1~uj11 - go.comdig.abclocal.go.com/wtvd/docs/051611_search_warrants.pdfi jake oakley being duly...
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A0106(Rev.5/851 Affidavit for Search Warrant
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
In the Matter of the Search of:
Premises of Law Enforcement Associates (LEA) located at 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, NC 27616 and a Late Model White Renault Van
APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
CASE NUMBER: 5: i1-mJ- /3'-J-1 I Jake Oakley being duly sworn depose and say: I am a(n) Special Agent, Office ofExport Enforcement, U.S. Department
ofCommerce and have reason to believe that 0 on the person of or lXI on the property or premises known as (name. description
and or location) : Law Enforcement Associates (LEA), 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, North Carolina 27616 (as more particularly described in Attachment A which is incorporated herein) in the Eastern District ofNorth Carolina, there is now concealed a certain person or property, namely (describe the person or property to be
seized)
SEE Attachments B and B1
which is (state one or more bases for search and seizure set forth under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure)
Fruits, evidence, or instrumentalities of crimes against the United States
concerning a Conspiracy to Export a Controlled Item from the United States in violation of Title 50, V.S.c. §§ 170 I - 1706 and 18 V.S.c. 371. The facts to support a finding of Probable Cause are as follows:
SEE Attached Affidavit herein.
Continued on the attached sheet and made a part hereof. lXI Yes o No
Sworn to before me, and subscribed in my presence
at Raleigh, NC 1~UJ11
ture of Judicial Officer
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 1 of 29
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT
Your AffiiUlt, Jake O. Oakley, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1. I am a Special Agent of the United States Department of Commerce (DOC), Office
of Export Enforcement (OEE). I have been a Special Agent with OEE since February 2010, and
have conducted numerous investigations involving the illegal export of items from the United States. In
the course ofmy duties, I am responsible for investigating violations of laws relating to the export of
controlled commodities and technology from the United States, as established by the Export
Administration Act (EAA) of 1979, as amended, 50 U.S.c. App. § 2401, et seq., and its
implementing regulations, the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), 15 C.F.R., Parts 730
through 774. Prior to my position as a Special Agent with OEE, I was employed as an officer and
program manager with the Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, for five years. I served honorably for four years in the United States Marine Corps. I have
completed the Criminal Investigator Training Program as well as other federal law enforcement
training courses held at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.
2. This affidavit is being submitted in support of an application for a search warrant
for the business location of Law Enforcement Associates (LEA) located at 2609 Discovery
Drive, Suite 125 Raleigh, NC 27616, more fully described in Attachment A. Based on the
investigation conducted, there is probable cause to believe that evidence currently exists at this
location relating to a conspiracy to illegally export a commercial van which has been outfitted
with devices that makes the van capable of surreptitiously intercepting wire, oral or electronic
communications, in violation of the EAR and the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 as well as 18 U.S.C. § 371.
3. On January 14,2011, the Honorable William A. Webb, U.S. Magistrate Judge,
~ Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 2 of 29
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, issued a search warrant
for the e-mail accounts npholding20 [email protected] and 101 [email protected]. This
warrant and supporting affidavit is incorporated by reference herein. The warrant was issued in
support of an investigation into a conspiracy to export a commercial van which I believe is
intended to be outfitted with devices useful in the surreptitious interception of communications,
and then re-exported from the U.S. to Morocco by a U.S. company identified as Law Enforcement
Associates (LEA), headquartered in Raleigh, NC. Export of this van when equipped with such
devices requires an export license from the Department of Commerce. Individuals previously
identified in this transaction are Mark White and Paul Briggs of LEA, Driss Hilmi ofNew Prime
Holdings, and Joseph Nounou of Airadionet Maroc.
4. I have personally participated in the investigation underlying the instant matter and
have witnessed many of the facts and circumstances described herein. In addition, I have received
information from other federal law enforcement officials, federal government officials, and
industry sources. I also have reviewed documents obtained during the course of the
investigation. The statements contained in this affidavit are based on my own observations and
review of documents, or reliable information provided to me by the other personnel identified
above. This affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of obtaining a search warrant. I
am setting forth only those facts and circumstances necessary to establish probable cause for the
issuance of the requested search warrant. Unless otherwise indicated, all written and oral
statements referred to herein are set forth in substance and in part, rather than verbatim.
EXPORT CONTROL LAWS AND REGULATIONS
5. Pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.c. §§ 1701-1706
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 3 of 29
("IEEPA"), the President through the Department of Commerce regulates and licenses the export of
various commodities, technology and software (collectively referred to as "items") to foreign countries
under the Export Administration Regulations ("EAR") (codified at 15 C.F.R. Parts 730-799). The
EAR place limitations on the export of those items that (l) could make a significant contribution
to the military potential of other countries; (2) could prove detrimental to the national security of the
United States; or (3) are contrary to United States foreign policy. The Secretary of Commerce
implements the authority provided by IEEPA (and fonnerly the predecessor statute the Export
Administration Act) through the EAR and maintains the EAR at the direction of the President, who
identifies items over which the Department of Commerce (DOC) exercises regulatory jurisdiction.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (mS) within the DOC is the Office which controls the issuance
of a license or other export authorization requirement before an item subject to the EAR may be
lawfully exported from the United States.
