1 softrare reliability methods prof. doron a. peled bar ilan university, israel and univeristy of...

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1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, Version 2008

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Page 1: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

1

Softrare Reliability Methods

Prof. Doron A. PeledBar Ilan University,IsraelAndUniveristy of warwick,UK

Version 2008

Page 2: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Some related books:

Also:Mainly:

http://www.dcs.warwick.ac.uk/~doron

Page 3: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Goal: software reliability

Use software engineering methodologies to develop the code.

Use formal methods during code development

Page 4: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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What are formal methods?

Techniques for analyzing systems, based on some mathematics.

This does not mean that the user must be a mathematician.

Some of the work is done in an informal way, due to complexity.

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Examples for FM

Deductive verification:Using some logical formalism, prove formally that the software satisfies its specification.

Model checking:Use some software to automatically check that the software satisfies its specification.

Testing:Check executions of the software according to some coverage scheme.

Page 6: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Typical situation:

Boss: Mark, I want that the new internet marketing software will be flawless. OK?

Mark: Hmmm. Well, ..., Aham, Oh! Ah??? Where do I start?

Bob: I have just the solution for you. It would solve everything.

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Some concerns

Which technique? Which tool? Which experts? What limitations? What methodology? At which points? How expensive? How many people?

Needed expertise. Kind of training. Size limitations. Exhaustiveness. Reliability. Expressiveness. Support.

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Badmouth

Formal methods can only be used by mathematicians.

The verification process is itself prone to errors, so why bother?

Using formal methods will slow down the project.

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Some answers...

Formal methods can only be used by mathematicians.

Wrong. They are based on some math but the user should not care.

The verification process is itself prone to errors, so why bother?

We opt to reduce the errors, not eliminate them.Using formal methods will slow down the

project.Maybe it will speed it up, once errors are found

earlier.

Page 10: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Some exaggerations

Automatic verification can always find errors.

Deductive verification can show that the software is completely safe.

Testing is the only industrial practical method.

Page 11: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Our approach

Learn several methods (deductive verification, model checking, testing process algebra).

Learn advantages and limitations, in order to choose the right methods and tools.

Learn how to combine existing methods.

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Emphasis

The process:Selecting the tools, Modeling,Verification, Locating errors.

Use of tools:Hands on. PVS, SPIN

Visual notation:Statecharts, MSCs, UML.

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Some emphasis

The process of selecting and using formal methods.

The appropriate notation. In particular, visual notation.

Hands-on experience with tools.

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The unbearable easiness of grading

During class, choose some small project in groups, e.g.,Explore some examples using tools.Implementing a simple algorithm.Dealing with new material.

or covering advanced subject.- Office presentation (1 hour).- Written description (2-3 pages +

computer output or 6-10 pages).- Class presentation (0.5-1.5 hours per

group).

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Example topics

Project:Verify some example

using some tools.Communication

protocols.Mutual exclusion.

Advanced topics:Abstractions.Reductions.Partitions.Static analysis.Verifying pushdown

automata.Verifying security

protocols.

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Where do we start?

Boss: Mark, can you verify this for me?

Mark: OK, first I have to ...

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Things to do

Check the kind ofsoftware to analyze.

Choose methods and tools.

Express system properties.

Model the software.

Apply methods.Obtain verification

results.Analyze results.Identify errors.Suggest correction.

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Different types of software

Sequential.Concurrent.Distributed.Reactive.Protocols.Abstract algorithms.Finite state.

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Specification:Informal, textual, visual

The value of x will be between 1 and 5, until some point where it will become 7. In any case it will never be negative.

(1<=x<=5 U (x=7/\ [] x>=0))

1<=x<=5 X=7

X>=0

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Verification methods

Finite state machines. Apply model checking.

Apply deductive verification (theorem proving).

Program too big, too complicated.Apply testing techniques.

Apply a combination of the above!

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Modeling

Use the program text.Translate to a programming language

embedded in some proof system.Translate to some notation (transition

system).Translate to finite automata.Use visual notation.Special case: black box system.

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Modeling Software Systems for Analysis

(Book: Chapter 4)

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Modelling and specification for verification and validation

How to specify what the software is supposed to do?

Can we use the UML model or parts of it?

How to model it in a way that allows us to check it?

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Systems of interest Sequential systems. Concurrent systems (multi-threaded).

1. Distributive systems.2. Reactive systems.3. Embedded systems

(software + hardware).

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Sequential systems.

Perform some computational task. Have some initial condition, e.g.,0in A[i] integer.

Have some final assertion, e.g., 0in-1 A[i]A[i+1].(What is the problem with this spec?)

Are supposed to terminate.

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Concurrent Systems

Involve several computation agents.Termination may indicate an abnormal

event (interrupt, strike).May exploit diverse computational

power.May involve remote components.May interact with users (Reactive).May involve hardware components

(Embedded).

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Problems in modeling systems Representing concurrency:

- Allow one transition at a time, or- Allow coinciding transitions.

Granularity of transitions. Assignments and checks? Application of methods?

Global (all the system) or local (one thread at a time) states.

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Modeling.The states based model.

V={v0,v1,v2, …} - a set of variables, over some domain.

p(v0, v1, …, vn) - a parametrized assertion, e.g.,

v0=v1+v2 /\ v3>v4. A state is an assignment of values to the program

variables. For example: s=<v0=1,v1=3,v3=7,…,v18=2>

For predicate (first order assertion) p:p(s) is p under the assignment s.Example: p is x>y /\ y>z. s=<x=4, y=3, z=5>.Then we have 4>3 /\ 3>5, which is false.

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State space

The state space of a program is the set of all possible states for it.

For example, if V={a, b, c} and the variables are over the naturals, then the state space includes: <a=0,b=0,c=0>,<a=1,b=0,c=0>, <a=1,b=1,c=0>,<a=932,b=5609,c=6658>…

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Atomic Transitions

Each atomic transition represents a small piece of code such that no smaller piece of code is observable.

Is a:=a+1 atomic? In some systems, e.g., when a is a

register and the transition is executed using an inc command.

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Non atomicity

Execute the following when a=0 in two concurrent processes:

P1:a=a+1 P2:a=a+1 Result: a=2. Is this always the

case?

Consider the actual translation:

P1:load R1,a inc R1 store R1,aP2:load R2,a inc R2 store R2,a a may be also 1.

Page 32: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Scenario

P1:load R1,a

inc R1

store R1,a

P2:load R2,a inc R2 store R2,a

a=0

R1=0

R2=0

R1=1

R2=1

a=1

a=1

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Representing transitions

Each transition has two parts: The enabling condition: a predicate. The transformation: a multiple assignment.

For example:a>b (c,d ):=(d,c )This transition can be executed in states where a>b. The result of executing it isswitching the value of c with d.

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Initial condition

A predicate I. The program can

start from states s such that I (s) holds.

For example:I (s)=a >b /\ b >c.

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A transition system

A (finite) set of variables V over some domain.

A set of states . A (finite) set of transitions T, each

transition e t has an enabling condition e, and a transformation t.

An initial condition I.

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Example

V={a, b, c, d, e}. : all assignments of natural

numbers for variables in V. T={c >0(c,e):=(c -1,e +1),

d >0(d,e):=(d -1,e +1)} I: c =a /\ d =b /\ e =0 What does this transition system

do?

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The interleaving model

An execution is a maximal finite or infinite sequence of states s0, s1, s2, …That is: finite if nothing is enabled from the last state.

The first state s0 satisfies the initial condition, I.e., I (s0).

Moving from one state si to its successor si+1 is by executing a transition et: e (si), i.e., si satisfies e. si+1 is obtained by applying t to si.

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Example:

s0=<a=2, b=1, c=2, d=1, e=0>

s1=<a=2, b=1, c=1, d=1, e=1>

s2=<a=2, b=1, c=1, d=0, e=2>

s3=<a=2, b=1 ,c=0, d=0, e=3>

T={c>0(c,e):=(c -1,e +1),

d>0(d,e):=(d-1,e+1)}

I: c=a /\ d=b /\ e=0

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L0:While True do NC0:wait(Turn=0); CR0:Turn=1endwhile ||L1:While True do NC1:wait(Turn=1); CR1:Turn=0endwhile

T0:PC0=L0PC0:=NC0T1:PC0=NC0/\Turn=0 PC0:=CR0T2:PC0=CR0 (PC0,Turn):=(L0,1)T3:PC1=L1PC1=NC1T4:PC1=NC1/\Turn=1 PC1:=CR1T5:PC1=CR1 (PC1,Turn):=(L1,0) Initially: PC0=L0/\PC1=L1

The transitions

Is this the only reasonable way to model this program?

Page 40: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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The state graph:Successor relation between reachable states.

Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=0L0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,L1

Turn=0CR0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,NC1

Turn=0CR0,L1

Turn=1L0,CR1

Turn=1NC0,CR1

Turn=1L0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,L1

Turn=1L0,L1T0 T0T3 T3

T1 T4T3

T0 T3

T0

T0 T4T1 T3

T2

T2

T5

T5

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Some important points

Reachable states: obtained from an initial state through a sequence of enabled transitions.

Executions: the set of maximal paths (finite or terminating in a node where nothing is enabled).

Nondeterministic choice: when more than a single transition is enabled at a given state. We have a nondeterministic choice when at least one node at the state graph has more than one successor.

Page 42: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Always ¬(PC0=CR0/\PC1=CR1)(Mutual exclusion)

Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=0L0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,L1

Turn=0CR0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,NC1

Turn=0CR0,L1

Turn=1L0,CR1

Turn=1NC0,CR1

Turn=1L0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,L1

Turn=1L0,L1

Page 43: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Always if Turn=0 then at some point Turn=1

Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=0L0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,L1

Turn=0CR0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,NC1

Turn=0CR0,L1

Turn=1L0,CR1

Turn=1NC0,CR1

Turn=1L0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,L1

Turn=1L0,L1

Page 44: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Always if Turn=0 then at some point Turn=1

Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=0L0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,L1

Turn=0CR0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,NC1

Turn=0CR0,L1

Turn=1L0,CR1

Turn=1NC0,CR1

Turn=1L0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,L1

Turn=1L0,L1

Page 45: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Interleaving semantics:Execute one transition at a time.

Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=0L0,NC1

Turn=0CR0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,NC1

Turn=1L0,CR1

Turn=1L0,NC1

Need to check the property

for every possible interleaving!

Page 46: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Interleaving semantics

Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=0L0,NC1

Turn=0CR0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,NC1

Turn=1L0,CR1

Turn=1L0,NC1

Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=0L0,NC1

Page 47: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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L0:While True do NC0:wait(Turn=0); CR0:Turn=1endwhile ||L1:While True do NC1:wait(Turn=1); CR1:Turn=0endwhile

T0:PC0=L0PC0:=NC0T1:PC0=NC0/\Turn=0PC0:=CR0T1’:PC0=NC0/\Turn=1PC0:=NC0T2:PC0=CR0(PC0,Turn):=(L0,1)

T3:PC1==L1PC1=NC1T4:PC1=NC1/\Turn=1PC1:=CR1T4’:PC1=NC1/\Turn=0PC1:=NC1T5:PC1=CR1(PC1,Turn):=(L1,0)

Initially: PC0=L0/\PC1=L1

Busy waiting

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Always when Turn=0 then at some point Turn=1

Now it does not hold!(Red subgraph generates a counterexample execution.)

Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=0L0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,L1

Turn=0CR0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,NC1

Turn=0CR0,L1

Turn=1L0,CR1

Turn=1NC0,CR1

Turn=1L0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,L1

Turn=1L0,L1T4’ T1’

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Combinatorial explosion

V1:=1

V1:=3

V1:=2

Vn:=1

Vn:=3

Vn:=2…

How many states?

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Global states

3n states

v1=1,v2=1…vn=1

v1=2,v2=1…vn=1 v1=1,v2=1…vn=2…

v1=3,v2=1…vn=1 …

v1=1,v2=1…vn=3

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Specification Formalisms

(Book: Chapter 5)

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Properties of formalisms Formal. Unique interpretation. Intuitive. Simple to understand (visual). Succinct. Spec. of reasonable size. Effective.

Check that there are no contradictions. Check that the spec. is implementable. Check that the implementation satisfies spec.

Expressive. May be used to generate initial code.Specifying the implementation or its

properties?

Page 53: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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A transition system

A (finite) set of variables V. A set of states . A (finite) set of transitions T, each transition

et has an enabling condition e and a

transformation t. An initial condition I. Denote by R(s, s’) the fact that s’ is a

successor of s.

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The interleaving model

An execution is a finite or infinite sequence of states s0, s1, s2, …

The initial state satisfies the initial condition, I.e., I (s0).

Moving from one state si to si+1 is by executing a transition et: e(si), I.e., si satisfies e. si+1 is obtained by applying t to si.

Lets assume all sequences are infinite by extending finite ones by “stuttering” the last state.

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Temporal logic

Dynamic, speaks about several “worlds” and the relation between them.

Our “worlds” are the states in an execution.

There is a linear relation between them, each two sequences in our execution are ordered.

Interpretation: over an execution, later over all executions.

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LTL: Syntax

::= () | ¬ | /\ \/ U |O | p

“box”, “always”, “forever”“diamond”, “eventually”,

“sometimes”O “nexttime”U“until”Propositions p, q, r, … Each represents some

state property (x>y+1, z=t, at_CR, etc.)

Page 57: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Semantics over suffixes of execution

O

U

Page 58: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Can discard some operators

Instead of <>p, write true U p. Instead of []p, we can write

¬(<>¬p),or ¬(true U ¬p).Because []p=¬¬[]p.¬[]p means it is not true that p holds forever, or at some point ¬p holds or <>¬p.

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Combinations

[]<>p “p will happen infinitely often”

<>[]p “p will happen from some point forever”.

([]<>p) ([]<>q) “If p happens infinitely often, then q also happens infinitely often”.

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Some relations: [](/\)=([])/\([]) But <>(/\)(<>)/\(<>)

<>(\/)=(<>)\/(<>) But [](\/)([])\/([])

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What about

([]<>)/\([]<>)=[]<>(/\)?

([]<>)\/([]<>)=[]<>(\/)?

(<>[])/\(<>[])=<>[](/\)?

(<>[])\/(<>[])=<>[](\/)?

No, just

Yes!!!Yes!!!

No, just

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Formal semantic definition Let be a sequence s0 s1 s2 … Let i be a suffix of : si si+1 si+2 … (0 = ) i |= p, where p a proposition, if si|=p. i |= /\ if i |= and i |= . i |= \/ if i |= or i |= . i |= ¬ if it is not the case that i |= . i |= <> if for some ji, j |= . i |= [] if for each ji, j |= . i |= U if for some ji, j|=

and for each ik<j, k |=.

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Then we interpret: For a state:

s|=p as in propositional logic. For an execution:|= is interpreted over a sequence, as in previous slide.

For a system/program:P|=holds if |= for every sequence of P.

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Spring Example

s1 s3s2

pull

release

releaseextended

malfunction

extended

r0 = s1 s2 s1 s2 s1 s2 s1 …

r1 = s1 s2 s3 s3 s3 s3 s3 …

r2 = s1 s2 s1 s2 s3 s3 s3 …

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LTL satisfaction by a single sequence

malfunction

s1 s3s2pull

release

releaseextende

dextended

r2 = s1 s2 s1 s2 s3 s3 s3 …

r2 |= extended ??

r2 |= O extended ??

r2 |= O O extended ??

r2 |= <> extended ??

r2 |= [] extended ??

r2 |= <>[] extended ??

r2 |= ¬ <>[] extended ??

r2 |= (¬extended) U malfunction ??

r2 |= [](¬extended->O extended) ??

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LTL satisfaction by a system

malfunction

s1 s3s2pull

release

releaseextende

dextended

P |= extended ??

P |= O extended ??

P |= O O extended ??

P |= <> extended ??

P|= [] extended ??

P |= <>[] extended ??

P |= ¬ <>[] extended ??

P |= (¬extended) U malfunction ??

P |= [](¬extended->O extended) ??

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More specifications

[] (PC0=NC0 <> PC0=CR0) [] (PC0=NC0 U Turn=0) Try at home:

- The processes alternate in entering their critical sections.- Each process enters its critical section infinitely often.

Page 68: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Proof system ¬<>p<-->[]¬p [](pq)([]p[]q) []p(p/\O[]p) O¬p<-->¬Op [](pOp)(p[]p) (pUq)<-->(q\/(p/\

O(pUq))) (pUq)<>q

+ propositional logic axiomatization.

+ proof rule: _p_ []p

Page 69: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

69

Traffic light example

Green Yellow Red Always has exactly one light:

[](¬(gr/\ye)/\¬(ye/\re)/\¬(re/\gr)/\(gr\/ye\/re))Correct change of color:

[]((grU ye)\/(yeU re)\/(reU gr))

Page 70: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

70

Another kind of traffic light

GreenYellowRedYellowFirst attempt:

[](((gr\/re) U ye)\/(ye U (gr\/re)))

Correct specification:[]( (gr(gr U (ye /\ ( ye U re ))))

/\(re(re U (ye /\ ( ye U gr ))))

/\(ye(ye U (gr \/ re))))

Needed only when wecan start with yellow

Page 71: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

71

Properties of sequential programs

init-when the program starts and satisfies the initial condition.

finish-when the program terminates and nothing is enabled.

