1980 - mansbridge - review (pateman) the problem of political obligation
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7/24/2019 1980 - Mansbridge - Review (PATEMAN) the Problem of Political Obligation
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ReviewAuthor(s): Jane MansbridgeReview by: Jane MansbridgeSource: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 74, No. 2 (Jun., 1980), pp. 488-490Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1960662Accessed: 23-11-2015 18:40 UTC
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7/24/2019 1980 - Mansbridge - Review (PATEMAN) the Problem of Political Obligation
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488
TheAmerican
PoliticalScience
Review
Vol. 74
has
written,
and
necessarily
presuppose
the
existence
of
such
criteria,
which he
has
em-
ployed in
order
to resolve
these
problems.
An
interpretation
of
Locke's
ideas,
in
other
words,
always
points
in
two
directions
in
its
assessment of those ideas. It presents,in some
respect, a
contextual
view of
Locke's
intellectu-
al
surroundings
n
terms of which
the
meanings
of his
statements
are
explicated,
and it
assumes
some
basis for
the
recognition
by
the
reader
of
the
relevance
of these
views. These
undertak-
ings, of
course, may
be
carried
out
well
or
poorly in
terms of the
historical
evidence
presented
and the
conscious
attention
paid to
the
interpreter's
presuppositions.
Against
the
record
of
existing
scholarship
dealingwith
the
history
of
political
theory,
Parry
does reason-
ably well. He recognizes that placingLockean
ideas in
their
historical
context
is
necessary
if
readers
are
to
grasp the
dimensions
and
the
implications attached
to the
choices
they
face
with
respect to
the
many
and
varied Lockean
legacies,
which,
like the
ghost of
Hamlet's
father,
appear
now
and
then
to
urge
them
to
commit-or
not
to
commit-some
political ac-
tion.
There
is much
to be
said
for
both
the
relevance
and the
historical
accuracy
of
Parry's
Locke
who
opposed authoritarianism
n
intel-
lectual life (p. 2). Certainly,a good deal of
this
anti-authoritarian
erspective,
especially
in
philosophy and
religion,
depends
upon
and
reinforces
the
development
of
individuality
as
Parry
describes
it.
Still,
the
darker
shadows
of this
enlightenment
iberalism
begin
to
appear
when we
shift
the
meaning
of
Locke's
indivi-
duality towards
its
identification
with
those
who are
industrious,
or its
necessary
connec-
tion
with
private
property,
leading to the
conclusion
that
a
capitalist
market
economy is
undoubtedly that
which
is
most
congruent
with
Lockean civil society (pp. 42-43, 50, 123).
The
interpretive
problems in
John
Locke arise
for
Parry
because
his
view
of Locke
supposes
that the
meaning
of
express
consent
extends
to all
individuals and
therefore
beyond Mac-
pherson's
identification
of
that
term
with
a
defense
of
property
rights,
although
Parry
admits
that
he
has
no
textual
warrantfor
this
reading
(thus,
he
judges
Locke's
account of
express
consent
to be
seriously
inadequate )
(pp.
103-08).
At
the same
time,
Parryargues
for the
importance of a
moral
dimension
to
Locke's linkage of private property with the
development
of
individuality
(p.
50).
Yet
when later
liberals
(e.g.,
T.
H.
Green)
used
this
aspect
of
Lockean
liberalism
n defense
of
the
view
that
society ought
to
redistribute
its
resources
to
place the
deprived
n a
position to
cultivate their
individuality,
they
are
accused
by
Parry
of
having
taken
the
wrong
historical
turn
(p.
157).
It
is
true
that
Locke
did
not
assignthis
task
to civil
society,
but
it
is
far
from
self-evident that
it does more violence
to
his
intentions than the attempt to use his defini-
tion
of
private
property (in its
moral dimen-
sion?) in defense of the
social and
economic
power
of
IBM,
StandardOil,
or General
Motors.
Throughout John
Locke,
Parry is con-
cerned-almost
obsessed-with
arguing hat
civil
society
has
no right
to
redistribute
private
property in
order
to
lessen
social
inequalities
(pp.
120,
153-56).
