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Political Realism and Human InterestsAuthor(s): Richard K. AshleySource: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, Symposium in Honor of Hans J.Morgenthau (Jun., 1981), pp. 204-236Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600353 .

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PoliticalRealism and

HumanInterests

RICHARD K. ASHLEYDepartment f PoliticalScience

Arizona State University

Although oliticalrealism s often nderstoods a moreorlesshomogeneous raditionfixed ncertain ssential oncepts,JohnHerz'sprovocative iecepromptsn attemptoexamine realist cholarshipna waythatreveals omedeep antinomies: omeinternaltensions hat make realist cholarship, t least potentially,n evolving, pen-ended"dialogue." Specifically, urgenHabermas's categoriesof knowledge-constitutiven-terests-practical, echnical, nd emancipatory-are employed o distinguishwoop-posed aspectsof the realist ialogue: practical ealism nd technical ealism.Practicalrealism s guided by a practical ognitiventerestn sustaining ntersubjectivender-standingwithin he contextof tradition. ts correspondingpproach to inquiry ndgroundings hermeneutic.echnical ealismsguidedby technical ognitiventerestncoming ogripswith bjectiveaws so as to expand powers f technical ontrol ver n

objectified eality. ts approach to inquiry nd grounding s essentially ositivistic.Against hisbackground, erz'scontributiono therealist ialogue sthat, nique mongrealists, ebrings strongommitmento anemancipatoryognitiventerest-an nterestin self-reflections thebasis for he utonomous xpression fwill nd consciousnessnthe humanspecies'"self-formativerocess." nterpretedn this ight,Herz is seen toemploy two-sided iscursivetrategy,achside ddressed o oneofrealism's wo spects,thepractical ndthe echnical.However, hough rilliantnconception, erz's rgumentis unlikelyo be persuasivefrealist cholars re at basepositivistcientists riented ytechnical nterestn control. n thissense,Herz's piece represents critical test"ofrealism,tsessence, nd itsdevelopmental otential.

I. Introduction

The word "realism,"n thecontext f nternationalelations,summonsforth wholehostof imagesand concepts. Powerpolitics," balanceofpower," anarchy,"thenational nterest,""thesecurity ilemma"-the concepts pring o mind, ll with

theirvisual images, nd all richwithhistorical xamples.The

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Vol. 25 No. 2, June1981 204-236? 1981 .S.A.

204



Ashley/ REALISM, HUMAN INTERESTS 205

pictures re farfromdyllic. heyare drawn, hough,with tarkclarity. he pictures ortray politically ragmented orld ofpervasive nsecurity,ecurringiolence, eneralizedxpectationsofwar,and self-animatingtrategicogicagainst trategicogic.So deeply ngrainedsthe ssociatedHobbesian magery,nfact,that ne need not skhow a realistwill espond orecentwritingsthatresurrect antianthemes femergent olisticmperativesina worldbecoming one." One knowsthe nswer.Realistswilldecryas idealistic,dangerous, r dangerouslydealistic hoseprograms nd practices, s advocatedby ecologicalholists" ndothers, hat would transcend hefragmented orldof powerpolitics.

Itis thereforeomethingf surpriseoread hewords fJohnHerz,who proclaims hathe sa realist,n theonehand, nd whowarmlymbraces hemesmoreKantianthanHobbesian,on theother.Yes, I am a realist,Herzsays,but am a globalhumanist,too. Yes, I am a realist, e repeats, ut n theface ofmountingglobal hreats hat annot ind nswersnthefragmentedoliticalorder fthepast, t stheheightfdangerousdealism oslavishlyseekguidance n thetimewornoncepts fyesteryear'sealism.The"existing ivens" fpolitical eality avechanged,nomatterhow much nemightwish hat hey adnot; ndpolitical ealismis nothingf t does not base itsargumentsn thereal facts, he"existing ivens."

So arguing,Herz advancesa position hatdepartsradicallyfrom he magerywe usually ssociatewithrealism.He appealsforan "attitude f universalism." e urgesthe surpassing f"national nterests"y global nterests"nworld iews.He urgesthat statesyield "portionsof theircherished overeignty"osupranational gencies. n all of thisand more,his argumentbespeaks holistic iewthat s almost heantithesis fthemoreatomisticworldconception ne associateswithrealism.

The initial enseofsurprisemanifests deeperdissonance-adiscomfortingensionborn of the fact that Herz's argumentsstrain ne'spreunderstandingsfpolitical ealism s a tradition.Itisa tension hat anberesolvedneither ftwoways.Onewayis simply odenyHerz thestatus fa truerealist.WithKenneth



206 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

Thompson 1979),we can wonder f Herz has "abandonedtheessence of politicalrealism." We can call him a "planetaryhumanist" r an "anguished omanticist." t thevery east,wecan pointout that Herz's realism s somehowblendedwith-orcontaminated y-liberal andutopian deals,thusmaking imvery trange indofrealist.

A secondway to resolve hetensionhas moreto commend t,however.t is to giveHerzthebenefitf thedoubt, o to speak,and then, ncedone,findn Herz's rgument basisfor eflectiveexamination f ourownpriorunderstandingsfrealism. hisIintend o do.

Herz'spresent rgument,submit,sproperlynderstoodnlyin the ontext f tsmaking. he immediate ontext sa dialogueamongrealists, utthebroader ontext, eflectedndsometimesdistortedn thedialogue,consists fsociety s a whole. Withinthis ialogue,Herz'spresent rgumentsonly nestatement. ikeall suchstatements,t containsgaps,and it no doubtexpressessomemisapprehensionsboutthenature fthedialogue ndthesocial order n which t occurs. Unlikemanysuch statements,however, erz's argument epresentsn attempt, ot usttosaysomethingbout theworld out there," ut to bring hatworldreflectivelyobear "right ere" nrealism tself-its oncepts,tsknowledge laims, nd even tsmodesof nquiry nd grounding.In "revisiting" ealism,Herz intends o call to consciousnesscommitmento human nterestsnderlyingealists' ttempts o

build knowledge; nd, upon thatbasis,to urgeupon realistscritical eexaminationfcherishedonceptsnlight fchangedconditions. ccordingly,f ne sto understand erz's rgument,and especiallywhat timplies or hedevelopmentftherealisttradition,ne mustbeginwith n understandingf therealistdialogueto which t is addressed.

In responding o Herz, then,my point of departures anassessmentfthe realist raditiontself.Myassessmentoesnot

regard ealism s a finished, omogeneous radition escribablesolely nterms f the essential" oncepts nd claimsbywhicht"knows" heworld.Rather, proposofHerz'sargument, try olook deeper. am concernedwiththedeeperrelationbetween




realistconcepts,knowledge laims,and modes of inquiry ndgrounding, n the one hand, and theworldof social action hatrealismwould inform, n the other.Here, at thisdeeper evel,will contend,realistscholarship s veryfar frombeing aninternally armonioustradition.At this deeper level, realistscholarship n fact contains some genuine antinomies-somecritical ensions hat makerealism, t least potentially, vital,open-ended radition.

More specifically, will tryto abstract out two opposed"aspects" ftherealist ialogue:what shall allpractical ealismand technical ealism. ach implicitlyssumes distinctelationbetweenrealist knowledge nd human nterests. ach is alsocommittedo a definitend corresponding odeof nquiry ndgroundingn its developmentnd validationof concepts ndarguments. hese opposed aspects, willargue, appear withvarying egrees femphasis mongrealist cholars, utthey representnallrealist cholarship. beginwith discussion f heseaspectsand therelationship etween hem.

II. AspectsoftheRealistDialogue

In order opresenthese wo"aspects"ofrealist cholarshipwillrely n a vocabularywhich, lthough riginatingutsideof

realist cholarship, ermitsemarkablyeen nsightnto omeofthe issuesraisedby Herz. This vocabularywas developed byJtirgen abermas 1971, 1975;see also 1974) n hisattemptoidentifyome competinggeneralorientations o the relationbetween nowledge,n theonehand, ndhumannterests,n theother.Habermas'sattemptn thisregard tarts rom positionwith whichsome realistswould agree. Knowledge s not con-stituted bjectively.t is notconstituteds a "universe ffacts

whose awlike onnection anbe graspeddescriptively"Haber-mas,1971:304).The llusion fobjectivismmust ereplacedwiththerecognitionhatknowledgesalways onstitutednreflectionof interests. he problemfor Habermas is how to progress




beyond this position without reducing the relation betweenknowledgeand interests o Mannheimian simplisms Mannheim,1936).

