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Project Alpha

Centre for Science

and Security Studies

The AEOI Files

Proliferation Case Study Series

Nick Gillard1 & Ian J. Stewart

2

11 August 2015

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About Project Alpha

Alpha was established in 2011 at King’s College London’s Centre for Science and Security Studies

(CSSS) with government funding to improve the implementation of trade controls. Alpha conducts

research to understand both illicit trade and the effectiveness of supply-side controls in countering

such trade. This research forms the basis of Alpha’s outreach and capacity building activities.

About the Case Study Series

This series was developed to highlight individual cases of illicit trade so that broader policy lessons

can be identified and enacted. The series draws upon a variety of open source information,

including media reporting, trade data and social media information.

Acknowledgements

Alpha’s work is funded from a variety of sources, including from the Carnegie Corporation of New

York and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

Copyright 2015 King’s College London

The author/s of this report invites liberal use of the information provided in it for educational

purposes, requiring only that the reproduced material clearly cite the source, using: ‘The AEOI

Files’, Proliferation Case Study Series, Nick Gillard & Ian J. Stewart, Project Alpha, 11 August

2015.

About the Authors

1. Nick Gillard is a Researcher working on Project Alpha at the Centre for Science and Security

Studies, Department of War Studies, King’s College London.

2. Ian J. Stewart heads Project Alpha at King’s College London, which works to understand and

prevent illicit proliferation-related trade.

Note: this is a corrected version. An earlier version, published on 10 August 2015, inadvertently

omitted information about the material composition of Iran’s IR-2m centrifuge.

© King’s College London

All Rights Reserved

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Summary

A research prospectus produced in 2006 by the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, and recently

obtained by Project Alpha, provides new insights into Iran’s nuclear programme. While dated, the

138-page prospectus reveals key aspects of Iranian nuclear-related research, including aspects that

Iran has not previously publicly acknowledged – such as apparent efforts to develop maraging steel

centrifuge rotors beyond the period that Iran has stated that it ceased such research. Read in

conjunction with other sources, the prospectus also reveals the apparently close involvement in

Iran’s nuclear programme by the Sharif University of Technology, which has made strenuous

efforts to overturn the European Union’s sanctions against it for purported nuclear involvement.

Finally, the document provides important information on certain key technologies that Iran will

likely seek to re-supply its nuclear programme under the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of

Action.

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Case Study Outline

1. Introduction

2. The AEOI research prospectus

3. Research areas

4. Centrifuge programme insights

a. IR-1 centrifuge materials and performance

b. Maraging steel research

c. Indigenisation of centrifuge support infrastructure

d. Depleted uranium hexafluoride conversion

5. Laser-related insights

6. Other insights

7. The role of Iranian universities in the nuclear programme

8. Conclusion

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1. Introduction

The Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, or AEOI, is Iran’s central nuclear agency. The AEOI

controls and operates Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle, from the uranium mines at Gachin and Saghand to

its planned heavy water reactor at Arak. In 2006, the UN Security Council designated the AEOI

for its role in overseeing Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities – namely, the uranium

enrichment and heavy water reactor programmes that Iran did not declare to the IAEA until 2003.1

An important part of the AEOI’s work is nuclear-related research.2 The AEOI’s central research

entity is the Tehran-based Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute (NSTRI),

although nuclear-related research is also likely conducted within various other subsidiaries and

companies related to the AEOI.3 A large number of research papers have been openly published by

AEOI-affiliated authors, although research on certain sensitive aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme

– such as design and performance parameters of gas centrifuges – is rarely, if ever, published in

open literature.4

2. The AEOI research prospectus

An AEOI research prospectus, published in 2006 and recently obtained by Project Alpha, is

unusual in this respect.5 This document provides detailed research parameters for centrifuge-related

projects and other nuclear-related subjects rarely seen in open publications. Titled ‘Collection of

Research Projects of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran,’ the report was published in 2006,

meaning that it by no means represents the cutting edge of Iranian nuclear research, although it is

still useful as a window into proliferation-sensitive and historical aspects of Iran’s nuclear

programme.

The prospectus’s author is Javad Karimi-Sabet, a well-known senior official from Iran’s nuclear

programme. Karimi-Sabet appeared on Iranian television in 2006 receiving an award from former

president Ahmadinejad, and was pictured again in 2008 during Ahmadinejad’s visit to the Natanz

enrichment facility (see figure 1).6 Karimi-Sabet has also been subjected to UN Security Council

1 UN Security Council, Resolution 1737, S/RES/1737 (2006), 27 December 2006,

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1737(2006), accessed 5 August 2015. 2 See ‘History of Establishment of the Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute,’ Atomic Energy

Organisation of Iran, http://www.aeoi.org.ir/Portal/Home/Default.aspx?CategoryID=6000d011-2442-4d4a-

ad59-414396705f12, accessed 5 August 2015. 3 For example, NSTRI has reportedly worked with other subsidiaries of the AEOI on research projects. See

US Department of State, ‘Additional Sanctions Imposed by the Department of State Targeting Iranian

