BATTLE OF SHAKARGARH

(WITH SPEC REF TO C ATTKS BY 19 FF REGT)

Intro

1. Gentleman, since its inception, for the last 60 yrs

Pakistan Army has found itself engaged in wars, battles and

skirmishes, to thwart the evil / nefarious designs of its

adversaries. On internal front, it has been equally involved

to defeat the anti state activities of rebellious elms, and

currently it has been in a state of cont confrontation with

such groups. Notwithstanding the rel ops during various

disasters and mishaps of enormous magnitude, it’s current

emp in intricate envmts prevalent in FATA and Balochistan

is a clear manifestation of its pledge to protect the

motherland from any turmoil.

2. Whenever any crisis has set in, this nation has always

stood up against all odds and seized the opportunity to

preserve its raison d’etat. It is only due to this spirit and

character that despite its conflict ridden hist, it has emerged

as the only Muslim Nuc State.

3. Notwithstanding, 1971 war beyond any doubt has been

a great tragedy but there are numerous examples of brilliant

tac actions which can be quoted from eastern and western

theatre of war. Out of these gallant actions, an act of

bravery and tac acumen was performed by the ldrs and the

led of 19 FF in Shakargarh Salient of RCC.

4. I also feel privileged and honoured to narrate the

events and actions of this op which happened in the area of

8 Inf Div. The div I am presently commanding. This brings

me to the aim of this presentation;

5. Aim To critically analyse Battle of Shakargarh with spec

emphasis on C attks by 19 FF Regt to draw pertinent lessons

at bn/coy lvl.

Scheme of Presentation

6. I shall fol the seq as flashed:-

a. Part I . Characteristics of Terrain and Opposing

Forces

(1) An Overview, 1971 War

(2) Types of Border

(3) Description of RCC and Shakargarh Salient

(4) Op Perspective of RCC

(5) Overview of Opposing Forces & Plans

(6) Conduct of Def Battle

b. Part II . Battle of Shakargarh

(1) Terrain Highlts

(2) Opposing Forces

(3) Conduct

c. Part III . Analysis and Lessons Learnt

7. I have endeavoured to dev this presentation keeping in

mind the lvl of the audience sitting in front of me.

PART– I

AN OVERVIEW, 1971 WAR

8. Comparison of Forces . Gentleman, before I go over

to terrain highlights, may I give you a very brief overview of

1971 war so as to estb context of my talk. However, the

focus of my talk would remain on the action of 19 FF. So

therefore, let us see the co relation of forces first:-

a. Eastern Theatre of War . In tangible terms India

enjoyed marked superiority of forces in the Eastern

Theatre of war. The comparison is as flased:-

Fmns Pakistan India Ratio

Corps HQ 1 3 1:3

Inf / Mtn Div’s (w/o Tks) 3 8 1:2.6

Inf Bdes 9 28 1:3

Para Bde - 1 0:1

Inf Bns 34 72 1:2.1

Armd Regts 1 6 1:6

Indep Armd Sqns 1 3 1:3

Arty Regts 6 46 1:8

Anti Aircraft Regts 1 4 1:4

Paramil Forces (Bns) 13 32 1:3

Mukti Bahini - 100,000 -

b. Intangibles

(1) Eastern theatre of war was far away from

Western theatre.

(2) East Pakistan was surrounded by India from

three sides.

(3) Sea Blockade also restd the mov.

c. Western Theatre of War . One the Western

Theatre of war, India had marginal superiority:-

Formations Pakistan India Ratio

Corps HQ 3 3 1:1

Armoured Divs 2 1 2:1

Inf/Mtn Divs 10 13 1:1.3

Indep Armd Bdes 2 4 1:2

Indep Inf Bdes 1 3 1:3

TERRAIN HIGHLTS AND OPPOSING FORCES

Types of Border

9. Before I give you the details of terrain of Shakargarh

salient, it might of interest to you that I refresh your

memories by acquainting you with variety of 3245 kms bdry

regions we share with India on our Eastern side. Starting

from North, Pakistan has four different kinds of bdrys with

India and they are as flashed:-

a. Line of Actual Contact.

b. Line of Control.

c. Working Bdry.