Partial correctness: init/\[](finish) Termination: init/\<>finish Total correctness: init/\<>(finish/\ ) Invariant: init/\[]

Page 72: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Automata over finite words A=<, S, , I, F> (finite) - the alphabet. S (finite) - the states. S x x S - the transition relation. I S - the starting states. F S - the accepting states.

a

a

b

bs0 s1

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The transition relation

(s0, a, s0) (s0, b, s1) (s1, a, s0) (s1, b, s1)

a

a

b

bs0 s1

Page 74: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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A run over a word A word over , e.g., abaab. A sequence of states, e.g. s0 s0 s1 s0 s0 s1. Starts with an initial state. Follows the transition relation (si, ci , si+1). Accepting if ends at accepting state.

a

a

b

bs0 s1

Page 75: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

75

The language of an automaton

The words that are accepted by the automaton.

Includes aabbba, abbbba. Does not include abab, abbb. What is the language?

a

a

b

bs0 s1

Page 76: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Nondeterministic automaton

Transitions: (s0,a ,s0), (s0,b ,s0), (s0,a ,s1),(s1,a ,s1).

What is the language of this automaton?

a,b aas0

s1

Page 77: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Equivalent deterministic automaton

b

a

as0 s1

b

a,b a as0 s1

Page 78: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

78

Automata over infinite words Similar definition. Runs on infinite words over . Accepts when an accepting state

occurs infinitely often in a run.

a

a

b

bs0 s1

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Automata over infinite words Consider the word abababab… There is a run s0s0s1s0s1s0s1 … This run in accepting, since s0

appears infinitely many times.

a

a

b

bs0 s1

Page 80: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Other runs For the word bbbbb… the run is

s0 s1 s1 s1 s1… and is not accepting. For the word aaabbbbb …, the

run is s0 s0 s0 s0 s1 s1 s1 s1 … What is the run for ababbabbb …?

a

a

b

bs0 s1

Page 81: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Nondeterministic automaton

What is the language of this automaton? What is the LTL specification if

b -- PC0=CR0, a =¬b?

•Can you find a deterministic automaton with same language?

•Can you prove there is no such deterministic automaton?

a,b a as0 s1

Page 82: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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No deterministic automaton for (a+b)*aω

In a deterministic automaton there is one run for each word.

After some sequence of a’s, i.e., aaa…a must reach some accepting state.

Now add b, obtaining aaa…ab. After some more a’s, i.e., aaa…abaaa…a must

reach some accepting state. Now add b, obtaining aaa…abaaa…ab. Continuing this way, one obtains a run that

has infinitely many b’s but reaches an accepting state(in a finite automaton, at least one would repeat) infinitely often.

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Specification using Automata

Let each letter correspond to some propositional property.

Example: a -- P0 enters critical section, b -- P0 does not enter section.

[]<>PC0=CR0

a

a

b

bs0 s1

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Mutual Exclusion

a -- PC0=CR0/\PC1=CR1 b -- ¬(PC0=CR0/\PC1=CR1) c -- true []¬(PC0=CR0/\PC1=CR1)

b a cs0 s1

Page 85: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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L0:While True do NC0:wait(Turn=0); CR0:Turn=1endwhile ||L1:While True do NC1:wait(Turn=1); CR1:Turn=0endwhile

T0:PC0=L0PC0=NC0T1:PC0=NC0/\Turn=0 PC0:=CR0T2:PC0=CR0 (PC0,Turn):=(L0,1)T3:PC1==L1PC1=NC1T4:PC1=NC1/\Turn=1 PC1:=CR1T5:PC1=CR1 (PC1,Turn):=(L1,0)

Initially: PC0=L0/\PC1=L1

Apply now to our program:

Page 86: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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The state space

Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=0L0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,L1

Turn=0CR0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,NC1

Turn=0CR0,L1

Turn=1L0,CR1

Turn=1NC0,CR1

Turn=1L0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,L1

Turn=1L0,L1

Page 87: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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[]¬(PC0=CR0/\PC1=CR1)(Mutual exclusion)

Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=0L0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,L1

Turn=0CR0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,NC1

Turn=0CR0,L1

Turn=1L0,CR1

Turn=1NC0,CR1

Turn=1L0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,L1

Turn=1L0,L1

Page 88: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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[](Turn=0 <>Turn=1)

Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=0L0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,L1

Turn=0CR0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,NC1

Turn=0CR0,L1

Turn=1L0,CR1

Turn=1NC0,CR1

Turn=1L0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,L1

Turn=1L0,L1

Page 89: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Interleaving semantics:Execute one transition at a time.

Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=0L0,NC1

Turn=0CR0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,NC1

Turn=1L0,CR1

Turn=1L0,NC1

Need to check the property

for every possible interleaving!

Page 90: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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[](Turn=0 <>Turn=1)

Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=0L0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,L1

Turn=0CR0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,NC1

Turn=0CR0,L1

Turn=1L0,CR1

Turn=1NC0,CR1

Turn=1L0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,L1

Turn=1L0,L1

Page 91: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

91

Correctness condition

We want to find a correctness condition for a model to satisfy a specification.

Language of a model: L(Model) Language of a specification:

L(Spec).

We need: L(Model) L(Spec).

Page 92: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Correctness

All sequences

Sequences satisfying Spec

Program executions

Page 93: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Incorrectness

All sequences

Sequences satisfying Spec

Program executions

Counter

examples

Page 94: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

94

Automatic Verification

(Book: Chapter 6)

Page 95: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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How can we check the model?

The model is a graph. The specification should refer the

the graph representation. Apply graph theory algorithms.

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What properties can we check?

Invariant: a property that needs to hold in each state.

Deadlock detection: can we reach a state where the program is blocked?

Dead code: does the program have parts that are never executed.

Page 97: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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How to perform the checking?

Apply a search strategy (Depth first search, Breadth first search).

Check states/transitions during the search.

If property does not hold, report counter example!

Page 98: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

98

If it is so good, why learn deductive verification methods?

Model checking works only for finite state systems. Would not work with Unconstrained integers. Unbounded message queues. General data structures:

queues trees stacks

parametric algorithms and systems.

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The state space explosion

Need to represent the state space of a program in the computer memory. Each state can be as big as the entire

memory! Many states:

Each integer variable has 2^32 possibilities. Two such variables have 2^64 possibilities.

In concurrent protocols, the number of states usually grows exponentially with the number of processes.

Page 100: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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If it is so constrained, is it of any use?

Many protocols are finite state. Many programs or procedure are finite

state in nature. Can use abstraction techniques.

Sometimes it is possible to decompose a program, and prove part of it by model checking and part by theorem proving.

Many techniques to reduce the state space explosion.

Page 101: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Depth First Search

Program DFSFor each s such that

Init(s) dfs(s)end DFS

Procedure dfs(s)for each s’ such

that R(s,s’) do

If new(s’) then dfs(s’)

end dfs.

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102

Start from an initial state

q3

q4

q2

q1

q5

q1

q1

Stack:

Hash table:

Page 103: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

103

Continue with a successor

q3

q4

q2

q1

q5

q1 q2

q1

q2

Stack:

Hash table:

Page 104: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

104

One successor of q2.

q3

q4

q2

q1

q5

q1 q2 q4

q1

q2

q4

Stack:

Hash table:

Page 105: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

105

Backtrack to q2 (no new successors for q4).

q3

q4

q2

q1

q5

q1 q2 q4

q1

q2

Stack:

Hash table:

Page 106: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

106

Backtracked to q1

q3

q4

q2

q1

q5

q1 q2 q4

q1

Stack:

Hash table:

Page 107: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

107

Second successor to q1.

q3

q4

q2

q1

q5

q1 q2 q4 q3

q1

q3

Stack:

Hash table:

Page 108: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

108

Backtrack again to q1.

q3

q4

q2

q1

q5

q1 q2 q4 q3

q1

Stack:

Hash table:

Page 109: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

109

How can we check properties with DFS?

Invariants: check that all reachable statessatisfy the invariant property. If not, showa path from an initial state to a bad state.

Deadlocks: check whether a state where noprocess can continue is reached.

Dead code: as you progress with the DFS, mark all the transitions that are executed at least once.

Page 110: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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The state graph:Successor relation between states.

Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=0L0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,L1

Turn=0CR0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,NC1

Turn=0CR0,L1

Turn=1L0,CR1

Turn=1NC0,CR1

Turn=1L0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,L1

Turn=1L0,L1

Page 111: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

111

¬(PC0=CR0/\PC1=CR1) is an invariant!

Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=0L0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,L1

Turn=0CR0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,NC1

Turn=0CR0,L1

Turn=1L0,CR1

Turn=1NC0,CR1

Turn=1L0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,L1

Turn=1L0,L1

Page 112: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Want to do more!

Want to check more properties. Want to have a unique algorithm to

deal with all kinds of properties. This is done by writing specification

in more complicated formalisms. We will see that in the next lecture.

Page 113: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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[](Turn=0 <>Turn=1)

Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=0L0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,L1

Turn=0CR0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,NC1

Turn=0CR0,L1

Turn=1L0,CR1

Turn=1NC0,CR1

Turn=1L0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,L1

Turn=1L0,L1

Page 114: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

114

Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=0L0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,L1

Turn=0CR0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,NC1

Turn=0CR0,L1

Turn=1L0,CR1

Turn=1NC0,CR1

Turn=1L0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,L1

Turn=1L0,L1

init

New initial stateConvert graph into Buchi automaton

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115

Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=1L0,L1

init

•Propositions are attached to incoming nodes.

•All nodes are accepting.

Turn=1L0,L1

Turn=0L0,L1

Page 116: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Correctness condition

We want to find a correctness condition for a model to satisfy a specification.

Language of a model: L(Model) Language of a specification:

L(Spec).

We need: L(Model) L(Spec).

Page 117: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Correctness

All sequences

Sequences satisfying Spec

Program executions

Page 118: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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How to prove correctness?

Show that L(Model) L(Spec). Equivalently: ______

Show that L(Model) L(Spec) = Ø. Also: can obtain Spec by

translating from LTL!

Page 119: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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What do we need to know?

How to intersect two automata? How to complement an

automaton? How to translate from LTL to an

automaton?

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Intersecting M1=(S1,,T1,I1,A1) and M2=(S2,,T2,I2,S2)

Run the two automata in parallel. Each state is a pair of states: S1 x S2

Initial states are pairs of initials: I1 x I2

Acceptance depends on first component: A1 x S2

Conforms with transition relation:(x1,y1)-a->(x2,y2) whenx1-a->x2 and y1-a->y2.

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121

Example (all states of second automaton accepting!)

a

bct0 t1

a

a

b,c

b,cs0 s1

States: (s0,t0), (s0,t1), (s1,t0), (s1,t1).

Accepting: (s0,t0), (s0,t1). Initial: (s0,t0).

Page 122: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

122

a

bct0 t1

a

a

b,c

b,cs0 s1

s0,t0

s0,t1

s1,t1

s1,t0b

b

a

c

a

c

Page 123: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

123

More complicated when A2S2

a

b

ct0 t1

a

a

b,cb,cs0 s1

Should we have acceptance when both components accepting? I.e., {(s0,t1)}?

No, consider (ba)

It should be accepted, but never passes that state.

s0,t0

s0,t1

s1,t1

b

a

c

a

c

Page 124: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

124

More complicated when A2S2

a

b

ct0 t1

a

a

b,cb,cs0 s1

Should we have acceptance when at least one components is accepting? I.e., {(s0,t0),(s0,t1),(s1,t1)}?No, consider b c

It should not be accepted, but here will loop through (s1,t1)

s0,t0

s0,t1

s1,t1

b

c

a

c

a

Page 125: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Intersection - general case

q0 q2

q3q1

q0,q3 q1,q3q1,q2

a a, c

c

c, bb

c

c

b

a

Page 126: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

126

Version 0: to catch q0

Version 1: to catch q2

q0,q3 q1,q3q1,q2

q0,q3 q1,q3q1,q2

Move when see accepting of left (q0)

Move when see accepting of right (q2)

Version 0

Version 1

c

c

c

c

b

a

b

a

Page 127: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

127

Version 0: to catch q0

Version 1: to catch q2

q0,q3 q1,q3q1,q2

q0,q3 q1,q3q1,q2

Move when see accepting of left (q0)

Move when see accepting of right (q2)

Version 0

Version 1

c

c

c

c

b

a

b

a

Page 128: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Make an accepting state in one of the version according to a component accepting state

q0,q3,0 q1,q3,0q1,q2,0

q0,q3,1 q1,q3 ,1q1,q2 ,1

Version 1

Version 0

c

c

c

c

b

ab

a

Page 129: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

129

How to check for emptiness?

s0,t0

s0,t1

s1,t1

b

a

c

a

c

Page 130: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Emptiness...

Need to check if there exists an accepting run (passes through an accepting state infinitely often).

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Strongly Connected Component (SCC)

A set of states with a path between each pair of them.

Can use Tarjan’s DFS algorithm for finding maximal SCC’s.

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Finding accepting runs

If there is an accepting run, then at least one accepting state repeats on it forever.

Look at a suffix of this run where all the states appear infinitely often.

These states form a strongly connected component on the automaton graph, including an accepting state.

Find a component like that and form an accepting cycle including the accepting state.

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Equivalently...

A strongly connected component: a set of nodes where each node is reachable by a path from each other node. Find a reachable strongly connected component with an accepting node.

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134

How to complement?

Complementation is hard! Can ask for the negated property (the

sequences that should never occur). Can translate from LTL formula to

automaton A, and complement A. But:can translate ¬ into an automaton directly!

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Model Checking under Fairness

Express the fairness as a property φ.To prove a property ψ under fairness,model check φψ.

Fair (φ)

Bad (¬ψ) Program

Counter

example

Page 136: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Model Checking under Fairness

Specialize model checking. For weak process fairness: search for a reachable strongly connected component, where for each process P either it contains on occurrence of a

transition from P, or it contains a state where P is

disabled.

Page 137: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Translating from logic to automata

(Book: Chapter 6)

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Why translating?

Want to write the specification in some logic.

Want model-checking tools to be able to check the specification automatically.

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Generalized Büchi automata

Acceptance condition F is a setF={f1 , f2 , … , fn } where each fi is a set of states.

To accept, a run needs to pass infinitely often through a state from every set fi .

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Translating into simple Büchi automaton

q0 q2q1

q0 q2q1

Version 0

Version 1

c

c

c

c

b

a

b

a

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141

Translating into simple Büchi automaton

q0 q2q1

q0 q2q1

Version 0

Version 1

c

c

c

c

b

b

a

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142

Translating into simple Büchi automaton

q0 q2q1

q0 q2q1

Version 0

Version 1

c

c

c

c

b

a

b

a

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Preprocessing

Convert into normal form, where negation only applies to propositional variables.

¬[] becomes <>¬. ¬<> becomes [] ¬. What about ¬ ( U )? Define operator R such that

¬ ( U ) = (¬) R (¬), ¬ ( R ) = (¬) U (¬).

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Semantics of pR q

p

qqq qq qq

q

qq

q qqq

¬p¬p¬p

¬p ¬p ¬p ¬p ¬p ¬p ¬p ¬p¬p

¬p

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Replace ¬true by false, and ¬false by true.

Replace ¬ ( \/ ) by (¬) /\ (¬) and ¬ ( /\ ) by (¬) \/ (¬)

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Eliminate implications, <>, []

Replace -> by (¬ ) \/ . Replace <> by (true U ). Replace [] by (false R ).

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Example

Translate ( []<>P ) ( []<>Q ) Eliminate implication ¬( []<>P ) \/ ( []<>Q ) Eliminate [], <>:

¬( false R ( true U P ) ) \/ ( false R ( true U Q ) )

Push negation inwards:(true U (false R ¬ P ) ) \/ ( false R ( true U Q ) )

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The data structure

Incoming

New Old

NextName

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The main idea

U = \/ ( /\ O ( U ) ) R = /\ ( \/ O ( R ) ) This separates the formulas to two

parts:one holds in the current state, and the otherin the next state.

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How to translate?

Take one formula from “New” and add it to “Old”.

According to the formula, either Split the current node into two, or Evolve the node into a new version.

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Splitting

Incoming

New Old

Next

Incoming

New Old

Next

Incoming

New Old

Next

Copy incoming edges, update other field.

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Evolving

Incoming

New Old

Next

Incoming

New Old

Next

Copy incoming edges, update other field.

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Possible cases:

U , split: Add to New, add U to Next. Add to New.Because U = \/ ( /\ O (U )).

R , split: Add to New. Add to New, R to Next.Because R = /\ ( \/ O ( R )).

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More cases:

\/ , split: Add to New. Add to New.

/\ , evolve: Add to New.

O , evolve: Add to Next.

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How to start?

Incoming

New Old

Next

init

aU(bUc)

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Incoming

init

aU(bUc)

Incoming Incoming

aU(bUc)aU(bUc) bUc

aU(bUc)

a

init init

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Incoming

aU(bUc)bUc

init initIncoming Incoming

aU(bUc)aU(bUc) c

(bUc)

bbUc bUc

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When to stop splitting?

When “New” is empty. Then compare against a list of existing

nodes “Nodes”: If such a with same “Old”, “Next” exists,

just add the incoming edges of the new versionto the old one.

