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TITLE:  SUSTAINABLE  ASSERTIVENESS  –  THE  ADAPTIVE  CYCLE  OF  RESILIENCE    

CAN  CURIOSITY  BE  ORGANIZED?  

A.W.  Abcouwer  and  B.G.  Parson  

Target  group:  general  management  –  strategic  management  –  Human  resource  management  –  Innovation  management  –  programme  management  Business  Schools  

From  the  nineties  onwards,  it  has  become  increasingly  clear  that  the  dynamics  in  the  environment  demand  that  organizations  respond  to  changes  in  a  different  way.  This  became  clear  in  various  different  areas.  For  example,  the  image  of  the  influence  of  ICT  on  organizations  changed.    On  the  one  hand,  this  involves  looking  at  the  rigid  support  of  the  organization;  from  those  days  on,  the  alignment  between  business  and  ICT  has  been  in  the  limelight  but  on  the  other  hand,  this  also  involves  the  application  of  modern  ICT  to  drastically  influence  the  strategic  choices  of  the  organization.    

Abraham  Lincoln,  1862.  

“The  dogmas  of  the  quiet  past,  are  inadequate  to  the  stormy  present.  The  occasion  is  piled  high  with  difficulty,  and  we  must  rise  -­‐-­‐  with  the  occasion.  As  our  case  is  new,  so  we  must  think  anew,  and  act  anew.  We  must  disenthrall  ourselves,  and  then  we  shall  save  our  country.”  

 

Furthermore,  the  attention  is  increasingly  more  focused  on  cultural  elements  that  shed  a  different  light  on  the  role  as  played  by  individuals  within  the  organization.  In  a  culture  of  consolidation  and  improvement,  different  rules  are  applied  and  different  choices  are  made  as  compared  to  a  culture  characterized  by  crisis  and  innovation.  

These  developments  are  not  isolated.  We  see  that  unexpected  and  undreamt-­‐of  crises  occur  in  increasingly  more  rapid  succession  and  have  a  more  profound  impact,  this  also  under  the  influence  of  ICT  as  a  facilitator  of  global  processes  that  are  increasingly  more  complex  and  intertwined.  This  way,  equilibriums  are  disturbed  more  quickly  and  more  radically.  From  the  insight  ensuing  from  this  information,  we  see  how  the  importance  of  cultural  issues  is  becoming  more  significant.  In  doing  so,  we  are  making  the  change  towards  general  strategic  management.  

In  this  essay  we  will  follow  up  on  this  development,  elaborating  on  the  fundamental  works  of  Thompson  (1967).    We  develop  a  model  in  which  the  tension  between  strategy  (the  wanting/obligation,  the  direction)  and  operations  (the  ability,  the  execution)  are  more  closely  considered  and  where  information  management  as  a  major  instigator  of  the  development,  is  included  in  the  consideration.    

One  reason  for  writing  this  essay  is  to  demonstrate  that  the  organization  over  time  goes  through  a  succession  of  phases,  in  which  each  phase  includes  a  different  assessment  of  reality,  culture,  management  style  and  actions  connected  with  these.  This  insight  may  lead  to  an  answer  to  the  question  how  organizations  can  deal  with  unthought-­‐of  and  unexpected  chances  and  crises  that  happen  in  increasingly  rapid  succession  (the  ‘stormy  present’).  In  order  to  be  able  to  control  in  the  next  phase,  the  organization  successively  has  to  be  able  to  manage  (the  ‘quiet  past’)  as  innovate  (‘think  anew  and  act  anew’).  Management  presumes  what  is  known,  a  norm;  conversely,  the  point  of  innovation  is  the  organization  of  innovation  towards  the  unexpected  and  unthought-­‐of.  In  both  activities,  curiosity  about  what  is  changing  plays  a  crucial  part.  However,  neither  of  the  two  provides  a  guarantee  for  continuity,  both  bear  the  risk  of  ruin  in  them.  Jointly  they  are  necessary  but  combined  they  prove  almost  impossible  to  manage.  It  has  to  be  noted  that  this  two-­‐sidedness  is  a  condition  for  a  chance  (no  guarantee)  of  continuity.  The  phase  model  as  developed  in  this  essay,  sketches  an  image  of  the  

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coherence  and  the  character  of  the  phases  and  how  these  can  be  dealt  with  in  practice.  Because  the  model  is  also  based  on  insights  from  the  ecology  of  Gunderson  et  al  (2002),  we    refer  to  this  model  as  the  “adaptive  cycle  for  resilience”.    

INTRODUCTION  

The  fact  that  dynamic  developments  within  and  in  the  vicinity  of  systems  demand  increasingly  more  attention  has  been  known  for  a  while.  An  important  reason  for  this  is  the  fact  that  it  becomes  increasingly  clearer  that  organizations  can  no  longer  assume  that  current  successes  will  be  sustainable  in  the  future  (Fukuyama  2011).    Being  aware  of  this  is  certainly  not  limited  to  organization  theory.  Other  disciplines  also  saw  attention  for  the  dynamics  in  change  processes  of  systems  arise.  Fundamental  research  in  this  field  took  place  in  for  example  ecology.  The  resilience  alliance1  for  example,  has  been  involved  in  research  into  the  understanding  of  ecological  system  changes  for  the  last  35  years.  As  a  major  reaction  to  this  study,  we  refer  to  the  Panarchy  bundle  (Gunderson  et  al.  2002),  which  was  edited  by  Gunderson  and  Holling  and  which  describes  the  understanding  and  controlling  of  natural  systems  (people  and  nature)  in  which  a  cyclic  development  is  recognized,  which  is  referred  to  as  the  adaptive  cycle.    But  also  within  organization  theory,  where  the  focus  lies  mainly  on  the  interaction  between  people  or  in  other  words,  on  social  systems,  there  has  been  attention  for  the  various  issues  that  organizations  may  be  confronted  as  a  result  of  internal  and  external  dynamics  for  a  long  time.  We  already  referred  to  the  work  of  Thompson  (1967),  who  based  on  fundamental  research,  arrived  at  a  set  of  propositions  that  assist  organizations  in  dealing  with  the  uncertainty  they  may  find  themselves  in  through    technological  and  environmental  developments  .  Of  a  more  recent  date,  is  the  study  by  Snowden  (Snowden  et  al.  2007),  who  uses  his  Cynefin  model  for  demanding  attention  for  the  various  positions  an  organization  may  find  itself  in.  He  sketches  situations  of  ‘organizational  disorder’  and  the  most  opportune  behaviour  given  that  situation.  There  is  also  cross-­‐pollination  between  the  different  areas  of  science.  The  Raford  (Raford  2009)  Cynefin  model  is  for  example  linked  to  the  adaptive  cycle  model  of  Holling  et  al.  into  the  Cynefin  +  model,  which  initiates  the  introduction  of  dynamics  in  the  models.    

Typical  for  the  outlined  models  is  that  these  take  their  starting  point  in  the  different  situations  that  an  organization  may  find  itself  in  and  how  it  should  react  to  these.  This  article  specifically  focuses  on  the  dynamics  developments  both  within  as  well  as  outside  the  organization  that  cause  the  organization  to  find  itself  in  these  different  situations.  In  addition,  we  discuss  the  implications  of  these  within  the  organization.  

In  the  light  of  this  new  attention  for  organizational  developments  and  dynamics,  we  choose  to  focus  this  article  on  the  assertive  and  resilient  organizations  that  respond  to  the  changes  in  a  robust  manner.    Following  Taleb  (2010),  we  also  presume  that  the  objective  of  the  organization  is  to  continue  to  function  in  context    in  which  crises,  imminent  crises  or  drastic  changes  are  sooner  considered  as  ‘normal’  (Taleb  even  speaks  of  inevitable)  and  where  “business-­‐as-­‐usual”  is  an  exception.  

THEME  OF  THIS  ARTICLE  

In  the  traditional  image,  organizations  strive  to  achieve  equilibrium  and  security  and  maintain  these.  To  this  purpose,  processes  are  setup  tightly,  standardized  and  set  up  as  simply  as  possible,  transaction,  logistics  and  staff  costs  are  minimised,  with  a  strong  leaning  towards  the  application  of  information  technology,  also  in  the  relationship  with  customers.  In  brief,  in  that  case  organizations  are  rationally  managed  according  to  the  command  and  control  principle  and  in  the  eyes  of  the  shareholders,  they  are  a  money  machine  instead    of  a  social  organism/system  (Geus  de  1997).  This  results  in  a  strategy  aimed  at  the  short  term,  also  because  of  the  short-­‐term  financial  criteria  as  applied  by  shareholders  and  analysts.  Thinking  from  well-­‐known  patterns  and  

1  http://www.resalliance.org/  

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fixed  values  and  norms  is  the  starting  point  in  all  this  and  both  affect  power  relations  and  interests:  this  often  leads  to  tunnel  vision.    

Another  image  pushes  itself  forward.  In  the  long  term,  which  is  getting  shorter  all  the  time  for  that  matter,  crises  disturb  this  pursuit  of  equilibrium.  In  addition  to  developments  regarding  politics  and  economy,  environment,  raw  materials,  the  financial  system  and  so  on,  one  of  the  main  drivers  of  these  crises  consists  of  the  developments  in  ICT  and  the  global  effects  of  these.  How  do  organizations  deal  with  the  surprises  that  ensue  from  this  dynamic  context?  In  order  to  stay  ahead  of  the  crisis  requires  acting  and  thinking  in  scenarios,  innovation  development  and  other  radical  changes.  This  is  based  on  curiosity,  which  from  the  unthought-­‐of  and  unexpected  searches  for  new  mindsets  and  initiatives,  with  a  view  to  the  search  for  and  ultimately  achievement  of  possible  and  relevant  new  equilibriums.  This  way  of  looking  is  contrary  to  the  previous  one,  is  often  also  seen  as  a  threat  to  the  organization  and  is  therefore  where  possible  suppressed  and  obstructed.  

In  the  combination  of  dealing  with  short  term  and  long  term  developments  simultaneously,  the  organization  shows  its  resilience  in  the  sense  of  accumulating  financial  capacity,  market  power  and  knowledge  from  a  business-­‐as-­‐usual  situation  in  order  to  be  ready  for  radical  change  as  well,  for  new  combinations,  innovation  and  revolutionary  renewal.  This  way,  the  organization  culture  is  ideally  based  on  pride  of  the  existing  and  curiosity  for  the  new.  Pride  for  the  existing  because  this  creates  the  room  and  means  in  which  the  organization  can  be  curious  about  what  the  necessary  innovation  has  to  be  based  on.  This  way,  curious  about  the  new  forms  the  basis  where  strategic  choices  may  be  founded  on.  This  seems  a  contradiction  but  is  in  fact  the  challenge  that  organizations  and  their  management  are  facing.  In  this  respect,  Fukuyama  introduces  the  concept  of  adaptive  organization,  which  he  defines  as  follows:  ‘The  adaptive  organization  can  evaluate  a  changing  external  environment  and  modify  its  own  internal  procedures  in  response’.    Furthermore,  he  observes  that  ‘adaptable  organizations  are  the  ones  that  survive  since  environments  always  change’  (Fukuyama  2011  p.  450).  

This  article  discusses  the  underlying  logic  but  also  the  traps  of  this  apparent  contradiction.  We  will  distinguish  the  successive  phases  that  differ  in  character  as  regards  management,  strategy,  structure  and  organization  culture.  Through  a  better  understanding  of  these  phases,  an  individual  organization  is  able  to  develop  the  strength  (under  their  own  steam  or  with  help  from  others)  to  find  its  way  in  dealing  with  the  dynamics  of  this  development.  Based  on  this  insight,  it  is  possible  to  make  better  strategic  choices  and  find  an  answer  to  the  question  on  how  much  the  organization  wishes  to  invest  in  these  innovations  as  a  basis  for  its  survival.  However,  we  will  first  seek  an  answer  to  the  question  of  to  what  extent  the  successive  phases  are  cyclic  in  character.  In  the  next  paragraph,  we  will  thus  connect  with  cyclic  development  models  as  found  in  professional  literature.  

CHANGE  AS  AN  IMAGE  OF  AN  ERA  

The  fact  that  the  current  day  and  age  can  be  characterized  as  being  very  changeable  cannot  be  and  should  not  be  seen  as  a  surprise.  Professional  literature  provides  us  with  countless  references  to  this.  Neither  is  there  any  doubt  that  organizations  find  it  very  difficult  to  cope  with  these  changes.  Scharmer  (2007)  observes  justly  that  we  live  in  an  era  of  intense  conflicts  and  massive  institutional  failures  that  may  result  in  unforeseen  disaster  but  also  in  hopeful  innovations.  Therefore,  Beer  (2003)  notices  that  ‘it  is  hardly  news  that  in  this  environment,  firms  will  have  to  possess  the  capacity  to  adapt  or  suffer  the  consequences  –  low  performance  and  ultimately  death  and  destruction’,  and  these  are  only  two  examples  of  authors  that  point  out  that  organizations  should  pay  serious  attention  to  these  developments.  Therefore,  the  complexity  of  the  issues  within  organizations  has  received  increasingly  more  attention  for  many  years(zie  o.a.  Allen  et  al.  2006;  Anderson  1999;  Benbya  et  al.  2006;  Kauffman  1995).  We  will  discuss  this  in  more  detail.  

The  environment  in  which  organization  function  is  characterized  by  globalization,  competition  and  non  linear  changes  (Maula  2006).  The  speed  at  which  these  changes  take  place  may  vary  strongly.  Perez  (2002)  for  

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example,  distinguishes  five  major  revolutions  in  the  past  few  centuries.  Starting  at  the  industrial  revolution  that  commenced  in  1771,  she  distinguishes  the  steam  revolution  (1829),  electricity  (1875),  oil  (1908)  and  as  last  the  information  technology  (1971)  revolution.  These  revolutions  each  developed  in  an  identical  way.  These  developments  were  also  described  by  Van  Praag  (1986).  He  distinguishes  five  phases  that  are  characterizing  for  a  revolutionary  development.  In  the  first  phase,  the  methodological  phase  of  the  revolution,  the  new  ideas  that  are  the  basis  for  the  development  germinate.  In  time,  these  ideas  are  adopted  by  science,  which  will  examine  the  development  thoroughly  and  ultimately,  after  the  necessary  experiments  (and  failures)  translate  into  technological  progress.  According  to  Van  Praag,  implementation  of  this  progress  will  lead  to  a  social  phase  in  the  revolution  when  the  impact  of  the  development  becomes  clear.  The  ultimate  incorporation  of  the  change  in  our  economical  and  cultural  system  completes  the  revolution  and  marks  the  moment  where  nobody  is  able  to  withdraw  from  this  development.  Both  Perez  as  Van  Praag  next  observe  that  the  cultural  phase  is  ultimately  followed  by  a  methodological  phase  that  heralds  a  new  revolution.  This  completes  the  cycle  and  a  new  one  starts.  

