1 the great panic of 2008: a historical perspective j watkins

39
1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

Upload: darleen-nancy-oliver

Post on 30-Dec-2015

223 views

Category:

Documents


6 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

1

The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective

j watkins

Page 2: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

2

Capitalism: Inherently Dynamic System

Capitalism: System of mass production Capitalism has been plagued with crises: The tulip mania of the 1630s, the Panic of

1837, the Panic of 1873 and the depression of 1894, the depression of 1921.

Only the Great Depression of the 1930s is burned on our collective consciousness.

Page 3: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

3

Great Depression of the 1930s The loss of jobs, the waste of resources, the social unrest that it

brings on the heels are just a part. The last global depression was unmatched in its ruthlessness:

From 1929 to 1932, Industrial output fell 45% Unemployment increased to 25% From 1929 to 1933, GNP fell by 46% Prices fell by 31%

Implications: WWII—war as an alternative to depression Laissez faire and representative democracy are incompatible

Page 4: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

4

Nature of Capitalism

Private ownership of the means of production Free labor force

Free from (independent of) the means of production

Free to sell their labor power (capacity to do work) Production based on the pursuit of profit Commodity production

Commodities—goods and services produced for sale on the market

Page 5: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

5

How Capitalist Make Profits

Adam Smith: to earn profits capital must circulate, “it must leave in one form and return in another.”

The central problem of capitalism: the conversion of commodities into money

Profits = Revenues – Expenses Revenues: income earned by selling commodities Expenses: costs incurred in producing

commodities.

Page 6: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

Revenues

Revenues: income earned from the sale of commodities

Revenues: market price*quantity sold To increase revenues businesses try to

increase demand by: Changing tastes (marketing) Providing credit Changing price

6

Page 7: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

Expenses

Fixed costs (costs that are invariant to output): Lease or mortgage Financial costs (interest and principal payments)

Variable costs (costs that vary with output) Labor costs Raw materials

Taxes or subsidies

7

Page 8: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

8

Evolution of consumer Credit

The evolution of consumer credit: outgrowth of business efforts to convert commodities into profits

The more goods and service are converted into money, the greater business revenues, which in turn increase profits.

The problem from the corporate point of view: how to increase revenues without increasing expenses.

Page 9: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

9

Credit …

enables the consumer to purchase products that would in many cases go unpurchased.

enhances corporate profits. Deficit expenditures by consumers create surpluses for corporations

Page 10: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

10

The Rise of Consumer Capitalism (1890s to 1920s)

In an economy producing an abundance of consumer goods, the economizing habit (saving) among the masses hinders the accumulation of capital.

Emphasis shifts to sustaining demand, which involves fostering desires and providing credit to satisfy those desires.

Page 11: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

11

Removing Constraints that Inhibit Consumer Spending

Dismantling the Protestant Ethic (Early 20th century)

Installment Credit (Durable goods revolution—early 20th century)

Universal Credit Card (1968) Equity Loans (1960s by flourished in 1980s) Credit Scoring (early 1990s) Securitizing credit card receivables (1990s) Subprime loans (early 2000s)

Page 12: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

12

Dismantling the Protestant Ethic

First, industrialization transformed nineteenth century emphasis on production to consumption.

Second, the emergence of the corporation rendered personal saving unnecessary in financing investment

Third, mass production combined with competition proved ruinous.

Fourth, installment credit, considered by Daniel Bell "The greatest single engine in the destruction of the Protestant ethic.”

Page 13: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

13

Installment Credit and the Durable Goods Revolution

Durable goods revolution: 1890-1920 "a structural change in consumer tastes in favor of

durable goods” Led by Two innovations:

Electrification Automobiles

Mass production created a need to sell. Calvin Coolidge: "mass production is only possible when there is mass demand.”

Page 14: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

14

Universal Credit Card

The creation of the universal credit introduced in 1968

Marquette Decision (1978)—preempted state usury laws

Smiley v Citibank—pre-empted state laws regulating fees (1996)

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC): repeatedly cited the National Bank Act of 1863 to pre-empt states from requiring credit card companies to provide consumers information.

Page 15: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

15

Equity Loans

Home equity has been around at least since the 1960s.

The increase in home equity loans is associated with two factors: the rise in real-estate values beginning in the

1980s Tax Reform Act of 1986—eliminated interest

deductibility on credit cards.

Page 16: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

16

Consumer Credit and Securitization

Examples Mortgage Backed Assets Collateralized Debt Obligations

Purpose: Transform a previously illiquid assets (income streams from mortgage payments or the income streams from credit card receivables) into Liquid Assets

Implication: Increased the allocation of purchasing power to consumers

Page 17: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

17

Securitization

Creating an asset the value of which is based on payments (receivables) on various loans.