6. IEEPA authorizes investigations into violations ofregulations, such as the EAR, issued to
implement the President's authority under IEEPA. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) and (2).
The EAR prohibits any person from exporting or causing to be exported from the United States any
controlled commodity without having first obtained a validated export license from the DOC.
Pursuant to 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(a), "No person may engage in any conduct prohibited by or contrary
to ... the EAA, the EAR, or any order, license, or authorization issued thereunder." According to
15 C.F.R. § 764.2 (b), "No person may cause or aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, procure, or
pennit the doing of any act prohibited, or the omission of any act required, by the EAA, the EAR or
any order, license or authorization issued thereunder." Under 15 C.F.R. § 764.2 (e), ''No person may
order, buy, remove, conceal, store, use, sell, loan, dispose of, transfer, transport, finance, forward, or
otherwise service, in whole or in part, any item exported or to be exported from the United States, or
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 4 of 29
that is otherwise subject to the EAR, with knowledge that a violation of the EAA, the EAR, or any
order, license or authorization issued thereunder has occurred, is about to occur, or is intended to
occur in connection with the item."
7. Willful violations of regulations issued or promulgated by the Executive Branch
under the authority of IEEPA are criminal offenses subject to 20 years imprisonment and a
maximum fine of $1 ,000,000. See 50 U.S. C. § 1705(c). IEEPA prohibits persons from violating,
attempting to violate, conspiring to violate, or causing a violation of any license, order, regulation
or prohibition issued under IEEPA. See 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a).
8. Specific items controlled by the DOC are identified on the Commerce Control List
(CCL), which is found in Supplement No.1 to Part 774 of the EAR. These items are further
classified through the use of Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCN). Each ECCN contains
a commodity description, license requirements, potential valid license exceptions, and the reasons
the item is controlled for export. If a license is required from the DOC, it is the responsibility of the
exporter to obtain such a license. DOC export licenses are processed and evaluated by the Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS), and records of export licenses and license applications are maintained
in a system known a<; the Export Control Automated Support System (ECASS). I conducted several
queries of this system and determined that none of the parties I have identified below as being
involved in this transaction have applied for or received an export license from the DOC in either
their personal names or any company name known to be associated with them for this
specific transaction.
9. Included on the CCL is ECCN 5A980, which details the licensing requirements for
the export of "Devices primarily useful for the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications; and parts and accessories therefor." Section 742.13 of the EAR states, in
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 5 of 29
relevant part, "In support of U.S. foreign policy to prohibit the export of items that may be used for
the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications, a license is required for all
destinations, including Canada" of communications intercepting devices. According to Section
742.13(d), export controls on these items and devices are maintained by the United States
government for foreign policy purposes.
10. According to section 742. 13(b) of the EAR, there is a general policy ofdenial as to
licenses for the export of all surreptitious listening devices unless the applicant is either a provider of
telecommunications services, a government agency or employee thereof.
BACKGROUND REGARDING LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.
11. Law Enforcement Associates, Inc. (LEA) is physically located at 2609 Discovery Drive,
Suite 125, in Raleigh, NC. LEA is a publicly traded security and surveillance technology company
that manufactures and markets a diverse product line to the worldwide law enforcement, military,
security, and corrections market. The company manufactures and distributes a complete line of
audio intelligence gathering equipment including radio frequency RF) disguised transmitters,
receivers, and repeaters for use by law enforcement agencies. I reviewed the company's website
and noted that LEA describes itself as "the only U.S. manufacturer of covert surveillance audio
devices in disguised housings." I reviewed a 2010 product catalog from LEA, and noted that the
company advises potential purchasers that "certain products may not be exported from the U.S.A.
without specific approval by the Department of Commerce and/or the Department of State."
12. In a review ofa Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) filling from 2010, I noted
that LEA lists Paul Briggs as the President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Mark White as
the Vice President - Operations
FACTS ESTABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 6 of 29
13. As noted in the previously referenced affidavit, in February and March 2010,
LEA entered into a contractual agreement with New Prime Holdings to outfit a Renault van
with a variety of electronic equipment, including devices useful for the surreptitious
interception of wire, oral or electronic communications. To the best of my knowledge, new
Renault vehicles are not available for purchase domestically in the United States. In March
2010, LEA indicated receipt of a bank transfer in the amount of $32426 from New Prime
Holdings, which I believe represents a down payment of approximately 25% by New Prime
for the alteration of this van. The van which was to be equipped by LEA was imported into
the United States from France in April 2010.