Recognizingthisproblem,Habermas (1971: 314) has provideda useful et ofconcepts.He has tried o identifyhree knowledge-constitutive interests" which, as general cognitive interests,delineate viewpointsfrom which the constitutionof knowledgeis guided. Brieflydefined,these are:

(1) Thepractical ognitiventerest. his s an interestn knowledgeas a basisfor urthering utual, ntersubjectivenderstanding.tguides knowledge owardthedevelopment f "interpretationsthat make possiblethe orientationsf action within ommontraditions." he practicalcognitiventerests theknowledge-constitutiventerestf the historical nd cultural ciences.

(2) The technical ognitiventerest. his san interestnknowledgeas a basis forextending ontrol over objects n the subject's

environmentpossiblyncluding trategic ominance verotherhumanbeings). t guidesknowledge o obtain informationhatexpands. . . powers f echnical ontrol." hetechnical ognitiveinterests theknowledge-constitutiventerest f the empirical-analytic ciences. t finds ts foremost hilosophical xpressionin positivism e.g., theViennaCircle,Carnap, and Nagel) andcritical ationalisme.g., Popper, Lakatos,and Albert).l

(3) The emancipatory ognitive nterest.This is an interest nsecuring reedom rom hypostatizedorces" ndconditions f

distorted ommunication e.g., ideology). t is rooted in thehuman capacitiesfor thecommunicativexerciseof reflectivereason n light fneeds,knowledge,nd rules; tguidesknowl-edge to achieve human autonomy nd self-understandingybringingo consciousnessreviouslynapprehendedeterminantsofthehuman pecies' self-formativerocess." he emancipatoryintereststheknowledge-guidingnterestfall criticallyrientedsciences.

1. Habermas 1971:314). Habermas ends oregardritical ationalisme.g.,Popper)as part of the positivist radition-somethinghatPopper strenuously enies. WhileacknowledginghedifferenceshichPopperemphasizes, willhereaftereferocriticalrationalisms partofpositivism.n this egard,t s useful o consultAdorno t al (1969)and the exchangebetweenHans Albert nd Habermas.




For Habermas,thesethree ognitiventerestsreinterestsfthe human species-they are a priori nterests y whichthehuman pecies organizes tsexperience. heyfind heir prioribasis, as interests,nthe fact hat humans re bothtoolmakingand language-usingnimals. Humankindhas a technical ogni-tive nterest-annterestnthe reation fknowledgenablingon-trol fobjectifiedrocesses-becausehumansmust produce romnaturewhat s neededformaterial xistencehroughhemanipu-lation and control fobjects" Held 1980: 255; Habermas 1971,1975).Humankind as a practical ognitiventerest-an nterestin maintaining ommunication-because humans mustcom-municatewith ne another throughheuse of ntersubjectivelyunderstood ymbolswithinhe context frule-governednstitu-tions" Held 1980: 255;Habermas1971, 1975).Andhumankindhas an emancipatorynterest-an interestn theunrestrained,communicative xerciseof reflectiveeason-because, amidst"the exigenciesof man's struggle or self-preservation,"nlyreflectionn the self-formativerocessof thehumanspeciesencourages onsciousnessfhithertonacknowledgednfluenceson humansand therebymakespossibletheautonomous, elf-consciousdevelopmentf ife Habermas,1971:211).2

This vocabulary, ogetherwith heassociatedconceptualiza-tion, s essential omy ttemptoidentifyhe womain spects ftherealistdialogue. n particular, willrely n thefirstwoofHabermas's three categoriesto define two aspects: practicalrealism nd technical ealism.

On the one hand,there s theaspectI am callingpracticalrealism. his stherealism f heHansMorgenthau howritesfthe"moralconsensus" fbalanceofpower;whosays, No studyof politics . . . can be disinterested n the sense that it is able todivorceknowledge rom ction";and whoadoptsthehistorian's

2. Habermas 1971: 211). ForHabermas, t simportantonote, hese hree ognitiveinterests, hough apprehendable priori, re accorded a ratherproblematic uasi-

transcendentaltatus. For they"arise fromthe actual structuresf human ife." nparticular,heemancipatorynterest as a "derivativetatus."Unlike hepractical ndtechnical nterests,heemancipatorynterestntailsnoimmediate, ecessary onnectionof knowledge o an "external"nterestn its utilizationit is instead reflectiveeasongrasping ts interest n reason); the actual historical orm n which n emancipatoryinterest inds xpression,f it does, depends upon the stageof developmentn bothtechnical ctivity nd conditions f symbolicnteraction.ee Habermas 1975: 176).




pose inpeering verthe tatesman'shoulder,isteningnon hisconversations,ndanticipatingisthoughtsMorgenthau, 978:224,23,5).Thisaspectofrealism, ractical ealism,sorientedya practicalcognitiventerest. t sees the aim ofknowledge sprincipallythe ttainmentfpossible onsensusmong ctors ntheframeworkf a self-understandingerived rom radition"(Habermas, 1971: 304). Its primary pproachto inquiry ndgrounding orresponds o that of the historical nd culturalsciences.As elaboratedbelow, tsapproach s hermeneutical.

On the otherhand,there s theaspect am calling echnicalrealism.This s the realism fthe Hans Morgenthauwhowritesthat"politics, ike society n general, s governed y objectivelaws";who aspires o"scientific";ho nvokes prior heoreticalframework f "interest efined s power";and whovalues thisframework ecause it "imposes ntellectual iscipline pon theobserver,nfuses ational rdernto he ubjectmatterfpolitics,and thusmakes he heoreticalnderstandingfpolitics ossible"(Morgenthau 1978: 4-5). Technical realism s orientedby atechnical ognitiventerest.t seesthe aim ofknowledge s thedevelopmentf nformation-regardingniversalaws andtheiroperation-thatcanexpand powers ftechnical ontrol ver nobjectifiednvironment.tsapproach o nquiryndgroundingsreminiscentfpositivisiticeconstructionsfnatural cience.

As I say,thesetwo aspects,practicalrealism nd technicalrealism,re abstractions.Withrare xceptions,tcannotbesaidthat a givenrealist cholarwhollyexpressesone aspect andwholly enies heother.Morgenthau,nfact,sexemplarynthisregard, incebothaspectsappearin hiswork.

Nevertheless,he woaspects reopposed nmany espects. osee how this sso,howrealists econcilehe wo spects, ndwhatthis mplies orpossible developmentsn therealist ialogue, tisnecessaryo look somewhatmoreclosely tthese woaspects.

A. PRACTICAL REALISM

In general,practicalrealism tresses he "uniquelyhuman"character f its subjectmatter.Human beingscan converse,




remember,now, xpect, nd attachmeaning othemselvesndtheir ircumstances. umanbeingscan also miscommunicate,forget,misunderstand,alsely xpect, and summonforth or-gotten xperiencesnwaysthat end novel ayers fmeaning oseemingly imilar ircumstances. uman beings, n short, resubjectivities.

Thus,from hevantagepointofpractical ealism,where hereare regularitiesn ife-and whereocial relationsreordered ndpredictable-this act s nottotally educible o theoperation fsomeeternal rnatural aw. Onthe ontrary, regularizedocialorderderives rom usuallyprotractednd arduous althoughnot necessarilyntentional) truggleo establish nd maintainconsensusof co-reflectiveelf-understanding:tradition.

For practical realism,the principalsocial role of realistscholarship erivesfrom hefact that thetraditionhat bindsparticipantswithin common orderis a fragile, ftenonlyimplicitetofrelations. umanbeings reeverprone oforgetrrepress spectsoftheir asts,to mistake heephemeral ortheeternal, o become caught up in and falselyuniversalize heexperiences f themoment, ndthus o lose sight f or evendoviolence o)the o-reflectivelyharednorms, xpectations,ights,and meanings built up under the weightof long-historicalexperience.

Given his endency,hetaskofpractical ealism s clear. t isalmost hat fan agent cting nbehalf fhistory-or, ather,nbehalfofan historicallystablished radition. racticalrealismstrives o examinehistory, o distill n understandingf thepractical onsensus, ocommunicatehisdistilled nderstandingto each and everyparticipant,nd thereby o situateall in atranshistoricalormative-practicalrder.

