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(DIGESTED CASES)

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

1. SANTIAGO V. BAUTISTA

FACTS: Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a graduating student at Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. Prior to the end of the school year, the said school constituted a “Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor†composed of teachers of the said school �for the purpose of selecting the “honor students†of its �graduating class. The above-named committee deliberated and adjudged Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as the third honor, the first and second place being obtained by his two other classmates, Socoro Medina and Patricia Liñgat. Three days before the date of graduation, the “third placer†Teodoro Santiago, Jr., �represented by his mother and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the “ranking of honor students†by �instituting an action for certiorari, injunction and damages in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato against the above-named committee members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place. The complaint alleges grave abuse of discretions and irregularities in the selection of honor students in the said school such as the following: (a)the placing of Patricia Liñgat in the second place instead of him when in fact he had been a consistent honor student and the former had never been his close rival before except in Grade V wherein she ranked third; (b)the tutorial given by their teacher in English to the first honor during summer vacation; (c)the illegal constitution of the said committee as the same was composed of all the Grade VI

teachers only, in violation of the Service Manual for Teachers of the Bureau of Public Schools which provides that the committee to select the honor students should be composed of all teachers in Grades V and VI; (d)the changing of the final ratings on their grading sheets; (e) that petitioner personally appealed the matter to the School Principal, to the District Supervisor, and to the Academic Supervisor, but said officials “passed the buck to each other†to delay his grievances, and as to appeal to higher �authorities will be too late, there is no other speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances. Respondents moved for the dismissal of the case on the grounds (1) that the action for certiorari was improper, and (2) that even assuming the propriety of the action, the question brought before the court had already become academic. The motion to dismiss was granted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action for certiorari filed by petitioner is proper.

RULING: The action for certiorari is not proper. Certiorari is a special civil action instituted against any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions (Section 1, Rule 67). A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court (34 C.J. 1182). In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights and obligations. It is evident that the so called committee on the rating of students for honor whose actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi-judicial functions in the performance of its assigned task. Before tribunal, board or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it must be clothed with power and authority to determine what the law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. In the instant case, there is nothing on record about any rule of law which provides that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions.

2. DAZA V. SINGSONTribunal and its Composition

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement.

ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments.

HELD: As provided in the constitution, “there should be a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by each

House respectively on the basis of proportional representation” of the political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT the court.

3. MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS V. CA

FACTS:MSI entered into an ³Interim Lease Agreement´ with DBP in August 26, 1986 regarding the Bay view Hotel Properties for a minimum term of 3 months until the properties are sold by DBP. In December 1986 Proclamation 50 ordered disposition/privatization of some Government properties including the Bay view Hotel, the disposition of which is transferred from DBP to Asset Privatization Trust (APT). MSI was latter notified that the lease will be terminated to effect the disposition. MSI sent a letter notifying APT that the Property will be available after 30 days from September 18, 1987.October 7, 1987, APT sent a letter to MSI that they are given another 30 days from October 18, 1987 to wind up the affairs for a smooth transition. However, on October 22, 1987, MSI sent a letter to APT stating that in their opinion, having leased the property for more than 1 year the agreement is long term in character and MSI have acquired preference in buying the property, while emphasizing that MSI has a legal lien on the property because of its advances for the hotel operations and repairs which amounted to P12 Million. APT answered MSI saying that there was no agreement to that effect. The bidding took place on November 4, 1987, but MSI did not participate. Makati-Agro Trading and La Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation were awarded the property as the highest bidder for P85 Million. November 22, 1987 MSI filed a complaint with injunction on awarding and transfer of the property to the winning bidders. Trial court granted, but the CA reversed the trial court.

ISSUE:Whether MSI as lessee has a right to retain the property pending reimbursement of its expenses?

HELD:No, MSI as lessee has no right to retain the property pending reimbursement. MSI being a lessee know that the possession of the property was temporary thereby introducing improvements and repairs by its own risk. MSI cannot be considered a builder in good faith for that matter because he never possessed or occupied the said property as owner. While MSI¶s right to be reimbursed cannot be denied, it does not have any right of retention.

The lease agreement also does not give any preferential right to purchase the property in question, unless it was clearly stipulated. In this case, no such stipulation was made and MSIs unjustified failure to bid in the public bidding for the Hotel may only be attributed or blamed to MSI.

4. MALAGA V. PENACHAOS

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the

publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.

On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the bidding had been awarded and closed.

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject law.

ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818?

RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:

Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes

the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818.

There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law. Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).

5. PACU V. SECRETARY OF EDUCATIONPolitical Law – Civic Efficiency

The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: A.) They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; B.) They deprive parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and C.) Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Petitioners complain that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of Education. Petitioners reason out, “this section leaves everything to the uncontrolled discretion of the Secretary of Education or his department. The Secretary of Education is given the power to fix the standard. In plain language, the statute turns over to the Secretary of Education the exclusive authority of the legislature to formulate standard . . .” Also, the textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or authorized by the government shall be submitted to the Board (Board of Textbooks) which shall have the power to prohibit the use of any of said textbooks which it may find to be against the law or to offend the dignity and honor of the government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against the general policies of the government, or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable.

HELD: Petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered with their operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for them to assail neither the validity of the power nor the exercise of the power by the Secretary of Education. No

justiciable controversy has been presented to us. We are not informed that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights for so refusing.

6. MARIANO V. COMELEC

FACTS:Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (“An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”). Another petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen.

ISSUES: Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds with technical descriptions

Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new city’s acquisition of a new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by the Constitution

Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be made by a special law

HELD/RULING:

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.

Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself.

Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide.

Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.

Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law.

7. MACASIANO V. NHA

R E S O L U T I O N

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. He predicates his locust standi on his being a consultant of the Department of

Public Works and Highways (DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain (executed immediately after his retirement on 2 January 1992 from the Philippine National Police) and his being a taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges that said Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures"; because of the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past." 1 As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully disbursed." 2

Republic Act No. 7279 was approved on 24 March 1992 and published in the 4 May 1992 issue of the Official Gazette. 3 The challenged provisions therein read as follows:

SEC. 28. Eviction and Demolition. — Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations:

(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorlines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds;

(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented; or

(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.

In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, the following shall be mandatory:

(1) Notice upon the affected persons or entities at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of eviction or demolition;

(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of resettlement with the duly designated representatives of the families to be resettled and the affected communities in the areas where they are to be relocated;

(3) Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction or demolition;

(4) Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;

(5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from Mondays to Fridays and during good weather, unless the affected families consent otherwise;

(6) no use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and of concrete materials;

(7) Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police who shall occupy the first line of law enforcement and observe proper disturbance control procedures; and

(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however, That in cases of eviction and demolition pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, relocations shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned and the National Housing Authority with the assistance of other government agencies within forty-five(45) days from service of notice of final judgment by the court, after which period the said order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be possible within the said period financial assistance in the amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be extended to the affected families by the local government concerned.

The Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council shall jointly promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the above provision.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 44. Moratorium on Eviction and Demolition. — There shall be a moratorium on the eviction of all program beneficiaries and on the demolition of their houses or dwelling units for a period of three (3) years from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the moratorium shall not apply to those persons who have constructed their structures after the effectivity of this Act and for cases enumerated in Section 28 hereof.

Petitioner maintains that the said provisions are unconstitutional because:

(a) They deprive the government, and more so, private property owners of their property without due process of law and without compensation;

(b) They reward, instead of punish, what this Honorable Court has categorically declared as unlawful acts;

(c) They violate the prohibition against legislation that" takes away one's property to be given to plain interlopers;

(d) They sweep overbroadly over legitimate concerns of the police power of the State; and

(e) They encroach upon the judicial power to its valid judgments and orders. 4

On 10 December 1992, we required the respondents to comment on the petition.

In its Comment 5 filed on 15 January 1993, respondent National Mapping and Resource Information Authority alleges that the implementation of the assailed sections of the Act does not belong to or fall within its jurisdiction. It disagrees with the petitioner's stand that the said sections are unconstitutional and avers that Section 28 merely provides for the "humanitarian approach" towards less privileged, citizens and does not in fact prohibit but merelydiscourages eviction or demolition, while Section 44 only covers program beneficiaries.

On 15 January 1993, the Realty Owners Association of the Philippines, Inc. filed a motion to intervene 6 alleging that it has a legal interest in the success of the petition and is in full accord with it. This Court required the parties to comment thereon.

On 16 February 1993, the Office of the Government Corporate (OGCC) filed a comment 7 for the respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) informing this Court that "in a letter of respondent NHA addressed to the office of the undersigned counsel, dated 29 January 1993, . . ., the former categorically expressed as its official stand on the instant petition that Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279 are indeed unconstitutional," and that "after a circumspect evaluation of petition. We find no cogent reason not to support the position heretofore taken by respondent NHA." Said office then prays that the instant petition be given due course.

On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He maintains that, the instant petition is devoid of merit for non-compliance with the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review in cases involving the constitutionality of a law. He contends that there is no actual case or controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that the petitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion, that the petitioner is not the proper party to question the Act as he does not state that he has property "being squatted upon" and that there is no showing that the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He argues that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionality infirm.

Up to this time, no comment has been submitted by the parties on the motion to intervene. Considering, however, that the issues are clear and simple enough, this Court dispenses with the need

for a comment on the said motion, denies the same and, after deliberating on the issues said and the arguments adduced by the parties in the petition and comments, declares this petition to be without merit.

It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that, question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be very lis mota presented. 8 To reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper property, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. 9 A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. 10

It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites are absent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he has been actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the challenged sections of the said Act. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants." 11

In reality, his petition is one for declaratory relief as he prays therein that, "his rights as well as those of private landowners be clearly defined and his duties under the Constitution and the pertinent laws be dearly stated with respect to the demolition of illegal structures on public and private lands." 12 Even so, it is still not viable since among the essential requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are controversy, (a) there must be a justiciable controversy,(b)the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse and (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy. 13 Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief does not fall within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved. 14True, we have said that such a petition may be treated as one for prohibition 15 or mandamus 16 if it has far reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved; but the exercise of such discretion presupposes, at the outset, that the petition is otherwise viable or meritorious.

