337 SCRA 714 (2000)

Rule 128, Sec 1-4

FACTS:Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (a.k.a. “Totong”) was charged with the crime of rape. The

prosecution alleged that the victim, Escelea Tabada (12 yrs and 6 months old at the time of the incident) and accused Turco were neighbors. On the night of the incident, upon reaching her home, Escelea heard a call from outside. She recognized the voice to be Turco’s since they have been neighbors for 4 years and are second cousins. When she opened the door, the accused with the use of a towel, covered the victim’s face. Then the accused bid the victim to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen which was about 12 meters away from the victim’s house, the accused laid the victim on the grass, went on top of her an took off her short pants and panty. The victim tried to resist by moving her body but to no avail. The accused succeeded in pursuing his evil design by forcibly inserting his penis inside the victim’s private parts.

Upon reaching home, the victim discovered that her short pants and panty were filled with blood. For almost ten days, she kept to herself the harrowing experience, until she had the courage to tell her brother-in-law, who in turn told the victim’s father about the rape of his daughter. Thereafter, they did not waste time and immediately asked the victim to see a doctor for medical examination. After the issuance of the medical certificate, they went to the Isabela Municipal Station and filed a compliant against the accused charging him with rape.

The trial court convicted the accused, stating that the defense of “sweetheart theory” was a mere concoction of the accused in order to exculpate him from criminal liability. Appealing his conviction, the accused-appellant argues that the trial court erred because no actual proof was presented that the rape of the complainant actually happened considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the same.

ISSUE(S):Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the medical certificate in evidence,

although the medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to testify on it.

RULING: Conviction affirmed. We place emphasis on the distinction between admissibility of

evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules (Section 3, Rule 128) or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility is therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception. However, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical

certificate. In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself, which standing alone even without the medical examination, is sufficient evidence. The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape. It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victim’s testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict.

Agustin vs. CAG.R. No. 162571

Facts:Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC.In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.

On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe’s leg. This incident was reported to the police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for support.

Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action.

The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this petition.

 

Issue:W/N  the respondent court erred in denying the petitioner’s MTD

W/N the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a form of unreasonable search

 

Held:1. No.  The trial court properly denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss because the private respondents’ complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff’s primary right and the defendant’s corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by

which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.2. No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.