d. International border, Now the brief description:-

a. Line of Actual Contact(LAC). It starts from Indra

Coli Pass in the north till NJ-9842 towards south

along the Saltoro Mtn Range. The dispute arose due

to differing interpretations of a provision of the 1949

ceasefire line and subsequent Simla Agreement of

1972. Indian Forces intruded into the areas of

Siachen Glacier in 1984 and occupied an area of

2500 Sq Kms. The length of LAC is 65 kms. It is

violable and not recognised by any intl or bilateral

agreement.

b. Line of Control (LOC). It is the dividing line

between Nothern areas / Azad Kashmir and IHK. It

starts from NJ-9842 and runs up to Thaku Chak a

place near Iftikharabad/Munawar, covering a total

length of about 740 KMs. This line is recognised by

Simla agreement signed in 1972, prior to Simla

agreement it was Cease Fire Line.

c. Working Bdry(WB). The 200 kms long bdry

between Pakistan and IHK from Thaku Chak in the

north to Abhial Dogran in south is termed as Working

Bdry. It is a de-facto border between India and

Pakistan till resolution of issue of Jammu and

Kashmir. ( India considers this portion beyond LOC to

be part of intl border whereas Pakistan subscribes to

the segment as the working boundary (WB)

between Pakistani Punjab and Indian Kashmir.

The implications of Working bdry are:-

(1) No concrete Pillars are instl however it is

marked by placing drums/ temp katcha pillars.

(According to Border Gr Rules of 1960/1961

Concrete Pillars can only be instl on Intl border)

(2) No side can carry out fencing along the border as

allowed in case of intl border. (However, the

Indians have done it in violation to this rule).

(3) Def const within 150 ms of the bdry cannot be

carried out by any side (However, India and

Pakistan both have done it in violation to this

rule).

(4) No recce/ log sp ac can fly within 1000 m of WB

and no cbt ac can fly within 10 kms.

e. Intl Border . The International Border starts from

Abial Dogran and runs south till Arabian Sea, having

a total length of 2,240 KMs. It is undisputed

internationally recognised except the Sir Creek

demarcation which is 100 km long estuary in saline

water lands of the Run of Kutch between the states

of the Gujarat in India and Sindh in Pakistan.

13. Description of RCC and Shakargarh Salient.

Gentlemen now I shall briefly orientate you with the Ravi

Chenab Corridor (RCC) in gen and Shakargarh salient in

particular:-

a. Ravi Chenab Corridor (RCC) is an area between the

two famous rivers flowing through Punjab i,e Chenab

in the NW and Ravi in the SE. Parmandal range

across WB lie to its NE and GT rd to its west, with a

total frontage of 371 Km.

b. Shakargarh Salient extends from east of Degh Nadi

to incl MRL – BRBL sub link Junc in the west.

Parmandal range to its NE and River Ravi in SE.

Total frontage of Shakargarh Salient is 202 Kms, out

of which 58 Kms is WB and remaining 144 Kms is IB.

c. The significant water channels in the area are, Degh

Nadi, few nullahs, Bein (which figures out in conduct)

and River Ravi.

d. In Cis-frontier imp comm centres are as flashed,

Zafarwal, Darman, Chak Amru, Kot Naina, Dhamtal,

Shakargarh, Nurkot, Ikhlaspur, Narowal, Baddomalhi,

QSS (Ahmedabad), and Pasrur.

e. A reasonably well dev comm infrastructure of both

rail and rd linked different towns and vills

f. On transfrontier, area is well populated with large,

medium and small size towns like Jammu, Samba,

Kuta, Kathua, Madhopur, Mamun, Pathankot,

Gurdaspur, Batala and Amritsar.

e. Main communication arteries of rd/rail, linking IHK

with mainland India passes perilously close to WB

through this narrow strip.

Op Perspective Of RCC

14. Gentlemen, RCC and Shakargarh salient stand out as

one of the most strategically vital pieces of gr for def of

motherland. Any Pakistani thrust launched from the Salient

into Kashmir at any pt along the entire 54 miles stretch from

Kathua to Jammu could enable the Pakistan Army to sever the

road link between India and Kashmir by advancing just five to

fifteen miles inside Indian Territory. On Indian side capture of

Shakargarh Salient was imperative to guard her vuln rd link

between India and Kashmir by launching a protective mnvr.