14. Information obtained from the aforementioned e-mail search warrant
and industry sources are detailed below. Unless otherwise stated, the following individuals
are associated with the corresponding email accounts:
Mark White - [email protected]
Driss Hilmi - npholding201 [email protected]
15. On October 4, 2010, Driss Hilmi ("Hilmi"), using the e-mail account
[email protected]. sent an e-mail to Mark White's ("White") e-mail account,
[email protected]. In this e-mail, Hilmi states in part: "the clearance has been done and
the van is on it's way to Raleigh, eta tomorrow." Hilmi also inquires about training needed
to operate the equipment in the van: "Is it possible for you to send an engineer/trainer to
Morocco to perform the training of the team involved? If yes, what will be the costs for one
week?" On October 4,2010, White responded to Hilmi and writes in part: "This is good
news. We will be prepared for the arrival of the chassis. Training in Morocco is included in
the contract. I will confirm back to you when the chassis arrives at our location."
16. In an e-mail dated October 7, 2010, Hilmi writes to White asking: "Did you
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 7 of 29
receive the Renault Master?" On the same date, White responded to Hilmi stating: "Yes. We
have the Renault Master and the chassis has been moved to the fabrication shop to begin work
on the modifications."
17. In an October 11, 2010 e-mail message to White, Hilmi writes: "it may seem
early to you but we don't want to face the same situation as when importing this vehicle into
the USA. We have been advised that if the vehicle is modified to a military application, it will
require and (sic) export license DSP-5. The application for the DSP-5 can be made by the
shipper with the State Department. .. In this case - are you taking care of this?" On October
19,2010, White responds to Hilmi stating: "The proposal/contract does not include
exporting the vehicle. It is the customer's responsibility to arrange for transportation and any
paperwork (i.e. export license, etc.) needed to get the vehicle from our facility in Raleigh, NC
to final destination."
18. On October 20, 2010, Hilmi responds to White stating in part: "I understand
you are not the exporter - but can you at least tell me for what equipment we will need an
export license - so I can at least make a start".
19. In an e-mail message dated November 2,2010, Hilmi sends an e-mail to White
asking: "Do you have some news? I have read that it takes quite a long time to obtain an
export license so please be so kind as to come back with some details on the equipment".
20. On November 24,2010, Hilmi sends White an email stating in part: "Please let
us know soonest if export licenses are needed - we only have limited import authorisation
(sic) and cannot exceed that period".
21. In an e-mail correspondence between Hilmi and White dated November 30,
2010, Hilmi asks White: "Do you already have details on the necessity of an export license
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 8 of 29
needed?" White responds: "I spoke with our agency which provides confirmation on what
mayor may not need export license. There are only two possible items that they feel mayor
may not need export license. They are still awaiting feed back from the State Department and
the US Dept of Commerce. Unfortunately, both the State Department and the Commerce
Department of the federal government have laws related to exporting of goods."
22. On January 5, 2011, White sends Hilmi and e-mail stating in part: "At present,
I'm projecting the vehicle to be complete and available for your customer to come to our
facility the week of January 24 ... It also appears that there is no equipment that would require
an export license."
23. In an e-mail dated January 11,2011, White writes to Hilmi stating in part:
"Attached are pictures. I apologize I did not get these to you yesterday as promised. We had
a snow storm / ice storm and we shutdown early. Very unusual for Raleigh, NC."
24. Attached to the January 11,2010 e-mail from White to Hilmi, are seven photos
showing various electronic devices and wiring installed in the rear compartment of a white
van. These photos were shown to industry sources that are familiar with LEA equipment and
have numerous years of experience in the outfitting of surveillance vehicles. The sources
stated that some of the equipment installed in the van is used for surreptitious monitoring.
These items include a four comer listening post and audio/video receiver equipment. Another
piece of equipment was identified as a power inverter - 220 to 12 volt. The sources stated
that this equipment would not be installed in anything that would be utilized in the U.S.
25. Also identified in the aforementioned photos is a piece of electronic equipment
bearing the identifier "aid RX-1225." Research on the RX-1225 identified this device as a
Synthesized Intelligence Receiver which operates on the frequency range of 150 to 174 MHz.
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 9 of 29
This frequency range is reserved for law enforcement conducting surreptitious surveillance.
This receiver is used in conjunction with synthesized transmitters which operate in the same
MHz range. The manufacturer of the RX-1225 is "aid" which is identified as a division of
LEA in LEA company literature. The RX-1225 was also listed under the "Recording and
Monitoring" section of the original sales quotation dated February 25,2010 that was provided
by LEA to Hilmi.
26. An industry source with knowledge of the details of the LEAlNew Prime
transaction at issue here, specifically an internationally known customs broker and freight
forwarder, provided the U.S. Government an e-mail dated on or about February 4, 2011, from
Hilmi regarding the export of the van. In the e-mail, Hilmi writes in part: "We have been
advised by Law Enforcement Associates in Raleigh that the Renault Van is ready for re
export to Morocco. According to Mr. White there is no material 0 (sic) board requiring an
export license. If needed for the export we can send you the copy of invoice of LEA".