Proliferators,’ 29 August 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/231159.htm, accessed 5 August 2015. 4 Examples of openly-available papers published by AEOI-affiliated authors include Maryam Mazaheri-

Tehrani (AEOI), ‘Removal of toxic heavy metals: natural products َ as biosorbents,’ KAUMS Journal (

FEYZ ). 2013; 16 (7), pp.721-722, http://feyz.kaums.ac.ir/browse.php?a_id=1827&sid=1&slc_lang=en,

accessed 5 August 2015; Hossein Kazemian and Mohammad Hassan Mallah (Jaber Ibn Hayan laboratory,

AEOI), ‘Elimination of Cd2+ and Mn2+ from Wastewaters Using Natural Clinoptilolite and Synthetic

Zeolite P,’ Iran. J. Chem. Chem. Eng. Research, Vol. 25, No.4, 2006,

http://www.ijcce.ac.ir/pdf_8037_482f41d323860636a82af20e96d6a444.html, accessed 5 August 2015. 5 Javad Karimi-Sabet, ‘Collection of Research Projects of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran,’ Public

Relations Department of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, Autumn 2006, available online at

http://ele.aut.ac.ir/~pajou/pajo2/news&&events/tarh/AEOI.pdf, accessed 5 August 2015. 6 See http://profile.nano.ir/nano/index.php?ctrl=paper&actn=view_papers_person&p_id=189203; Middle

East Media Research Institute, ‘#1252 - Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Awards Medals to Iranian

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sanctions for his role as head of Novin Energy Company, a subsidiary of the AEOI.7 He is listed in

the prospectus document as a ‘technical assistant’ of the Novin Energy Company.8

Figure 1. Javad Karimi-Sabet at the Natanz enrichment facility with former president Ahmadinejad (inset: images

identifying Karimi-Sabet)

3. Research areas

The prospectus is divided into 11 project areas, which are demarked by acronym designations most

likely representing various AEOI subsidiaries and facilities. The proposed research projects in these

areas (see table 1) cover almost the entirety of Iran’s fuel cycle, from uranium extraction to reactor

operation and radiation safety.

The balance of projects across the different areas of the fuel cycle is broadly consistent with Iran’s

known technical progress and strategic priorities at the time: for example, about one third of the

Nuclear Scientists Channel 2 (Iran) - August 27, 2006 - 13:50,’ http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1252.htm,

accessed 5 August 2015. 7 The UN Security Council designated Karimi-Sabet in March of 2008 for his role as head of Novin Energy

Company. See UN Security Council, Resolution 1803, S/RES/1803 (2008), 3 March 2008,

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1803 (2008), accessed 5 August 2015. For

information on Novin Energy Company, see ‘Treasury Employs Financial Sanctions Against WMD

Proliferation Supporters in Iran,’ 4 January 2006, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-

releases/Pages/js3069.aspx, accessed 5 August 2015. 8 Javad Karimi-Sabet, ‘Collection of Research Projects of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran,’ Public

Relations Department of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, Autumn 2006, available online at

http://ele.aut.ac.ir/~pajou/pajo2/news&&events/tarh/AEOI.pdf, accessed 5 August 2015.

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projects are dedicated to centrifuge design and operation. Iran at that time was building from a

pilot-scale to an industrial-scale centrifuge enrichment programme.9

Table 1. Research areas in AEOI prospectus, sorted by designation

Designation Probably a reference to Number of proposals

Topics covered

RSN Rahkar Sanaye Novin, aka MITEC, an AEOI subsidiary responsible for design and construction of the IR-40 heavy water reactor in Arak.

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4 Computer equations for IR-40 reactor; IR-40 fuel handling mechanisms; concrete for reactor.

HWP Heavy Water Production Plant 1 Design of a mass spectrometer to distinguish deuterium from hydrogen isotopes.

FEP Fuel Enrichment Plant 31 Frequency analysers; rotation monitors; maraging steel forming, properties and failure; composite interactions with UF6; rotor durability; fluid modelling for a tank; rotor creep in 7075-T6 aluminium; UF6 modelling in piping and centrifuges; frequency inverters; electronic switching and filtering; corrosion of 316 stainless steel; gas flow on pitot tubes; vibration effects on piping; fuel cycle simulation software; de-magnetisation and gaussmeters; pressure transducers; vacuum pumps.

YCP Yellowcake Plant 8 Production of trioctylamine (TOA); production of tributylphosphate (TBP); production of di-2-ethylhexyl phosphoric acid (D2EHPA); production of strong base anion resin; production of trifluoroacetylacetone (TAA); optimisation of drying and calcination of yellowcake; organic and aqueous phases in YCP process lines; production of trialkylphosphine oxides (TRPO).

FMP Fuel Manufacturing Plant 16 UO2 pellet sintering; fuel rod structural analysis; effect of additives on U3O8 and UO2 pellets; niobium-zirconium alloys for fuel rods; fuel rod storage efficiency; fuel rod weld safety; effect of U308 and AUC on UO2 sintering; measurement of enrichment rates of fuel rods; internal quality control for fuel rods; UO2 pellet production processes; welding techniques.