Overview of Opposing Forces/ Plan

15. Gentlemen, now let us see how both sides planned in

RCC.

16. Indian Offn Plan.In 1971 war, Indian 1 corps had the

dual task, not only to def the AOR opposite RCC but was also

tasked to add depth to her vuln line of comm by launching a

protective mnvr in Shakargarh Salient. The resources at the

disposal of 1 Corps are as flashed:-

a. Indian Army (1 Corps) - Forces

(1) 36 Inf Div Comd by Maj Gen Ahluwalia.

(2) 39 Inf Div Comd by Maj Gen Prabhu.

(3) 54 Inf Div Comd by Maj Gen Pinto.

(4) 16 Indep Armd Bde.

(5) 2 Indep Armd Bde.

(6) 16 Cav ex 14 Armd Bde.

(7) 2 Indep Arty Bde.

(8) 41 Indep Arty Bde.

17. Indian Army (1 Corps Offn Plan). Offn plan of the en

is as flashed:-

a. Main Effort. Emp 54 Div (UC Maj Gen Pinto)

alongwith 16 IABG less a regt to launch offn b/w

Degh and Karir Nadi on axis Mawa – Darman –

Zafarwal commencing op at 1900 hrs on 5/6 Dec

71 to clear area upto Zafarwal – Azizpur.

b. Sdry Effort. By 39 Div (UC Maj Gen Prabhu) less

a bde alongwith 2 IABG less a regiment to launch

offn b/w Karir Nadi and River Bein on axis –

Samba – Delhra – Chak Amru – Shakargarh

commencing op at 1900 hrs on ni 5/6 Dec 71 to

clear area upto Shakargarh.

c. Aux Effort. With 36 Div (UC Maj Gen Ahluwalia)

less a bde alongwith 14 H (ex 2 IAB) to launch offn

on axis Thakarpur - Kotnaina – Shakargarh /

Nurkot across river front commencing op on ni

10/11 Dec 71 to clear area up to line Nurkot-

Shakargarh.

d. Note. ( The delay of 5/6 days b/w Main, Sdry and

Aux effort was to embroil / cut the base of own offn

( if launched ) towards Kathua – Madhopur.

(However, it did not materialise and taking the

advantage Indian planned offn to clear line

Shakargarh – Nurkot on ni 10/11 Dec )

18. Pakistan Army (1 Corps) – Forces. Forces aval to 1

Corps were :-

a. Def Forces

(1) 8 Div, UC Maj Gen Abdul Malik

(2) 15 Div, UC Maj Gen Abdul aziz

(3) 8 IABG, UC Brig Mohammad Ahmed

b. Offn Forces

(4) 6 Armd Div

(5) 17 Inf Div UC R.D Shamim

19. Pakistan Army (1 Corps Def Plan). Gentlemen, 1

Corps UC Lt Gen Irshad Ahmed was resp for the Def of RCC

from Marala HW to MRL sub link (the area which is now

being def by 30 Corps) with,

a. 15 Div to def area from incl Marala HW to incl Deg

Nadi. and,

b. 8 Div was resp:-

(1) To def Shakargarh Salient from excl Degh Nadi

to incl MRL sub Link Canal in SW.

(2) Capture Dharam enclave on the out break of

hostilities.

(3) 8 IABG . To act as Corps Res and was loc in gen

area Dhamthal.

c. 8 Div Def Plan . The depl plan in response to en

offn plan was:-

(1) Main Def Effort. 24 Bde was resp to def

Zafarwal Sec. Zafarwal was to be def as str pt.

(2) Sdry Def Effort. 14 (P) Bde was resp to def

Shakargarh Sec as under:-

(a) 23 FF was depl as lt fwd bn.

(b) 19 FF was depl in Shakargarh sub sec as

cen fwd bn.

(c) 20 PR was depl in Nurkot sub sec as rt

fwd bn.

(3) Aux Def Effort . 115 Bde was to def

Narowal Sec with an addl task to capture

Dharam enclave.