The petitioner is not likewise a "proper party." As a consultant of the DPWH under the "Contract for Consultancy . . .," he is not vested with any authority to demolish obstructions and encroachments on properties of the public domain, much less on private lands. The consultancy contract limits his duties to the following: "(a) to organize and train selected DPWH personnel for the different Engineering Districts in the NCR in the techniques and methods of removing/demolishing illegal structures/stalls, etc. as well as in crowd control, self-defense and security procedures . . .; (b) to provide advice to the Secretary and other DPWH officials regarding prioritization of areas to be

cleared of obstructions and encroachments; (c) to conduct field inspection from time to time of areas recommend for clearing; (d) to provide advice in developing appropriate standards and techniques in cost effective implementation of the removal and demolition of obstructions and encroachments . . .; and (e) to develop operational procedures that will institutionalize demolitionprocesses." 17 Moreover, the consultancy contract expired on 31 December 1992 and the petitioner has not manifested that he obtained a renewal or extension thereof.

Nor does the petitioner claim that he is an owner of an urban property whose enjoyment and use would be affected by the challenged provisions of R.A. No. 7279.

Although the petitioner likewise anchors his locus standi on the fact that he is a taxpayer, it does not mean, however, that in each and every instance where such a ground is invoked, this Court is left with no alternative except to hear the parties. In Tan vs. Macapagal, 18 we clarified that "as far as a taxpayer's suit s concerned, this Court is not devoid of the discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained."

We do not, as well, find an indubitable ground for the constitutional challenge. As this Court said through Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz in Garcia vs. Executive Secretary. 19

On the merits, We find that the constitutional challenge must be rejected for failure to show that there is an indubitable ground for it, not to say even a necessity to resolve it. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.

We cannot end this resolution without a few words on the comment of the OGCC for public respondent National Housing Authority wherein the OGCC merely adopted the stand of the officer-in-charge of the Legal Department of the said Authority that the challenged sections of R.A. No. 7279 are unconstitutional. On its own, the OGCC did not even attempt to reason out why this petition should be granted or denied. It has obviously treated this case without the circumspection and seriousness expected of it especially in the light of the functions, duties and responsibilities of the NHA under the challenged Act. The OGCC should not have cursorily adopted the opinion of the officer-in-charge who acted on his own and who, apparently, did not even refer his opinion to the Board of Directors of the NHA.

Wherefore, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

8. JOYA V. PCGG

Facts: On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President Corazon C. Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc concerning the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two) Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. On 14 August 1990, then President Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New York to auction off the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. On 15 August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie's of New York. According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction the eighty-two Old Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as the silverware contained in seventy-one cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of the agreement.

On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit through then Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo submitted to President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the Consignment Agreement of 15 August 1990 to the effect that: the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality; the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance, hence, their disposal was prohibited by law.

After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issued immediately our resolution denying the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks on the ground that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and that proper parties had not been impleaded.

On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

Whether or not the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced in the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation".

Whether or not the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion on which can be disposed of through the joint concurrence of the President and Congress.

Whether or not PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other statutory requirements for the exportation and sale of the subject items.

Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic, and if so, whether the above Issue warrant resolution from this Court.

Held: This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party.

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. The ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit.

The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.

Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money.

Anent the second requisite of actual controversy, petitioners argue that this case should be resolved by this Court as an exception to the rule on moot and academic cases; that although the sale of the paintings and silver has long been consummated and the possibility of retrieving the treasure trove is nil, yet the novelty and importance of the Issue raised by the petition deserve this Court's attention. They submit that the resolution by the Court of the Issue in this case will establish future guiding principles and doctrines on the preservation of the nation's priceless artistic and cultural possessions for the benefit of the public as a whole.

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy — one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date — 11 January 1991 — which is long past, the Issue raised in the petition have become moot and academic.

The cultural properties of the nation which shall be under the protection of the state are classified as the "important cultural properties" and the "national cultural treasures." On the other hand, a "national cultural treasures" is a unique object found locally, possessing outstanding historical, cultural, artistic and/or scientific value which is highly significant and important to this country and nation. This Court takes note of the certification issued by the Director of the Museum that the Italian paintings and silverware subject of this petition do not constitute protected cultural properties and are not among those listed in the Cultural Properties Register of the National Museum.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED.

9. LEGASPI V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Facts:-Civil Service Commission denied Valentin Legaspi’s (petitioner) request for information on the civil service eligibilities of 2 people employed as sanitarians, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, in the Health Department in Cebu.-Petitioner claims that his right to information is guaranteed by the Constitution prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information.-the Solicitor General challenges the petitioner’s standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any legal right to be informed of the civil services eligibilities of the government employees concerned.-SolGen further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.

Issue:WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service eligibilities of the Health Department

employees.

Held:Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligible for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.

Ratio:The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring the present suit.In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee.

10. DUMALAO V. COMELECFacts: Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution which provides that “….Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.” He likewise alleges that the provision is directed

insidiously against him, and is based on “purely arbitrary grounds, therefore, class legislation.

Issue: Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 22 is valid.

Held: In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for

this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such denial.

The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the low and applies to all those belonging to the same class.

WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.

11. BUGNAY CONSTRUCTION V. LARON

Facts:1. A lease contract between the City of Dagupan and P & M Agro was executed for the use of a city lot called the Magsaysay Market Area. Subsequently, the City filed a case to rescind the contract due to the failure of P&M to comply with the lease contract conditions.

2. Thereafter, the City issued a resolution granting the lease of said lot to the petitioner Bugnay COnstruction for the establishment of a Magsaysay Market building. As a result, respondent Ravanzo filed a taxpayer's suit against the City assailing the validity of the lease contract between the petitioner and the city. Ravanzo was the counsel of P&M Agro in the earlier case.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is the real party in interest

Held:NO.

1. The Court held that the respondent has no standing to file the case. There was no disbursement of public funds involved in this case since it is the petitioner, a private party which will fund the planned construction of the market building.

12. KILOSBAYAN V. GUINGONA JR.

FACTS:Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and conduct “charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,” the PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, “a multinational company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia,” “became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO.” As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which “was intended to be the

medium through which the technical and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO.”Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. On 15 August 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to the PCSO. On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given the respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the country’s on-line lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be submitted not later than 8 November 1993 “for final clearance and approval by the Chief Executive.”On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its protest and the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that “only a court injunction can stop Malacañang,” and the imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition.Petitioner claims that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders. The rest of the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Tañada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Tañada and Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities as members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines. The public respondents, meanwhile allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit, citing the Court’s resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi2. Whether or the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign.” is legal and valid.

HELD:

We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.The language of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169 is indisputably clear. The PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease such franchise. Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.Undoubtedly, from the very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC mutually understood that any arrangement between them would necessarily leave to the PGMC the technical, operations, and management aspects of the on-line lottery system while the PSCO would, primarily, provide the franchise. The so-called Contract of Lease is not, therefore, what it purports to be. Woven therein are provisions which negate its title and betray the true intention of the parties to be in or to have a joint venture for a period of eight years in the operation and maintenance of the on-line lottery system.We thus declare that the challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to law. This conclusion renders unnecessary further discussion on the other issues raised by the petitioners.

13. PHILCONSA (PHILIPPINE CONSTRUCTION ASSOCIATION) V. ENRIQUEZ

FACTS:House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:

1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA.” And that “appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987.2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s),3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,” which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the “Specific Prohibition” which states that the said Modernization Fund “shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers”5. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds.7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi2. Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) are constitutional3. Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional.

HELD:Locus StandiWe rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]).Veto of the Provisions The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by

the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the “one-fund policy” (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Management’s Procurement Service).The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended — 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an “appropriate” provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item (Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]).The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “use of Fund” for the AFP modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the “congressional or legislative veto.” However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be amended.On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to

complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take “necessary and proper steps” to carry into execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]). These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.

14. TATAD V. GARCIA JR.

FACTS: DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along Edsa. EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., a foreign corporation was awarded the contract to build, lease and transfer the said light railway.

The said award was questioned by the petitioners on the basis that a foreign corporation cannot own the EDSA LRT III, a public utility as it violates the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not an owner and lessor of the facilities used by a public utility constitute a public utility?

HELD: EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd. Is admittedly a foreign corporation “duly incorporated and existing under the laws of Hong Kong”. However, there is no dispute that once the EDSA LRT III is constructed, the private respondent, as lessor, will turn it over to DOTC as lessee, for the latter to operate the system and pay rentals for the said use.

What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks, rail stations, terminals and the power plant, not a public utility. While a franchise is needed to operate these facilities to serve the public, they do not themselves constitute a public utility. What constitutes a public utility in not their ownership but their use to serve the public.

The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility. However, it does not require a franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a public utility so long as it does not operate them to serve the public. In law, there is a clear distinction between the “operation” of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities and the equipment used to serve the public.

15. OPOSA V. FACTORAN

FACTS: Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,

taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and, the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that, the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, the motion is dilatory and the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.

Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit.

Whether or not the TLA’s can be out rightly cancelled.

Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.

HELD: As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. The plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because

of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 and P.D. No. 1152 were issued. Thus, the right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of

Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

16. KILOSBYAN V. MORATO

FACTS: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract

ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

HELD: NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

17. LOZADA V. COMELECPolitical Law – Vacancy in the Legislature Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to hold an election to fill the vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution which provides: “In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.” COMELEC opposes the petition alleging, substantially, that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies in the legislature.

HELD: The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter’s decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads: “Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.” There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC.It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist, would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of

appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.

18. ATTY. LOZANO V. SPEAKER NOGRALES

FACTS: The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress.†Both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable� controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners alleged that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from the prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding the Senate of the Philippines from the complete process of proposing amendments to the Constitution and for lack of thorough debates and consultations.†�ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress committed a violation in promulgating the HR1109.HELD: No, the House that the Congress ought to convene into a Constituent Assembly and adopt some Rules for proposing changes to the charter. The House has said it would forward H.Res.1109 to the Senate for its approval and adoption and the possible promulgation of a Joint and Concurrent Resolution convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly. Petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. No proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court. Judicial review is exercised only to remedy a particular and concrete injury.The petitions were dismissed.

19. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COMELEC

ACTION:These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent

municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

FACT: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature.The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

ISSUE:The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

HELD:We grant the petitions.The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

20. VENANCIO INONOG VS JUDGE FRANCISCO IBAY

The present administrative case stemmed from the Sinumpaang Salaysay[1] of Venancio P. Inonog, filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on April 26, 2005, charging Judge Francisco B. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 135, Makati City with gross abuse of authority. The complaint involved an incident in the Makati City Hall basement parking lot for which respondent judge cited complainant in contempt of court because complainant parked his superior’s vehicle at the parking space reserved for respondent judge. Respondent judge initiated the proceeding for indirect contempt by issuing an order dated March 18, 2005 in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1320, 02-3046, 02-3168-69, and 03-392-393, entitled People v. Glenn Fernandez, et al., directing the complainant to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. The said order read: ORDER For intentionally parking car with plate no. WDH 804 at the parking space reserved for the undersigned Presiding Judge, thereby causing the delay in the promulgation of the Decisions in the above-entitled cases driver Butch Inonog, c/o Permit Division, this City, is hereby ordered to appear before this Court at 10:30 A.M., March 18, 2005 and show cause why he should not be cited for Contempt for delaying the administration of justice. SO ORDERED. Makati City, 18 March 2005. That same day, respondent judge issued another order, finding complainant guilty of contempt. To quote from the second order: ORDER

For failure to appear of respondent Venancio Inonog alias Butch Inonog at today’s hearing and show cause why he should not be cited for contempt, the Court finds him GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT, and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment for a period of five (5) days and to pay a fined [sic] of P1,000.00. Let a warrant issue for his arrest furnishing copies thereof to the Director General Philippine National Police, the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and the Station Commander of Makati Police Station. SO ORDERED. Makati City, 18 March 2005. The relevant facts, culled from the records, follow: Complainant alleged that he is the security-driver of the Chief of the Business Permit Division of Makati City. According to complainant, at around 1:00 a.m. of March 18, 2005, he parked the vehicle that he drives for his boss in a vacant parking space at the basement of the Makati City Hall because the slot where he usually parked was already occupied. At the time, the parking slots at the basement of the Makati City Hall were indicated only by numbers and not by names of officials to whom they were assigned. Thereafter, complainant notified his superior that he will not be reporting for work for the rest of that day, March 18, 2005, because he was not feeling well. Thus, he left the vehicle in the said basement parking area and went home to Tanay, Rizal. Later that morning, complainant received a call from his brother, also an employee of the City Government of Makati, informing him that he should appear before the sala of respondent judge at 10:30 a.m. to explain/show cause why he should not be cited for contempt of court for parking his vehicle at the space reserved for respondent judge. He was informed that the respondent judge blamed the usurpation of the said parking space for the delay in the promulgation of the decision in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1320, 02-3046, 02-3168-69, and 03-392-393 scheduled at 8:00 a.m. of March 18, 2005 because the latter had a hard time looking for another parking space. Complainant was also informed that if he failed to appear at the hearing, a warrant for his arrest will be issued. Complainant immediately left his home in Tanay to go to Makati City Hall even though he was not feeling well. However, due to the distance involved and the time consumed by using various modes of public transportation, he arrived there only at around 1:00 p.m. He found out that by then he had already been adjudged guilty of contempt of court by respondent judge for delaying in the administration of justice. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00). A warrant for his arrest was also issued.[2] On March 21, 2005, complainant through counsel filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Lift Order of Arrest, but said motion was denied. Subsequently, complainant filed an Amended Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or To Lift the Order of Arrest, attaching proof of payment of the fine in the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00). In his motions, complainant

explained that he did not know that the parking space was reserved for the respondent judge. He also begged for forgiveness and promised not to repeat the incident. Acting on the said amended motion, respondent judge issued an Order dated March 30, 2005 finding complainant’s explanation to be unsatisfactory. However, respondent judge modified his previous order by deleting the sentence for imprisonment for five (5) days but the fine of P1,000.00 was increased to P2,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely. In compliance, complainant paid the additional amount of P1,000.00 as fine. Aggrieved by the said orders of respondent judge, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint. In his Comment dated June 10, 2005, respondent judge explained that on March 18, 2005, he proceeded to the court at around 7:00 a.m. to finalize the decision in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1320, 02-3046, 02-3168-69 and 03-392-393, all entitled People v. Glenn Fernandez, et al., which were to be promulgated on the first hour of the same day. Upon reaching his parking slot, he found complainant’s vehicle parked there. As a result, he had a hard time looking for his own parking space. Hence, the promulgation of the decision was delayed. According to respondent judge, complainant knew that the parking slot was reserved for him because it bore his name. He emphasized that prior to the incident, he already had his name indicated at the said slot precisely because there had been previous occasions when other vehicles would occupy his parking space and he had been forced to park at the public parking area. Respondent judge added that he ordered the complainant to appear before him for the hearing at 10:30 a.m. of March 18, 2005, but, complainant refused, thus, he declared him in contempt of court. Respondent judge also averred that he neither took advantage nor exercised arbitrarily the power of the court as in fact, complainant was given a chance to be represented by a counsel of his own choice and was given an opportunity to explain his position which the latter seriously considered. Respondent judge explained that his acts were brought about by his deep concern with the disposition of the cases assigned to him within the prescribed period. To accomplish this, he came to office at 7:00 a.m. and worked on his cases not only in his office, but even at home. Respondent judge mentioned that he was able to dispose 349 cases leaving only 171 cases pending as of December 31, 2004. He pointed out that he was able to further reduce his docket to 23 civil cases and 29 criminal cases as of May 31, 2005. Thus, he ranked 3rd among judges in the RTC, Makati with respect to disposition of cases. Respondent judge added that petty disturbances, like the incident involved in the instant administrative complaint, were annoying to him since they interfered in the performance of his judicial function. Nevertheless, he did not lose his objectivity, probity, equanimity, integrity and impartiality and reacted to these incidents within the limits and boundaries of the law and justice.

On November 15, 2005, the OCA made the following evaluation and recommendation: EVALUATION: This administrative complaint came about when Judge Francisco B. Ibay cited complainant in contempt of court simply because the latter parked his vehicle at the parking space served for him. In the exercise of his contempt power, not only did respondent deny the complainant his right to be heard but also convicted him in contempt of court based on a very loose and flimsy reason. Contempt of court has been defined as a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation (Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 57). Under the Rules of Court, contempt is classified into direct and indirect. Direct contempt, which is summary, is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so (Section 1, Rule 71). Indirect contempt, on the other hand, is not committed in the presence of the court and can be punished only after notice and hearing (Zarate v. Balderian, 329 SCRA 558). Undoubtedly, Judge Ibay cited the complainant for indirect contempt of court since the subject incident transpired not in the court’s presence. In the instant case, there was no defiance of authority on the part of the complainant when he parked his vehicle at the spot reserved for the respondent judge. The incident is too flimsy to be a basis of a contempt proceedings. At most, the act resulted to a minor inconvenience on the part of the respondent but it was unlikely that it delayed the administration of justice. Besides, it was not shown that complainant parked his vehicle at the spot intentionally to show disrespect to Judge Ibay. Respondent Judge Ibay acted precipitously in citing complainant in contempt of court in a manner which obviously smacks of retaliation rather than upholding of the court’s honor. xxx xxx xxx Assuming, without conceding, that the complainant had committed indirect contempt of court, he was nonetheless entitled to be charged in writing and given an opportunity to be heard by himself or counsel. Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court specifically outlines the procedural requisites before a person may be punished for indirect contempt, thus: (1) a complaint in writing which may either be a motion for contempt filed by a party or an order issued by the court requiring a person to appear and explain his conduct; and, (2) an opportunity for the person charged to appear and explain his conduct (Pacuribot v. Lim, Jr., 275 SCRA 543). Proceedings against persons charged with contempt of court are commonly treated as criminal in nature, thus this mode of procedure should be strictly followed.

Records failed to show that complainant was properly notified of Judge Ibay’s order directing the former to appear and explain why he should not be cited in contempt of court. The hearing was set at 10:30 A.M. or only about two and a half hours after respondent judge found that his parking space was occupied. The lack of notice accounts for the complainant’s failure to appear at the hearing. Verily, complainant was not given a reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of his defense. xxx xxx xxx RECOMMENDATION: In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court our recommendations that this instant I.P.I. be REDOCKETED as a regular administrative matter and Judge Francisco B. Ibay, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Makati City, be penalized to pay a FINE in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA but deems it proper to impose a penalty different from the OCA’s recommendation. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court prescribes the rules and procedure for indirect contempt. Sections 3 and 4 of the said rule read as follows: SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.—After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: (a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions; (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; (c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule; (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; (e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority; (f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him. xxx xxx xxx SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced.—Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. xxx xxx xxx The phrase “improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice” is so broad and general that it encompasses wide spectrum of acts that could constitute indirect contempt. However, the act of complainant in parking his car in a slot allegedly reserved for respondent judge does not fall under this category. There was no showing that he acted with malice and/or bad faith or that he was improperly motivated to delay the proceedings of the court by making use of the parking slot supposedly reserved for respondent judge. We cannot also say that the said act of complainant constitutes disrespect to the dignity of the court. In sum, the incident is too flimsy and inconsequential to be the basis of an indirect contempt proceeding. In Lu Ym v. Mahinay,[3] we held that an act, to be considered contemptuous, must be clearly contrary or prohibited by the order of the Court. A person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for contempt unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required. Here, the act of complainant is not contrary or clearly prohibited by an order of the court. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of justice. The courts must exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they exercise. Thus, judges have, time and again, been enjoined to exercise their contempt power judiciously, sparingly, with utmost restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication.[4] Respondent judge’s act of unceremoniously citing complainant in contempt is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority vested upon him by law. Besides possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark of judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge.[5] Respondent judge himself has characterized this incident as a “petty disturbance” and he should not have allowed himself to be annoyed to a point that he would even waste valuable court time and resources on a trivial matter. As for the appropriate penalty to be imposed, we note that this is not the first time respondent judge was charged with grave abuse of authority in connection with his misuse of his contempt power. In A.M. No. RTJ-06-1972 entitled Panaligan v. Ibay,[6] the Court in its Decision dated June 21, 2006 resolved to impose a fine of P5,000.00 on respondent judge for improperly citing therein

complainant for contempt and ordering his detention without sufficient legal basis. He was warned not to repeat the same or similar offense, lest a more severe penalty shall be imposed. In Macrohon v. Ibay,[7] respondent judge was also found guilty of the same offense and ordered to pay a fine of P25,000.00. In the recent case of Nuñez v. Ibay,[8] which involved a very similar incident regarding inadvertent usurpation of respondent judge’s parking slot, the Court likewise found respondent judge guilty of grave abuse of authority for citing complainant therein in contempt of court without legal basis. In Nuñez, we ordered respondent judge to pay a fine in the amount of P40,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits, since said respondent judge opted to avail of Optional Retirement under R.A. No. 910 (as amended by R.A. No. 5095 and P.D. No. 1438) effective August 18, 2007. Considering that this is not the first time that respondent judge committed the same offense and in Nuñez, which had similar factual antecedents as the case at bar, the Court already saw fit to impose upon him a fine in the amount of P40,000.00, it is proper to impose on him the same penalty in this case. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay is found guilty of grave abuse of authority. He is ordered to pay a FINE of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

21. BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

FACTS:

President Benigni Simeon Aquino III signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an “independent collegial body,” it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control.To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics: (1) they examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report

containing conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State. Commission’s members are usually empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and recommend institutional reforms. Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1

HELD:Yes. Petitioners-legislators’s petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court.