Otherwise, add the node to “Nodes”. Generate a successor with “New” set to “Next” of father.

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Incoming

a,aU(bUc)

aU(bUc)

init

Incoming

aU(bUc)

Creating a successor node.

When we enter to Nodes a new node (with different Old or Next than any other node), we start a new node by copying Next to New, and making an edge to the new successor.

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How to obtain the automaton?

There is an edge from node X to Y labeled with propositions P (negated or non negated), if X is in the incoming list of Y, and Y has propositions P in field “Old”.

Initial node is init.

Incoming

New Old

Next

X

Node Y

a, b, ¬c

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The resulted nodes.

a, aU(bUc) b, bUc, aU(bUc) c, bUc, aU(bUc)

b, bUc c, bUc

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a, aU(bUc) b, bUc, aU(bUc) c, bUc, aU(bUc)

b, bUc c, bUc

All nodes with incoming edge from “init”.

Initial nodes

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Include only atomic propositions

Init

a

b

c

cb

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Acceptance conditions

Use “generalized Buchi automata”, wherethere are several acceptance sets f1, f2, …, fn, and each accepted infinite sequence must include at least one state from each set infinitely often.

Each set corresponds to a subformula of form U. Guarantees that it is never the case that U holds forever, without .

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Accepting w.r.t. bU c

a, aU(bUc) b, bUc, aU(bUc) c, bUc, aU(bUc)

b, bUc c, bUc

All nodes with c, or without bUc.

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Acceptance w.r.t. aU (bU c)

a, aU(bUc) b, bUc, aU(bUc) c, bUc, aU(bUc)

b, bUc c, bUc

All nodes with bUc or without aU(bUc).

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The SPIN System

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What is SPIN?

Model-checker. Based on automata theory. Allows LTL or automata

specification Efficient (on-the-fly model

checking, partial order reduction). Developed in Bell Laboratories.

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Documentation

Paper: The model checker SPIN,G.J. Holzmann, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, Vol 23, 279-295.

Web: http://www.spinroot.com

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The language of SPIN

The expressions are from C. The communication is from CSP. The constructs are from Guarded

Command.

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Expressions

Arithmetic: +, -, *, /, % Comparison: >, >=, <, <=, ==,

!= Boolean: &&, ||, ! Assignment: = Increment/decrement: ++, --

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Declaration

byte name1, name2=4, name3; bit b1,b2,b3; short s1,s2; int arr1[5];

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Message types and channels

mtype = {OK, READY, ACK} mtype Mvar = ACK

chan Ng=[2] of {byte, byte, mtype}, Next=[0] of {byte}Ng has a buffer of 2, each message consists of two bytes and an enumerable type (mtype).Next is used with handshake message passing.

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Sending and receiving a message

Channel declaration:

chan qname=[3] of {mtype, byte, byte}

In sender:

qname!tag3(expr1, expr2)or equivalently:qname!tag3, expr1, expr2

In Receiver:

qname?tag3(var1,var2)

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Defining an array of channels

Channel declaration: chan qname=[3] of {mtype, byte,

byte}defines a channel with buffer size 3.

chan comm[5]=[0] of {byte, byte}defines an array of channels (indexed 0 to 4. Communication is synchronous (handshaking), meaning that the sender waits for the receiver.

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Condition

if:: x%2==1 -> z=z*y; x--:: x%2==0 -> y=y*y; x=x/2fi

If more than one guard is enabled: a nondeterministic choice.

If no guard is enabled: the process waits (until a guard becomes enabled).

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Looping

do:: x>y -> x=x-y:: y>x -> y=y-x:: else breakod;

Normal way to terminate a loop: with break. (or goto).

As in condition, we may have a nondeterministic loop or have to wait.

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Processes

Definition of a process: proctype prname (byte Id; chan Comm){ statements}

Activation of a process:run prname (7, Con[1]);

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init process is the root of activating all others

init { statements }init {byte I=0; atomic{do ::I<10 -> run prname(I, chan[I]);

I=I+1 ::I=10 -> break; od}}atomic allows performing several actions as

one atomic step.

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Exmaples of Mutual exclusion

Reference:A. Ben-Ari, Principles of Concurrent

and Distributed Programs, Prentice-Hall 1990.

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General structure

loop

Non_Critical_Section;

TR:Pre_Protocol; CR:Critical_Section; Post_protocol;end loop;

Propositions:inCRi, inTRi.

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Properties

loop

Non_Critical_Section;

TR:Pre_Protocol; CR:Critical_Section; Post_protocol;end loop;

Assumption:~<>[]inCRiRequirements:[]~(inCR0/\inCR1)[](inTRi<>inCRi)Not assuming:[]<>inTRi

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Turn:bit:=1;

task P0 is

begin

loop

Non_Critical_Sec;

Wait Turn=0;

Critical_Sec;

Turn:=1;

end loop

end P0.

task P1 is

begin

loop

Non_Critical_Sec;

Wait Turn=1;

Critical_Sec;

Turn:=0;

end loop

end P1.

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Translating into SPIN

#define critical (incrit[0] ||incrit[1])

byte turn=0, incrit[2]=0;proctype P (bool id){ do :: 1 -> do :: 1 -> skip :: 1 -> break od;

try:do ::turn==id -> break od; cr:incrit[id]=1; incrit[id]=0; turn=1-turn od}init { atomic{ run P(0); run P(1) } }

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The leader election algorithm

A directed ring of computers. Each has a unique value. Communication is from left to right.

Find out which value is the greatest.

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Example

7

2

312

9

4

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Informal description:

Initially, all the processes are active.

A process that finds out it does not represent a value that can be maximal turns to be passive.

A passive process just transfers values from left to right.

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More description

The algorithm executes in phases. In each phase, each process first sends

itscurrent value to the right.

Each process, when receiving the first value from its left compares it to its current value. If same: this is the maximum. Tell others. Not same: send current value again to left.

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Continued

When receiving the second value: compare the three values received. These are values of the process itself. of the left active process. of the second active process on the left.

If the left active process has greatest value among three, then keep this value. Otherwise, become passive.

Page 190: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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7

2

312

9

4

3

2

9

7

4

12

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191

7

2

312

9

4

3, 7

2, 9

9, 4

7, 2

4, 12

12, 3

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7

2

312

9

4

3, 7

2, 9

9, 4

7, 2

4, 12

12, 3

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9

7

12

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9

7

12

12, 7

7, 9

9, 12

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12

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send(1, my_number);state:=active;when

received(1,number) do

if state=active then if number!=max then send(2, number); neighbor:=number; else (max is

greatest, send to all processes); end if; else send(1,number); end if;end do;

when received(2,number) do

if state=active then if neighbor>number

and neighbor>max then

max:=neighbor; send(1, neighbor); else state:=passive; end if; else send(2, number); end if;end do;

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Now, translate into SPIN (Promela) code

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Running SPIN

Can download and implement (for free) using www.spinroot.com

Available in our system. Graphical interface: xspin

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Homework: check properties

There is never more than one maximal value found.

A maximal value is eventually found.

From the time a maximal value is found, we continue to have one maximal value.

There is no maximal value until a moment where there is one such value, and from there, there is exactly one value until the end.

The maximal value is always 5.

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Dekker’s algorithm

P1::while true do begin non-critical section 1 c1:=0; while c2=0 do begin if turn=2 then begin c1:=1; wait until turn=1; end end critical section 1 c1:=1; turn:=2 end.

P2::while true do begin non-critical section 2 c2:=0; while c1=0 do begin if turn=1 then begin c2:=1; wait until turn=2; end end critical section 2 c2:=1; turn:=1 end.

boolean c1 initially 1;

boolean c2 initially 1;

integer (1..2) turn initially 1;

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Project

Model in Spin Specify properties Do model checking Can this work without fairness? What to do with fairness?

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Modeling issues

Book: chapters 4.12, 5.4, 8.4, 10.1

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Fairness

(Book: Chapter 4.12, 8.3, 8.4)

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Dekker’s algorithm

P1::while true do begin non-critical section 1 c1:=0; while c2=0 do begin if turn=2 then begin c1:=1; wait until turn=1;

c1:=0; end end critical section 1 c1:=1; turn:=2 end.

P2::while true do begin non-critical section 2 c2:=0; while c1=0 do begin if turn=1 then begin c2:=1; wait until turn=2;

c2:=0; end end critical section 2 c2:=1; turn:=1 end.

boolean c1 initially 1;

boolean c2 initially 1;

integer (1..2) turn initially 1;

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Dekker’s algorithm

P1::while true do begin non-critical section 1 c1:=0; while c2=0 do begin if turn=2 then begin c1:=1; wait until turn=1;

c1:=0; end end critical section 1 c1:=1; turn:=2 end.

P2::while true do begin non-critical section 2 c2:=0; while c1=0 do begin if turn=1 then begin c2:=1; wait until turn=2;

c2:=0; end end critical section 2 c2:=1; turn:=1 end.

boolean c1 initially 1;

boolean c2 initially 1;

integer (1..2) turn initially 1;

c1=c2=0,turn=1

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Dekker’s algorithm

P1::while true do begin non-critical section 1 c1:=0; while c2=0 do begin if turn=2 then begin c1:=1; wait until turn=1;

c1:=0; end end critical section 1 c1:=1; turn:=2 end.

P2::while true do begin non-critical section 2 c2:=0; while c1=0 do begin if turn=1 then begin c2:=1; wait until turn=2;

c2:=0; end end critical section 2 c2:=1; turn:=1 end.

boolean c1 initially 1;

boolean c2 initially 1;

integer (1..2) turn initially 1;

c1=c2=0,turn=1

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Dekker’s algorithm

P1::while true do begin non-critical section 1 c1:=0; while c2=0 do begin if turn=2 then begin c1:=1; wait until turn=1;

c1:=0; end end critical section 1 c1:=1; turn:=2 end.

P2::while true do begin non-critical section 2 c2:=0; while c1=0 do begin if turn=1 then begin c2:=1; wait until turn=2;

c2:=0; end end critical section 2 c2:=1; turn:=1 end.

P1 waits for P2 to set c2 to 1 again.Since turn=1 (priority for P1), P2 is ready to do that. But never gets the chance, since P1 is constantly active checking c2 in its while loop.

c1=c2=0,turn=1

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0:START P10:START P1

11:c1:=111:c1:=1

12:true12:true

13:end13:end2:c1:=02:c1:=0

8:c2=0?8:c2=0?

7:turn=2?7:turn=2?

6:c1:=06:c1:=0

3:c1:=13:c1:=1

11:turn:=211:turn:=2

10:c1:=110:c1:=1

9:critical-19:critical-1

4:no-op4:no-op

5:turn=2?5:turn=2?

nono

nono

nono

nonoyesyes

yesyes

yesyes

yesyes

0:START P20:START P2

11:c2:=111:c2:=1

12:true12:true

13:end13:end2:c2:=02:c2:=0

8:c1=0?8:c1=0?

7:turn=1?7:turn=1?

6:c2:=06:c2:=0

3:c2:=13:c2:=1

11:turn:=111:turn:=1

10:c2:=110:c2:=1

9:critical-29:critical-2

4:no-op4:no-op

5:turn=1?5:turn=1?

nono

nono

nono

nonoyesyes

yesyes

yesyes

yesyes

Initially:

turn=1

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What went wrong? The execution is unfair to P2.

It is not allowed a chance to execute.

Such an execution is due to the interleaving model (just picking an enabled transition).

If it did, it would continue and set c2 to 0, which would allow P1 to progress.

Fairness = excluding some of the executions in the interleaving model, which do not correspond to actual behavior of the system.

while c1=0 do begin if turn=1 then begin c2:=1; wait until turn=2;

c2:=0; end end

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Recall:The interleaving model An execution is a finite or infinite sequence of states s0, s1,

s2, … The initial state satisfies the initial condition, I.e., I (s0). Moving from one state si to si+1 is by executing a transition

et: e(si), I.e., si satisfies e. si+1 is obtained by applying t to si.

Now: consider only “fair” executions. Fairness constrains sequences that are considered to be executions.

Fair executions

Sequences Executions

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Some fairness definitions Weak transition fairness:

It cannot happen that a transition is enabled indefinitely, but is never executed.

Weak process fairness: It cannot happen that a process is enabled indefinitely, but non of its transitions is ever executed

Strong transition fairness:If a transition is infinitely often enabled, it will get executed.

Strong process fairness:If at least one transition of a process is infinitely often enabled, a transition of this process will be executed.

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How to use fairness constraints? Assume in the negative that some

property (e.g., termination) does not hold, because of some transitions or processes prevented from execution.

Show that such executions are impossible, as they contradict fairness assumption.

We sometimes do not know in reality which fairness constraint is guaranteed.

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Example

P1::x=1 P2: do :: y==0 ->

if :: true

:: x==1 -> y=1 fi

od

Initially: x=0; y=0;

In order for the loop to terminate (in a deadlock !) we need P1 to execute the assignment. But P1 may never execute, since P2 is in a loop executing true. Consequently, x==1 never holds, and y is never assigned a 1.

pc1=l0(pc1,x):=(l1,1) /* x=1 */

pc2=r0/\y=0pc2=r1 /* y==0*/

pc2=r1pc2=r0 /* true */

pc2=r1/\x=1(pc2,y):=(r0,1) /* x==1 y:=1 */

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Weak transition fairness

P1::x=1P2: do :: y==0 ->

if :: true

:: x==1 -> y=1

fi od

Initially: x=0; y=0;

Under weak transition fairness, P1 would assign 1 to x, but this does not guarantee that 1 is assigned to y and thus the P2 loop will terminates, since the transition for checking x==1 is not continuously enabled (program counter not always there).

Weak process fairness only guarantees P1 to execute, but P2 can still choose the true guard.Strong process fairness: same.

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Strong transition fairness

P1::x=1 P2: do :: y==0 ->

if :: true

:: x==1 -> y=1 fi

od

Initially: x=0; y=0;

Under strong transition fairness, P1 would assign 1 to x. If the execution was infinite, the transition checking x==1 was infinitely often enabled. Hence it would be eventually selected. Then assigning y=1, the main loop is not enabled anymore.

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Specifying fairness conditions

Express properties over an alternating sequence of states and transitions:s0 1 s1 1 s2 …

Use transition predicates exec.

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Some fairness definitions

Weak transition fairness:

/\ T (<>[]en []<>exec).

Equivalently: /\aT ¬<>[](en /\¬exec)

Weak process fairness:

/\Pi (<>[]enPi []<>execPi ) Strong transition fairness:

/\ T ([]<>en []<>exec )

Strong process fairness:

/\Pi ([]<>enPi []<>execPi )

exec is executed.

execPi some transition of Pi is executed.

en is enabled.

enPi some transition of process Pi is enabled.

enPi = \/ Pi en

execPi = \/ Pi exec

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“Weaker fairness condition”

A is weaker than B if B A.(Means A has more executions than B.)

Consider the executions L(A) and L(B). Then L(B) L(A).

If an execution is strong {process/transition} fair, then it is also weak {process/transition} fair.

There are fewer strong {process,transition} fair executions.

Strongtransitionfair execs

Weakprocess

fair execs

Weaktransitionfair execs

Strongprocess

fair execs

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Fairness is an abstraction; no scheduler can guarantee exactly all fair executions!

Initially: x=0, y=0P1::x=1

||P2::do

:: x==0 -> y=y+1 :: x==1 -> break od

x=0,y=0

x=0,y=1x=1,y=0

x=1,y=1x=0,y=2

x=1,y=2Under fairness assumption (any of the four defined),P1 will execute the assignment, and consequently, P2 will terminate. All executions are finite and there are infinitely many of them, and infinitely many states. Thus, an execution tree (the state space) will potentially look like the one on the right, but with infinitely many states, finite branching and only finite sequences. But according to König’s Lemma there is no such tree!

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Model Checking under fairness

Instead of verifying that the program satisfies , verify it satisfies fair

Problem: may be inefficient. Also fairness formula may involves special arrangement for specifying what exec means.

May specialize model checking algorithm instead.

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Model Checking under Fairness

Specialize model checking. For weak process fairness: search for a reachable strongly connected component, where for each process P either it contains on occurrence of a

transition from P, or it contains a state where P is

disabled. Weak transition fairness: similar. Strong fairness: much more difficult

algorithm.

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Abstractions

(Book: Chapter 10.1)

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Problems with software analysis

Many possible outcomes and interactions.

Not manageable by an algorithm (undecideable, complex).

Requires a lot of practice and ingenuity (e.g., finding invariants).

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More problems

Testing methods fail to cover potential errors. Deductive verification techniques require

too much time, mathematical expertise, ingenuity.

Model checking requires a lot of time/space and may introduce modeling errors.

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How to alleviate the complexity?

Abstraction Compositionality Partial Order Reduction Symmetry

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Abstraction

Represent the program using a smaller model.

Pay attention to preserving the checked properties.

Do not affect the flow of control.

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Main idea

Use smaller data objects.

x:= f(m)y:=g(n)if x*y>0 then … else …x, y never used again.

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How to abstract?

Assign values {-1, 0, 1} to x and y. Based on the following connection:

sgn(x) = 1 if x>0, 0 if x=0, and -1 if x<0.sgn(x)*sgn(y)=sgn(x*y).