(4) Covering Tps – Changez Task Force . To

conduct delaying battle b/w Degh and Bein.

Note ( Changez Task Force UC Brig Nisar with

20 L, 33 Cav and 13 Punjab fought covering

tps battle b/w Basanter Nullah and Bein River

from 5 to 11 Dec. Delaying Indian offn for

seven days against the perceived 72 hrs delay)

PART – II

BATTLE OF SHAKARGARH

20. Terrain – Shakargarh. Gentlemen, just to have quick

look at the area where Battle of Shakargarh was fought by 19

FF, it is a stretch of 30 kms in length and 20 kms in width. Two

famous rivers Ravi and Bein flow in this area from north to

south. Tarnah N and River Ravi flow in the east and Bein in

the centre of AOO. Shakargarh is connected with Narowal

through rd and rly. Rly line and rd terminates at Chak Amru in

the north of Shakargarh. Major portion of the battle was fought

in north of Shakargarh. Imp vills/ towns in the AOO (are as

flashed) Shakargarh,Tehra, Phalware, Chatrana, Chatrana

Forest, Pindi Sainyan, Pindi Manan, Chak Amru, Sukol (En

Post), Inayatpur, Jalala Bund, Kot Naina, Ikhlaspur,

Dinpur Kalan and Dinpur Khurd.

21. Apchs ldg to Shakargarh. 3 x apchs entered into the

AOO. These were:-

a. Chak Amru Apch. Kuta – Chak Amru - Maryal-

Shakargarh.

b. Ikhlaspur Apch. Kathua - Ikhlaspur –

Shakargarh.

c. Kot Naina Apch. Gurdaspur - Kukar enclave –

Kot Naina – Shakargarh.

( all apch can take div/ div plus with armr bde)

19 FF Def Plan

22. Msn. The bn msn was “ to def Shakargarh by taking

up def from incl Pindi Manan to lncl Din pur Kalan by Ist lt

28 Nov 1971 with protective dets at:-

a. Coy in area Inayatpur.”

b. Coy at Jalala Bund in area Ikhlaspur.

23. Resources Aval to 19 FF

a. Under Comd

(1) Pl ex 21 Balcoh (R&S)

(2) 1 x Det ex 226 Sp Coy (COBRA).

(3) C Coy ex 2 Wing Chenab Rangers.

b. In DS

(1) Q Bty ex 78 Fd Regt.

24. Depl Plan. As flashed:-

a. Ali Coy. Initially to act as part of protective det with a

coy of West Pakistan Rangers in area Inayatpur with

fall back posn (16 kms) at Pindi Manan incl to Pindi

Sainiyan excl facing north as part of left fwd coy of bn

main def posn.

b. Bahadur Coy. As rt fwd coy in gen area from incl

Dinpur Khurd to incl Dinpur Kalan.

c. Chattak Coy. Depl as cen fwd coy in gen area

Chatrana vill incl to Chatrana Forest excl.

d. Dalair Coy. Initially depl as protective dets at Jalala

Bund with fall back posn as depth coy in gen area vill

Phalwari facing east

e. Bn HQ. At vill Tehra.

f. Mor Pl. At Chatrana Forest.

g. Pl ex 21 Baloch (R&S). To cover gap b/w

Bahadur and Chattak coys.

h. C Coy ex 2 Wing Chenab Rangers. It was depl

in gen area Afzal Pura facing south from rd Dinpur

Kalan excl to Afzal Pura incl.

j. Obs Plan. Def M fd in front of FDLs over a

frontage of 8 x kms.

k. Obsn Plan. Listening Posts (LPs) and standing ptl

(SP) for early wng in front of fwd coys.

En Attk Plan on Shakargarh

25. Gentleman, before I dilate upon the offn plan on

Shakargarh, let me very briefly acquaint you with the

unfolding of battle up to 13/14 Dec 1971 inside Shakargarh

Salient:-

a. Indian 54 & 39 Div launched the offn on 5/6 Dec as

per plan.

b. By 7/8 Dec, 54 Div had contacted line Sakror-

Lagwal and 39 Div had secured area up to Chak

Amru – Khaira after a tough delaying battle given

by Changez tasks force.

c. By 10/11 Dec 54 Div had captured Dehlara and 39

Div had secured area further south of Chak Amru.