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations. It emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the commission are to be taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the President’s power over contingent funds.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution.

The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but

because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society.

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions; Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code?

ISSUE: Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code contemplates “reorganization” as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.

To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term “restructure”– an “alteration of an existing structure.” Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1.

The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. Reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them.In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President’s power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.

The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed.

The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed.

On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.

ISSUE:

whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ

HELD:

The President’s power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive department.

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. No quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of

persons who come before it. Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. Even respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.

Contrary to petitioners’ apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation. The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, “when in the course of its investigation,” under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.

At any rate, the Ombudsman’s power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials.

Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such cases.

The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a preliminary investigation or the determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically out of the PTC’s sphere of functions. Its power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsman’s primordial duties.

The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws.

ISSUE:

whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause

HELD:

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test ofreasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him.

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or “underinclude” those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these are:

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the “COMMISSION,” which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. – The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied]

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration.

Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional.

22. ATTY. ROMULO MACALINTAL V. PRES. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

FACTS: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”

Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC’s decision dismissing the former’s petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.

Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:Whether or not PET is constitutional.Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.

HELD:Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they “constitutionalized what was statutory.” Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.

No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.” The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.

SECTION 3

23. BENGZON V. DRILON

FACTS: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Court’s General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the

Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.

HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item.

SECTION 4

24. LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On June 23, 1988, Pedro Revilla, Jr., a licensed real estatebroker was given formal authority by BPI to sell the lot for P1,000.00 per square meter. The owners of the Philippine Remnants concurred this arrangement. Broker Revilla contacted Alfonso Lim of petitioner company who agreed to buy the land. On July 9, 1988, Revilla formally informed BPI that he had procured a buyer, herein petitioner. On July 11, 1988, petitioner's officials, Alfonso Lim and Albino Limketkai, went to BPI to confirm the sale. Vice-President Merlin Albano and Asst. Vice-President Aromin entertained them. The parties agreed that the lot would be sold at P1,000.00 persquare meter to be paid in cash. The authority to sell was on a first come, first served and non-exclusive basis; there is no dispute over petitioner's being the first comer and the buyer to be first served. Alfonso Lim then asked if it was possible to pay on terms. The bank officials stated that there was no harm in trying to ask for payment on terms because in previous transactions, the same had been allowed. It was the understanding, however, that should the term payment be disapproved, then the price shall be paid in cash. Two or three days later, petitioner learned that its offer to pay on terms had been frozen. Alfonso Lim went to BPI on July 18, 1988 and tendered the full payment of P33,056,000.00 to Albano. The payment was refused because Albano stated that the authority to sell that particular piece of property in Pasig had been withdrawn from his unit. The same check was tendered to BPI Vice-President Nelson Bona who also refused to receive payment. An action for specific performance with damages was thereupon filed on August 25, 1988 by petitioner against BPI. In the course of the trial, BPI informed the trial court that it had sold the property under litigation to NBS on July 14, 1989.

ISSUE: Whether or not such contract is covered by the statute of frauds.

HELD: In the case at bench, the allegation that there was no concurrence of the offer and the acceptance upon the cause of the contract is belied by the testimony of the very BPI official with whom the contract was perfected. Aromin and Albano concluded the sale for BPI. The fact that the deed of sale still had to be signed and notarized does not mean that no contract had already

been perfected. A sale of land is valid regardless of the form it may have been entered into. The requisite form under Article 1458 of the Civil Code is merely for greater efficacy or convenience and the failure to comply does not affect the validity and binding effect of the act between parties. Therefore, such contract that was made constituted fraud and is covered by the statute of frauds. BPI should be held liable and can be sued for damages

SECTION 5

24. DRILON V. LIM

FACTS:Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. The court cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter,” while the second is “the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions is accordance with law.”

ISSUES:The issues in this case are(1) whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional; and(2) whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than supervision, over the local government

HELD:The judgment of the lower court is reversed in so far as its declaration that Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional but affirmed the said lower court’s finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed.

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.

Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court carefully examined every exhibit and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process.

25. LARRANAGA V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention before the RTC of Cebu City. He was arrested and was detained without the filing of the necessary Information and warrant of arrest. The petitioner alleged that he must be released and be subject to a preliminary investigation. However pending the resolution of the Court for the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction filed by the petitioner, RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest directed to the petitioner.

ISSUE:

1. Whether petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation.2.Whether petitioner should be released from detention pending the investigation.

HELD:1.Yes. Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been arraigned on October 14, 1997. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. Petitioner, in this case, has been actively and consistently demanding a regular preliminary investigation even before he was charged in court. Also, petitioner refused to enter a plea during the arraignment because there was a pending case in this Court regarding his right to avail of a regular preliminary investigation. Clearly, the acts of petitioner and his counsel are inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminary investigation is part of procedural due process. It cannot be waived unless the waiver appears to be clear and informed.

2.No. The filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect. The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the

petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993against him and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.

26. FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:1. Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of Investments (BOI).

2. BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA.

4. CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction.

5. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.

6. Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court.

7. While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case

HELD:YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.

27. ARUELO V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the respondent therein only five days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer. According to him, the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer.

ISSUE:

whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the five-day period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

HELD:

No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court.

Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability — These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction.

It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases pending before the regular courts.

Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).

28. JAVELLANA VS. DILG

FACTS:This petition for review on certiorari involves the right of a public official to engage inthe practice of his profession while employed in the Government. Attorney Erwin B. Javellanawas an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. City Engineer Ernesto C.Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-10-90

against Javellana for: (1) violation of Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees," and (2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority.Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged inthe practice of law without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director,Department of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 inrelation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department.On the other hand, Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case againsthim on the ground mainly that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 areunconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.

HELD:Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLGMemorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution iscompletely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code andDLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials toavoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers anddoctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in anyoccupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools expect during session hours." If thereare some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.

29. PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF THE GSIS FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES, AM NO. 08-2-01-0

May the legislature exempt the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from legal fees imposed by the Court on government-owned and controlled corporations and local government units? This is the central issue in this administrative matter.The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on government-owned or controlled corporations under Section 22,[1] Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court. The said provision states: SEC. 22. Government exempt. – The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local government corporations andgovernment-owned or controlled corporations with or without independent charter are not exempt from paying such fees.

However, all court actions, criminal or civil, instituted at the instance of the provincial, city or municipal treasurer or assessor under Sec. 280 of the Local Government Code of 1991 shall be exempt from the payment of court and sheriff’s fees. (emphasis supplied) The GSIS anchors its petition on Section 39 of its charter, RA[2] 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997): SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all times and that contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low as possible in order not to burden the members of the GSIS and their employers.Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid. Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect. Moreover, these exemptions shall not be affected by subsequent laws to the contrary unless this section is expressly, specifically and categorically revoked or repealed by law and a provision is enacted to substitute or replace the exemption referred to herein as an essential factor to maintain and protect the solvency of the fund, notwithstanding and independently of the guaranty of the national government to secure such solvency or liability. The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favour of the GSIS. (emphasis supplied) The GSIS then avers that courts still assess and collect legal fees in actions and proceedings instituted by the GSIS notwithstanding its exemption from taxes, assessments, fees, charges, or duties of all kinds under Section 39. For this reason, the GSIS urges this Court to recognize its exemption from payment of legal fees. According to the GSIS, the purpose of its exemption is to preserve and maintain the actuarial solvency of its funds and to keep the contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits

provided by RA 8291 as low as possible. Like the terms “taxes,” “assessments,” “charges,” and “duties,” the term “fees” is used in the law in its generic and ordinary sense as any form of government imposition. The word “fees,” defined as “charge[s] fixed by law for services of public officers or for the use of a privilege under control of government,” is qualified by the phrase “of all kinds.”[3] Hence, it includes the legal fees prescribed by this Court under Rule 141. Moreover, no distinction should be made based on the kind of fees imposed on the GSIS or the GSIS’ ability to pay because the law itself does not distinguish based on those matters. The GSIS argues that its exemption from the payment of legal fees would not mean that RA 8291 is superior to the Rules of Court. It would merely show “deference” by the Court to the legislature as a co-equal branch.[4] This deference will recognize the “compelling and overriding” State interest in the preservation of the actuarial solvency of the GSIS for the benefit of its members.[5] The GSIS further contends that the right of government workers to social security is an aspect of social justice. The right to social security is also guaranteed under Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, including the right to social security, but the GSIS is not compelling the Court to promulgate such rules. The GSIS is merely asking the Court to recognize and allow the exercise of the right of the GSIS “to seek relief from the courts of justice sans payment of legal fees.”[6] Required to comment on the GSIS’ petition,[7] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the petition should be denied.[8] According to the OSG, the issue of the GSIS’ exemption from legal fees has been resolved by the issuance by then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.[9] of OCA[10] Circular No. 93-2004: TO : ALL JUDGES, CLERKS OF COURT AND COURT PERSONNEL OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARI’A CIRCUIT COURTS SUBJECT : REMINDER ON THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 3-98 (Re: Payment of Docket and Filing Fees in Extra-Judicial Foreclosure); SECTION 21, RULE 141 OF THE RULES OF COURT; SECTION 3 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 385; and ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 07-99 (Re: Exercise of Utmost Caution, Prudence, and Judiciousness in Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders and Writs of Preliminary Injunctions) Pursuant to the Resolution of the Third Division of the Supreme Court dated 05 April 2004 and to give notice to the concern raised by the [GSIS] to expedite extrajudicial foreclosure cases filed in court, we wish to remind all concerned [of] the pertinent provisions of Administrative Circular No. 3-98, to wit: 2. No written request/petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, real or chattel, shall be acted upon by the Clerk of