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Abstraction mapping

S - states, I - initial states. L(s) - labeling.

R(S,S) - transition relation. h(s) maps s into its abstract image.

Full model -h Abstract model I(s) I(h(s)) R(s, t) R(h(s),h(t)) L(h(s))=L(s)

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230

Traffic light example

go

stop

stop

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go

stop

stop

go

stop

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What do we preserve?

go

stop

stop

go

stop

Every execution of the full model can be simulated by an execution of the reduced one.

Every LTL property that holds in the reduced model hold in the full one.

But there can be properties holding for the original model but not the abstract one.

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Preserved: [](go->O stop)

go

stop

stop

go

stop

Not preserved:

[]<>go

Counterexamples need to be checked.

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234

Symmetry

A permutation is a one-one and onto function p:AA.For example, 13, 24, 31, 45, 52.

One can combine permutations, e.g.,p1: 13, 21, 32p2: 12, 21, 33p1@p2: 13, 22, 31

A set of permutations with @ is called a symmetry group.

Page 235: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

235

Using symmetry in analysis

Want to find some symmetry group suchthat for each permutation p in it,R(s,t) if and only if R(p(s), p(t))and L(p(s))=L(s).

Let K(s) be all the states that can be permuted to s. This is a set of states such that each one can be permuted to the other.

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Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=0L0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,L1

Turn=0CR0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,NC1

Turn=0CR0,L1

Turn=1L0,CR1

Turn=1NC0,CR1

Turn=1L0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,NC1

Turn=1NC0,L1

Turn=1L0,L1

init

Page 237: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Turn=0L0,L1

Turn=0L0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,L1

Turn=0CR0,NC1

Turn=0NC0,NC1

Turn=0CR0,L1

init

The quotient model

Page 238: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

238

Homework: what is preserved in the following buffer abstraction? What is not preserved?

e

empty

quasi

full

q

q

q

f

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239

BDD representation

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Computation Tree Logic. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

p p

p

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

EG p

p p p p

p

p p

AF p

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Computation Tree Logic

q q

q

p

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

p

q

p

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

E pUq

p

A pUq

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Example formulas

CTL formulas: mutual exclusion: AG ( cs1

cs2) non starvation: AG (request

AF grant) “sanity” check: EF request

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Model Checking M |= f[Clarke, Emerson, Sistla 83]

The Model Checking algorithm works iterativelyon subformulas of f , from simpler subformulas to more complex ones

When checking subformula g of f we assume that all subformulas of g have already been checked

For subformula g, the algorithm returns the set of states that satisfy g ( Sg ) The algorithm has time complexity: O(|M||f|)

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Model checking f = EF g

Given a model M= < S, I, R, L >and Sg the sets of states satisfying g in M

procedure CheckEF (Sg )

Q := emptyset; Q’ := Sg ;while Q Q’ do Q := Q’; Q’ := Q { s | s' [ R(s,s’)

Q(s’) ] }end whileSf := Q ; return(Sf )

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g

g

g

f

f

f

f

f

f

f

Example: f = EF g

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Model checking f = EG g

CheckEG gets M= < S, I, R, L > and Sg

and returns Sf

procedure CheckEG (Sg)

Q := S ; Q’ := Sg ;

while Q Q’ do Q := Q’; Q’ := Q { s | s' [ R(s,s’) Q(s’) ] }end whileSf := Q ; return(Sf )

Page 247: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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g

g

g

g

g

g

Example: f = EG g

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Symbolic model checking[Burch, Clarke, McMillan, Dill 1990]

If the model is given explicitly (e.g. by adjacent

matrix) then only systems with about ten Boolean

variables (~1000 states) can be handledSymbolic model checking uses Binary Decision Diagrams ( BDDs )to represent the model and sets of states. It

can handle systems with hundreds of Boolean variables.

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Binary decision diagrams (BDDs) [Bryant 86]

Data structure for representing Boolean functions

Often concise in memory Canonical representation Boolean operations on BDDs can

be done in polynomial time in the BDD size

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Assume that states in model M are encoded by {0,1}n and described by Boolean variables v1...vn

Sf can be represented by a BDD over v1...vn

R (a set of pairs of states (s,s’) ) can be represented by a BDD over v1...vn v1’...vn’

BDDs in model checking

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BDD definition A tree representation of a Boolean

formula. Each leaf represents 0 (false) or 1 (true). Each internal leaf represents a node. If we follow a path in the tree and go

from a node left (low) on 0 and right (high) on 1, we obtain a leaf that corresponds to the value of the formula under this truth assignment.

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Examplea

b c

c c b b

)a/\(b\/¬c)¬)/\(a/\(b/\c)(

0 0 0 11 1 0 1

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OBDD: there is some fixed appearance order between variables, e.g., a<b<c

)a/\(b\/¬c)¬)/\(a/\(b/\c)(

a

b b

c c c c

0 0 0 11 0 1 1

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In reduced form: combine all leafs with same values, all isomorphic subgraph.

a

b b

c c c c

)a/\(b\/¬c)¬)/\(a/\(b/\c)(

0 0 0 11 0 1 1

In addition, remove nodes with identical children (low(x)=high(x)).

Page 255: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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In reduced form: combine all leafs with same values, all isomorphic subgraph.

a

b b

c c c c

)a/\(b\/¬c)¬)/\(a/\(b/\c)(

0 1

In addition, remove (shortcut) nodes with identical children (low(x)=high(x)).Apply bottom up until not possible.

Page 256: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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In reduced form: combine all leafs with same values, all isomorphic subgraph.

a

b b

c c c c

)a/\(b\/¬c)¬)/\(a/\(b/\c)(

0 1

In addition, remove (shortcut) nodes with identical children (low(x)=high(x)).

Page 257: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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In reduced form: combine all leafs with same values, all isomorphic subgraph.

a

b b

c c

)a/\(b\/¬c)¬)/\(a/\(b/\c)(

0 1

In addition, remove (shortcut) nodes with identical children (low(x)=high(x)).

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Example, even parity, 3 bits

a

b b

c c c c

1 0 0 01 1 1 0

Page 259: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Apply reducea

b b

c c c c

01

Page 260: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Apply reducea

b b

c c c c

01

Page 261: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Apply reducea

b b

c c c

01

Page 262: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Apply reducea

b b

c c c

01

Page 263: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Apply reducea

b b

c c

01

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f[0/x], f[1/x] (“restrict” algorithm)

Obtain the replacement of a variable x by 0 or 1, in formula f, respectively.

For f[0/x], incoming edges to node x are redirected to low(x), and x is removed.

For f[1/x], incoming edges to node x are redirected to high(x), and x is removed.

Then we reduce the OBBD.

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Calculate x x= [0/x]\/[1/x] Thus, we apply “restrict” twice to

and then “apply” the disjunction.

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Shannon expansion of Boolean expression f. f=(¬x/\f[0/x])\/(x/\f[1/x]) Thus, f#g, for some logical operator #

is f#g=(¬x/\f#g [0/x])\/(x/\f#g [1/x])= (¬x/\f [0/x]#g [0/x])\/(x/\f [1/x]#g[1/x])

Page 267: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Now compute f#g recursively:

Let rf be the root of the OBDD for f, and rg be the root of the OBDD for g.

If rf and rg are terminals, then apply rf#rg and put the result.

If both roots are same node (say x), then create a low edge to low(rf)#low(rg), and a high edge to high(rf)#high(rg).

If rf is x and rg is y, and x<y, there is no x node in g, so g=g[0/x]=g[1/x]. So we create a low edge to low(rf)#g and a high edge to high(rf)#g. The symmetric case is handled similarly.

We reduce.

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Same subgraphs are not needed to be explored again (use memoising, i.e., dynamic programming, complexity: exponential 2xmultiplications of sizes.

R1,S1

R6,S5

R2,S3 R3,S2

R3,S3 R4,S3

R5,S4

R6,S3

R4,S3

R4,S3

R5,S4 R6,S5

R6,S5

R6,S4

R6,S5

R5,S4 R6,S5

x

z

t

z

y

x

t

0 1 0 1

R1

R3

R2

R5

R6

R4

S1

S3

S2

S4 S5

x

z

z tt

tt

y

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Same subgraphs are not needed to be explored again (use memoising,

i.e., dynamic programming, complexity: exponential 2xmultiplications of sizes.

R1,S1

R6,S5

R2,S3 R3,S2

R3,S3 R4,S3

R5,S4

R6,S3

R4,S3

R4,S3

R5,S4 R6,S5

R6,S5

R6,S4

R6,S5

R5,S4 R6,S5

x

z

t

z

y

x

y

0 1 0 1

R1

R3

R2

R5

R6

R4

S1

S3

S2

S4 S5

x

z

z tt

tt

y

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Symbolic Model Checking Characterize CTL formulas using fixpoints. AF= \/AX AF EF= EX EF Z.EX Z AG= /\AX A G EG= EX EG Z.EX Z AU = \/(/\AXU) EU = (EXU) Z.(EXZ) AR = /\(\/AXR) ER = (EXR) Z.(EXZ)

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Representing the successor relation formula R A relation between the current state and the

next state can be represented as a BDD with prime variables representing the variables at next states.

For example:p/\¬q/\r/\¬p’/\q’/\r’ says that the current state satisfies p/\¬q/\r and the next state satisfies ¬p/\q/\r. (typically, for one transition, represented as a Boolean relation).

If ti represents this relation for transition i, we can

write for the entire code R=\/i ti.

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Calculating (Z) for (Z)=EX Z Z is a BDD. Rename variables in Z by their primed

version to obtain BDD Z’. Calculate the BDD R/\Z’. Let y1’…yn’ be the primed variables,

Then calculate the BDD T=y1’… yn’ R/\Z’ to remove primed variables.

Calculate the BDD T.

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Model checking Z (least fixed point)For example, = EX ZFor formulas with main operator .

procedure Check LFP ()Q :=False; Q’ := (Q) ;while Q Q’ do Q := Q’; Q’ := (Q) ;end whilereturn(Q)

Page 274: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Model checking Z (Greatest fixed point)For example, = (EX Z)For formulas with main operator .

procedure Check GFP ()Q :=True; Q’ := (Q) ;while Q Q’ do Q := Q’; Q’ := (Q) ;end whilereturn(Q)

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Program verification: flowchart programs

(Book: chapter 7)

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History

Verification of flowchart programs: Floyd, 1967 Hoare’s logic: Hoare, 1969 Linear Temporal Logic: Pnueli, Krueger, 1977 Model Checking: Clarke & Emerson, 1981

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Program Verification

Predicate (first order) logic. Partial correctness, Total correctness Flowchart programs Invariants, annotated programs Well founded ordering (for

termination) Hoare’s logic

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Predicate (first order logic)

Variables, functions, predicates

Terms

Formulas (assertions)

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Signature

Variables: v1, x, y18Each variable represents a value of some given

domain (int, real, string, …). Function symbols: f(_,_), g2(_), h(_,_,_).Each function has an arity (number of

paramenters), a domain for each parameter, and a range.

f:int*int->int (e.g., addition), g:real->real (e.g., square root)

A constant is a predicate with arity 0. Relation symbols: R(_,_), Q(_).Each relation has an arity, and a domain for each

parameter.R : real*real (e.g., greater than).Q : int (e.g., is a prime).

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Terms

Terms are objects that have values. Each variable is a term. Applying a function with arity n to n

terms results in a new term.Examples: v1, 5.0, f(v1,5.0),

g2(f(v1,5.0))

More familiar notation: sqr(v1+5.0)

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281

Formulas

Applying predicates to terms results in a formula.

R(v1,5.0), Q(x)More familiar notation: v1>5.0 One can combine formulas with the

boolean operators (and, or, not, implies).

R(v1,5.0)->Q(x)x>1 -> x*x>x One can apply existentail and universal

quantification to formulas.x Q(X) x1 R(x1,5.0) x y R(x,y)

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A model, A proofs

A model gives a meaning (semantics) to a first order formula: A relation for each relation symbol. A function for each function symbol. A value for each variable.

An important concept in first order logic is that of a proof. We assume the ability to prove that a formula holds for a given model.

Example proof rule (MP) :

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Flowchart programs

Input variables: X=x1,x2,…,xlProgram variables: Y=y1,y2,…,ymOutput variables: Z=z1,z2,…,zn

start

haltY=f(X)

Z=h(X,Y)

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Assignments and tests

Y=g(X,Y) t(X,Y)FT

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start

halt

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

y2>=x2

(y1,y2)=(y1+1,y2-x2) (z1,z2)=(y1,y2)

Initial condition

Initial condition: the values for the input variables for which the program must work.

x1>=0 /\ x2>0

FT

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start

halt

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

y2>=x2

(y1,y2)=(y1+1,y2-x2) (z1,z2)=(y1,y2)

The input-output claim

The relation between the values of the input and the output variables at termination.

x1=z1*x2+z2 /\ 0<=z2<x2

FT

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Partial correctness, Termination, Total correctness

Partial correctness: if the initial condition holds and the program terminates then the input-output claim holds.

Termination: if the initial condition holds, the program terminates.

Total correctness: if the initial condition holds, the program terminates and the input-output claim holds.

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Subtle point:

The program ispartially correct

withrespect tox1>=0/\x2>=0and totally correctwith respect tox1>=0/\x2>0

start

halt

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

y2>=x2

(y1,y2)=(y1+1,y2-x2) (z1,z2)=(y1,y2)

T F

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start

halt

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

y2>=x2

(y1,y2)=(y1+1,y2-x2) (z1,z2)=(y1,y2)

Annotating a scheme

Assign an assertion for each pair of nodes. The assertion expresses the relation between the variable when the program counter is located between these nodes.

A

B

C D

E

FT

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Invariants Invariants are assertions that hold at each state

throughout the execution of the program. One can attach an assertion to a particular

location in the code:e.g., at(B) (B).This is also an invariant; in other locations, at(B) does not hold hence the implication holds.

If there is an assertion attached to each location, (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), then their disjunction is also an invariant: (A)\/(B)\/(C)\/(D)\/(E)(since location is always at one of these locations).

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Annotating a scheme with invariants

A): x1>=0 /\ x2>=0B): x1=y1*x2+y2 /\

y2>=0C): x1=y1*x2+y2 /\

y2>=0 /\ y2>=x2D):x1=y1*x2+y2 /\

y2>=0 /\ y2<x2E):x1=z1*x2+z2 /\ 0<=z2<x2Notice: (A) is the initial

condition, Eis the input-output condition.

start

halt

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

y2>=x2

(y1,y2)=(y1+1,y2-x2) (z1,z2)=(y1,y2)

A

B

C D

E

FT

A) Is the precondition of (y1,y2)=(0,x1) and B) is its postcondition

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Preliminary:Relativizing assertions

(B) : x1= y1 * x2 + y2 /\ y2 >= 0Relativize B) w.r.t. the assignment,

obtaining B) [Y\g(X,Y)]e(B) expressed w.r.t. variables at

A.) (B)A =x1=0 * x2 + x1 /\ x1>=0Think about two sets of variables,

before={x, y, z, …} after={x’,y’,z’…}.

Rewrite (B) using after, and the assignment as a relation between the set of variables. Then eliminate after by substitution.

Here: x1’=y1’ * x2’ + y2’ /\ y2’>=0 /\x1’=x1 /\ x2’=x2 /\ y1’=0 /\ y2’=x1now eliminate x1’, x2’, y1’, y2’.

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

A

B

A

B

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

Y=g(X,Y)

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Preliminary:Relativizing assertions

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

A

B

A

B

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

A):

(B)A

(B)

Y=g(X,Y)

Y=g(X,Y)

Page 294: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

294

Verification conditions: assignment

A) B)A

where B)A = B)[Y\g(X,Y)]

A): x1>=0 /\ x2>=0B): x1=y1*x2+y2 /\

y2>=0

B)A=x1=0*x2+x1 /\

x1>=0

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

A

B

A

B

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

Y=g(X,Y)

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(y1,y2)=(y1+1,y2-x2)

Second assignment

C): x1=y1*x2+y2 /\ y2>=0 /\ y2>=x2

B): x1=y1*x2+y2 /\ y2>=0

B)C: x1=(y1+1)*x2+y2-x2 /\ y2-x2>=0

C

B

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(z1,z2)=(y1,y2)

Third assignment

D):x1=y1*x2+y2 /\ y2>=0 /\ y2<x2

E):x1=z1*x2+z2 /\ 0<=z2<x2

E)D:

x1=y1*x2+y2 /\ 0<=y2<x2

E

D

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Verification conditions: tests

B) /\ t(X,Y) C)B) /\¬t(X,Y) D)

B): x1=y1*x2+y2 /\y2>=0

C): x1=y1*x2+y2 /\ y2>=0 /\ y2>=x2

D):x1=y1*x2+y2 /\ y2>=0 /\ y2<x2

y2>=x2

B

C

D

B

C

Dt(X,Y)

FT

FT

Page 298: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Verification conditions: tests

y2>=x2

B

C

D

B

C

Dt(X,Y)

FT

FT

t(X,Y)¬t(X,Y)

B)

C)

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Partial correctness proof:An induction on length of execution

B)

B)

D)

C)

Initially, states satisfy the initial conditions.

Then, passing from one set of states to another, we preserve the invariants at the appropriate location.