27. LEA's 2010 Product Catalog contains the following relevant wording: "Certain
products may not be exported from the U.S.A. without specific approval by the Department of
Commerce (Part 370, Export Administration Regulations.) .. .It is the BUYER's (emphasis in
original) responsibility, not LEA's, to obtain such licensing, unless agreed upon otherwise. "
28. An industry source who has provided reliable information in the past stated
that s/he engaged in numerous conversations with private counsel and an attorney from the
Office of Chief Counsel within BIS from 2004 to 2006, in order to determine the specific
license requirements for the exporting of surreptitious monitoring systems. According to
this source, White was in Source's office on an almost daily basis during this time period
and was frequently involved in discussions regarding the export licensing requirements for
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 10 of 29
surreptitious monitoring systems. Source advised that White knows U.S. export laws very
well, is extremely familiar with them and is aware of what is legal and illegal regarding
exports. Source also indicated that White's former company, Audio Intelligence Devices,
frequently exported surveillance equipment from the United States while White was
employed there prior to 2004.
29. In an e-mail message sent from White to Briggs on April 29, 2010, White
states in relevant part "Vehicles are difficult to deal with on the import and the export
side ... bottom line, and this is why we quoted everything based on customer being
responsible to get chassis to Raleigh and then when complete is responsible to get the
chassis back out from Raleigh, is to maintain the position that it is customer responsibility to
get the chassis to us. Then this simply becomes a domestic transaction for LEA. When
complete, we notify the customer that the unit is ready to re-export. The customer's
responsibility to deal with the import/export issue. It was estimated to me that if we get
involved with the import/export issue, we will spend 80+ hours just to accomplish the
import/export process in addition to the cost associated. Seeing as we probably don't have
somebody who has this expertise, we would be buying 80+ hours in addition to the
associated costs."
30. I reviewed a four page sales quotation issued by LEA and noted a section of
the quote entitled "Surveillance Equipment Options." The technical specifications of this
surveillance van as equipped, along with the specific equipment line items were provided to
licensing officers of the DOC's Bureau ofIndustry and Security. The technical specifications
were obtained from an invoice prepared by LEA and sent to New Prime Holdings in the
course of contract negotiations. Photographs of the interior of the van, obtained with a search
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 11 of 29
warrant from New Prime's email account ([email protected]). confinned that
the van had in fact had the surreptitious listening devices described in LEA's invoice
installed.. A preliminary classification based on this infonnation detennined that the
surveillance van, as described by LEA, would be classified under Export Control
Classification Number 5A980 on the Commerce Control List. See 15 CFR 774, Supplement
No.1. Items classified under ECCN 5A980 require an export license for all destinations,
including Canada. See 15 CFR 742. 13(a).
31. As noted previously, I know through a review of BIS records that no party to
this transaction has applied for an export license from the Department of Commerce.
32. On February 28,2011, at the request of the government, an email was sent to
Mark White from the entity which had been contacted by Hilmi to ship the van back out of
the United States. The message asked LEA: "Wanted to let you know we are ready to
proceed with the shipment. Need to verify for our paperwork that no license is required as it
is our understanding that none ofthe other parties (the Moroccans or New Prime) have a
license. Please get back with us as soon as possible so we can get the paperwork finished
up." Mark White replied: "It is our understanding that no license should be required for
export."
33. A confidential source who was a former employee of LEA reports that during
the time period that the contract with New Prime Holdings was being considered within LEA,
LEA applied for a license to export another surreptitious listening device for export to
Bennuda. This application was denied by the Department of Commerce because LEA was
neither a governmental agency nor employee nor a telecommunications company. This
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 12 of 29
denial was confirmed by the Department of Commerce.
34. The same confidential source referenced in paragraph 32, as well as a second
confidential source who was also a former employee of LEA, both confirmed that their own
discussions with Mark White and Paul Briggs, made clear that they were well aware that the
Commerce Department would not grant LEA a license for export of a surreptitious listening
device. These same confidential sources reported their belief that White's reason for stating
that the surreptitious listening equipment built into the white van did not require a license was
simply because White knew that the license requirement would put an end to the transaction.
Location of Evidence at 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleieh, NC
35. In an e-mail provided by an industry source, dated February 17, 2011, White
states in part: "Vehicle is at our location, 2609 Discovery Drive, Raleigh, NC 27616."
36. I have determined through investigation that LEA utilized their place of
business, located at 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, NC, to arrange and facilitate
the outfitting of the surveillance van.
37. I know through training and experience that businesses engaged in
international sales and the export ofgoods from the United States usually maintain records related
to those transactions at their business location. Section 762.2 of the EAR describes the specific
records which individuals and/or businesses are required to maintain if engaging in a transaction
subject to the EAR. These documents include, but are not limited to, export control documents
(which are further defined as items such as Shipper's Export Declarations, dock receipts and bills of
lading), memoranda, notes, correspondence, contracts, financial records and invitations to bid.
38. On 2010 SEC Filings, 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, NC 27616 is listed
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 13 of 29
as LEA's principal executive offices.