This is
a
bit
odd,
since
no
one has
attributed
such
a view to
Locke. At the
same
time,
Parry enlists the
support
of
Hayek,
Banfield, and
Friedman in their
criticisms
of
the ends and achievements of welfare state
liberalism.
There
is
nothing
wrong with
this,
but to
conclude, as
Parry
does, that
the
remedy
for the
political
problems of
con-
temporarysociety
must
be to turn
the
state's
activities
back to
something
akin to
those
of
Locke's civil
government
p. 158),
assumes he
construction
of a bridge
over
troubled
waters
for which
all the
necessary materials
are
not
provided
n
John
Locke.
RICHARD
ASHCRAFT
Universityof California,LosAngeles
The
Problem of Political
Obligation:A
Critical
Analysis
of
Liberal
Theory.
By
Carole
Pate-
man.
(New York:
John
Wiley,
1979.
Pp.xi +
205.
$21.95.)
Subtle insight, originality, and the dogged
pursuit of
an idea
markCarole
Pateman'snew
book on
political
obligation.
Obligation
for
Pateman can
only mean
self-assumed' bliga-
tion (pp.
12-13). This
assumption
leads her
to
conclude
that only a
fully
participatory
democracy-where each citizen
either wills
each
law
or actively
consents to a
majority
willing
that
law-can create
genuine
political
obliga-
tion.
oPateman's
onsideration
of different
versions
of
the
competing
liberal
heory
of
obligation
and the analogyshe developsbetween political
obligation and
the
social
practice
of
promising
form
the
strongest
parts
of
the
book.
Hypo-
thetical,
or
tacit,
consent cannot
produce
politi-
cal
obligation, she
argues,
because
'consent'
is
meaningless
if
people
do not
know
that
t6'
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7/24/2019 1980 - Mansbridge - Review (PATEMAN) the Problem of Political Obligation
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1980
Book Reviews:
Political
Theory
and
Methodology
489
perform
a certain act is
to consent (p. 73).
Neither
can
non-acts
like electoral
abstention
count as acts
of authorization
that
create
obligation.
Nor,
if one adds the criteria of
relatively
free or
consciousaction,
can voting
in
a polity
in which the government
significantly
manipulates public
opinion,
or in
which
the
policy consequences
of voting are difficult
to
decipher,
be
said to
imply consent.
Finally,
Pateman
considers the claim
that political
obligation
is a spuriousproblem
risingfrom
the
individualist's
nability
to understand what it
means to be a
member of a policy,
and
concludes that this conceptual
view says
nothing about specific
rules or forms of social
institutions (p.
107).
What
of the claim that we
are politically
obligated to obey just laws because they are
just? Patemandistinguishes
between actions
we
4 ought
to
perform
because
those actions
are
generally
right and morally
worthy to per-
form and actions
we are
obliged
to
perform
because we
have
voluntarily
assumed that obli-
gation.
In the first
case, she argues,the citizen
simply accepts
or
recognizes
an
already
existing
duty;
only
in the
second
case is there a
freely
created,
public, obligation (pp.
28-29). This
distinction
between
what
we
ought
to do and
the
obligations
we
have
voluntarily
assumed is
useful. But Pateman does not convinceme that
it
is useful to
restrict
the
term
obligation
to
that
which we have
voluntarily
assumed.
It
would
be more
plausible
to
argue
that
when
one's
voluntary assumption of
obligation
coin-
cides with one's
sense of
justice,
one's obliga-
tion is
clear;
when the two
conflict,
one's
obligation
s unclear.
Pateman does
not claim to
have
developed
a
full theory
of political obligation.
She claims
only
that the
problem
of
political obligation
can be solved only through the
developmentof
the theory and practice of participatory or
self-managing democracy (p.
1).
Yet in the
context
of
her
interpretation
of
Rousseau,
she
puts forth
the
first
tendrils of what she
pre-
sumably believes
to be a valid theory
of
political obligation.
This is
the
weakest section
of the book.
For Pateman
(or
Pateman-Rousseau),poli-
tical
obligation,
though
self-assumed,
is not
purely
procedural p. 92).
The mere
agreement
of
citizens does
not
(ever?)
create
political
obligation. Rather,
political
obligation presup-
poses substantiveprinciplesof politicalmorali-
ty,
like
the
principle
(the only
one Pateman
spells
out)
that
each
law must benefit
or
burden all
citizens
equally
(p. 152).