We prove: starting with a state satisfying the initial conditions, if are at a point in the execution, the invariant there holds.

Not a proof of termination!

start

halt

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

y2>=x2

(y1,y2)=(y1+1,y2-x2) (z1,z2)=(y1,y2)

A

B

C D

E

A)

no

no

yes

yes

T F

Page 300: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Exercise: prove partial correctness

Initial condition: x>=0

Input-output claim:

z=x!

start

halt

(y1,y2)=(0,1)

y1=x

(y1,y2)=(y1+1,(y1+1)*y2) z=y2

TF

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What have we achieved?

For each statement S that appears between points X and Y we showed that if the control is in X when (X) holds (the precondition of S) and S is executed, then (Y) (the postcondition of S) holds.

Initially, we know that (A) holds. The above two conditions can be combined into

an induction on the number of statements that were executed: If after n steps we are at point X, then (X)

holds.

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Another example

(A) : x>=0

(F) : z^2<=x<(z+1)^2

z is the biggest numberthat is not greaterthan sqrt x.

start

(y1,y2,y3)=(0,0,1)

A

halt

y2>x

(y1,y3)=(y1+1,y3+2) z=y1

B

C

D

F

truefalse

E

y2=y2+y3

Page 303: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Some insight

1+3+5+…+(2n+1)=(n+1)^2

y2 accumulates theabove sum, untilit is bigger than x.

y3 ranges over oddnumbers 1,3,5,…

y1 is n-1.

start

(y1,y2,y3)=(0,0,1)

A

halt

y2>x

(y1,y3)=(y1+1,y3+2) z=y1

B

C

D

F

truefalse

E

y2=y2+y3

Page 304: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

304

Invariants

It is sufficient to have one invariant for every loop(cycle in the program’sgraph).

We will have(C)=y1^2<=x /\ y2=(y1+1)^2 /\ y3=2*y1+1

start

(y1,y2,y3)=(0,0,1)

A

halt

y2>x

(y1,y3)=(y1+1,y3+2) z=y1

B

C

D

F

truefalse

E

y2=y2+y3

Page 305: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

305

Obtaining (B)

By backwards substitution in (C).

(C)=y1^2<=x /\ y2=(y1+1)^2 /\ y3=2*y1+1

(B)=y1^2<=x /\ y2+y3=(y1+1)^2 /\ y3=2*y1+1

start

(y1,y2,y3)=(0,0,1)

A

halt

y2>x

(y1,y3)=(y1+1,y3+2) z=y1

B

C

D

F

truefalse

E

y2=y2+y3

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306

Check assignment condition

(A)=x>=0(B)=y1^2<=x /\ y2+y3=(y1+1)^2 /\ y3=2*y1+1(B) relativized is 0^2<=x /\ 0+1=(0+1)^2 /\ 1=2*0+1Simplified: x>=0

start

(y1,y2,y3)=(0,0,1)

A

halt

y2>x

(y1,y3)=(y1+1,y3+2) z=y1

B

C

D

F

truefalse

E

y2=y2+y3

Page 307: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

307

Obtaining (D)

By backwards substitution in

(B).

(B)=y1^2<=x /\ y2+y3=(y1+1)^2 /\ y3=2*y1+1

(D)=(y1+1)^2<=x /\ y2+y3+2=(y1+2)^2 /\ y3+2=2*(y1+1)+1

start

(y1,y2,y3)=(0,0,1)

A

halt

y2>x

(y1,y3)=(y1+1,y3+2) z=y1

B

C

D

F

truefalse

E

y2=y2+y3

Page 308: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Checking

(C)=y1^2<=x /\ y2=(y1+1)^2 /\ y3=2*y1+1

(C)/\y2<=x) (D)

(D)=(y1+1)^2<=x /\ y2+y3+2=(y1+2)^2 /\ y3+2=2*(y1+1)+1

start

(y1,y2,y3)=(0,0,1)

A

halt

y2>x

(y1,y3)=(y1+1,y3+2) z=y1

B

C

D

F

truefalse

E

y2=y2+y3

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y1^2<=x /\

y2=(y1+1)^2 /\ y3=2*y1+1 /\y2<=x (y1+1)^2<=x /\

y2+y3+2=(y1+2)^2 /\

y3+2=2*(y1+1)+1y1^2<=x /\ y2=(y1+1)^2 /\ y3=2*y1+1 /\y2<=x (y1+1)^2<=x /\ y2+y3+2=(y1+2)^2

/\ y3+2=2*(y1+1)+1

y1^2<=x /\

y2=(y1+1)^2 /\

y3=2*y1+1 /\y2<=x (y1+1)^2<=x /\

y2+y3+2=(y1+2)^2 /\

y3+2=2*(y1+1)+1

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310

Not finished!

Still needs to:

Calculate (E) bysubstituting backwardsfrom (F).

Check that(C)/\y2>x(E)

start

(y1,y2,y3)=(0,0,1)

A

halt

y2>x

(y1,y3)=(y1+1,y3+2) z=y1

B

C

D

F

truefalse

E

y2=y2+y3

Page 311: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

311

Exercise: prove partial correctness. Initially: x1>0/\x2>0. At termination: z1=gcd(x1,x2).

halthalt

startstart

(y1,y2)=(x1,x2)(y1,y2)=(x1,x2)

z1=y1z1=y1

y1=y2F T

y1>y2y1>y2

y2=y2-y1y2=y2-y1y1=y1-y2y1=y1-y2

TF

Page 312: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Annotation of program with invariants

halthalt

startstart

(y1,y2)=(x1,x2)(y1,y2)=(x1,x2)

z1=y1z1=y1

y1=y2F

T

y1>y2y1>y2

y2=y2-y1y2=y2-y1y1=y1-y2y1=y1-y2

TF

z1=gcd(x1,x2)

x1>0 /\ x2>0

gcd(y1,y2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\y1>0/\y2>0

gcd(y1,y2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\y1>0/\y2>0/\y1y2

gcd(y1,y2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\y1>0/\y2>0/\y1<y2

gcd(y1,y2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\y1>0/\y2>0/\y1>y2

y1=gcd(x1,x2)

A

B

D

EF

G

H

Page 313: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

313

Part 1

halthalt

startstart

(y1,y2)=(x1,x2)(y1,y2)=(x1,x2)

z1=y1z1=y1

y1=y2F

T

y1>y2y1>y2

y2=y2-y1y2=y2-y1y1=y1-y2y1=y1-y2

TF

(A)= x1>0 /\ x2>0

(B)=gcd(y1,y2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\y1>0/\y2>0 A

B

D

EF

G

H

(B)’rel= gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\x1>0/\x2>0 (A)

(B)’rel

Page 314: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

314

Part 2a

halthalt

startstart

(y1,y2)=(x1,x2)(y1,y2)=(x1,x2)

z1=y1z1=y1

y1=y2F

T

y1>y2y1>y2

y2=y2-y1y2=y2-y1y1=y1-y2y1=y1-y2

TF

(B)= gcd(y1,y2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\y1>0/\y2>0

(D)=gcd(y1,y2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\y1>0/\y2>0/\y1y2 A

B

D

EF

G

H

(B)/\¬(y1=y2) (D)

Page 315: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Part 2b

halthalt

startstart

(y1,y2)=(x1,x2)(y1,y2)=(x1,x2)

z1=y1z1=y1

y1=y2F

T

y1>y2y1>y2

y2=y2-y1y2=y2-y1y1=y1-y2y1=y1-y2

TF

(G)= y1=gcd(x1,x2)

A

B

D

EF

G

H

(B)= gcd(y1,y2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\y1>0/\y2>0

(B)/\(y1=y2) (G)

Page 316: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Part 3

halthalt

startstart

(y1,y2)=(x1,x2)(y1,y2)=(x1,x2)

z1=y1z1=y1

y1=y2F

T

y1>y2y1>y2

y2=y2-y1y2=y2-y1y1=y1-y2y1=y1-y2

TF

(D)= gcd(y1,y2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\y1>0/\y2>0/\y1y2

(E)=gcd(y1,y2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\y1>0/\y2>0/\y1<y2

(F)=(gcd(y1,y2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\y1>0/\y2>0/\y1>y2

A

B

D

EF

G

H

(D)/\(y1>y2) (F)

(D)/\¬(y1>y2) (E)

Page 317: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Part 4

halthalt

startstart

(y1,y2)=(x1,x2)(y1,y2)=(x1,x2)

z1=y1z1=y1

y1=y2F T

y1>y2y1>y2

y2=y2-y1y2=y2-y1y1=y1-y2y1=y1-y2

TF

x1>0 /\ x2>0

(B)= gcd(y1,y2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\y1>0/\y2>0

(E)= gcd(y1,y2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\y1>0/\y2>0/\y1<y2

(F)= gcd(y1,y2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\y1>0/\y2>0/\y1>y2

A

B

D

EF

G

H

(B)’rel1=gcd(y1,y2-y1)=gcd(x1,x2)/\y1>0/\y2-y1>0(B)’rel2=gcd(y1-y2,y2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\y1-y2>0/\y2>0

(E) (B)’rel1 (F) (B)’rel2

Page 318: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

318

Annotation of program with invariants

halthalt

startstart

(y1,y2)=(x1,x2)(y1,y2)=(x1,x2)

z1=y1z1=y1

y1=y2F

T

y1>y2y1>y2

y2=y2-y1y2=y2-y1y1=y1-y2y1=y1-y2

TF

(H)= z1=gcd(x1,x2)

(G)= y1=gcd(x1,x2)

A

B

D

EF

G

H

(H)’rel= y1=gcd(x1,x2)

(G) (H)’rel2

Page 319: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

319

Proving termination

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320

Well-founded sets

Partially ordered set (W,<): If a<b and b<c then a<c (transitivity). If a<b then not b<a (asymmetry). Not a<a (irreflexivity).

Well-founded set (W,<): Partially ordered. No infinite decreasing chain a1>a2>a3>…

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321

Examples for well founded sets Natural numbers with the bigger than

relation. Finite sets with the set inclusion relation. Strings with the substring relation. Tuples with alphabetic order:

(a1,b1)>(a2,b2) iff a1>a2 or [a1=a2 and b1>b2].

(a1,b1,c1)>(a2,b2,c2) iff a1>a2 or [a1=a2 and b1>b2] or [a1=a2 and b1=b2 and c1>c2].

Page 322: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

322

Why does the program terminate

y2 starts as x1. Each time the loop is

executed, y2 is decremented.

y2 is natural number The loop cannot be

entered again when y2<x2.

start

halt

(y1,y2)=(y1+1,y2-x2) (z1,z2)=(y1,y2)

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

A

B

D

E

falsey2>=x2

C

true

Page 323: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

323

Proving termination

Choose a well-founded set (W,<). Attach a function u(N) to each

point N. Annotate the flowchart with

invariants, and prove their consistency conditions.

Prove that (N) (u(N) in W).

Page 324: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

324

How not to stay in a loop?

Show that u(M)>=u(N)’rel.

At least once in each loop, show that u(M)>u(N).

S

M

N

TN

M

Page 325: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

325

How not to stay in a loop?

For stmt: (M)(u(M)>=u(N)’rel)

Relativize since we need to compare values not syntactic expressions.

For test (true side):((M)/\test)(u(M)>=u(N))

For test (false side):((M)/\

¬test)(u(M)>=u(L))

stmt

M

N

test

N

M

true

L

false

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What did we achieve?

There are finitely many control points. The value of the function u cannot

increase. If we return to the same control point,

the value of u must decrease (its a loop!).

The value of u can decrease only a finite number of times.

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Why does the program terminate

u(A)=x1u(B)=y2u(C)=y2u(D)=y2u(E)=z2

W: naturals> : greater than

start

halt

(y1,y2)=(y1+1,y2-x2) (z1,z2)=(y1,y2)

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

A

B

D

E

falsey2>=x2

C

true

Page 328: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Recall partial correctness annotation

A): x1>=0 /\ x2>=0B): x1=y1*x2+y2 /\

y2>=0C): x1=y1*x2+y2 /\

y2>=0 /\ y2>=x2D):x1=y1*x2+y2 /\

y2>=0 /\ y2<x2E):x1=z1*x2+z2 /\ 0<=z2<x2

start

halt

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

y2>=x2

(y1,y2)=(y1+1,y2-x2) (z1,z2)=(y1,y2)

A

B

C D

E

falsetrue

Page 329: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Strengthen for termination

A): x1>=0 /\ x2>0B): x1=y1*x2+y2 /\

y2>=0/\x2>0C): x1=y1*x2+y2 /\

y2>=0/\y2>=x2/\x2>0D):x1=y1*x2+y2 /\

y2>=0 /\ y2<x2/\x2>0E):x1=z1*x2+z2 /\ 0<=z2<x2

start

halt

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

y2>=x2

(y1,y2)=(y1+1,y2-x2) (z1,z2)=(y1,y2)

A

B

C D

E

falsetrue

Page 330: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Strengthen for termination

A): x1>=0 /\ x2>0 u(A)>=0B): x1=y1*x2+y2 /\ y2>=0/\

x2>0u(B)>=0C): x1=y1*x2+y2 /\y2>=0

/\y2>=x2/\x2>0u(c)>=0D):x1=y1*x2+y2 /\ y2>=0 /\

y2<x2/\x2>0u(D)>=0E):x1=z1*x2+z2 /\ 0<=z2<x2u(E)>=0This proves that u(M) is natural for

each point M.

u(A)=x1u(B)=y2u(C)=y2u(D)=y2u(E)=z2

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We shall show:

u(A)=x1u(B)=y2u(C)=y2u(D)=y2u(E)=z2A)u(A)>=u(B)’relB)u(B)>=u(C)C)u(C)>u(B)’relB)u(B)>=u(D)D)u(D)>=u(E)’re

l

start

halt

(y1,y2)=(y1+1,y2-x2) (z1,z2)=(y1,y2)

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

A

B

D

E

falsey2>=x2

C

true

Page 332: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Proving decrement

C): x1=y1*x2+y2 /\ y2>=0 /\ y2>=x2/\x2>0

u(C)=y2u(B)=y2u(B)’rel=y2-x2

C) y2>y2-x2(notice that C) x2>0)

start

halt

(y1,y2)=(y1+1,y2-x2) (z1,z2)=(y1,y2)

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

A

B

D

E

falsey2>=x2

C

true

Page 333: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

333

Integer square prog.

(C)=y1^2<=x /\ y2=(y1+1)^2 /\ y3=2*y1+1

(B)=y1^2<=x /\ y2+y3=(y1+1)^2 /\y3=2*y1+1

start

(y1,y2,y3)=(0,0,1)

A

halt

y2>x

(y1,y3)=(y1+1,y3+2) z=y1

B

C

D

F

truefalse

E

y2=y2+y3

Page 334: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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u(A)=x+1u(B)=x-y2+1u(C)=max(0,x-y2+1)u(D)=x-y2+1u(E)=u(F)=0u(A)>=u(B)’relu(B)>u(C)’relu(C)>=u(D)u(C)>=u(E)u(D)>=u(B)’relNeed some invariants,i.e., y2<=x/\y3>0at points B and D,and y3>0 at point C.

start

(y1,y2,y3)=(0,0,1)

A

halt

y2>x

(y1,y3)=(y1+1,y3+2) z=y1

B

C

D

F

truefalse

E

y2=y2+y3

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Program VerificationUsing Hoare’s Logic

Hoare triple is of the form{Precondition} Prog-segment {Postcondition}

It expresses partial correctness: if the segment starts with a state satisfying the precondition and it terminates, the final state satisfies the postscondition.

The idea is that one can decompose the proof of the program into smaller and smaller segments, depending on its structure.

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While programs

Assignments y:=e Composition S1; S2 If-then-else if t then S1 else S2 fi While while e do S od

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Greatest common divisor

{x1>0/\x2>0}y1:=x1;y2:=x2;while ¬(y1=y2) do if y1>y2 then y1:=y1-y2 else y2:=y2-y1 fiod{y1=gcd(x1,x2)}

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Why it works?

Suppose that y1,y2 are both positive integers. If y1>y2 then gcd(y1,y2)=gcd(y1-y2,y2) If y2>y1 then gcd(y1,y2)=gcd(y1,y2-y1) If y1=y2 then gcd(y1,y2)=y1=y2

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Assignment axiom

{p[e/y] } y:=e {p}

For example:{y+5=10} y:=y+5 {y=10}{y+y<z} x:=y {x+y<z}{2*(y+5)>20} y:=2*(y+5) {y>20}Justification: write p with y’ instead of y,

and add the conjunct y’=e. Next, eliminate y’ by replacing y’ by e.

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Why axiom works backwards?

