1st arvn division, and the 3d - united states marine corps vol 22 no 3_2.pdfcitadel employed...

14
other 5th Marines battalion, the 1st Bat- talion remained under the operational control of the 1st Marines. Apparently when the one Vietnamese Marine company came into the Citadel the previous day, the Vietnamese airborne units departed. Unaware of the departure of the Vietnamese airborne, Maj Thomp- son departed the Mang Ca compound on the morning of 13th to take over the new sector: "There was no Airborne unit in the area and Company A was up to their arm- pits in NVA." Within minutes the com- pany sustained 35 casualties. Much of the fighting centered around an archway tower occupied by the NVA along the Citadel's eastern wall. Finally af- ter committing its reserve and the exten- sive use of supporting fires, including air, the battalion captured the tower on the night of 15-16 February. F OR THE NEXT few days the 1st Bat- talion met the same close-quarter resistance from the enemy. In contrast to the enemy in southern Hue, the battal- ion discovered that the NVA units in the Citadel employed "better city-fighting tac- tics." As Maj Thompson wrote, the ene- my "had everything going for him." During this period, on the 13th, the Vietnamese Marine Task Force finally ar- rived in the Citadel and was assigned the southwest sector. In two days of heavy fighting, however, the Vietnamese Marine task force advanced less than 400 meters. In other sectors of the Citadel, other ARVN units were also at a standstill. By this time, the enemy also had his problems. On the night of 16-17 Febru- ary, the allies intercepted an enemy radio transmission, relating the death of the NVA commander in the city and the as- sumption of command of a new officer. The new commander recommended with- drawal but the senior headquarters denied the request. In the Citadel General Truong prepared for the final thrust to capture the Imperi- al Palace. With the Vietnamese Marines on the western flank, he placed the 3d ARVN Regiment in the center. On the left flank, the U.S. Marine battalion renewed its assault. If the NVA in the Citadel were now fighting a rear guard action, they con- tested nearly every piece of ground. Both Gens Abrams, who had estab- lished his new headquarters at Phu Bai, and Cushman shared a concern about progress in the Citadel and the resulting American casualties. The Washington Post quoted a Marine officer: We don't have enough men, . . . air support, or enough artillery to do this thing quickly Q N io FEBRUARY, Gen Abrams radio- ed Gen Cushman that he consi- dered "the measures so far taken to be in- adequate." He also sent a message to Gen Tolson of the 1st Air Cavalry to clear the approaches to Hue. Tolson was to "make personal contact with BGen Truong and report personally to this headquart- ers with your proposed plan of action." Despite the note of anxiety in Abrams' messages, the battle for Hue was in its last stages. By 22 February, after stiff resistance, the 1st Cavalry's 3d Brigade was within sight of the city walls. In the eastern sector, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines had once again taken the in- itiative. Despite heavy initial resistance, by the morning of the 22d, the Marines had reached the southeastern wall. To the west of the American Marines, however, the North Vietnamese continued to hold out. Venting his anger at what he considered the slow progress of the Viet- namese Marines, Gen Abrams complained to Westmoreland that the Vietnamese Ma- rines in the last three days "have moved forward less than half a city block," and even recommended their possible disso- lution. N OTWITHSTANDING Abrams' frustra- tions, the Vietnamese forces were on the offensive. At 0500 on the 24th, ARVN soldiers raised their flag over the Citadel and by late afternoon, South Vietnamese troops had recaptured the palace with its surrounding grounds and walls. Save for mopping-up operations, the fight for the Citadel was over. On 26 February, ARVN forces relieved the Marine battalion. On the 29th, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 5th Marines conducted a sweep east and north of the city. The Marines uncovered "fresh trench work along the route of ad- vance:' but the search for significant North Vietnamese forces proved fruitless. LtCol Cheatham observed, "we couldn't close the loop around the enemy. To be honest, we didn't have enough people to close it." On 2 March 1968, the Marines closed out the operation. The suddenness and the extent of the enemy offensive in Hue caught both the South Vietnamese and American com- mands offstride. At first underestimating the strength of the enemy in Hue, the al- lies sent too few troops. Command, con- trol, and coordination remained a problem until the last weeks. The activa- tion of the MACV Phu Bai Headquarters added an additional unneeded layer of command from above. Task Force X-Ray, the 1st ARVN Division, and the 3d Brigade fought their own battles in isola- tion from one another. Outside of Gen Cushman of III MAF and Gen Abrams, there was not even an overall American, let alone a single, commander of the Hue campaign. Both Cushman and Abrams were at too high a level to focus much of their attention on the Hue situation. From his headquarters, Gen Truong controlled the South Vietnamese effort. As a Marine officer observed, the lack of an overall commander resulted in no general battle plan and competition for support. By the time a U.S. Army general became the Hue coordinator, 'he didn't have anything to coordinate T HE BATFLE COST all sides dearly. All told, allied unit casualties totaled more than 600 dead and nearly 3,800 wounded and missing. Allied estimates of NVA and VC dead ranged from 2,500 to 5,000 troops. Just as speculative were the size and number of enemy units in the one-month battle. Allied intelligence officers initial- ly identified at least three North Viet- namese regimental headquarters. Later they confirmed battalions from at least four more NVA regiments. Allied intelli- gence estimated that from 16 to 18 ene- my battalions took part in the battle. Some of these battalions were supposed to have been at Khe Sanh. From 8,000 to 11,000 enemy troops participated in the fighting for Hue in the city itself or its ap- proaches. American intelligence officers believed that a forward headquarters of the Tri-Thien-Hue Front under a North Viet- namese general officer directed the Hue offensive. Given both the resources that the North Vietnamese put into the battle and the tenacity with which they fought, it was ob- vious they placed a high premium on Hue. The North Vietnamese planners viewed Hue as the weak link in the allied defenses in the north. As a North Viet- (Continued on page 24) Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993 11 other 5th Marines battalion, the 1st Bat- talion remained under the operational control of the 1st Marines. Apparently when the one Vietnamese Marine company came into the Citadel the previous day, the Vietnamese airborne units departed. Unaware of the departure of the Vietnamese airborne, Maj Thomp- son departed the Mang Ca compound on the morning of 13th to take over the new sector: "There was no Airborne unit in the area and Company A was up to their arm- pits in NVA." Within minutes the com- pany sustained 35 casualties. Much of the fighting centered around an archway tower occupied by the NVA along the Citadel's eastern wall. Finally af- ter committing its reserve and the exten- sive use of supporting fires, including air, the battalion captured the tower on the night of 15-16 February. OR THE NEXT few days the 1st Bat- I talion met the same close-quarter resistance from the enemy. In contrast to the enemy in southern Hue, the battal- ion discovered that the NVA units in the Citadel employed "better city-fighting tac- tics." As Maj Thompson wrote, the ene- my "had everything going for him." During this period, on the 13th, the Vietnamese Marine Task Force finally ar- rived in the Citadel and was assigned the southwest sector. In two days of heavy fighting, however, the Vietnamese Marine task force advanced less than 400 meters. In other sectors of the Citadel, other ARVN units were also at a standstill. By this time, the enemy also had his problems. On the night of 16-17 Febru- ary, the allies intercepted an enemy radio transmission, relating the death of the NVA commander in the city and the as- sumption of command of a new officer. The new commander recommended with- drawal but the senior headquarters denied the request. In the Citadel General Truong prepared for the final thrust to capture the Imperi- al Palace. With the Vietnamese Marines on the western flank, he placed the 3d ARVN Regiment in the center. On the left flank, the U.S. Marine battalion renewed its assault. If the NVA in the Citadel were now fighting a rear guard action, they con- tested nearly every piece of ground. Both Gens Abrams, who had estab- lished his new headquarters at Phu Bai, and Cushman shared a concern about progress in the Citadel and the resulting American casualties. The Washington Post quoted a Marine officer: "We don't have enough men, . . . air support, or enough artillery to do this thing quickly Q N io FEBRUARY, Gen Abrams radio- ed Gen Cushman that he consi- dered "the measures so far taken to be in- adequate." He also sent a message to Gen Tolson of the 1st Air Cavalry to clear the approaches to Hue. Tolson was to "make personal contact with BGen Truong and report personally to this headquart- ers with your proposed plan of action." Despite the note of anxiety in Abrams' messages, the battle for Hue was in its last stages. By 22 February, after stiff resistance, the 1st Cavalry's 3d Brigade was within sight of the city walls. In the eastern sector, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines had once again taken the in- itiative. Despite heavy initial resistance, by the morning of the 22d, the Marines had reached the southeastern wall. To the west of the American Marines, however, the North Vietnamese continued to hold out. Venting his anger at what he considered the slow progress of the Viet- namese Marines, Gen Abrams complained to Westmoreland that the Vietnamese Ma- rines in the last three days "have moved forward less than half a city block," and even recommended their possible disso- lution. N OTWITHSTANDING Abrams' frustra- tions, the Vietnamese forces were on the offensive. At 0500 on the 24th, ARVN soldiers raised their flag over the Citadel and by late afternoon, South Vietnamese troops had recaptured the palace with its surrounding grounds and walls. Save for mopping-up operations, the fight for the Citadel was over. On 26 February, ARVN forces relieved the Marine battalion. On the 29th, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 5th Marines conducted a sweep east and north of the city. The Marines uncovered "fresh trench work along the route of ad- vance," but the search for significant North Vietnamese forces proved fruitless. LtCol Cheatham observed, "we couldn't close the loop around the enemy. To be honest, we didn't have enough people to close it." On 2 March 1968, the Marines closed out the operation. The suddenness and the extent of the enemy offensive in Hue caught both the South Vietnamese and American com- mands offstride. At first underestimating the strength of the enemy in Hue, the al- lies sent too few troops. Command, con- trol, and coordination remained a problem until the last weeks. The activa- tion of the MACV Phu Bai Headquarters added an additional unneeded layer of command from above. Task Force X-Ray, the 1st ARVN Division, and the 3d Brigade fought their own battles in isola- tion from one another. Outside of Gen Cushman of III MAF and Gen Abrams, there was not even an overall American, let alone a single, commander of the Hue campaign. Both Cushman and Abrams were at too high a level to focus much of their attention on the Hue situation. From his headquarters, Gen Truong controlled the South Vietnamese effort. As a Marine officer observed, the lack of an overall commander resulted in no general battle plan and competition for support. By the time a U.S. Army general became the Hue coordinator, "he didn't have anything to coordinate T HE BATFLE COST all sides dearly. All told, allied unit casualties totaled more than 600 dead and nearly 3,800 wounded and missing. Allied estimates of NVA and VC dead ranged from 2,500 to 5,000 troops. Just as speculative were the size and number of enemy units in the one-month battle. Allied intelligence officers initial- ly identified at least three North Viet- namese regimental headquarters. Later they confirmed battalions from at least four more NVA regiments. Allied intelli- gence estimated that from 16 to 18 ene- my battalions took part in the battle. Some of these battalions were supposed to have been at Khe Sanh. From 8,000 to 11,000 enemy troops participated in the fighting for Hue in the city itself or its ap- proaches. American intelligence officers believed that a forward headquarters of the Tri-Thien-Hue Front under a North Viet- namese general officer directed the Hue offensive. Given both the resources that the North Vietnamese put into the battle and the tenacity with which they fought, it was ob- vious they placed a high premium on Hue. The North Vietnamese planners viewed Hue as the weak link in the allied defenses in the north. As a North Viet- (Continued on page 24) Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993 11

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Page 1: 1st ARVN Division, and the 3d - United States Marine Corps Vol 22 No 3_2.pdfCitadel employed "better city-fighting tac-tics." As Maj Thompson wrote, the ene- ... loop around the enemy

other 5th Marines battalion, the 1st Bat-talion remained under the operationalcontrol of the 1st Marines.

Apparently when the one VietnameseMarine company came into the Citadel theprevious day, the Vietnamese airborneunits departed. Unaware of the departureof the Vietnamese airborne, Maj Thomp-son departed the Mang Ca compound onthe morning of 13th to take over the newsector: "There was no Airborne unit in thearea and Company A was up to their arm-pits in NVA." Within minutes the com-pany sustained 35 casualties.

Much of the fighting centered aroundan archway tower occupied by the NVAalong the Citadel's eastern wall. Finally af-ter committing its reserve and the exten-sive use of supporting fires, including air,the battalion captured the tower on thenight of 15-16 February.

F OR THE NEXT few days the 1st Bat-talion met the same close-quarter

resistance from the enemy. In contrast tothe enemy in southern Hue, the battal-ion discovered that the NVA units in theCitadel employed "better city-fighting tac-tics." As Maj Thompson wrote, the ene-my "had everything going for him."

During this period, on the 13th, theVietnamese Marine Task Force finally ar-rived in the Citadel and was assigned thesouthwest sector. In two days of heavyfighting, however, the Vietnamese Marinetask force advanced less than 400 meters.In other sectors of the Citadel, otherARVN units were also at a standstill.

By this time, the enemy also had hisproblems. On the night of 16-17 Febru-ary, the allies intercepted an enemy radiotransmission, relating the death of theNVA commander in the city and the as-sumption of command of a new officer.The new commander recommended with-drawal but the senior headquarters deniedthe request.

In the Citadel General Truong preparedfor the final thrust to capture the Imperi-al Palace. With the Vietnamese Marineson the western flank, he placed the 3dARVN Regiment in the center. On the leftflank, the U.S. Marine battalion renewedits assault. If the NVA in the Citadel werenow fighting a rear guard action, they con-tested nearly every piece of ground.

Both Gens Abrams, who had estab-lished his new headquarters at Phu Bai,and Cushman shared a concern about

progress in the Citadel and the resultingAmerican casualties. The Washington Postquoted a Marine officer: We don't haveenough men, . . . air support, or enoughartillery to do this thing quickly

Q N io FEBRUARY, Gen Abrams radio-ed Gen Cushman that he consi-

dered "the measures so far taken to be in-adequate." He also sent a message to GenTolson of the 1st Air Cavalry to clear theapproaches to Hue. Tolson was to "makepersonal contact with BGen Truongand report personally to this headquart-ers with your proposed plan of action."