Practicalrealismthus servesa practical cognitive nterest(Habermas:1971).The aimis to undertakenterpretationshatmake possible the orientation f action withina common

tradition.n thepractical ealist spect, alidknowledge ntails,not so much an improved capacityto control one's objectenvironment,ut an improved apacity o be and behave as aworthymember f one's traditional ommunity, ith ts nter-subjective nd consensually ndorsednorms, ights,meanings,




purposes, ndlimitationsnwhat he ndividual articipantsanbe and mightbecome. Drawing out the nature of such aconsensus-including he anguage ndconceptsn which ventsfindmeaning nd validation mongtheparties-is an essentialtask with practical mport. t is essential o theintegrationfsociety, he maintenance forder, hemutualityf nteraction,and theavoidanceofsevere, islocating ocial conflict.

This understandingf thepractical nterest fknowledge sclosely oupled withpractical ealism's pproachto inquiry ndgrounding. his approach s hermeneutical.t is reminiscent,otofnatural cience, utofthecultural ciences.Equating knowl-edge with understanding, ot causal explanation, ts relevantmetaphors found n the nterpretationftexts.3

As in the nterpretationftexts, he askof he nterpreters tolearn o speak,not ustread, he anguagehe would nterpret.heinterpreter ust become part of the world of the text-thesubject/bject radition eing nterpreted-andmust earn o seeand generate statements bout the world as it does. Theinterpreter ustbecomepart of,and makehis own, the same"stream f ife," ncludinghose ndirectlyommunicatedxperi-encesthatrepresentheempirical ontext fthatwhich hetextdoes express.He must trive or deep,totalconsensuswith hetext-therebyto establishgenuine understanding nd sharedexpectations s well as common inguistic kills.

Inso striving,hough, he nterpreteretains certain umilityin thefaceofthefinal uthorityf he ext, he radition e wouldunderstand. e knows hat very nterpretationas the tatus fan "hypothesis"o be tested.Every nterpretations tested, s itwere, nsofar s itgenerates xpectations orpractice, ncludinglanguage,that can be gauged against actual practices n thereferentext.A disappointmentfexpectationsignals hefailureof interpretationnd a need, therefore,o carry hedialogueforwardn a way informinghe interpreter'swn world. An

interpreter hose expectationsare persistently isappointedevidentlyas notbecomepart f heworldhewould nterpret.ecannot peak ts anguage nd wouldnotberegardeds a worthy

3. In mydiscussion f hermeneutics,rely n Habermas 1971,1975,1977); ee alsoGadanrier1975).




participant ithin t.Practically peaking,he nterpreterouldbe a failure nthe worldofthetext.Onlywhen he nterpreter'sexpectations lose on actual practice an it be said-and thenalwaysprovisionally-thathe nterpreterassucceeded, hat heinterpreteras becomea successful, uitable nhabitant ftheworldof thesubject/bjecttext.

For practicalrealism, hepredominantpproach-the con-sciously invokedmethod, f you will-is found in just thishermeneuticttitude.Morgenthau eferso this pproachwhenhe says thatwe

retrace ndanticipate,s itwere, he teps statesman-past,present,r future-has aken r will akeon thepoliticalcene.We ookover is houlder hen ewritesisdispatches; e istenin on his conversations ithother tatesmen; e read andanticipateisvery houghtsMorgenthau,978: ].

Beingpractical n intent nd hermeneuticn approach,prac-tical realism s not and cannot be phrased n terms fanotherlanguageoutsidethe realmof its text-analogue,heworldoftraditional tatesmanship. racticalrealismdoes nothave therelation o its text-the worldof statesmanship-that aturalscientific heoryhas to its object nature. It cannot be tostatesmanships a metalanguagean empirical ontent-freeetofrulesofconstitution)s to ordinaryanguage itselfntertwined

with,and at once reflectingnd expressing,he real stuff fexperience).Rather,forpracticalrealism, xplicans nd expli-candum reofthe ame"language ystem,"ndpractical ealismmust xpresstsconcepts, orms,ndknowledgelaims ntermsofthevery anguage tinterprets.

It follows hattheterms nd knowledge laims ofpracticalrealismmustbemeaningfulnd warranted ithinhe ubjectivityoftheobject ext tself,hat s,withinhe raditionalommunity

ofstatesmen.fproposed erms,oncepts,ndknowledgelaimsare not warranted ndmeaningful ithinustthis rame if theyare not meaningfulo statesmen-then heyhave no place inpractical ealism.Obviously, heywouldexpressno aspectofanexistingor possible consensusamong statesmen hemselves.




Indeed, ttempts o impose uch lienterms rom ne or anotherflankwould hreateno overload r disruptwhatever onsensus spossiblewithinhe xistinganguage f raditionalxperience.norder o be admitted s terms rstatementsfpractical ealism,such alien termsmust firstbe shownto be meaningful ndwarrantedwithin hetext,within he classicaldiplomatic an-guageoftraditional tatesmanship.

If this helpsto explain why PoliticsAmong Nations is still"mustreading" mong foreignerviceofficers,t also helpstoaccountfor realists' ttitudes owardtheoperationalizationfconcepts, ncluding heirnsistence pon "theautonomy f thepolitical sphere." Regarding onceptsof power and nationalinterest,orexample,realistswould remindus thatno fixed,once-and-for-allperationaldefinitions possible. The specificrecognized ontents fthese erms t any moment ependuponthe "political and culturalenvironments,"he "political andculturalcontextwithinwhichforeignpolicy is formulated"(Morgenthau 978:9). Thetraditional ommunityf tatesmensresponsibleor upplyinghespecific mpirical ontentsotheseterms.t willdo so ina way reflectinghe nternal istoryfthecommunitynd its nternalizedontext, ot omesetof aws andoperations xternal o and unrecognized y thiscommunity.Within he hermeneuticircle fpractical ealism, he ntersub-jectivity fthe traditional ommunityf statesmen s the onlypossible standardof itself.Read onto thisworld, he anguage

andnorms fother raditions-say, conomics, eligion,aw,orpositivisticocial science-are meaninglessrworseunless heycan be rewritten,ustifiedwithin,nd hence ubordinatedo thelanguageof thetraditionalommunityfstatesmen.

All ofthis uggestshatpractical ealism oesobey systema-tically escribable,nternallyonsistentogicofdevelopment-ahermeneuticogicarticulatedwith practical ognitiventerest.None of this suggests,however, hatthe practical aspect of

realism stands alone. Undiscussed n my description f thepractical spectaremany f the ssuesthatonewouldexpect osee raisedin any reasonably ompletedescription f politicalrealism.How, in the firstplace, do realists dentifyhe true




tradition fstatesmanship,s opposed to external ractices, hatmerit heirhermeneuticpproachtounderstanding?ow is the"political phere" etoff rom ther pheres? ndhowdo realistsreconcile practical nterestn ntersubjectivenderstanding,nthe onehand,with hemutually bjectifyingnstrumentalismfpower politics,on the other? These questionsbegin to findanswers ntechnical ealism.

B. TECHNICALREALISMAll realists re technical ealists, t east npart,but t s n the

so-called "modernrealism"of KennethWaltz thattechnicalrealism finds ts starkest pproval. Waltz's position n realistscholarshipsextreme. e isfirst,oremost,ndonly technicalrealist. He is a "scientific" ealiststrippedof all practicalpretensions. s such,hiswork, specially isTheory f nterna-tional Politics (1979), performs valuable servicefor mypurposes.His work lays bare the cognitive nterest nd theassociated approach to inquiryand grounding hat are thehallmarks fthe technical spectofall realist cholarship.4

Specifically,Waltzspeaksfor he echnical spectofall realistscholarshipwhenhe saysthat heunderstandingftheorydoesnot accord withusage in muchof traditional oliticaltheory,which s concernedmorewithphilosophical nterpretationhanwith theoreticalexplanation" (1979: 6). Theory is given adefinitionorrespondingopositivisticnderstandingsftheoryin thenatural sciences.A theorys understood o be a setofstatementsmbodyingssumptionsnd explaining aws,wherelaws are repeatedly bservedrelationsbetween ariablesof anobjectifiedeality.As Waltz (1979: 9-10) puts t:

Bya theoryhe ignificancef he bservedsmademanifest.theoryrranges henomenao that hey re seenas mutually

dependent;tconnectstherwiseisparateacts:tshowshowchangesnsomephenomenaecessarilyntailhangesnothers.