Meanwhile Changez task force was ordered to wdr

on 11 Dec.

d. Towards Shakargarh Sec, on 10 Dec, 8 IABG had

launched a C attk b/w Kotnaina – Nurkot on

possible break out by 36 Div towards line Nurkot –

Shakargarh (However, this attk went in vaccum as

the en had not launched the offn as yet).

e. On 11 Dec, GOC 8 Div ordered re-depl of 14 (P)

Bde west of Bein as Flashed:-

(1) 23 FF (West of Shakargarh)

(2) 19 FF ( N & E of Shakargarh)

(3) 27 FF (b/w Nurkot – South of 19 FF)

(4) 20 PR (Nurkot)

f. By 14/15 Dec, 54 Div Commenced the offn and

captured Barapind Jarpal, where a famous acct of

battle by 35 FF was given.

26. Towards Shakargarh Sec en had planned a two

pronged attk as fol:-

a. 115 Bde ex 36 Div (Kotnaina - Shakargarh Apch)

(1) Ph – 1. 4 Grenadiers was to attk and capture

vill Dinpur commencing op at 1900 hrs on ni

13/14 Dec 71.

(2) Ph – 2. 10 Grenadiers and 1st Mahar Regts

with armr in close sp were to attk and capture

Shakargarh commencing op at 1st lt 14 Dec.

b. 87 Bde ex 39 Div (Chak Amru – Shakargarh Apch)

(1) Ph – 1. 3/9 Gorkha Rifles were to attk and

capture vill Chatrana and Chatrana Forest

commencing op at 2000 hrs on ni 14/15 Dec.

(2) Ph – 2. 14 Rajputana Rifles and 9 Mahar

Regts sp by armr elms were to attk and capture

vill Phalwari and Shakargarh from NE

commencing op at 1st lt 15 Dec.

27. Conduct - Battle of Protective Dets

a. Ali and Dalair coys were to act as protective dets and

occupy successive delaying lines till joining bn main

def posn north of Shakargarh. Both the coys

occupied their fwd posn at Jalala bund and Inayatpur

by 29 Nov 71.

b. On 4 Dec at 0600 hrs No1 Pl of Ali Coy attacked

sukol post at own initiative and destroyed OP tower.

However could not over run the post. On 5 Dec, No.1

Pl/ Ali Coy again attk en Sukol Post from different dir

and was able to capture the post alongwith 3 sq

miles area upto Tarnah N.

c. Due to dev of en op on Kot Naina and Chak Amru

axis, on 9 Dec 71 both the coys were ordered to imed

wdr to main def and by morning 10 Dec 71 both coys

were in their respective AOR of bn main def north of

Shakargarh.

28. Main Battle of Shakargarh

a. Conduct of Battle (Kotnaina – Shakargarh Apch)

(1) At 1900 on ni 13/14 Dec En commenced attk.

Coy plus size force of 4 Grenadiers attk rt fwd pl

(4) of Bahader Coy at Dinpur Kalan. Attk was

repulsed and en left behind 5 dead and 4 POWs.

Own cas incl 4 x shaheeds and 7x injured incl

OC Bahader Coy who was replaced by Bn 2IC.

(2) This pl (4) was rft with Bn Pnr pl by 1800 hrs 14

Dec 71.

(3) At 1900 hrs on 14 Dec, en attempted second

attk on No 4 Pl at Dinpur. This time the en was

successful and pl posn was over run by 1950

hrs.

(4) 1 st C Attk . At 2000 hrs, Dalair coy less a Pl

was ordered to launch C attk. Bde HQ had

promised provn of few tks for C attk but the

same did not arrive in time.

(5) Keeping in mind the time constraints, Bn Comd

ordered to launch C attk without tks. Dalair Coy

less a pl UC Maj Hamid ( later Brig Hamid) , loc

5 miles away from its obj launched timely C attk

and recaptured the lost posn by approx 2300

hrs, ni 14/15 Dec 71.

b. Conduct of Battle (Chak Amru – Shakargarh

Apch)

(1) At 2000 hrs on ni 14/15 Dec, 3/9 Gorkha Rifles

launched the attk.