Court, as Ex-Officio Sheriff, without the corresponding filing fee having been paid and the receipt thereof attached to the request/petition as provided for in Sec. 7(c), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. 3. No certificate of sale shall be issued in favor of the highest bidder until all fees provided for in the aforementioned sections and paragraph 3 of Section 9 (I) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court shall have been paid. The sheriff shall attach to the records of the case a certified copy of the Official Receipt [O.R.] of the payment of the fees and shall note the O.R. number in the duplicate of the Certificate of Sale attached to the records of the case. Moreover, to settle any queries as to the status of exemption from payment of docket and legal fees of government entities, Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides: SEC. 21. Government exempt. – The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local governments and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees.[11]x x x x x x x x x The OSG contends that there is nothing in Section 39 of RA 8291 that exempts the GSIS from fees imposed by the Court in connection with judicial proceedings. The exemption of the GSIS from “taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds” is necessarily confined to those that do not involve pleading, practice and procedure. Rule 141 has been promulgated by the Court pursuant to its exclusive rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. Thus, it may not be amended or repealed by Congress. On this Court’s order,[12] the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) submitted a report and recommendation[13] on the petition of the GSIS and the comment of the OSG thereon. According to the OCAT, the claim of the GSIS for exemption from the payment of legal fees has no legal basis. Read in its proper and full context, Section 39 intends to preserve the actuarial solvency of GSIS funds by exempting the GSIS from government impositions through taxes. Legal fees imposed under Rule 141 are not taxes. The OCAT further posits that the GSIS could not have been exempted by Congress from the payment of legal fees. Otherwise, Congress would have encroached on the rule-making power of this Court. According to the OCAT, this is the second time that the GSIS is seeking exemption from paying legal fees.[14] The OCAT also points out that there are other government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units which asked for exemption from paying legal fees citing provisions in their respective charters that are similar to Section 39 of RA 8291.[15] Thus, the OCAT recommends that the petition of GSIS be denied and the issue be settled once and for all for the guidance of the concerned parties.Faced with the differing opinions of the GSIS, the OSG and the OCAT, we now proceed to probe into the heart of this matter:

may Congress exempt the GSIS from the payment of legal fees? No. The GSIS urges the Court to show deference to Congress by recognizing the exemption of the GSIS under Section 39 of RA 8291 from legal fees imposed under Rule 141. Effectively, the GSIS wants this Court to recognize a power of Congress to repeal, amend or modify a rule of procedure promulgated by the Court. However, the Constitution and jurisprudence do not sanction such view. Rule 141 (on Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court was promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution: Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:x x x x x x x x x(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. x x x x x x x x x (emphasis supplied)The power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts is a traditional power of this Court.[16] It necessarily includes the power to address all questions arising from or connected to the implementation of the said rules. The Rules of Court was promulgated in the exercise of the Court’s rule-making power. It is essentially procedural in nature as it does not create, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Corollarily, Rule 141 is basically procedural. It does not create or take away a right but simply operates as a means to implement an existing right. In particular, it functions to regulate the procedure of exercising a right of action and enforcing a cause of action.[17] In particular, it pertains to the procedural requirement of paying the prescribed legal fees in the filing of a pleading or any application that initiates an action or proceeding.[18] Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part of the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional requirement.[19] It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action.[20] Appellate docket and other lawful fees are required to be paid within the same period for taking an appeal.[21] Payment of docket fees in full within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal.[22] Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.[23]

An interesting aspect of legal fees is that which relates to indigent or pauper litigants. In proper cases, courts may waive the collection of legal fees. This, the Court has allowed in Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court in recognition of the right of access to justice by the poor under Section 11, Article III of the Constitution.[24] Mindful that the rule with respect to indigent litigants should not be ironclad as it touches on the right of access to justice by the poor,[25] the Court acknowledged the exemption from legal fees of indigent clients of the Public Attorney’s Office under Section 16-D of the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended by RA 9406.[26] This was not an abdication by the Court of its rule-making power but simply a recognition of the limits of that power. In particular, it reflected a keen awareness that, in the exercise of its rule-making power, the Court may not dilute or defeat the right of access to justice of indigent litigants. The GSIS cannot successfully invoke the right to social security of government employees in support of its petition. It is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and distinct from that of its individual members. The rights of its members are not its rights; its rights, powers and functions pertain to it solely and are not shared by its members. Its capacity to sue and bring actions under Section 41(g) of RA 8291, the specific power which involves the exemption that it claims in this case, pertains to it and not to its members. Indeed, even the GSIS acknowledges that, in claiming exemption from the payment of legal fees, it is not asking that rules be made to enforce the right to social security of its members but that the Court recognize the alleged right of the GSIS “to seek relief from the courts of justice sans payment of legal fees.”[27] However, the alleged right of the GSIS does not exist. The payment of legal fees does not take away the capacity of the GSIS to sue. It simply operates as a means by which that capacity may be implemented. Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive.[28] Speaking for the Court, then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the rule-making power of this Court and highlighted its evolution and development in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice:[29] Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides: Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be

uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan, Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided: x x x x x x x x x Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.x x x x x x x x x(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:x x x x x x x x xSection 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:x x x x x x x x x(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails. Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence — fiscal autonomy.[30] Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees,[31] including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF).[32] The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF[33] expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to “guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy.”[34] Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the Court’s fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.

WHEREFORE, the petition of the Government Service Insurance System for recognition of its exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed under Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court on government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units is hereby DENIED. The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to promptly issue a circular to inform all courts in the Philippines of the import of this resolution.

SECTION 6

30. MACEDA VS VASQUEZ

FACTS: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.

ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts

HELD: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

31. RAQUIZA V. JUDGE CASTANEDA JR.

Petition to order the transfer of Special Proceedings No. 6824 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Testate Estate of the late Don Alfonso Castellvi) from the sala of respondent judge, Hon.

Mariano Castañeda to another branch and administrative complaint against the same judge for "(1) violation of the Anti-Graft Law; (2) rendering decision knowing it to be unjust and illegal (3) extortion by means of oppression; and (4) bribery.After respondent judge had filed his comment on said petition and administrative complaint, the Court resolved on August 3, 1976 to refer the a administrative complaint to Justice Jose G. Bautista of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. Under date of September 1, 1977 and after duly hearing the parties, Justice Bautista submitted the following report:Complainant Antonio V. Raquiza charges the dent Hon. Mariano Castañeda Jr., under four counts, namely:I. Violation of the Anti-Graft Law;II. Decision knowing it to be unjust and illegal;III. Extortion by means of oppression; andIV. Bribery.I — Under Count I. complainant charges respondent of giving Mrs. Natividad Castellvi Raquiza and Mrs. Nieves Toledo-Gozun unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in violation of paragraph (e), Section 3, Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti- Graft Law. which reads:Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:xxx xxx xxx(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of hisofficial administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, respondent bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.These two parties according to complainant are not entitled to get any share from the second release of P1,000,000.00 for the Castellvi Estate and yet they were able to receive P200,000.00 and P500,000.00, respectively. Complainant further claims that Mrs. Raquiza has no more share or participation in the Castellvi Estate and in the case of Mrs. Gozun she has no right to be given a share of the second release as it is intended solely for the Raquiza children.Complainant also charges respondent under paragraph (f), section 3 of Republic Act 3019 which provides:(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter Pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of discriminating against any other interested party.in having allegedly neglected or refused after several motions and oral demands, the release of the amount of P1,000,000.00 (Treasury Warrant No. D-04,231,948) to the Raquiza children thereby giving undue advantage to both Mrs. Raquiza and Mrs. Gozun discriminating against the Raquiza children.II — Under Count II, complainant charges respondent with a violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code for knowingly and deliverately issuing his illegal orders of February 25, and 26, 1976 allowing Mrs. Raquiza to obtain a loan of P200,000.00 from

the Philippine Veterans Bank using the equivalent amount in the second release of P1,000,000.00 deposited in the bank in the name of the Castellvi Estate as collateral. Complainant contends that respondent Judge knows that Mrs. Raquiza has no more participation or interest in or any rights to the Castellvi Estate since according to the records in Civil Case No. 2761 entitled "Pobre vs. Natividad Castellvi Raquiza," both parties agreed to give all the properties subject matter of the suit to the Raquiza children.III — Under Count III, complainant alleges that respondent committed attempted extortion by oppression in that after Mrs. Raquiza got the total of P330,000.00 from the Philippine Veterans Bank in connection with the first release of P1,000,000.00, he visited the respondent Judge in his house asking that he would also release the balance of P300,000.00 to the Raquiza children because part of the money would be used by complainant in going to the United States for his eye treatment; and that respondent promised to give the necessary order the following day. Complainant went to Pampanga the following morning per advice of respondent and saw the judge in his private chamber; that the judge invited complainant to a corner of the room and told him that he needed money, that taken aback by such alleged act of graft and corruption, complainant shouted in a very loud voice, "You are corrupt." There is graft and corruption in this office and then left the room; but that following the saying, "a man in need is a beggar", complainant called the judge a few days later and assistant. that they were reconciled but nonetheless. the respondent despite several requests from Atty. Yuzon, counsel for the complainant, consistently failed to comply with his promise that he would release money for the Raquiza children; that after the reconciliation, complainant visited the respondent Judge in his house and the latter promised to give the order the following day; that it was only after repeated trips of Atty. Yuzon or his assistant. Mr. Gracio Dacutan, to Pampanga that the respondent Judge released the total amount of P350,000.00 to the Raquiza children; that as the Raquiza children urgently needed some of the money for themselves, the balance was not enough anymore to finance the trip of the complainant to the United States; hence, he asked again the President to release another P1,000,000.00; that the complainant brands the imposition of this hardships by respondent Judge, which is supposedly a case of extortion by means of oppression where respondent subjected complainant, his counsel Atty. Yuzon and his assistant Gracio Dacutan, had to shuttle everyday for a period of about one month between Manila to Pampanga to get the promised order of release which never came up to the present.IV — As to the fourth count, the complainant charges the respondent of bribery, in that "he (respondent) gets bribe money from Mrs. Raquiza and surely from all other parties;" that on the first release of P1,000,000.00, respondent Judge extorted P70,000.00 from Mrs. Raquiza out of the release of about P330,000.00.In his comment or answer to the charges, respondent alleged that those indictments are devoid of factual and/or legal basis because:As to Charge I (Violation of Anti-Graft Law) and II (knowingly rendering unjust and illegal judgment), respondent Mrs. Raquiza still has a share in the Castellvi Estate because by testamentary provision approved by final judgment, Natividad Castellvi Raquiza as instituted heir, is entitled to 2/8 share of the estate although one-half (1/2) of said 2/3 had been transferred to her children by