In  professional  literature  this  cyclic  development  was  also  observed  by  others.  In  this  respect,  Land  (2003  p.53-­‐54)  for  example,  points  at  the  Belgian  chemist  Prigogine  (Prigogine  et  al.  1987)  who  views  systems  as  eternally  moving  compound  units.  These  systems  always  absorb  energy  from  their  environment,  next  transform  to  a  new  quality  and  subsequently  give  off  their  energy  to  their  environment.  Once  this  new  situation  has  been  reached,  this  leads  to  a  certain  degree  of  stability.  However  in  due  course,  the  system  will  absorb  energy  again,  get  into  a  crisis,  develop  a  new  quality  and  next  end  up  in  a  relatively  stable  state  again.  The  necessity  for  developing  a  new  quality  stems  from  the  situation  where  increasing  energy  obliges  the  system  to  deal  with  more  transformations.  Land  (2003  p.53-­‐54)  uses  this  approach  for  indicating  that  organizations  being  open  systems,  are  going  through  cyclic  learning  processes.  In  this  learning  process,  the  organization  successively  finds  itself  in  a  relatively  stable  situation  alternated  with  a  phase  of  instability.  A  comparable  reasoning  can  also  be  found  at  Zuijderhoudt  (1993    p  21),  Sauer  (1997  p  98-­‐99)  and  Abcouwer  (2006  p  207).  The  question  facing  organizations  in  these  dynamics  is  how  the  management  will  be  able  to  govern  the  developments  in  this  complex  situation  in  order  to  be  able  to  realize  the  necessary  adjustments.  In  this  situation,  one  often  links  to  the  product  lifecycle  in  which  successively  the  phases  introduction,  growth,  maturity  and  decline  are  gone  through  (Abcouwer  et  al.  2006;  Porter  1980).  If  an  organization  wishes  to  further  develop,  then  this  is  only  possible  if  a  new  introduction  phase  is  initiated  as  early  as  the  decline  phase,  during  which  chaos  and  crisis  are  already  occurring/threatening.  For  the  management,  this  is  not  a  natural  motion.  The  management  of  an  organization  will  reckon  with  variables  that  come  within  the  reference  framework  and  time  frame  they  use.  In  this  regard,  decisions  from  the  past  decide  decisions  now  and  in  the  future  to  a  high  degree.  In  professional  literature,  this  phenomenon  is  denoted  as  “path  dependency”  (zie  o.a.  Pierson  2000).  In  the  literature,  these  ways  of  viewing  developments  mainly  within  the  existing  world  view  is  called  framing    (Fiske  et  al.  1991).  In  practice,  a  manager  will  therefore  usually  embroider  on  the  experience  he  or  she  has  accumulated  in  the  past.  In  any  situation  where  an  action  proved  successful  in  the  past  there  is,  as  a  result  of  the  fact  that  the  context  has  changed,  no  guarantee  that  this  action  will  also  prove  successful  now  or  in  the  future.  In  many  cases,  taking  the  past  for  granted  may  even  prove  to  have  a  negative  impact  on  the  functioning  of  the  organization.  Miller  (1990)  for  example,  observed  that  ‘success  leads  to  specialization  and  exaggeration,  to  confidence  and  complacency  to  dogma  and  ritual.’  And  ‘their  strength  so  often  seduces  them  into  the  excesses  that  cause  their  downfall.’  Holling  (2002a)  points  out  that,  from  the  rigidity  that  is  created  by  basing  behaviour  on  the  past,  systems  (and  therefore  also  organizations)  inevitably  become  ‘accidents  waiting  to  happen’.  Finally,  Christensen  (1999)  observes  that  the  ‘better’  (in  terms  of  the  past)  the  management  the  more  chance  that  disrupting  developments  are  not  recognized.    Christensen  (1999)  calls  this  particular  situation  the    “Innovators  Dilemma”.  In  doing  so,  he  demonstrates  that  in  particular  the  best  managed  companies  that  have  a  tendency  towards  profitability,  efficiency  and  focus,  will  be  surprised  by  a  “disruptive/unsettling”  technology  and  innovation  because  the  customer  does  not  ask  for  this  and  these  also  do  not  fit  in  with  the  business  model  of  the  organization.    

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In  conclusion,  it  can  be  noted  that  incremental  improvement  in  general  works  well  within  normal  “sustaining/strengthening”  technological  development  but  that  these  are  often  missed  or  overlooked  from  an  evolutionary  perspective  in  cases  of  real  threatening  crises.  Seen  from  that  perspective,  it  is  expected  that  the  solutions  based  on  incremental  improvements  within  a  crisis  situation  will  not  lead  to  a  durable  solution  of  problems.  

About  the  number  of  variables  that  an  organization  is  able  to  process/requires  without  becoming  unstable,  the  “Law  of  requisite  Variety”  says:  “Control  can  be  obtained  only  if  the  variety  of  the  controller  is  at  least  as  great  as  the  variety  of  the  situation  to  be  controlled”  (Ashby's  Law  zoals  aangehaald  in  Lewis  et  al.  2003  p.32).  Stafford  Beer  (1981)  also  observes  that  for  maintaining  of  security  and  equilibrium,  the  organization  needs  to  have  more  variables/variations  at  its  disposal  than  the  competitors  and/or  environment  it  is  confronted  with.  In  practice,  management  strives  to  keep  the  developments  in  the  number  of  variables  to  be  dealt  with  manageable  by  means  of  standardization  and  specialisation,  which  results  in  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  variations.  In  practice,  this  is  considered  good  management.  Because  they  start  from  known  relations  and  influences,  Christensen  (1999)  and  Miller  (1990)  observe  that  this  is  where  the  inability  of  the  management  lies  with  regard  to  dealing  with  disrupting  developments  (leading  to  crisis).  This  way,  good  management  leads  to  in  increase  in  vulnerability  with  all  the  risks  that  brings.    Taleb  (2010)  states  in  this  context  that  the  systems  do  become  more  fragile  under  the  influence  of  two  factors:  specialisation  of  the  system  itself,  resulting  in  a  reducing  flexibility  for  being  able  to  react  to  developments  and  the  increasing  complexity  of  the  environment,  resulting  in  an  increased  need  for  being  able  to  react  to  often  unforeseen  developments.  On  the  one  hand,  this  results  in  external  disruptions  being  foreseen  to  a  decreasing  degree  and  on  the  other  hand,  that  these  disruptions  when  they  occur  cannot  be  counterbalanced.    The  combination  of  these  two  tendencies  makes  the  organization  more  vulnerable  to  possible  crises.    

The  approach  of  organizations/systems  derived  from  the  chaos  theory  also  illustrates  the  quandary  like  character  of  the  learning/developing  process.  Alternately,  the  organization  finds  itself  in  a  stable  and  an  unstable  position  and  during  the  unstable  phase  there  is  a  danger  of  regression.  In  this  vision,  an  organization  will  therefore  always  be  confronted  with  unsettling  disruptions  that  will  often  show  the  character  of  a  strange  attractor  (Ruelle  et  al.  1971).  A  strange  attractor  is  capable  of  initiating  a  true  change  and  therefore  holds  the  capability  of  heralding  a  subsequent  phase.  

The  image  of  the  organizational  reality  as  developed  like  this  explains  that  life  consists  of  a  succession  of  surprises  than  can  be  expected:  Taleb’s  (2010)  Black  Swans2.  In  this  respect,  the  nature  of  these  surprises  is  unknown  (just  like  Perez’  revolutions  were  never  predictable  either)  but  that  they  do  arrive,  is  inevitable  according  to  this  vision.  The  organization  has  the  task  to  learn  how  to  deal  with  this  process.  This  also  demands  a  different  way  of  thinking,  learning  and  considering  reality  from  a  different  perspective.  

THE  ROLE  AND  INFLUENCE  OF  INFORMATION  AND  ICT  

In  the  introduction,  we  already  noted  that  ICT  is  a  major  driver  in  the  organizational  dynamics  as  discussed  in  the  previous  paragraph.  In  this  day  and  age,  many  Black  Swans  are  ICT  related.    This  is  entirely  in  line  with  the  point  of  view  that  the  world  is  currently  in  the  middle  of  the  technological  ICT  revolution  (Perez  2002).  The  mentioned  cyclic  developments  often  have  their  origins  in  a  different  way  of  dealing  with  information  and  communication  within  the  organization.  This  way,  being  the  initiator  of  the  developments,  ICT  plays  a  central  role.  Therefore,  reflection  on  the  role  of  information  and  communication  within  the  organization,  namely  the  role  of  information  management,  is  increasingly  important  to  organizations.  In  that  case,  information  and  communication  play  a  double  role.  In  one  respect  it  is  the  initiator  of  the  development  but  it  is  also  required  to  

2  According  to  Taleb,  a  so-­‐called  Black  Swan  is  an  unexpected  event  with  far-­‐reaching  effects  that  could  be  only  predicted  with  hindsight.  

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assist  the  organization  in  facing  the  uncertain  future.  Related  to  the  learning  process  that  organizations  go  through  in  the  development  cycle  Sauer  (1997)  makes  a  link  to  information  and  ICT  management.  

In  line  with  everything  we  observed  above,  Sauer  also  indicates  that  the  orientation  within  organizations  is  usually  aimed  at  stability.  There  is  only  limited  attention  to  change.  In  his  opinion,  information  management  often  chooses  for  a  conservative  attitude  within  organizations,  an  innovative  approach  is  a  rarity.  By  linking  the  business  orientation  focused  on  stability  to  a  conservative  information  management  attitude,  he  distinguishes  a  consolidation  approach  in  which  bureaucratic  organizations  thrive.  In  that  case,  the  emphasis  is  mostly  on  standardization,  cost  management  and  control  of  the  expanding  complexity  of  the  legacy  in  information  systems  and  silo  like  system  development.  The  developed  systems  are  in  that  case  often  registrative,  reporting  or  checking  in  nature.  In  this  respect,  McKinsey  speaks  of    Factory  IT  (Roberts  et  al.  2010).  In  such  a  context,  many  organizations  find  it  hard  to  innovate  and  in  that  case,  stagnation  in  the  development  of  the  organization  is  obvious.  The  striving  for  equilibrium  and  alignment  limit  the  organization  when  dealing  with  dynamics  effectively.  In  other  words,  this  alignment  philosophy  supports  tunnel  thinking.  In  such  a  situation,  leaning  towards  experience  and  old  thinking  is  counterproductive.  Therefore,  Sauer  (1997  :  p  100)  observes  the  following:    “Unfortunately,  within  the  dynamic  conception  of  alignment,  this  situation  cannot  be  a  permanent  state  for  most  firms,  not  least  because  of  the  high  costs  involved.”    

However,  where  technology  can  and  must  play  a  role  in  the  support  of  dynamic  organizational  developments,  the  information  provision  should  play  a  much  more  supporting  and  facilitating  role.  In  that  case,  the  character  of  the  information  provision  should  be  more  that  of  a  toolbox,  which  is  available  to  the  business  professional.  According  to  the  circumstance,  he/she  can  choose  which  I(T)  tools  could  be  useful  for  realizing  a  higher  degree  of  effectivity  in  the  pursuit  of  competitive  advantage  through  innovation  and  the  striving  for  growth.  In  this  respect,  McKinsey  speaks  of  enabling  IT  (Roberts  et  al.  2010).    

The  above  shows  that  the  role  that  information  and  communication  could  play  within  an  organization  shows  similarities  with  the  cyclic  movement  that  we  observed  in  the  previous  paragraph.  On  the  one  hand,  this  supports  the  framing  character  that  prevails  within  an  organization;  on  the  other  hand,  a  role  is  expected  in  the  support  of  the  organization  in  finding  a  way  for  dealing  with  crises.  In  that  case,  this  has  to  happen  in  coherence  with  the  organizational  structure  and  the  management  (culture)  in  the  light  of  the  changes  that  take  place.  In  the  next  paragraph,  we  will  discuss  this  further.  

THE  ROAD  AHEAD:  ORGANIZATION,  MANAGEMENT  AND  CHANGE  As  we  have  seen  above,  it  is  widely  observed  that  there  is  no  general  one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all  solution  for  the  major  dynamic  challenges  that  organizations  are  faced  with.  The  challenges  as  mentioned  before  demand  an  alternative  approach  to  the  concept  organization.  In  this  respect,  Dyer  (Dyer  et  al.  2008)  distinguishes  between  the  theory  regarding  bureaucratic  organizations  versus  the  theory  about  the  complex  adaptive  systems  (CAS)  approach  of  organizations  (zie  voor  een  nadere  beschouwing  van  CAS  o.a.  Kauffman  1995;  Miller  et  al.  2007).  According  to  his  view,  bureaucratic  organizations  mainly  point  

their  attention  at  incremental  improvements  in  their  pursuit  of  a  sustainable  competitive  advantage,  continuity,  stability  and  discipline.  All  this  within  fixed  frameworks,  in  which  interventions  mainly  take  place  in  short-­‐term  variables  within  the  existing  structures.  In  general,  such  an  organization  will  not  recognize  the  long-­‐term  disrupting  developments.  On  the  other  hand,  he  points  at  the  CAS  approach,  which  mainly  focuses  the  attention  on  dealing  with  complexity  in  order  to  realize  temporary  competitive  advantages,  innovation,  dynamics  and  adaptability.  This  adaptability  should  also  assist  the  organization  in  dealing  with  unsettling  developments.    

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Van  Es  (2008)  also  makes  a  similar  distinction.  He  distinguishes  between  two  models,  each  with  their  own  characteristics.  In  a  nutshell,  he  interprets  the  models  as  follows  (van  Es  2008:  58):  

User  theory   Model  1   Model  2  Objective  values   Winning  

Emphasizing  rationality  Suppressing  negative  feelings  

Obtaining  the  right  information  Free  choice  Commitment  

Actions   Checking,  safeguarding  Insinuating  Own  vision  is  the  right  one  

Sharing  power  Participating  Clarifying  differences  of  opinion  

Consequences   Defensive  relationships  Little  freedom  of  choice  Little  openness  for  testing  

Minimizing  defence  Major  freedom  of  choice  Naming  and  testing  impressions  

Double  loop  learning   Hardly  possible   Totally  possible  

Where  model  1  assumes  defensive  rationality,  model  2,  just  like  the  Complex  Adaptive  Systems  (CAS)  approach,  offers  the  organization  the  possibility  to  deal  with  unsettling  developments.  

Ciborra  (1997)  also  seeks  a  solution  for  enabling  the  organization  to  deal  with  complexity.  To  this  purpose,  he  introduces  the  concept  of  improvisation.  This  requires  the  realization  of  a  platform  structure,  as  a  collective  cognitive  structure  consisting  of  organizational  arrangements  and  cognitive  frames,  which  enables  managers  to  improvise  effectively  in  extreme  situations.  This  shows  the  ability  of  the  organization  to  organize  itself,  which  is  the  organization’s  ability  to  create  order  from  chaos  (Maula  2006  :  p  24).  The  platforms  thus  created  form  coherent  new  patterns,  structures  and  behaviour  which  grow  from  the  previous.  In  turn,  these  patterns  have  to  be  operationalized  via  rationalisation.    

All  approaches  as  mentioned  above,  boil  down  to  needing  to  find  a  balance  between  innovation  for  one  thing  and  rationalization  for  another.  Finding  that  balance  is  the  core  of  the  problems  that  organization  are  facing.  In  the  rest  of  this  article,  we  will  further  discuss  the  search  process  as  a  result  of  this  issue.  Starting  point  in  this  is  the  fact  that  any  balance  is  temporary.  The  power  for  better  meeting  the  uncertain  future  should  be  found  in  thinking  in  temporary  equilibriums,  balancing  between  past  and  future,  from  the  inevitable  certainty  of  cyclically  appearing  surprises.  This  requires  assertiveness  and  resilience.  Assertiveness  is  the  ability  to  want  to  accept  the  ‘fight/challenge’  with  the  new  context;  resilience  is  the  ability  to  enable  new  equilibriums  in  these  continually  changing  circumstances  each  time.    