If
genuine
political obligation
s
to
be created,
each
citizen
at the
moment of
the
social
contract must
actively
will some
or all of
the
principles
of
political morality.
Citizens
come
to will the
principles
of political
morality whenever
their
previous experience
of political participation
(presumably
under either
the liberal social
contract or some
other imperfect
regime) has
had a
sufficient educative
effect for them to
see the
light (p. 156).
Whole
polities
can revoke
the
principle(s)
of political morality
(p.
154),
althoughperhaps
ndividualscannot
(p.
82).
Individuals
are, however,
remarkably
ree
in
this participatory
polity.
Even
within the social
contract, not
every individual
is obliged to
conform
to
the
mandate
of
every
law.
In
analogy with
the social practice of promising,
citizens
incur political obligation
only by know-
ingly
committing
themselves
to
their fellow
citizens through their votes on specific issues
(citizens
must
understand that to
vote .. . is
to commit oneself [p.
1611 ). Citizens who do
not themselves
vote on a specific
law
(e.g., by
referendum) remain
uncommitted.
The
mi-
nority who
vote against
a
winningproposal
also
remain uncommitted
unless they judge
indi-
vidually
either
(1)
that the majority
in
voting
followed the
principles
of
political
morality
or
(2)
that at
least the
majority
acted
in
good
faith, thinking
t was following
the
principlesof
political
morality.
In short, the only polity that could bind its
citizens
would be both based
on the
principle(s)
of
political
morality
and
a
truly
voluntary
association
(p.
155),
or
on
the
largest
scale,
a
political
association of
a
multiplicity
of
politi-
cal
associations
(p. 174).
Unfortunately,
such
a
polity
could not act
when
individual nterests
came
in
conflict. It
could
only act,
as Rousseau
said a
polity
should only act,
when
there was
an
overriding
common
good
on
a
given
issue.
Indeed,
if citizens
were
to
take seriously
the
principle
of equal benefit,
their polity
could
seldom act even when there was a common
good,
because
laws can seldom
avoid
producing
more
benefit
for
some
than
for
others.
Thus
it
seems
unlikely
that
a
polity
based on the
principles
Pateman
begins
to sketch out here
could
survive.
Its
low
degree
of practicalapplicability
may
lead
readers to dismiss
Pateman's fledgling
conception
of
political
obligation.
So
may
her
occasional
overstatement or careless
wording.
Such a dismissal
would
be a
mistake.
Her
attempt
to
push
the
analogy
with
promising
as
far as it can go, while not resulting in a
convincing theory
of
political
obligation, does
permit
a successful
challenge
to many of
the
shibboleths of
the liberal
tradition,
and lends
itself to
intriguing interpretations
of
Hobbes,
Locke, Hegel, Godwin,
and others. It
poses
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7/24/2019 1980 - Mansbridge - Review (PATEMAN) the Problem of Political Obligation
4/4
490
The American
Political
Science
Review
Vol.
74
starkly
problems
that are
central
to
developing
a
coherent
theory of
democracy.
JANE
MANSBRIDGE
Universityof
Chicago
Emile
or
On
Education.
By
Jean-JacquesRous-
seau.
Translated
by
Allan
Bloom.
(New
York:
Basic
Books, 1979.
Pp. ix
+
501.
$18.50,
cloth;
$7.95,
paper.)
Unlike
his
Plato's
Republic,
Bloom
here
reserves
extended
commentary
to
another
pro-
ject,
adding
only
a
25-page
ntroductionand 14pages of notes
indicating
Rousseau's
sources
and
translating
Latinisms,
etc.,
inconveniently
left
standing
n
the
text.
Adherence
to
Leo
Strauss'
goals of
literal-
ness
and
consistency
strengthens this
transla-
tion.
Its
superiority
is
obvious
to
anyone
who
has
crowded
the
margins
of the
1911
Foxley
translation
with
corrections.
Apart
from
omit-
ting
at
least
one
paragraph
which
Bloom
re-
stores
(his
p.
272),
Foxley
loosely
phrased
even
the
famous
opening
of
Book
1.