{p} y:=t {?}Strategy: write p and the conjunct y=t, where

y’ replaces y in both p and t. Eliminate y’.This y’ represents value of y before the

assignment.{y>5} y:=2*(y+5) {? } {p} y:=t { y’ (p[y’/y] /\ t[y’/y]=y) }y’>5 /\ y=2*(y’+5) y>20

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Composition rule

{p} S1 {r }, {r} S2 {q }

{p} S1;S2 {q}For example: if the antecedents are1. {x+1=y+2} x:=x+1 {x=y+2}2. {x=y+2} y:=y+2 {x=y}Then the consequent is {x+1=y+2} x:=x+1; y:=y+2 {x=y}

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More examples

{p} S1 {r}, {r} S2 {q} {p} S1;S2 {q}{x1>0/\x2>0} y1:=x1

{gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(y1,x2)/\y1>0/\x2>0}

{gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(y1,x2)/\y1>0/\x2>0} y2:=x2

___{gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(y1,y2)/\y1>0/\y2>0}____

{x1>0/\x2>0} y1:=x1 ; y2:=x2 {gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(y1,y2)/\y1>0/\y2>0}

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If-then-else rule

{p/\t} S1 {q}, {p/\¬t} S2 {q}

{p} if t then S1 else S2 fi {q}For example: p is gcd(y1,y2)=gcd(x1,x2) /\y1>0/\y2>0/\¬(y1=y2)t is y1>y2S1 is y1:=y1-y2S2 is y2:=y2-y1q is gcd(y1,y2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\y1>0/\y2>0

Page 344: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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While rule

{p/\t} S {p} {p} while t do S od {p/\¬t}Example:p is {gcd(y1,y2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\y1>0/\y2>0}t is ¬ (y1=y2)S is if y1>y2 then y1:=y1-y2 else y2:=y2-y1 fi

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Consequence rules

Strengthen a precondition rp, {p } S {q } {r } S {q } Weaken a postcondition {p } S {q }, qr {p } S {r }

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Use of first consequence rule

Want to prove{x1>0/\x2>0} y1:=x1

{gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(y1,x2)/\y1>0/\x2>0}By assignment rule:{gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\x1>0/\x2>0}

y1:=x1 {gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(y1,x2)/\y1>0/\x2>0}

x1>0/\x2>0 gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(x1,x2)/\x1>0/\x2>0

Page 347: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Combining program

{x1>0 /\ x2>0} y1:=x1; y2:=x1;{gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(y1,y2)/\y1>0/\y2>0} while S do if e then S1 else S2 fi od{gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(y1,y2)/\y1>0/\y2>0/\

y1=y2}Combine the above using concatenation

rule!

Page 348: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Not completely finished

{x1>0/\x2>0} y1:=x1; y2:=x1; while ¬(y1=y2) do if e then S1 else S2 fi od{gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(y1,y2)/\y1>0/\y2>0/\

y1=y2}But we wanted to prove:{x1>0/\x1>0} Prog {y1=gcd(x1,x2)}

Page 349: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Use of second consequence rule

{x1>0/\x2>0} Prog{gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(y1,y2)/\y1>0/\y2>0/\

y1=y2}And the implicationgcd(x1,x2)=gcd(y1,y2)/\y1>0/\y2>0/\y1=y2 y1=gcd(x1,x2)Thus,{x1>0/\x2>0} Prog {y1=gcd(x1,x2)}

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Annotating a while program

{x1>0/\x2>0}y1:=x1; {gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(y1,x2

) /\y1>0/\x2>0}y2:=x2; {gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(y1,y2

) /\y1>0/\y2>0}

while ¬(y1=y2) do{gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(y1,y2)/\

y1>0/\y2>0/\¬(y1=y2)}

if y1>y2 then y1:=y1-y2 else y2:=y2-y1 fiod{y1=gcd(x1,x2)}

Page 351: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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While rule

{p/\e} S {p} {p} while e do S od {p/\¬e}

Page 352: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Consequence rules

Strengthen a precondition rp, {p} S {q} {r} S {q} Weaken a postcondition {p} S {q}, qr {p} S {r}

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Soundness

Hoare logic is sound in the sense thateverything that can be proved is correct!

This follows from the fact that each axiomand proof rule preserves soundness.

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Completeness

A proof system is called complete if every

correct assertion can be proved.

Propositional logic is complete. No deductive system for the

standard arithmetic can be complete (Godel).

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And for Hoare’s logic?

Let S be a program and p its precondition.

Then {p} S {false} means that S never terminates when started from p. This is undecideable. Thus, Hoare’s logic cannot be complete.

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Weakest prendition, Strongest postcondition

For an assertion p and code S, let post(p,S) be the strongest assertion such that {p}S{post(p,S) }

That is, if {p}S{q} then post(p,S)q. For an assertion q and code S, let

pre(S,q) be the weakest assertion such that {pre(S,q)}S{q}

That is, if {p}S{q} then ppre(S,q).

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Relative completeness

Suppose that either post(p,S) exists for each p, S, or pre(S,q) exists for each S, q.

Some oracle decides on pure implications.Then each correct Hoare triple can be proved.What does that mean? The weakness of theproof system stem from the weakness of the

(FO) logic, not of Hoare’s proof system.

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Extensions

Many extensions for Hoare’s proof rules:

Total correctness Arrays Subroutines Concurrent programs Fairness

Page 359: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Proof rule for total correctnessSimilar idea to Floyd’s termination: Well foundedness

{p/\t/\f=z} S {p/\f<z}, p(f>=0) {p} while t do S od {p/\¬t}

wherez - an int. variable, not appearing in

p,t,e,S.f - an int. expression.

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Verification with Array Variables

Book: Chapter 7.2

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The problem

Using array variables can lead to complication:

{x[1]=1/\x[2]=3} x[x[1]]:=2

{x[x[1]]=2} No!!!Why?Because the assignment changes x[1] as

well. Now it is also 2, and x[x[1]], which is x[2] is 3 and not 2!

Page 362: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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What went wrong?

Take the postcondition {x[x[1]]=2} and substitute 2 instead of x[x[1]].

We obtain {2=2} (which is equivalent to {true}).

Now, (x[1]=1/\x[2]=3) 2=2. So we may wrongly conclude that

the above Hoare triple is correct.

Page 363: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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How to fix this?

`Backward substitution’ should be done with arrays as complete elements.

Define (x; e1: e2) : an array like x, with value at the index e1 changed to e2.

(x; e1: e2)[e3]=e2 if e1=e3 x[e3] otherwise

(x; e1: e2)[e3]=if (e1=e3, e2, x[e3])

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Solved the problem?

How to deal with if(φ, e1, e2)?Suppose that formula ψ contains this

expression.Replace if(φ, e1, e2) by new variable v

in ψ.The original formula ψ is equivalent to: (φ/\ ψ[e1/v])\/(¬φ/\ ψ[e2/v])

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Returning to our case

Our postcondition is {x[x[1]]=2}. The assignment x[x[1]]:=2 causes the

substitution in the postcondition ofthe (array) variable x by a new array, which is (x; x[1] : 2), resulting in

{x[x[1]]=2}

(x; x[1] : 2)[(x; x[1] : 2)[1]] = 2

Page 366: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Are we done?

Not yet. It remains to Convert the array form into an if form. Get rid of the if form.

Will not be done in class. All we say is that we obtain an

expression that is not implied by the precondition x[1]=1/\x[2]=3.

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Proof checking with PVSBook: Chapter 3

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A Theory

Name: THEORY BEGIN Definitions (types,

variables, constants)

Axioms Lemmas

(conjectures, theorems)

END Name

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Group theory

(*, e), where * is the operator and e the unity element.

Associativity (G1): (x*y)*z=x*(y*z).

Unity (G2): (x*e)=x

Right complement (G3):

x y x*y=e.

Want to prove: x y y*x=e.

Page 370: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Informal proof

Choose x arbitrarily.By G3, there exists y

s.t.(1) x*y=e.By G3, we have z s.t.(2) y*z=e.y*x=(y*x)*e (by

G2) =(y*x)*(y*z) (by

(2))

=y*(x*(y*z)) (by G1)

=y*((x*y)*z) (by G1) =y*(e*z) (by (1)) =(y*e)*z (by G1) =y*z (by

(G2)) =e (by (2))

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Example: groups

Group: THEORY BEGIN element: TYPE unit: element *: [element, element-

> element] < some axioms>

left:CONJECTURE FORALL (x: element): EXISTS (y: element): y*x=unitEND Group

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Axioms

associativity: AXIOM FORALL (x, y, z:element): (x*y)*z=x*(y*z)

unity: AXIOM FORALL (x:element): x*unit=x

complement: AXIOM FORALL(x:element): EXISTS (y:element): x*y=unity

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Skolemization

Corresponds to choosing some arbitrary constant and proving “without loss of generality”.

Want to prove (…/\…)(…\/x(x)\/…).

Choose a new constant x’. Prove (…/\…)(…\/(x’)\/…).

Page 374: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Skolemization

Corresponds to choosing some unconstrained arbitrary constant when one is known to exist.

Want to prove (…/\x(x)/\…)(…\/…).

Choose a new constant x’. Prove (…/\(x’)/\…)(…\/…).

Page 375: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Skolem in PVS

(skolem 2 (“a1” “b2” “c7”)) (skolem -3 (“a1” “_” “c7”)) (skolem! -3)

invents new constants, e.g., for x will invent x!1, x!2, … when applied repeatedly.

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Instantiation

Corresponds to restricting the generality.

Want to prove (…/\x(x)/\…) (…\/…).

Choose a some term t. Prove (…/\(t)/\…)(…\/…).

Page 377: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Instantiation

Corresponds to proving the existence of an element by showing an evidence.

Want to prove (…/\…)(…\/x(x)\/…).

Choose some term t. Prove (…/\…)(…\/(t)\/…).

Page 378: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Instantiating in PVS

(inst -1 “x*y” “a” “b+c”) (inst 2 “a” “_” “x”)

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Other useful rules

(replace -1 (-1 2 3))Formula -1 is of the form le=ri. Replace any occurrence of le by ri in lines -1, 2, 3.

(replace -1 (-1 2 3) RL)Similar, but replace ri by le instead.

(assert), (assert -) (assert +) (assert 7) Apply algebraic simplification.

(lemma “<axiom-name>”) - add axiom as additional antecedent.

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Why testing?

Reduce design/programming errors. Can be done during development,

before production/marketing. Practical, simple to do. Check the real thing, not a model. Scales up reasonably. Being state of the practice for

decades.

Page 382: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Part 1: Testing of black box finite state machine

Know:

Transition relation

Size or bound on size

Wants to know:

In what state we started?

In what state we are?

Transition relation

Conformance

Satisfaction of a temporal property

Page 383: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Finite automata (Mealy machines)

S - finite set of states. (size n)- set of inputs. (size d)O - set of outputs, for each transition.(s0 S - initial state). δ S S - transition relation (deterministic but

sometimes not defined for each input per each state). S O - output on edges.

Notation: δ(s,a1a2..an)= δ(… (δ(δ(s,a1),a2) … ),an)(s,a1a2..an)= (s,a1)(δ(s,a1),a2)…(δ(… δ(δ(s,a1),a2) … ),an)

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Finite automata (Mealy machines)

S - finite set of states. (size n)– set of inputs. (size d)O – set of outputs, for each

transition.(s0 S - initial state). δ S S - transition relation. S O – output on edge.

S={s1, s2, s3 }, {a, b }, O={0,1 }.

δ(s1,a)=s3 (also s1=a=>s3),δ(s1,b)=s2,(also s1=b=>s2)…(s1,a)=0 , (s1,b)=1,…δ(s1,ab)=s1, (s1,ab)=01

s1

s3

s2

a/0b/1 b/0

b/1

a/0

a/0

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Why deterministic machines?

Otherwise no amount of experiments would guarantee anything.

If dependent on some parameter (e.g., temperature), we can determinize, by taking parameter as additional input.

We still can model concurrent system. It means just that the transitions are deterministic.

All kinds of equivalences are unified into language equivalence.

Also: connected machine (otherwise we may never get to the completely separate parts).

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Determinism

When the black box is nondeterministic, we might never test some choices.

b/1a/1

a/1

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Preliminaries: separating sequences

s1

s3

s2

a/0b/1 b/0

b/1

a/0

a/0

Start with one block containing all states {s1, s2, s3}.

A set of sequences X such that if we execute them from different states, at least one of them will give a different output sequence.

s≠t µX (s, µ )≠(s, µ )

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A: separate to blocks of states with different output.

s1

s3

s2

a/0b/1

b/0

b/1

a/0

a/0

The states are separated into {s1, s3}, {s2} using the string b.

But s1 and s3 have the same outputs to same inputs.

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Repeat B : Separate blocks based on input that cause moving to different blocks.

s1

s3

s2

a/0b/1 b/0

b/1

a/0

a/0

Separate first block using b to three singleton blocks obtaining separation sequence bb.Separating sequences: b, bb.Max rounds: n-1, sequences: n-1, length: n-1.

If string x separated blocks B1, B2, and letter a splits part of block C to move to B1 and part to B2, then ax separates C into C1, C2, accordingly.

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Want to know the state of the machine (at end): Homing sequence.

After firning homing sequence, we know in what state we are by observing outputs.

Find a sequence µ such thatδ(s, µ )≠δ(t, µ ) (s, µ )≠(s, µ )

So, given an input µ that is executed from state s, we look at a table of outputs and according to a table, know in which state r we are.

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Homing sequence

Algorithm: Put all the states in one block (initially we do not know what is the current state).

Then repeatedly separate blocks, as long as they are not singletons, as follows:

Take a non singleton block, append a distinguishing sequence µ that separates at least two states in that block.

Update each block to the states after executing µ. (Blocks may not be disjoint, its not a partition!)

Max length of sequence: (n-1)2 (Lower bound: n(n-1)/2.)

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Example (homing sequence)

s1

s3

s2

a/0b/1 b/0

b/1

a/0

a/0

{s1, s2, s3}

{s1, s2} {s3}

{s1} {s2} {s3}

b

b1 0

011

1

On input b and output 1, we still don’t know if we were in s1 or s3, i.e., if we are currently in s2 or s1. So separate these cases with another b.

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Synchronizing sequence

One sequence takes the machine to the same final state, regardless of the initial state or the outputs.That is: find a sequence µ such that for each states s, t,

δ(s, µ )=δ(t, µ ) Not every machine has a

synchronizing sequence. Can be checked whether

exists and if so, can be found in polynomial time.

a/1

b/1

a/0b/0b/1

a/0

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Algorithm for synchronizing sequeneces

s1

s2 s3

a/1

b/1

a/0b/0b/1

a/0

Construct a graph with ordered pairs of nodes (s,t) such that (s,t )=a=>(s’,t’ ) when s=a=>s’, t=a=>t’.(Ignore self loops, e.g., on (s2,s2).)s1,s1

s2,s2

s3,s3

s1,s2

s2,s3 s1,s3

b b

b

b

b

baa

a

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Algorithm continues (2)There is an input

sequence from both s≠t to some r iff there is a path in this graph from (s,t ) to (r,r ).

There is a synchronization sequence iff some node (r,r ) is reachable from every pair of distinct nodes.

In this case it is (s2,s2 ).

s1,s1

s2,s2

s3,s3

s1,s2

s2,s3 s1,s3

b b

b

b

b

baa

a

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Algorithm continues (3)Notation:δ(S,x)=

{t |sS,δ(s,x)=t }1. i=1; S1=S

2. Take some nodes s≠tSi, and find a shortest path labeled xi to some (r,r ).

3. i=i+1; Si:=δ(Si-1,x ). If |Si |>1,goto 2., else goto 3.

4. Concatenate x1x2…xk.

s1,s1

s2,s2

s3,s3

s1,s2

s2,s3 s1,s3

b b

b

b

b

baa

a

Number of sequences ≤ n-1.Each of length ≤ n(n-1)/2.Overall O(n(n-1)2/2).

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Example:

(s2,s3)=a=>(s2,s2)

x1:=a

δ({s1,s2,s3},a)={s1,s2}

(s1,s2)=ba=>(s2,s2)

x2:=ba

δ({s1,s2},ba)={s2}

So x1x2=aba is a synchronization sequence, bringing every state into state s2.

s1,s1

s2,s2

s3,s3

s1,s2

s2,s3 s1,s3

b b

b

b

b

baa

a

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State identification: Want to know in which state the

system has started (was reset to).

Can be a preset distinguishing sequence (fixed), or a tree (adaptive).

May not exist (PSPACE complete to check if preset exists, polynomial for adaptive).

Best known algorithm: exponential length for preset, polynomial for adaptive [LY].

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Sometimes cannot identify initial state

b/1a/1 s1

s3

s2

a/1

b/0

b/1

a/1

Start with a:in case of being in s1 or s3 we’ll move to s1 and cannot distinguish.Start with b:In case of being in s1 or s2 we’ll move to s2 and cannot distinguish.The kind of experiment we do affects what we can

distinguish. Much like the Heisenberg principle in Physics.

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So…

We’ll assume resets from now on!

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Conformance testing Unknown deterministic finite state system B. Known: n states and alphabet . An abstract model C of B. C satisfies all the

properties we want from B. C has m states. Check conformance of B and C. Another version: only a bound n on the number of

states l is known.

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Check conformance with a given state machine

Black box machine has no more states than specification machine (errors are mistakes in outputs, mistargeted edges).

Specification machine is reduced, connected, deterministic. Machine resets reliably to a single initial state (or use homing

sequence).

s1

s3

s2

a/1

b/0

b/1

a/1

?=

a/1

b/1

Page 403: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Conformance testing [Ch,V]

a/1

b/1

Cannot distinguish if reduced or not.

a/1

b/1

a/1

b/1

a/1

b/1a/1

b/1

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Conformance testing (cont.)

ab b

a

a

a

a b

b

b

a

Need: bound on number of states of B.

a

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Preparation: Construct a spanning tree, and separating sequences

b/1a/1 s1

s3

s2

a/1

b/0

b/1

a/1

s1

s2s3

b/1a/1

Given an initial state, we can reach any state of the automaton.