Instead  of  just  thinking  in  terms  of  optimizing  and  maximizing,  we  argue  that  thinking  in  terms  of  assertiveness  and  resilience  provides  clues.  This  way,  this  approach  shapes  the  thinking  in  terms  of  complex  adaptive  systems,  Model  2  of  Van  Es  and  improvisation.  This  offers  the  possibility  to  ensure  that  the  organization  builds  up  the  resilience  to  adapt  to  the  inevitable  in  such  a  way,  that  it  can  continue  to  function  and  adapt  its  identity  to  the  changed  circumstances.  In  many  cases,  this  means  disassociation  and  letting  go  of  the  past,  focused  on  change.  Summarizing,  resilience  and  assertiveness  as  an  insurance  against  the  unexpected,  in  the  certitude  that  nothing  is  for  nothing.  We  will  see  that  a  price  is  to  be  paid  for  this.  

We  will  therefore  search  for  a  school  of  thought,  a  model  for  managing  organizations  as  an  adaptive  social  system  with  a  view  to  make  this  into  an  adaptive  organization  (Fukuyama  2011).  As  we  observed  above,  the  ability  to  be  curious  is  a  necessity  for  surviving  in  such  dynamics.  In  this  context,  curiosity  is  natural  inquisitive  behaviour;  the  emotional  aspect  of  living  creatures  that  leads  to  exploration,  research  and  learning,  in  other  words,  the  ability  to  think  beyond  the  borders  of  what  is  known.  

In  this  respect,  the  central  question  is  whether  organizations  are  actually  capable  of  curiosity.  We  argue  that  to  this  purpose,  the  organization  needs  to  be  assertive  in  facing  the  developments,  needs  to  have  the  resilience  

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for  facilitating  new  solutions  that  are  provided  and  developed  from  curiosity.  However,  these  conceptions  will  only  flourish  through  people.  Even  in  organizations  where  all  employees  are  possibly  assertive  and  curious,  the  combination  of  all  these  individual  characteristics  should  be  allowed  to  optimally  develop  within  the  organization.  On  the  one  hand,  this  demands  personal  growth  of  management  and  work  floor  but  on  the  other  hand,  it  can  only  lead  to  positive  results  for  the  organization  if  the  development  comes  to  fruition  in  coherence.  This  means  that  the  three  conceptions  are  inextricably  and  in  different  dimensions  (between  individual  and  organization)  connected  to  each  other,  it  functions  as  a  trinity.  Only  this  way,  is  the  organization    able  to  say  goodbye  to  old  insights  and  work  on  the  construction  of  new  ones.  With  regard  to  this,  Schumpeter  introduced  the  concept  of  creative  destruction  (Schumpeter  1950).    

It  is  necessary  to  organize  the  above  mentioned  trinity  explicitly  because  curiosity,  being  in  conflict  with  anything  existing  and  well  known,  is  seen  as  threatening  within  traditional  organizational  approaches  (from  the  prevailing  tunnel  thinking)    and  therefore  not  allowed.  Only  by  paying  the  price  as  demanded  by  this  curiosity,  is  the  organization  able  to  face  the  future  robustly.  Therefore,  we  introduce  the  concept  of  Robustness  as  the  combination  of  assertiveness,  resilience  and  curiosity,  which  enables  the  organization  to  deal  with  the  issue  of  creative  destruction.  However,  before  we  actually  do  this,  we  will  first  give  some  attention  to  the  question  how  managers  and  organizations  perceive  the  reality  that  surrounds  them.      

HOW  DO  ORGANIZATIONS  PUT  A  MEANING  ON  THEIR  ENVIRONMENT  AS  THE  BASIS  FOR  DECISION  MAKING  AND  ACTION?  THINKING  MODELS…  

In  the  previous  paragraph,  we  stated  that  there  is  a  dominant  way  of  thinking  within  organizations.  This  involves  all  attention  being  focused  on  optimisation  and  efficiency.  This  is  aimed  at  the  creation  of  equilibrium  and  security  as  a  basis  for  decision  making  and  action.  This  mode  of  thought  finds  it  basis  in  the  way  that  people  (and  in  a  derivative  form  organizations)  focus  their  attention.    How  do  they  perceive  the  reality  that  surrounds  them,  how  do  they  put  a  meaning  on  what  they  see  and  in  doing  so,  do  they  also  seek  security,  also  avoid  change?  The  result  of  combining  all  these  individual  modes  of  thought  determines  the  answer  to  the  question  of  how  robust  the  organization  is.  In  this  paragraph,  we  will  focus  on  this.  

Where  organizations  may  be  considered  as  a  structured  system  of  people  (and  resources),  it  is  vital  to  realize  what  motives  incite  people  to  collaborate.  Fukuyama  (2011  p.  43  e.v.)  distinguishes  five,  which  we  will  summarize  below  point  by  point:  

• people  are  inclined  to  collaborate.  The  basis  for  this  is  ‘reciprocal  altruism’  with  a  preference  for  family  and  friends  and  strangers  that  can  be  trusted;  

• people  have  the  aptitude  and  inclination  to  comply  with  norms  and  rules.  These  norms  and  rules  are  often  based  on  emotions  such  as  fear,  shame,  guilt,  safety  and  so  on;  

• people  are  capable  of  using  mental  models  based  on  ‘observed’  cause/effect  relationships.  This  way,  they  put  a  meaning  on  their  surroundings.  This  forms  the  basis  for  belief,  ideology  and/or  convictions.  Complex  collaboration  relationships  and  objectives  may  ensue  from  the  sharing  of  these  mental  models  and  insights  with  the  corresponding  rules  and  rituals.  This  is  also  known  as  the  culture  of  collaboration.    

• people  are  conservative  by  nature.  Once  rules  and  convictions  have  become  part  of  the  morality  and  culture,  these  are  persistent.  Even  when  the  rules  and  guidelines  are  no  longer  valid  or  even  dysfunctional  ,  they  are  carried  through  and  therefore  potentially  a  source  of  decay  and  may  cause  a  crisis;  

• people  have  a  competitive  attitude.  Competition  and  battle  are  a  source  of  change  and  survival.  Competition  is  often  aimed  at  acquiring  market  power,  resource  and  recognition.  In  this  respect,  

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especially  recognition  is  important  because  this  is  the  basis  for  the  legitimacy  that  managers/authorities  require  for  being  able  to  function.      

As  stated  in  the  previous  paragraphs,  the  reality  that  surrounds  us  is  changeable  and  dynamic  to  an  increasing  degree.  In  order  to  be  able  to  adequately  respond  to  these  dynamics,  there  should  be  an  idea  of  what  is  actually  going  on.  However,  reality  is  that  complex,  it  is  impossible  to  oversee  and  understand  all  its  aspects.  In  order  to  get  some  idea  of  how  organizations  deal  internally  with  reality,  we  need  to  further  analyse  the  decision  making  processes  by  also  including  the  above  described  motives.    

Professional  literature  includes  a  vast  number  of  models  that  explain  how  decisions  are  made  in  organizations.  All  these  approaches  start  at  observation.    

Decision  making  requires  models  based  on  observations  from  the  past.  Observations  require  senses.  Using  our  senses,  we  observe  the  world  around  us  as  well  as  the  changes  that  take  place.  Nevertheless,  you  could  ask  to  what  extent  these  observations  indeed  represent  reality  because  these  are  interpreted  using  the  thinking  models  from  the  past,  the  conservative  motive  which  was  formulated  under  the  influence  of  Fukuyama  (2011).  Within  organizations,  the  observation  process  goes  through  a  (re)combination  of  different  observations  by  individuals.  One  of  the  factors  that  play  a  part  in  this  is  denoted  by  the  term  Gestalt-­‐switch  (van  Es  2008)  or  the  Figure–ground  concept  (King  et  al.  2005).  This  denotes  the  situation  in  which  observations  are  in  general  polyinterpretable.  This  fits  in  with  Weick’s  approach  (Weick  1979),  which  examines  the  process  of  signification  in  an  organizational  context.  As  soon  as  a  change  to  the  surroundings  is  observed,  there  is  a  first  filtering  of  what  has  been  observed.  This  leads  to  an  image  of  that  reality,  which  is  not  necessarily  identical  to  that  reality.  The  observed  reality  is  next  provided  with  an  interpretation  based  on  the  experiences  and  world  images  from  the  past.  In  this  process,  as  we  observed  before,  the  term  framing  is  often  mentioned,  which  is  the  assessment  of  the  situation  within  the  frames  of  reference  and  the  context  that  are  current  to  the  observer.  This  way,  a  map  of  reality  is  developed.  Actions  are  based  on  this  interpretation  (map)  and  if  necessary,  the  world  images/experiences  are  adjusted  to  the  observed  reality.  The  fact  remains  that  this  map  is  not  the  landscape  (Dilts  1990).  

However,  the  approach  as  described  this  way  is  often  quoted  in    professional  literature  (zie  o.a.  Choo  1998;  van  Es  2008)  and  receives  increasingly  more  critical  comments.  The  focus  in  this  is  the  incapacity  of  the  human  brain  to  put  a  meaning  on  all  important  stimuli  in  a  rational  manner  (Lipton  2007).  Being  one  of  the  most  powerful  data  processors,  the  subconscious  observes  both  the  internal  as  well  as  the  external  reality  and  immediately  manifests  (learned)  behaviour  in  which  the  consciousness  plays  no  role  or  only  a  very  limited  role.  This  way  it  provides  the  first  filtering  which  leads  to  an  observed  reality.  In  that  sense,  a  person’s  past  has  caused  inscriptions  (Orlikowski  et  al.  1994;  Orlikowski  2000  die  dit  verschijnsel  vooral  vanuit  de  technologie  verklaren)  in  our  actions  that  have  a  much  more  profound  effect  on  our  actions  than  our  so-­‐called  rationality.  In  this  respect,  Dijksterhuis  (2007)  goes  even  as  far  as  to  say  that  our  consciousness  only  plays  a  part  when  we  justify  our  actions  afterwards  and  in  the  adjustment  of  our  repertoire  of  actions  based  on  these  experiences.  Therefore,  in  this  approach  our  consciousness  plays  an  important  part  in  our  learning  process  but  a  limited  one  in  the  governing  of  our  behaviour.  

Contrary  to  what  is  assumed  in  economic  literature  and  on  the  basis  of  the  above,  man  is  therefore  often  not  a  “homo  economicus”,  and  according  to  Tversky  and  Kahneman  (1986)  decisions  are  often  not  rational.  This  finds  its  basis  (zie  ook  o.a.  Taleb  2010)  in  dealing  badly  with  the  estimation  of  uncertain  chances  and  risks  (prospect  theory),  in  having  a  preference  for  the  existing,  the  status  quo,  one’s  own  observations  (n=1),  generalizing  (inference),  having  an  aversion  to  losing,  preferring  to  work  with  an  inadequate  model  of  reality  rather  than  working  without  a  model  (the  map  and  the  landscape,  the  power  of  theories  in  use),  etc.  This  forms  a  dominant  set  of  psychological  inclinations  with  a  result  that  the  certain  chance  of  a  crisis  taking  place  in  the  long  or  short  term  not  being  taking  into  account.  These  authors  also  speak  of  thinking  according  to  system  1,  the  experience  system:  This  acts  intuitively,  subconsciously,  emotional,  associatively.  This  means  

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that  decisions  are  made  fast  and  often  on  the  basis  of  what  is  known,  of  experiences  and  a  personal  repertoire  of  actions;  however,  man’s  associative  ability  still  offers  possibilities  for  progressive  development.    The  opposite  of  this  is  system  2,  the  cogitation  system:  this  acts  rationally  and  calculating.  System  2  is  slow  and  works  along  logical  serial  and  progressive  lines  towards  a  reasoned  act.  However,  as  we  observed  above,  this  rationality  is  in  many  cases  dictated  by  experiences  from  the  past.  This  way,  rationality  may  lead  to  conservative  behaviour.        

As  Dijksterhuis  (2007)  already  observed,  man  uses  system  1  for  everyday  acts  and  usually  uses  a  repertoire  of  actions  that  was  built  in  the  past.  In  that  situation,  the  provision  of  and  being  attentive  to  possible  sources  of  crises  does  not  come  into  being  as  a  matter  of  course.    

In  addition,  there  is  a  difference  in  relevant  time  scale.  The  time  scale  of  the  management  and  that  of  the  organization  as  a  whole.  Resilience  demands  extra  costs  and  persuasiveness  of  the  board  of  directors  against  the  psychological,  emotional  and  business  like  resistance.  Besides,  there  is  the  self-­‐interest  of  the  individual  reward    (also  in  the  shape  of  recognition)  which  is  decided  on  the  basis  of  short  term  results.  The  time  scale  of  the  organization  as  a  whole  is  a  longer  one.  Resilience  is  an  insurance,  it  means  increasing  the  chance  of  long  term  survival.  However,  the  management  has  in  general  a  shorter  time  scale  on  the  basis  of  the  above  arguments.    

Nevertheless,  not  all  managers  are  the  same.  Some  function  particularly  well  from  a  system  1  approach  whilst  others  flourish  much  better  from  a  system  2  approach.  In  this  respect,  we  draw  attention  to  research  carried  out  by  Van  Es  (van  Es  2008).  To  this  purpose,  he  describes  styles  of  thought,  persuasions  that  may  occur  in  managers  and  in  organizations.  On  the  one  hand,  these  can  be  recognized  in  a  visible  strategic,  rational  and  calculating  upper  current  and  on  the  other  hand,  in  an  invisible,  emotional  under  current  that  reacts  to  the  upper  current.  His  name  for  this  fits  in  with  the  metaphors  of  organization  as  used  by  Morgan  (1986)  for  denoting  the    ‘character’    of  organizations.  The  styles  of  thought  are  spectacles  for  explaining  reality  and  inciting  decision  making.  Organizations  are  characterized  by  one  single  or  two  dominant  styles  of  thought.    

This  way  of  looking  via  the  distinctive  styles  of  thought  fits  in  almost  seamlessly  with  the  work  of  developmental  psychologist  Graves    (2005)  and  the  elaboration  of  his  theory  by  Becks  and  Cowan  (Beck  et  al.  2006).    They  treat  the  developments  of  values  and  convictions  in  people  and  groups  of  people  as  the  motives  that  form  the  basis  of  behaviour.    These  motives  develop  according  to  a  set  order  as  a  result  of  an  increasing  complexity  of  the  environment.  Up  until  now,  Spiral  Dynamics  attributes  eight  clusters  of  cohering  values,  convictions  and  motives.  Characterisation  of  the  contexts  and  contents  of  the  systems  of  values,  transitions  and  developments  are  described  in  detail.  People  choose  their  dominant  values  in  different  ways  and  subconsciously.  This  is  the  resultant  of  biological  aptitude,  social  experiences  and  the  context.  This  makes  them  suitable  for  a  context  in  which  these  values  are  done  the  most  justice  and  if  possible,  this  is  what  they  seek  out.    

