14-05-2015 | 1 cooperation and retaliation in public good ... · 14-05-2015 | cooperation and...
TRANSCRIPT
| 14-05-2015
Cooperation and retaliation in public good games
Does counter-punishment really destroy cooperation? Dieko Bakker (presenting) Jacob Dijkstra Andreas Flache
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| Dieko Bakker / University of Groningen / ICS 14-05-2015
Enforcing cooperation
› Punishment and rewards in collective action (e.g. Fehr & Gächter 2002)
› Free riders get punished – contributions
increase
› But what about counter-punishment? (e.g. Nikiforakis 2008)
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| Dieko Bakker / University of Groningen / ICS 14-05-2015
Counter-punishment in PGGs 3
Contributions Punishment Counter-punishment
Source: Nikiforakis (2008)
| Dieko Bakker / University of Groningen / ICS 14-05-2015
Why does this happen? 4
Counter-punishment
Less punishment
Lower contributions
| Dieko Bakker / University of Groningen / ICS 14-05-2015
This presentation
› Counter-punishment happens
› Counter-punishment deters punishment… but it mainly deters antisocial punishment
› Counter-punishment has no impact on
contribution levels
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| Dieko Bakker / University of Groningen / ICS 14-05-2015
Conditions for counter-punishment
› Design features facilitating counter-punishment Anonymous and consequence-free Highly salient
› Introducing future consequences (e.g. Flache & Macy 1996; Flache 2002; Flache & Bakker 2012;
Nikiforakis & Engelmann 2011; Denant-Boemont et al 2007)
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| Dieko Bakker / University of Groningen / ICS 14-05-2015
Four treatments
› Punishment (Fehr & Gächter 2000)
› .. plus Counter-Punishment
(Nikiforakis 2008)
› … plus Non-Anonymous
› … plus Reminder
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| Dieko Bakker / University of Groningen / ICS 14-05-2015
Expectations 8
Punishment
Counter-Punishment
Non-Anonymous
Reminder
Level of Counter-Punishment
Level of Punishment
Level of Contributions
| Dieko Bakker / University of Groningen / ICS 14-05-2015
Data
› 88 participants across 7 sessions
› 2 to 4 treatmens played per session › Order of treatments varied
› 2200 Contribution decisions › 6600 Punishment decisions › 389 Counter-punishment decisions
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| Dieko Bakker / University of Groningen / ICS 14-05-2015
Analysis highlights
› Multilevel models Hurdle models for punishment and counter-
punishment
› Decisions nested in individuals and in groups
› Always controlling for time and for order of treatments Punishment: also controlling for contribution
target vs group / target vs self Counter-punishment: same, and controlling
for severity of received punishment
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| Dieko Bakker / University of Groningen / ICS 14-05-2015
52% 48%
Of anti-social punishments
35%
65%
Of all punishments
Counter-punishment frequent 11
Counter-punishment
Less punishment
Lower contributions
| Dieko Bakker / University of Groningen / ICS 14-05-2015
Counter-punishment frequent 12
Counter-punishment
Less punishment
Lower contributions
… in all treatments
| Dieko Bakker / University of Groningen / ICS 14-05-2015
Punishment deterred 13
Counter-punishment
Less punishment
Lower contributions
| Dieko Bakker / University of Groningen / ICS 14-05-2015
Contributions unaffected 14
Counter-punishment
Less punishment
Lower contributions
| Dieko Bakker / University of Groningen / ICS 14-05-2015
Why do contributions not deteriorate?
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| Dieko Bakker / University of Groningen / ICS 14-05-2015
Prosocial punishment deterred…
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Proscocial punishment opportunities taken
| Dieko Bakker / University of Groningen / ICS 14-05-2015
... antisocial deterred more
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Antiscocial punishment opportunities taken
| Dieko Bakker / University of Groningen / ICS 14-05-2015
Changing balance
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Percentage of punishment which is antisocial
| Dieko Bakker / University of Groningen / ICS 14-05-2015
Conclusions
› Counter-punishment behavior is robust to variations in potential future consequences
› (The threat of) counter-punishment deters punishment
› But antisocial punishment is deterred more than prosocial punishment
› And contributions do not necessarily deteriorate
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| 14-05-2015
Thank you for your attention
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Dieko Bakker
Co-authored by Jacob Dijkstra & Andreas Flache
| Dieko Bakker / University of Groningen / ICS 14-05-2015
Related references
› Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter. 2002. “Altruistic Punishment in Humans.” Nature 415(6868):137–40.
› Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter. 2000. “Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3):159–82.
› Nikiforakis, Nikos. 2008. “Punishment and Counter- Punishment in Public Good Games: Can We Really Govern Ourselves?” Journal of Public Economics 92(1):91–112.
› Nikiforakis, Nikos, and Dirk Engelmann. 2011. “Altruistic Punishment and the Threat of Feuds.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 78(3):319–32.
› Denant-Boemont, Laurent, David Masclet, and Charles N. Noussair. 2007. “Punishment, Counterpunishment and Sanction Enforcement in a Social Dilemma Experiment.” Economic Theory 33(1):145–67.
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