Page 406: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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How the algorithm works?According to the spanning

tree, force a sequence of inputs to go to each state.

1. From each state, perform the distinguishing sequences.

2. From each state, make a single transition, check output, and use distinguishing sequences to check that in correct target state.

s1

s2s3

b/1a/1

Rese

t

Rese

t

Distinguishing sequences

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Comments1. Checking the different distinguishing

sequences (m-1 of them) means each time resetting and returning to the state under experiment.

2. A reset can be performed to a distinguished state through a homing sequence. Then we can perform a sequence that brings us to the distinguished initial state.

3. Since there are no more than m states, and according to the experiment, no less than m states, there are m states exactly.

4. Isomorphism between the transition relation is found, hence from minimality the two automata recognize the same languages.

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Combination lock automaton

Assume accepting states. Accepts only words with a specific suffix

(cdab in the example).

s1 s2 s3 s4 s5

bdc a

Any other input

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When only a bound on size of black box is known…

Black box can “pretend” to behave as a specification automaton for a long time, then upon using the right combination, make a mistake.

b/1a/1s1

s3

s2

a/1

b/0

b/1

a/1

b/1

Pretends to be s3

Pretends to be s1

a/1

Page 410: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Conformance testing algorithm [VC]

The worst that can happen is a combination lock automaton that behaves differently only in the last state. The length of it is the difference between the size n of the black box and the specification m.

Reach every state on the spanning tree and check every word of length n-m+1 or less. Check that after the combination we are at the state we are supposed to be, using the distinguishing sequences.

No need to check transitions: already included in above check.

Complexity: m2 n dn-m+1

Probabilistic complexity: Polynomial.

Distinguishing sequences

s1

s2s3

b/1a/1

Words of length n-m+1

Rese

t

Rese

t

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Model Checking Finite state description of a system B. LTL formula . Translate into an automaton P. Check whether L(B ) L(P )=. If so, S satisfies . Otherwise, the intersection

includes a counterexample. Repeat for different properties.

Page 412: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Buchi automata (-automata)

S - finite set of states. (B has l n states) S0 S - initial states. (P has m states) - finite alphabet. (contains p letters) S S - transition relation. F S - accepting states.Accepting run: passes a state in F infinitely often.

System automata: F=S, deterministic, one initial state.

Property automaton: not necessarily deterministic.

Page 413: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Example: check a

a, aa

a<>a

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Example: check <>a

a

a

a

a

<>a

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Example: check <>a

Use automatic translation algorithms, e.g., [Gerth,Peled,Vardi,Wolper 95]

a

a

a, a<>a

Page 416: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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System

c b

a

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Every element in the product is a counter example for the checked property.

c b

a

a

a

a

a

s1 s2

s3 q2

q1

s1,q1

s1,q2 s3,q2

s2,q1a

b

c

aAcceptance isdetermined byautomaton P.

<>a

Page 418: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Model Checking / Testing Given Finite state

system B. Transition relation of B

known. Property represent by

automaton P. Check if L(B ) L(P )=. Graph theory or BDD

techniques. Complexity: polynomial.

Unknown Finite state system B.

Alphabet and number of states of B or upper bound known.

Specification given as an abstract system C.

Check if B C. Complexity: polynomial

if number states known. Exponential otherwise.

Page 419: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Black box checking [PVY]

Outputs: {0,1} (for enabled/disabled)

Property represent by automaton P.

Check if L(B ) L(P )=. Graph theory techniques.

Unknown Finite state system B.

Alphabet and Upper bound on Number of states of B known.

Complexity: exponential.

Page 420: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Experiments

aa

bb cc

reset

a

a

b

b

c

c

try ba

a

b

b

c

c

try c

(Output 1+ progress)

(Output 0=stay)

Page 421: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Simpler problem: deadlock?

Nondeterministic algorithm:guess a path of length n from the initial state to a deadlock state.Linear time, logarithmic space.

Deterministic algorithm:systematically try paths of length n, one after the other (and use reset), until deadlock is reached.Exponential time, linear space.

Page 422: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Deadlock complexity

Nondeterministic algorithm:Linear time, logarithmic space.

Deterministic algorithm:Exponential (pn-1) time, linear space.

Lower bound: Exponential time (usecombination lock automata).

How does this conform with what we know about complexity theory?

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Modeling black box checking

Cannot model using Turing machines: not all the information about B is given. Only certain experiments are allowed.

We learn the model as we make the experiments.

Can use the model of games of incomplete information.

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Games of incomplete information

Two players: player, player (here, deterministic). Finitely many configurations C. Including:

Initial Ci , Winning : W+ and W- . An equivalence relation on C (the player cannot

distinguish between equivalent states). Labels L on moves (try a, reset, success, fail). The player has the moves labeled the same from

configurations that are equivalent. Deterministic strategy for the player: will lead to a

configuration in W+ W-. Cannot distinguish between equivalent configurations.

Nondeterministic strategy: Can distinguish between equivalent configurations..

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Modeling BBC as games

Each configuration contains an automaton and its current state (and more).

Moves of the player are labeled withtry a, reset... Moves of the -player withsuccess, fail.

c1 c2 when the automata in c1 and c2 would respond in the same way to the experiments so far.

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A naive strategy for BBC Learn first the structure of the black box. Then apply the intersection. Enumerate automata with n states

(without repeating isomorphic automata). For a current automata and new automata,

construct a distinguishing sequence. Only one of them survives.

Complexity: O((n+1)p (n+1)/n!)

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On-the-fly strategy Systematically (as in the deadlock

case), find two sequences v1 and v2 of length <=m n.

Applying v1 to P brings us to a state t that is accepting.

Applying v2 to P brings us back to t. Apply v1 v2

n to B. If this succeeds,there is a cycle in the intersection labeled with v2, with t as the P (accepting) component.

Complexity: O(n2p2mnm).

v1

v2

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Learning an automaton

Use Angluin’s algorithm for learning an automaton.

The learning algorithm queries whether some strings are in the automaton B.

It can also conjecture an automaton Mi and asks for a counterexample.

It then generates an automaton with more states Mi+1 and so forth.

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A strategy based on learning

Start the learning algorithm. Queries are just experiments to B. For a conjectured automaton Mi ,

check if Mi P =

If so, we check conformance of Mi with B ([VC] algorithm).

If nonempty, it contains some v1 v2 .

We test B with v1 v2n. If this succeeds:

error, otherwise, this is a counterexample for Mi .

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Complexity l - actual size of B. n - an upper bound of size of B. d - size of alphabet. Lower bound: reachability is similar to deadlock. O(l 3 d l + l 2mn) if there is an error. O(l 3 d l + l 2 n d n-l+1+ l 2mn) if there is no error.If n is not known, check while time allows. Probabilistic complexity: polynomial.

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Some experiments

Basic system written in SML (by Alex Groce, CMU).

Experiment with black box using Unix I/O.

Allows model-free model checking of C code with inter-process communication.

Compiling tested code in SML with BBC program as one process.

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Part 2: Software testing(Book: chapter 9)

Testing is not about showing that there are no errors in the program.

Testing cannot show that the program performs its intended goal correctly.

So, what is software testing?Testing is the process of executing the

program in order to find errors.A successful test is one that finds an

error.

Page 433: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Some software testing stages

Unit testing – the lowest level, testing some procedures.

Integration testing – different pieces of code. System testing – testing a system as a whole. Acceptance testing – performed by the

customer. Regression testing – performed after updates. Stress testing – checking the code under

extreme conditions. Mutation testing – testing the quality of the

test suite.

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Some drawbacks of testing

There are never sufficiently many test cases.

Testing does not find all the errors. Testing is not trivial and requires

considerable time and effort. Testing is still a largely informal task.

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Black-Box (data-driven, input-output) testing

The testing is not based on the structure of the program (which is unknown).

In order to ensure correctness, every possible input needs to be tested - this is impossible!

The goal: to maximize the number of errors found.

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testing

Is based on the internal structure of the program.

There are several alternative criterions for checking “enough” paths in the program.

Even checking all paths (highly impractical) does not guarantee finding all errors (e.g., missing paths!)

Page 437: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Some testing principles

A programmer should not test his/her own program. One should test not only that the program does

what it is supposed to do, but that it does not do what it is not supposed to.

The goal of testing is to find errors, not to show that the program is errorless.

No amount of testing can guarantee error-free program.

Parts of programs where a lot of errors have already been found are a good place to look for more errors.

The goal is not to humiliate the programmer!

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Inspections and Walkthroughs

Manual testing methods. Done by a team of people. Performed at a meeting

(brainstorming). Takes 90-120 minutes. Can find 30%-70% of

errors.

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Code Inspection

Team of 3-5 people. One is the moderator.

He distributes materials and records the errors.

The programmer explains the program line by line.

Questions are raised. The program is

analyzed w.r.t. a checklist of errors.

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Checklist for inspections

Data declarationAll variables

declared?Default values

understood?Arrays and strings

initialized?Variables with similar

names?Correct initialization?

Control flowEach loop terminates?DO/END statements

match?

Input/outputOPEN statements

correct?Format specification

correct?End-of-file case

handled?

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Walkthrough

Team of 3-5 people. Moderator, as

before. Secretary, records

errors. Tester, play the role

of a computer on some test suits on paper and board.

Page 442: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Selection of test cases (for white-box testing)

The main problem is to select a good coverage

criterion. Some options are: Cover all paths of the program. Execute every statement at least once. Each decision has a true or false value at

least once. Each condition is taking each truth value at

least once. Check all possible combinations of conditions

in each decision.

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Cover all the paths of the program

Infeasible.Consider the flow

diagram on the left.It corresponds to a

loop.The loop body has 5

paths.If the loops executes

20times there are 5^20

different paths!May also be

unbounded!

Page 444: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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How to cover the executions?

IF (A>1) & (B=0) THEN X=X/A; END;

IF (A=2) | (X>1) THEN X=X+1; END;

Choose values for A,B,X. Value of X may change, depending on A,B. What do we want to cover? Paths?

Statements? Conditions?

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Statement coverageExecute every statement at least once

By choosingA=2,B=0,X=3each statement will

be chosen.The case where the

tests fail is not checked!

IF (A>1) & (B=0) THEN X=X/A; END;

IF (A=2) | (X>1) THEN X=X+1; END;

Now x=1.5

Page 446: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Decision coverage (if, while checks)Each decision has a true and false outcome at least once.

Can be achieved using A=3,B=0,X=3 A=2,B=1,X=1

Problem: Does not test individual conditions. E.g., when X>1 is erroneous in second decision.

IF (A>1) & (B=0) THEN X=X/A; END;

IF (A=2) | (X>1) THEN X=X+1; END;

Page 447: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Decision coverage

A=3,B=0,X=3 IF (A>1) & (B=0) THEN X=X/A; END;

IF (A=2) | (X>1) THEN X=X+1; END;

Now x=1

Page 448: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Decision coverage

A=2,B=1,X=1

The case where A1 and the case where x>1 where not checked!

IF (A>1) & (B=0) THEN X=X/A; END;

IF (A=2)|(X>1) THEN X=X+1; END;

Page 449: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Condition coverageEach condition has a true and false value at least once.

For example: A=1,B=0,X=3 A=2,B=1,X=0

lets each condition be true and false once.

Problem:covers only the path where the first test fails and the second succeeds.

IF (A>1) (A>1) & (B=0) THEN X=X/A; END;

IF (A=2) | (X>1) THEN X=X+1; END;

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Condition coverage

A=1,B=0,X=3 IF (A>1) (A>1) & (B=0) THEN X=X/A; END;

IF (A=2) | (X>1) THEN X=X+1; END;

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Condition coverage

A=2,B=1,X=0

Did not check the first THEN part at all!!!

Can use condition+decision coverage.

IF (A>1) (A>1) & (B=0) THEN X=X/A; END;

IF (A=2) | (X>1) THEN X=X+1; END;

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Multiple Condition CoverageTest all combinations of all conditions in each test.

A>1,B=0 A>1,B≠0 A1,B=0 A1,B≠0 A=2,X>1 A=2,X1 A≠2,X>1 A≠2,X1

IF (A>1) & (B=0) THEN X=X/A; END;

IF (A=2) | (X>1) THEN X=X+1; END;

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A smaller number of cases: A=2,B=0,X=4 A=2,B=1,X=1 A=1,B=0,X=2 A=1,B=1,X=1Note the X=4 in the firstcase: it is due to the factthat X changes beforebeing used!

IF (A>1) & (B=0) THEN X=X/A; END;

IF (A=2) | (X>1) THEN X=X+1; END;

Further optimization: not all combinations.For C /\ D, check (C, D), (C, D), (C, D).For C \/ D, check (C, D), (C, D), (C, D).

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Preliminary:Relativizing assertions(Book: Chapter 7)

(B) : x1= y1 * x2 + y2 /\ y2 >= 0Relativize B) w.r.t. the assignment

becomes B) [Y\g(X,Y)]e(B) expressed w.r.t. variables at

A.) (B)A =x1=0 * x2 + x1 /\ x1>=0

Think about two sets of variables,before={x, y, z, …} after={x’,y’,z’…}.

Rewrite (B) using after, and the assignment as a relation between the set of variables. Then eliminate after.

Here: x1’=y1’ * x2’ + y2’ /\ y2’>=0 /\x1=x1’ /\ x2=x2’ /\ y1’=0 /\ y2’=x1now eliminate x1’, x2’, y1’, y2’.

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

A

B

A

B

(y1,y2)=(0,x1)

Y=g(X,Y)

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Verification conditions: tests

C) B)= t(X,Y) /\C)D) B)=t(X,Y) /\D)

B)= D) /\ y2x2y2>=x2

B

C

D

B

C

Dt(X,Y)

FT

FT

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How to find values for coverage?

•Put true at end of path.

•Propagate path backwards.

•On assignment, relativize expression.

•On “yes” edge of decision, add decision as conjunction.

•On “no” edge, add negation of decision as conjunction.

•Can be more specific when calculating condition with multiple condition coverage.

A>1 & B=0

A=2 | X>1

X=X+1

X=X/Ano

no

yes

yes

true

true

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How to find values for coverage?

A>1 & B=0

A=2 | X>1

X=X+1

X=X/Ano

no

yes

yes

true

true

A≠2 /\ X>1

(A≠2 /\ X/A>1) /\ (A>1 & B=0)

A≠2 /\ X/A>1Need to find a

satisfying assignment:

A=3, X=6, B=0

Can also calculate path condition forwards.

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How to cover a flow chart? Cover all nodes, e.g., using search

strategies: DFS, BFS. Cover all paths (usually impractical). Cover each adjacent sequence of N nodes. Probabilistic testing. Using random number

generator simulation. Based on typical use. Chinese Postman: minimize edge traversal

Find minimal number of times time to travel each edge using linear programming or dataflow algorithms.

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Test cases based on data-flow analysis

Partition the program into pieces of code with a single entry/exit point.

For each piece find which variables are set/used/tested.

Various covering criteria: from each set to

each use/test From each set to

some use/test.

X:=3

z:=z+x

x>y

t>y

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Test case design for black box testing: how to find a good test suite? Equivalence partition Boundary value

analysis

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Equivalence partition

Goals: Find a small number of test cases. Cover as much possibilities as you can.

Try to group together inputs for which the program is likely to behave the same.

Specificationcondition

Valid equivalenceclass

Invalid equivalenceclass

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Example: A legal variable

Begins with A-Z Contains [A-Z0-9] Has 1-6 characters.

Specificationcondition

Valid equivalenceclass

Invalid equivalenceclass

Starting char

Chars

Length

Starts A-Z Starts other

[A-Z0-9] Has others

1-6 chars 0 chars, >6 chars

1 2

3 4

56 7

Page 463: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Equivalence partition (cont.)

Add a new test case until all valid equivalence classes have been covered. A test case can cover multiple such classes.

Add a new test case until all invalid equivalence class have been covered. Each test case can cover only one such class.

Specificationcondition

Valid equivalenceclass

Invalid equivalenceclass

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Example

AB36P (1,3,5) 1XY12 (2) A17#%X (4)

Specificationcondition

Valid equivalenceclass

Invalid equivalenceclass

Starting char

Chars

Length

Starts A-Z Starts other

[A-Z0-9] Has others

1-6 chars 0 chars, >6 chars

1 2

3 4

56 7

(6) VERYLONG (7)

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Boundary value analysis

In every element class, select values that are closed to the boundary. If input is within range -1.0 to +1.0,

select values -1.001, -1.0, -0.999, 0.999, 1.0, 1.001.

If needs to read N data elements, check with N-1, N, N+1. Also, check with N=0.

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For Unit Testing

Write “drivers”, which replaces procedures calling the code.

Write “stubs”, which replaces procedures called by the code.