virtue of a compromise agreement submitted by Urbane Pobre in Civil Case No. 2761 entitled Urbano Pobre vs. Natividad Castellvi-Raquiza (Exhs. 2 & 3, Orders of Judge Honorio Romero dated March 29, 1971 and May 26, 1971 in Sp. Proc. No. 6824). Note that a case for reconveyance was filed by Natividad Castellvi Raquiza (Civil Case No. 3509 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against her children. Said case is still pending hearing and decision according to respondent. Respondent avers that it was only after careful study of the records (16 big volumes) of Special Proceeding No. 6824 that he granted on June 19, 1975 the motion of Mrs. Raquiza filed on January 23, 1975 for authority to obtain loan believing that Mrs. Raquiza still has a share, interest and participation in the subject estate.Respondent also explained that the testate estate of Alfonso Castellvi is still on liquidation when the first release of 1 million was made by the government in partial payment of the expropriated property of the estate; that as several claim of creditors have not been paid, respondent was not inclined at the outset to allow any Cash release; and that the second release of 1 million could not have been intended solely for the Raquiza children, much less for the use of the complainant in his trip to the United States for his eye treatment as claimed; that the reason given in complainant's request to the President dated December 29, 1975 for the release of the P1 million out of the P2,600,000.00 was that the money would be used "in patenting the Super-Gas Reducer in all car manufacturing countries in the world" (Exh. 5); that complainant's representative capacity as attorney-in-fact of his children as well as the purpose for seeking the withdrawal of the entire second release of P1 million is questionable because Lily Raquiza, one of the complainant's children, denied having signed or granted any power of attorney (p. 32, Rollo); that in view of the foregoing, respondent judge could not properly be charged with having knowingly rendered an unjust judgment or interlocutory order.As to Charge III (IX) by Means of Oppression):Respondent states that the commission of attempted extortion against complainant is highly improbable; that complainant did not describe the' shouting spree' incident faithfully because:Respondent does not approve of being approached in his house in connection with his official functions and without promising complainant anything, advised the latter to see respondent in his office; that the following morning when complainant went to his court chamber, Atty. Celia Macapagal and other lawyers and two or three of the court's personnel were inside the chamber; that complainant then pleaded for help that he would be able to go to the United States for his eye treatment, saying that after all the first release was authorized by the President precisely for that purpose; that complainant wanted in the corresponding order to be issued by respondent that so much amount of his children's shares in the second release should be specifically ordered paid or given to complainant; that in a nice way, respondent explained to complainant of the unsettled claims of creditors of the late that even more complainant was not the movant but his children and what his children would want to lend him is a matter between him and his children; that complainant then replied, "Judge, if you would not give me the small amount I need, I will be your number one enemy ... you chut"; that respondent stood up to reach for his crutches (respondent then had swollen foot due to his arthritis) and ordered 'Arrest that man' but complainant had already left; that complainant's accusation is the height of absurdity since respondent would not be that stupid and careless to choose his

court chamber (barely 2-1/2 x 3-1/2 meters) and in the presence of many listeners and viewers to attempt an extortion against complainant, a man of known stature, an ex-Governor. Congressman, Cabinet member and a delegate to the Constitutional Convention.As to Charge IV - (Bribery): —Respondent explains this is unthinkable becausePetitioner should surely admit that Mrs. Raquiza is even hard to converse with. To talk to her, one has to speak loud or shout. She could much less be whispered to. This considering, one could not ask something from her without being heard. Write her a note, for evidence in order to be caught This is absurd.that authority was given Mrs. Raquiza only on June 19, 1975 almost 5 months of study of her motion filed on January 23, 1975; that the authority was for P500,000.00, which was even reduced to only P333,000.00 or 1/3 of P1,000,000.00 when such release was known.As the letter complaint and the answer or comment of respondent are both verified, they were adopted as part of the respective evidence of the parties. They also introduced additional oral and documentary proofs. Besides complainant, his counsel Atty. Manuel Yuson and the latter's assistant. Gracio Dacutan, testified. For the respondent, Atty. Celia Macapagal, Atty. Vicente Sicat and respondent Judge offered testimonial and documentary evidence.After a careful study of all the evidence on record, I find the charges not substantiated. There is factual and legal basis for respondent's conclusion that Mrs. Raquiza has still a share or participation in the Castellvi estate and that Mrs. Gozun has likewise a right to be given a share of the second release. As to the first (Mrs. Raquiza,' her right as instituted heir of 2/3 of the estate is recognized by final judgment although by compromise agreement, 1/2 was transferred by her to her children (Exh. 2). The Raquiza children sought a reconsideration of the order of Judge Romero (Exh. 2), but the motion was denied by the same Judge (Exh. 3). There appears no appeal from said order.Moreover, the Raquiza children subsequently respected the remaining share of their mother by expressly agreeing to her request to the Philippine Veterans Bank president for additional loan (Exh. 4).It is not also rebutted that several claims chargeable against the estate has not been completely settled for which reason respondent at the outset refused to grant any release. However, for humanitarian considerations and... mainly on the basis of the President's handwritten note on complainant's letter, dated July 16, 1975 (Exh. 8), respondent authorized the withdrawal from the funds of the Castellvi Estate in the Philippines Veterans Bank derived from the first release of P1 million, for the delivery to the Raquiza children Daisy, Antonio. Jr.. Levy and Douglas, in the amount of P248,000.00, and an additional amount of P20,000.00, under his orders, dated August 20, 1975 and November 24, 1975 respectively; and a separate amount of P60,000.00 to complainant's daughter Lily Raquiza (Exh. 9 and 19); and after the said Raquiza children were granted their aforementioned shares, respondent ordered the immediate payment of Mrs. Raquiza's loan by the said bank, in the amount of P330,000.00;19 — That under his letter, dated December 29, 1975, (Exh. 5), complainant requested again the President to release P1 million from the funds of the Castellvi Estate to the Raquiza children to be used by them in patenting the Super-Gas Reducer in all car

manufacturing countries in the world', and after the President authorized the release of PI million by the Government subject to the availability of funds, the Treasurer of the Philippines, following the recommendation of the TJAG of the AFP, issued Treasury Warrant No. D-281-948 for payment to the Castellvi Estate, which was actually released to the Phil. Veterans Bank, by the Army, on February 11, 1976;As regards the payment to Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun it appears that of the three expropriated properties, one parcel belongs to the Castellvi Estate while two parcels are owned by Maria Nieves Toledo, who at the time when payment was ordered, had not yet received any partial payment and had filed a motion for execution (Civil Case No. 1623 or G.R. No. L-20620) praying for partial payment. As respondent correctly argues, '... for reasons of justice and equity (he) just followed the mandate of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974, for payment of the corresponding just compensation to both owners of the properties condemned.' Thus, in sharing landowner Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun in the second release, respondent had factual and legal basis and can hardly be branded as giving "unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference" under paragraph (e), section 3 of the Anti-Graft Law.Similarly, considering that Mr. Raquiza has a sham in the Castellvi estate which is still on liquidation; that the second release could not have been intended solely for the Raquiza children nor for complainant's trip to the United States for his alleged eye treatment; and that complainant's authority to represent all his children had been questioned by no less than one of his children, I find it hard to respondent Judge knowing that they unjust and illegal.Relative to the charge of extortion by means of oppression, the undersigned believes as more probable the version testified to by the respondent at the investigation as well as in his verified comment. Indeed, it would be stretching credibility to its b point to believe that in a small room (2-1/2 x 3-1/2 meters) the respondent would have thrown all precautions to the winds and demand bribe money in the presence of Atty. Celia Macapagal, Atty. Sicat, Atty. Yuzon, Fiscal Macalino, Messrs. Yalong and Dacutan- Complainant's version cannot stand the test of common experience and the ordinary instincts of human nature and therefore should be disbelieved. There is no evidence presented by complainant that when he visited that respondent in the latter's residence in Quezon City, the respondent asked for money. There is more privacy in respondent's home rather than in his small office and yet respondent in a place of absolute privacy never asked or demanded for bribe money.One salient fact also denies the veracity of the version of the complainant relative to the "shouting incident." It is not denied that at the time the respondent could hardly stand and walk without crutches. He could not have stood therefore on a corner of the court chamber during the incident. What is more, as he was seated on a chair at the end of his desk to the right and that since complainant was only one meter away from him, the conversation naturally would have been audible and the witnesses inside the court chamber never testified that the respondent was asking money from the complainant. The evidence also remains unrebutted that a few days after the said incident, the complainant apologized to the respondent for what he had done. On top of it all, it is difficult to believe that the respondent would have committed extortion or attempted extortion against the complainant, who is reputedly of high stature, not counting that