Despite the note of anxiety in Abrams'messages, the battle for Hue was in its laststages. By 22 February, after stiff resistance,the 1st Cavalry's 3d Brigade was withinsight of the city walls.

In the eastern sector, the 1st Battalion,5th Marines had once again taken the in-itiative. Despite heavy initial resistance, bythe morning of the 22d, the Marines hadreached the southeastern wall.

To the west of the American Marines,however, the North Vietnamese continuedto hold out. Venting his anger at what heconsidered the slow progress of the Viet-namese Marines, Gen Abrams complainedto Westmoreland that the Vietnamese Ma-rines in the last three days "have movedforward less than half a city block," andeven recommended their possible disso-lution.

N OTWITHSTANDING Abrams' frustra-tions, the Vietnamese forces were on

the offensive. At 0500 on the 24th, ARVNsoldiers raised their flag over the Citadeland by late afternoon, South Vietnamesetroops had recaptured the palace with itssurrounding grounds and walls. Save formopping-up operations, the fight for theCitadel was over. On 26 February, ARVNforces relieved the Marine battalion.

On the 29th, the 1st and 2d Battalions,5th Marines conducted a sweep east andnorth of the city. The Marines uncovered"fresh trench work along the route of ad-vance:' but the search for significant NorthVietnamese forces proved fruitless. LtColCheatham observed, "we couldn't close theloop around the enemy. To be honest, wedidn't have enough people to close it." On2 March 1968, the Marines closed out theoperation.

The suddenness and the extent of theenemy offensive in Hue caught both the

South Vietnamese and American com-mands offstride. At first underestimatingthe strength of the enemy in Hue, the al-lies sent too few troops. Command, con-trol, and coordination remained a

problem until the last weeks. The activa-tion of the MACV Phu Bai Headquartersadded an additional unneeded layer ofcommand from above. Task Force X-Ray,the 1st ARVN Division, and the 3dBrigade fought their own battles in isola-tion from one another. Outside of GenCushman of III MAF and Gen Abrams,there was not even an overall American,let alone a single, commander of the Huecampaign. Both Cushman and Abramswere at too high a level to focus much oftheir attention on the Hue situation. Fromhis headquarters, Gen Truong controlledthe South Vietnamese effort. As a Marineofficer observed, the lack of an overallcommander resulted in no general battleplan and competition for support. By thetime a U.S. Army general became the Huecoordinator, 'he didn't have anything tocoordinate

T HE BATFLE COST all sides dearly. Alltold, allied unit casualties totaled

more than 600 dead and nearly 3,800wounded and missing. Allied estimates ofNVA and VC dead ranged from 2,500 to5,000 troops.

Just as speculative were the size andnumber of enemy units in the one-monthbattle. Allied intelligence officers initial-ly identified at least three North Viet-namese regimental headquarters. Laterthey confirmed battalions from at leastfour more NVA regiments. Allied intelli-gence estimated that from 16 to 18 ene-my battalions took part in the battle.Some of these battalions were supposedto have been at Khe Sanh. From 8,000 to11,000 enemy troops participated in thefighting for Hue in the city itself or its ap-proaches. American intelligence officersbelieved that a forward headquarters of theTri-Thien-Hue Front under a North Viet-namese general officer directed the Hueoffensive.

Given both the resources that the NorthVietnamese put into the battle and thetenacity with which they fought, it was ob-vious they placed a high premium onHue. The North Vietnamese plannersviewed Hue as the weak link in the allieddefenses in the north. As a North Viet-

(Continued on page 24)

Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993 11

other 5th Marines battalion, the 1st Bat-talion remained under the operationalcontrol of the 1st Marines.

Apparently when the one VietnameseMarine company came into the Citadel theprevious day, the Vietnamese airborneunits departed. Unaware of the departureof the Vietnamese airborne, Maj Thomp-son departed the Mang Ca compound onthe morning of 13th to take over the newsector: "There was no Airborne unit in thearea and Company A was up to their arm-pits in NVA." Within minutes the com-pany sustained 35 casualties.

Much of the fighting centered aroundan archway tower occupied by the NVAalong the Citadel's eastern wall. Finally af-ter committing its reserve and the exten-sive use of supporting fires, including air,the battalion captured the tower on thenight of 15-16 February.

OR THE NEXT few days the 1st Bat-I talion met the same close-quarterresistance from the enemy. In contrast tothe enemy in southern Hue, the battal-ion discovered that the NVA units in theCitadel employed "better city-fighting tac-tics." As Maj Thompson wrote, the ene-my "had everything going for him."

During this period, on the 13th, theVietnamese Marine Task Force finally ar-rived in the Citadel and was assigned thesouthwest sector. In two days of heavyfighting, however, the Vietnamese Marinetask force advanced less than 400 meters.In other sectors of the Citadel, otherARVN units were also at a standstill.

By this time, the enemy also had hisproblems. On the night of 16-17 Febru-ary, the allies intercepted an enemy radiotransmission, relating the death of theNVA commander in the city and the as-sumption of command of a new officer.The new commander recommended with-drawal but the senior headquarters deniedthe request.

In the Citadel General Truong preparedfor the final thrust to capture the Imperi-al Palace. With the Vietnamese Marineson the western flank, he placed the 3dARVN Regiment in the center. On the leftflank, the U.S. Marine battalion renewedits assault. If the NVA in the Citadel werenow fighting a rear guard action, they con-tested nearly every piece of ground.

Both Gens Abrams, who had estab-lished his new headquarters at Phu Bai,and Cushman shared a concern about

progress in the Citadel and the resultingAmerican casualties. The Washington Postquoted a Marine officer: "We don't haveenough men, . . . air support, or enoughartillery to do this thing quickly

Q N io FEBRUARY, Gen Abrams radio-ed Gen Cushman that he consi-

dered "the measures so far taken to be in-adequate." He also sent a message to GenTolson of the 1st Air Cavalry to clear theapproaches to Hue. Tolson was to "makepersonal contact with BGen Truongand report personally to this headquart-ers with your proposed plan of action."

Despite the note of anxiety in Abrams'messages, the battle for Hue was in its laststages. By 22 February, after stiff resistance,the 1st Cavalry's 3d Brigade was withinsight of the city walls.

In the eastern sector, the 1st Battalion,5th Marines had once again taken the in-itiative. Despite heavy initial resistance, bythe morning of the 22d, the Marines hadreached the southeastern wall.

To the west of the American Marines,however, the North Vietnamese continuedto hold out. Venting his anger at what heconsidered the slow progress of the Viet-namese Marines, Gen Abrams complainedto Westmoreland that the Vietnamese Ma-rines in the last three days "have movedforward less than half a city block," andeven recommended their possible disso-lution.

N OTWITHSTANDING Abrams' frustra-tions, the Vietnamese forces were on

the offensive. At 0500 on the 24th, ARVNsoldiers raised their flag over the Citadeland by late afternoon, South Vietnamesetroops had recaptured the palace with itssurrounding grounds and walls. Save formopping-up operations, the fight for theCitadel was over. On 26 February, ARVNforces relieved the Marine battalion.

On the 29th, the 1st and 2d Battalions,5th Marines conducted a sweep east andnorth of the city. The Marines uncovered"fresh trench work along the route of ad-vance," but the search for significant NorthVietnamese forces proved fruitless. LtColCheatham observed, "we couldn't close theloop around the enemy. To be honest, wedidn't have enough people to close it." On2 March 1968, the Marines closed out theoperation.

The suddenness and the extent of theenemy offensive in Hue caught both the

South Vietnamese and American com-mands offstride. At first underestimatingthe strength of the enemy in Hue, the al-lies sent too few troops. Command, con-trol, and coordination remained a

problem until the last weeks. The activa-tion of the MACV Phu Bai Headquartersadded an additional unneeded layer ofcommand from above. Task Force X-Ray,the 1st ARVN Division, and the 3dBrigade fought their own battles in isola-tion from one another. Outside of GenCushman of III MAF and Gen Abrams,there was not even an overall American,let alone a single, commander of the Huecampaign. Both Cushman and Abramswere at too high a level to focus much oftheir attention on the Hue situation. Fromhis headquarters, Gen Truong controlledthe South Vietnamese effort. As a Marineofficer observed, the lack of an overallcommander resulted in no general battleplan and competition for support. By thetime a U.S. Army general became the Huecoordinator, "he didn't have anything tocoordinate

T HE BATFLE COST all sides dearly. Alltold, allied unit casualties totaled

more than 600 dead and nearly 3,800wounded and missing. Allied estimates ofNVA and VC dead ranged from 2,500 to5,000 troops.

Just as speculative were the size andnumber of enemy units in the one-monthbattle. Allied intelligence officers initial-ly identified at least three North Viet-namese regimental headquarters. Laterthey confirmed battalions from at leastfour more NVA regiments. Allied intelli-gence estimated that from 16 to 18 ene-my battalions took part in the battle.Some of these battalions were supposedto have been at Khe Sanh. From 8,000 to11,000 enemy troops participated in thefighting for Hue in the city itself or its ap-proaches. American intelligence officersbelieved that a forward headquarters of theTri-Thien-Hue Front under a North Viet-namese general officer directed the Hueoffensive.

Given both the resources that the NorthVietnamese put into the battle and thetenacity with which they fought, it was ob-vious they placed a high premium onHue. The North Vietnamese plannersviewed Hue as the weak link in the allieddefenses in the north. As a North Viet-

(Continued on page 24)

Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993 11

Page 2: 1st ARVN Division, and the 3d - United States Marine Corps Vol 22 No 3_2.pdfCitadel employed "better city-fighting tac-tics." As Maj Thompson wrote, the ene- ... loop around the enemy

Somalia Task Force History-Keeping in Care of Marines

T HE FIRST U.S. Joint History Team everto deploy went to Somalia on 4

February with LtCol Charles H. Cureton,USMCR, as its officer in charge. LtColCureton is a member of the History andMuseums Division-affiliated MobilizationTraining Unit (History) DC-7.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman GenCohn L. Powell, USA, approved the jointhistory program concept during the springof 1992, as an extension of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which directs more and im-proved interservice cooperation and un-derstanding. With the concurrence of theService chiefs, the Joint Staff issuedMemorandum of Policy No. 62: Guidancefor the Joint Histoiy Program on 15 May1992, and followed that with an improvedversion of the same document on 23November 1992. That "MOP" spawnedthe Joint History Program, and with Presi-dent Bush's offer of humanitarian relief as-sistance for Somalia, the opportunity arosealmost immediately to test its precepts.

The team, which consisted of six mem-bers representing all of the Services, as-sembled at the Pentagon on 2 February

by LtCol Thomas A. Richards, USMCHead, Historical Branch

and received two days of briefings aboutthe program and the current operationalsituation in Somalia. Thereafter, itdeployed to the U.S. Central CommandHeadquarters at McDill Air Force Base,Florida, for additional briefings. It arrivedin Somalia on 6 February and, as of thiswriting, remains there. The team's dutieswhile in Somalia included collecting docu-ments, journals, photos, film, and files;conducting oral history interviews; andrecording its own impressions of Opera-tion Restore Hope.

B EFORE LTCOL CuRFIDN'S team coulddeploy, the Joint Staff and the Serv-

ices had to coordinate the finai details ofthe program and the logistical arrange-ments for the deployment. Meanwhile,Capt David A. Dawson, USMC, an infan-try officer who currently is serving as ahistorical writer for the Marine Corps His-tory and Museums Division, precededLtCol Cureton into Somalia. Capt Dawsonprovided historical advice to the staff ofCombined Joint Task Force Restore Hope,initially at Camp Pendleton and then in

Somalia, and simultaneously served as theinitial representative of the Marine Corps'historical effort. He commenced the col-lection effort of both Marine and jointdocumentation.

On 18 December 1992, LtCol Dennis P.Mroczkowski, USMCR, also a member ofMTh DC-7, followed Capt Dawson intoSomalia and became the second Marine(and second person) to represent the JointHistory Program in an operational en-vironment. LtCol Mroczkowski was also"dual-hatted," serving additionally as thesenior Marine historian. He built uponCapt Dawson's work, continuing the col-lection and oral history efforts. On 8February, after welcoming LtCol Curetonand his team to Somalia and orientingthem, LtCol Mroczkowski returned to theUnited States.

The joint history MOP provides for: adirector, a new Senior Executive Servicebillet; a joint staff history office to bestaffed by a combination of civilian histori-ans and three "full-time support" (FTS)officers; history offices at each of the speci.

12 Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993

In Somalia inJanuaiy, in a photograph by combat artist LtColDonna]. Neaiy, USMCR, a Marine talking with an adult inBardera, "The Italian Village," is quickly surrounded by curious

children. To fellow combat artist Col Peter M. Gish, USMCR,on his own visit, "some of the children seem too far gone to besaved but most, with multiple daily feedings gain strength."

4.-

Somalia Task Force History-Keeping in Care of Marinesby LtCol Thomas A. Richards, USMC

Head Historical Branch

T HE FIRST U.S. Joint History Team everto deploy went to Somalia on 4

February with LtCol Charles H. Cureton,USMCR, as its officer in charge. LtColCureton is a member of the History andMuseums Division-affiliated MobilizationTraining Unit (History) DC-7.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman GenCohn L. Powell, USA, approved the jointhistory program concept during the springof 1992, as an extension of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which directs more and im-proved interservice cooperation and un-derstanding. With the concurrence of theService chiefs, the Joint Staff issuedMemorandum of Policy No. 62: Guidancefor the Joint History Program on 15 May1992, and followed that with an improvedversion of the same document on 23November 1992. That "MOP" spawnedthe Joint History Program, and with Presi-dent Bush's offer of humanitarian relief as-sistance for Somalia, the opportunity arosealmost immediately to test its precepts.