Banks can sell these assets Banks receive a fee Banks recoup the money originally loaned, enabling banks

to make more loans

Page 18: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

Examples of Securitization

Asset backed Securities: equity loans, credit card receivables, etc. Credit cards receivables were relatively illiquid Banks securitize the receivables, receiving a lump sum for

the receivables, allowing banks to make new loans Moving securitization off balance sheet, effectively reduces

the capital requirements, increasing profits Mortgage backed Securities

Mortgages were also relatively illiquid Ginnie Mae created a market for securitized assets.

18

Page 19: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

19

Consumer Debt (pink) and Consumption (blue) as a Percentage of GDP

0.00%

20.00%

40.00%

60.00%

80.00%

100.00%

120.00%

140.00%

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

56.00%

58.00%

60.00%

62.00%

64.00%

66.00%

68.00%

70.00%

72.00%

Drop Page Fields Here

Year or quarter

Data

Page 20: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

20

Corporate Profits by Industry as a % of GDP

0.00%

2.00%

4.00%

6.00%

8.00%

10.00%

12.00%

14.00%

16.00%

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Sum of Fin_Pr/GDP

Sum of ROW Corp/GDP

Sum of Other Non-Fin Corp/GDP

Sum of Info/GDP

Sum of Retail/GDP

Sum of Wholesale/GDP

Sum of Utilities/GDP

Sum of Transportation/GDP

Sum of Manf/GDP

Drop Page Fields Here

Year or quarter

Data

Page 21: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

21

Consumer Debt (pink) and Financial Profits (blue) as a Percentage of GDP

0.00%

20.00%

40.00%

60.00%

80.00%

100.00%

120.00%

140.00%1

95

9

19

64

19

69

19

74

19

79

19

84

19

89

19

94

19

99

20

04

0.00%

0.50%

1.00%

1.50%

2.00%

2.50%

3.00%

3.50%

4.00%

4.50%

Drop Page Fields Here

Year or quarter

Data

Page 22: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

22

Consumption Expenditures (pink) and Financial Profits (blue) as a Percentage of GDP

56.00%

58.00%

60.00%

62.00%

64.00%

66.00%

68.00%

70.00%

72.00%

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

0.00%

0.50%

1.00%

1.50%

2.00%

2.50%

3.00%

3.50%

4.00%

4.50%

Drop Page Fields Here

Year or quarter

Data

Page 23: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

23

Federal Reserve Bank Profits and the Profits of Other Financial Indistitutions as a Percentage of GDP

0.00%

0.50%

1.00%

1.50%

2.00%

2.50%

3.00%

3.50%

4.00%

4.50%

1959

.19

60.

1961

.19

62.

1963

.19

64.

1965

.19

66.

1967

.19

68.

1969

.19

70.

1971

.19

72.

1973

.19

74.

1975

.19

76.

1977

.19

78.

1979

.19

80.

1981

.19

82.

1983

.19

84.

1985

.19

86.

1987

.19

88.

1989

.19

90.

1991

.19

92.

1993

.19

94.

1995

.19

96.

1997

.19

98.

1999

.20

00.

2001

.20

02.

2003

.20

04.

2005

.20

06.

2007

:III

Sum of Other Financial/GDP

Sum of Fed Res Banks/GDP

Drop Page Fields Here

Year or quarter

Data

Page 24: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

24

Non-Interest Income as a Percent of Net Operating Expenses

Total

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

0.35

0.4

0.45

0.5

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Total

Drop Page Fields Here

Sum of Non-Interest Income as % of Net Operating Revenues

Year

Drop Series Fields Here

Page 25: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

25

Percent of Households filing for Bankruptcy

Total

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

198

0:0

1:0

0

198

5:0

1:0

0

199

0:0

1:0

0

199

5:0

1:0

0

200

0:0

1:0

0

200

5:0

1:0

0

Total

Sum of Share of households filing (percent)

Year and quarter

Page 26: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

26

Housing Burden to Households 2006Moderate Burden: 30-50%Severe Burden: Over 50%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Bottom Decile BottomQuartile

Lower-MiddleQuartile

Sum of No Burden2

Sum of ModerateBurden2

Sum of Severe Burden2

Page 27: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

27

Federal Reserve Bank Profits and Other Financial Profits as a Percentage of GDP

0.00%

0.50%

1.00%

1.50%

2.00%

2.50%

3.00%

3.50%

4.00%

4.50%

1959

.19

60.

1961

.19

62.

1963

.19

64.

1965

.19

66.

1967

.19

68.

1969

.19

70.

1971

.19

72.

1973

.19

74.

1975

.19

76.

1977

.19

78.

1979

.19

80.

1981

.19

82.

1983

.19

84.

1985

.19

86.

1987

.19

88.

1989

.19

90.

1991

.19

92.

1993

.19

94.

1995

.19

96.

1997

.19

98.

1999

.20

00.

2001

.20

02.

2003

.20

04.

2005

.20

06.

