2003-07-29 to larry di rita re gingrich paper- memo attachment

8/3/2019 2003-07-29 to Larry Di Rita Re Gingrich Paper- Memo Attachment

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/2003-07-29-to-larry-di-rita-re-gingrich-paper-memo-attachment 1/7

T O : L a r r y D i R i t a

F R O M : D o n a l d R u m s f e l d

S U B J E C T : G i n g r i c h P a p e r

P l e a s e s e e m e o n t h i s N e w t G i n g r i c h p a p e r o n " S e v e n S t r a t e g i c N e c e s s i t i e s . "

T h a n k s .

A t t a c h .

6 / 2 7 / 0 3 G i n g r i c h p a p e r : " S e v e n S t r a t e g i c N e c e s s i t i e s "

D H R : d h

0 7 2 9 0 3 - 6

P l e a s e r e s p o n d b y g / 3

J u l y 2 9 , 2 0 0 3

U 2 0 9 5 4 / 0 3

July 29,2003

TO : Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald RumsfeldwSUB JECT : Gingrich Paper

Please see m e on this New t Gingrich paper on “Seven Strategic Necessities.”

Thanks.

Attach.

6/27/03Gingrich paper: “Seven Strategic Necessities”

Please respond by g/ ! Q 3

July 29, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Gingrieh Paper

Please see me on this Newt Gingrieh paper on "Seven Strategie Neeessities."

Thanks.

Attach.

6/27/03 Gingrich paper: "Seven Strategie Necessities"

DHR:dh

072903-6

• • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • •• •

Please respond by__g--+/_g---,/f-o--=-3 _r '

U20954 103



S e v e n S t r a t e g i c N e c e s s i t i e s

J u n e 2 7 , 2 0 0 3

N e w t G i n g r i c h

T h e r e a r e s e v e n l a r g e a r e a s o f s t r a t e g i c n e c e s s i t y t h a t r e q u i r e s t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g a n d s o m es i g n i f i c a n t m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f c u r r e n t a s s u m p t i o n s a n d e f f o r t s .

I . S t r a t e g i c n e e d 1 . W i n n i n g t h e l a r g e r a r g u m e n t a b o u t t e r r o r i s m , w e a p o n s o f m a s s

m u r d e r , a n d A m e r i c a n s e c u r i t y

I t i s v e r y i m p o r t a n t f o r t h e B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n n o t t o g e t d r a w n i n t o a d a y t o d a y ,

i n c i d e n t m a n a g i n g , n e w s m e d i a a n d l e g i s l a t o r a p p e a s i n g m i n d s e t .

W e a r e g o i n g t o t a k e c a s u a l t i e s .

W e a r e g o i n g t o b e e n g a g e d i n I r a q , I r a n , P a l e s t i n e a n d e l s e w h e r e f o r a l o n g t i m e .

W e n e e d a n e l e v a t e d d e b a t e a b o u t t h e l a r g e r z o n e o f A m e r i c a n s e c u r i t y a n d t h e t h r e a t s t o

t h a t s e c u r i t y . W e w a n t t o d i v i d e t h e c o u n t r y i n t o t h r e e f a c t i o n s .

T h o s e w h o w o u l d h i d e a n d i g n o r e r e a l i t y ( e s s e n t i a l l y t h e M c G o v e r n - D e a n

D e m o c r a t s ) .

. T h o s e w h o p r e t e n d t o b e r e s p o n s i b l e b u t r e a l l y w a n t t o c a r p a n d c o m p l a i n

w i t h o u t a n e f f e c t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e .

T h o s e w h o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h i s w i l l b e a h a r d c a m p a i g n a n d m a y t a k e y e a r s a n d

w i l l i n v o l v e m i s t a k e s .

Y o u w a n t t o f o r c e t h e c a r p i n g , c r i t i c i z i n g g r o u p t o j o i n y o u f o r t h e l o n g h a u l o r j o i n t h e

i s o l a t i o n i s t s a n d r e a l i t y a v o i d e r s .

I f t h e r e i s a c l e a r s t r a t e g i c c h o i c e t h e B u s h A d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i l l w i n .

I f p e o p l e g e t t h r e e c h o i c e s t h e k n i t p i c k i n g , d a i l y c r i t i c s w i l l s t e a d i l y g a i n g r o u n d .

D o n o t l e t y o u r s e l f b e c a u g h t u p i n a d a i l y a r g u m e n t o r i n t r y i n g t o p r e d i c t w h e n y o u w i l ll e a v e a c o u n t r y o r w h e n y o u w i l l s o l v e e v e r y t h i n g

T h e c o u n t r y n e e d s a l i t t l e C h u r c h i l l i a n p r o m i s e o f ' b l o o d , s w e a t , t o i l a n d t e a r s " .