(2) At this moment 19 FF was under attk from two

dir. In south No 4 Pl / Bahader Coy was over run

by en and own Dalair Coy less a pl (depth Coy)

was on mov for the C attk. Whereas in north en

had commenced attk on Chatrana forest.

(3) LP and SP of 19 FF could not report en attk and

thus en was able to achieve surprise and entered

Chatrana forest where it confronted Mor pl depl

between and rear of Ali & Chattak Coy.

(4) Due to resilient fight put up by mor pl and timely

on loc (OL) arty fire en attk was halted at mere

25 yds from the mor posn.

(5) At the same time fresh en tps contacted No 2 Pl /

Ali Coy from Chatrana forest on reverse front.

Adv en was checked very gallantly by a Bangali

Lnk Suleman Sarkar who was performing sentry

duty on LMG and kept on firing volley after volley

despite en pressure till he ran out of the ammo,

but the brave man started throwing Energa grens

on adv en.

(6) Due to well-timed, well coord and gutsy response

by Mor Pl and Lnk Sulaman Sarkar of No2 Pl/Ali

Coy, en wdr few hundred yards south and took

up re-org posn in Chatrana Forest in between Ali

& Chattak Coy.

(7) Reading the fast changing battle sit, the CO imed

ordered No 12 Pl / Dalair Coy UC Adjt Capt

Faryad Ali to occupy Pl C pen posn south of Ali

Coy and NW of Chattak Coy in front of the en

depl to check the further adv towards the depth

of bn.

(8) As per en plan a coy of 3/9 Gorkha was to attk

Chatrana vill from Chatrana Forest in bn Phase

II. Chattak Coy Comd (defending Chatrana vill)

was aware of the en presence north and rear of

his coy. He info the current sit to Bn Comd who in

turn instr the coy comd to get more info about the

en. Coy Comd alongwith CHM and runner started

mov toward Chatrana vill where he was engaged

by the en fire, on his way back he was

surrounded by en and made captive as the en

had over run his Coy HQ by that time.

(Later when the area was recaptured by

successful C attk, bullets ridden dead body of

Maj Afzal was found along with body of CHM.)

c. Sit at 0100 hrs, 15 Dec 71

(1) En had captured Chatrana vill and forest and

was in process of quick re org/consolidation in

an area of over 1000 yds facing SW.

(2) No 12 Pl/Dalair Coy UC Adjt lost dir to occupy C

Pen posn and reached west of Chatrana village

where he cfm en presence in vill Chatrana to bn

HQ.

(3) Own Dalair Coy less one pl had recaptured lost

area of Bahader Coy at Din Pur Kalan.

(4) Ali Coy and mor pl were intact.

(5) Bn Comd was in serious sit, however the

audacious CO kept his wits on and decided fol:-

(a) Asked 12 Pl / Dalair Coy UC Adjt to fall back

to Bn HQ as rft.

(b) Dalair Coy less one pl alongwith pnr pl to fall

back to Bn HQ from Dinpur Kalan. (On

insistence from OC Bahader Coy 1 x Pl ex

Dalair Coy was left in situ).

(c) Asked Bde HQ for aval of few tks.

(d) Alerted all the elms of bn HQ incl cks / clks

swprs, and even civs.

d. 2 nd C Attk

(1) CO waited for tp of tk, Dalair Coy and pnr pl but

they were still not in loc. Seeing the criticality of

time he imed ordered to launch a two pronged C

attk. CO along with elms of Bn HQ to run over

the en from rt of village Chatrana whereas Adjt

Capt Faryad along with SM Galeen Khan with

No 12 pl/Dalair Coy to launch the C attk from left

dir.

(2) The two pronged C attk commenced at 0200 hrs

on on ni 14/15 Dec 71.

(3) Soon after the C attk commenced, Capt Faryad

sustained a bullet injury on chest and comd was

taken over by SM Galeen Khan. Both the C attks

met success and en was evicted from Chatrana

vill and was pushed towards Chatrana Forest by

0330 hrs 15 Dec 71.

e. 3 rd C Attk

(1) By 0400 hrs 15 Dec, Dalair Coy less one pl

along with pnr pl and tp of tk arrived at Bn HQ.