2007

:III

Sum of Other Financial/GDP

Sum of Fed Res Banks/GDP

Drop Page Fields Here

Year or quarter

Data

Page 28: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

28

Federal Reserve Bank Profits and Other Financial Profits as a Percentage of GDP

0.00%

0.50%

1.00%

1.50%

2.00%

2.50%

3.00%

3.50%

4.00%

4.50%

1959

.19

60.

1961

.19

62.

1963

.19

64.

1965

.19

66.

1967

.19

68.

1969

.19

70.

1971

.19

72.

1973

.19

74.

1975

.19

76.

1977

.19

78.

1979

.19

80.

1981

.19

82.

1983

.19

84.

1985

.19

86.

1987

.19

88.

1989

.19

90.

1991

.19

92.

1993

.19

94.

1995

.19

96.

1997

.19

98.

1999

.20

00.

2001

.20

02.

2003

.20

04.

2005

.20

06.

2007

:III

Sum of Other Financial/GDP

Sum of Fed Res Banks/GDP

Drop Page Fields Here

Year or quarter

Data

Page 29: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

29

Mortgage Debt/GDP

Total

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

19

59

19

60

19

61

19

62

19

63

19

64

19

65

19

66

19

67

19

68

19

69

19

70

19

71

19

72

19

73

19

74

19

75

19

76

19

77

19

78

19

79

19

80

19

81

19

82

19

83

19

84

19

85

19

86

19

87

19

88

19

89

19

90

19

91

19

92

19

93

19

94

19

95

19

96

19

97

19

98

19

99

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

Total

Drop Page Fields Here

Sum of Total Mortgage Debt/GDP

End of year or quarter

Drop Series Fields Here

Page 30: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

30

Ratio of Debt to Income Household Quintiles and the Top-Income Earning Decentiles

Year 0-19.9 % 20-39.9% 40-59.9% 60-79.9% 80-89.9% 90-99.9%

1992 734% 378% 477% 295% 242% 215%

1995 720% 508% 458% 312% 278% 197%

1998 737% 688% 442% 388% 284% 215%

2001 715% 565% 424% 318% 260% 225%

2004 760% 836% 543% 451% 355% 299%

Page 31: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

31

Distribution of Income: 2006

3.48.6

14.5

22.9

50.5

Lowest Fifth

Second Fifth

Third Fifth

Fourth Fifth

Highest Fifth

Page 32: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

32

Anatomy of a Depression

Depressions are characterized by deft deflation People and business alike took on debt to purchase

assets they believed would increase in value The increase in real estate values combined with

low interest rates Consumers increased their debt Increase in real estate values led people to borrow,

speculating that home prices would increase Banks seeking higher returns provided money to subprime

borrowers, bundled the mortgages, and sold them to unsuspecting investors

Page 33: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

33

Revenues: Uncertain (based on expectations)

Debt obligations: Certain, stated contractually Decreases in revenues to business and

income to individuals preclude their ability to repay debts

Businesses and consumers sell assets, creating a fall in asset values

Page 34: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

34

Credit Default Swaps

Type of insurance” that financial institutions purchased in case the mortgage borrowers defaulted.

AIG earned billions in fees selling credit default swaps. AIG assumed it would never have to pay.Others purchased swaps, betting consumers would default.

As of November of 2008, credit default swaps exceed thirty-two trillion dollars, more than double the output of the US economy. 

Page 35: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

35

The Problem

How do we sustain business revenues? Fall in consumer spending:

10 trillion decline in wealth People paying down debts Inability to borrow Loss of jobs or the uncertainty of a future job

Fall Investment: Investment depends on expectations Business confidence has collapsed

Page 36: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

36

Fall in exports: The decline in the output of other countries

precipitates a decrease in exports abroad Rise the dollar as the safe-haven currency makes

our exports more expensive in terms of other currencies

Government? Function of government deficits: Function of the Federal Reserve

Page 37: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

37

Government Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP

Page 38: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

Government Deficits and Surpluses as a Percentage of GDP

38

1937

.

1940

.

1943

.

1946

.

1949

.

1952

.

1955

.

1958

.

1961

.

1964

.

1967

.

1970

.

1973

.

1976

.

1979

.

1982

.

1985

.

1988

.

1991

.

1994

.

1997

.

2000

.

2003

.

2006

.

2009

.

Trans

ition

quar

ter.

-35.00

-30.00

-25.00

-20.00

-15.00

-10.00

-5.00

0.00

5.00

10.00

Total

Total

Page 39: 1 The Great Panic of 2008: A Historical Perspective j watkins

39

Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP

1939

.

1942

.

1945

.

1948

.

1951

.

1954

.

1957

.

1960

.

1963

.

1966

.

1969

.

1972

.

1975

.

1978

.

1981

.

1984

.

1987

.

1990

.

1993

.

1996

.

1999

.

2002

.

2005

.

2008

.

2011

(est

imat

es).

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

45.00

50.00

Total

Total