I n 1 9 4 5 - 4 7 t h e c o u n t r y r e l u c t a n t l y h a d a g r e a t d e b a t e a b o u t t h e n a t u r e o f t h e S o v i e t

t h r e a t . P e o p l e w h o h a d s u r v i v e d a d e p r e s s i o n a n d a w o r l d w a r w a n t e d t o r e t u r n t o

n o r m a l c y . G r a d u a l l y t h e y c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h a t w a s i m p o s s i b l e a n d w i t h t h e h e l p o f y o u n g

R e p u b l i c a n s l i k e N i x o n a n d F o r d , H a r r y T r u m a n a n d G e o r g e M a r s h a l l f o r g e d a

c o n s e n s u s t h a t l a s t e d f o r o v e r 4 0 y e a r s .

Seven Strategic NecessitiesJune 27,2003Newt Gingrich

There are seven large areas of strategic necessity that require strategic planning and som esignificant modifications of current assumptions and efforts.

I. Strategic need 1. Winning the larger argument about terrorism, weapons of massmurder, and American security

It is very important for the Bush administration not to get drawn into a day to day,incident managing, news media and legislator appeasing mindset.

We are going to take casualties.

We are go ing to be engaged in Iraq, Iran, Palestine and elsewhere for a long time.

We need an elevated debate about the larger zone of American security and the threats tothat security. We w ant to divide the country into three factions.

1. Those who would h ide and ignore reality (essentially the McG overn-DeanDemocrats).

2. . Those who pretend to be responsible but really want to carp and complainwithout an effective alternative.

3. Those who understand that this will be a hard campaign and may take years andwill involve mistakes.

You want to force the carping, criticizing group to join you for the long haul or join theisolationists and reality avoiders.

If there is a clear strategic choice the Bush Administration will win.

If people get three choices the knit picking, daily critics will steadily gain ground.

Do not let yourself be caught up in a daily argum ent or in trying to predict w hen you willleave a country or when you w ill solve everything.

The country needs a little Churchillian promise of ‘blood, sweat, toil and tears”.

In 1945-47 the country reluctantly had a great debate about the nature of the Sovietthreat. People who had survived a depression and a world war wanted to return tonormalcy. Gradually they concluded that that w as impossible and with the help o f young

Republicans like Nixon and Ford, Harry Trum an and George Marshall forged aconsensus that lasted for o ver 40 years.

Seven Strategie Neeessities

lune 27,2003

Newt Gingrieh

There are seven large areas of strategie neeessity that require strategie planning and some

signifieant modifieations of eurrent assumptions and efforts.

1. Strategie need 1. Winning the larger argument about terrorism, weapons ofmass

murder, and Ameriean seeurity

It is very important for the Bush administration not to get drawn into a day to day,

ineident managing, news media and legis1ator appeasing mindset.

We are going to take easualties.

We are going to be engaged in Iraq, Iran, Palestine and elsewhere for a long time.

We need an elevated debate about the larger zone ofAmeriean seeurity and the threats to

that seeurity. We want to divide the eountry into three factions.

1. Those who wou1d hide and ignore reality (essentially the MeGovern-Dean

Democrats).

2. . Those who pretend to be responsible but really want to earp and eomplain

without an effeetive alternative.

3. Those who understand that this will be a hard eampaign and may take years and

will involve mistakes.

You want to force the earping, eritieizing group to join you for the long haul or join the

is01ationists and reality avoiders.

If there is a c1ear strategie ehoice the Bush Administration will win.

Ifpeople get three ehoiees the knit picking, daily erities will steadily gain ground.

Do not let yourselfbe eaught up in a daily argument or in trying to prediet when you will

leave a eountry or when you will solve everything.

The eountry needs a little Churehillian promise of 'blood, sweat, toil and tears".

In 1945-47 the country reluetantly had a great debate about the nature of the Soviet

threat. People who had survived adepression and a world war wanted to return to

normalcy. Gradually they eonc1uded that that was impossible and with the help ofyoung

Republieans like Nixon and Ford, Harry Truman and George Marshall forged a

consensus that lasted for over 40 years.



A m e r i c a h a s a s o u n d d o c t r i n e f o r t o t a l w a r a g a i n s t a n e n t i r e n a t i o n . D r e s d e n , H a m b u r g ,

T o k y o a n d N a g a s a k i a r e a m o n g t h e m e m o r i e s o f h o w d e c i s i v e A m e r i c a n s c a n b e w h e n

f a c e d w i t h a t h r e a t o f t o t a l w a r .

H o w e v e r A m e r i c a d o e s n o t h a v e a d o c t r i n e f o r t o t a l w a r a g a i n s t a n e n e m y w h o i s h i d i n g

b e h i n d a c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e t h a t c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n i s l i k e l y t o b e

t e r r o r i z e d b y t h e f o r c e s o f t o t a l w a r a n d s o s i m p l y a p p e a l i n g t o t h e i r b e t t e r i n t e r e s t s i s

u s e l e s s .