TAM TAMAS Company, an AEOI subsidiary whose responsibilities include areas from uranium extraction to concentration and nuclear waste.

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9 Production of hydrogen fluoride (HF) from calcium fluoride; biological shielding requirements for alpha, beta and gamma radiation; thermohydraulic cores and neutron spectrums for miniature reactors; gamma ray monitoring systems; enrichment measurement systems; Boron neutron capture therapy simulation; radiation monitoring systems for vehicle entry/exit points; neutron activation analysis of heavy metal pollution in environment.

9 See, e.g, Report by the Director-General, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the

Islamic Republic of Iran,’ GOV/2006/15, 27 February 2006,

https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2006-15.pdf, accessed 5 August 2015. 10

UN Security Council, Resolution 1929, S/RES/1929 (2010), 9 June 2010,

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1929(2010), accessed 5 August 2015. 11

UN Security Council, Resolution 1803, S/RES/1803 (2008), 3 March 2008,

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1803 (2008), accessed 5 August 2015.

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PYP Paya Partov, an AEOI subsidiary involved in laser welding and laser enrichment-related technology.

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19 Chiller design; power supply design; switching design; Nd:YAG laser systems; Nd:YAG laser cutting and drilling devices; ceramic disc and YAG rod production for Nd:YAG lasers; laser surface treatment of Inconel turbine blades; digital control systems and power supplies; krypton arc laser lamp triggers.

UCF Uranium Conversion Facility 7 Use of microwaves for AUC to UO2 conversion; simulation of UF6, UF4 and AUC production; preparation of potassium hydrogen fluoride (KHF) and fluorine gas; production of UO2 powder from UF6; conversion of DUF6 to DUO2 and AHF recovery; extraction of uranium, thorium and rare earth elements from Saghand; production of fluorine gas through electrolytic cells.

SHK Shakhes Behbood Sanat, an AEOI subsidiary involved in production of equipment and parts for the nuclear fuel cycle.

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1 Design and construction of an electron-beam welding machine.

TSA Centrifuge Technology Company of Iran (TESA/TSA), an AEOI subsidiary that manufactures centrifuge parts and is involved in the production of IR-1 centrifuges.

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8 Vibration analysis inside a rotor; evaluation of rotor failures; effect of earthquakes on rotors; design and construction of an automatic balancing device; modelling of centrifuge scoop placement; modelling squeeze film dampers; reducing torque fluctuations in switched reluctance motors (SRM) and SRM drive control.

ZPP Zirconium Production Plant 9 Production of magnesium alloys Az61 and Az93; magnesium powder production using plasma process and atomising; production of zirconium alloys EH-110 and EH-125; production of titanium sponge; delayed hydride cracking in zirconium alloys; separation of hafnium from zirconium in liquid-liquid process; pollution reduction from Zirconium Production Plant.

4. Centrifuge programme insights

Iran has frequently displayed models of its various centrifuges at public exhibitions, and has made

available footage from inside its centrifuge enrichment halls at Natanz.15

However, like most states

with uranium enrichment programmes, Iran does not make public its research on centrifuge

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European Council, Decision 2011/299/CFSP, 23 May 2011, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32011D0299, accessed 5 August 2015; US Treasury, ‘Fact Sheet: E.O. 13382

Designations on Iran,’ 21 November 2011, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-

Enforcement/Documents/11212011_iran_wmd_factsheet.pdf, accessed 5 August 2015. 13

European Council, Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2010, 26 July 2010, accessed 5 August 2015. 14

US State Department, ‘Executive Order 13382 Designations on Iran,’ 21 November 2011,

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177608.htm, accessed 7 August 2015; Council of the European

Union, ‘Council implementing regulation (EU) No 503/2011 of 23 May 2011 implementing Regulation (EU)

No 961/2010 on restrictive measures against Iran,’ 24 May 2011, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32011R0503, accessed 7 August 2015. 15

See, e.g., William J. Broad, ‘A Tantalizing Look at Iran’s Nuclear Program,’ 29 April 2008, The New

York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/science/29nuke.html?pagewanted=all, accessed 7

August 2015; Press TV, ‘Press TV gains exclusive access to IAEA cameras in Natanz facility,’ 21 September

2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EM2Lkltg390, accessed 7 August 2015; ‘Iran Nuclear Advances-

News Analysis-02-15-2012,’ 16 February 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iUWgTXme2cI,

accessed 7 August 2015.