he was a former provincial governor, congressman, cabinet member and delegate to the Constitutional Convention and it could have taken so much nerve and daring to do such an act.As regards the fourth charge of bribery, complainant claims that Mrs. Raquiza had told him that out of the P300,000.00 she obtained as loan from the first release of P1 million, she gave P70,000.00 to the respondent, the undersigned also finds that this charge was not substantiated. In the first place, the testimony is purely hearsay. As the complainant testified on cross-examination:Q Your other charge is bribery. You mentioned that the Judge extorted P70,000 from Mrs. Raquiza, what is your basis ?A It was told to me by Mrs. Raquiza.Q I thought you are a widower?A I am separated from her, but she comes to the house very often.INVESTIGATOR:May the Investigator inquire, is that separation legalA I filed a divorce in the States.xxx xxx xxxQ So you are not a widower?A I am a widower.Q I cannot understand that?A Yes, I am married to another woman.Q You said you were told by Mrs. Raquiza?A She told me she practically spent 1/2 of what was given to her.xxx xxx xxxQ So, your basis is what you got from Mrs. RaquizaA Yes.Q Of your own personal knowledge, you don't know that?A I have not seen Mrs. Raquiza giving the money to him. (pp. 16 17,18, tsn., Feb. 2, 1977)Mrs. Raquiza was not presented to testify on the matter. The rules even in an administrative case demands that if the respondent Judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence presented against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary, to which respondent belongs, no less demands that before its member could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and based on competent proofs, no less. This is all the more so when as in this case the charges are penal in nature.The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply (33 C.J. 945, see. 47); also National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA) vs. Martinez, 62 SCRA 411; Castral vs. Bullecer 64 SCRA 289; Melquiades Udani Jr. vs. Pagharion 65 SCRA 549)Parenthetically, under Count I and II, 'misconduct' also implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment' (Buenaventura v. Hon. Mariano V. Benedicto, 38 SCRA 71). It results that even if respondent were not collect in his legal conclusions, his judicial actuations cannot be regarded as grave misconduct, unless the contrary sufficiently appears. And undersigned finds, as above discussed, that complainant's evidence is wanting in this respect.WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the charges against the respondent be dismissed for lack of merit.We have reviewed the record, including the pt of the testimonies of the witnesses and the other evidence submitted by the parties.

After careful consideration thereof, We find the conclusions of fact and the recommendations of the Investigator in the above report to be well taken and fully sup. ported by the evidence on record.ACCORDINGLY, the above-quoted report of Justice Bautista is approved, the respondent judge is exonerated and the administrative case against him is dismissal The petition to transfer Special Proceedings No. 6824 to another judge is denied.

SECTION 10

32. NITAFAN VS COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

FACTS: Nitafan and some others seek to prohibit the CIR from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries or compensation for such would tantamount to a diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. On June 7 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of income tax.

HELD: What is provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.

SECTION 11

DE LA LLANA V. ALBAConstitutional Law – Political Question – if there is no question of law involved – BP 129In 1981, BP 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129).

HELD: The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to

be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.” 34. PEOPLE V. JUDGE GACOTT JR.

FACTS: For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the SC. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the competence to administratively discipline respondent judge

HELD: To support the Court’s ruling, Justice Regalado relied on his recollection of a conversation with former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion who was the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986 Constitutional Commission of which Regalado was also a member.

The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that “the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,” is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc

can “order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein.” In this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.

Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc, a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than 1 year or a fine exceeding P10, 000.00 or both.

Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc.

SECTION 12

35. IN RE: MANZANO

FACTS: Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of judiciary.

ISSUE: What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned?HELD: The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the Judiciary to any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12, Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution).

Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction.Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct & affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.

“Administrative functions” as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Government’s executive machinery and its performance of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are

devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence “we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.

SECTION 14

36. NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORP VS CAFACTS:•On January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan of P2,000,000.00from private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank and to secure payment thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land located at Marilao, Bulacan•On July 11, 1983, the mortgage was foreclosed for non-payment of the loan, a sheriff's sale was held without re-publication of the required notices after the original date for the auction was changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor. UCPB was the highest and lone bidder and the mortgaged lands were sold to it for P3,558,547.64.•On August 29, 1983, UCPB sold all its rights to the properties to private respondent Manuel Co, who on the same day transferred them to Golden Star Industrial Corporation, another private respondent, a writ of possession was issued to it on November 4, 1983.•On September 6, 1984, NICOS and the other petitioners, filed their action for "annulmen tof sheriff's sale, recovery of possession, and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction."•On April 30, 1986, Golden Star and Evangelista filed a 7-page demurrer to the evidence where they argued that the action was a derivative suit that came under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission; that the mortgage had been validly foreclosed; that the sheriff's sale had been held in accordance with Act 3135; that the notices had been duly published in a newspaper of general circulation; and that the opposition to the writ of possession had not been filed on time. No opposition to the demurrer having been submitted despite notice thereof to the parties, Judge Nestor F. Dantes considered it submitted for resolution.•The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly and distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial court. They also stress that the sheriff's sale was irregular because the notices thereof were published in a newspaper that did not

have general circulation and that the original date of the sheriff's sale had been changed without its consent, the same having been allegedly given by a person not authorized to represent NICOS. Complaint was dismissed.•June 6, 1986, the petitioners complaint was dismissed.•A careful perusal of the challenged order will show that the complaint was dismissed not only for lack of jurisdiction but also because of the insufficiency of the evidence to prove the invalidity of the sheriff's sale. Regarding this second ground, all the trial court did was summarily conclude "from the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff" that the sheriff's sale "was in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3, Act 3135." It did not bother to discuss what that evidence was or to explain why it believed that the legal requirements had been observed.

HELD:It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed

37. KOMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHILS.) INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS

ISSUE:

whether or not issuance of Minute Resolutions is valid under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution

HELD:

“Resolutions” are not “decisions” within the above constitutional requirements; they merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained. And the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ decision.

The constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases “submitted for decision,” i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition is refused due course, with the resolution therefor stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the Supreme Court, after deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the respondent court’s decision, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

38. PRUDENTIAL BANK V. CASTRO

FACTS: The case at bar relates with the disbarment of Atty. Grecia (resp).Contentions c/o Resp:

• CJ Claudio Teehankee should have voluntary inhibited himself from the proceedings. CJ was prejudicial against Greciathat he rendered a decision against Grecia (disbarment).• The Court’s decision violates the Constitution in that it lacks certification by the CJ that the conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court.

HELD:As to CJ Teehankee’s voluntary inhibition. Petition denied for lack of legal and factual basis. After a member has given an opinion on the merits of a given case, he may not be disqualified from participating in the proceedings because a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court and raise an objection of this sort after decision has already been rendered. It should be made of record that at no time during the deliberations on the case did the CJ show any ill will nor any sign of vindictiveness much less any attempt to exact vengeance for past affront against Grecia. As to the lack of certification. This requirement is only present in judicial decisions, not in administrative cases, like a disbarment proceeding. Even if such certification were required, it is beyond doubt that the conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after consultation and deliberations and voted attest to that. Per curiam decision – opinion of the court as a whole; there is no ponente. For cases where the court does not want to expose the identity of the ponente. Resolution v Decision Resolution – does not decide the case; dilatory; i.e. dismissal of a case for lack of merit Decision – when the court has given due course; must state facts and law.

39. OIL AND NATURAK GAS COMMISSION V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, against the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED. The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India while the private respondent is a private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.

The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted from the failure of the respondent to deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well cement to the petitioner even it had already received payment and despite petitioner’s several demands. The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates that he venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.

The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in favour of the petitioner setting forth the arbitral award. To enable the petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. This was objected by the respondent but foreign court refused to admit the private respondent's objections for

failure to pay the required filing fees. Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands by the petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. The petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari,

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract.

RULING:

The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. If the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the trial court's dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's complaint before Branch 30 of the RTC of Surigao City is REVERSED.

40. ATTY ALICE ODCHIGUE-BONDOC VS. TAN TIONG BIO AKA HENRY TAN

Tan Tiong Bio (respondent) had fully paid the installment payments of a 683-square-meter lot in the Manila Southwoods Residential Estates, a project of Fil-Estate Golf & Development, Inc. (Fil-Estate) in Carmona, Cavite, but Fil-Estate failed to deliver to him the title covering the lot, despite repeated demands. Fil-Estate also failed to heed the demand for the refund of the purchase price.[1]Respondent, later learning that the lot “sold” to him was inexistent,[2] filed a complaint for Estafa against Fil-Estate officials including its Corporate Secretary Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc (petitioner) and other employees.[3]

In her Counter-Affidavit, petitioner alleged that, inter alia,

x x x x

5. I had no participation at all in the acts or transactions alleged in the Complaint-Affidavit. As a Corporate Secretary, I have never been involved in the management and day-to-day operations of [Fil-Estate]. x x x

x x x x.

7. x x x. [Herein respondent] alleges:

“The letter showed that the request was approved by [herein petitioner], provided that the transfer fee was paid, and that there be payment of full downpayment, with the balance payable in two years.”

8) The handwritten approval and endorsement, however, are not mine. I have never transacted, either directly or indirectly, with Mrs. Ona or [herein respondent]. x x x[4] (emphasis partly in the original, partly supplied; underscoring supplied)On the basis of petitioner’s above-quoted allegations in her Counter-Affidavit, respondent filed a complaint for Perjury against petitioner, docketed as I.S. No. PSG 03-07-11855 before the Pasig City Prosecutor’s Office, which dismissed it by Resolution of June 17, 2004[5] for insufficiency of evidence, and denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration.[6]

On petition for review, the Department of Justice (DOJ), by Resolution of July 20, 2005 signed by the Chief State Prosecutor for the Secretary of Justice,[7] motu proprio dismissed the petition on finding that there was no showing of any reversible error, following Section 12(c) of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000 (National Prosecution Service [NPS] Rule on Appeal).

Respondent’s motion for reconsideration having been denied[8] by Resolution of January 23, 2006, he filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which, by Decision of September 5, 2008,[9] set aside the DOJ Secretary’s Resolution, holding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing respondent’s petition for review without therein expressing clearly and distinctly the facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.[10]

The appellate court went on to hold that the matter of disposing the petition outright is clearly delineated, not under Section 12 but, under Section 7 of the NPS Rule on Appeal which categorically directs the Secretary to dismiss outright an appeal or a petition for review filed after arraignment; and that under Section 7, the Secretary may dismiss the petition outright if he finds the same to be patently without merit, or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised are too unsubstantial to require consideration.[11]

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, she filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner asserts that the requirement in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions of “courts of justice”[12]; that, citing Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna,[13] the constitutional provision does not extend to decisions or rulings of executive departments such as the DOJ; and that Section 12(c) of the NPS Rule on Appeal allows the DOJ to dismiss a petition for review motu proprio, and the use of the word “outright” in the DOJ Resolution simply means “altogether,” “entirely” or “openly.”[14]

In his Comment, respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not limited to courts, citing Presidential Ad hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,[15] as it extends to quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, as well as to preliminary investigations conducted by these tribunals.