Therefore,  not  just  their  competencies  and  behaviour  make  people  suitable  for  a  specific  task.  people  also  come  to  a  different  conclusion  because  of  their  underlying  motives,  values,  starting  points  and  motivation  (vergelijk  hier  ook  de  NLP  benadering,  zie  o.a.  Dilts  1990)  .    The  study  also  investigates  the  meaning  of  a  similar  context  or  situation,  what  is  going  on,  what  the  problem  is,  in  what  direction  the  solution  can  be  found  and  which  decisions  and  actions  are  obvious.    

A  lot  of  the  things  that  happen  to  us  and  which  we  react  to  in  our  behaviour  are  determined  by  our  environment.  In  a  sense,  we  live  by  our  environment,  by  the  context  in  which  we  function.  For  being  able  to  optimally  react  to  the  developments,  this  does  demand  that  individuals  are  suitable  of  functioning  in  that  specific  context.  People  also  make  choices  regarding  this,  in  the  sense  that  they  consider  whether  their  own  competencies  fit  in  with  that  specific  situation.  However,  this  choice  process  is  hampered  by  the  fact  that  it  cannot  be  determined  which  combinations  of  context  and  competency  are  the  optimum  ones.  This  assessment  

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always  takes  place  from  a  certain  perspective  and  if  people  do  not  share  this  perspective,  the  assessment  falls  through!    

Nevertheless,  the  process  is  still  aimed  at  finding  a  balance  in  an  internal/external  area  of  tension.  In  this  respect,  thinking  in  contexts  is  crucial.  In  the  next  paragraph,  we  will  discuss  this  thinking  in  contexts  in  more  detail.    

THINKING  IN  CONTEXTS  

Signification  forms  the  basis  for  the  success  of  the  organization.  However,  changing  contexts  may  be  of  influence  on  the  process  of  signification  and  another  meaning  will  also  have  its  influence  on  the  interpretation  of  the  notion  of  success.  This  way,  context  determines  the  functioning  of  the  organization.  The  crucial  question  regarding  this  is  which  types  of  action  an  organization  takes  and  when  it  takes  these  and  how  all  this  relates  to  this  changing  context.    

The  question  whether  an  organization  functions  optimally  cannot  be  answered  in  a  general  sense.  This  is  subject  to  the  yardstick  that  is  used  for  defining  the  term  ‘optimal’.  For  profit  organizations,  the  preferred  norm  is  often  profit  maximization  but  the  question  how  many  jobs  have  to  be  maintained,  may  also  be  used  as  a  criterion.  For  non-­‐profit  organizations,  profit  usually  is  not  a  leading  criterion.  In  those,  the  optimum  functioning  of  an  organization  is  measured  by  means  of  socially  relevant  themes  like  ‘the  degree  of  safety  on  the  street’,  ‘the  social  relevance  of  education  and  research’  or  ‘pro-­‐active  prevention  of  bursting  dikes’.  Furthermore,  the  important  question  in  this  regard  is  whether  optimum  functioning  is  considered  from  an  ‘individual’  point  of  view  or  whether  optimum  functioning  is  always  viewed  in  relation  with  competition.  In  all  this,  the  issue  of  to  what  degree  one  assumes  that  optimum  functioning  is  considered  from  a    zero-­‐sum  approach    (‘one  man’s  breath  is  another  man’s  death’-­‐  the  traditional  competitive  approach)  or  whether  optimisation  is  mainly  viewed  from  a    win-­‐win  perspective  (one  can  only  speak  of  optimum  functioning  if  the  environment  of  the  organization  is  also  healthy  –  the  ecological  perspective    (Moore  1996).  

Besides,  the  environment  has  an  enormous  influence  on  the  functioning  of  the  organization  through  contingency  factors:  the  developments  within  the  organization  cannot  be  viewed  separately  from  the  developments  that  take  place  in  its  environment.  In  the  literature,  this  is  known  as  co  evolution  (Allen  et  al.  2006;  Benbya  et  al.  2006),  the  evolution  of  the  organization  and  its  environment  in  interaction.  Recognition  of  this  interaction  and  giving  it  an  interpretation  may  be  imperative  for  the  functioning  of  the  organization.    

The  above  means  that  it  is  questionable  whether  an  organization  can  come  up  to  expectations.  After  all,  if  the  applicable  criteria  for  deciding  whether  an  organization  functions  optimally  are  even  known,  even  then  the  ‘correct’  strategic  choices  have  to  be  made  and  the  developments  in  the  environment  have  to  be  interpreted  

‘correctly’.  With  regard  to  the  term  ‘correct’,  we  have  to  be  aware  of  the  fact  that  this  is  determined  presuming  a  specific  interpretation  of  the  reality.  Heene  (2002)  refers  to  this  area  of  tension,  which  applies  to  every  organization,  as  the  want  –  must  –  can  dilemma.  

For  an  organization,  the  challenge  lies  in  bringing  this  area  of  tension  into  balance.  Many  organizations  pursue  a  situation  in  which  it  is  clear  what  the  organization  wants  or  needs  to  do  where  there  is  the  certainty  that  thus  can  be  indeed  realized.    In  everyday  practice,  such  a  balance  does  not  exist  or  it  is  not  durable.  The  organization  is  constantly  faced  with  changes  and  challenges  

which  means  that  a  new  equilibrium  between  this  want  –  must  –  can  has  to  be  found.  These  dynamics  lead  to  organizations  being  permanently  in  motion.  In  this,  stability  and  (threatening)  chaos  continuously  alternate  

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each  other  (Prigogine  et  al.  1987).  The  only  way,  the  organization  will  be  able  to  function  optimally  is  for  it  to  find  a  developing  (in  other  words,  each  time  a  new)  balance  in  this  field  of  tension.    

In  line  with  this  approach,  we  point  at  the  fundamental  work  done  by  Thompson  (Thompson  1967).  Like  many  other  authors,  Thompson  works  using  dilemmas.  Confronting  two  dilemmas  creates  quadrant  models,  which  can  be  used  for  interpreting  reality.  The  enclosed  figure  shows  one  of  his  central  models.  In  this  model,  he  confronts  the  preferences  with  regard  to  possible  outcomes  with  the  insight  into  cause/effect  relations.  In  doing  so,  he  observes  that  this  confrontation  results  in  four  combinations.  In  his  view,  each  of  these  combinations  demands  a  different  type  of  strategy.  Furthermore,  Thompson  indicates  in  his  observation  that  organizations  that  function  within  this  field  of  tension  should  pay  a  lot  of  attention  to  the  dominant  coalition.  For  that  reason  he  writes:  “We  have  argued  that  in  the  highly  complex  organization,  power  is  dispersed  ……  the  dispersed  power  must  be  reflected  in  and  exercised  through  an  inner  circle”  (Thompson  1967  p  142).  He  denotes  this  inner  circle  at  a  later  stage  as  the  dominant  coalition.  In  95  propositions  he  next  makes  suggestions  on  how  the  organization  should  and  could  react  to  the  situation  it  finds  itself  in.  Otherwise,  he  does  not  dwell  upon  the  way  in  which  an  organization  subsequently  reacts  to  the  dynamics  and  effects  of  the  propositions  in  this  complex  situation.  

Starting  from  Thompson’s  theoretical  insights  and  apart  from  this,  based  upon  the  insights  of  the  complexity  theory,    Parson  et  al.  (1990)  developed  a  model  that  further  identifies  this  tension  and  translates  into  the  influence  of  modern  information  and  communications  technology  on  organizations.  In  their  model,  they  use  the  axes  “want”  and  “can”.  Want  in  the  sense  of  providing  direction,  where  an  organization  decides  on  the  course  it  wishes  to  take  and  can  in  the  sense  of  the  ability  to  actually  enable  this  direction.  For  that  matter,  it  has  to  be  remarked  that  ‘ability’  can  be  a  source  of  change  as  well;  see  the  development  of  theories  about  the  Resource  based  view  of  the  firm  (zie  o.a.  Hamel  et  al.  1994;  Prahalad  et  al.  1990).  All  this  under  the  influence  of  the  context  as  laid  down  by  the  environment,  the  must,  which  determines  to  a  high  degree  within  which  limiting  conditions  /  limits,  the  organization  can  make  its  choices.  In  the  quadrant  model  thus  developed,  Heene’s  must/want/can  dilemma  plays  a  part  in  its  own  unique  way.    

In  a  later  publication,  Parson  (2002)  further  dwells  on  the  internal  and  external  developments  that  keep  the  organization  swinging  back  and  forth  between  these  quadrants.  This  view  was  later  on  further  elaborated  by  Abcouwer  et  al.  (2006).  It  is  specified  that  this  motion  is  not  random.  There  is  a  certain  logic  to  it:  the  development  path  is  generic  in  character.  The  starting  point  in  this  being  that  the  organization  will  inevitably  end  up  in  a  crisis  situation,  which  is  followed  by  a  process  leading  to  (temporary)  recovery  of  equilibrium  and  stability.  In  this  respect,  the  periodical  need  for  fundamental  reconsideration  of  the  existing  is  a  necessity  for  survival.  Within  the  context  model  as  described  here,  this  development  can  be  represented  as  a  lemniscate.  The  lemniscate  movement  developed  such,  looks  similar  to  the  ‘adaptive  cycle’  motion  as  indicated  in  the  literature  and  which  is  recognized  in  ecology  (Gunderson  et  al.  2002;  Walker  et  al.  2006b).  However,  by  choosing  different  axes,  (Holling  uses  solidarity  and  potential  for  axes,  later  on  in  this  article  we  will  apply  these  notions)  the  motion  is  not  fully  identical.  However,  the  succession  of  phases  does  show  a  strong  resemblance.  

The  various  different  four-­‐quadrant  models  have  their  similarities  and  differences  but  they  all  denote  the  same  issues,  how  to  deal  with  uncertainties.  On  the  one  hand,  there  is  order  and  repetition.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  chaos  and  adjustment.  In  the  next  paragraph,  we  will  describe  the  development  path  in  general  terms,  as  it  is  recognized  by  Parson  and  Abcouwer.  

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THE  ADAPTIVE  CYCLE      Starting  point  for  the  reasoning  as  presented  above  is  that  every  organization  goes  through  a  cyclic  development  path  that  can  be  defined  within  the  want/can  (or  objectives/means  for  fitting  in  more  closely  with  Thompson)  context  model.  Summarized,  we  can  describe  the  movement  as  follows.    

In  order  to  describe  the  process  we  start  in  quadrant  1.      This  quadrant  is  the  simplest  from  a  management  viewpoint:  the  equilibrium  situation.  It  is  clear  which  goals  are  pursued  and  how  these  goals  will  have  to  be  realized.  In  general  the  customers  are  satisfied  and  there  is  no  reason  for  making  new  

strategic  choices.  There  is  confidence  that  the  organization  is  able  to  cope  with  threat  from  outside  using  the  currently  applicable  management  skills,  as  available  within  the  existing  dominant  coalition.  In  this  quadrant,  any  improvements  take  place  within  the  existing  objectives  and  the  prevailing  business  model.  Market  power  and  profitability  are  the  goal.  If  external  influences  that  disturb  this  equilibrium  can  no  longer  be  denied  or  if  a  ‘Black  Swan’  (Taleb  2010)  occurs,  the  organization  is  generally  too  far  out  of  phase  for  finding  a  way  out  of  the  arisen  situation.  In  that  case  we  speak  of  a  crisis,  a  crisis  that  otherwise,  may  occur  in  two  guises:  as  a  crisis  in  the  negative  sense  of  the  word  but  also  as  a  crisis  that  is  an  opportunity  for  innovation.  However,  both  guises  lead  to  uncertainty  with  regard  to  the  organization’s  future.        

The  change  in  this  awareness  suddenly  moves  the  organization  to  quadrant  2.  In  that  case,  the  existence  of  uncertainties  about  how  to  define  the  unforeseen  development  becomes  clear  and  secondly,  uncertainties  about  what  the  organization  wants  and  can  do.    This  makes  demands  on  the  management  skills  and  inspirational  ability.  Otherwise,  the  start  of  a  crisis  usually  also  demonstrates  that  the  existing  dominant  coalition,  with  its  repertoire  of  actions  based  on  experiences,  is  no  longer  capable  of  dealing  with  the  situation.  There  is  a  need  to  add  new  varieties  to  the  repertoire  of  actions.  These  varieties  need  to  be  sourced  outside  the  existing  dominant  coalition.  One  needs  to  find  inspiration  in  for  example  the  multitude  of  possibilities  that  are  presented  from  inside  as  well  as  outside  the  organization.  In  this  situation,  the  objective  should  be  to  arrive  at  a  realistic  set  of  options  from  which  the  organization  can  choose,  given  the  crisis  situation  it  finds  itself  in.  For  the  sake  of  the  organization,  there  are  hopefully  still  sufficient  means,  in  a  financial  sense,  in  market  power,  in  prestige,  in  space  for  being  able  to  develop  these  options  and  next,  being  able  to  choose.  In  order  to  decide  how  realistic  these  alternatives  are,  requires  far-­‐reaching  analyses.  This  can  be  done  by  carrying  out  pilot  studies,  by  means  of  thorough  scenario  analyses  and  so  on.  At  a  given  time,  once  this  set  of  options  is  available,  the  decision  can  be  made  to  react  no  longer  defensively  to  the  internal  and  external  threats.  One  is  able  to  look  at  the  future  with  some  form  of  confidence  once  again.  The  moment  when  the  basic  attitude  of  fear  for  the  future  and  searching  for  new  alternatives  is  altered  towards  confidence  in  the  future  marks  the  transition  form  quadrant  2  to  quadrant  3.  In  fact  this  means  therefore  that  on  the  road  to  this,  saw  the  development  of  a  whole  range  of  alternatives  from  which  the  organization  can  choose.    

Because  it  is  impossible  to  realize  all  opportunities,  it  is  necessary  to  make  a  choice.  The  selection  process  entails  that  one  of  the  available  alternative  options  has  to  be  chosen  and  will  be  further  developed.  To  that  purpose,  it  is  not  just  necessary  to  choose  which  option  is  to  be  developed  but  often  also  why  certain  other  options  will  not  be  further  developed.  The  moment  of  making  the  final  choice  for  the  option  to  be  implemented  marks  the  change  from  quadrant  3  to  quadrant  4.  This  choice  demands  an  actual  decision,  which  will  often  lead  to  an  uncertain  result.  Therefore,  whether  this  choice  is  made  on  purely  rational  grounds  is  not  probably  in  some  cases  and  probably  also  not  necessary  in  all  cases!  The  choice  concerns  a  management  decision  which  is  often  made  based  on  intuition  and  gut  feeling.  The  moment  the  decision  is  made  it  concerns  a  choice  to  go  for  a  specific  option,  for  better  or  worse!  

IV II

I III

Certain

Certain

Uncertain

Uncertain

WANT

CAN

  14  

Once  the  choice  has  been  made,  it  will  often  become  clear  that  the  organization  is  not  ready  yet  for  proceeding  to  large  scale  implementation.  The  experiences  acquired  in  the  pilots  or  the  scenario  analyses  will  not  have  led  to  a  situation  in  which  the  developed  skills  enable  the  organization  to  scale  up  towards  actual  production  circumstances.  The  switch  to  a  new  equilibrium  situation  (and  therefore  a  new  quadrant  1  situation)  demand  unremitting  labour  and  the  reorganization  and/or  rationalisation  of  business  processes  before  the  organization  gets  back  to  a  relative  state  of  balance  between  want  and  can.  After  this,  the  whole  game  starts  all  over  again.        