The team, which consisted of six mem-bers representing all of the Services, as-sembled at the Pentagon on 2 February

and received two days of briefings aboutthe program and the current operationalsituation in Somalia. Thereafter, itdeployed to the U.S. Central CommandHeadquarters at McDill Air Force Base,Florida, for additional briefings. It arrivedin Somalia on 6 February and, as of thiswriting, remains there. The team's dutieswhile in Somalia included collecting docu-ments, journals, photos, film, and files;conducting oral history interviews; andrecording its own impressions of Opera-tion Restore Hope.

B EFORE LTCOL CURE1ON'S team coulddeploy, the Joint Staff and the Serv-

ices had to coordinate the finaj details ofthe program and the logistical arrange-ments for the deployment. Meanwhile,Capt David A. Dawson, USMC, an infan-try officer who currently is serving as ahistorical writer for the Marine Corps His-tory and Museums Division, precededLtCol Cureton into Somalia. Capt Dawsonprovided historical advice to the staff ofCombined Joint Task Force Restore Hope,initially at Camp Pendleton and then in

Somalia, and simultaneously served as theinitial representative of the Marine Corps'historical effort. He commenced the col-lection effort of both Marine and jointdocumentation.

On 18 December 1992, LtCol Dennis P.Mroczkowski, USMCR, also a member ofMTU DC-7, followed Capt Dawson intoSomalia and became the second Marine(and second person) to represent the JointHistory Program in an operational en-vironment. LtCol Mroczkowski was also"dual-hatted," serving additionally as thesenior Marine historian. He built uponCapt Dawson's work, continuing the col-lection and oral history efforts. On 8February, after welcoming LtCol Curetonand his team to Somalia and orientingthem, LtCol Mroczkowski returned to theUnited States.

The joint history MOP provides for: adirector, a new Senior Executive Servicebillet; a joint staff history office to bestaffed by a combination of civilian histori-ans and three "full-time support" (FTS)officers; history offices at each of the speci-

12 Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993

In Somalia in January, in a photograph by combat artist LtColDonna J. Neary, USMCR, a Marine talking with an adult inBardera, "The Italian Village," is quickly surrounded by curious

children. To fellow combat artist Col Peter M. Gish, USMCR,on his own visit "some of the children seem too far gone to besaved but most, with multiple daily feedings gain strength."

Page 3: 1st ARVN Division, and the 3d - United States Marine Corps Vol 22 No 3_2.pdfCitadel employed "better city-fighting tac-tics." As Maj Thompson wrote, the ene- ... loop around the enemy

fled commands; Reserve joint historydetachments; and a joint advisory com-mittee, a new body which has not yet offi-cially convened—though a group whichfunctioned in this capacity has met sever-al times to coordinate the details of theprogram. Officers to fill the three FTSbillets will come, one each, from theArmy, Air Force, and naval services, thelatter billet to be a rotational one, withthe Marines and Navy having alternatingresponsibility for filling it. The Joint Staffwill ask each of the Services to providerepresentatives to serve in the Joint His-tory Detachments.

A SECOND TEST of the program com-menced on 13 February when a joint

history team deployed to the Headquart-ers of the U.S. European Command towork on the historical effort for Operation

Provide Promise relief efforts in the form-er Yugoslavia. MTU DC-7 member LtColNicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR, represent-ed the Marine Corps on that team.

These test deployments, which occurunder actual operational conditions, pro-vide invaluable lessons for the Joint His-tory Program. The "after-action" reportssubmitted by the returning team membersprovide recommendations for refining theprocedures for future deployments. Addi-tionally, they provide valuable informationregarding the training of future Joint His-tory Detachment members, and alsoabout the logistical requirements for fu-ture deployments. The team members willalso contribute their observations to thedocumentation files for the exercises, fromwhich will be written the joint histories ofthe respective operations. Ill 775L11

Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993 13

Col Gish, a renowned watercolorist, portrayeda pair of "Fast At-tack Vehicles, 15th MEU Somalia." In his journal, he describesan early morning ride "with an armed convoy from the airport

to the Embassy, driving through littered dirty streets, past ricketymarkets more filthy than I could have imagined, including acamel slaughtering area cleansedonly by the hot sun andflies."

Child photograp hed in Baidoa by LtColNeaiy has more than hunger as a problem;he has measles. His bed is on the ground

4'r4 A',tL -

/t

•1

fled commands; Reserve joint historydetachments; and a joint advisory com-mittee, a new body which has not yet offi-cially convened—though a group whichfunctioned in this capacity has met sever-al times to coordinate the details of theprogram. Officers to fill the three FTSbillets will come, one each, from theArmy, Air Force, and naval services, thelatter billet to be a rotational one, withthe Marines and Navy having alternatingresponsibility for filling it. The Joint Staffwill ask each of the Services to providerepresentatives to serve in the Joint His-tory Detachments.

A SECOND TEST of the program com-menced on 13 February when a joint

history team deployed to the Headquart-ers of the U.S. European Command towork on the historical effort for Operation

Provide Promise relief efforts in the form-er Yugoslavia. MTU DC-7 member LtColNicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR, represent-ed the Marine Corps on that team.

These test deployments, which occurunder actual operational conditions, pro-vide invaluable lessons for the Joint His-tory Program. The "after-action" reportssubmitted by the returning team membersprovide recommendations for refining theprocedures for future deployments. Addi-tionally, they provide valuable informationregarding the training of futureJoint His-tory Detachment members, and alsoabout the logistical requirements for fu-ture deployments. The team members willalso contribute their observations to thedocumentation files for the exercises, fromwhich will be written the joint histories ofthe respective operations. L111775L11

Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993 13

Col Gish, a renowned watercolorist, portrayeda pair of "Fast At-tack Vehicles, 15th MEU Somalia." In his journal, he describesan early morning ride "with an armed convoy from the airport

to the Embassy, driving through littered dirty streets, past ricketymarkets more filthy than I could have imagined, including acamel slaughtering area cleansed only by the hot sun and flies."

Child photographed in Baidoa by LtColNeary has more than hunger as aproblem;he has measles. His bed is on the ground

Page 4: 1st ARVN Division, and the 3d - United States Marine Corps Vol 22 No 3_2.pdfCitadel employed "better city-fighting tac-tics." As Maj Thompson wrote, the ene- ... loop around the enemy

Marine Historians Tracked Somalia Force from Outset

"\V7 HERE IS MY HISTORIAN?"'V demanded Col Billy C. Steed,

Chief of Staff of the I Marine Expedition-ary Force (I MEF), of Col Marshall B.Darling, Deputy Director of the MarineCorps History and Museums Division. ColSteed was assembling his operational"team," even as he planned for the deploy-ment of the Joint Task Force headquart-ers and its subordinate units to Somalia.

LtGen Robert B. Johnston, Command-ing General, I MEF, had recently receivedorders to serve as Commander, Joint Task

Above: The "noisiest, but most beautiful"campsites in Somalia belonged to Battal-ion Landing Team 2/9, writes Col Gish ofthe also steadily windy seaside locations.

by LtCol Thomas A. Richards, USMCHead Historical Branch

Force Restore Hope, and to organize theSomalian relief effort. This was to be thefourth time that a Marine has served as thecommander of an operational joint taskforce. Marines served as JTF commandersfor Operation Sea Angel, humanitarianrelief program following a typhoon inBangladesh; Operation Gitmo, relief ef-fort for Haitian refugees; and OperationProvide Relief, predecessor of OperationRestore Hope. Additionally, a Marinecommanded theJTF which conducted thewargame exercise Cobra Gold-92 inThailand last year.

Within a few days of the formation ofthe JTF, Col Darling had bidden farewellto Capt David A. Dawson, one of theHistorical Branch's writers, departing on

temporary duty orders to the CG, I MEF,at Camp Pendleton, California. CaptDawson was the "point man" of the Ma-rine Corps' historical effort in Somaliawhich, as of the date of publication, con-tinues.

W ORKING UNDER THE auspices ofthe J-3, Joint Task Force Restore

Hope, Capt Dawson set immediatelyabout the task of organizing the histori-cal program for the Somalian relief effort.While still at Camp Pendleton, hereceived advice and assistance from ColCharles J. Quilter II, USMCR, who livesnearby in Laguna Beach. (Col Quiltercommands Mobilization Training Unit[Historyl DC-7 and served as the I MEF

14 Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993

A

•1

'TI

, '1

t 9

Marine Historians Tracked Somalia Force from Outset

"\V7 HERE IS MY HISTORIAN?"'V demanded Col Billy C. Steed,

Chief of Staff of the I Marine Expedition-ary Force (I MEF), of Col Marshall B.Darling, Deputy Director of the MarineCorps History and Museums Division. ColSteed was assembling his operational"team:' even as he planned for the deploy-ment of the Joint Task Force headquart-ers and its subordinate units to Somalia.

LtGen Robert B. Johnston, Command-ing General, I MEF, had recently receivedorders to serve as Commander, Joint Task

Above: The "noisiest, but most beautiful"campsites in Somalia belonged to Battal-ion Landing Team 2/9, writes Col Gish ofthe also steadily windy seaside locations.

by LtCol Thomas A. Richards, USMCHead, Historical Branch

Force Restore Hope, and to organize theSomalian relief effort. This was to be thefourth time that a Marine has served as thecommander of an operational joint taskforce. Marines served as JTF commandersfor Operation Sea Angel, humanitarianrelief program following a typhoon inBangladesh; Operation Gitmo, relief ef-fort for Haitian refugees; and OperationProvide Relief, predecessor of OperationRestore Hope. Additionally, a Marinecommanded the JTF which conducted thewargame exercise Cobra Gold-92 inThailand last year.

Within a few days of the formation ofthe JTF, Col Darling had bidden farewellto Capt David A. Dawson, one of theHistorical Branch's writers, departing on

temporary duty orders to the CG, I MEF,at Camp Pendleton, California. CaptDawson was the "point man" of the Ma-rine Corps' historical effort in Somaliawhich, as of the date of publication, con-tinues.

W ORKING UNDER THE auspices ofthe J-3, Joint Task Force Restore

Hope, Capt Dawson set immediatelyabout the task of organizing the histori-cal program for the Somalian relief effort.While still at Camp Pendleton, hereceived advice and assistance from ColCharles J. Quilter II, USMCR, who livesnearby in Laguna Beach. (Col Quiltercommands Mobilization Training Unit[History DC-7 and served as the I MEF

14 Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993

Page 5: 1st ARVN Division, and the 3d - United States Marine Corps Vol 22 No 3_2.pdfCitadel employed "better city-fighting tac-tics." As Maj Thompson wrote, the ene- ... loop around the enemy

historian during Operations Desert Shieldand Desert Storm. The History and Muse-ums Division will shortly publish hismonograph entitled "With the I MarineExpeditionary Force in Operations DesertShield and Desert Storm.")

Following closely on the heels of the IMEF command group, Capt Dawsondeployed to Somalia on 13 December1992. In his capacity as the representativeof the Director of Marine Corps Historyand Museums, Capt Dawson's duties in-cluded: serving as the "duty expert" onCombined Joint Task Force (CJTF)Somalia* for the Marine Corps HistoricalProgram; advising historians of subor-dinate units about the Historical Program;collecting documents, photographs, andoral history interviews relative to any andall aspects of Operation Restore Hope; andcoordinating the submission by all of theMarine units in the CJTF of periodic"command chronologies" to the Comman-dant of the Marine Corps. Capt Dawson'sinitial duties also included serving as theMarine Corps's representative for the nas-cent Joint History Program.

A N INFANTRY OFFICER, Capt Dawsonattended Kansas State University un-

der the Marine Corps' Advanced DegreeProgram and will receive his master'sdegree in 1993. He reported immediatelythereafter to the History and Museums Di-vision. He has performed several functionsin the Historical Section, including beingthe interim custodian of the Oral HistoryProgram, revising the Marine CorpsHistorical Center W/riting Guide, and con-tributing to the on-going writing of the1968 Vietnam history volume).

LtCol Dennis P. Mroczkowski, USMCR,reported to active duty on 14 December1992. Three days later, after receivingJointHistory Program and "current ops" brief-ings at the Pentagon, he departed forSomalia. Upon his arrival there, he as-sumed Capt Dawson's role at the head-quarters of the CJTF. Capt Dawson movedon to perform similar historical functionsfor the 1st Marine Division, which is alsothe Marine Corps 'component command:'or Marine Corps Forces (MARFOR) Soma-lia. LtCol Mroczkowski departed Somaliaon 8 February, after serving as the JTF

*TheJTF was first redesignated as Combined JointTask Force (CJTF) Somalia; later, it was redesignat-ed again as Unified Task Force (IJNITAF)/Combined

Joint Task Force Somalia.

Flyer dropped by aircraft over Somalian towns and villages was collected by LtCol Neary.It advises residents of the impending arrival of military convoys on friendly missions.

historian and the senior Marine historian published by the History and Museumsfor about eight weeks. Division.

LtCol Mroczkowsi is a member of MTLJ LtCol Charles H. Cureton, USMCR,(History) DC-7 and served during Opera- who reported for active duty on 2 Febru-tions Desert Shield and Desert Storm with ary, succeeded LtCol Mroczkowski inthe 2d Marine Division. His manuscript, Somalia. After receiving two days of brief-'With the 2d Marine Division in Desert ings from the Joint Staff, LtCol CuretonShield and Desert Storm," is about to be deployed from Washington, D.C., via U.S.

Near Baidoa, in the village of Goof Guudud, young women watched the unloadingof foodstuffs and using appropriate hand gestures, asked the visiting LtCol Neary,well disguised by her layers of military and protective clothing if she also was a woman.

Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993 15

WAXAANU XAGAN UNIMID IN AANUDIFAACNO DADCA IDN CAAWINAYA,

HA HOR-ISTAAGINA WADADA I

r-I

H(

historian during Operations Desert Shieldand Desert Storm. The History and Muse-ums Division will shortly publish hismonograph entitled "With the I MarineExpeditionary Force in Operations DesertShield and Desert Storm.")

Following closely on the heels of the IMEF command group, Capt Dawsondeployed to Somalia on 13 December1992. In his capacity as the representativeof the Director of Marine Corps Historyand Museums, Capt Dawson's duties in-cluded: serving as the "duty expert" onCombined Joint Task Force (CJTF)Somalia* for the Marine Corps HistoricalProgram; advising historians of subor-dinate units about the Historical Program;collecting documents, photographs, andoral history interviews relative to any andall aspects of Operation Restore Hope; andcoordinating the submission by all of theMarine units in the CJTF of periodic"command chronologies" to the Comman-dant of the Marine Corps. Capt Dawson'sinitial duties also included serving as theMarine Corps's representative for the nas-cent Joint History Program.

A N INFANTRY OFFICER, Capt Dawsonattended Kansas State University un-

der the Marine Corps' Advanced DegreeProgram and will receive his master'sdegree in 1993. He reported immediatelythereafter to the History and Museums Di-vision. He has performed several functionsin the Historical Section, including beingthe interim custodian of the Oral HistoryProgram, revising the Marine CorpsHistorical Center W/ritzng Guide, and con-tributing to the on-going writing of the1968 Vietnam history volume).

LtCol Dennis P. Mroczkowski, USMCR,reported to active duty on 14 December1992. Three days later, after receivingJointHistory Program and "current ops" brief-ings at the Pentagon, he departed forSomalia. Upon his arrival there, he as-sumed Capt Dawson's role at the head-quarters of the CJTF. Capt Dawson movedon to perform similar historical functionsfor the 1st Marine Division, which is alsothe Marine Corps "component command,"or Marine Corps Forces (MARFOR) Soma-lia. LtCol Mroczkowski departed Somaliaon 8 February, after serving as the JTF

*TheyrF was first redesignated as Combined jointTask Force (CJTF) Somalia; later, it was redesignat-ed again as Unified Task Force (IJNITAF)/Combined

Joint Task Force Somalia.

Flyer dropped by aircraft over Somalian towns and villages was collected by LtCol Neary.It advises residents of the impending arrival of military convoys on friendly missions.

historian and the senior Marine historian published by the History and Museumsfor about eight weeks. Division.

LtCol Mroczkowsi is a member of MTLJ LtCol Charles H. Cureton, USMCR,(History) DC-7 and served during Opera- who reported for active duty on 2 Febru-tions Desert Shield and Desert Storm with ary, succeeded LtCol Mroczkowski inthe 2d Marine Division. His manuscript, Somalia. After receiving two days of brief-"With the 2d Marine Division in Desert ings from the Joint Staff, LtCol CuretonShield and Desert Storm," is about to be deployed from Washington, D.C., via U.S.

Near Baidoa, in the village of Goof Guudud, young women watched the unloadingof foodstuffs and, using appropriate hand gestures, asked the visiting LtCol Neary,well disguised by her layers of military and protective clothing if she also was a woman.

Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993 15

Page 6: 1st ARVN Division, and the 3d - United States Marine Corps Vol 22 No 3_2.pdfCitadel employed "better city-fighting tac-tics." As Maj Thompson wrote, the ene- ... loop around the enemy

Central Command, as the officer in chargeof the first Joint History Team ever todeploy. As of this writing, he and the teamremain in Somalia, working at the Uni-fied Task Force headquarters, collectingdocuments, papers, journals, photos, andfilms; conducting interviews; and record-ing their own impressions of OperationProvide Hope. He also served as the seniorMarine historian in Somalia, coordinatingand assisting the efforts of Capt Dawson

and the several Marine combat artists whodeployed to Somalia.

LTCOL CuREION ALSO is a member ofMT(J (History) DC-7, and served dur-

ing Operations Desert Shield and DesertStorm with the 1st Marine Division as itshistorian. His manuscript, "U.S. Marinesin the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the1st Marine Division in Desert Shield andDesert Storm," is pending publication by

the History and Museums Division. Thatmonograph forms one of the series of sixcovering major forces engaged in the Gulfconflict—I MEF, 1st and 2d Marine Divi-sions, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, MarineForces Afloat, and Humanitarian ReliefOperations in Northern Iraq andTurkey— all under the general editorshipof LtCol Kenneth W. Estes, USMC. All areslated for publication in fiscal year 1994.

Eli 775 El

Marines' Efforts, People's Dramatic Plight Drew Combat Artists to Somalia

A RTISTS' FIELD sketches, drawings,and on-the-spot watercolors; the

subjects they focus their reference-gather-ing cameras on; and their finished studioproducts differ as they are filtered throughbrain, heart, fingertips, tools, and the sumof individual experience.

One of the products of History andMuseums Division's assignment to Soma-lia of three Marine Corps Reserve artists(and of the preparations for sending acivilian artist) will be a major Washington,D.C., exhibit recounting the Marine Corps'experience in Operation Restore Hope.

Col Peter Michael Gish, USMCR (Ret),Vietnam veteran and veteran combat ar-tist, whose most recent assignment was toOperation Provide Comfort for Kurdishrefugees in northern Iraq and Turkey,landed in Somalia in December 1992.LtCol DonnaJ. Neary, USMCR, noted for

A young girl visiting the Bardera feedingcenter filled the pot atop her head withfood and then posed for LtCol Neary.

by John T Dyer JrCurator of Art

her highly detailed paintings of historicalsubjects and as the artist for the plate seriesMarine Corps Uniforms, 1983, joined ColGish in January 1993. Capt Burton Moore,USMCR, a Vietnam veteran and a wild-life artist of national repute, teamed withthem in Somalia in early February. ColGish and LtCol Neary have returned to theU.S. and are working up finished piecesin their respective studios.

WO Charles Grow, USMC, who pro-duced fine paintings and drawings, now inthe Museum collection, from his ex-

periences of the war in the Persian Gulf,was in Somalia with the Joint CombatCamera Team, attached to the CombinedJoint Task Force Somalia, and is preparingnew art from his African experience.

James A. Fairfax, civilian head of theMarine Corps Museums' Exhibits Unit, an-other Vietnam veteran combat artist and

retired Marine master sergeant, is prepar-ing for the possibility of going to Somalia,also for the combat art program.E1i775E1

One of many pencil sketches made by ColGish is this figure from a full sheet, "Refu-gees —The Sick and Starved at Bardera."

In this scene by LtCol Neary, a Marine stands guard while Somali villagers unloadbags of grain from a UN convoy truck. "No matter what village we were in, the vil-lagers unloading the trucks would chant and sing" while the work progressed she wrote.

16

/

A

4

Central Command, as the officer in chargeof the first Joint History Team ever todeploy. As of this writing, he and the teamremain in Somalia, working at the Uni-fied Task Force headquarters, collectingdocuments, papers, journals, photos, andfilms; conducting interviews; and record-ing their own impressions of OperationProvide Hope. He also served as the seniorMarine historian in Somalia, coordinatingand assisting the efforts of Capt Dawson

and the several Marine combat artists whodeployed to Somalia.

LTCOL CUREION ALSO is a member ofMT(J (History) DC-7, and served dur-

ing Operations Desert Shield and DesertStorm with the 1st Marine Division as itshistorian. His manuscript, "U.S. Marinesin the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the1st Marine Division in Desert Shield andDesert Storm," is pending publication by

the History and Museums Division. Thatmonograph forms one of the series of sixcovering major forces engaged in the Gulfconflict—I MEF, 1st and 2d Marine Divi-sions, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, MarineForces Afloat, and Humanitarian ReliefOperations in Northern Iraq andTurkey—all under the general editorshipof LtCol Kenneth W. Estes, USMC. All areslated for publication in fiscal year 1994.

Eli 775LIl

Marines' Efforts, People's Dramatic Plight Drew Combat Artists to Somalia

A RTISTS' FIELD sketches, drawings,and on-the-spot watercolors; the

subjects they focus their reference-gather-ing cameras on; and their finished studioproducts differ as they are filtered throughbrain, heart, fingertips, tools, and the sumof individual experience.

One of the products of History andMuseums Division's assignment to Soma-lia of three Marine Corps Reserve artists(and of the preparations for sending acivilian artist) will be a major Washington,D.C., exhibit recounting the Marine Corps'experience in Operation Restore Hope.

Col Peter Michael Gish, USMCR (Ret),Vietnam veteran and veteran combat ar-tist, whose most recent assignment was toOperation Provide Comfort for Kurdishrefugees in northern Iraq and Turkey,landed in Somalia in December 1992.LtCol DonnaJ. Neary, USMCR, noted for

A young girl visiting the Bardera feedingcenter filled the pot atop her head withfood and then posed for LtCol Neary.

by John T Dyer JrCurator of Art

her highly detailed paintings of historicalsubjects and as the artist for the plate seriesMarine Corps Uniforms, 1983, joined ColGish inJanuary 1993. Capt Burton Moore,USMCR, a Vietnam veteran and a wild-life artist of national repute, teamed withthem in Somalia in early February. ColGish and LtCol Neary have returned to theU.S. and are working up finished piecesin their respective studios.

WO Charles Grow, USMC, who pro-duced fine paintings and drawings, now inthe Museum collection, from his ex-periences of the war in the Persian Gulf,was in Somalia with the Joint CombatCamera Team, attached to the CombinedJoint Task Force Somalia, and is preparingnew art from his African experience.

James A. Fairfax, civilian head of theMarine Corps Museums' Exhibits Unit, an-other Vietnam veteran combat artist and

retired Marine master sergeant, is prepar-ing for the possibility of going to Somalia,also for the combat art program.E11775E1

One of many pencil sketches made by ColGish is this figure from afull sheet, "Refu-gees —The Sick and Starved at Bardera."

In this scene by LtCol Neary, a Marine stands guard while Somali villagers unloadbags of grain from a UN convoy truck. "No matter what village we were in, the vil-lagers unloading the trucks wo uld chant and sing" while the work progressed she wrote.

16

Page 7: 1st ARVN Division, and the 3d - United States Marine Corps Vol 22 No 3_2.pdfCitadel employed "better city-fighting tac-tics." As Maj Thompson wrote, the ene- ... loop around the enemy

C ol Gish, a longtime member of theCombat Art Program, kept a jour-

nal during his stay in Somalia. Below aresome entries from the period 29 Decem-ber 1992-21 February 1993— Editor

After two days of travel in a C-5, I spentmy first night in a tent at the airport be-ing introduced to the wind, blowing sand,and noise which would be features of lifehere. (The Battalion Landing Team 2/9 ofthe 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit hadthe noisiest, but most beautiful, sites be-tween the airport and the sea.)

In the morning I rode with an armedconvoy from the airport to the Embassy,driving through littered, dirty streets, pastrickety markets more filthy than I couldhave imagined, including a camel slaugh-tering area cleansed only by the hot sunand flies.

But the color is beautiful, especially thebrilliant orange saffron yellows, scarlets,bright blues, and violets in many intricatepatterns worn by the women. The people,too, are lovely and graceful with finefeatures.

Life here is rougher than I'danticipated — no showers, laundry, or hotchow, only blowing sand, MREs, and awater bull, but I am now able to shave outof a cup at first light and be ready in cam-

mies, boots, web belt, cameras and camerabag, plus my Alice-pack full of watercolorpaper, art supplies, and my French fold-ing easel. For overnight excursions my cot,mosquito netting, and poles also have tobe carried. Nevertheless, I manage to beready to move out by 0600, catching a con-

voy to the airport or port for travel intothe interior.

Baidoa

We spent a windy night at theMogadishu port, up at 0330, and depart-ing while it was still dark to avoid possi-ble hostile fire. The long convoy of UNtrucks loaded with packs of grain rumbledout of the city, and in the early dawn I wassurprised by the amount of traffic comingtoward town on foot and by donkey. Loadafter load of fresh-cut firewood and strawand other products were carried by wom-en and pack animals. The women carriedhuge loads on their backs, headbandsgripped in their hands. We passed camelherds and fields of corn and areas moreverdant than I'd thought possible. I won-dered why the people were starving.

One of our LAVs had a battery explodeand we had to wait for a replacement. Backunderway we passed through drier areas,past a prominent rock cliff seeminglyheaved up by the desert, towering over avillage, and finally in the late afternoonentered the streets of Baidoa.

As the convoy turns into the dusty vil-

Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993 17

Gish Found Color Beautiful, People Lovely and Gracefulby Col Peter M. Gish, USMCR

Mogadishu

Combat artist Col Peter M. Gish, USMCR, was sketched in Somalia by fellow combatartist andportraitist LtCol Donnaj Neary, USMCR, as Col Gish painted in watercolors.

Col Gish pauses in Kismayo for some hand games with youngsters. He found Somaliansto be "lovely and graceful" and "handsome, erect people with welcoming smiles."

..-4ç

-

r

C ol Gish, a longtime member of theCombat Art Program, kept a jour-

nal during his stay in Somalia. Below aresome entries from the period 29 Decem-ber 1992-21 February 1993— Editor

Mogadishu

After two days of travel in a C-5, I spentmy first night in a tent at the airport be-ing introduced to the wind, blowing sand,and noise which would be features of lifehere. (The Battalion Landing Team 2/9 ofthe 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit hadthe noisiest, but most beautiful, sites be-tween the airport and the sea.)

In the morning I rode with an armedconvoy from the airport to the Embassy,driving through littered, dirty streets, pastrickety markets more filthy than I couldhave imagined, including a camel slaugh-tering area cleansed only by the hot sunand flies.