Computers
39. Computers are frequently used in transactions related to exports, and the
transmittal and receipts of funds to and from transacting parties. The term "computer" as
used here, is defined as an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed
data processing device performing logical or storage functions, and includes any data storage
facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such
device. Based on the above e-mail exchange, your affiant believes that computers, computer
systems, and related equipment located at 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, NC,
contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of illegal exports and conspiracy to commit the
same.
Conclusion
40. Bas~:d upon the information above, I believe probable cause exists to conclude
the following: LEA has entered into a contractual agreement with New Prime Holdings to sell
that company a vehicle equipped, in part, with equipment and devices useful for the
surreptitious interception of wire, oral or electronic communications.
41. This vehicle has been outfitted with this equipment and is currently ready for
export at the LEA facility, located at 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, NC. Export
of this vehicle, which is classified under Export Control Classification Number 5A980
requires a license from the Department of Commerce for export to any destination outside of
the United States, including the People's Republic of China or Morocco. Based my training
and experience, it is my understanding that customs brokers and freight forwarders are not
typically responsible for obtaining export licenses.
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 14 of 29
42. According to information developed during the course ofthis investigation,
LEA and its employees are aware that the export of some items sold by LEA fall under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce.
43. No party to this transaction has applied for an export license from the
Department of Commerce.
44. For the foregoing reasons, I submit that there is probable cause to believe that
export of this van would be a violation of the export laws of the United States, and that
employees of LEA, specifically Mark White and Paul Briggs, have engaged in a conspiracy
to violate those laws, specifically Title 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 and Title 18 U.S.C. § 371. I
further submit that there is probable cause to believe that fruits, evidence and
instrumentalities of this conspiracy, as set forth in Attachment B, will be found at the LEA
facility, located at 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, NC. More particularly, I
believe the evidence gathered in this matter leads to the following conclusions relative to the
activities of LEA, Mark White and Paul Briggs:
a) Both Briggs and White were well aware that the van they contracted to outfit
would as outfitted require a license before it could be exported.
b) The van was in fact outfitted as agreed, specifically to serve as a surreptitious
listening device and did in fact require a license to be exported anywhere out side the United
States.
c) Both White and Briggs were well aware that because LEA was neither a
government agency or an employee of same nor a telecommunications provider, it was not
even eligible to be given an export license.
d) Both white and Briggs were well aware of the licensing requirement and their
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 15 of 29
ineligibility at the time they contracted to outfit the van and in fact did outfit the van.
e) LEA, in the person of White, engaged in a series of emails designed to mislead
New Prime and the broker freight forwarder into believing that no license was required.
f) LEA accepted approximately $32,426 as a down payment for their work on the van
and expected to receive $209,902 in total for their work.
g) On February 28, 2011, LEA, in the person of Mark White, was told via email that a
license for the van had not been obtained by the other parties in the transaction and knowingly
lied when representing that the van did not require a license to be exported. Their purpose in
doing so was to induce the export to Morocco and thus collect the balance of their fee.
h) Thus White and Briggs, for the purpose of making an illicit profit, conspired to
cause an unlicensed export of surreptitious listening device in violation of the law as detailed
above and committed a series of overt acts in furtherance of such conspiracy, including
emails, preparation of an invoice, outfitting a Renault van with electronic devices designed to
be used for the purpose of surreptitious listening.
i) That there is probable cause to believe that evidence of this conspiracy, including
the altered van, documents and other items as detailed in Attachment B are currently located
at 2609 Discovery Dr., Suite 125, Raleigh NC.
Evidence obtained durine: search on March 3, 2011
45. On Thursday, March 3, 2011, pursuant to a warrant issued on Wednesday,
March 2, 2011, federal law enforcement agents representing the Department of Commerce
and other federal agencies executed a search of the premises located at 2609 Discovery
Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, NC. In the course of conducting this search additional evidence of
a series of exports of surreptitious listening devices was found. Based on the training and
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 16 of 29
experience of the undersigned it is believed that each of these exports required a license from
the Department of Commerce before they could be lawfully exported to any foreign country.
As a result of a search of Department of Commerce records the undersigned is aware that no
such license was applied for or issued. The evidence of the additional illegal exports includes
the following LEA invoices reflecting shipments already sent::
An LEA invoice dated April 20, 2010. This invoice reflected the repair and reexport of three PST1000BWs. These items were shipped by LEA to ASTC Matrix International in Cairo, Egypt on April 20, 20 IO. According to information provided by LEA, the PST-I OOOBW is a covert body wire, used in the surreptitious audio monitoring of conversations. The documents related to the original export of these items have not been located. No export license was noted in the sales file.
An LEA invoice, dated November 24, 2010, reflecting repair and reexport of three PST-IOOOBW body wires. These body wires were shipped to ASTC Matrix International on November 24,2010. The documents related to the original export of these items have not been located. No export license was noted in the sales file. .