(2) Without any delay Maj Hamid, coy comd was

called upon by the CO and ordered to launch C

attk on Chatrana Forest. Tk led the C attk up to

outer fringes of forest and from then on went in

fire sp role and inf charged through the forest.

The C attk met success and en was evicted,

during the process 23 x en soldiers were made

POW by Dalair Coy. It was the second

successful C attk by the Dalair Coy in one ni

under the dynamic comd of Maj Hamid.

(3) When the Dalair Coy was clearing the Chatrana

forest they were fired upon by some en tps

hidden in BUA of Chatrana vill, Dalair Coy

encircled them and made another 30 x POW’s

incl a fd offr.

(4) By 0600 hrs, 15 Dec due to well-timed and

heroic action 19 FF recaptured all the lost area

and def was restored before the cease fire at

1930 hrs on 17 Dec 1971. This was a fine

example of dash, initiative and courage on the

part of commanders and tps, and goes on to

prove that timely C attk, even if vastly inferior in

no, can throw back a much larger enemy force

from his lodgements.

29. Over View of Losses

a. Own

(1) Shaheed - 13 (1xOffr,12xOR)

(2) Wounded - 30 (2xOffrs, 2xJCOs, 26xOR)

b. En

(1) Killed - 73

(2) Wounded - 09

(3) POW’s - 70 (3xOffrs,1xJCO,66xOR)

PART – III

ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNT

Analysis and Lessons Learnt

30. As a defender while conceiving a def plan one must be

able to visualize how the def battle takes place. The

visualization of en’s cap will enable the defender to

ascertain the bias of def, anti tk def, formulate the obsn

plan, obs plan and make sure that aval firepower is

optimally utilized. As a comd you must remember that the

attk will always have an initial advantage of initiative, str

ratio and choice of pt of application. Then starts the duel b /

w two thinking minds with the obj of defeating each other. As

Clauswitz said that def is the stronger form of warfare, the

def must ident his strs. The str of def lies after having

absorbed the initial disadvantage making use of the flexibility

that comes to his hands after the en has cmt itself. Another

imp factor that you must understand is ident of correct time

and place of decisive action by the bn and bde comd. If

these two things are correctly conceived then the def can

bring the en to the killing zone of his own choice by taking

appropriate measures, in the process causing attrition to the

en and conc max possible fire power at that place and time of

his own choosing then the attacker is doomed to lose. In

nutshell, if you as a def aprc and analyse the terrain better,

coord good obs and obsn plan, carryout sound vis of en,

ident correct time and place of decisive battle, you can

snatch that initial advantage from the en, disturb his

design, attrite him through bold and offn application of

resources and bring him to the place of your choosing

and then give him that final blow, there is no reason why

the en can’t be defeated. This all will req the ability of jnr ldrs

to handle unforeseen sits, willpower and endurance by all

ranks to stand the mental as well as phy stress. With this

premise let’s go over some of the lessons which if carried

home can become instinctive reactions at the time of crisis:-

a. Deliberate Planning, Prep and Knowledge of

Terrain. On being given orders to occupy defs on 28

Nov, CO carried out deliberate planning as regards to

depl of his coys on gr and laying of obs sys, posting

of security elms etc. He also had advantage of

knowledge of the terrain owing to initial task as bde

res. This deliberate planning and thorough prep for

battle lead the way for victory of 19 FF despite some

flaws like failure of Standing Ptl and Listening Post to

info about en’s adv towards Chatak Coy and loss of

dir by 12 pl of Dalair Coy which was being led by

Capt Faryad.

b. Comd, Con and Flow of Info. Once the bn is depl

over extended frontages and under the fog of the

battle and sketchy info is being shared by

undercomds, then it is perceived that comd and con

becomes little difficult. However, in case of 19 FF,

the timely info was passed on to bn comd which

enabled him to take quick and right decisions.

d. En Attk Plan and Exec. En had planned to attk

Shakargarh with two bdes on either of the flanks of

19 FF. However, the exec did not commensurate with

the planning. En attks lacked boldness, conc of effort

and desired impetus. GM, if you recollect the conduct

of the battle, the en had some serious voids in their

attk plan. Instead of going with bde attks, she

resorted to bn and coy lvl attks. Though the attks

were multi directional yet en was strong no where.

e. Change of Op Task. 19 FF was initially asg the task

to act as bde res. However, in Nov 71 unit was asg

the task of def Shakargarh Sec. 19 FF was able to

perform the changed task successfully due to their

advantage of their presence in the area for 8 months.

