10 and “john does” 1 deadline · bagatourian, jeremy haft, eddie gonzalez, morgan creek...

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Civil Action No.: 17-cv-03785-DLI-JO

Hon. Dora L. Irizarry

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Documents Filed Herewith: Notice of

Motion, Affidavit of Erica J. Van Loon;

Request For Judicial Notice

Complaint Filed: June 23, 2017

Date of Service: August 7, 2017

(E-filing)

KEVIN POWELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

DAVID ROBINSON, LENTON TERRELL

HUTTON, JAMES G. ROBINSON, STEVEN

BAGATOURIAN, JEREMY HAFT, EDDIE

GONZALEZ, MORGAN CREEK

PRODUCTIONS, INC., PROGRAM PICTURES,

LIONS GATE FILMS, INC., “JOHN DOE

ENTITIES” 1-10 and “JOHN DOES” 1-10,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS LIONSGATE FILMS,

INC., MORGAN CREEK PRODUCTIONS, INC., PROGRAM PICTURES, AND

LENTON TERRELL HUTTON’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF KEVIN

POWELL’S COMPLAINT

Case 1:17-cv-03785-DLI-JO Document 32 Filed 08/07/17 of 11 PageID #: 125

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS ........................................................................................2

LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................................3

ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................4

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................7


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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page

Federal Cases

Accurate Grading Quality Assur., Inc. v. Thorpe,

No. 12 CIV. 1343 ALC, 2013 WL 1234836 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013) ................................ 4, 6

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009) .................................................................................................................... 3

Brown v. New York City Hous. Auth.,

No. 05 Civ. 7332, 2006 WL 1378599 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2006) ........................................... 3, 5

Caldwell v. Rudnick,

2006 WL 2109454 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2006) ............................................................................. 5

Capitol Records, Inc. v. Wings Digital Corp.,

210 F. Supp. 2d 147 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ........................................................................................ 6

Castro v. Azaria,

Case No. 06-CV-3853 (ENV) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2006) ............................................................. 5

Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc.,

282 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2002)........................................................................................................ 3

Cruise v. Doyle,

No. 07 Civ. 3940, 2008 WL 116703, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2008) .............................................. 3

Elektra Entm't Grp., Inc. v. Schwartz,

No. CV-06-3533(DGT), 2008 WL 906737 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2008) ........................................ 4

Fischer v. Talco Trucking, Inc.,

No. 07-CV-4564(JS)(ARL), 2009 WL 5066902 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2009) .......................... 5, 6

K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1-29,

No. CV 11-3331 JTB ETB, 2011 WL 4401933 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2011) .......................... 4, 6

Muench Photography, Inc. v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Pub. Co.,

No. 09 CV 2669 (LAP), 2012 WL 1021535 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012) ................................... 6

Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,

748 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2014)........................................................................................................ 4

Pyatt v. Raymond,

462 F. App'x 22 (2d Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................... 4


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Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick,

559 U.S. 154 (2010) ................................................................................................................ 2, 4

Scientific Computing Assoc., Inc. v. Warnes,

No. 07-CV-6351, 2011 WL 1327398 (W.D.N.Y. April 5, 2011) ............................................... 4

Toms v. Pizzo,

4 F. Supp. 2d 178 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) ........................................................................................... 4

Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int'l Corp.,

354 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2003)........................................................................................................ 2

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Wrights Mill Holdings, LLC,

127 F. Supp. 3d 156 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2015) .......................................................................... 5

Federal Statutes

17 U.S.C. § 411 ........................................................................................................................... 5, 6

17 U.S.C. § 411(a) .......................................................................................................... 1, 2, 3, 4, 6

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A) ......................................................................................................... 1, 2

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)............................................................................................................... 3, 4


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MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Defendants Lionsgate Films, Inc. (“Lionsgate”), Morgan Creek Productions, Inc.

(“Morgan Creek”), Program Pictures (“Program Pictures”) and Lenton Terrell Hutton1 (“Mr.

Hutton”) (collectively, “Defendants”) respectfully submit this Memorandum of Law in Support

of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Kevin Powell’s Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6).

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Kevin Powell’s Complaint is procedurally deficient and must be dismissed as a

matter of law. The basis for Defendants’ motion to dismiss is simple. Plaintiff asserts six causes

of action in the Complaint, all of which are predicated on Defendants’ alleged infringement of

Plaintiff’s purported copyrights. But Plaintiff fails to plead a fundamental prerequisite to sustain

a copyright infringement claim, i.e., receipt or refusal of a registration certificate for the works at

issue. Thus, the Complaint fails to allege a single claim upon which this Court can grant relief.

Specifically, Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act requires that a copyright must be

registered before an infringement action may be brought under it. Courts in the Second Circuit,

including this district, have held that Section 411(a) precludes a plaintiff copyright owner from

initiating an infringement action until the plaintiff either receives or is denied a copyright

registration. Here, Plaintiff fails to satisfy this statutory precondition, as the Complaint does not

allege that he has either obtained or been denied registration for any of the three works at issue in

his Complaint. Indeed, Plaintiff cannot make such an allegation in good faith, as an online search

1 Defendants note that to date, Plaintiff has not filed a proof of service indicating that Program Pictures or Lenton

Terrell Hutton have been served a copy the Complaint and Summons. However, Mr. Hutton, Principal of Program

Pictures, received a copy of the Complaint and the Summons to Program Pictures in the mail on July 17, 2017.