4. In drawing ponWaltz, almost otally gnorehis"theory" er se,concentratinginsteadon hisunderstandingfwhat heorys,how t sconstructed,nd itsredeemingsocial utility. n Waltz'stheory,ee Ashley 1980b).




The words recallMorgenthau's1978: 3) claim thata theorybrings"order and meaningto a mass of phenomenawhichwithoutt wouldremaindisconnectednd unintelligible."

As Waltzalso makesclear, heoryn this ense does notarisethrough one-sided rocessof nduction rom acts r everydaypractice. here s no expectationhat heoretical nowledgewillnecessarily ind xpression n reality-insomealready xistingtradition,for example. Rather,theory s seen to exist (inPopperian anguage) nanother world" Popper, 1972), world"distinct rom herealitytexplains."Theory s detachedfrompractice nd cannotbe made identical o it. Nor can theory ereduced o the anguageofpractice, or, s Waltz 1979: 7, 11)stresses, heoreticalnotions"have no meaningoutsideof thetheoryn which hey ppear."Morgenthau1978: 8)wouldhaveagreed. It is no argumentgainst he heory resented ere,"hewrote, that ctualforeign olicycannot iveup to it."

How, then, s theory enerated? n this uestionmostrealistsare vague.Waltzshows us why:Within hetechnical spectofrealism, s in positivist econstructionsf science, the back-ground ntersubjectivenderstandingshatgo into hemaking ftheoryre nottobe systematicallynterpretedrcriticized. heposition s reminiscentf Karl Popper's 1935)fascination ith"boldconjectures."How are theories]made?"Waltz sks. Crea-tively," eanswers. he constructionf theoryomesonlywhen"a brilliantntuitionlashes, creativedeaemerges."t sallvery

mysterious.One cannotsayhowthe ntuition omes and howthe dea is born" Waltz, 1979: 9).

Indeed,one is not evenallowedtoask.Thesubjective rocessoftheory onstruction,enderedmysterious,sbracketedndsetbeyond hescope ofrational nquiry nd criticism. here s noallowancefor uestioninghebackgroundntersubjectivender-standingshatpermit hetheoristo arrive t-just his brilliantintuition,"hebackgroundanguage f xperiencehrough hich

his "creativedea" is communicableoothers, r thebackgroundintersubjectivenderstandingshat ermithe heoristnd otherstoagreeonthefactsn needofexplaining.Nor sthere llowancefor questioning he dependenceof thesebackgroundunder-




standingsnevolving istorical onditions hatmight ebeyondtheframe f consciousness. hetheory,f t s to be regarded sanythingmore than thepersonallymeaningful onsenseof alunatic,dependsupon such intersubjectivereunderstandings.Yetas Waltz'swork o clearlyllustrates,ealists isallow riticalinterpretationsf these ntersubjectiverocesseseven as theydepend upon them.

Thisbracketing, hich ecures hetechnical-theoreticalasisofrealist cholarship gainst ystematicnterpretiveriticism,saffected n several ways. Perhaps the foremostway, mostpronouncednMorgenthau's orkbutabsentfromWaltz's, s toinvoke a metaphysical ystem s an unassailabledefenseoftheory. hus, theNiebuhrianmetaphysicsffallenman-manwitha "will-to-power"-entersealism,not as the necessarykernel ftheory, ut as anhypostatizedefense or he ssertionthat the truggleorpower suniversalntime ndspaceand isan undeniable act of experience,"Niebuhr,1940,1953;Mor-genthau,1978: 36). As Morgenthauwellrecognized, owever,thismetaphysicalefenses nota rational efense ftheory.t isantirationalistic.

The rational ustification f technicalrealism'stheory, sWaltzstresses,sfound nterms f tsusefulness. ere, though,usefulness oes not refer o a theory's apacity to sustain apractical onsensusofmutualunderstanding.nstead, he use-fulness ftheoreticalxplanation esidesn ts apacities oorientpurposive-rationalttemptso exert ontrol veran objectifiedreality.Waltz 1979: 6) isvery traightforwardnthepoint. Theurge oexplain,"hesays, is notbornof dlecuriositylone. t isproduced also by the desireto control, r at leastto know ifcontrol s possible."

A theory,Waltz indicates,goes beyond"knowledge f theregularityfassociationsembodied n laws." A theory ellsus"why particularssociationholds" othatwemight e nformedas to "whetherwe can exercise ontrol nd how we might oaboutdoingso." Put differently,theory rovides n explana-tionofrelations etweenmeans ndendsandtherebyulfillshepurposive-rationalnterestn behaving fficiently-inworking




"with objective] orces, otagainst hem," ouseMorgenthau's(1978: 3) words.Hereinstechnical ealism's ationalustificationoftheory: purposive-rationalustification. erein, lso, is itsknowledge-constitutiventerest: technical ognitive nterest.

As longas theory emonstrablyerves his echnical ognitiveinterest,t s considered alidfromhevantagepointoftechnicalrealism. he question henbecomes:Howcan a theory's tilitysan instrumentorapprehending eality e tested? The testbywhich theorymaybe udged," ccording oMorgenthau1978:3), "is not a priori nd abstract ut empiricalndpragmatic."theorymustmeet dual test, n empirical nd logical one":

Do the actss theyctuallyre end hemselvesothenterpreta-tion he heoryasputupon hem,nd do conclusionst whichthe heoryrrivesollow ithogical ecessityromtspremises?Inshort,s the heoryonsistentith he acts ndwithintself?

Waltz accordswith hisview,sharpens t,and drawsout itsdistinctivelyositivisticharacter. s Waltz 1979: 13-16) nder-stands he testing ftheory,t involves he ogicaldeduction ftestablehypothesesnd thesubjecting fthesehypotheseso avariety f distinct nd demanding xperimentalnd observa-tional testsunderconditionswhereperturbingariables an becontrolled r eliminated.5 or Waltz,as forMorgenthau, hetesting ftheorys a matter f mitatingontrol perations nd

observing esults: he theoryhouldbe a logicalsystem hat angenerate eliable xpectationss totheresults fcertain ontroloperations; ccordingly,o the extent hat hetheory's xpecta-tionscorrespondwith ctualhistorical esultswhere hecontrolconditions ontemplated ythetheory btain, hetheoryssaidtofind orroboration. o theextenthat xpectations eneratedby theory o not correspondwithactualhistorical esults,hetheory's orth s anhypostatizedasisfor he xercise f ontrol

overan objectified ealitys called ntoquestion. f tflunks he"qualitycontrol" ests, hen t is an inadequateand unreliable

5. Waltz 1979: 13-16).Waltz ater onsiders ther ossible ests: confirmatoryests"and comparisons crosssimilarlynd differentlytructuredomains.




instrument,nd it s said tobe falsified-presumingofcourse hata morereliable nstruments available.

The theory itself s expressed in differentways by differentrealists. But at base, I think,there s a common "kernel" to allrealistformulations.Crudelysummarized,the kernelmaybe saidto startfrom an impossibilityheorem, hich all realists take tobe axiomatic and thereforenneed of no defense:There xistsnoactual or mmanentniversal onsensus hatwill r can ora longtime atisfy herealand emergingwants nd needsofall statesandpeoples. In more Morgenthauian (1978: 179) language, theworld is seen to be made up of a multiplicity f units whoseinterests re antagonisticallypoised, with heresult hatuniversalmoral principles an neverbe fullyrealized in practice.Fromthis"impossibilitytheorem"all else follows:

From it followsthe expectation hat policies,practices, nd

movementsiming rtendingoward heuniversal ealization fsome particular orms or interestsmustat some point reach athreshold eyondwhich the satisfaction f some participants'wants nd needs comesonlyat theexpenseof others.

Fromthis, nturn, ollows heexpectationhatwhenprogramsand practices eachbeyondthisthreshold, articipantsan nolonger ommunicativelynteract o serve heirmutualneedsandwants, utcanonly ct onanduse one another s mere hingso bemanipulated,ontrolled, eflected,r balanced.

Fromthisfollows he expectation hat nternational elationssinherentlycompetitiveealm,with ompetitionentering,otonabsoluteends,but on relativemeans-on the nstrumentsndagenciesof mutualcontrol.Competition vermeans is, so tospeak, hemain nimatingorce f nternationalolitical evelop-ment.Althoughome states nd statesmenmight ail oenter he"race," hey redestined o sooneror ater fallby hewayside" fhistory.