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production and operation, most likely for reasons of security. The research prospectus is unusual in

this respect. This document represents the only known written material that the AEOI has

released on manufacturing and design information for its centrifuges: as such, it contains useful and

significant insights.

a. IR-1 centrifuge materials and performance

The prospectus contains several research project proposals specifically related to the IR-1

centrifuge, the mainstay unit of Iran’s enrichment programme. These proposals yield two

particularly interesting pieces of information regarding IR-1 centrifuge materials and operating

parameters:

The material used for the IR-1 rotor is 7075-series aluminium alloy, heat-treated to T6-

grade (7075-T6).16

Significance: Knowing the precise form of aluminium from which an IR-1 rotor is made will

help assist efforts to monitor supplies to Iran’s centrifuge programme. That Iran uses 7075-

T6 has been reported previously, albeit without sourcing, by the Institute for Science and

International Security.17

Other sources have been less specific: the UN Panel of Experts,

for example, has stated that the material used is 7000-series aluminium alloy, a generic

grade that encompasses 7075-T6.18

The IR-1 rotor is expected to operate within a range of 0 and 70,000rpm.19

Significance: This adds additional context to the academic range of estimates on the

operating speed of an IR-1. For example, the Institute for Science and International

Security, quoting authoritative sources, has stated that Iran operates IR-1s at between

60,420rpm (1007Hz) and 63,840rpm (1064Hz).20

Glaser has stated that the IR-1’s operating

speed is 64,000rpm (1067Hz).21

Analysis by Langer of the Stuxnet malware, which

apparently targeted Iran’s centrifuges, has suggested a normal operating speed of

16

Javad Karimi-Sabet, ‘Collection of Research Projects of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran,’ Public

Relations Department of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, Autumn 2006, p. 17, available online at

http://ele.aut.ac.ir/~pajou/pajo2/news&&events/tarh/AEOI.pdf, accessed 5 August 2015. 17

See, e.g., David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond, ‘Did Stuxnet Take Out 1,000

Centrifuges at the Natanz Enrichment Plant? Preliminary Assessment,’ http://isis-online.org/isis-

reports/detail/did-stuxnet-take-out-1000-centrifuges-at-the-natanz-enrichment-plant/, accessed 5 August

2015. 18

UN Security Council, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010),’

S/2014/394, 11 June 2014, p.16, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/394, accessed

5 August 2015. 19


Relations Department of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, Autumn 2006, p. 17, available online at


David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond, ‘Did Stuxnet Take Out 1,000 Centrifuges at the

Natanz Enrichment Plant? Preliminary Assessment,’ 22 December 2010, Institute for Science and

International Security, http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/did-stuxnet-take-out-1000-centrifuges-at-the-

natanz-enrichment-plant/, accessed 6 August 2015. 21

Alexander Glaser, ‘Characteristics of the Gas Centrifuge for Uranium Enrichment and Their Relevance for

Nuclear Weapon Proliferation (corrected),’ Science and Global Security, 16:1–25, 2008,

https://www.princeton.edu/~aglaser/2008aglaser_sgsvol16.pdf, accessed 5 August 2015.

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63,000rpm (1050Hz).22

According to Langner, one of Stuxnet’s attack methods was to

briefly increase the speed of centrifuges to 84,600rpm, which is slightly beyond the IR-1’s

operating limits. Project Alpha estimates that the theoretical maximum operating speed of

an aluminium 7075 rotor is around 83,300rpm.

b. Maraging steel research

The prospectus contains multiple proposals relating to maraging steel, a form of steel whose high

tensile strength makes it suitable for use in centrifuge rotors, as well as the bellows used to join

rotor sections in supercritical centrifuge designs.23

Iran has acknowledged receiving in the

mid-1990s from the AQ Khan network blueprints for the Pakistani P-2 centrifuge, which uses a

maraging steel rotor.24

While some of Iran’s centrifuges are known to use maraging steel bellows

and end-caps, none of Iran’s deployed centrifuges are known to use maraging steel rotors. The

IR-2 centrifuge, a shorter version of the P-2 briefly deployed by Iran at Natanz, reportedly used a

carbon fibre rotor, as did the IR-3 centrifuge, another short-lived model.25

The IR-2m and IR-4

centrifuges have been reported to use carbon fibre rotors, with the IR-2m using a single maraging

steel bellows to join its two rotor segments.26

The compositions of the rotors in the IR-5, IR-6,

IR-6s and IR-8 centrifuge are not known, but have been presumed to be carbon fibre.27

Iran’s IR-1

centrifuge uses three maraging steel bellows to join aluminium rotor tube sections.28

The prospectus appears to indicate that the AEOI considered the development of maraging steel

centrifuge rotors for longer than it has previously acknowledged to the IAEA. According to Iran’s

22

Ralph Langner, ‘To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet’s Creators Tried to

Achieve,’ November 2013, http://www.langner.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/To-kill-a-

centrifuge.pdf, accessed 5 August 2015. 23

Centrifuges with long rotors have natural bending frequencies. A centrifuge operating at rotational speeds

above its natural bending frequency is called a supercritical centrifuge. See Houston G. Wood, Alexander

Glaser and R. Scott Kemp, ‘The gas centrifuge and nuclear weapons proliferation,’ Physics Today,

September 2008, https://www.princeton.edu/~rskemp/Kemp%20-

%20Gas%20Centrifuge%20and%20Nonproliferation%20-%20SPLG.pdf, accessed 6 August 2015. 24

‘Communication of 13 June 2004 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning

the Report of the Director General contained in GOV/2004/34,’ INFCIRC 630/2004, 16 June 2004, p.3,

https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2004/infcirc630.pdf, accessed 5