But the color is beautiful, especially thebrilliant orange saffron yellows, scarlets,bright blues, and violets in many intricatepatterns worn by the women. The people,too, are lovely and graceful with finefeatures.

Life here is rougher than I'danticipated—no showers, laundry, or hotchow, only blowing sand, MREs, and awater bull, but I am now able to shave outof a cup at first light and be ready in cam-

mies, boots, web belt, cameras and camerabag, plus my Alice-pack full of watercolorpaper, art supplies, and my French fold-ing easel. For overnight excursions my cot,mosquito netting, and poles also have tobe carried. Nevertheless, I manage to beready to move out by 0600, catching a con-

voy to the airport or port for travel intothe interior.

Baidoa

We spent a windy night at theMogadishu port, up at 0330, and depart-ing while it was still dark to avoid possi-ble hostile fire. The long convoy of UNtrucks loaded with packs of grain rumbledout of the city, and in the early dawn I wassurprised by the amount of traffic comingtoward town on foot and by donkey. Loadafter load of fresh-cut firewood and strawand other products were carried by wom-en and pack animals. The women carriedhuge loads on their backs, headbandsgripped in their hands. We passed camelherds and fields of corn and areas moreverdant than I'd thought possible. I won-dered why the people were starving.

One of our LAVs had a battery explodeand we had to wait for a replacement. Backunderway we passed through drier areas,past a prominent rock cliff seeminglyheaved up by the desert, towering over avillage, and finally in the late afternoonentered the streets of Baidoa.

As the convoy turns into the dusty vii-

Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993 17

Gish Found Color Beautiful, People Lovely and Gracefulby Col Peter M. Gish, USMCR

Combat artist Col Peter M. Gish, USMCR, was sketched in Somalia by fellow combatartist andportraitist LtCol Donnaj Neary, USMCR, as Col Gish painted in watercolors.

Col Gish pauses in Kismayo for some hand games with youngsters. He found Somaliansto be "lovely and graceful" and "handsome, erect people with welcoming smiles."

Page 8: 1st ARVN Division, and the 3d - United States Marine Corps Vol 22 No 3_2.pdfCitadel employed "better city-fighting tac-tics." As Maj Thompson wrote, the ene- ... loop around the enemy

lage roads people alongside are smiling,waving, and sometimes applauding the ar-rival of the relief column. They are hand-some, erect people with welcoming smilesand again the brilliant colors; and fre-quently a baby strapped to the back or thehips of a woman. There are not many signsnow of starvation, seeing these handsome,healthy people walking barefootedthrough the African dust. But tomorrowthe convoys will go out to the feedingcenters where malnutrition and disease arevery much in evidence.

Bardera, 'The Italian Village'

The human suffering here is appalling.I take pictures and sketch, feeling that Iam intruding on these poor people, yetthis my mission. This is at the heart of ouroperation.

Two women have been left out of thegreen plastic-roofed shelter. They are toofar gone to be helped, skeletal, unable tohold down any nourishment, pleadingwith their eyes, muttering throughphlegm, indecipherable. I cannot respondto them, not knowing their language.Some of the children seem too far goneto be saved, but most, with multiple dailyfeedings gain strength. Some who havebeen in the camp for a while are sporting"Friend of the USMC" tee shirts providedby Camp Pendleton.

OddurJust between the runway and the French

positions is a large circular well. As withothers in the village it is stepped up, madeof stone and concrete. The figures of menand women drawing water are most color-

Fascinated by the plant life as wel/ ColGish painted Son7alian trees near Oddur In Mogadishu, above, Col Gish drew a

Marine sentry posted at the US. Embassy.

ful and the splashed water shining on thestone levels reflects the ultramarine bluesky late in the day. This next to the ochres,scarlets, and blues of the dress, and theexotic shapes of camels passing is spec-tacular.

The villagers do not easily admit refu-gees, who are camped outside, their stickhovels scattered about in a barren land-scape with sparse, dry vegetation. Alongthe roadside are thousands of mound-graves, stark reminders of how bad it was.

Despite the harshness of life and theheat, these colors are gentle and lovely,ideally suited to watercolor and pastel

L111775L1J

18 Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993

5' 'Jr

— I (J

lage roads people alongside are smiling,waving, and sometimes applauding the ar-rival of the relief column. They are hand-some, erect people with welcoming smilesand again the brilliant colors; and fre-quently a baby strapped to the back or thehips of a woman. There are not many signsnow of starvation, seeing these handsome,healthy people walking barefootedthrough the African dust. But tomorrowthe convoys will go out to the feedingcenters where malnutrition and disease arevery much in evidence.

Bardera, 'The Italian Village'

The human suffering here is appalling.I take pictures and sketch, feeling that Iam intruding on these poor people, yetthis my mission. This is at the heart of ouroperation.

Two women have been left out of thegreen plastic-roofed shelter. They are toofar gone to be helped, skeletal, unable tohold down any nourishment, pleadingwith their eyes, muttering throughphlegm, indecipherable. I cannot respondto them, not knowing their language.Some of the children seem too far goneto be saved, but most, with multiple dailyfeedings gain strength. Some who havebeen in the camp for a while are sporting"Friend of the USMC" tee shirts providedby Camp Pendleton.

OddurJust between the runway and the French

positions is a large circular well. As withothers in the village it is stepped up, madeof stone and concrete. The figures of menand women drawing water are most color-

Fascinated by the plant life as well, ColGish painted Somalian trees near Oddur In Mogadishu, above, Col Gish drew a

Marine sentry posted at the US. Embassy.

ful and the splashed water shining on thestone levels reflects the ultramarine bluesky late in the day. This next to the ochres,scarlets, and blues of the dress, and theexotic shapes of camels passing is spec-tacular.

The villagers do not easily admit refu-gees, who are camped outside, their stickhovels scattered about in a barren land-scape with sparse, dry vegetation. Alongthe roadside are thousands of mound-graves, stark remindets of how bad it was.

Despite the harshness of life and theheat, these colors are gentle and lovely,ideally suited to watercolor and pastel

L111775L1J

18 Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993

Page 9: 1st ARVN Division, and the 3d - United States Marine Corps Vol 22 No 3_2.pdfCitadel employed "better city-fighting tac-tics." As Maj Thompson wrote, the ene- ... loop around the enemy

M ARINE CORPS combat artist LtColDonna J. Neary, USMCR, is

newly returned from Somalia, where sherecorded her observations, made pagesof pencil and pen-and-ink sketches, andtook scores of photographs of Marinesand allied forces in Operation RestoreHope.

During her tour LtCol Neary hitchedrides with Marine convoys and subse-quently visited nearly every locationwhere Marines worked to end the fa-mine that has afflicted the people of theEast African country. She also touredbases established by Australian and Bel-gian troops.

A portion of the sketches she madeare of Somalis, and one drawing, madein the courtyard schoolroom of an or-phanage, is decorated with the small,dusty fingerprints of children who want-ed to see or feel the paper; school sup-plies have been unavailable for manymonths. In one village, women whocongregated to watch the unloading offoodstuffs pointed fingers toward LtColNeary with laughter. Finally they madehand gestures to suggest female curva-ture, obviously to ask if she indeed wasa woman, heavily encumbered as shewas by "chocolate chip" utilities and thevarious layers and appurtenances of Ma-rine field gear.

LtCol Neary's previous Marine Corpsassignments have included NATO exer-cises in Norway and Korea. In 1991 she

LtCol Neary wears familiar gear of Ma-rines in Somalia: helmet and goggles.

produced the widely displayed colorprint illustrating the various uniformsworn by Marines for Operations DesertShield and Desert Storm. She also is theartist of the print set Marine Corps Unitforms 1983, a prominent feature of wallsat all Marine Corps posts and stations.

An artist of both national and inter-national reputation, LtCol Neary hasproduced paintings for the Queen'sOwn Highlanders and the Scots Guardsin Britain, as well as for many U.S.Government agencies and facilities. Herpaintings have been published on the

covers of numerous books and maga-zines, including Saturday Review, TheW/ashington Post Magazine, CommonCause, Regardie c, and Naval InstituteProceedings. Others of her works haveappeared in Time-Life Books' seriesEchoes of Glory, Civil lVar, and Enchant-ed Uorld, as well as Boston Publishing'sVietnam Experience series. She also hasillustrated articles in Smithsonian andJVashingtonian magazines. Her currentproject is a series of limited editionprints based upon her paintings of CivilWar subjects.

Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993 19

Neary Sketch Wreathed by Small, Dusty Fingerprints

The LaFole Hospital and Orphanage was used as a food distribution center. ThereLtCol Neary saw a woman and a child who vividly seemed to express restored hope.

-I

M ARINE CORPS combat artist LtCol

Donna J. Neary, USMCR, isnewly returned from Somalia, where sherecorded her observations, made pagesof pencil and pen-and-ink sketches, andtook scores of photographs of Marinesand allied forces in Operation RestoreHope.

During her tour LtCol Neary hitchedrides with Marine convoys and subse-quently visited nearly every locationwhere Marines worked to end the fa-mine that has afflicted the people of theEast African country. She also touredbases established by Australian and Bel-gian troops.

A portion of the sketches she madeare of Somalis, and one drawing, madein the courtyard schoolroom of an or-phanage, is decorated with the small,dusty fingerprints of children who want-ed to see or feel the paper; school sup-plies have been unavailable for manymonths. In one village, women whocongregated to watch the unloading offoodstuffs pointed fingers toward LtColNeary with laughter. Finally they madehand gestures to suggest female curva-ture, obviously to ask if she indeed wasa woman, heavily encumbered as shewas by "chocolate chip" utilities and thevarious layers and appurtenances of Ma-rine field gear.

LtCol Neary's previous Marine Corpsassignments have included NATO exer-cises in Norway and Korea. In 1991 she

LtCol Neary wears familiar gear of Ma-rines in Somalia: helmet and goggles.

produced the widely displayed colorprint illustrating the various uniformsworn by Marines for Operations DesertShield and Desert Storm. She also is theartist of the print set Marine Corps Uni-forms 1983, a prominent feature of wallsat all Marine Corps posts and stations.

An artist of both national and inter-national reputation, LtCol Neary hasproduced paintings for the Queen'sOwn Highlanders and the Scots Guardsin Britain, as well as for many U.S.Government agencies and facilities. Herpaintings have been published on the

covers of numerous books and maga-zines, including Saturday Review, TheU-7ashington Post Magazine, CommonCause, Regardie , and Naval InstituteProceedings. Others of her works haveappeared in Time-Life Books' seriesEchoes of Glory, Civil War, and Enchant-ed W/orld, as well as Boston Publishing'sVietnam Experience series. She also hasillustrated articles in Smithsonian andWashingtonian magazines. Her currentproject is a series of limited editionprints based upon her paintings of CivilWar subjects.

Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993 19

Neary Sketch Wreathed by Small, Dusty Fingerprints

The LaFole Hosp ital and Orphanage was usedas afood distribution center. ThereLtCol Neary saw a woman and a child who vividly seemed to express restored hope.

Page 10: 1st ARVN Division, and the 3d - United States Marine Corps Vol 22 No 3_2.pdfCitadel employed "better city-fighting tac-tics." As Maj Thompson wrote, the ene- ... loop around the enemy

Jane V E. BlakeneyJane V. E. Blakeney, longtime head of

the Decorations and Medals Branch ofHeadquarters Marine Corps, died on 14January at the age of 94.

Mrs. Blakeney is best known to militaryhistorians and medals collectors as theauthor of Heroes, US. Marine Corps,1861-1955, published by the author in1957. This is an invaluable semi-officialrecord of Marine heroes and the awardswith which they were decorated in theperiod indicated by the book's title.

Mrs. Blakeney enlisted in the MarineCorps in 1918 and was sent to Washing-ton to work in the decorations and medalsbranch. She was discharged in 1922, butremained on the job as a civilian employeefor the next 34 years, retiring as branchhead in 1956 after a total of 38 combinedyears with the federal government. She wasuniversally acknowledged as an expert inher field and in 1953, the Marine CorpsReserve Officers Association recognizedher with the Non Sibi Sed Patriae award,the first woman to receive it. Her husband,

which focus on the contributions of in-dividual Services to joint operations.

T HE TEAM ARRIVED at EUCOM on 13February and was met by the com-

mand historian, Dr. Bryan van Sweringen.He asked the team to create an operationalarchive of key EUCOM documents on Pro-vide Promise, to interview principal staffofficers planning for the operation, andto prepare a subteam to travel ahead toYugoslavia.

Chosen to be a member of the subteam,LtCol Reynolds set off for Zagreb on 26February, to visit Joint Task Force ProvidePromise (Forward), collocated with a U.S.Army medical unit, the 212th MASH.There he conducted interviews with keypersonnel, including the task force andMASH commanders.

The team returned to Stuttgart, Germa-ny, on 27 February and to the U.S. on 1March, to begin organizing their observa-tions for official reports. Eli 775E

Maj Arthur Blakeney, died in 1947. Mrs.Blakeney was buried in Arlington Nation-al Cemetery on 21 January.

SgtMaj Leland D. CrawfordRetired Sergeant Major of the MarineCorps Leland D. "Crow" Crawford, 63,died of cancer at his home in San Diegoon 16 February. SgtMaj Crawford, a nativeof West Virginia, enlisted in September1951. He served in Korea as a rifleman andartilleryman. SgtMaj Crawford also servedtwo tours in Vietnam, where he receivedtwo awards of the Bronze Star Medal andthe Purple Heart Medal.

He had several tours as a Drill Instruc-tor, first at Parris Island and then at SanDiego. He was the Sergeant Major of the1st Marine Division until he was selectedas Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps inAugust 1979.

Funeral services were held for SgtMajCrawford at the MCRD, San Diego PostChapel, 19 February, following which hewas buried with full military honors at FortRosecrans National Cemetery. LI1i775LI1

Awards Citing CombatProwess Are PresentedTo Persian Gulf Marines

by Ann A. FerranteReference Historian

A FINAL UPDATE of awards fromOperations Desert Shield and

Desert Storm was recently released by theMilitary Awards Branch of HeadquartersMarine Corps.