Fromthis,finally,ollows he belief hatpower san interest,t

once basic,universal,nd historicallynsurpassable.nescapably,whetherhey cknowledget or not,all states nd statesmen-indeed, ll people-are potentiallyheobjectsofpower.As theyare,theyhaveanobjectively ecessarynterestnpower. nterest,necessity,nd powerare soldered ntoone:raison 'tat.




This,I think, s a fairrenditionfthe technical ealist theorykernel."Upon it,all other acets ftheory re built.Attemptsoassaythe "elements fnationalpower," ttempts o identifyhe"inevitable"aws ofbalanceofpower, nd attemptsodeduce heexpectedconsequencesof various controloperations, uchas"divide nd rule"-all builduponthe"theory ernel."

Theoryformulatedn technicalrealismthusconcerns tselfwith hecategory fobjectivenecessity,ot themore ubjectivecategories fcontingencynd choice, norms, ndvalues. Tech-nicalrealism oes notassert, owever, hat nternationaloliticscan be fully accountedfor in terms of objectivelaws. AsMorgenthau 1978: xi) wrote, Nothing havereador earnednrecentyears has dissuadedme frommyconviction hat thetheoreticalnderstandingf nternationaloliticsspossible nlywithin elativelyarrow imits."Waltz 1979: 68) puts t nmoreprosaic terms: "The behavior of states and statesmen . . . isindeterminate." echnical realisttheory hus does not trytopredict, or to explain, he policies nd behaviors f ndividualstates and statesmen. t concerns tself, nstead,withgeneraltendencies nd potentialitiesnd the likelihoods of differentsystemic utcomes undervarious conditions.That is why, sWaltz ndicates,echnical ealist heoryshardtotest.Butthat salso why echnical ealism eaves roomforpracticalrealism.

The point to be stressed, hough, s that technical ealism'scognitive nterest,ts associatedmethodology f inquiry ndgrounding,nd thetheorytproducesand validatesare all incomplete ccord.As to its technical ognitiventerest,echnicalrealism:

-would constitutenowledgen order to expand powersoftechnicalontrol ver n objectifiedeality.

-would conceive f nternationaloliticsnterms fsomefixedstructurefbeingwhich hannelsbjectiveorcesndconstrains

outcomesttendinglternativerograms,olicies,nddesigns.-wouldgauge nowledgentermsf purposive-rationalriterion:

the nhancementfthe fficiencyfmeans.




As to its approach to inquiry nd grounding,echnical ealism:

-would bracket ndset asidequestionsfascertainingruthndfalsityfknowledgelaims nd oncepts,mphasizingnstead hegaugingf theory'sdequacys anhypostatizedasis or ontroloperations.As Waltz 1979: 117) phraseshematter:One ..cannotegitimatelysk f theoretical]ssumptionsre rue rfalse,butonlyf heyreuseful.")

-would treat s mysterious-anduspend eyond hereachof

criticalnterpretation-thehistoricallyependent)ntersubjectiveunderstandingshat llowthetheoristo conceive ftheworld"just o."

-would test nd validateheoryhroughhe mitationfcontroloperationsn historicalxperience.

As to itstheory,echnical ealismproduces theorywherein:

-participants'nterestsrebest efinednterms f he ategoryfobjective ecessity.-participants o not reflect n ultimate r universalaluesor

norms-oron the historical ontingencyf theirwants ndneeds-but instead oncentraten the efficiencyf meansofcontrol.

-participantsmeasureuccess y he uccess f ontrol perationsover nobjectifiedeality.

Nowheremore learly han ntechnical ealism stheunderlyingidentity r raisond'etatand raisonde science ositivedisplayed.

C. THE RELA TION BETWEEN TECHNICALREALISM AND PRACTICAL REALISM

By nowit should be clearthat hetwoabstracted spects resharply pposed.Practicalrealism's pproach s interpretive.practical raditionf tatesmens thereal ubjectwhose anguageof experience heinterpreterries o make his own. Technical




realism, y contrast,s positivistic.heory captures" bjectiveforces hat xistbeyondhistory,nd statesmen ithin istoryreamongtheobjectsof thoseforces.Clearly,neither fthe twoaspects anfully ominate ealist cholarshipwithout enyingplace to the other.Yet each is a partof realism.How is thisopposition econciled?

Some hints s tothe nswer othis uestionhavealready eenprovided. or onething, echnical ealism ssumes hat nterna-tionalpolitical ehavior s indeterminate.lthough heobjectiveforcesnd tendencies isclosed ntechnical-realistheory arrowthe latitude of effective ction and limit the consequencesattendingpolicies and practices, heyare not understood oexactly determinebehavior or the immediatemotives andsubjective nderstandingsehindbehavior.As a result, nemaysay that heres room forpractical ction:Practical ealismhaspartialautonomy.

For another thing,technicalrealism,with its positivisiticinclinations, uts itselfoutside of the hermeneutic ircle ofpractical ealism.As I have ndicated,echnical ealism isallowsinterpretationfthe ntersubjectivereunderstandingsnd lan-guage of experienceby whichtechnical ealism 1) recognizesintersubjectivelyccessible facts and lawfulregularities,2)"intuits" oncepts capable of organizing his ntersubjectivelyaccessibleexperience,nd then 3) communicatestsconcepts,explanations,ndassociatedmeanings.n sodoing,t stablishestechnical ealism's otalautonomy fpracticalhermeneutics.

Still, moredefinitetatementntherelationshipetween hetwo aspects is required. deally such a statementwould bebuttressedby a substantialreview of realist literatures ocorroborateand illustrate he relationshipproposed. Here,though, canonlypropose relationshipnd assert hat carefulreading f realistwritings6ouldsubstantiatemypropositions.The relationship proposehas twoparts.

6. See, forexample,Aron (1966), Carr (1946), Kennan (1966), Kissinger1964),Morgenthau1978), Schuman 1969), Wight1946), and Wolfers1962).




First, the theory produced by technical realism constrainspractical realism by identifying he "true tradition" worthyofinterpretation nd understanding. n particular:

Technicalrealism's heory rients ractical ealism o regard spart fthe true radition'hose tates,tatesmen,nd policies hatrecognize he imits f any universal onsensus, hatare conse-quently onscious f their wn andothers' nterestsnpower, ndthatthereforeeek to establishmutualunderstandingespecting

the imits eyondwhichman becomes hemere bjectofman. Sooriented, ractical ealism egards articipantsnthis rue radi-tion-for example,MetternichorKissinger1964) and Hay forKennan (1957)-as the real subjectswhose actions are to beinterpreted,ithwhom herealist an converse,'nd fromwhomtherealist an learn.

Among participantsin this "true tradition"-that is, as partici-pants inthis"true tradition"relateto one another-power can be

regarded as a practical matter:

Amongparticipantsnthetrue radition' ower snotreducibleoa matter fmutually irectednstrumentalction. t is instead nessentialpartof thepractical anguageofexperience y whichparticipantsustain onsciousness ftheirmutual ependence na commonorder such as Morgenthau'snotionof the moralconsensus' of balance of power). Among participants, owerbecomes matter f nstrumentalction suchas threats fforce

and use offorce) nly nsofar s its imited xercise s sometimesnecessary o clarify mpirically trengthsf commitment,n-terests, nd relativecapabilitiesthat cannot be consensuallyascertained hrough erbal nteractionlone; but evenhere, heinstrumental se of power,one participant gainst another, sessentially communicativenterprisentendedto adjust orclarify, otoverturn,he ntersubjectiveonsensualunderstand-ing bywhich he truetradition'ustains tscommonorder.

However, it must be stressed thatpower is a practical matteramong participants in the "true tradition" only because theycommonly recognize their shared interest in using power toinstrumentallyrestrain or repress programs, practices, and




movementshatbetray,re outsideof,but nanycase threatenthe true radition." hat s tosay, echnical ealism's heory otonly dentifieshe "true radition" fpractical ealismbut alsodistinguishest from tsopposite:

Statesmen, olicies,movements,nd developments hich triveor tend toward some universal consensussurpassing powerpolitics re understood o be outsideofand inopposition o the'true radition.' s such, hey re regardedsobjectifiedforces' r

'tendencies'which likenineteenthentury ermannationalismforboth Metternichnd Kissinger) annot be understoodorinterpretedut whichnonethelesshreaten heonetrueorder fthe 'true tradition.'They are regarded s objectiveforces ortendencieshat an only e checked, eflected,rpitted ne againsttheotherhroughhe oordinatednstrumentalctions f hetruetradition.'