Further, respondent, citing Adasa v. Abalos,[16] argues that the DOJ “muddled” the distinction between Sections 7 and 12 of the NPS Rule on Appeal and that an “outright” dismissal is not allowed since the DOJ must set the reasons why it finds no reversible error[17] in an assailed resolution.

The petition is impressed with merit.

A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since “the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.”[18]

x x x [A prosecutor] does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged [of] a crime and to enable the [prosecutor] to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the [prosecutor] makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the [prosecutor].[19] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)A preliminary investigation thus partakes of an investigative or inquisitorial power for the sole purpose of obtaining information on what future action of a judicial nature may be taken.[20]

Balangauan v. Court of Appeals[21] in fact iterates that even the action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor’s order or resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the “DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body.”[22] Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.

Respondent posits, however, that Balangauan finds no application in the present case for, as the Supreme Court stated, the DOJ “rectified the shortness of its first resolution by issuing a lengthier one when it resolved [the therein] respondent['s] . . . motion for reconsideration.”[23] Respondent’s position fails.

Whether the DOJ in Balangauan issued an extended resolution in resolving the therein respondent’s motion for reconsideration is

immaterial. The extended resolution did not detract from settling that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body.

Respondent’s citation of Presidential Ad hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans is misplaced as the Ombudsman dismissed the therein subject complaint prior to any preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman merely evaluated the complaint pursuant to Section 2, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which reads:

SEC. 2. Evaluation.–Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be:

a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;

b) referred to respondent for comment;

c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case;

d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or official for fact-finding investigation;

e) referred for administrative adjudication; or

f) subjected to a preliminary investigation. (emphasis supplied)Respecting the action of the Secretary of Justice on respondent’s petition for review under Section 12 of the NPS Rule on Appeal, respondent posits that “outright” dismissal is not sanctioned thereunder but under Section 7. Respondent’s position similarly fails.

That the DOJ Secretary used the word “outright” in dismissing respondent’s petition for review under Section 12 of the Rule which reads:

SEC. 12. Disposition of the appeal.–The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the petition for review on any of the following grounds:

x x x x

(a) That there is no showing of any reversible error;

x x x x (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)does not dent his action. To be sure, the word “outright” was merely used in conjunction with the motu proprio action.

Section 7 has an altogether different set of grounds for the outright dismissal of a petition for review. These are (a) when the petition is patently without merit; (b) when the petition is manifestly intended for delay; (c) when the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration; and (d) when the accused has already been arraigned in court.[24]

When the Secretary of Justice is convinced that a petition for review does not suffer any of the infirmities laid down in Section 7, it can decide what action to take (i.e., reverse, modify, affirm or dismiss the appeal altogether), conformably with Section 12. In

other words, Sections 7 and 12 are part of a two-step approach in the DOJ Secretary’s review power.

As for respondent’s reliance on Adasa, it too fails for, unlike in the case of Adasa, herein petitioner has not been arraigned as in fact no Information has been filed against her.

In the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of a public prosecutor who alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause in filing a criminal information,[25] courts will not interfere with his findings; otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the exercise of discretion on his part each time a criminal complaint is dismissed or given due course.[26]

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and the Resolutions of July 20, 2005 and January 23, 2006 of the Secretary of Justice are REINSTATED.

41. VALDEZ VS CA

SUMMARY OF DOCTRINES

Sec. 1:

Santiago vs Bautista- The courts may not exercise judicial power when there is no applicable law.- Case at bar: An award of honors to a student by a board of teachers may not be reversed by a court where the awards are governed by no applicable law.

Daza v Singson- Even if the issue presented was political in nature, the Court is still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.- That where serious constitutional questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure."

Mantruste Systems v Court of Appeals

- There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency, except when it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.

- Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the Asset Privatization Trust (administrative body), nor block, by an injunction, the discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decisions in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it.

Malaga v Penachos, Jr.

- It was previously declared the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to judge these matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. On issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not be prevented by any law (in this case, P.D. No. 605) from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

PACU v Secretary of Education

- Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies.

(Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy.)

- Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is especially true where the issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion.

Mariano, Jr. v COMELEC

- Considering that those contingencies mentioned by the petitioners may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue (city of Makati is involved). Worse, they raise this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

Macasiano v National Housing Authority

-It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case.

J. Joya v PCGG

- The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first two (2) requisites.

- Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.

Legaspi v Civil Service Commission

- It becomes apparent that when a Mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.

-"Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces every person.

Dumlao v COMELEC

- For one, there is a misjoinder of parties and actions. One petitioner does not join other petitioners in the burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join the former in his. They, respectively, contest completely different statutory provisions.

- For another, there are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.

Bugnay Const. and Dev’t. Corp. v Laron

- The doctrine holds that only when the act complained of directly involves an illegal disbursement of public funds raised by taxation will the taxpayer's suit be allowed. The essence of a taxpayer's right to institute such an action hinges on the existence of that requisite pecuniary or monetary interest.

- It is not enough that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he would be benefited or injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party in interest.

Kilosbayan v Guingona, Jr.

- A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised.

- In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities.

PHILCONSA v Enriquez

- The Senators have legal standing to question the validity of the veto. When a veto was made in excess of the authority of the President, it impermissibily intrudes into the domain of the Legislature. A member of Congress can question an act of the Executive which injures Congress as an institution.

Tatad v Garcia, Jr.

-The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of the law and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved (just like in Bugnay case since no public money was involved).

Oposa v Factoran, Jr.

- CLASS SUIT: The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court.

- Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

- Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors` assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

Lozada v COMELEC

- As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged that tax money is being illegally spent. It is only when an act complained of, which may include a legislative enactment or statute, involves the illegal expenditure of public money that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed.- The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial

resolution. When the asserted harm is a "generalized grievance" shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.

Kilosbayan v Morato

- The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous case was a narrow one, seven (7) members sustaining petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners' right to bring the suit. The majority was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in any subsequent litigation. In addition, there have been charges in the membership of the Court, with the retirement of Justice Cruz and Bidin and the appointment of the writer of this opinion and Justice Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the maintenance of the ruling as to petitioners' standing.

SECTION 3

Bengzon v Lim

- What is fiscal autonomy? It contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and play plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control.

- The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based

SECTION 4

Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v Court of Appeals, et.al.

- Reorganization is purely an internal matter of the Court to which petitioner certainly has no business at all.

- The Court with its new membership is not obliged to follow blindly a decision upholding a party's case when, after its re-examination, the same calls for a rectification.

SECTION 5

Drilon v Lim

- The Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all

cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

- In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion.

Larranaga v Court of Appeals

(Transfer the venue of the preliminary investigation from Cebu City to Manila because of the extensive coverage of the proceedings by the Cebu media which allegedly influenced the people's perception of petitioner's character and guilt.)

- The Court recognizes that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. It was previously held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage in publicity.- In the case at bar, nothing in the records shows that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel.

First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v Court of Appeals

- It is intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases paced under its appellate jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction can unnecessarily burden the Court and thereby undermine its essential function of expounding the law in its most profound national aspects.

Aruelo v Court of Appeals

- Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court.

Javellana v DILG

(Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 does not violate Article VIII. Section 5 of the Constitution. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law.)

- The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.

SECTION 6

Maceda v Vasquez

- In the absence of any administrative action taken against a person by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

- Where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

Raquiza v Judge Castaneda, Jr.

- The rules even in an administrative case demands that if the respondent Judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence presented against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary, to which respondent belongs, no less demands that before its member could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and based on competent proofs, no less. This is all the more so when as in this case the charges are penal in nature.

('Misconduct' also implies 'a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. It results that even if respondent were not correct in his legal conclusions, his judicial actuations cannot be regarded as grave misconduct, unless the contrary sufficiently appears.)

SECTION 10

Nitafan v Commissioner of Internal Revenue

- The clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches of Government.”

SECTION 11

De La Llana v Alba

-Judiciary Act does not violate judicial security of tenure. This Court is empowered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal." Thus, it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a

non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary.

People v Gacott, Jr.

- To require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc.

- Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be decided in division.

SECTION 12

In Re: Manzano

- As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the landable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.

SECTION 14

Nicos Industrial Corp v Court of Appeals

- The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.

- As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits, it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on which it is based.

Mendoza v CFI

- What is expected of the judiciary "is that the decision rendered makes clear why either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as established. Nor is there any regid formula as to

the language to be employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the particular judge in this respect, while not unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of words which he must use upon pain of being considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution directs."

- The provision has been held to refer only to decisions of the merits and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters such as the one at bar. (content of the resolution: incident in the prosecution of petitioner)

Borromeo v Court of Appeals

- The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis.

- When the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

- Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice.

Komatsu Industries (Phils.) Inc v Court of Appeals

- It has long been settled that this Court has discretion to decide whether a "minute resolution" should be used in lieu of a full-blown decision in any particular case and that a minute Resolution of dismissal of a Petition for Review on Certiorari constitutes an adjudication on the merits of the controversy or subject matter of the Petition. It has been stressed by the Court that the grant of due course to a Petition for Review is "not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the Court's denial. For one thing, the facts and law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion."Prudential Bank v Castro

- The Constitutional mandate that "no . . . motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be . . . denied without stating the legal basis therefor" is inapplicable in administrative cases. And even if it were, said Resolution stated the legal basis for the denial and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the Constitutional requirement. "Lack of merit," which was one of the grounds for denial, is a legal basis.

-(certification issue) The requirement of a certification refers to decisions to judicial cases and not to administrative cases. Besides, since the decision was a per curiam decision, a formal certification is not required.

Oil and Natural Gas Commission v Court of Appeals

- The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

SECTION 14 (not 16)

Valdez v Court of Appeals

- The (lower) court statement in the decision that a party has proven his case while the other has not, is not the findings of facts contemplated by the Constitution and the rules to be clearly and distinctly stated.- This Court has said again and again that it is not a trier of facts and that it relies, on the factual findings of the lower court and the appellate court which are conclusive.