This  cycle  can  be  easily  interpreted  as  a  sequential  process  which  the  organization  as  a  whole  goes  through.  The  sequential  character  of  the  process  requires  a  thoughtful  approach.  After  all,  the  level  of  consideration  used  for  looking  at  the  organization  is  not  necessarily  the  organization  as  a  whole.  Different  parts  of  organizations  may  be  at  different  phases  of  the  cycle.  In  that  case,  various  cycles  are  current,  each  with  their  own  size  and  speed  and  taking  stock  of  the  consolidated  effects  of  all  these  cycles  is  impossible  or  hardly  possible.  This  also  better  fits  in  with  the  ideas  of  the  complex  adaptive  systems  approach  of  organizations  as  we  saw  and  discussed  in  the  previous  paragraph.  Nevertheless,  it  is  obvious  that  crises  also  determine  the  autonomy  and  the  survival  of  organizations.  Not  every  organization  manages  to  survive  a  crisis  without  any  damage.    

 The  above  described  simplified  descriptions  of  the  adaptive  cycles  provide  a  first  idea  of  the  development  as  this  may  take  place  within  organizations  at  different  levels.  However,  a  further  and  more  accurate  description  of  the  various  phases  is  needed.  In  order  to  raise  the  level  of  complexity  not  too  high,  we  will  start  by  examining  the  singular  cycle  more  accurately  in  the  next  paragraph.    

WHAT  HAPPENS  IN  THE  QUADRANTS  If  we  regard  the  outlined  development  as  a  single  process,  the  organization  goes  through  four  phases  that  we  can  represent  in  the  shape  of  a  lemniscate.  In  the  previous  paragraph  we  have  already  briefly  described  this  lemniscate.  In  this  paragraph,  we  will  describe  this  lemniscate  model  more  closely  and  in  more  detail.  As  remarked  before,  the  development  is  a  continuous  cyclic  process.  Apart  from  that,  it  is  important  to  emphasize  here  that  this  continuous  process  will  not  be  experienced  as  such  by  an  individual  involved  in  this.  As  a  rule,  individuals  have  too  short  an  event  horizon.  

The  transition  from  one  to  the  next  phase  does  not  mean  a  true  change  of  the  system’s  circumstances.  Often  this  involves  an  essential  change  to  the  manner  of  looking  at  things.  In  that  sense,  the  transitions  between  the  quadrants  can  be  viewed  as  a  Gestalt  switch  (van  Es  2008):  this  involves  suddenly  giving  an  entirely  different  meaning  to  the  situation  at  hand.  This  transition  is  also  denoted  as  the  figure-­‐ground  metaphor  (King  et  al.  2005).  Anything  initially  seen  as  background,  suddenly  appears  to  be  central  stage  when  considered.  These  transitions  mark  the  crucial  issues  of  organizational  change.  For  organizations  it  is  important  whether  they  have  the  resilience  to  recognize  and  cope  with  this  sudden  change  at  abstraction  level.  Being  capable  of  recognizing  the  various  changes/switches  and  acting  on  these,  ultimately  determines  either  the  success  of  the  organization  or  it  prevents  the  loss  of  its  autonomy  or  even  its  decline.  

In  the  description,  we  consider  the  development  along  different  lines.  The  table  below  includes  the  main  references.  In  the  following  text,  we  do  not  always  refer  to  these  authors  individually.  

Strategy   Thompson  (1967)  Type  management   Mintzberg  (2009)  Culture,  game  rules   Graves  (2005),  Van  Es  (2008)  Resilience   Gunderson  et  al.  (2002),  Holling  et  al.  (2002a;  2002b)  State  of  mind   Graves  (2005)  Taleb  (2010)  Process  archetype   Parson  (1990),  Snowden  (2007)  

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QUADRANT  1  EQUILIBRIUM  

BUSINESS  AS  USUAL:  WE  KNOW  WHAT  WE  WANT  AND  WE  ARE  PROPERLY  ORGANIZED,  STRUCTURED  AND  IN  EQUILIBRIUM  WITH  THE  ENVIRONMENT.  OUR  WORLD  IS  

VERY  SAFE.  

In  this  quadrant  the  cause/effect  relationships  are  known.  There  is  a  pursuit  for  efficiency  and  preservation  and  improvement  of  the  market  position.  The  equilibrium  should  not  be  disturbed.  In  Anglo-­‐Saxon  management  thinking,  ‘compliance’  with  the  law,  ‘control’  and  short  term  predictability  of  the  results  are  core  issues.  Analysis  of  the  weal  and  woe  of  the  organization  takes  place  with  an  emphasis  on  financial  indicators,  e.g.  the  share  price.  Efficiency,  standardisation,  specialisation,  obsession  with  power,  predictability  and  the  eternal  cutting  of  costs  leads  to  the  creation  of  a  dominant  way  of  thinking,  which  is  aimed  internally  and  attempts  to  solve  problems  by  using  more  of  the  same.  In  learning  theory,  this  way  of  thinking  is  known  as  first  order  learning.  However,  under  the  influence  of  dynamic  developments  in  the  environment,  there  is  a  matter  of  decreasing  redundancy  and  variety  in  the  actions.  However,  in  this  situation  the  collection  of  knowledge,  assets  and  market  power  is  given  all  possible  attention.  Snowden  (2007)  describes  the  process-­‐archetype  that  corresponds  with  this  phase  as  Sense  –  Categorize  –  Respond,  denoting  that  the  categorization  of  what  is  perceived  will  lead  to  a  standard  reaction.  Therefore,  the  organization  will  be  encouraged  by  the  confidence  that  disruptions  can  be  solved,  from  the  conviction  that  the  available  repertoire  of  interventions  is  sufficient  to  make  the  organization  survive.  For  this  -­‐  not  strategically  aware-­‐,  a  price  is  paid,  the  organization  becomes  increasingly  more  rigid  and  waits  for  an  external  disruption,  usually  a  slow  variable,  which  in  the  long  run  may  become  a  real  threat  to  the  organization’s  equilibrium.  The  rigid  solidarity  with  the  existing  results  in  the  organization  becoming  increasingly  inflexible  and  has  to  deal  with  a  limited  change  potential.  Typical  for  such  an  organizational  setting  is  a  bureaucratic  culture  that  is  aimed  at  short  term  success  and/or  avoiding  risks.    Characterizing  for  this  is  the  searching  of  solutions  by  means  of  even  more  rules  and  procedures.  In  many  cases,  this  involves  ignoring  the  true  causes  of  the  problems.  Those  that  think  differently  will  be  listened  to  increasingly  less.  In  many  cases,  those  involved  that  are  capable  of  initiating  changes,  will  be  deployed  either  for  incremental  improvements  or  for  adjustments  to  the  existing  under  the  influence  of  changes  to  the  environment  that  do  not  immediately  disturb  the  equilibrium  or  realization  of  objectives.  Furthermore,  the  organization  already  takes  a  risk  from  its  current  line  of  thought.  Working  in  an  increasingly  complex  reality  means  that  there  is  constantly  less  insight  into  all  cause  and  effect  relationships.  Nevertheless,  there  is  adjustment  and  innovation  but  this  only  happens  within  the  existing  objectives  and  relationships.  All  this  happens  within  a  context  development  of  which  Christensen  (1999)  observes  there  comes  a  time  when  properly  understanding  the  customer,  carefully  studying  the  competition,  more  efficiently  setting  up  business  processes,    incremental  improvement  of  the  production  technologies  or  no  matter  which  other  approach  aimed  at  incremental  improvement,  simply  no  longer  suffices.  When  the  external  disruption  does  indeed  become  unsettling  ,  then  in  general,  good  management  will  miss  this  (as  a  result  of  cognitive  dissonance,  a  mismatch  between  the  reality  and  the  image  of  reality  the  manager  bases  his  judgment  on,  see  (Festinger  1957).  This  results  in  an  amplifying  effect  on  the  uncertainty  about  the  future.  Paradoxally,  the  above  shows  that  good  management  itself  is  in  fact  one  of  the  fundamental  reasons  organizations  getting  into  a  crisis.  In  that  case,  playing  the  game  according  to  what  is  expected  of  the  manager  is  the  reason  why  the  disruptive  development  goes  unnoticed.  Holding  on  to  what  is  existing,  results  in  hindering  the  change  to  what  is  new.    

Miller  (1990)  also  observes  that  the  specific  qualities  of  managers,  when  taxed  in  extreme  situations,  are  in  fact  a  threat  to  organizations.  This  way,  the  concept  of  creative  destruction  (Schumpeter  1950),  which  is  needed  as  a  reaction  to  the  dynamic  change,  is  in  fact  hampered  by  tenacious  managers  or  other  stakeholders  (shareholders,  owners  and  so  on).  Therefore,  under  influence  of  the  inevitable  and  increasingly  more  rapid  dynamic  changes,  each  organization  will  have  to  put  more  energy  into  maintaining  its  equilibrium.  From  the  traditional/insecurity  avoiding  way  of  thinking  of  organizations  (by  Thompson  called  the  ruling  logic  of  organizations),  attempts  to  restore  the  old  will  be  made,  by  means  of  making  even  better  analyses  of  what  the  

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organization  usually  wants  in  terms  of  the  past.    The  result  of  this  using  of  the  old  arsenal  interventions  is  an  increasing  rigidity.  The  consequence  is  fossilization  ,  which  will  make  the  organization  into  ‘an  accident  waiting  to  happen’  (Gunderson  et  al.  2002).  

FROM  EQUILIBRIUM  TO  CRISIS  –  RELEASE  

At  a  given  moment,  the  complexity  of  the  situation  becomes  that  high,  (also)  as  a  result  of  unthought-­‐of  and  unexpected  external  developments  with  a  large  impact,  that  the  existing  organization  is  no  longer  capable  of  dealing  with  these  developments.  With  the  existing  management,  the  self-­‐organizing  ability  for  dealing  with  this  crisis  will  not  be  at  hand.  As  soon  as  the  organization  becomes  aware  of  this,  its  confidence  will  change  to  insecurity.  A  so-­‐called  Gestalt  switch  occurs,  from  confidence  to  insecurity,  which  cannot  be  explained  by  the  actual  events.  Therefore,  the  point  that  marks  the  crisis  coming  into  being  is  based  mainly  on  perception!  In  the  lemniscate  model,  the  transition  to  the  crisis  quadrant  is  fact.  At  this  stage,  we  would  like  to  point  out  the  double  identity  of  this  situation  once  again.  One  the  one  hand,  the  crisis  may  arise  from  fear  of  the  unknown;  on  the  other  hand,  it  may  also  result  in  a  desire  for  a  new  future.  This  creates  a  situation  that  results  in  a  lack  of  connection  to  the  old  but  that  also  does  not  as  yet  have  a  potential  answer  for  the  new.  Holling  uses  the  term  Release  for  this  transition.  

This  means  that  essential  changes  are  required.  This  may  be  change  in  the  shape  of  new  management,  the  search  for  new  markets,  entering  into  new  relationships,  coalitions,  mergers,  and  so  on.  

  From  equilibrium   To  crisis    Strategy   Preservation  of  the  existing  

equilibrium:  Computational  Strategy  Understanding  what  is  going  on  and  choosing  a  new  direction:  Inspirational  Strategy  

Management   Management,  optimisation,  efficiency  and  certainty  

Leadership  and  charisma.  Inspiration  and  finding  a  way  out  of  the  crisis  and  communication  

Culture   Certainty,  method  and  order   Being  open  to  system  changes  and  putting  a  meaning  on  these.    Practical  initiatives  for  change  and  innovation    

Resilience   Decreases  through  internal  variety   None,  no  answer  as  yet  to  external  variety  

State  of  mind   Confidence  in  the  present  and  the  past   Insecurity  about  the  present  and  (curious  about)  the  future.    

 

QUADRANT  2  CRISIS  

CRISIS,  SCENARIOS,  GURUS:  THE  OLD  AND  FAMILIAR  NO  LONGER  APPLIES  AND  THE  FUTURE  IS  UNCERTAIN  AND  PRECARIOUS.  THERE  IS  NO  BEST  METHOD  OR  MODEL  

FOR  DEALING  WITH  THE  SITUATION.  WHAT  IS  WAITING  TO  BE  DONE?  GOOD  ADVICE  IS  WORTH  ITS  WEIGHT  IN    GOLD.  

In  this  quadrant,  the  organization  is  aware  of  the  fact  that  disruptions  can  no  longer  be  dealt  with  using  the  available  repertoire  of  actions.  In  this  respect,  three  crucial  characteristics  connected  to  the  concept  of  crisis  need  to  be  pointed  out:  

• The  crisis  arrives  unexpectedly  and  was  only  foreseeable  with  hindsight  • The  crisis  has  a  major  impact  on  the  organization  /  the  system:  everything  changes  

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• The  crisis  can  only  be  predicted  with  hindsight;  there  were  possible  signs  of  an  imminent  crisis  but  these  were  not  recognized  from  the  prevailing  logic.  It  was  not  taken  into  account.    

In  such  a  situation,  the  tools  at  the  disposal  of  the  dominant  coalition  does  no  longer  suffice.  As  remarked  before,  the  disruptions  come  into  being  from  the  development  of  long  variables  whose  impact  was  not  assessed  correctly.  This  did  not  happen  because  the  management  omitted  to  do  a  good  job  but  because  these  slow  variables  caused  durable  changes  to  the  context  of  the  organization  and  existing  working  methods  and  insights  did  no  longer  suffice  within  the  new  changed  context.  In  this  situation,  one  needs  to  actively  search  for  innovations.  This  means  that  the  organization  has  to  reinvent  itself  and  that  current  objectives  possibly  no  longer  apply  and  that  current  processes  possibly  have  to  be  turned  around.  There  is  fear  of  an  uncertain  future  and  one  is  looking  for  inspiration  in  order  to  find  a  new  way  out  of  the  crisis  (Thompson  1967).  However,  the  existing  tools  no  longer  prove  to  suffice.  The  required  variety  for  dealing  with  the  crisis  lacks.  The  question  is  how  one  needs  to  operate.  Only,  the  crisis  resulted  from  the  impossibility  to  deal  with  the  dynamics  from  traditional  insights.  In  other  words,  this  means  that  one  needs  to  look  for  alternative  approaches  of  which  it  is  far  from  known  what  their  effect  in  this  crisis  situation  will  be.  Snowden  refers  to  the  necessary  process  approach  as  Act  –  Sense  –  Respond:  because  there  is  no  clarity  about  the  necessary  actions  –  the  organization  hasn’t  got  a  clue  what  needs  to  be  done  –  each  action  in  a  search  process  will  be  judged  on  its  implications  and  possibly  lead  to  an  adjusted  response.  Evidently,  an  organization  does  not  wish  to  be  in  a  permanent  crisis  situation.  Therefore,  inspiration  will  probably  have  to  be  sourced  outside  the  dominant  coalition.  Such  as  for  example  new  members  of  the  board,  acting  management,  prestigious  advisors,  etc.  This  leads  to  a  new  dominant  coalition  that  will  have  to  put  a  meaning  on  the  situation  and  point  towards  a  way  out  of  the  crisis.  In  order  to  decide  in  which  direction  one  needs  to  search,  strategic  options  need  to  be  considered  and  it  has  to  be  determined  how  many  resources  are  available  for  carrying  out  these  investigations.  The  crisis  situation  creates  a  situation  where  there  is  no  more  connection  with  the  existing.  Given  the  complexity  of  the  existing,  this  results  in  there  being  room    for  self-­‐organizing  ability  (Maula  2006)  to  flourish.    The  potential,  as  far  as  present  within  the  organization,  is  able  to  fully  develop.  In  this  quadrant  there  is  room  for  visionaries,  for  inventors  and  lateral  thinkers.  After  all,  there  are  no  best  ways  or  experience  available  for  dealing  with  the  situation.  All  this  is  aimed  at  developing  a  large  number  of  alternatives.  At  this  stage,  choices  are  not  made  yet,  nor  is  feasibility  an  immediate  issue.  In  this  phase,  organizations  are  confronted  firmly  with  the  question  of  how  its  actual  creative  powers  are  doing.  A  lack  of  this  will  result  in  the  organization  being  easily  faced  with  mergers,  forces  division  and  in  extreme  circumstances  even  death:  in  a  nutshell,  in  such  a  situation  it  will  lose  its  autonomy.  By  means  of  the  product  life  cycle,  Abcouwer  (2006),  Porter  (1980)  and  Christensen  (1999)  show  that  the  transition  towards  a  new  product  life  cycle  is  prepared  here.    There  is  a  moment  when  a  new  dominant  coalition  comes  into  being  and  builds  itself  a  position  in  which  decision  can  be  made.  The  basis  for  this  is  usually  a  sketch  of  a  possible  future.  This  way,  the  contours  of  a  new  strategy  and  objectives  start  to  emerge.  The  power  relations  are  rearranged,  coalitions  negotiated,  resources  allocated  and  the  transition  to  the  next  quadrant  becomes  fact.    