This, then, s the first artoftherelationship etween he two

aspects.Technicalrealist heory onstrains ractical ealism y(1) identifying"true radition" orwhichpower s a practicalmatter nd (2) distinguishingt fromopposing universalisticdesigns,movements,rtendencieswhich retaken o representobjectified nd threateningxternalities.

Thesecondpartoftherelationshipsthis.As circumscribedythe hypostatized riortheoryof technical realism,the her-meneutic ircleofpractical ealism an onlyconfirm, ut never

call intoquestion, hepracticalustificationfthe heorytself:theory hat dentifiesnterest nd power. Specifically:

The theory onstrainspracticalrealisthermeneuticsuch thatprograms, ractices, onditions,nd movementshat imtowardor imply possibleuniversal onsensus annotcall intoquestionthe heoryhatpresupposeshe mpossibilityf ucha consensus.It does so by constraining ractical realismto regard suchpracticesnd developments1) as beyond hepaleofhermeneutic

understanding,2) as objectifiednd irrational orces nd tenden-cies thatthreateno shatter r overwhelmhe one trueorder fthe 'true tradition,' nd hence, (3) as forcesand tendencieswhich articipantsnthe true radition' ave nurgent,ommon,and practical nterestn collectively ecognizingnd restrainingthroughhe coordinated se ofpower.




In short, hanksto the constraintmposed by priortechnicaltheory, he very empiricaldevelopments hat might eem toinvalidate he theory's ssential mpossibilityheorem re re-corded in practical realism as threateningevelopments hatjustify he mmediate ractical elevance fthe heory uilt ponthattheorem.

Taken together, hesetwo partscometo onepoint: echnicalrealism rovides he utonomous cientific-technologicalase ofrealism's partially autonomouspracticalsuperstructure. hetechnical ase, oriented y technical ognitiventerestncontrol,remains utonomous nd mmune o criticismn ight fpracticaldevelopmentss longas thosewho would and can exert ontrolfind uidance n thetheory hat hebase provides.As longas atleast some powersfindguidance n thetheory, raspobjectiveforces dentifiedn it, and,wieldingheseforces, endothers othe ystem ithin hich heir wn uccess sassured, he echnicaltheoreticalaseofrealism roves tselfn tsownterms.And t smade all themore ecure nthatpractical ealism, onstrainedythe heory, orks oward heuniversalizationf superstructural"truetradition" n which (1) the questioningof the base isdisallowed, nd (2) opposingprograms, evelopments,nd nor-mative ystems-those hat mply hepossibilityf a universalconsensus urpassing owerpolitics-arethemselvesegarded sirrational bjectsofpower.

This, n very tylized orm, s therealistdialogue,a kindof

dialoguethat s echoed nmany male-dominant arriage. heworkingmale, he technicalide," severdominantndoperatesin the realmofnecessity. he dependent emale, he"practicalside," s asked to maintain ndadjustthe ntersubjectivender-standings,alues,and ethics f the wholefamilynaccordwiththedemands ndopportunitiesmergingromhe man'sworld."So adjusted, he and thewholefamilyre ikely o oin with hemale nregardingheworldna manneronsistent ith hemale's

"necessities" ffindingmployment,leasing isboss,competingwith ther mployees, dvancing career, nd so on. Seldom, fever, oesshedare tocriticizeradvise hemanon his onductntheoutsideworld.And onthoserareoccassionswhen hefemalebecomes onsciousofand complains bout the imits fher nd




thefamily'sxistencemposedbythedominantmale-when shebecomes wareofand complains boutopportunitiesorgone,careerunfulfilled,riendseft ehind, nd childrengnored-sheknowswhat nswer he willhear. Be rational,woman!Don't beso idealistic.Mine s theworldofnecessity.houldI changemyways, urwhole worldwould tumbledown."

III. JohnHerz's ContributionEnterJohnHerz,whobrings omething ovel othedialogue

just described. n readingHerz'ssubstantialwritings roducedover nearly ourdecades-fromhis splendidPolitical Realismand Political dealismthrough is betterknown nternationalPolitics in theAtomicAge to his most recentwritings-onediscovers strong hreadof continuity.t is not,to be sure,thread eflectingsublime ertaintybout omeanchoring ernelofrealist ruth.nstead, he hreadsfoundnHerz's ommendabledeterminationo anchorrealism, bove all, inreflectiveeason(Herz, 1951, 1959, 1976).

The essence fHerz'sunique pproach orealismsfoundnacritical ension hat he associates with he essenceofman as asocial being. It is an antinomy somewhatreminiscentf an"idealized"Freud) between go and community,ower nd pity.It isan antinomyetweenhe ocially ituated rge ocontrol nd

subordinate ne'senvironment,ossibly ncludingther eople,on the one hand,and theurgeto submergend find he argermeaning f oneself n one's environmentnd one'scommunity,on theother. t is an antinomy etweenparts" nd "wholes"-between heparticular ubjectwhowould makethewholeworldthe object of his interests nd the individualwhose interests,beliefs,ndself-understandingsre nescapablyheobjects f heworld nwhichhe acts (see especiallyHerz, 1951).

ExactlythisantinomynimatesHerz'swritings.n hisview,thecontradictions to be found"out there" ntherealityhatrealistswould study.The tensionshe envisionsbetweenthecitizen nd the "rational" tateor between national nterests"and "global interests" re cases in point. mportantly,hough,




Herz also sees thecontradictionright ere," s theorganon freason in realistscholarship.Even as realistswould seek to"capture" an object reality n theirconcepts and knowledgeclaims to aid in controllingn environment r sustainingpractical onsensus, ealistshave an interestn reflectiveeasonfor tsown sake. Realismmust ver ee tself,ts oncepts,nd tsclaims s at eastpotentiallyhe captive" bjects f omereal ndevolving onditionsyetto be understood.

Thedistinguishingeature fHerz'srealism,hen, s thedepthof his commitmentto an emancipatory cognitive interest asdefined bove:An interestnsecuringreedomrom nacknowl-edged constraints,elations f domination, nd conditions fdistortedommunicationnd understandinghatdenyhumansthe capacityto make theirfuture hrough ullwill and con-sciousness.Herz's, nshort,san interestnreason s such. t s aninterestn exercising eflectiveeasonto dissolve imits n theself-consciousevelopmentf ife ndtherebyestore o men ndwomen a true awarenessof theirplace in history nd theircapacities o make the future.

Accordingly, hile Herz can recognize hatknowledge as abasis n nterests,e cannot ccordfinal, ncontestablealidityonorms, oncepts, ndknowledgelaims olelybecausethey erve(or are consistentwith)the practical nd technical nterestsnunderstandingnd control hiat ociety onsciously ecognizesandendorses. orHerz,neitherhe echnical-strategicnterestn

masteringn objectifiednvironmentor hepracticalnterestnsustaining onsensual order s a sufficientnterest asis forthejustificationfknowledge.Neithers sufficientecauseneitherresponds o thehuman nterestnautonomy,ndneithermakesuse oftheessential uman apacitybywhich utonomymaybeachieved: elf-reflection.oth eaveunquestioned-andbeyondthe force of reason-those yet to be apprehendedhistoricalprocesses hat hapeparticipants'elf-understandings,ncluding

theirunderstandingsfthe immediate nterestshey all uponknowledge o serve.

This positionon Herz's partis whatdictateshis habit"ofquestioning.. assumptions,freexamining eriodicallydeasand concepts."So habituated,Herz understands hatbeinga




committed ealistmeansbeing criticalnonrealist t the sametime. n advancing ealist orms, oncepts,ndarguments, erzsenses,one must also step "outside of" realism to examinecriticallyhepossibly hangingonditions-thepoliticomilitary,technological, ocial, environmentalonditions-amidstwhichrealistnorms re worthyor not),realist oncepts revalid ornot),and realist rgumentsre warrantedor not).