August 2015; David Albright and Jacqueline Shire, ‘Iran Installing More Advanced Centrifuges at Natanz

Pilot Enrichment Plant: Factsheet on the P-2/IR-2 Centrifuge,’ 7 February 2008, http://www.isis-

online.org/publications/iran/ISIS_Iran_P2_7Feb2008.pdf, accessed 10 August 2015. 25

David Albright, Jacqueline Shire, and Paul Brannan, ‘May 26, 2008 IAEA Safeguards Report on Iran:

Centrifuge Operation Improving and Cooperation Lacking on Weaponization Issues, Rev. 2,’ Institute for

Science and International Security, 29 May 2008, http://www.isis-

online.org/publications/iran/ISIS_Iran_IAEA_Report_29May2008.pdf, accessed 5 August 2015. 26



5 August 2015; David Albright and Christina Walrond, ‘Iran’s advanced centrifuges,’ Institute for Science

and International Security, 18 October 2011, http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/irans-advanced-

centrifuges/, accessed 5 August 2015. 27

David Albright, ‘Technical Note: Making Sense out of the IR-8 Centrifuge,’ Institute for Science and

International Security, 23 September 2014, http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/technical-note-making-

sense-out-of-the-ir-8-centrifuge/8, accessed 5 August 2015. 28



5 August 2015

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declarations to the IAEA, it conducted no work on the P-2 design it received from Khan’s network

until 2002, when the AEOI contracted a private company to build centrifuge rotors based on the

P-2. The private company, Iran has told the IAEA, quickly decided to use composite carbon fibre

rotors rather than maraging steel rotors, which were deemed too difficult to manufacture and less

advanced than carbon fibre rotors.29

The project based on the P-2 designs was said to be

terminated in 2003.30

Iran has not made public any work on maraging steel rotors after that date. Four research projects

in the prospectus, however, suggest that the AEOI considered developing maraging steel rotors as

late as 2006. Each of these projects is listed under the auspices of ‘FEP’ – most likely the Natanz

Fuel Enrichment Plant. The research proposals are:

The process of manufacturing ‘cylindrical tubes’ made of maraging steel;

Extrusion of C350-grade maraging steel to 0.3-1mm thickness and 1m length for use in

‘cylindrical tubes’ in centrifuges;

Metallurgical failure properties of C350-grade maraging steel; and

Effect of gas and plasma nitriding on the properties of C350-grade maraging steel cylinders.

Each of these projects has potential utility for production or operation of the maraging steel bellows

in Iran’s IR-1 and IR-2m centrifuges, but the second project stands out as being unquestionably for

the purpose of manufacturing centrifuge rotors, rather than bellows. Indeed, the dimensions of the

cylinder described (1m length and ≤1mm thickness) match the known dimensions of the P-2 rotor.31

It seems that Iran has at the very least considered developing – if not actually tried to develop -

maraging steel rotors for longer than it has previously acknowledged.

c. Indigenisation of centrifuge support infrastructure

The research prospectus contains a number of proposals for the indigenous development and

manufacture of various dual-use items used in the enrichment process. This is unsurprising: the

supply of certain equipment, such as specialised vacuum and electrical supply technology, is

regulated under export controls due to its utility for uranium enrichment, and these items have

been difficult for Iran to obtain under sanctions.

Vacuum technology, required in order to ensure the proper passage of uranium hexafluoride (UF6)

gas into and through centrifuge cascades, is one focus for proposed research. The prospectus seeks

29

‘Communication of 13 June 2004 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning

the Report of the Director General contained in GOV/2004/34,’ INFCIRC 630/2004, 16 June 2004, p.3,

https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2004/infcirc630.pdf, accessed 5

August 2015. 30

Report by the Director-General, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic

Republic of Iran,’ GOV 2004/83, 15 November 2004, p.11,

https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2004-83.pdf, accessed 5 August 2015; Report by the Director-

General, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council

resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,’ GOV 2007/58, 15 November 2007,

pp.4-5, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2007-58.pdf, accessed 6 August 2015. 31

The P-2 is widely reported as having a rotor length of 1 metre. See, e.g., Victor Gilinsky, Marvin Miller

and Harmon Hubbard, ‘A fresh examination of the proliferation dangers of light water reactors,’ 22 October

2004, Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre, p.38, available online at

http://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/perspex-npec-lwr-102204.pdf, accessed 6 August 2015;

Alexander Glaser, ‘Characteristics of the Gas Centrifuge for Uranium Enrichment and Their Relevance for

Nuclear Weapon Proliferation (corrected),’ Science and Global Security, 16:1–25, 2008, p.9, available online

at https://www.princeton.edu/~aglaser/2008aglaser_sgsvol16.pdf, accessed 5 August 2015.

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research on the design and manufacturing of various gauges used in this process: Pirani gauges,

semiconductor strain gauges, thermomanometers, ionisation gauges, hot-cathode ionisation gauges,

and Penning gauges. It also seeks research for the design and manufacturing of various vacuum

pumps: turbomolecular pumps, roots pumps, Kinney (piston) pumps, sliding rotary vane pumps,

and rotary vane pumps.