While Defendants dispute the propriety of this attempted service, out of an abundance of caution, Program Pictures

and Mr. Hutton are responding to the Complaint within 21 days of receipt, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A).


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of the United States Copyright Office’s catalogue confirms no registration has issued under

Plaintiff’s name for his asserted copyrights. Accordingly, the Complaint must be dismissed in its

entirety under Rule 12(b)(6)2.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

On June 23, 2017 Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Lionsgate, Morgan Creek,

Program Pictures, Mr. Hutton, and five other named defendants. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). In the

Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he “completed and published several articles and cover stories

for Vibe Magazine based on the life and struggles of Tupac Shakur.” Compl., ¶ 17. The three

articles specifically referenced in the Complaint are titled “Exclusive: Is Tupac Crazy Or Just

Misunderstood” (published February 1994), “Tupac Shakur Jailhouse Exclusive” (published

April 1995), and “Live from Deathrow” (published February 1996) (collectively referred to

herein as the “Asserted Works”). Id.

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants infringed Plaintiff’s copyrights in the Asserted

Works via the production, distribution, and broadcast of the 2017 motion picture “ALL EYEZ

ON ME.” See id., ¶¶ 12, 14, 31 – 32, 38 – 39, 44 – 45, 50 – 51, 54, 59. However, the Complaint

offers only that the Asserted Works are “copyrighted” or “copyrightable” under the Copyright

Act. See id., ¶¶ 18-19. Plaintiff does not plead pre-suit receipt of valid copyright registrations for

the Asserted Works. Nor does he allege that the Copyright Office denied registration as to any of

the Asserted Works.

2 Prior to the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, various circuit courts - including the

Second Circuit - had treated Section 411(a) as jurisdictional in nature, and dismissed copyright infringement claims

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when a plaintiff failed to obtain a registration. See, e.g.,

Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int'l Corp., 354 F.3d 112, 114 (2d Cir. 2003). In Reed Elsevier, however, the

Supreme Court held that Section 411(a) imposes “a precondition to filing a claim” under the Copyright Act, and

thus, leads to dismissal of such actions under 12(b)(6). Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, (2010).


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Indeed, a search of the Copyright Office’s online catalogue of registered copyrights

reveals that at the time Plaintiff filed the Complaint, he did not possess valid copyright

registrations for any of the Asserted Works. Declaration of Erica J. Van Loon (“Van Loon

Decl.”), Exs. 1-4. Because Plaintiff has not, and cannot, plead either possession of a copyright

registration or a refused attempt at registration for any of the Asserted Works, his Complaint

must be dismissed under Rule 12.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff's complaint “must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If a plaintiff fails to plead any essential element of a

claim for which it seeks relief, such a claim should be dismissed. See Cruise v. Doyle, No. 07

Civ. 3940, 2008 WL 116703, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2008) (“Dismissal is proper where a plaintiff

fails to plead the basic elements of a claim.”).

While the factual allegations of a complaint must be accepted as true, courts are “not

bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678). When deciding a motion brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court may

consider “documents incorporated by reference into the complaint,” “matters of which judicial

notice may be taken,” and “documents that are ‘integral’ to the complaint.” Chambers v. Time

Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted). “Critically, where

allegations set forth in a complaint are contradicted by other matters asserted or by materials

attached to or incorporated by reference in the complaint, the court is not obliged to credit the

allegations in the complaint. Brown v. New York City Hous. Auth., No. 05 Civ. 7332, 2006 WL

1378599, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2006).


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ARGUMENT

Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act imposes a “precondition to filing a claim.” Reed

Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010); see also 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (“[N]o civil action

for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until

preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this

title.”). To properly plead an infringement claim, a plaintiff “must state…that the copyrights

have been registered in accordance” with Section 411. Elektra Entm't Grp., Inc. v. Schwartz, No.

CV-06-3533(DGT), 2008 WL 906737 at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2008) (internal citation omitted);

see also K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1-29, No. CV 11-3331 JTB ETB, 2011 WL 4401933, at *1

(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2011) (holding that post Reed-Elsevier, “valid registration is an element of

an infringement claim.”). Indeed, the Second Circuit consistently enforces this statutory

requirement, routinely affirming dismissal of copyright infringement claims instituted prior to

any attempt to register the works at issue. See e.g., Pyatt v. Raymond, 462 F. App'x 22 (2d Cir.

2012), as amended (Feb. 9, 2012) (affirming dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and denying the

plaintiff an opportunity to amend, holding that “post-complaint registrations were not within the

scope of the complaint”); Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2014)

(affirming dismissal where copyright plaintiff did not attempt registration prior to instituting an

infringement action).

District courts in this circuit have universally followed suit. See e.g., Scientific

Computing Assoc., Inc. v. Warnes, No. 07-CV-6351, 2011 WL 1327398, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. April

5, 2011) (dismissing under Rule 12(b)(6) “[d]efendant's copyright claims [because they] are

unsupported by the facts, as he has not alleged that he actually registered a copyright”); Toms v.