To  be  perfectly  clear,  it  has  to  be  remarked  in  this  place  that  it  is  also  possible  that  there  is  relapse  to  quadrant  1  from  the  crisis  situation.  In  that  case,  the  organization  returns  to  its  core  business  by  giving  up  all  its  non  core  activities.  In  this  situation,  it  takes  a  step  back  in  order  to  be  able  to  meet  the  future  more  powerfully  starting  from  the  existing.  This  could  be  a  suitable  strategy  in  situations  where  the  organization  has  run  out  of  resources,  where  the  dominant  coalition  sees  no  viable  alternative  or  when  the  intention  is  to  prepare  the  organization  for  a  future  take-­‐over  or  when  new  financiers  wish  to  break  the  organization  into  sections  in  order  to  deal  with  these  separately,  etc.  Whether  this  method  will  ultimately  prove  to  be  successful  cannot  be  predicted  in  general  terms.  

No  matter  what,  in  this  quadrant  the  organization’s  future  is  on  the  line.  Hopefully,  the  dominant  coalition  knows  well  how  to  choose;  this  is  the  artistic  side  of  management  (Mintzberg  2009).  

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FROM  CRISIS  TO  NEW  COMBINATIONS  -­‐  REORGANIZATION  

If  during  the  crisis,  the  management’s  basic  attitude  is  uncertainty,  the  creative  powers,  which  came  to  fruition  within  the  organization,  will  create  a  situation  where  the  future  can  be  looked  at  with  a  nucleus  of  confidence.  The  moment  when  the  basic  attitude  of  fear  for  the  future  and  searching  for  new  alternatives  is  altered  towards  confidence  in  the  future  marks  the  transition  form  quadrant  2  to  quadrant  3.  This  transition  cannot  be  identified  univocally  either.  Once  again,  this  involves  a  Gestalt  switch  that  creates  new  insights  into  the  current  situation.  This  new  insight  involves  that  the  organization  sees  new  futures  that  could  be  chosen.  This  leads  to  an  optimistic  and  hopeful  look  towards  at  the  future.  In  this  respect,  the  strategic  view  on  innovation  may  change  by  collaborating  with  others  across  the  borders  of  the  organization:  open  innovation.  In  this  new  situation,  the  potential  for  coping  with  the  new  is  developed  but  there  is  no  solidarity  yet  because  one  has  not  chosen  which  opportunity  from  the  various  options  will  be  utilized.  Because  this  should  enable  a  far  reaching  restructuring  of  the  organization,  Holling  labels  this  phase  with  the  term  Reorganization  

  From  crisis   To  new  combinations    Strategy   Understanding  what  is  going  on  and  

choosing  a  new  direction:  :  Inspirational  Strategy  

Deciding  to  go  for  favourable  options  and  deliver  evidential  value  by  means  of  a  pilot:  Compromise  Strategy    

Management   Leadership  and  charisma.  Inspiration  and  finding  a  way  out  of  the  crisis  and  communication  

Being  able  to  choose  which  options  are  chosen  and  which  are  not  chosen  for  research,  pilots  and  development.  Inspiring  management  of  pilots  whilst  assisting  in  these  

Culture   Being  open  to  system  changes  and  putting  a  meaning  on  these.  Practical  initiatives  for  change  and  innovation  

Innovation,  new  combinations,  focus  and  fast  learning.  Create  a  basis  for  change.  

Resilience   None,  no  answer  as  yet  to  external  variety  

Increases  through  development  of  internal  variety  

State  of  mind   Insecurity  about  the  present  and  (curious  about)  the  future.    

Hopeful  about  the  future  

 

QUADRANT  3  NEW  COMBINATIONS  

PLANS,  INSIGHTS:  THE  NEW  BUT  AS  YET  UNKNOWN  STARTS  TO  DAWN  AT  THE  HORIZON.    FROM  THE  PALETTE  OF  POSSIBILITIES,  NEW  ROUTES  ARE  PROPOSED.  LEADERSHIP  AND  CHARISMA.  HOWEVER,  LIMITED  CAPACITY  REMAINS  DECISIVE.  

 FROM  CHOOSING  WITH  LIMITATIONS  TO  CHOOSING  IN  ABUNDANCE  DOES  NOT  MAKE  IT  EASIER  TO  DECIDE.  

The  result  of  the  initiated  searches  is  that  possible  options  have  become  available.  The  organization  is  developed  into  a  situation  where  it  is  still  not  known  what  it  wants;  nevertheless,  a  number  of  relevant  new  combinations  (options)  have  been  developed/chosen,  which  the  organization  can  investigate  on  feasibility.  This  does  result  in  new  zest,  people  within  the  organization  do  see  possibilities,  and  there  is  a  feeling  of  innovation  being  appreciated.  The  expectations  will  become  increasingly  tenser  but  the  abundance  of  possibilities  does  not  make  choosing  easier.  Searching  for  combinations  of  initiatives  in  order  to  limit  the  number  of  options  demands  that  compromises  are  reached.  For  that  reason,  Thompson  calls  this  compromise  strategy:  “I  do  know  how  to  do  it  but  I  have  no  idea  whether  I  want  it  and  what  I  want”.  In  this  instance,  it  is  all  about  acquiring  experiences  and  thus  ultimately  making  the  ‘right’  choice.  This  implies  that  the  organization  will  need  to  choose.  After  all,  developing  new  combinations  and  testing  these  in  pilots  does  take  up  (a  lot  of)  

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resources  (in  the  shape  of  saved  capital  and  knowledge).  Therefore,  at  a  certain  moment  it  all  boils  down  to  choosing.  Next,  the  number  of  possibilities  needs  to  be  reduced.  Snowden  denotes  this  via  the  Probe  –  Sense  –  Respond  process  approach.  Based  on  the  developed  insights,  an  idea  of  the  feasibility  of  the  various  options  emerges.  Therefore,  the  selection  process  entails  making  a  choice  from  the  multitude  of  options  and  choosing  which  one  will  indeed  be  operationalised.  However,  there  are  two  sides  to  choosing.  Choosing  (and  focusing)  means  on  the  one  hand,  choosing  what  will  be  done  but  also  implies  that  it  has  to  be  underpinned  why  specific  possibilities  are  NOT  chosen.  After  all,  options  do  compete  with  each  other.  This  affects  all  those  involved  to  a  large  extent.  For  in  a  number  of  cases,  the  enthusiasm  and  zest  that  were  encouraged  in  the  preceding  development  will  have  to  be  thwarted.  Initiatives  are  rejected;  people  will  be  disappointed.  Given  the  limited  organization  resources,  one  ultimately  needs  to  determine  which  initiatives  will  be  continued.  This  leads  to  the  question  of  who  is  responsible  for  this  selection  process.  In  the  dynamics  of  the  developments,  the  new  dominant  coalition  will  have  to  bear  this  managerial  responsibility.  The  choice  is  linked  to  a  new  strategic  view  on  the  future  of  the  organization.  However,  it  is  also  the  phase  in  which  options  fight  for  survival  in  internal  competition.  In  this  respect,  Holling  remarks  that  certain  relatively  autonomous  options  could  become  dominant  through  their  self-­‐organization  capacity  (Holling  et  al.  2002a:  35).  Therefore,  Thompson  calls  this  compromise  strategy.  This  involves  a  decrease  in  the  diversity  of  the  possibilities,  which  ultimately  simplifies  the  selection  process.  

FROM  NEW  COMBINATIONS  TO  BUSINESS  -­‐  EXPLOITATION  

In  terms  of  perception  of  the  situation,  the  making  of  a  definitive  choice    means  that  ‘hopeful  about  the  future’  is  replaced  by  ‘confidence  in  the  future’  in  the  belief  that  the  right  choice  was  made.  Therefore,  this  choice  was  no  made  on  purely  rational  grounds.  In  that  case,  intuition  and  emotions  play  an  important  part  in  the  decision  making  process.  Future  success  can  hardly  be  proved.  In  a  sense  this  also  involves  a  Gestalt  switch;  the  moment  the  decision  is  made,  is  a  choice  for  a  certain  option,  for  better  or  for  worse!  Subsequently,  it  will  turn  out  whether  the  management  chose  wisely.    In  terms  of  solidarity  and  potential,  we  can  observe  that  the  potential  is  reduced  during  this  phase,  new  initiatives  are  no  longer  sought  and  one  strives  to  promote  the  solidarity  once  again.  This  often  happens  by  recording  processes  and  standards,  allowing  for  scaling  up  to  a  new  business-­‐as-­‐usual  situation.  Holling  uses  the  term  Exploitation  for  this  phase.  

 

 

  From  new  combinations   To  business    Strategy   Deciding  to  go  for  favourable  options  

and  deliver  evidential  value  by  means  of  a  pilot:  Compromise  Strategy  

Allowing  chosen  options  to  grow  fast  and    conquer  a  market  position  and/or  scaling  up  for  replacing  existing  product/market  combinations:  Judgemental  Strategy  

Management   Being  able  to  choose  which  options  are  chosen  and  which  are  not  chosen  for  research,  pilots  and  development.  Inspiring  management  of  pilots  whilst  assisting  in  these  

Enterprising  and  aimed  at  success  and  the  start  of  standardization,  effectivity  dominant  to  efficiency  

Culture   Innovation,  new  combinations,  focus  and  fast  learning.  Create  a  basis  for  change.  

Learning,  homogenising  and  standardizing  and  focus.  Change  is  needed  for  the  future.  

Resilience   Increases  through  development  of  internal  variety  

Large,  all  varieties  aimed  at  the  choice  are  still  available  

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State  of  mind   Hopeful  about  the  future   Confidence  in  the  present  and  the  future  

QUADRANT  4  BUSINESS  

THE  CHOICE  WAS  MADE:  SCALING  UP  AND  IMPROVEMENT  IS  THE  CHALLENGE.    TO  THIS  PURPOSE,  RESISTANCES  HAVE  TO  BE  CONQUERED,  NEW  PROCESSES  NEED  TO  BE  STREAMLINED  AND  MARKETS  (RE)  CONQUERED.  

RADICAL  CHANGE  PROCESSES  ARE  THE  RESULT.    SAILING  THE  WILD  SEAS  DEMANDS  HELMSMANSHIP.  

In  this  quadrant,  one  strives  for  a  desired  improvement  or  new  development  with  much  energy  and  focus.  Fast  growing/development  is  the  device:  we  know  what  we  want,  we  have  a  vision  and  objectives,  we  are  growing  fast/are  scaling  up  and  are  improving  the  knowledge  of  cause  and  result.  Snowden  hints  at  this  situation  via  the  Sense  –  Analyse  –  Respond  process  approach.  This  development  actually  adjusts  the  existing  method  for  doing  things,  the  old  ‘business-­‐as-­‐usual’  within  the  company,  into  a  new  ‘business-­‐as-­‐usual’.  In  an  existing  company,  for  example  by  scaling  up  a  new  product/service  possibly  in  combination  with    dissimilar  knowledge  and  skill  for  being  able  to  operate  truly  differently.  However,  this  may  also  happen  as  a  result  of  external  factors  such  as  the  operationalisation  of  the  integration  with  a  new  partner  as  a  result  of  a  merger.  Ultimately,  this  involves  the  designing  of  a  new  business  as  usual,  based  on  new  equilibriums  within  and  outside  the  organization.  However,  finding  new  equilibriums  also  introduces  the  new  organization  being  less  open  to  alternatives.  It  is  all  about  realizing  the  intended  position.  The  emphasis  lies  on  creating  a  basis  and  market  reach  (internally  and  externally)  and  designing  and/or  improving  the  quality  and  standardization  of  the  knowledge,  skills  and  processes.  This  may  be  accompanied  by  drastic  changes.  

This  quadrant  involves  fast  growth  and  improvements,  continuous  dynamics  and  the  initiation  of  changes  outside  the  chosen  focus  is  an  enemy  of  this  development.  This  concerns  building  up  of  a  stable  vision  and  the  advancement  of  skills  that  facilitate  the  accumulation  of  knowledge,  power  and  capital,  which  enables  the  exploitation  phase  of  this  new  business-­‐as-­‐usual.    

FROM  BUSINESS  TO  EQUILIBRIUM  –  CONSERVATION  

As  soon  as  the  choices  are  made,  one  needs  to  pay  attention  to  their  operationalisation  and  improvement.  In  other  words,  one  needs  to  produce  order  out  of  the  urge  to  growth  which  prevailed  until  that  moment.  Once  again,  rationalisation  of  processes,  attention  to  efficiency  and  effectivity  become  important,  involving  the  regaining  of  bureaucratic  structures,  re-­‐establishing  routines  that  result  in  the  organization  is  being  able  to  end  up  in  a  new  business-­‐as-­‐usual  situation.  Completion  of  the  selection  process  means  reaching  the  quadrant  of  equilibrium  in  which  everybody  knows  clearly  what  is  going  to  happen  and  everybody  sticks  to  the  rules  and  norms  and  works  on  the  success  of  the  organization  within  limited  demarcated  frameworks.  At  that  stage,  solidarity  reaches  a  peak  again  and  the  qualities  in  terms  of  potential  of  the  remaining  parties  concerned  are  optimally  utilized.  The  state  of  mind  of  the  manager  is  changed  from  conviction  regarding  the  choice  for  the  future  into  confidence  in  the  present.    