Another focus is the electrical supply and the control systems that power centrifuge motors and

regulate centrifuge speeds. For example, the prospectus seeks research to design and manufacture a

frequency converter capable of a 3300Hz frequency output – almost certainly for the purpose of

driving a centrifuge motor, which will spin at above 1000Hz.32

Frequency converters with a

frequency output of above 600Hz are controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, making them

difficult for Iran to obtain from preferred suppliers.33

A related project request seeks an active filter

to reduce harmonic distortion in power supply, perhaps as a means to adapt frequency converters

purchased from abroad that lack appropriate power filters for centrifuge use.34

That Iran might be seeking each of these forms of technology for its enrichment programme – and

that it has had such difficulty in obtaining them from abroad that indigenous development has

become an attractive prospect – is a useful addition to our understanding of the external needs of

the programme, and should help assist monitoring procurement efforts under the Joint

Comprehensive Plan of Action.

d. Depleted uranium hexafluoride conversion

The prospectus also calls for research on converting depleted UF6 into uranium oxide. Depleted

uranium is often stored in the form of UF6. The most likely rationale for this process step would be

to recover hydrogen fluoride for continued nuclear use.

32

Interestingly, the required power output for the proposed frequency converter is 750 watts, a relatively low

output. Taken in combination with previous analysis of the Stuxnet malware by anti-virus company

Symantec, this suggests that Iran may have used one frequency converter per centrifuge, an inefficient

practice considering that industrial enrichment facilities would be expected to power many centrifuges with a

single, higher-output frequency converter. For Symantec’s analysis of Stuxnet and its relationship to

centrifuge power configurations, see Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, and Eric Chien, ‘W32.Stuxnet

Dossier version 1.4,’ February 2011, Symantec, p.44,

https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_

dossier.pdf, accessed 10 August 2015. 33

Nuclear Suppliers Group, ‘Guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials,

software and related technology,’ June 2013, p.3-1,

http://nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/images/Files/Updated_control_lists/Prague_2013/NSG_Part_2_Rev._9_cl

ean.pdf, accessed 6 August 2015. 34

In 2013, as part of a broad review of the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s control lists, the NSG changed the

specifications of frequency inverters that it agrees to control the export of. One of the changes was the

removal of a requirement that controlled frequency inverters have a total harmonic distortion of less than 10

percent. This change may have been made on the understanding that frequency inverters could be

supplemented with filters to circumvent this requirement, as Iran appears to be attempting in 2006. See

Nuclear Suppliers Group, ‘Guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software

and related technology (track-changes version),’ June 13, p.3-1,

http://nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/images/Files/Updated_control_lists/Prague_2013/NSG_Part_2_Rev._9_tr

acked_Changes.pdf, accessed 10 August 2015.

13

5. Laser-related insights

Iran has declared to the IAEA that it ran various small-scale laser uranium enrichment efforts from

the mid-1970s until ceasing them in January of 2003.35

Various researchers have expressed concerns

that Iran may have continued laser enrichment-related activity beyond 2003, with those concerns

compounded by a statement by former president Ahmadinejad in 2010 that ‘Iranian scientists have

acquired the laser-operating uranium enrichment know-how but would put the technology on shelf

for the moment.’36

(In 2014, Iran told the IAEA that this statement was made based on its ‘past

R&D experiences…which ended in 2003’.37

)

The AEOI prospectus provides some insight into the state of the AEOI’s laser research in 2006. It

suggests a focus on neodymium-doped yttrium-aluminium-garnet (Nd:YAG) lasers, a type of laser

that can be used to pump dye lasers used in the Atomic Vapour Laser Isotopic Separation (AVLIS)

process. This is not necessarily reflective of research geared towards laser uranium enrichment,

though. Nd:YAG lasers are commonly used in industrial laser processes, such as laser cutting and

welding – civil applications that are specifically mentioned in the research prospectus.

6. Other insights

The nature of some of the research projects contained in the prospectus suggests that Iran had not

mastered cascade dynamics in the enrichment process. For example, one research project relates to

development of flow meters as imported flowmeters had proven unsuitable for cascade operations

(specifically, the operating temperature of the cascades was too high for the imported flowmeter).

It is notable that the research prospectus also includes activities related to medical applications of

nuclear technology – specifically, Boron Neutron Capture Therapy, a non-invasive form of cancer

treatment involving the use of neutrons. With attention on Iran’s nuclear program often focussed

on the programme’s secretive origins and past military dimensions, Iran’s legitimate desire to use

atomic energy for peaceful and medical purposes is frequently overlooked.

It is also worth noting that the research prospectus includes reference to best practices in relation to

nuclear safety. For example, one project related to reactor facility design makes reference to the As

Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) standard, a widely-recognised regulatory requirement

to reduce human exposure to ionising radiation.38

Again, given the many legitimate aspects of the

AEOI’s work, Iran’s desire to work to internationally-recognised nuclear safety standards should

not come as a surprise.