W e l e a r n e d i n I r a q t h a t t h e B a a t h i s t f o r c e s w o u l d k i l l v i l l a g e r s a n d t h r e a t e n w i v e s a n d

c h i l d r e n i n o r d e r t o g e t p e o p l e t o a t t a c k t h e A m e r i c a n s .

I t i s c l e a r t h a t P a l e s t i n i a n s w h o f a v o r r e a l d e m o c r a c y o r w o u l d b e w i l l i n g t o l i v e

p e a c e f u l l y w i t h I s r a e l r i s k t h e i r l i v e s i f t h e y s p e a k o u t .

W h e n f a c e d w i t h a t e r r o r i s t o p p o n e n t w i l l i n g t o u s e v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t t h e i r o w n p e o p l e t h e

o n l y s o l u t i o n i s t o d e v e l o p o v e r m a t c h i n g s y s t e m s o f i n t e l l i g e n c e a n d f o r c e w h i c h c a n

h e l p p e o p l e d e f e a t t h e m .

B r i t i s h G e n e r a l T h o m p s o n i n M a l a y a d e v e l o p e d a s y s t e m l i k e t h i s a n d d e c i s i v e l y

d e f e a t e d t h e c o m m u n i s t s . I n o n e o f t h e m o s t s u c c e s s f u l a s p e c t s o f t h e V i e t N a m w a r

( d e s c r i b e d i n B i n g W e s t ' s T h e V i l l a g e ) v e r y s m a l l u n i t s o f M a r i n e s w o r k e d w i t h v i l l a g e r s

t o d e v e l o p s e l f d e f e n s e f o r c e s i n c o m m u n i t i e s o f 6 , 0 0 0 V i e t n a m e s e w i t h a b o u t 2 0

M a r i n e s .

I f t h e P r e s i d e n t i s t o b e a b l e t o c o n f r o n t a n d d e f e a t H a m a s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l h a v e t o

d e v e l o p a d o c t r i n e a n d s y s t e m o f h e l p i n g t h o s e P a l e s t i n i a n s w h o w a n t t h e i r f a m i l i e s t o

h a v e s a f e t y , h e a l t h p r o s p e r i t y , a n d f r e e d o m a n d a r e p r e p a r e d t o f i g h t t h e t e r r o r i s t s i f

n e c e s s a r y t o a c h i e v e t h a t f u t u r e .

T h e o n l y h o p e f o r p e a c e b e t w e e n I s r a e l a n d t h e P a l e s t i n i a n p e o p l e i s f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

t o o v e r t l y a l l y w i t h t h o s e P a l e s t i n i a n s w h o w i l l a c c e p t I s r a e l i f t h e y h a v e s a f e t y , h e a l t h ,

p r o s p e r i t y a n d f r e e d o m a n d i n t h i s a l l i a n c e d e f e a t a n d u l t i m a t e l y e l i m i n a t e t h e t h r e a t o f

t h e t e r r o r i s t s .

V i c t o r y i n t h e I s r a e l - P a l e s t i n i a n c o n f l i c t t h u s i n h e r e n t l y m e a n s v i c t o r y b o t h i n a

c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s t s a n d i n a c a m p a i g n t o b u i l d a s a f e , h e a l t h y , p r o s p e r o u s , f r e e

P a l e s t i n i a n s o c i e t y .

I n t h i s c a s e v i c t o r y i n a t o t a l w a r s u r r o u n d e d b y c i v i l i a n s r e q u i r e s w a g i n g t h e f i r s t a n ds e c o n d c a m p a i g n s c o n c u r r e n t l y .

T h e s p e c i a l i s t s a t Q u a n t i c o , F o r t B e n n i n g a n d F o r t B r a g g s h o u l d b e a s s i g n e d t h e j o b o fd e v e l o p i n g i n d e t a i l a d o c t r i n e , s t r a t e g y a n d s t r u c t u r e f o r w i n n i n g t h i s t o t a l w a r o n b e h a l f

o f t h e P a l e s t i n i a n p e o p l e a g a i n s t t h e t e r r o r i s t s . T h e i n t e l l i g e n c e c o m m u n i t y s h o u l d b eV

America has a sound doctrine for total war against an entire nation. Dresden, Hamburg,Tokyo and Nagasaki are among the memories of how decisive Americans can be whenfaced with a threat of total war.

However Am erica does not have a doctrine for total war against an enemy who is hiding

terrorized by the forces of total war and so simply appealing to their better interes ts is

useless.

behind a civilian population. Furthermore that civilian population is likely to be /

We learned in Iraq that the Baathist forces would kill villagers and threaten wives andchildren in order to get people to attack the Am ericans.