An LEA invoice dated June 15, 20 10, reflecting the sale of 20 video key fobs, model number 921 OOA, to Griff Comm Limited, in Powys, Great Britain. According to LEA sources, this key fob is an undercover digital and audio recorder. These items were shipped by LEA on June 16,2010. No export license was noted in the sales file.
An LEA invoice, dated July 21, 2010, reflecting the sale of three video key fobs, model number 1492100A, to Safe Tactics BV in Amersfoort, The Netherlands. According to LEA sources, this key fob is an undercover digital and audio recorder. These items were shipped by LEA on July 21, 2010. No export license was noted in the sales file.
An LEA invoice dated January 10,2011 reflecting the sale of two video key fobs, model number 92100A, to Safe Tactics BV in Amersfoort, The Netherlands. According to LEA sources, this key fob is an undercover digital and audio recorder. These items were shipped by LEA on January 10,2011. No export license was noted in the sales file.
An LEA invoice dated January 27,2011. This invoice reflected the repair and reexport ofa PST-lOOOBW. This item was shipped by LEA to ASTC Matrix International in Cairo, Egypt on January 27, 2011. According to information provided by LEA, the PST-1 OOOBW is a covert body wire, used in the surreptitious audio monitoring of conversations. The documents related to the original export of these items have not been located. No export license was noted in the sales file.
46. The undersigned believes these invoices constitute evidence of additional
criminal activity in violation of Title 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 and Title 18 U.S.C. § 371 as
well as evidence of intent relative to the intended export of the Renault van described above.
During the search conducted on March 3, 2011, the agents also found the Renault van fully
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 17 of 29
outfitted with surreptitious listening gear as described above.
Sworn to and subscribed before me this J~2011
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 18 of 29
Attachment A
2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, North Carolina (NC) is an office complex housing multiple businesses. This brick single story structure contains glass doors and windows on the front and white bay or garage type doors in the rear. Law Enforcement Associates (LEA) leases approximately 10,000 square feet of space at this location, which is marked with signage, "LEA" in white letters above the front entry door. The rear garage is door is also marked with signage identifying it as LEA space.
Late model, white Renault "Master" van possibly bearing Vehicle Identification Number (VIN)
VF1FDB1H642299376. This v.an has been outfitted with electronic surveillance equipment which is capable ofsurreptitiously intercepting wire, oral or electronic communications.
2609 Discovery Dr, Raleigh, NC 2761&-1904
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Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 19 of 29
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2609 Discovery Dr, Raleigh, He 2761~ 1904
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 20 of 29
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 21 of 29
ATTACHMENTB
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED
"Document" as that tenn is used herein, means records, notes, letters, correspondence,
forms, financial records, checks, ledgers, accounting papers, computer printouts, saved e-
mail, information on computer hard drives and disks, computer input and output reports,
and writings, and any other item of any type that conveys information.
1. Documents pertaining to the export activities of Law Enforcement
Associates, Inc., or any individual acting on their behalf, which provide evidence of any
illegal export activity. Such activities include, but are not limited to, the purchase,
export, intended export, re-export or transshipment of any U.S. origin item to an ultimate
licensable destination. These documents include, but are not limited to:
a. Shipper's Export Declarations b. Shipper's Letters of Instructions c. Air Waybills d. Bills of Lading e. Purchase Orders f. Invoices g. Delivery Receipts h. Inventory Records 1. Contracts J. Powers of Attorney k. Payment Records 1. Letters of Credit m. Product Literature n. Product Specifications o. Correspondence p. Ledgers and other financial records q. Product Registration and Warranty Infonnation r. DistributorlDistribution Agreements s. End User Statements t. Customer Mailing Lists il. Documents related to U.S. export laws v. Document indicating knowledge of such activity
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 22 of 29
2. Documents related to surreptitious listening devices or devices primarily
useful for the surreptitious interception of wire, oral or electronic communications and
related parts and accessories.
3. Documents related to the proposed sale, sale, purchase, brokering, export,
or intended export of surreptitious listening devices or devices primarily useful for the
surreptitious interception of wire, oral or electronic communications and related parts and
accessories.
4. Notes, letters documents and other papers, whether in handwritten or other
form, which document any correspondence or discussions between Marc White, Paul
Briggs, Driss Hilmi, or any other representatives of Law Enforcement Associates, New
Prime Holdings or the Government of Morocco, related to the purchase and export of a
White Renault van equipped with various electronic components.
5. Any and all documents related to U.S. Export Laws~
6. Documents related to the training of foreign nationals on items or
technology controlled under the Export Administration Regulations.
7. Documents reflecting names, addresses, telephone numbers, pager
~numbers. facsimile telephone numbers and/or telex numbers of co-conspirators, sources
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 23 of 29
and institutions with whom a financial relationship exists, and safes, including the
contents within.
8. Documents related to travel to the People's Republic of China or
Morocco, including but not limited to passports and visas.