Finally, it is interesting to note that no fuel handling system had apparently been designed for the

IR-40 reactor by the time of the prospectus’s publication. There has been speculation about the

35


Republic of ran,’ GOV/2003/75, 10 November 2003, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2003-

75.pdf, accessed 5 August 2015. 36

David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, ‘Lashkar Ab’ad: Iran’s Unexplained Laser Enrichment

Capabilities,’ Institute for Science and International Security, 29 July 2013, http://isis-

online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Lashkar_Abad_29July2013.pdf, accessed 5 August 2015. 37


Republic of Iran,’ GOV/2014/10, 27 February 2006, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2014-

10.pdf, accessed 5 August 2015. 38

See ‘ALARA,’ Health Physics Society, http://hps.org/publicinformation/radterms/radfact1.html,

accessed 10 August 2015.

14

level of support that foreign entities, most likely from Russia, have given Iran in designing the

IR-40 reactor, given Iran’s acknowledgement to the IAEA that ‘foreign experts had been

consulted in the development of some parts of the design of the [IR-40] reactor’.39

The

requirement to design a fuel-handling system would indicate that a wholesale transfer of reactor

facility design blueprints did not take place.

7. The role of Iranian universities in the nuclear programme

The prospectus provides new insights into the role of Iranian universities and research centres in

supporting the nuclear programme, suggesting a much wider partnership between academia and the

AEOI than has previously been assessed. Certain Iranian universities have been previously

reported as assisting Iran’s nuclear programme in covert procurement of dual-use goods, with

Fitzpatrick citing Sharif University of Technology and Amirkabir University of Technology as two

of the institutions involved, but no study has so far examined the broader research ties that exist

between the AEOI and Iranian universities.40

The prospectus suggests that research cooperation with universities is crucial to Iran’s nuclear

programme. Indeed, a preface in the document states that cooperation between the AEOI and

Iranian universities is ‘of paramount importance’ to achieving the AEOI’s strategic goals.41

What is

unclear, at least from the prospectus, is which Iranian universities adopted the proposed research

projects (if any) – and which Iranian universities may have continued, beyond 2006, in providing

research support to the AEOI.

Some answers to these questions can be gleaned from other sources. The website of Sharif

University of Technology (SUT) lists in summary form a number of postgraduate theses that

appear to have been conducted for or with the assistance of the AEOI. Each thesis patently relates

to an aspect of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle, or an AEOI-operated nuclear facility, or both. These

theses are:

Investigation of Flow Rate and Cooling Water Temperature Effects on the Process

Parameters in Centrifuge Machine (2009, co-advised by Seyed Jaber Safdari)42

Production of Uranium Dioxide Nano Powder (2010, co-advised by Javad Karimi-Sabet)43

39


Republic of Iran,’ GOV 2003/75, 10 November 2003,

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf, accessed 10 August 2015. 40

Mark Fitzpatrick, ed, Nuclear black markets: Pakistan, AQ Khan, and the rise of proliferation networks,

(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), p.52. The prospectus was found on the

publicly-available website of Amirkabir University of Technology’s Electrical Engineering Department. 41


Relations Department of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, Autumn 2006, page c, available online at


Majid Aghaei, ‘Investigation of Flow Rate and Cooling Water Temperature Effects on the Process

Parameters in Centrifuge Machine,’ M.Sc thesis, 2009, http://sdr.library.sharif.ir/resource/291378/-

/&from=search&&query=safdari--jaber&field=authorOther&count=20&execute=true, accessed 6 August

2015. 43

Abooali Golzari, ‘Production of Uranium Dioxide Nano Powder With Hydrothermal Method in

Supercritical Water Reactor,’ M.Sc thesis, 2010, http://sdr.library.sharif.ir/resource/291288/-

/&from=search&&query=karimi-sabet--javad&field=authorOther&count=20&execute=true, accessed 6

August 2015.

15

Bioleaching of Vanadium from Multimetal Ore of Saghand Mine (2011, co-advised by

Jaber Safdari)44

A Detailed Study on Extraction of Uranium from Mother Leach Liquor (of Uranium

Mills) by TOA Extractant and Development of a Thermodynamical Model for it (2012,

co-advised by Jaber Safdari)45

Uranium Bioleaching from a Low Grade Ore (2012, co-advised by Jaber Safdari)46

Extraction of uranium from yellowcake solution from Bandar Abbas using D2EHPA

solvent, with thermodynamic models (2012, co-advised by Jaber Safdari)47

Study on the Mass Transfer and Isotope Separation Phenomena in a Gas Centrifuge by

Using FREON Mixtures as Model Compounds (2014, co-advised by Karimi-Sabet).48

Two of these thesis summaries – on extraction of uranium using TOA and extraction of uranium

using D2EHPA – are remarkably close in subject matter to outlines from the 2006 research

prospectus, and have probably been undertaken in response to the requirements outlined in the

prospectus.