Ideally speaking under the prevailing envmt no bn will

be purly for def or offn roll.

f. Personality of the CO. Study of mil history is

testament to the fact that all battles have been

impacted by personal style and comportment of

comds. Lt Col Shafique SJ, a war veteran of 1965

war, with attributes of professional excellence,

courage, determination and mental robustness led 19

FF by setting personal example who was capable of

responding to the unforeseen sits and leading his tps

resolutely through the adverse conditions of B fd.

g. Aggressiveness in Def. Best form of def is

characterized by aggressive spirit and vigorous

behaviour of the def. The def battle has to be seen to

begin where you can improve your posture, display

the will to fight and deliver a fatal blow during main

def battle. As en is in new area, is disoriented,

imbalanced and fatigued so this is the time to seize

the opportunity with aggressive spirit. Cadence, beat

and attitude is the recipe of aggressive spirit.

h. Stress Bearing Capacity. A hard contested battle

would always stretch you to extreme limits of physical

and psychological pressures. Under the sit of

immense pressure, despite the cas of coy comds of

Bahadur and Chatak coys and Adjt, the remaining

offrs and men of 19 FF in gen and Dalair coy in

particular displayed high lvl of stress bearing

capacity. The attitude of fighting till last man last

bullet should become instinct for ldrs and led. Def

must not succumb to initial reversal but always strive

resolutely to recover and re-gp to give another tough

fight to the attk.So the pt to remember here is that

whatever is the nature of physical and psychological

pressures during peace time exs, you the jnr ldrs

should conceive the ways and methods to put

undercomd through demanding sits where they are

able to survive the stress for 72 hrs and still fight in

the face of strong opposn.

j. Role of Jnr Ldrs. Jnr ldr have always played a very

crucial role in the outcome of any battle. This would

be even more applicable in any future conflict. During

any conflict with the en, ups and downs are basic

ingredient of the battle. Only those comds and jnr ldrs

who can keep their wits about in the face of

intimidating sits and exhibit resilience while

confronting adverse sits, likely to confront them

frequently, can take right decisions and lead their

outfits to the ultimate success. Jnr Ldrs who have

conviction in the rightness of their obj, are self

assured, proud to be led by excellence of their comds

and fearlessly vigorous to disregard any threat to

their life are recipe of success in the profession of

arms. During the exec of 2nd C attk, Capt Faryad

sustained bullet injury and the comd was imed taken

over by SM Galeen Khan, who led the action to

success

l. Aval of Res. Res at all lvls provide flexibility to

local comds to react promptly and restore the sit.

While planning any def battle comd must keep

adequate res at his disposal in order to react imed

w/o waiting for help from higher HQ. Though Dalair

Coy was cmt in def of depth loc, yet the Bn Comd

took the risk of up sticking two pls to exploit the

opportunity to evict the en from his defs w/o waiting

for the bde res. This calc risk proved very beneficial

and the C attk was a success.

30. Now, before I conclude lets hear the views of Maj Gen

(Retd) Shafique then CO 19 FF and Brig ( Retd) Hamid then

Coy comd Dalair Coy.

CONCL

31. There are always lessons to be learnt from the past

battles and the conflicts. Taking a realistic stock of our failings

of the past also helps us to realize the inadequacy of our

present preparation for the test of war. It is important to ask

ourselves as where do we stand today vis-à-vis our state in

1971? Is the state of our leadership, character, efficiency,

discipline and training and preparation significantly better,

marginally better, at the same level or have we deteriorated

even further? It is time that we answer this question with

courage, maturity and honesty if we have to redeem our

honour and self respect. If we are truly conscious of this, we

are bound to be successful in any future war, Insha Allah.

I thank you all gentlemen. Now if you have any question, I

will be privileged to answer.