9. Late model, white Renault "Master" van possibly bearing Vehicle
Identification Number (VIN) VFlFDBlH642299376. This van has been outfitted with
electronic surveillance equipment which is capable of sIDTeptitiously intercepting wire,
oral or electronic communications.
lO. All computer, computer hardware, system peripherals, computer software,
computer documentation, computer storage media and data storage devices, computer
passwords, and other data security devices, computer printouts, and computer programs
which contain. or were used to transmit or store any of the foregoing records, documents,
and materials.
A U.S. Department of Commerce Special Agent or Computer Forensic Analyst specially
trained in computer evidence recovery shall supervise the retrieval of digital evidence,
computers and related storage devices from 2609 Discovery Drive, Raleigh, North
Carolina 27616. The computer forensics agent/analyst will make an initial review of any
computer hardware, system peripherals, and computer storage media to determine if it is
possible to search these items during the execution of the search warrant without
~I ~11
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 24 of 29
jeopardizing the government's ability to preserve the electronically stored information in
its original state. As an alternative, a computer forensics agent/analyst will determine if it
is possible to make forensically sound images of the original computer hardware and
storage media on-site within a reasonable period of time, and if these forensically sound
images will be useable for an off-site examination conducted at a later date without the
ori.ginal equipment.
If it is not possible to perform an on-site review of these materials or to create usable
forensic imagf:s, the agent executing the warrant will seize all computer hardware,
computer storage media, system peripherals, software, documentation, password and data
security devices, and storage media as set forth in this attachment and as defined below.
The seized items will be transported to an appropriate law enforcement facility for a
timely analysis and review.
Any electronically stored information or data that does not fall within the list of items to
be seized will be returned to the subject premises within 30 days from the execution of
the warrant. However, any electronically stored information, data, image, or file found to
contain, or constituting, contraband (as defined by law), shall not be returned.
Any computer equipment taken from the subject premises in order to perform an off-site
search for electronically stored information and data shall be returned to the subject
premises within 30 days from the execution of the warrant. If it is not possible to conduct
the offsite examination within the 30-day time period because of the volume of
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 25 of 29
electronically stored infonnation to be reviewed or the need for specialized equipment of
expertise to conduct the review, the government may apply for a Court-ordered extension
of the 30-day time period. However, items which constitute evidence of the commission
of a criminal offense or contraband, the fruit of a crime, or things otherwise used as the
means ofcommitting a criminal offense need not be returned. Instead, the government
may seize and maintain custody of these items pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41 (c).
For purposes of this warrant, the foregoing terms are defmed as follows:
a. Hardware: computer hardware consists of all equipment which can
collect, analyze, create, display, convert, store, conceal, or transmit electronic, magnetic,
optical, or similar computer impulses or data. Hardware includes (but is not limited to)
any data-procc~ssing devices (such as server, desktop, laptop, and notebook computers,
tablets, hand-held electronic organizers, personal digital assistants (PDA), and cellular
phones which contain capabilities found on a PDA or a computer - such as the ability to
send and receive e-mail and store and edit documents. It); internal and external storage
devices (magnetic storage devices such as hard disk drives, diskette drives, and tape
drives, optical storage devices such as CD-ROM drives, CD-R/CD-RW recorders, and
DVD drives, recorders, and other electronic memory storage devices); internal computer
components (such as motherboards, central processing units, graphics processing units,
power supplies and RAM modules); and related communication devices such as modems,
routers, cables, and connectors, programmable telephone dialing or signaling devices, and
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 26 of 29
electronic toUl~ generating devices, as well as devices, mechanisms or parts that can be
used to restrict access to computer hardware such as physical keys and locks.
b. System Peripherals: A piece of equipment which sends data to, or
receives data from, a computer, keyboards, mousse, printers, scanners, plotters, video
display monitors, and certain types of facsimile machines are examples of peripherals.
c. Software: Computer software is digital information which can be
interpreted by a computer and any of its related components to direct the way they work.
Software is stored in electronic, magnetic, optical, or other digital form. It commonly
includes programs to run operating systems, applications (like word processing, graphics,
or spreadsheet programs), utilities, compilers, interpreters, and communications
programs.
d. Documentation: Computer related documentation consists of written,
recorded, printed, or electronically stored material which explains or illustrates how to
configure or use computer hardware, software, or other related items.
e. Passwords and Data Security Devices: Computer passwords and other
security devices are designed to restrict access or to hide computer software,
documentation, or data Data security devices may consist ofhardware, software, or
other programming code. A password or pass phrase (a string of alphanunieric
characters) usually operates as a sort of digital key to ''unlock'' particular data security
devices. Data security hardware may include encryption devices, chips, cards, and circuit
boards. Data security software or digital code may include a prograrhming code that
creates ''test'' keys or "hot" keys, which perform certain preset security functions when
touched. Data security software or code may also encrypt, compress, hide, or "booby
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 27 of 29
trap" protected data to make it inaccessible or unusable, as well as reverse the process to
restore it.
f. Storage Media: Storage media includes any material capable of storing
. information in. a manner that can be used by computer hardware to save and/or retrieve
information. Examples of storage media include diskettes, CD-ROMs, DVDs, Blue-Ray
discs, magnetic tapes, ZIP disks, JAZ disks, flash memory storage devices and EPROMS.