Thus, Herz has contributed hathave becomesome ofthemost central oncepts frealist cholarship:heconcepts fthe"security ilemma" nd"impenetrability,"onametwo.Butthusalso, Herzinsists hat hese nd other ealist oncepts annotbeviewedas both parentand childof themselves. hey cannotfinally alidate themselves.nstead,one mustpersistentlyndsystematicallyxamine he mplicationsftechnological,ocial,and economic hange,not ustfor tate-to-stateelations er e,but also for thevalidity ftheveryconceptsframing ealists'views of the world. Herz's whole career-especially in itsemphasis n the mplicationsf theevolving meansofdestruc-tion"-atteststo the seriousness e attaches o this mperative(Herz 1959,1976).

As Herz's emancipatorynterestn reason leads himevertoward reflectiveose,however, e sexposed othe harge hathemovesona path oward kind f dealism.t snot, obesure,the dealism fAnglo-Americanlegalists"nd"moralists."t sakindof idealismhaving deeper ineagetraceable o German

Idealism,perhapsHegelmore hanKant. t is a kindof dealismthat trains lwaysfor heultimate,he bsolute, heuniversallygood and true.As a resultto assemble nd apply omefamiliarcriticismsgainst his orm f dealism),Herzcan bechargedwithleapingto an abstract laneofargumenthat 1) is "no longerintegratedntohistory"Horkheimer, 974); 2) isdeprived f hecritical, alsifyingorce fconventionallyndorsed ense-basedevidencePopper, 1961); 3) is detached rom sensuoushuman

activity" Marx, 1970);(4) denies tself ll practicalrelevance,becoming method s impotence" PerryAnderson,1976); and(5) becomes dangerous, ncorrectableorcewhen, pon finallyclosing upon the"absolute," t reasserts tself n theplane ofpractical ctivityPopper, 1961;Morgenthau, 978;Carr, 1946;Marx, 1970).




To examine loselyHerz'spresent iece s tosee thathe s notunaware of such possible criticisms.He is conscious of thedangers ssociatedwiththepositionhe is taking.Rather hanretreat n the face of these dangers,though,Herz tries todialecticallyranscendhem.Far from scending o a worldofpure reason, leavingthe practicaland technical nterests frealism behind, Herz tries to dialecticallyrecombinetheseinterestsnd the ssociated pproaches o nquiry nd groundingin a waythatwouldcarryherealist ialogueforwardnresponseto historical hange.

His discursive trategyn thisregard s, think, othinghortof brilliant.7t is a two-sided trategy,achside directedgainstoneof realism's woaspects.First,Herz tries o shift heplaneofgroundingorpractical ealisthermeneuticswayfrom tradi-tional consensusof statesmanship-a"truetradition"with tsassociatedconcepts mbodied nthenowglobalizedfacticityf"state," nation," nd"national nterest"-and oward nantici-pated universal consensusthat is realizable in principle-aconsensusthat finds ts ustification,bove all, through nre-strained eason.Althoughhis intent n thisrespectmaynot beimmediatelypparent,his ideofHerz's trategys mplicitnhisattemptto demonstrate hat realistconceptsfind differentmeaningsas viewed fromdifferent istorical,political,andeconomic antagepoints.Much oftheworld,he ssaying,tandsoutside fand actively uestions he true radition"fpracticalrealisthermeneutics.ow can thisbe so? How, heasks, can werealists ationally efendnd ustifyurtraditionaloncepts ndclaimsto a worldthatdailyattests o their ack of universalmeaning?

Sucha justification,erzknows, annotbepresentedntermsofthetraditionalanguageofexperience fthe true radition,"for thelanguage tselfs in question.To justify ationallyheirtraditional oncepts nd claims,realistsmust ppeal to experi-

7. In my opinion,Herz'stwo-part trategy,hough rilliantnconception, s notaswell executed s it might e. In partthis s because Herz's present rguments quasi-autobiographical,ot systematicritique frealism,ts imitations,nd tspotentialities.My ownargumentsn Section II have been meantto provide hiskind of systematictreatmentgainstwhichthesignificancef Herz's statementshould becomeclear. Inlargerpart, though, he problem s thatthe thorough xecutionof Herz's strategyssomethinghatno single rticle anbeexpected o accomplish. ee especially ootnote ,below.




encesbeyond hose hat repersonallymeaningfulnterms f he"true radition's" ersonalprehistory.ealistsmustregard ar-ticipants utside of the "truetradition," ot as mereobjectsbeyond ntersubjectivenderstanding,ut as suitablepartnersfor a dialogue.Realistsmustregard hese outsiders" s othersubjectivitieshose wnprehistoriesnd anguages f xperiencecan be interpreted,nderstood,nd integrated ithin mutualunderstandingmbracinghe "true radition" s well. n short,the ntended ffectfthisgesture,hefirstart fHerz's trategy,is to widen hehermeneuticircle fpractical ealism o embracethewholeof nternationalocietynditshistory,ot usta "truetradition" fstatesmanship.

The second part of Herz's two-part trategys directed ttechnical ealism.n effect,eargues hat 1) a "triad" fthreatshas projected heonceremote utalwaysuniversalnterestnthesurvival fthehuman peciesonto the mmediate laneofreal,urgent roblems equiringechnicalolutions; ence 2) theonceseeminglydealistic mancipatorynterestnthehuman pecies'reason, autonomy,and conscious self-creation as come tocoincide withthe technicalcognitive nterest t the base ofrealism.The unrestrainedxerciseof reason,he is saying,hasbecome a technicalmatter-a superordinatematter f humansurvival hattranscendsll particular nterests.

ThispartofHerz's strategys crucial, or tsgoes to theverybase ofrealismnd ts echnicalognitiventerest.nthe irst art

of his strategy, erz would expand the hermeneutic ircle ofpractical ealism, utas I tried o showearlier, his superstruc-tural" hift annot ccur o long sthebaseof echnical ealism sleft nchallenged. omehowHerzmust ucceed ndemonstratingsomething o those for whom a theoryfoundedupon theimpossibilityheorem ervesa technicalcognitive nterest ncontrol over others. He must demonstrate hat theyhave asuperordinatenteresthatwould ead them owanttoquestion

thetheory nd the mpossibilityheoremtself.Here the secondpartofhis strategynters.To say thatthe

survival fthehuman pecies s at stake s tosaythat veryone'ssurvival s at stake, ncluding hosepeople and societiesthat




benefitnevery therwayfromheprotractedolitical ragmen-tationofthe world. Whenthesurvival fthehumanspecies sseen to be at stake, venthosewhosefirstoncern stomaintaincontrol verothersmight ewillingoadmit need oget ontrolof themselves. ventheywould wanttowidenthehermeneuticcircleofpractical ealism o embrace hewhole of nternationalsociety.And even heymight opethat nthe xpandeddialogue,technical ealism ndits mpossibilityheoremwouldbe provenwrong.8

Takentogether,hetwo sidesofthisdiscursivetrategyre, sI say, brilliantn conception.Herz's argumentmountsto atransformationalritiquentended,ottodeny rreplace ealism,butto find n therealistdialoguethe basis fora newsynthesisaproposofhistorical hange nd emergentonditions. he newsynthesishe envisions s one in which immediate echnicalinterests n control no longer subordinatepractical under-standing, nd both no longer oin inexcluding s mere dealismthe universalisticrientation f reflectiveeason. In the newsynthesis,echnical,practical, nd emancipatorynterestsrecoextensive. hey are joinedas one.

8. This part of Herz's strategys crucial, nd thanksto his introduction f thisargumentnthe ealist ialogue,we can see at once howmuch he lassicrealist onceptionofpowerpolitics ependsupon: 1) the bility f technological ptimists"o beatdownholistic limits o growth" rguments,2) the bility f nuclear trategistso convincinglyassert hat nuclearwarcan be survived nd"won"by t least omeparticipants,nd 3)thefaintly arwinian entiment

hat,o paraphraseChurchill, henpeople starve hey

won'thave thegood grace o starve quallybutwillbeat warwith neanother ver he astmorsels.

To fully xecute his strategy, erzmust omehow urmount ll ofthese positions.Here hemerely sserts hat "triad f hreats" uts he urvival fthe pecies n eopardyso longas the world s politically rdered ccording o classic realist oncepts.Goingbeyond hisbald assertionwouldrequire majorproject. pecifically,thinkhat he ullmaking f his rgument equires is ttempt o analyze he nsecurity-perpetuatingtatessystems a nowdeeply nstitutionalizedut stillproblematicocialrelation: newhoseemergence, eproduction, nd possible passingcan be explainedin terms f its realhistorical onnectionswith ocial, economic, nd natural nvironmentalspectsof thehuman ifeprocess, ncluding symmetricalelations fdominationnd subordination.