Above
all,
Bloom
avoids
Foxley's exasperatingly incon-
sistent
renditions
of
central
terms.
Rousseau's
generic
term
for
preoccupation
with
one's
standing in
the
eyes
of
others is
wisely left
untranslated
as
amour-propren
Bloom
but
was
obscured
by
a
half-dozen
English
substitutes
n
Foxley.
Joining
sound
translationsof
the
politi-
cal
writings,
Bloom's
version
of
Rousseau's
masterpiece
diminishes
handicaps
for
students
with little
or no
French.
Strauss'
influence
weakens
Bloom's
intro-
duction, which
works
the
familiar
pattern
of
magnifying contrasts of Ancients and Moderns
by
exaggerating
consensus
within each
group.
Rather
than
training
rational
souls
to
master
bodily
passions,
the
Moderns
engineer
environ-
ments
to
control
results
of
passions
which
inevitably master
reason,
neutralizing
what
is
nasty
in
the
passions
and
anointing
what
is
nice
(these
ground
rights
and
derivative
duties).
Like
Strauss
and
Roger
Masters,
Bloom
thinks
Rous-
seau's
dualism
of
matter/body
and
spirit/soul is
dubious
or
detachable.
Objection:
Dualism
is
necessary
for
the
coherence of
Rousseau's
otherwisecontradictoryusagesof natural. As
merely
physical
beings
we
naturally
tend to
subordinate
general
interests to
the
particular
and
exempt
ourselves
from
general
rules,
but
as
spiritual
beings we
naturally
ought
to
subor-
dinate the
particular o the
general, sometimes
even
sacrificing our
lives.
But the
soul's
reason
is
motivationally barren
and
conscience
is
weak
unless
bodily
passions
of
(sublimated)
sexuality
and
(redirected)
amour-propre
become
allies
rather
than
antagonists
of
compassionate
rea-
son.
Bloom
perversely
views
compassion
as
a
selfish
passion
(p.
18),
claiming that
Rous-
seau
merely derives
duties from
different
pas-
sions
than
Hobbes' fear
of
death,
which
is
beyond
experience
before
conceptualized.
Bloom
should
say
that the
intensity
rather
than
the
existence
of
self-preservation
motivation is
held
unnatural
(cf.
pp.
9,
82).
Bloom
accents
discontinuities
more
than
continuities
between
a favored
Plato and
the
democratizing
Rous-
seau, but if
Plato's
sexual
equality was
ironical
we expect Bloom to warm to Rousseau when
clearly
sexist
(pp.
23-24).
Bloom
complains
that
Rousseau
invented the
disadvantaged
by
assessing claims on
society
by
negative
lacks
rather
than
positive
contributions
(p.
18).
His
sexism
aside, Rousseau
could
respond:
the
capacity to
give to a
society
is a
consequence
of
what
one has
got
from it.
TERRENCE
E.
COOK
Washington State
University
Marx's
Method:
Ideology,
Science
and
Critique
in
Capital. By
Derek
Sayer.
(Atlantic
High-
lands,
N.J.:
Humanities
Press,
1979.
Pp.xi
+
197.
$20.00.)
Derek
Sayer's
intent was
to write
a
clear
book
that
would
be
accessible
to more
than
a
specialist
audience
(p. x).
Though
a
detailed
knowledge of Marx is not a prerequisiteof
what
follows,
nonetheless
Sayer
concedes
that
some
readers
might
prefer
to
pass
over
some
of
the
more
technical
discussions
first
time
around
(p.
x).
Midway
through
chapter
2,
the
Language
of
Commodities, the
reader
is
confronted
with
the
Marxist
concept
of
the
value
of
commodity
expressed
as
(p.
27): Z
com
A
=
u com
B
=
v
com
C
=
w
com
D
=
x
com E
...
etc.
Unfortunately,
there are
some
other
instances
(pp.
116,
168)
of
Marxist
hierograms hat
contradict
the
author's
stated
purpose of writinga clearbook.
To
compound the
problem,
the
writing is
rather obscure
and
jargon-laden.
magine
what
would have
become
of
Christianity
f
Jeremy
Bentham
had
written the
parables.
One
can
sense
the
result
by
reading
Sayer's
book.
The
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