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 28 of 29
ATTACHMENT B-1
Notwithstanding any language in this Attachment B to the contrary, this warrant authorizes (i) the search of the items listed in this Attachment B for only the following and (ii) authorizes the seizure of the items listed in this Attachment B only to the extent they constitute the following:
(a) evidence of violations of both 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 and 18 U.s.C. § 371 with respect to only:
1. the sale ofthe outfitted Renault "Master" van (Vehicle IdentificationNumber VFIFDBIH642299376) described in paragraph 13, among numerous other paragraphs, of the affidavit supporting the application for this warrant ("Affidavit"), including, but not limited to, the subject Renault van;
ii. the transaction involving the surreptitious listening device for which an application to export to Bermuda was denied, as described in paragraph 33 of the Affidavit; and
111. shipments or intended shipments to overseas locations of surreptitious listening devices which fall within Export Control Classification Number 5A980 (collectively "the subject violations").
(b) any item constituting contraband due to the subject violations, fruits of the subject violations, or other items possessed whose possession is illegal due to the subject violations; or
(c) any property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing any subject violations.
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 29 of 29
AD 93 (Rev. 01/09) Search and Seizure Warrant
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the
Eastern District of North Carolina
In the Matter of the Search of ) (Briefly describe the property to be searched ) or identifY the person by name and address) ) Case No.5: 1/- rnj - J3'-17
)Premises at Law Enforcement Associates (LEA) located
)at 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, NC 27616 )and Late Model Renault White Van
SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT
To: Any authorized law enforcement officer
An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Eastern District of North Carolina (identifY the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):
See Attachment A
The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identifY the person or describe the
property to be seized):
SeeAttach~e~~~B1andC. ~~~/_f-~$ ..r~ of- ~ U>I"1rU C1U~{' Rr5 ~t:.-n.v7~ ~ULGA.fv:··
I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.
YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before J 7 ~?-O ( ) (not to exceed IMays)
lilt' in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. 0 at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable ~ruse has been established.
Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.
The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by' law and P~0!IWt1y.reJiurn this Wl£,.a12.t and invent9fY,..to United States Magistrate Judge James E. Gates 0(1... Av'( &1)ttf L,.. IeA' tvC l~ ,ey.<Jv(,O(/'-lV" .
(name)
o I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) ofor days (not to exceed 30).
Date and time issued: 3~+U1l( S: l> f·f\1. •
Ountil, the facts justifying, the later specific
City and state: Raleigh, NC 28601 JAMES E. GATES, United States Magistrate Judge Printed name and title
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 3 Filed 03/18/11 Page 1 of 3
AO 93 (Rev. 01/09) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)
Return
Case No.: Date and time warrant executed:
S".'6fi:>
FILED
MAR 1 8 2011 DENNIS P. IA\lllRONE. ClEflU( US OIS~O\JfI.T, EONe
ISY' O!PCLK,
Certification
I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the designated judge.
Date: OS/a/lkl(
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 3 Filed 03/18/11 Page 2 of 3
Inventory Listing of All Items Seized at Search Warrant Site
Site Name: Investigation Number: Report Date: Law Enforcement Associates EE444710 Monday, January 10, 2000 Inc. Starting Date and Time: 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 03/03/2011 06:05 PM 125 Raleigh, NC 27616
Ending Date and Time:
03/03/2011 08:10 PM
Control #: 1
Location: Garage Found: Middle of garage Description: Seized Per Warrant
Evidence Box: Locator Code: L
White outfitted Renault "Master" surveillance van - VIN VF1 FDB1 H642299376. Contents of van: (1) Rainbow lens controller; (1) Aid vision 1 gig thumbdrive; (5) Rolls of cabling; (1) Power extension cord; (2) Harware mounts; (3) Remote controls; (6) AAA batteries; (1) Bag of misc. hardware accessories; (1) Desk chair.
Control #: 2 Evidence Box: 2 Location: Garage Locator Code: L Found: Inside LEA facility Description: Seized Per Warrant Master key for white surveillance van.
Control #: 3 Evidence Box: 2 Location: Sr. Vice President Locator Code: D Found: File cabinet
Description: Seized Per Warrant Russia Ford Transit documents
Control #: Location: Found:
Description:
4 Sr. Vice President Inside LEA facility Seized Per Warrant Egypt sales order
Evidence Box: Locator Code:
2 L
Control #: Location: Found: Description:
5
Main Lobby Lateral files Seized Per Warrant Various intemational files.
Evidence Box: Locator Code:
2 L
Control #: Location: Found: Description:
6 Lateral files Lateral files Seized Per Warrant Various lateral files.
Evidence Box: Locator Code:
2 K
Page 1 of 1
Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 3 Filed 03/18/11 Page 3 of 3