The following numbers of awards havebeen presented to Marines for exception-al valor and performance in SouthwestAsia: Navy Cross, 2; Distinguished Serv-ice Medal, 8; Silver Star, 14; Legion ofMerit, 70; Distinguished Flying Cross, 21;Bronze Star, 509; Defense MeritoriousService, 1; Meritorious Service, 201; AirMedal, 1,949; Joint Service Commenda-tion, 6; Navy Commendation, 3,296; JointService Achievement, 5; Navy Achieve-ment, 5,075; Air Force Commendation, 5;Army Commendation, 4; and ArmyAchievement, 114.

The two Navy Crosses were awarded toLtCol Michael M. Kurth of Waukegan, Il-linois, and Capt Eddie S. Ray of LosAngeles, California. Their bravery is

reflected in the following excerpts fromtheir award citations.

D URING OPERATION Desert Storm,LtCol Kurth commanded Marine

Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369.On 26 February 1991, as the 1st Marine Di-vision attacked north to prevent Iraqiforces from escaping, LtCol Kurth's repeat-ed acts of bravery in providing close-in firesupport to embattled Marines helped tocollapse the Iraqi defenses. With visibili-ty nearly impossible due to hundreds ofburning oil field fires, and with total dis-regard for his own safety, he flew underand perilously close to high-voltagepowerlines.

Capt Ray commanded Company B, 1stLight Infantry Battalion, Task ForceShepherd, 1st Marine Division. On 25February 1991, an Iraqi mechanized divi-sion counter-attacked elements of the 1stMarine Division west of the flame- andsmoke-engulfed oil fields in SoutheasternKuwait. Capt Ray repeatedly maneuveredhis light armored vehicle company inharm's way, skillfully integrating his lightarmored infantry weapons to decisivelydefeat main Iraqi counterattacks. Eli 775L11

20 Fortjtudjne, Winter 1992-1993

Marine Historian Inspects Yugoslavia CivilianRelief Operation's Zagreb Forward Headquarters

W ITH A FINAL destination of Zagrebin the former Republic of Yugos-

lavia, a Marine Reserve historian was as-signed to a Joint History Team gatheredin February in Washington, D.C., andtransported to the headquarters of the U.S.European Command (EUCOM) in Vaihin-gen, Germany, in support of the emergen-cy civilian assistance program, OperationProvide Promise.

LtCol Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR, amember of the History and MuseumsDivision-sponsored Mobilization TrainingUnit (History) DC-7, joined Air Force andArmy Reservists to form the team, whichfirst met on 11 February in the office ofWillard Webb, chief of the Joint StaffHistorical Office at the Pentagon. Theteam heard briefings on the backgroundof Provide Promise and met briefly withGen Cohn L. Powell, Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, who described his in-terest in the writing of joint histories ofjoint operations, as opposed to histories

Mentioned in Passing

Medals Expert Blakeney, SgtMaj Crawford Dieby Benis M. Frank

Chief HistorianJane V E. Blakeney

Jane V. E. Blakeney, longtime head ofthe Decorations and Medals Branch ofHeadquarters Marine Corps, died on 14January at the age of 94.

Mrs. Blakeney is best known to militaryhistorians and medals collectors as theauthor of Heroes, US. Marine Corps,1861-1955, published by the author in1957. This is an invaluable semi-officialrecord of Marine heroes and the awardswith which they were decorated in theperiod indicated by the book's title.

Mrs. Blakeney enlisted in the MarineCorps in 1918 and was sent to Washing-ton to work in the decorations and medalsbranch. She was discharged in 1922, butremained on the job as a civilian employeefor the next 34 years, retiring as branchhead in 1956 after a total of 38 combinedyears with the federal government. She wasuniversally acknowledged as an expert inher field and in 1953, the Marine CorpsReserve Officers Association recognizedher with the Non Sibi Sed Patriae award,the first woman to receive it. Her husband,

which focus on the contributions of in-dividual Services to joint operations.

T HE TEAM ARRWED at EUCOM on 13February and was met by the com-

mand historian, Dr. Bryan van Sweringen.He asked the team to create an operationalarchive of key EUCOM documents on Pro-vide Promise, to interview principal staffofficers planning for the operation, andto prepare a subteam to travel ahead toYugoslavia.

Chosen to be a member of the subteam,LtCol Reynolds set off for Zagreb on 26February, to visit Joint Task Force ProvidePromise (Forward), collocated with a U.S.Army medical unit, the 212th MASH.There he conducted interviews with keypersonnel, including the task force andMASH commanders.

The team returned to Stuttgart, Germa-ny, on 27 February and to the U.S. on 1March, to begin organizing their observa-tions for official reports. E1775E

Maj Arthur Blakeney, died in 1947. Mrs.Blakeney was buried in Arlington Nation-al Cemetery on 21 January.

SgtMaj Leland D. CrawfordRetired Sergeant Major of the MarineCorps Leland D. "Crow" Crawford, 63,died of cancer at his home in San Diegoon 16 February. SgtMaj Crawford, a nativeof West Virginia, enlisted in September1951. He served in Korea as a rifleman andartilleryman. SgtMaj Crawford also servedtwo tours in Vietnam, where he receivedtwo awards of the Bronze Star Medal andthe Purple Heart Medal.

He had several tours as a Drill Instruc-tor, first at Parris Island and then at SanDiego. He was the Sergeant Major of the1st Marine Division until he was selectedas Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps inAugust 1979.

Funeral services were held for SgtMajCrawford at the MCRD, San Diego PostChapel, 19 February, following which hewas buried with full military honors at FortRosecrans National Cemetery. 1111 775E1

Awards Citing CombatProwess Are PresentedTo Persian Gulf Marines

by Ann A. FerranteReference Historian

A FINAL UPDATE of awards fromOperations Desert Shield and

Desert Storm was recently released by theMilitary Awards Branch of HeadquartersMarine Corps.

The following numbers of awards havebeen presented to Marines for exception-al valor and performance in SouthwestAsia: Navy Cross, 2; Distinguished Serv-ice Medal, 8; Silver Star, 14; Legion ofMerit, 70; Distinguished Flying Cross, 21;Bronze Star, 509; Defense MeritoriousService, 1; Meritorious Service, 201; AirMedal, 1,949; Joint Service Commenda-tion, 6; Navy Commendation, 3,296; JointService Achievement, 5; Navy Achieve-ment, 5,075; Air Force Commendation, 5;Army Commendation, 4; and ArmyAchievement, 114.

The two Navy Crosses were awarded toLtCol Michael M. Kurth of Waukegan, Il-linois, and Capt Eddie S. Ray of LosAngeles, California. Their bravery is

reflected in the following excerpts fromtheir award citations.

D URING OPERATION Desert Storm,LtCol Kurth commanded Marine

Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369.On 26 February 1991, as the 1st Marine Di-vision attacked north to prevent Iraqiforces from escaping, LtCol Kurth's repeat-ed acts of bravery in providing close-in firesupport to embattled Marines helped tocollapse the Iraqi defenses. With visibili-ty nearly impossible due to hundreds ofburning oil field fires, and with total dis-regard for his own safety, he flew underand perilously close to high-voltagepowerlines.

Capt Ray commanded Company B, 1stLight Infantry Battalion, Task ForceShepherd, 1st Marine Division. On 25February 1991, an Iraqi mechanized divi-sion counter-attacked elements of the 1stMarine Division west of the flame- andsmoke-engulfed oil fields in SoutheasternKuwait. Capt Ray repeatedly maneuveredhis light armored vehicle company inharm's way, skillfully integrating his lightarmored infantry weapons to decisivelydefeat main Iraqi counterattacks. Eli 775L1

20 Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993

Marine Historian Inspects Yugoslavia CivilianRelief Operation's Zagreb Forward Headquarters

W ITH A FINAL destination of Zagrebin the former Republic of Yugos-

lavia, a Marine Reserve historian was as-signed to a Joint History Team gatheredin February in Washington, D.C., andtransported to the headquarters of the U.S.European Command (EUCOM) in Vaihin-gen, Germany, in support of the emergen-cy civilian assistance program, OperationProvide Promise.

LtCol Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR, amember of the History and MuseumsDivision-sponsored Mobilization TrainingUnit (History) DC-7, joined Air Force andArmy Reservists to form the team, whichfirst met on 11 February in the office ofWillard Webb, chief of the Joint StaffHistorical Office at the Pentagon. Theteam heard briefings on the backgroundof Provide Promise and met briefly withGen Cohn L. Powell, Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, who described his in-terest in the writing of joint histories ofjoint operations, as opposed to histories

Mentioned in Passing

Medals Expert Blakeney, SgtMaj Crawford Dieby Benis M. Frank

Chief Historian

Page 11: 1st ARVN Division, and the 3d - United States Marine Corps Vol 22 No 3_2.pdfCitadel employed "better city-fighting tac-tics." As Maj Thompson wrote, the ene- ... loop around the enemy

Commandant Opens Pentagon World War II Exhibit

R EMARKING THAT THIS World War IIcampaign is too little known and

studied, the Commandant of the MarineCorps, Gen Carl E. Mundy,Jr., dedicateda new exhibit on the Central Solomonsoperations on 19 February. The exhibithad been installed in the ceremonial Cor-ridor A of the Pentagon by the MuseumsBranch during January.

Sponsored by the Department ofDefense's World War II Anniversary Com-mittee, the exhibit is the third to be shownin the 55-foot-long Pentagon case. Eachbranch of Service has volunteered tomount an exhibit which focuses on the an-niversary of a six-month period of WorldWar II. These exhibits emphasize cam-paigns which have special significance foreach Service, but yet are explained in thecontext of the entire war, with an empha-sis on joint operations.

The Navy Museum was the first insti-tution tasked, and it opened with an ex-hibit covering the first six months of thewar after the attack on Pearl Harbor. ByMay 1992, the Marine Corps had beenscheduled to follow the Army's treatmentof the six-month period betweenJuly andDecember 1942. While assisting the Ar-my's Center of Military History for theirpresentation on the Guadalcanal cam-paign, the Marine Corps Museums Branchformalized its own approach to the sub-ject and staned the in-depth research andplanning for the Central Solomonsexhibit.

T HE TIME PERIOD allotted to the Ma-rine Corps corresponded with the

Central Solomons campaign in the springand summer of 1943. This island-to-islandcampaign was launched following thefight for Guadalcanal to establish new airbases from which the majorJapanese baseat Rabaul on New Britain could be at-tacked. Codenamed Operation Toenails,the action centered around a series ofsmall islands between Guadalcanal andBougainville, and opened with the seizureof the Russell Islands in February 1943. Bythe end of the summer of 1943, Marinesand soldiers had seen several months ofhard fighting and had eliminated theJapanese defenders on the large islands of

by Kenneth L. Smith-ChristmasCurator of Material History

Rendova and New Georgia, while firmlyestablishing antiaircraft defenses on VellaLavella and other smaller islands. All ofthe fighting was done in much the samesetting as the Marines had found onGuadalcanal: a steaming, almost im-penetrable tropical rain forest.

Since the Marine Corps' contribution tothe actions were in direct support of a larg-er Army force, this simplified the request-ed emphasis on joint operations. In hisremarks at the dedication, Gen Mundyalso would note that "we ... tend to thinkwe invented it, but as we see here, this was'jointness' in its classic sense." The MarineCorps units involved often were the Raid-ers and the defense battalions.

Plans called for the exhibit to be brokendown into three distinctive sections. Thearea in the center would address the his-tory of the campaign, with a reference toother significant events of World War IIwhich occurred during the same period.Flanking on the right would be a sectionon the Marine Raiders, and on the left, asection on the history of the defense bat-talions. In the center section, oversizedphotographs were used to illustrate theNorth Africa campaign, the bombing ofGermany, the battle for the Atlantic, andthe Casablanca conference. The photo-graphs are backdrop to a 50-inch by50-inch model of an F4U Corsair. TheCorsair was chosen to symbolize the air waragainst Rabaul, and it was at this time thatthe aircraft first appeared in the Pacific.The Marine Raiders display includes such

rarities as Raider knives and boots, a

M1897 trench shotgun, and a capturedJapanese light machine gun.

Sand, with broken sea shells, was usedalong with dried tropical foliage as a"floor" to the exhibit to create a tropicalbeach atmosphere in the two side sectionsof the case.

SINCE THE EXHIBIT case is so large, itwas possible to place crew-served

weapons in the areas between the majorsections. Two significant weapons from theperiod were included in the exhibit: aJapanese Type 92 heavy 7.7mm machinegun and a Boys .55 caliber anti-tank rifle.The Boys rifle was carried by Marine Raid-ers in the early part of the war.

The Ml rifle and the 1941 utility uni-form were worked into the area dedicatedto the defense battalions. Text labels onthe various weapons used by these battal-ions are supported by enlarged photo-graphs of the guns and an array of inertammunition, from the 90mm antiaircraftround to a belt of .50-caliber machine guncartridges. While most of these artifactscame from the Museum's collection, theU.S. Army Ordnance Museum at Aber-deen Proving Ground came through at thelast minute with a needed complete90mm round.

The exhibit will remain on display untilthe end ofJuly, when it will be succeededby an exhibit mounted by the U.S. AirForce. L11775E

Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993 21

At the Central Solomons exhibit dedication, Marine Commandant Gen CarlE. Mun-dy,Jr., left, is assisted by MajGenJohn P Condon, USMC (Ret), a veteran of the Pacif-ic air war andLtGen Claude M. Kicklighter, USA (Ret), of the Anniversary Committee.