Tested unit

Driver

StubStubStub

Driver

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package bucket;import java.util.*;import java.math.*;public class BugBucketSort{ public static void main(String[] args) { Random r = new Random(100); r.nextInt(100); LinkedList<Integer> ls = new LinkedList<Integer>(); for (int j = 0; j < 10; j++) ls.push(r.nextInt(100)); System.out.println(ls); bucketSort(ls); } public static void bucketSort(LinkedList<Integer> ls) { LinkedList<HashMap<Integer,Integer>> la = new LinkedList<HashMap<Integer,Integer>>(); for (int i = 0 ; i<11; i++) la.add(new HashMap<Integer,Integer>()); System.out.println("\nValues in the array: "+la.size()); for (int j = 0; j < ls.size(); j++) { la.get((int)ls.get(j)/10).put((int)ls.get(j)%10, ls.get(j)); } System.out.println("\nThe ordered array is:"); System.out.print("["); for (int i = 0; i < la.size(); i++) for (int k = 1; k < 10; k++) { if(la.get(i).containsKey(k)) System.out.print(la.get(i).get(k)+" "); } System.out.println("]"); }}

Bucket sort:With bugs!!

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package bucket;import java.util.*;import java.math.*;public class BucketSort{ public static void main(String[] args) { Random r = new Random(100); r.nextInt(100); LinkedList<Integer> ls = new LinkedList<Integer>(); for (int j = 0; j < 10; j++) ls.push(r.nextInt(100)); System.out.println(ls);// System.out.println((int) 17 / 5); bucketSort(ls); } public static void bucketSort(LinkedList<Integer> ls) { LinkedList<HashMap<Integer,Integer>> la = new LinkedList<HashMap<Integer,Integer>>(); for (int i = 0 ; i<10; i++) la.add(new HashMap<Integer,Integer>()); System.out.println("\nValues in the array: "+la.size()); for (int j = 0; j < ls.size(); j++) { la.get((int)ls.get(j)/10).put((int)ls.get(j)%10, ls.get(j)); } System.out.println("\nThe ordered array is:"); System.out.print("["); for (int i = 0; i < la.size(); i++) for (int k = 0; k < 10; k++) { if(la.get(i).containsKey(k)) System.out.print(la.get(i).get(k)+" "); } System.out.println("]"); }}

Bucket sort:Without bugs!!

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class MergeSortAlgorithm{ public static int [] mergeSort(int array[])

{ int loop;int rightIndex = 0;int [] leftArr = new int[array.length / 2];int [] rightArr = new int[(array.length - array.length) / 2];if (array.length <= 1)

return array;for (loop = 0 ; loop < leftArr.length ; ++loop)

leftArr[loop] = array[loop];for (; rightIndex < rightArr.length ; ++loop)

rightArr[rightIndex++] = array[loop];mergeSort(leftArr);

rightArr = mergeSort(rightArr);array = merge(leftArr,rightArr);return array; }

public static int [] merge(int [] leftArr , int [] rightArr){ int [] newArray = new int[leftArr.length + rightArr.length];

int leftIndex = 0; int rightIndex = 0; int newArrayIndex = 0;while (leftIndex < leftArr.length && rightIndex < rightArr.length){ if (leftArr[leftIndex] < rightArr[rightIndex])

newArray[newArrayIndex] = leftArr[leftIndex++];newArray[newArrayIndex] = rightArr[rightIndex++];}

while (rightIndex < rightArr.length) newArray[newArrayIndex++] = rightArr[rightIndex++];

while (leftIndex < leftArr.length) newArray[newArrayIndex++] = leftArr[leftIndex++];

return newArray;}public static void print(int [] arr , String caller){ int loop;

for (loop = 0 ; loop < arr.length ; ++loop) System.out.println("caller " + caller + " : " + arr[loop]);}public static void main(String [] args){ int []originalArray = {1,5,4,3,7};

print(originalArray,"before"); originalArray = mergeSort(originalArray);print(originalArray,"after"); }}

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class MergeSortAlgorithm{ public static int [] mergeSort(int array[])

{ int loop;int rightIndex = 0;int [] leftArr = new int[array.length / 2];int [] rightArr = new int[(array.length - array.length) / 2]; // BUGif (array.length <= 1)

return array;for (loop = 0 ; loop < leftArr.length ; ++loop)

leftArr[loop] = array[loop];for (; rightIndex < rightArr.length ; ++loop)

rightArr[rightIndex++] = array[loop];mergeSort(leftArr); // BUGrightArr = mergeSort(rightArr);array = merge(leftArr,rightArr);return array; }

public static int [] merge(int [] leftArr , int [] rightArr){ int [] newArray = new int[leftArr.length + rightArr.length];

int leftIndex = 0; int rightIndex = 0; int newArrayIndex = 0;while (leftIndex < leftArr.length && rightIndex < rightArr.length){ if (leftArr[leftIndex] < rightArr[rightIndex])

newArray[newArrayIndex] = leftArr[leftIndex++];newArray[newArrayIndex] = rightArr[rightIndex++]; //

TWO BUGS}while (rightIndex < rightArr.length) newArray[newArrayIndex++] =

rightArr[rightIndex++];while (leftIndex < leftArr.length) newArray[newArrayIndex++] =

leftArr[leftIndex++];return newArray;}

public static void print(int [] arr , String caller){ int loop;

for (loop = 0 ; loop < arr.length ; ++loop) System.out.println("caller " + caller + " : " + arr[loop]);}public static void main(String [] args){ int []originalArray = {1,5,4,3,7};

print(originalArray,"before"); originalArray = mergeSort(originalArray);print(originalArray,"after"); }}

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Test case generation based on LTL specification

CompilerModel

CheckerPath condition

calculation

First orderinstantiator

Testmonitoring

Transitions

Path

Flowchart

LTLAut

Page 472: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Goals

Verification of software. Compositional verification. Only a unit of code. Parametrized verification. Generating test cases.

A path found with some truth assignment satisfying the path condition. In deterministic code, this assignment guarantees to derive the execution of the path.

In nondeterministic code, this is one of the possibilities.Can transform the code to force replying the path.

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Divide and Conquer Intersect property automatonproperty automaton with the

flow chartflow chart, regardless of the statements and program variables expressions.

Add assertions from the property automaton to further restrict the path condition.

Calculate path conditions for sequences found in the intersection.

Calculate path conditions on-the-fly. Backtrack when condition is false.Thus, advantage to forward calculation of path conditions (incrementally).

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Spec:¬at l2U (at l2/\ ¬at l2/\(¬at l2U at l2))

¬at l2

at l2

¬at l2

at l2

l2:x:=x+z

l3:x<t

l1:…

l2:x:=x+z

l3:x<t

l2:x:=x+z

XX==

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Spec: ¬at l2U (at l2/\ xy /\

(¬at l2/\(¬at l2U at l2 /\ x2y )))

¬at l2

at l2/\xy

¬at l2

at l2/\x2y

l2:x:=x+z

l3:x<t

l1:…

l2:x:=x+z

l3:x<t

l2:x:=x+z

XX==

xy

x2y

Page 476: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Example: GCD

l1:x:=a

l5:y:=z

l4:x:=y

l3:z:=x rem y

l2:y:=b

l6:z=0?yesn

o

l0

l7

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Example: GCD

l1:x:=a

l5:x:=y

l4:y:=z

l3:z:=x rem y

l2:y:=b

l6:z=0?yesn

o

Oops…with an error (l4 and l5 were switched).

l0

l7

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Why use Temporal specification

Temporal specification for sequential software?

Deadlock? Liveness? – No! Captures the tester’s intuitionintuition about the

location of an error:“I think a problem may occur when the program runs through the main while loop twice, then the if condition holds, while t>17.”

Page 479: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Example: GCD

l1:x:=a

l5:x:=y

l4:y:=z

l3:z:=x rem y

l2:y:=b

l6:z=0?yesn

o

l0

l7

a>0/\b>0/\at l0 /\at l7

at l0/\a>0/\b>0

at l7

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Example: GCD

l1:x:=a

l5:x:=y

l4:y:=z

l3:z:=x rem y

l2:y:=b

l6:z=0?yesn

o

l0

l7

a>0/\b>0/\at l0/\at l7

Path 1: l0l1l2l3l4l5l6l7a>0/\b>0/\a rem b=0

Path 2: l0l1l2l3l4l5l6l3l4l5l6l7 a>0/\b>0/\a rem b0

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Potential explosion

Bad point: potential explosion

Good point: may be chopped on-the-fly

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Drivers and Stubs Driver: represents the

program or procedure that called our checked unit.

Stub: represents a procedure called by our checked unit.

In our approach: replace both of them with a formula representing the effect the missing code has on the program variables.

Integrate the driver and stub specification into the calculation of the path condition.

l1:x:=a

l5:x:=y

l4:y:=z

l3:z’=x rem y/\x’=x/\y’=x

l2:y:=b

l6:z=0?yesn

o

l0

l7

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Process Algebra

(Book: Chapter 8)

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The Main Issue

Q: When are two models equivalent?

A: When they satisfy different properties.

Q: Does this mean that the models have different executions?

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What is process algebra? An abstract description for

nondeterministic and concurrent systems.

Focuses on the transitions observed rather than on the states reached.

Main correctness criterion: conformance between two models.

Uses: system refinement, model checking, testing.

Page 500: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Different models may have the same set of executions!

aa a

b b cc

a-insert coin, b-press pepsi, c-press pepsi-light

d-obtain pepsi, e-obtain pepsi-light

dd ee

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Actions: Act={a,b,c,d}{}.Agents: E, E’, F, F1, F2, G1, G2, …

E

E’

G2G1

F1 F2

F

aa a

b b cc

Agent E may evolve into agent E’.

Agent F may evolve into F1 or F2.

dd ee

Page 502: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Events.

E

E’

G2G1

F1 F2

F

aa a

b b cc

E—aE’, F—aF1, F—aF2, F1—aG1,

F2—aG2. G1—F, G1—F.

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Actions and co-actions

For each action a, except for , there is a co-action a. a and a interact (a input, a output).The coaction of a is a.

G2G1

F1 F2

Fa a

b c

E

E’

a

b c

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Notation

a.E – execute a, then continue according to E.E+F – execute according to E or to F.E||F – execute E and F in parallel.

E

G H

F

a

b c

a.(b+c)(actually, a.((b.0)+(c.0))

E—aFF—bGF—cH

0 – deadlock/termination.

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Conventions

“.” has higher priority than “+”. “.0” or “.(0||0||…||0)” is omitted.

Page 506: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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CCS - calculus of concurrent systems [Milner]. Syntax

a,b,c, … actions, A, B, C - agents. a,b,c, coactions of a,b,c. -silent action. nil - terminate. a.E - execute a, then behave like E. + - nondeterministic choice. || - parallel composition. \L - restriction: cannot use letters of L. [f] - apply mapping function f between

between letters.

Page 507: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Semantics (proof rule and axioms).Structural Operational Semantics SOS

a.p –a p p—ap’ |-- p+q –a p’ q—aq’ |-- p+q –a q’ p—ap’ |-- p|q –a p’|q q—aq’ |-- p|q –a p|q’ p—ap’, q—aq’ |-- p|q – p’|q’ p—ap’ , a R |-- p\L –a p’\R p—ap’ |-- p[m]—m(a)p’[m]

Page 508: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Action Prefixing

a.E—aE (Axiom)

Thus, a.(b.(c||c)+d)—a(b.(c||c)+d).

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Choice

E—aE’ F—aF’ (E+F)—aE’ (E+F)—aF’

b.(c||c)—b(c||c).Thus,

(b.(c||c)+e)—b(c||c).

If E—aE’ and F—aF’, then E+F has a nondeterministic choice.

Page 510: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Concurrent Composition

E—aE’ F—aF’ E||F—aE’||F E||F—aE||F’

E—aE’, F—aF’ ———————— E||F—E’||F’

c—c0, c—c0, c||c—0||0, c||c—c0||c, c||c—cc||0.

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Restriction

E—aE’, a, a R —————————

E\R –aE’\RIn this case: allows only

internal interaction of c.c||c—0||0 c||c—c0||c c||c—cc||0(c||c) \ {c}—(0||0) \{c}

Page 512: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Relabeling

E—aE’ ———— E[m] –m(a)E’[m]

No axioms/rules for agent 0.

Page 513: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Examples

a.E||b.F

a.E||FE||b.F

E||F

b

b

a

a

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Derivations

(0||0)

a.(b.(c||c)+d)

b.(c||c)+d

(c||c) 0

(0||c) (c||0)

a

b d

c

cc

c

Page 515: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

515

Modeling binary variable

C0=is_0? . C0 + set_1 . C1 + set_0 . C0

C1=is_1? . C1 + set_0 . C0 + set_1 . C1

C0 C1

set_1

set_0

set_0

is_0?

set_1

is_1?

Page 516: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Equational Definition

E=a.(b..E+c..E) E—aE’, A=EF=a.b..F+a.c..F A—aE’

G2G1

F1 F2

Fa a

b c

E

E’

a

b c

Page 517: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Trace equivalence:Systems have same finite sequences.

Same traces

Fa a

b b

E

a

b c c

E=a.(b+c) F=(a.b)+a.(b+c)

Page 518: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Failures: comparing also what wecannot do after a finite sequence.

Fa a

b b

E

a

b c c

Failure of agent E: (σ, X), where after executing σ from E, none of the events in X is enabled.Agent F has failure (a, {c}), which is not a failure of E.

Page 519: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Simulation equivalence

Relation over set of agents S. RSS. E R F If E’ R F’ and E’—aE’’, then there

exists F’’, F’—aF’’, and E’’ R F’’.

E

c d

b b

aaF

c d

b b

a

Page 520: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Simulation equivalence

Relation over set of agents S. RSS. E R F If E’ R F’ and E’—aE’’, then there exists F’’,

F’—aF’’, and E’’ R F’’.

E

c d

b b

aaF

c d

b b

a

Page 521: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Here, simulation works only in one direction. No equivalence!

Relation over set of agents S. RSS. E R F If E’ R F’ and E’—aE’’, then there exists F’’,

F’—aF’’, and E’’ R F’’.

E

c d

b b

aaF

c d

b b

a

want to establish

symmetricallynecessarily

problem!!!

Page 522: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Simulation equivalentbut not failure equivalent

Left agent a.b+a has a failure (a,{b}).

E

b

aaF

b

a

Page 523: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Bisimulation: same relation simulates in both directions

Not in this case: different simulation relations.

E

b

aaF

b

a

Page 524: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Hierarchy of equivalences

Bisimulation

Trace

FailureSimulation

Page 525: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Example:

A=a.((b.nil)+(c.d.A))

B=(a.(b.nil))+(a.c.d.B)

a b

c

ds0

s1 s2

s3 a

d

b

ac

t0

t1

t4

t2

t3

Page 526: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Bisimulation between G1 and G2

Let N= N1 U N2

A relation R : N1 x N2 is a bisumulation ifIf (m,n) in R then1. If m—am’ then n’:n—an’ and (m’,n’) in R2. If n—an’ then m’:m—am’ and (m’,n’) in R.

Other simulation relations are possible, I.e., m=a=> m’ when m—…—a—m’.

Page 527: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Algorithm for bisimulation:

Partition N into blocks B1B2…Bn=N. Initially: one block, containing all of N. Repeat until no change:

Choose a block Bi and a letter a. If some of the transitions of Bi move to some block Bj and some not, partition Bi accordingly.

At the end: Structures bisimilar if initial states of two structures are in same blocks.

Page 528: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Correctness of algorithm

Invariant: if (m,n) in R then m and n remain in the same block throughout the algorithm.

Termination: can split only a finite number of times.

Page 529: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Example:

a b

c

ds0

s1 s2

s3 a

d

b

ac

t0

t1

t4

t2

t3{s0,t0},{s1,s2,s3,t1,t2,t3,t4} split on b

{s0,t0},{s1,t1},{s0,s2,s3,t2,t3,t4}

Page 530: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Example:a b

c

ds0

s1 s2

s3 a

d

b

ac

t0

t1

t4

t2

t3

{s0,t0},{s1,t1},{s2,s3,t2,t3,t4} split on c

{s0,t0},{s1},{t1},{s2,s3,t2,t3,t4}

Page 531: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Example:

{s0,t0},{s1},{t1},{s2,s3,t2,t3,t4} split on c

{s0,t0},{s1},{t1},{t4},{s2,s3,t2,t3}

a b

c

ds0

s1 s2

s3 a

d

b

ac

t0

t1

t4

t2

t3

Page 532: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Example:

{s0,t0},{s1},{t1},{t4},{s2,s3,t2,t3} split on d

{s0,t0},{s1},{t1},{t4},{s3, t3},{s2,t2}

a b

c

ds0

s1 s2

s3 a

d

b

ac

t0

t1

t4

t2

t3

Page 533: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Example:

{s0,t0},{s1},{t1},{t4},{s2,t2},{s3,t3} split on a

{s0},{t0},{s1},{t1},{t4},{s3, t3},{s2,t2}

a b

c

ds0

s1 s2

s3 a

d

b

ac

t0

t1

t4

t2

t3

Page 534: 1 Softrare Reliability Methods Prof. Doron A. Peled Bar Ilan University, Israel And Univeristy of warwick, UK Version 2008

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Example:

{s0},{t0},{s1},{t1},{t4},{s2,s3,t2,t3} split on d

{s0},{t0},{s1},{t1},{t4},{s3},{t3},{s2,t2}

a b

c

d

s0

s1 s2

s3a

d

b

ac

t0

t1

t4

t2

t3