There is other evidence that these projects have been undertaken for the AEOI. Each of the thesis

summaries lists as a co-advisor an individual who can be identified as a senior Novin Energy

Company officials – either Javad Karimi-Sabet, author of the 2006 research prospectus document,

or Seyed Jaber Safdari (see figure 2), whom the US State Department has described as a Novin

44

Hassan Gharahbagheri, ‘Bioleaching of Vanadium from Multimetal Ore of Saghand Mine,’ M.Sc thesis,

http://sdr.library.sharif.ir/resource/293662/-/&from=search&&query=safdari--

jaber&field=authorOther&count=20&execute=true, accessed 6 August 2015. 45

Hadi Khorshidsavar, ‘A Detailed Study on Extraction of Uranium from Mother Leach Liquor (of Uranium

Mills) by TOA Extractant and Development of a Thermodynamical Model for it ,’ M.Sc thesis, 2012,

http://sdr.library.sharif.ir/resource/383263/-

/&from=search&&query=thermodynamics&field=subjectkeyword&count=20&execute=true, accessed 6

August 2015. 46

Abbas Rashidi, ‘Uranium Bioleaching from a Low Grade Ore,’ PhD thesis, 2012,

http://sdr.library.sharif.ir/resource/377703/-/&from=search&&query=safdari--

jaber&field=authorOther&count=20&execute=true, accessed 6 August 2015. 47

Narges Khatoon Ebrahimi, ‘تخراج س يوم ا لول از اوران يك مح باس زرد ك ندرع ا ب فاده ب ت س يل -2 - دي حالل از ا ات

ل ك هگزي فري س يد ف س ه و ا كي مدل ارائ ي نام رمودي راي ت ,M.Sc thesis ’,.آن ب

http://sdr.library.sharif.ir/resource/383608/, also

http://library.sharif.ir/parvan/resource/383608/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%A7

%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-

%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%83-

%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%AF-

%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D8%A7-

%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B2-

%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AF%D9%8A---2--%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%84-

%D9%87%DA%AF%D8%B2%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%81%D8%B3%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83-

%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%87-

%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%84-

%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%83

%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D8%A2%D9%86, accessed 6 August 2015. 48

Mohammad Reza Fard Kashani, ‘Study on the Mass Transfer and Isotope Separation Phenomena in a Gas

Centrifuge by Using FEREON Mixtures as Model Compounds,’ Sharif University of Technology, M.Sc

thesis, 2014, http://sdr.library.sharif.ir/resource/402986/-/&from=search&&query=karimi-sabet--

javad&field=authorOther&count=20&execute=true, accessed 6 August 2015.

16

departmental head.49

Both men have been designated by the UN Security Council for their roles in

Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.50

It appears that both have acted as liaison officers

between the AEOI and SUT.

Figure 2. Seyed Jaber Safdari receives an award for his role in Iran’s nuclear programme from former Iranian president

Ahmadinejad in 2006 (image capture of video from Memritv.org51

)

This apparent involvement in research for Iran’s nuclear programme by SUT may have

implications for SUT’s attempts to strike down European Union sanctions against it. The EU

Council designated SUT in 2012 for ‘assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN

and EU sanctions on Iran and…providing support to Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear

activities.’52

In July of 2014, the General Court of the European Union overturned the EU

Council’s sanctions against SUT on the grounds that the Council was unwilling to provide its

confidential evidence that purportedly demonstrated SUT’s support for Iran’s nuclear

programme.53

The EU Council has subsequently re-listed SUT on other grounds, but another

49

US State Department, ‘Increasing Sanctions Against Iranian Nuclear Proliferation Networks Joint

Treasury and State Department Actions Target Iran’s Nuclear Enrichment and Proliferation Program,’ 13

December 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/202023.htm, accessed 6 August 2015. 50

See ‘The List established and maintained by the 1737 (2006) Committee,’ 17 December 2014,

http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/pdf/1737.pdf, accessed 6 August 2015. 51

Middle East Media Research Institute, ‘#1252 - Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Awards Medals

to Iranian Nuclear Scientists Channel 2 (Iran) - August 27, 2006 - 13:50,’

http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1252.htm, accessed 7 August 2015. 52

According to the text of the designation, ‘As of late 2011 SUT had provided laboratories for use by UN-

designated Iranian nuclear entity Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) and EU-designated Iran Centrifuge

Technology Company (TESA).’ See Council of the European Union, ‘Council decision 2012/829/CFSP of

21 December 2012 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran,’ 22

December 2012, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32012D0829, accessed 7

August 2015. 53

Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber), Case T‑181/13, Sharif University of Technology v Council

of the European Union, 3 July 2014,

http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=154526&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&m

ode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=521574, accessed 6 August 2015.

17

appeal is possible.54

The evidence presented above will likely be of interest in any further legal

case.

8. Conclusion

With Iran agreeing to unparalleled levels of international access to its nuclear programme under the

terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, insights such as those provided in this document

are likely to become much more common than they have been previously in the public domain.

Over the long term, increased transparency by the AEOI into its nuclear research will help build

confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

54

Council of the European Union, ‘Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1202/2014 of 7 November

2014 implementing Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran,’ 7 November

2014, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2014:325:FULL, accessed 7 August 2015.

18

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