Commandant Opens Pentagon World War II Exhibit

R EMARKING THAT THIS World War IIcampaign is too little known and

studied, the Commandant of the MarineCorps, Gen Carl E. Mundy,Jr., dedicateda new exhibit on the Central Solomonsoperations on 19 February. The exhibithad been installed in the ceremonial Cor-ridor A of the Pentagon by the MuseumsBranch during January.

Sponsored by the Department ofDefense's World War II Anniversary Com-mittee, the exhibit is the third to be shownin the 55-foot-long Pentagon case. Eachbranch of Service has volunteered tomount an exhibit which focuses on the an-niversary of a six-month period of WorldWar II. These exhibits emphasize cam-paigns which have special significance foreach Service, but yet are explained in thecontext of the entire war, with an empha-sis on joint operations.

The Navy Museum was the first insti-tution tasked, and it opened with an ex-hibit covering the first six months of thewar after the attack on Pearl Harbor. ByMay 1992, the Marine Corps had beenscheduled to follow the Army's treatmentof the six-month period between July andDecember 1942. While assisting the Ar-my's Center of Military History for theirpresentation on the Guadalcanal cam-paign, the Marine Corps Museums Branchformalized its own approach to the sub-ject and staned the in-depth research andplanning for the Central Solomonsexhibit.

T HE TIME PERIOD allotted to the Ma-rine Corps corresponded with the

Central Solomons campaign in the springand summer of 1943. This island-to-islandcampaign was launched following thefight for Guadalcanal to establish new airbases from which the majorJapanese baseat Rabaul on New Britain could be at-tacked. Codenamed Operation Toenails,the action centered around a series ofsmall islands between Guadalcanal andBougainville, and opened with the seizureof the Russell Islands in February 1943. Bythe end of the summer of 1943, Marinesand soldiers had seen several months ofhard fighting and had eliminated theJapanese defenders on the large islands of

by Kenneth L. Smith-ChristmasCurator of Material History

Rendova and New Georgia, while firmlyestablishing antiaircraft defenses on VellaLavella and other smaller islands. All ofthe fighting was done in much the samesetting as the Marines had found onGuadalcanal: a steaming, almost im-penetrable tropical rain forest.

Since the Marine Corps' contribution tothe actions were in direct support of a larg-er Army force, this simplified the request-ed emphasis on joint operations. In hisremarks at the dedication, Gen Mundyalso would note that "we ... tend to thinkwe invented it, but as we see here, this was'jointness' in its classic sense." The MarineCorps units involved often were the Raid-ers and the defense battalions.

Plans called for the exhibit to be brokendown into three distinctive sections. Thearea in the center would address the his-tory of the campaign, with a reference toother significant events of World War IIwhich occurred during the same period.Flanking on the right would be a sectionon the Marine Raiders, and on the left, asection on the history of the defense bat-talions. In the center section, oversizedphotographs were used to illustrate theNorth Africa campaign, the bombing ofGermany, the battle for the Atlantic, andthe Casablanca conference. The photo-graphs are backdrop to a 50-inch by50-inch model of an F4U Corsair. TheCorsair was chosen to symbolize the air waragainst Rabaul, and it was at this time thatthe aircraft first appeared in the Pacific.The Marine Raiders display includes such

rarities as Raider knives and boots, a

M1897 trench shotgun, and a capturedJapanese light machine gun.

Sand, with broken sea shells, was usedalong with dried tropical foliage as a

"floor" to the exhibit to create a tropicalbeach atmosphere in the two side sectionsof the case.

SINCE THE EXHIBIT case is so large, itwas possible to place crew-served

weapons in the areas between the majorsections. Two significant weapons from theperiod were included in the exhibit: aJapanese Type 92 heavy 7.7mm machinegun and a Boys .55 caliber anti-tank rifle.The Boys rifle was carried by Marine Raid-ers in the early part of the war.

The Ml rifle and the 1941 utility uni-form were worked into the area dedicatedto the defense battalions. Text labels onthe various weapons used by these battal-ions are supported by enlarged photo-graphs of the guns and an array of inertammunition, from the 90mm antiaircraftround to a belt of .50-caliber machine guncartridges. While most of these artifactscame from the Museum's collection, theU.S. Army Ordnance Museum at Aber-deen Proving Ground came through at thelast minute with a needed complete90mm round.

The exhibit will remain on display untilthe end ofJuly, when it will be succeededby an exhibit mounted by the U.S. AirForce. L11775L1

Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993 21

At the Central Solomons exhibit dedication, Marine Commandant Gen CanE. Mun-dy, Jr., left, is assisted by MajGen John P Condon, USMC (Ret), a veteran of the Pacific air war and LtGen Claude M. Kicklightei USA (Ret), of the Anniversary Committee.

Page 12: 1st ARVN Division, and the 3d - United States Marine Corps Vol 22 No 3_2.pdfCitadel employed "better city-fighting tac-tics." As Maj Thompson wrote, the ene- ... loop around the enemy

Fkght Lines

Thomas-Morse S.4 'Scout'

T HE "SCOUT," ALSO known as

the "Tommy," was designed andproduced by the Thomas-Morse AircraftCorporation shortly after the United Statesentered World War I in 1917. The proto-type was evaluated as a fighter by the Armyand Navy but not accepted. After modifi-cations were made to the airframe, and theoriginal Gnome rotary engine was replacedby the more dependable Le Rhone, theresulting S.4B and, later, S.4C variants,along with the Curtiss JN-4 "Jenny," werewidely used by the Marine Corps, the Navy,

by Michael E. StainCurator of Aviation

and the Army for training fighter pilots.Because of its success as an advanced train-er, the Scout became one of the most fa-mous single-seat aircraft built in the UnitedStates during the war.

William T Thomas, who founded theThomas Brother's Airplane Company, Inc.,in 1910, had emigrated to America initial-ly to assist Glenn Curtiss in the design ofaircraft engines. He was soon joined by hisbrother, Oliver W. Thomas, and B. D. Tho-mas (no relation) who became their chiefengineer. The combined experimental ef-

forts of the three Thomas's culmi-nated in the production of a successfulpusher biplane later that year.

Merging with Morse Chain Company ofIthaca, New York, the Thomas Morse Air-craft Corporation incorporated in 1917. De-termined to produce a single-seat aircraft,for the purpose of training pursuit pilots,Thomas-Morse started from scratch insteadof starting with an obsolete or war-wearydesign, as was being done by most foreigngovernments. Though not too surprising-ly, the S.4 empennage and wing designreflected B. D. Thomas' earlier work withSopwith "Camels."

During the summer of 1917 flight testsof the S.4 at the Army Experimental AirStation at Hampton, Virginia (now LangleyField), revealed the need for numerousmodifications. This resulted shortly there-after in the production of an entirely new"Scout," the S.4B.

In early October, 150 S.4B aircraft wereordered by the Army Signal Corps.Although the new airframe proved to besturdy during aerobatics, its 100 horsepowerGnome engine proved to be a seriousproblem due to excessive right-hand tor-que, difficulty in starting, high rate ofcastor-oil leakage, and the resultant fires.Being tail heavy, the S.4B was prone toground loop on landing. Its flight controlswere difficult to operate in the cold becauseof control cable contraction.

Refinement of the S.4B led to its even-tual success and the U.S. War Department'sorder of 400 aircraft of a yet newer version,the S.4C. The S.4C showed marked im-provements in the control system, wasarmed with a camera gun, and was drivenby the more dependable 80 horsepower LeRhone engine.

Being powered by rotary engines, the"Scout" had some potentially dangerousflight characteristics common to all like-powered aircraft. Pilots were cautioned notto attempt a right-hand turn during aclimb-out after takeoff, and to enable themto pull-out, never to attempt a right-handpower-on spin at less than 4,000 feet of al-titude. E11775E1

22 Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993

A "Tommy Morse Scout" powered by an 80-horsepower LeRhone engine, was pho-tographedat Marine Flying Field, Miami, Florida, in 1915. Because of the Tommy'ssuccess as a trainer; it became one of the most popular single-seaters built in America.

Technical Data

Manufacturer: Thomas-Morse Aircraft Corporation, Ithaca, New York

Type: Fighter-pilot training

Accommodation: Pilot

Power Plant: Le Rhone 80 hp

Dimensions: Length, 19 feet 10 inches; wing span, 26 feet 6 inches; height 8 feet10 inches

Weights: Empty, 940 pounds; Gross, 1,330 pounds

Performance: Max speed 97 mph; climb to 7,500 feet in 10 minutes; Landing speed,45 mph

Armament: Principally a gun camera

\a . ----

Flight Lines

Thomas-Morse S.4 'Scout'

T HE "SCOUT," ALSO known as

the "Tommy:' was designed andproduced by the Thomas-Morse AircraftCorporation shortly after the United Statesentered World War I in 1917. The proto-type was evaluated as a fighter by the Armyand Navy but not accepted. After modifi-cations were made to the airframe, and theoriginal Gnome rotary engine was replacedby the more dependable Le Rhone, theresulting S.4B and, later, S.4C variants,along with the Cuniss JN-4 "Jenny," werewidely used by the Marine Corps, the Navy,

by Michael E. StainCurator of Aviation

and the Army for training fighter pilots.Because of its success as an advanced train-er, the Scout became one of the most fa-mous single-seat aircraft built in the UnitedStates during the war.

William T Thomas, who founded theThomas Brother's Airplane Company, Inc.,in 1910, had emigrated to America initial-ly to assist Glenn Curtiss in the design ofaircraft engines. He was soon joined by hisbrother, Oliver W. Thomas, and B. D. Tho-mas (no relation) who became their chiefengineer. The combined experimental ef-

forts of the three Thomas's culmi-nated in the production of a successfulpusher biplane later that year.

Merging with Morse Chain Company ofIthaca, New York, the Thomas Morse Air-craft Corporation incorporated in 1917. De-termined to produce a single-seat aircraft,for the purpose of training pursuit pilots,Thomas-Morse started from scratch insteadof starting with an obsolete or war-wearydesign, as was being done by most foreigngovernments. Though not too surprising-ly, the S.4 empennage and wing designreflected B. D. Thomas' earlier work withSopwith "Camels."

During the summer of 1917 flight testsof the S.4 at the Army Experimental AirStation at Hampton, Virginia (now LangleyField), revealed the need for numerousmodifications. This resulted shortly there-after in the production of an entirely new"Scout," the S.4B.

In early October, 150 S.4B aircraft wereordered by the Army Signal Corps.Although the new airframe proved to besturdy during aerobatics, its 100 horsepowerGnome engine proved to be a seriousproblem due to excessive right-hand tor-que, difficulty in starting, high rate ofcastor-oil leakage, and the resultant fires.Being tail heavy, the S.4B was prone toground loop on landing. Its flight controlswere difficult to operate in the cold becauseof control cable contraction.

Refinement of the S.4B led to its even-tual success and the U.S. War Department'sorder of 400 aircraft of a yet newer version,the S.4C. The S.4C showed marked im-provements in the control system, wasarmed with a camera gun, and was drivenby the more dependable 80 horsepower LeRhone engine.

Being powered by rotary engines, the"Scout" had some potentially dangerousflight characteristics common to all like-powered aircraft. Pilots were cautioned notto attempt a right-hand turn during aclimb-out after takeoff, and to enable themto pull-out, never to attempt a right-handpower-on spin at less than 4,000 feet of al-titude. Eli 775E1

22 Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993

A "Tommy Morse Scout" powered by an 80-horsepower LeRhone engine, was pho-tographed at Marine Flying Field, Miami; Florida, in 1915. Because of the Tommy'ssuccess as a trainer it became one of the most popular single-seaters built in America.

Technical Data

Mantifacturer: Thomas-Morse Aircraft Corporation, Ithaca, New York

Type: Fighter-pilot training

Accommodation: Pilot

Power Plant: Le Rhone 80 hp

Dimensions: Length, 19 feet 10 inches; wing span, 26 feet 6 inches; height 8 feet10 inches

Weights: Empty, 940 pounds; Gross, 1,330 pounds

Performance: Max speed 97 mph; climb to 7,500 feet in 10 minutes; Landing speed,45 mph

Armament: Principally a gun camera

Page 13: 1st ARVN Division, and the 3d - United States Marine Corps Vol 22 No 3_2.pdfCitadel employed "better city-fighting tac-tics." As Maj Thompson wrote, the ene- ... loop around the enemy

W/orld JVar II Chronology, 1941-1945

July— December 1943by Robert V Aquilina

Assistant Head, Reference Section

Fortitudine's World War II Chronology continues with plan-ning for 1943 Central Pacific operations, which would be-

gin later in the year in the Marine assault on Tarawa.

ijul—The Navy's V.12 program, designed to recruit and traincollege students for future service as line officers, was launched;11,500 Marines were to be included initially in the training.3 Jul—In New Georgia, the Southern Landing Group of theMunda-Bairoko Occupation Force landed troops of the Army's172d Infantry, 43d Division, on Zanana Beach.5Jul —The Northern Landing Group, commanded by Col Har-ry B. Liversedge, made a secondary landing on New Georgia,and established a beachhead at Rice Anchorage on the northcoast.lOJul—Marine Corps Air Station, El Centro, California was com-missioned.11 Jul—The 1st Marine War Dog Platoon arrived in the SouthPacific where the dogs would serve on Bougainville, as scouts,messengers, and night security guards with the 2d Marine Raid-er Regiment.20-2lJul —The Northern Landing Group (including the 1st Ma-rine Raider Regiment, the 4th Raider Battalion, and the Army's3d Battalion, 148th Regiment) unsuccessfully attacked BairokoHarbor, then withdrew to Enogai, covered by one of the heavi-est air strikes of the Central Solomons campaign.25 Jul —The final attack by the New Georgia Occupation Forceopened with destroyer and torpedo and dive-bomber support.Marine tanks from the 9th Defense Battalion, joined (3 Aug)by those of the 10th and 11th Defense Battalions, supported theinfantry advance.6-7 Aug—In the Battle of Vella Gulf, U.S. Navy forces defeated