It  is  important  to  acknowledge  that  the  business-­‐as-­‐usual  situation  thus  achieved  is  not  the  same  as  the  old  one.  In  this  respect,  we  can  join  the  ecological  resilience  concept  as  defined  by  Holling  (further  on,  we  will  discuss  this  notion  in  more  detail).  Using  this  term,  Holling  argues  that  the  organization’s  successfulness  is  determined  by  the  extent  to  which  it  has  the  ability  to  achieve  a  new,  different,  business-­‐as-­‐usual  situation.  However,  where  in  the  quadrant  model,  the  lemniscate  development  process  ultimately  leads  the  organization  back  to  the  quadrant  of  

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equilibrium,  this  quadrant  has  shifted  in  relation  to  the  old  equilibrium.  The  degree  of  successfully  shifting  this  equilibrium  is  determined  by  the  ecological  resilience;  that  is  to  say,  the  equilibrium  within  the  organization  once  again  being  in  line  with  its  changing  environment.  Holling  uses  the  term  Conservation  for  this  phase.  

  From  business   To  equilibrium  Strategy   Allowing  chosen  options  to  grow  fast  and    

conquer  a  market  position  and/or  scaling  up  for  replacing  existing  product/market  combinations:  Judgemental  Strategy  

Market  dominance,  efficiency,  improving  standards  and  processes,  specialisation  Preservation  of  the  existing  equilibrium:  Computational  Strategy  

Management   Enterprising  and  aimed  at  success  and  the  start  of  standardization,  efficiency  

Management,  optimisation,  efficiency  and  certainty  

Culture   Learning,  homogenising  and  standardizing  

Method  and  order.  Efficiency,  rules  and  processes  

Resilience   Large,  all  varieties  aimed  at  the  choice  are  still  available  

Decreases  through  internal  variety  

State  of  mind   Confidence  in  the  present  and  the  future   Confidence  in  the  present  and  the  past  

With  this  fourth  transition,  we  have  discussed  the  entire  adaptive  cycle  model.  In  many  places,  the  logics  of  the  approach  can  be  recognized  in  every  day  practice.    

However,  the  question  remains  to  what  degree  this  development  is  inevitable  and  which  part  the  management  plays  in  this.    

THE  ADAPTIVE  CYCLE,  MAN  AND  TIME  In  the  previous  paragraph,  we  made  the  distinction  between  the  quadrants  as  descriptions  of  a  developing  state  of  a  system  on  the  one  hand  and  on  the  other  hand,  the  transitions  as  Gestalt  switches,  as  changing  perception  of  the  developing  system.  In  other  words,  this  says  a  lot  about  the  different  cultures  and  the  driving  force,  motives  and  perception  of  the  management  and  all  those  involved  in  each  of  the  quadrants.  Although  the  adaptive  cycle  assumes  four  transitions,  in  practice,  many  authors  point  out  two  main  movements  taking  place  in  the  model  (zie  o.a.  Walker  et  al.  2006b)  .  The  first  development  takes  the  organization  out  of  its  comfort  zone  of  conviction  and  certainty  regarding  the  present  towards  a  situation  of  uncertainty  and  possible  fear  regarding  the  future  and  a  cry  for  creativity,  innovation,  a  new  vision,  etc.  This  concerns  the  transitions  release  and  reorganization.  This  means  that  the  organization  moves  towards  the  right  hand  side  of  the  model.  This  side  is  characterized  by  uncertainty,  by  curiosity  and  by  experimentation.  It  is  the  phase  where  the  loss  of  all  sorts  of  capital  occurs.  This  is  where  creative  destruction  takes  place.  Man  plays  a  major  role  at  this  side  of  the  model,  whether  this  is  intentional  and/or  carefully  considered,  or  possibly  spontaneous  and  even  reckless.  This  means  that  special  demands  on  his  or  her  competencies  are  made;  after  all,  traditional  management  skills  no  longer  suffice  in  this  situation.  Crucial  to  such  a  process  is  that  those  involved  see  the  importance  of  a  new  vision,  arguments  being  more  important  than  the  exertion  of  power  for  commanding  developments.    Summarizing,  we  can  characterize  these  as  follows:  in  this  situation,  there  is  an  emphasis  on  

• Innovative  /  intuitive  actions  • Change  oriented    • Innovation  ability  takes  central  stage  • Second  order  learning  aimed  at  coping  with  changes  • Innovation  takes  central  stage  • Curiosity  

The  second  development  brings  the  organization  out  of  its  position  of  

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uncertainty  and  back  to  stability  and  equilibrium.  This  means  that  the  organization  moves  back  to  the  left  hand  side  of  the  diagram.  This  concerns  the  transitions  exploitation  and  conservation.  This  development  can  be  characterized  by  the  pursuit  of  stability  and  the  conservation  of  this,  often  by  means  of  the  accumulation  of  capital  and  resources.  This  development  is  vital  to  the  development  and  anchoring  of  the  wellbeing  of  the  systems  as  well  as  of  the  people  that  function  within  the  system  (Walker  et  al.  2006b).  This  situation  once  again,  makes  specific  –  and  entirely  different  –  demands  to  the  competencies  of  the  management.  An  obvious  difference  with  the  first  main  movement  consists  of  power,  in  the  sense  of  the  capacity  to  impose  developments,  being  more  important  than  arguments  in  this  process.  Summarizing,  we  can  characterize  these  demands  as  follows:  the  emphasis  is  namely  on  

• Acting  rationally  • Striving  for  stability  and  equilibrium  • Optimisation  strategy  takes  central  stage  • First  order  learning  aimed  at  continuous  improvement  • Growth  takes  central  stage  • Tunnel  thinking    

The  necessary  management  competencies  as  outlined  here  have  to  enable  the  organization  to  realize  the  choice  it  has  made.  In  this  respect,  it  is  notable  that  the  characterization  of  necessary  competencies  is  very  similar  to  the  competency  set  that,  as  we  previously  observed,  got  the  organization  into  trouble.  After  all,  in  this  phase,  the  management  competencies  that  were  partly  responsible  for  the  initiation  of  the  adaptive  cycle  that  formed  the  basis  for  the  rigidity  that  made  the  organization  into  ‘an  accident  waiting  to  happen’  are  of  crucial  importance  if  the  organization  is  to  achieve  its  new  goals.  With  this,  the  initiation  of  a  new  instance  of  the  cycle  has  already  taken  place  once  again.    

However,  this  way  of  viewing  organizational  change  trajectories  does  make  it  clear  that  managers  play  a  vital  role  in  the  cycle.  The  competencies  and  culture  requirements  needed  for  this  do  make  it  extremely  unlikely  that  these  can  be  found  in  one  single  person.  The  tragic  side  of  it  all  is  that  the  managers  involved  are  often  the  last  to  realize  this  and  draw  the  obvious  conclusions;  namely,  to  hand  over  the  baton  to  the  type  of  managers  they  do  have  an  aversion  to,  whilst  this  was  crystal  clear  to  the  bystanders  for  a  long  time.  Once  again,  the  tragedy  of  the  case  is  that  both  management  styles  do  complement  each  other  and  are  therefore  rarely  combined  in  one  single  person  (well-­‐known  exceptions  such  as  Steve  Jobs  left  aside).  Furthermore,  competencies  cannot  be  simply  switched  on  or  off  as  needed,  both  styles  have  to  be  able  to  live  and  work  under  one  single  roof.  And  this  goes  a  bit  further  than  tolerating.    

However,  not  just  the  quality  of  the  management  decides  how  the  organization  is  able  to  cope  with  these  developments.  For  surviving  as  an  organization  it  is  necessary  to  better  understand  which  forces  are  important  and  which  are  leading  to  the  characterized  developments.  Next,  one  needs  to  draw  one’s  conclusions.  The  set  up  of  Management  Development  programmes  for  example,  could  play  a  part  in  making  the  management  also  understand  the  right  hand  side  of  the  model,  meaning  that  initiatives  can  be  developed  in  time  and  one  is  prepared  to  pay  the  required  price  for  this.  To  this  purpose,  one  needs  to  test  strategic  choices  bottom-­‐up,  allow  redundancy  as  well  as  building  in  financial  space  for  absorbing  shocks.  However,  finding  a  balance  between  these  two,  in  themselves  conflicting  approaches,  is  no  trivial  matter.    

Making  sure  that  none  of  the  divisions  is  that  large  it  can  get  the  entire  company  into  difficulties  should  it  fail,  is  also  an  option  that  has  to  be  seriously  considered.  This  also  applies  to  the  dependency  of  just  a  few  customers,  suppliers  or  products/services,  etc.  Simple  consideration  if  the  cycle  does  is  not  sufficient  for  this  comprehension.  In  the  next  paragraph,  we  will  therefore  further  discuss  the  adaptive  cycle  from  a  hierarchic  dimension.  

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HIERARCHICAL  THINKING  IN  THE  ADAPTIVE  CYCLE  

To  keep  things  simple  in  the  development  as  described  above,  we  took  our  departure  from  a  singular  cycle.  However,  the  forces  involved  do  express  themselves  at  different  levels  within  the  organization  but  possibly  also  across  the  borders  of  the  organization.  After  all,  organizations  are  part  of  chains  of  networks  of,  in  many  cases,  inseparable  components.  The  distinction  between  ‘within  the  organization’  and  ‘the  organization  functioning  within  its  environment’  is  in  a  sense  an  artificial  one.  Subject  to  the  level  of  consideration,  one  may  observe  that  organizations  themselves  also  consist  of  chains  of  networks  or  organization  parts  or  of  mutually  dependent  processes.    The  various  components  respond  to  each  other  and  influence  each  other  in  their  individual  behaviour.  This  view  of  the  organization  fits  in  with  that  of  the  complex  adaptive  systems.  It  describes  organizations  as  patchwork  quilts  consisting  of  individual  parts  that  each    function  independently  but  that  also  do  mutually  influence  each  other  (Kauffman  1995).  In  many  case,  this  influence  is  not  of  equal  value.  The  flexibility  of  the  smaller  parts  often  provides  opportunities  for  responding  faster  to  developments,  which  may  have  an  initiating  influence  on  the  other  parts  of  the  organization.  Along  those  lines  of  reasoning,  the  larger  and  slower  parts  within  the  organization  -­‐  or  the  network  of  organizations  –  may  in  fact  fulfil  a  stabilizing  (or  even  restraining  )  role.    

Holling  et  al.  (2002b)  refer  to  this  distinction  with  the  terms  revolt  and  remember.    By  revolt,  they  mean  the  effect  of  small  fast  organizations  or  –part  thereof  –  initiating  developments  in  larger  and  slower  organizations  –  or  parts  thereof,  because  they  go  through  many  different  adaptive  cycles  at  great  speed.  Revolt  is  a  progressive  force.  The  degree  to  which  the  initiations  of  changes  are  responded  to  at  this  larger  level,  determines  the  ability  of  the  organization  for  finding  new  equilibriums.  By  means  of  the  revolt  influences,  it  is  possible  to  initiate  a  release  phase,  the  phase  in  which  the  system  moves  from  equilibrium  to  crisis.  The  revolt  force  is  also  the  basis  for  the  creative  ability  that  the  organization  uses  to  build  up  the  new  competencies  for  taking  a  new  route  via  for  example,  pilots  and  the  development  of  scenarios:  the  reorganization  movement  from  crisis  to  new  combinations.    

As  opposed  to  this  are  the  larger  and  slower  forces  within  the  organization.  These  are  formed  by  the  organizational  memory  (remember)  and  are  expressed  in  the  critical  consideration  of  the  necessity  for  the  changes.  The  comparative  assessment  needed  for  this  can  never  be  made  from  a  revolt.  After  all,  in  that  case  there  is  a  danger  that  the  revolt  enthusiasm  will  result  in  organizational  risks  that  prove  too  large.  Remember  is  a  conservative  force  that  originates  from  the  status  quo  of  the  organization  that  does  however  enable  revolt,  for  example  financially.  In  the  adaptive  cycle,  this  resistance  is  mainly  expressed  when  choices  have  to  be  made.    In  this  case,  it  concerns  the  exploitation  phase,  from  new  combinations  to  business.  In  this  phase,  there  is  focus  formation,  initiatives  are  rejected,  people  are  seriously  disappointed,  and  so  on.  It  is  obvious  that  all  sorts  of  counterforces  will  be  deployed  for  making  sure  that  one  doesn’t  choose  for  the  new  too  soon.  In  that  case,  a  certain  tendency  towards  carrying  on  in  the  same  old  way  is  certainly  not  an  unhealthy  option  but  at  the  same  time,  this  holds  the  risk  of  the  organization  relapsing  into  the  existing  order.  ‘Remember’  should  ultimately  be  convinced  of  the  need  to  change.  And  they  usually  do  not  do  this  until  the  crisis  is  imminent.    

In  the  second  main  movement  as  described  above,    the  part  of  the  development  where  the  organization  in  a  situation  of  wild  uncertainties  starts  looking  for  new  certainty  and  stability,  ‘remember’  may  compel  the  necessary  consideration  for  deciding  whether  the  changes  could  indeed  achieve  the  desired  goal.  The  result  of  this  consideration  can  be  twofold.  One  may  decide  to  resolve  the  crisis  through  incremental  improvements,  in  the  model  you  continue  to  think  from  insights  from  the  past  (the  left  hand  side  of  the  model),  or  one  may  choose  to  go  for  a  paradigm  change,  which  leads  to  a  new  business  model  (based  on  new  and  from  revolt  derived  insights,  on  the  right  side  of  the  model  therefore),  after  which  the  management  is  given  the  task  to  further  organize  the  change.  When  a  paradigm  change  becomes  topical,  the  route  via  the  right  in  the  adaptive  cycle,  then  a  new  choice  is  made  via  exploitation  and  next,  this  will  have  to  find  stability  in  the  conservation  phase,  the  existing  organization,  where  remember  is  the  prevailing  approach,  can  make  the  resources  

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available  and  this  way  enforce  that  the  changes  will  not  proceed  too  enthusiastically.  The  combined  action  of  these  two  forces  will  lead  to  the  organization  working  on  finding  a  balance  in  a  natural  way,  a  balance  between  pride  of  the  existing  and  curiosity  about  the  new.    The  successful  course  of  the  entire  adaptive  cycle  is  mainly  expressed  in  the  degree  to  which  the  new  status  of  certainty  and  equilibrium  is  achieved.    

In  professional  literature,  the  ability  for  finding  a  new  equilibrium  is  often  denoted  by  the  term  resilience  (Folke  et  al.  2002;  Gunderson  et  al.  2002;  Holling  et  al.  2002a;  Walker  et  al.  2006a;  Walker  et  al.  2006b).  In  line  with  the  difference  in  results  of  the  adaptive  cycle  as  described  above,  the  term  resilience  is  defined  in  two  ways.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  referred  to  as  the  ability  of  a  system  for  remaining  in  balance.  Holling  (1996)  refers  to  this  form  as  engineering  resilience.  In  other  words,  this  involves  the  optimum  functioning  from  the  left  hand  side  of  the  model.  In  this  instance,  engineering  resilience  refers  to  the  ability  to  realize  new  equilibriums  from  the  existing.  Engineering  resilience  is  usually  pursued  from  the  remember  force,  as  discussed  above.  Departing  from  pride  of  the  past,  one  embroiders  on  the  force  that  is  present  in  the  organization.  In  the  literature,  this  form  of  resilience  is  also  often  referred  to  in  connection  with  the  term  elasticity  (Holling  1996):  the  ability  to  go  with  the  flow  without  the  need  for  essential  changes.  In  this  respect,  one  departs  from  the  existing  reality  and  incremental  improvements.  This  is  the  area  where  the  above  mentioned  bureaucratic  hierarchy  is  topical.  However,  tunnel  thinking  lies  in  wait.    