Pizzo, 4 F. Supp. 2d 178, 185 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[A] plaintiff must register his copyright prior


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to instituting a copyright infringement action”); Accurate Grading Quality Assur., Inc. v. Thorpe,

No. 12 CIV. 1343 ALC, 2013 WL 1234836, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013) (holding that a

copyright claim without registration “is necessarily barred and must be dismissed”). Indeed, this

Court has itself consistently dismissed infringement claims based on unregistered works. See

e.g., Castro v. Azaria, Case No. 06-CV-3853 (ENV) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2006) (holding that

plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted when he failed to allege in his

complaint that he owned a valid registration in the copyright); Caldwell v. Rudnick, 2006 WL

2109454 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2006) (“[A] plaintiff's failure to register a copyright before bringing

an infringement action requires dismissal”).

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint merely offers the conclusory allegations that the Asserted

Works were “copyrighted” or “copyrightable.” Compl., ¶¶ 18-19. But Plaintiff did not plead that

he owns valid copyright registrations in the Asserted Works, or that the Copyright Office denied

registration for the Asserted Works. Nor did Plaintiff attach any registration certificates to the

Complaint, or any correspondence from the Copyright Office indicating a refusal to register any

of the Asserted Works. This alone warrants dismissal. See Fischer v. Talco Trucking, Inc., No.

07-CV-4564(JS)(ARL), 2009 WL 5066902 at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2009) (dismissing

plaintiff's copyright infringement claim for failure to plead registration). Moreover, a search of

the Copyright Office’s registration database for “Kevin Powell” and for each of the titles of the

Asserted Works returned no corresponding registrations. Van Loon Decl., Ex. 1-4.3 Thus,

Plaintiff’s bare-bones, conclusory assertions that the works were “copyrighted” cannot satisfy the

3 In accordance with this Court’s holding in Messina, this Court may take judicial notice of the search records

printed from the United States Copyright Office’s website. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Wrights Mill Holdings,

LLC, 127 F. Supp. 3d 156, 166 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2015) (stating that it is “clearly proper for [the Court] to take

judicial notice” of “documents retrieved from official government websites” and that “Courts routinely take judicial

notice of such governmental records”).


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pleading requirements imposed by Section 411, and no amendment can cure this fatal deficiency.

See Brown, 2006 WL 1378599, at *2 (holding that a Court need not credit any allegation in a

complaint contradicted by materials upon which the Court may rely); Fischer, 2009 WL

5066902 at *2 (denying an opportunity to amend where the plaintiff could not show he obtained

registration for the copyrights at issue).

Even if Plaintiff has attempted to register the Asserted Works, and the related

applications are pending, the Complaint still must be dismissed. This Court has held that

“submission of an application for copyright registration does not satisfy the registration

precondition of Section 411(a).” K-Beech, 2011 WL 4401933, at *1 (noting “courts in both the

Eastern District of New York and the Southern District of New York have held that submission

of an application for copyright registration does not satisfy the registration precondition of §

411(a)” and citing supporting cases); see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. Wings Digital Corp., 210

F. Supp. 2d 147 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (plaintiff's complaint dismissed as to works in which plaintiff's

application to register his copyrights was pending); Accurate Grading Quality Assur., Inc., 2013

WL 1234836 at *7 (“[A]ny pending application cannot support [plaintiffs'] tenuous copyright

claim, even if registration is later obtained.”). Indeed, the Copyright Office must have acted on

such an application before a plaintiff can bring an infringement suit compliant with the pre-suit

requirements of Section 411. Muench Photography, Inc. v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Pub. Co.,

No. 09 CV 2669 (LAP), 2012 WL 1021535 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012) (“It remains the law

in this Circuit that § 411(a) imposes a bar to copyright infringement claims where a plaintiff has

not either received or been denied a copyright registration at the time such a claim is

interposed.”) (emphasis added). As such, Plaintiff cannot remedy the deficiency in his

Complaint, and dismissal, rather than an opportunity to amend, is the appropriate relief.


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In sum, Plaintiff fails to adequately plead an essential element necessary to sustain an

infringement claim – valid registration(s) for the Asserted Works, or denial thereof. Because

each of the causes of action identified in the Complaint rest on Defendants’ alleged infringement

of the Asserted Works (see Compl., at ¶¶ 31 – 32, 38 – 39, 44 – 45, 50 – 51, 54, 59), a complete

dismissal of the Complaint is appropriate.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety, and grant Defendants other such relief the Court deems just

and proper.

Dated: August 7, 2017

Los Angeles, California Respectfully submitted,

GLASER WEIL FINK HOWARD

AVCHEN & SHAPIRO LLP

By: /s/ Erica J. Van Loon

Erica J. Van Loon

Admitted Pro Hac Vice

10250 Constellation Blvd. 19th Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90067

(310) 282 - 6260

[email protected]

Attorneys for Defendants Lionsgate Films,

Inc., Morgan Creek Productions, Inc.,

Program Pictures, and Lenton Terrell Hutton


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