As heavy black smoke pours from a burning fuel dump to therear and broken, shredded palms give evidence of preparationfire, Marines on Tarawa await orders to press the attack inland

a Japanese attempt to reinforce the Central Solomons area.14-24 Aug—At the Quebec Conference (Quadrant), the line ofadvance for the Central Pacific offensive was delineated from theGilberts, to the Marshalls, to the Marianas, and then to theCarolines.16 Aug—The 4th Marine Division, commanded by MajGen Har-ry Schmidt, was activated at Camp Pendleton, California. It wasthe only Marine division during World War II to be mountedand staged into combat directly from the United States.25 Aug—Bairoko Harbor was captured on New Georgia, end-ing Japanese resistance on the island.25 Aug—The V Amphibious Corps was activated at Camp El-liott, California.28 Oct—The 2d Parachute Battalion landed on Choiseul Islandin a diversionary raid prior to the Bougainville operation.1 Nov—The 3d Marine Division (Reinforced) landed in assaulton Bougainville at Cape Torokina as part of I Marine Amphibi-ous Corps. Despite prior bombardment by both ships and planes,the invasion force met heavy fire from Japanese defenders.Nevertheless, by nightfall, the Marines had 14,000 troops and6,200 tons of supplies ashore.2 Nov—In the Naval Battle of Empress Augusta Bay, Task Force39 turned back a Japanese naval attempt to counterattack theCape Torokina landing.5 Nov—In the Bismarcks, Task Force 38, covered by GrummanHellcat F6F fighters from Aircraft, Solomons, flew the firstcarrier-cased air strike on Rabaul, causing heavy damage toJapanese warships, and preventing another sea attack on the Bou-gainville beachhead.8 Nov—The 3d Marine Brigade was deactivated at Apia, WesternSamoa.9 Nov— MajGen Roy S. Geiger relieved LtGen Alexander A. Van-degrift, the newly appointed 18th Commandant of the MarineCorps, as Commanding General, I Marine Amphibious Corps.16 Nov—Tactical Group I was activated under V AmphibiousCorps for the Eniwetok (Marshalls) operation.20 Nov—Following a massive preliminary bombardment, the 2dMarine Division (Reinforced) landed in assault on Betio Island,Tarawa atoll, as part of the V Amphibious Corps. HeavyJapanesefire accounted for many landing craft attempting to reach thebeach, and there were 1,500 Marine casualties at the end of thefirst day's fighting.28 Nov—MajGenJulian C. Smith, commanding the 2d MarineDivision, announced the capture of Tarawa atoll.15 Dec—Army XIV Corps assumed control of the Bougainvilleoperation from I Marine Amphibious Corps.26 Dec—Following a light naval and air bombardment, the 1stMarine Division landed in assault on Cape Gloucester, New Bri-tain. While meeting relatively light enemy resistance, the Ma-rines encountered an exceedingly difficult terrain in the dense,tropical rain forest that covers most of the island. L111775L1

Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993 23

4

W/orld War II Chronology, 1941-1945

July— December 1943by Robert V Aquilina

Assistant Head, Reference Section

Fortitudine's World War II Chronology continues with plan-ning for 1943 Central Pacific operations, which would be-

gin later in the year in the Marine assault on Tarawa.

lJul—The Navy's V-12 program, designed to recruit and traincollege students for future service as line officers, was launched;11,500 Marines were to be included initially in the training.3 Jul—In New Georgia, the Southern Landing Group of theMunda-Bairoko Occupation Force landed troops of the Army's172d Infantry, 43d Division, on Zanana Beach.5Ju1—The Northern Landing Group, commanded by Col Har-ry B. Liversedge, made a secondary landing on New Georgia,and established a beachhead at Rice Anchorage on the northcoast.lOJul—Marine Corps Air Station, El Centro, California was com-missioned.11 Jul—The 1st Marine War Dog Platoon arrived in the SouthPacific where the dogs would serve on Bougainville, as scouts,messengers, and night security guards with the 2d Marine Raid-er Regiment.20-2lJul —The Northern Landing Group (including the 1st Ma-tine Raider Regiment, the 4th Raider Battalion, and the Army's3d Battalion, 148th Regiment) unsuccessfully attacked BairokoHarbor, then withdrew to Enogai, covered by one of the heavi-est air strikes of the Central Solomons campaign.25 Jul —The final attack by the New Georgia Occupation Forceopened with destroyer and torpedo and dive-bomber support.Marine tanks from the 9th Defense Battalion, joined (3 Aug)by those of the 10th and 11th Defense Battalions, supported theinfantry advance.6-7 Aug—In the Battle of Vella Gulf, U.S. Navy forces defeated

As heavy black smoke pours from a burning fuel dump to therear and broken, shredded palms give evidence of preparationfire, Marines on Tarawa await orders to press the attack inland

a Japanese attempt to reinforce the Central Solomons area.14-24 Aug—At the Quebec Conference (Quadrant), the line ofadvance for the Central Pacific offensive was delineated from theGilberts, to the Marshalls, to the Marianas, and then to theCarolines.16 Aug—The 4th Marine Division, commanded by MajGen Har-ry Schmidt, was activated at Camp Pendleton, California. It wasthe only Marine division during World War II to be mountedand staged into combat directly from the United States.25 Aug—Bairoko Harbor was captured on New Georgia, end-ing Japanese resistance on the island.25 Aug—The V Amphibious Corps was activated at Camp El-liott, California.28 Oct—The 2d Parachute Battalion landed on Choiseul Islandin a diversionary raid prior to the Bougainville operation.1 Nov—The 3d Marine Division (Reinforced) landed in assaulton Bougainville at Cape Torokina as part of I Marine Amphibi-ous Corps. Despite prior bombardment by both ships and planes,the invasion force met heavy fire from Japanese defenders.Nevertheless, by nightfall, the Marines had 14,000 troops and6,200 tons of supplies ashore.2 Nov—In the Naval Battle of Empress Augusta Bay, Task Force39 turned back a Japanese naval attempt to counterattack theCape Torokina landing.5 Nov—In the Bismarcks, Task Force 38, covered by GrummanHellcat F6F fighters from Aircraft, Solomons, flew the firstcarrier-cased air strike on Rabaul, causing heavy damage toJapanese warships, and preventing another sea attack on the Bou-gainville beachhead.8 Nov—The 3d Marine Brigade was deactivated at Apia, WesternSamoa.9 Nov.— MajGen Roy S. Geiger relieved LtGen Alexander A. Van-degrift, the newly appointed 18th Commandant of the MarineCorps, as Commanding General, I Marine Amphibious Corps.16 Nov—Tactical Group I was activated under V AmphibiousCorps for the Eniwetok (Marshalls) operation.20 Nov—Following a massive preliminary bombardment, the 2dMarine Division (Reinforced) landed in assault on Betio Island,Tarawa atoll, as part of the V Amphibious Corps. Heavy Japanesefire accounted for many landing craft attempting to reach thebeach, and there were 1,500 Marine casualties at the end of thefirst day's fighting.28 Nov—MajGenJulian C. Smith, commanding the 2d MarineDivision, announced the capture of Tarawa atoll.15 Dec—Army XIV Corps assumed control of the Bougainvilleoperation from I Marine Amphibious Corps.26 Dec—Following a light naval and air bombardment, the 1stMarine Division landed in assault on Cape Gloucester, New Bri-tain. While meeting relatively light enemy resistance, the Ma-rines encountered an exceedingly difficult terrain in the dense,tropical rain forest that covers most of the island. L111775L1

Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993 23

Page 14: 1st ARVN Division, and the 3d - United States Marine Corps Vol 22 No 3_2.pdfCitadel employed "better city-fighting tac-tics." As Maj Thompson wrote, the ene- ... loop around the enemy

MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL CENTERBUILDING 58, WASHINGTON NAVY YARD

901 M STREET, SOUTHEASTWASHINGTON, D.C. 20374-5040

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Marines Defended Hue in Historic Clash 25 Years Ago(Continued from page 11)

namese author wrote: "the enemy knewnothing of our strategy; by the time ourforces approached the city of Hue, theenemy still had not taken any specificdefensive measures."

O NCE IN HUE, the Communists es-tablished their own civil government

and their cadres rounded up knowngovernment officials, sympathizers, andforeigners. After the recapture of Hue,South Vietnamese authorities exhumedsome 3,000 bodies thrown into hastily-duggraves. The North Vietnamese admittedthe tracking down and punishing of"hoodlum ringleaders:' but denied killinginnocent civilians.

The struggle for Hue initially was a nearthing. Only the failure of the North Viet-namese to overrun the Mang Ca andMACV compounds permitted the allies toretain a toehold in both the Citadel andthe new city. This enabled the allies tobring in reinforcements, albeit piecemeal.A Marine commander observed that theenemy had oriented his defenses to fendoff forces coming into the city in strengthand that the Americans "fought him fromthe inside out." Even then, if the enemyhad blown the An Cuu Bridge on the firstday, the Marines would not have been able

to bring their initial battalions and sup-plies into the city.

Fortuitously, the 1st Air Cavalry Divi-sion was in position to commit eventuallya four-battalion brigade to the battle. The1st Cavalry commander remembered thatGen Truong told him that if "I could everget the Cay to the walls of Hue, the ene-my would 'bug out.' " The problem wasthat it took 22 days for the 3d Brigade tofight its way there.

A LTHOUGH THE Viet Cong and theNorth Vietnamese harassed ship

traffic in the Perfume River, they made noserious attempt to close the waterways.Even with the An Cuu Bridge closed forover a week, the Marines had stockpiled

In 1968, men of Company C, 1st Battal-ion, 5th Marines, wage a firefight in thestreets of the ancient imperial capital.

and brought in enough supplies by boatto support operations in both the Citadeland southern Hue. If the enemy cut boththe water and land lines of communica-tions, the outcome of the struggle for Huewould have been less predictable.Although desiring a general uprising dur-ing Tet, the Communists realistically mayhave had in mind a more limited and at-tainable goal. They perhaps hoped thatthe capture of Hue would result in thedefection of the Southern Vietnameseforces and the loss of other populationcenters in the two northern provinces ofSouth Vietnam. Such a result would havecut the allied lines of communication andleft the 3d Marine Division isolated infixed positions bordering the DMZ andLaos. This would have left the Com-munists in a strong position for obtainingtheir own terms. In any event, Tet servedas a bench mark for both sides, forcingeach to reassess his strategy. The UnitedStates determined the extent of its com-mitment to Vietnam and began turningmore of the war over to the South Viet-namese. After August 1968, the Com-munists scaled down their large-unit war.probably out of both weakness and the expectation that the Americans would even-tually withdraw. Tet taught both sides thatthere was to be no quick fix. Eli 775 LI

24 Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993

'-'M

.t

7rJ.

.I

MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL CENTERBUILDING 58, WASHINGTON NAVY YARD

901 M STREET, SOUTHEASTWASHINGTON, D.C. 20374-5040

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Marines Defended Hue in Historic Clash 25 Years Ago(Continued from page 11)

namese author wrote: "the enemy knewnothing of our strategy; by the time ourforces approached the city of Hue, theenemy still had not taken any specificdefensive measures."

O NCE IN HUE, the Communists es-tablished their own civil government

and their cadres rounded up knowngovernment officials, sympathizers, andforeigners. After the recapture of Hue,South Vietnamese authorities exhumedsome 3,000 bodies thrown into hastily-duggraves. The North Vietnamese admittedthe tracking down and punishing of"hoodlum ringleaders," but denied killinginnocent civilians.

The struggle for Hue initially was a nearthing. Only the failure of the North Viet-namese to overrun the Mang Ca andMACV compounds permitted the allies toretain a toehold in both the Citadel andthe new city. This enabled the allies tobring in reinforcements, albeit piecemeal.A Marine commander observed that theenemy had oriented his defenses to fendoff forces coming into the city in strengthand that the Americans "fought him fromthe inside out." Even then, if the enemyhad blown the An Cuu Bridge on the firstday, the Marines would not have been able

to bring their initial battalions and sup-plies into the city.

Fortuitously, the 1st Air Cavalry Divi-sion was in position to commit eventuallya four-battalion brigade to the battle. The1st Cavalry commander remembered thatGen Truong told him that if "I could everget the Cay to the walls of Hue, the ene-my would 'bug out.' " The problem wasthat it took 22 days for the 3d Brigade tofight its way there.

A LTHOUGH THE Viet Cong and theNorth Vietnamese harassed ship

traffic in the Perfume River, they made noserious attempt to close the waterways.Even with the An Cuu Bridge closed forover a week, the Marines had stockpiled

In 1968, men of Company C, 1st Battal-ion, 5th Marines, wage afirefight in thestreets of the ancient imperial capital.

and brought in enough supplies by boatto support operations in both the Citadeland southern Hue. If the enemy cut boththe water and land lines of communica-tions, the outcome of the struggle for Huewould have been less predictable.Although desiring a general uprising dur-ing Tet, the Communists realistically mayhave had in mind a more limited and at-tainable goal. They perhaps hoped thatthe capture of Hue would result in thedefection of the Southern Vietnameseforces and the loss of other populationcenters in the two northern provinces ofSouth Vietnam. Such a result would havecut the allied lines of communication andleft the 3d Marine Division isolated infixed positions bordering the DMZ andLaos. This would have left the Com-munists in a strong position for obtainingtheir own terms. In any event, Tet servedas a bench mark for both sides, forcingeach to reassess his strategy. The UnitedStates determined the extent of its com-mitment to Vietnam and began turningmore of the war over to the South Viet-namese. After August 1968, the Com-munists scaled down their large-unit war.probably out of both weakness and the cxpectation that the Americans would even-tually withdraw. Tet taught both sides thatthere was to be no quick fix. Eli 775 [1

24 Fortitudine, Winter 1992-1993