Holling  distinguishes  this  form  of  resilience  and  refers  to  it  as  ecological  resilience.  With  this  form  of  resilience,  the  starting  point  is  in  fact  a  far  from  stable  situation.  The  organization  receives  its  boost  from  the  right  hand  side  of  the  model.  The  previously  discussed  revolt  force  plays  a  crucial  and  initiating  role  in  finding  new  paradigms.    The  instability  within  and  outside  the  organization  may  oblige  the  showing  of  new  behaviour.  In  this  case,  ecological  resilience  refers  to  the  ability  of  the  system  for  finding  a  new  equilibrium  in  a  radically  changed  environment.  In  this  respect,  the  volume  of  the  disruption  which  the  system  is  able  to  cope  with  without  failing  is  important.  This  also  denotes  the  capacity  of  the  system  for  dealing  with  failing  management.  Because  we  focus  on  complex  adaptive  systems,  important  key  concepts  are:    order  (including  the  lack  of  order:  chaos),  complexity,  self-­‐organizing  ability  and  (ecological)  resilience.  These  concepts  are  also  the  key  concepts  when  talking  about  the  functioning  of  the  organization  on  the  right  hand  side  of  the  model.  

It  is  right  to  observe  in  this  place  that  anything  we  argue  with  regard  to  organizations,  will  also  apply  to  entire  industries,  business  sectors,  countries,  nations,  federations,  churches,  etc.  Especially  when  political  choices  have  to  be  made  democratically  and  the  chosen  administration  have  about  4  years  in  office.  The  larger  the  association,  the  stronger  the  conservative  forces  and  convictions  that  ignore  the  necessary  changes  when  instability  threatens.  And  the  stronger  these  forces  are,  the  larger  the  chance  that  remember  is  dominant,  which  will  ultimately  disrupt  the  equilibrium  of  the  organization  such  that  things  will  just  have  to  run  their  course  and  the  price  has  to  be  paid.  

Therefore,  the  introduction  of  the  hierarchic  component  in  the  consideration  also  introduces  potential  risks.  In  the  next  paragraph,  we  will  further  discuss  this.  

RISKS  AND  VULNERABILITIES    The  mutual  influence  between  various  parts  of  the  organization  is  not  without  its  risks.  In  this  respect,  Holling  points  at  the  threat  of  two  pitfalls,  the  poverty  and  the  rigidity  trap.  These  risks  are  directly  linked  with  the  various  revolt  and  remember  forces  and  therefore  also  to  the  two  resilience  types  as  described  above.  

When  insufficient  innovations  are  initiated,  meaning  that  the  revolt  force  does  not  reach  its  full  growth,  the  organization  runs  the  risk  of  not  finding  a  way  out  off  an  occurring  crisis.  In  that  case,  the  organization  also  runs  the  risk  of  losing  its  influence  on  the  development.  However,  the  revolt  force  is  not  just  important  for  initiating  the  reaction  to  a  crisis.  Proactive  initiation  of  a  (mini)  crisis  from  the  revolt  boosts  the  development  of  the  organization  and  could  soften  the  effects  of  possible  large(r)  crises.  Innovation  that  does  not  remain  limited  to  the  borders  of  the  organization  and  applied  research,  scenarios  that  have  the  unthought-­‐of  for  a  

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subject,  are  examples  of  ways  of  thinking  and  activities  that  are  part  of  revolt  thinking.  After  all,  if  the  crisis  is  initiated  from  the  outside  and  if  it  catches  the  organization  unprepared,  the  risks  for  the  organization  are  much  larger  and  the  costs  will  be  too  high.  In  that  case,  the  organization  will  put  its  resources  towards  maintenance  of  the  old  equilibrium  for  too  long.    This  lack  of  sufficient  revolt  forces,  which  is  expressed  in  not  having  physical  and  intellectual  resources  available  is  referred  to  as  the  poverty  trap  by  Holling  et  al.  (Holling  2001)  .  

The  organization  runs  a  different  risk  when  the  remember  force  is  that  large  that  every  (including  the  necessary)  innovation  is  nipped  in  the  bud.  In  that  case,  the  second  development  from  the  new  combinations  back  to  business  and  a  new  certainty  will  not  be  achieved.  Holling  refers  to  this  risk  with  the  term  rigidity  trap.  This  situation  may  occur  purely  from  resistance  within  the  organization.  In  that  case,  remember  is  too  strong,  which  leads  to  rigidity.  This  has  a  paralyzing  effect  on  the  organization.  This  may  be  the  organization’s  downfall.  However,  the  chance  of  taking  the  edge  of  innovations  from  remember  successfully  does  also  depend  on  how  powerfully  the  first  development  has  manifested  itself  in  the  organization.  If  the  initial  impetuses  for  innovations  are  strong  and  inevitable,  if  reality  can  be  no  longer  denied,  the  chance  of  conquering  the  resistance  will  become  proportionally  larger.  This  also  expresses  everything  we  said  previously  about  finding  a  balance  between  pride  of  the  past  and  curiosity  about  the  future  in  a  different  way.  

THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  EQUILIBRIUM  

By  pointing  out  in  the  previous  paragraph  that  as  far  as  the  organization  is  concerned,  the  issue  boils  down  to  finding  a  balance  between  pride  and  curiosity,  it  becomes  immediately  clear  that  the  differences  that  form  the  basis  for  this  confrontation  do  hamper  an  easy  solution.  In  the  previous  paragraph,  we  already  observed  that  a  clear  discrepancy  may  occur  between  the  wish  to  innovate  the  organization  and  the  wish  aimed  at  consolidation  of  the  existing.  However,  this  discrepancy  can  also  be  expressed  in  other  dilemmas.  In  the  last  few  years,  thinking  around  the  notion  of  Ambidexterity  was  relevant.  2009  saw  the  publication  of  a  special  about  these  discrepancies  in  Organization  Science  (see  for  example  the  special  issue  of  Organization  Science  2009.  See  e.g.  Organizational  ambidexterity  Raisch  et  al.).  Many  of  these  discrepancies  are  also  illustrated  in  the  model  as  shown  here.  In  Organization  Science,  the  following  tensions  are  distinguished  amongst  others:  

• differentiation  versus  integration  this  refers  to  the  degree  to  which  exploitation  of  the  existing  and  exploration  of  the  new  have  to  be  considered  next  to  each  other  or  integrated.  In  the  model  used  in  this  article,  exploitation  is  mainly  expressed  on  the  left  hand  side,  whilst  exploration  is  a  main  feature  of  the  right  hand  side.  However,  along  the  line  of  thinking  that  we  used  around  revolt  and  remember,  which  we  used  for  introducing  a  hierarchy  to  the  model  in  imitation  of  Holling  et  al.,  we  explained  that  both  concepts  should  find  a  place  side  by  side  in  an  organization.  This  produces  tension.  This  tension  is  expressed  in  management  style,  process,  culture,  type  of  people  etc.  This  tension  is  the  basis  for  variety,  innovation  and  adjustment.  In  this  respect,  we  have  also  pointed  at  the  risks  of  imbalance  that  may  express  itself  in  the  poverty  and  the  rigidity  trap,  

• individual  versus  organizational  elaborating  on  the  previous  antithesis,  the  literature  suggests  that  a  solution  for  ambidexterity  should  be  mainly  sought  at  a  lower  organizational  level.  The  tension  could  be  resolved  by  setting  up  two  sub  divisions,  which  should  each  get  to  work  with  a  different  focus.  This  way,  the  antithesis  could  be  resolved  along  structural  lines.  Whether  this  also  resolves  the  discrepancy  between  an  individual  orientation  and  an  organizational  one,  does  remain  the  question.  Raisch  et.al.  (2009)  observe  that  relatively  little  research  has  been  done  in  this  specific  field.  We  observe  structural  differences,  minimally  between  left  and  right  in  the  model,  but  that  managers  should  be  able  to  cope  with  the  discrepancies  at  an  individual  level,  as  with  opposite  goals,  with  paradoxal  thinking  and  with  the  

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discrepancies  as  a  result  of  short  term  and  long  term  orientation.  The  demands  differences  in  strategy,  management  style  and  culture,  which  are  both  required  for  being  able  to  survive  as  an  organization.  The  organization  has  to  learn  to  live  with  this.  In  practice,  it  turns  out  that  the  chance  of  an  individual  manager  being  able  to  cope  with  this  is  a  slim  one.  In  line  with  Holling  (Holling  2001),  the  discrepancies  are  mainly  expressed  along  the  lines  of  the  hierarchy,  meaning  that  in  general,  revolt  is  expressed  in  the  small  and  fast  parts  of  the  organization  and  remember  particularly  in  the  large,  slow  moving  ones,  which  are  usually  higher  up  in  the  hierarchy.  With  regard  to  this,  it  is  noted  that  a  setting  in  which  managers  are  given  the  power  of  decision  (with  a  natural  urge  to  pay  more  attention  to  exploitation),  the  necessity  for  developing  more  in  the  field  of  exploration  at  a  personal  level  (via  making  sense  and  cognitive  processes)  does  become  more  succinct  (Raisch  et  al.  2009).  

• Static  versus  dynamic  In  line  with  the  reasoning  that  we  used,  various  researchers  have  argued  that  organizations  should  go  through  a  sequential  alternation  of  exploitation  and  exploration  (Brown  et  al.  1998;  Nickerson  et  al.  2002;  Siggelkow  et  al.  2003)  but  more  frequently  it  is  presumed  that  exploitation  and  exploration  should  be  practised  side  by  side.  With  this,  the  attention  is  mainly  shifted  from  a  (comparatively)  static  to  a  dynamic  orientation.  Managing  the  organization  from  a  continuous  tension  between  exploitation  and  exploration  emphasizes  the  more  dynamic  character  of  this  management  issue.  In  this  article,  we  have  attempted  to  interpret  this  antithesis  mainly  along  the  lines  of  hierarchy,  management  style  and  culture.    

• Internal  versus  external  in  conclusion,  we  would  like  to  point  at  the  contrast  that  is  distinguished  between  internal  and  external.  Professional  literature  often  refers  to  the  need  for  feeding  internal  exploration  from  external  knowledge.  This  could  strengthen  the  reconfiguration  of  knowledge  bases  (zie  o.a.  Kogut  et  al.  1992).  In  this  essay,  we  make  a  distinction  between  external  developments  as    crisis  initiators,  crises  sooner  ‘happen’  to  organizations  through  external  developments  than  through  internal  ones,  and  the  internal  ability  to  deal  with  dynamic  threats.  In  the  latter,  there  is  much  more  emphasis  on  the  internal  ability  for  initiating  innovations.  Using  external  influences  in  this  is  a  matter  of  course.    

The  organization  needs  to  find  a  path  along  all  the  discrepancies  as  distinguished  here,  in  search  of  an  equilibrium  but  without  denying  these  discrepancies.  Both  sides  are  present  and  a  requirement  for  the  development  of  the  organization.  The  cycle  as  described  in  this  essay  explains  that  these  differences  are  necessary  and  also  that  these  cohere.  In  this  respect,  dealing  well  with  the  occurring  dynamics  forms  the  basis  for  the  success  of  the  organization.  

IN  CONCLUSION  –  THE  DYNAMICS  OF  CHANGE  AND  THE  ROLE  OF  CURIOSITY  

The  description  of  the  quadrants  starts  from  situations,  from  states  of  mind,  from  the  management’s  attitudes  and  culture  characteristics  that  necessitate  a  certain  behaviour.    As  indicated,  these  differ  strongly.    

At  the  end  of  this  essay,  it  is  of  vital  importance  to  emphasize  that  the  cycle  as  outlined  is  not  absolute  in  character,  nor  does  it  run  its  course  within  a  fixed  time  frame.  The  distinction  between  two  main  movements,  as  well  as  consideration  along  the  lines  of  revolt  and  remember,  explain  that  finding  the  mentioned  equilibrium  between  pride  of  the  past  and  curiosity  about  the  future  boils  down  to  finding  a  balance  between  striving  to  maintain  the  status  quo  from  the  strength  of  the  organization  and  the  wish/desire  to  focus  on  finding  new  equilibriums  (in  the  previous  paragraph,  we  have  therefore  linked  this  approach  expressly  to  the  recently  spotlighted  notion  of  ambidexterity).    In  this  last  case,  innovative  action  takes  central  stage.  First  order  learning  and  second  order  learning  describe  the  difference  very  well.    

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As  we  observed  at  the  start  of  our  reasoning,  key  to  our  approach  is  that  organizations  have  to  be  assertive  enough  to  face  developments,  need  resilience  for  enabling  new  solutions  that  are  supplied  and  developed  from  curiosity.    

This  starting  point  works  out  entirely  different  in  the  two  distinguished  main  areas  within  the  model  if  the  organization  wishes  to  be  able  to  respond  to  the  developments  sturdily.  With  regard  to  this,  a  main  role  is  reserved  for  the  notion  of  curiosity,  albeit  in  different  ways.  Thinking  from  the  left  hand  side  of  the  model,  curiosity  is  aimed  at  maintaining  the  equilibrium  and  finding  new  ways  of  maintaining  and  possibly  anchoring  this  equilibrium.  The  result  of  this  curiosity  will  be  often  reactive  in  nature  and  of  a  conservative  character.  This  also  immediately  brings  forth  that  the  result  bears  many  risks  through  the  limited  number  of  varieties  that  are  considered  from  the  organization’s  history.  After  all,  as  we  have  seen,  tunnel  thinking  is  a  lurking  risk.  

Thinking  from  the  right  hand  side  of  the  model,  curiosity  acts  as  an  initiator,  from  which  one  searches  for  a  different  view  of  the  future,  inspiration  and  innovation  that  have  to  be  the  driving  forces  behind  the  innovation  within  the  organization.  The  result  will  often  be  proactive  and  innovative  in  character.  Fantasizing,  losing  sight  of  reality  and  matching  too  far  ahead  of  the  band  are  obvious  risks  here.    

There  is  a  price  to  be  paid  for  these  two  different  forms  of  curiosity  via  searching  and  experimenting,  including  the  matching  failures,  and  only  by  paying  this  price  is  the  organization  able  to  act  robustly,  this  being  a  combination  of  assertiveness,  resilience  and  curiosity.  The  management  style  that  links  these  two  forms  of  curiosity  is  aimed  at  insight,  vision,  the  forming  of  coalitions,  and  enterprising  attitude  and  a  focus  on  results,  in  other  words  the  ‘enterprising  politician’.    This  way,  two  forms  of  curiosity  are  able  to  flourish  side  by  side.  

The  critical  success  factor  in  this  is,  as  we  argued  in  various  places,  management.  This  makes  all  the  difference  with  regard  to  set  up,  people  and  culture.  Finding  a  balance  between  left  and  right  in  the  model  that  we  used  should  ensure  that  risks  do  not  get  out  of  hand.  However,  the  chance  of  an  individual  manager  having  both  types  of  competencies  is  a  small  one.  In  practice,  ambidexterity  is  relatively  rare.    Usually,  the  differences  are  too  large  for  this  to  happen.  Solutions  are  therefore  often  sought  in  teamwork.  Teams  that  are  able  to  cope  with  the  multitude  of  varieties.    

This  is  expected  to  lead  to  a  powerful  organization,  which  is  prepared  for  its  future.  And  should  the  unexpected  happen  after  all,  the  organization  will  have  a  better  chance  of  survival.  

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