Only nthiswaywould t becomepossible osystematicallyorroborate is ssertions otheeffect hatnowemergentonditions hreatenhe tructurefhuman ife nways hatoverwhelm he states system's apacitiesto adapt. However,doing thisrequires hedevelopmentf frameworknwhich nterconnectionsetweennsecurityolitics, ntheonehand, ndrelations fproduction, eproduction,ndexchange midst nvironmentallimits, n the other, re set forth. ee Ashley 1980a, 1980b).




IV. Implicationsor the RealistDialogue

To say that Herz's contributiono the realistdialogue s animportantne s a grossunderstatement.o saythathis trategy,brilliantn conception,ucceeds nwhat t tries o do is anothermatter.Herz's aim is to tug realismtowarda new synthesiscenteringn hisuniversalizedealist oncepts.Whether r nothistuggingucceeds n budging therrealists epends,notentirelyon hisargument,ut also on therealistswhohear t. n making

hisargument, erznecessarilyssumes hatmy haracterizationofthe wo spects frealismnSection I iswrong, t east npart.He necessarily ssumesthatfor otherrealists, s forhimself,reason s notreducibleo technicalealism's urposiveationality.He must ssume this,for fmycharacterizations correct,hentherealists o whomhe addresseshisargumentreincapableofresponding ith nydegree f elf-reflectivityoargumentsuchas Herz's. They willnot budge at all.

The realism resentednmy haracterizationsrobust gainstcriticismsuch s Herz's.Perhaps hemostobviousreason, romwhat have said so far, s thatthe technical ase ofrealism sautonomousofthepractical uperstructure,ith heresult hatcriticismsodgedsolelyat thesuperstructuralevel ofpracticalexperiencewillgenerally eregardeds unwarrantedyrealists.Theywillmiss hepoint.For example, onsider n argumentothe ffecthatrealism alters ecause tsconcepts re outofkilter

with worldfullof slamicmovements,multinationalorpora-tions,statelessterrorists,nd other transnational orces.Orconsiderthe argument hat realism s inadequate because theclassic language of power politicsfails to be responsive oimperativesor ollaborationmerging ithmounting conomicinterdependence,ncreasing rospects f"globaltragedies fthecommons," nd so on. Such argumentsreunwarranted,vensilly, n realisteyes. They are unwarranted ecause,froma

vantage pointframedbythe technical ealistbase, suchargu-mentsmerely ointoutobjective echnical roblems,xternal othe true radition," hich hat radition,nd t lone,can wrestlewith nd try o manage.

Ifmycharacterizations accurate, henforrealism, heonlyadmissibleriticismsre those odged tthe evelofthe echnical




base, and hererealism'srobustness gainstcriticisms all themoreplain. Threepoints-all dealingwithtechnical ealism'scognitiventerest nd positivisticutlook-need to be made.

First, iven echnical ealism's echnical ognitiventerest,heonly admissible tandard f criticisms means-ends ationality.At this evel,the reflectivexamination f intersubjectivere-understandingssdisallowed,ndtheonus s thrown ackon thecritico showbothoftwothings:1) that he heory eveloped tthe technical evel does not enhancethe efficiencyf controloperations,nd 2) that herexists "better"heory hichwouldenhance heefficiencyf control perations.n otherwords, hecriticmustbeattechnical ealism t its owngame.

Second,technical ealism,ikepositivistcience n general,sprepared o pass udgment n onlyone kindofend:Again,theenhancementftheefficiencyf means. Likepositivistcience,technical ealism onceives f tself s valueneutral nd tries otatallto establishnobjective asisfor alues, thics,ndends. nso doing, though, t implicitlyanctions particularkindofethics: decisionisticthicsbased onlyonthe ndividual ctor'spersonalcommitment, elief,or faith.As a result, echnicalrealismstotallymmuneo criticismshatwouldpoint utthatworld orderedaccordingto realistconceptsis incapable ofrealizing lobal ends or humanistic alues.As faras technicalrealismsconcerned, oneexist; ndalthoughndividual ealistsmighthave theirown personalcommitmento some ethical

system,uch a commitments only personal ne.It introducesno tensionwhatsoevernto heir nderstandingfobjectiveaws.9

9. To beclear, ealism oesadmit onsiderationfnorms,thics,ndmores, ut heseenter ealism olely t the uperstructuralracticalevel, nd their ntrys not ccounted

forbythetechnical heoretical ase. Instead, orMorgenthaus formostrealists, hesenorms, thics, nd mores nter ealism s exogenous, d hoc termswhich reofconcern,not so much because of theircontents,per se, but because of theirfunctions: s"limitations n power."Still,precisely ecausethesenorms, thics, nd moresoriginateoutsideof the theoretical ase, realismprovidesno objectivebasis forassessing heirhistorical ependence, deologicaldistortions,nd/ r truthontent.Whether rnotoneagrees or disagreeswith thesenorms, thics, nd moresremainspurely matter fpersonal hoice.




Third, echnical ealisms robust gainst riticism ecause ofthemutual reinforcementf its positivist utlook, on the onehand,and thetheory fpowerpolitics, n theother. n technicalrealism's ositivisticutlook,knowledges redeemed n terms fitsenhancementf ome ubject's ower f echnical ontrol veranobjectreality, here hat bjectreality appens obe madeupofother ubjectivities.he problem, hough, s that f veryonessubject and everyone s object, with no hierarchy f controlrelations mong them, henpositivist ciencemakesno senseatall. Under uchcircumstances,he echnicallysefulnformationgiven oone wouldbe equally ccessible nduseful oall, andthemoment it is applied by all, the whole system would betransformedn a waymaking heoriginalnformationseless tbest.Here thetheory fpowerpolitics omestotherescue.Forrealist heory imply ubmitshatwhile llstates reobjects f hepowerof at least one other-therefore aving heirntereststleast partially haped nterms fobjective ecessities-some remorepowerful han others.And being powerfulmeansbeingsituated midst hierarchical elationshipsuchthat,relative oothers, nehasgreater utonomynd sthereforebletorelate oothersmore s subject han s object.While he trongdo whatthey can," moreover, heyare also positionedto dispropor-tionately se and value a science f nternationalolitics hat tonce 1) orients heir fficientxercise f ontrol oreproduceheheirarchynd sustaintheirpositionswithin t, (2) denies thepossibilityfa world rderednanyotherway, nd 3) disallowsany objectivebasis for values or ethicsfromwhichone mightcriticizehings s they re.

The implicationhould be clear:So long as theworld s anhierarchicalrder fdomination,hedominantwill lways etainan interestn realist oncepts nd claims;and beingdominant,theywill ry,with arying egrees f uccess, o make heworldnreflectionf thoseconcepts ndclaims. n the nd, heonlykind

of criticismhatwouldpossibly o awaywith ealism sa globalrevolutionaryhange hatwouldputan endto the urrent rderofdominationwithout stablishing newonein tsplace. n theend, this, nd only this, s the kindoffalsifyingvidence hatrealismwillrecognize.




Again,to say thatrealism s robust gainstcriticismn thesewaysis to say that my presentationfthebase-superstructurerelationbetween echnical nd practical spects s an accuratecharacterization.t isalso, n animportantense, o nsult ealistsby suggesting hat, t thebase of it all, there s no oppositionbetween scientific an"and "powerpolitics."Reducing easonto purposiverationality, auging ctionsolely n terms ftheefficiencyfmeans,and one-sidedly oncentratingn the"is,"realists re "scientific en."For the ate Hans Morgenthau,uchan assertionwouldhave to be denied 1965).

Itsdenial, hough,s a matter f actualscholarly ractice, otdeclaratorypolicy,and a way of measuring hatpractice sprovidedby Herz's present iece.As I havesaid,Herzwants obelieve and mustbelieve hatthere s more to realism han mycharacterizationuggests.His argument ppeals to realists obreak out of theconfines fpurposive ationality,xercise heiressentially umanreflectiveapacities, nd transcend hetech-nical interestn control.He believes hat realism s capable ofdoing o. Whetherrnotrealisms in fact apableof iving ptoHerz's understandingf tspotentialsanempiricaluestion. t sa question hatonlyrealists,n thequality f their esponses oHerz'scontribution,an answer.

Dateofreceiptffinalmanuscript:/3/81

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