It is clear that P alestinians who favor real dem ocracy or would be willing to livepeacefully with Israel risk their lives if they speak out.

When faced with a terrorist opponent willing to use violence against their own people the

help people defeat them.

only solution is to develop overm atching systems of intelligence and force which can V"British General Thom pson in Malaya developed a system like this and decisivelydefeated the comm unists. In one of the most successful aspects of the V iet Nam w ar(described in Bing West's The Village) very small units of Marines worked w ith villagersto develop self defense forces in comm unities of 6,000 Vietnamese with about 20Marines.

If the President is to be able to confiont and defeat Hamas the United States will have todevelop a doctrine and system of helping those Palestinians who w ant their fam ilies tohave safety, health prosperity, and freedom and are prepared to fight the terrorists if

necessary to achieve that future.

The only hope for peace between Israel and the Palestinian people is for the United States

to overtly ally with those Palestinians who will accept Israel if they h ave safety, health,prosperity and freedom and in this alliance defeat and ultimately eliminate the threat of

the terrorists.

Victory in the Israel-Palestinian conflict thus inherently means victory both in a

campaign against terrorists and in a campaign to build a s afe, healthy, prosperous, freePalestinian society.

In this case victory in a total war surrounded by civilians requires waging the first andsecond campaigns concurrently.

The specialists at Quantico, Fort Benning and Fort Bragg sho uld be assigned the jo b ofdeveloping in detail a doctrine, strategy and structure for winning this total war o n behalfof the Palestinian people against the terrorists. The intelligence community should be

1/

America has asound doctrine for total war against an entire nation. Dresden, Hamburg,

Tokyo and Nagasaki are among the memories ofhow decisive Americans can be when

faced with a threat of total war.

However America does not have a doctrine for total war against an enemy who is hiding

behind a civilian population. Furthermore that civilian population is likely to be

terrorized by the forces of total war and so simply appealing to their better interests is

useless.

We leamed in Iraq that the Baathist forces would kill villagers and threaten wives and

children in order to get people to attack the Americans.

It is clear that Palestinians who favor real democracy or would be willing to live

peacefully with Israel risk their lives if they speak out.

When faced with a terrorist opponent willing to use violence against their own people the v/only solution is to develop overmatching systems of intelligence and force which can

help people defeat them.

British General Thompson inMalaya developed a system like this and decisively

defeated the communists. In one ofthe most successful aspects ofthe Viet Nam war

(described in Bing West's The Village) very small units ofMarines worked with villagers

to develop self defense forces in communities of 6,000 Vietnamese with about 20

Marines.

If the President is to be able to confront and defeat Hamas the United States will have to

develop a doctrine and system of helping those Palestinians who want their families to

have safety, health prosperity, and freedom and are prepared to fight the terrorists if

necessary to achieve that future.

The only hope for peace between Israel and the Palestinian people is for the United States

to overtly ally with those Palestinians who will accept Israel ifthey have safety, health,

prosperity and freedom and in this alliance defeat and ultimately eliminate the threat of

the terrorists.

Victory in the Israel-Palestinian conflict thus inherently means victory both in a

campaign against terrorists and in a campaign to build a safe, healthy, prosperous, free

Palestinian society.

In this case victory in a total war surrounded by civilians requires waging the first andsecond campaigns concurrently.

The specialists at Quantico, Fort Benning and Fort Bragg should be assigned the job of

developing in detail a doctrine, strategy and structure for winning this total war on behalf V'of the Palestinian people against the terrorists. The intelligence community should be



i n v o l v e d f o r i t s k n o w l e d g e b u t t h e d o c t r i n e f o r w a r w i n n i n g s h o u l d c o m e f r o m s p e c i a l i s t s

i n p o l i c i n g , u r b a n w a r f a r e , a n d g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e m i l i t a r y .

T h e g o a l i s t o g i v e t h e P r e s i d e n t t h e i n s t r u m e n t s h e n e e d s t o b e a b l e t o w i n i f t h e f o r c e s

o f H a m a s , I s l a m i c J i h a d , A l F a t a h , e t c i n s i s t o n t o t a l w a r .

I V . S t r a t e g i c N e e d 4 . F u t u r e t h r e a t s a n d c o m p l e x r e a l i t i e s r a t h e r t h a n l e s s o n s l e a r n e d

f r o m I r a q s h o u l d d e f i n e t h e c o r e o f A m e r i c a n i n t e l l i g e n c e , m i l i t a r y a n d i n t e g r a t e d n e e d s

f o r t h e n e x t g e n e r a t i o n .

I r a q a n d I r a n a r e u s e f u l c a m p a i g n s t o s t u d y b u t t h e y h a v e l i m i t e d a p p l i c a t i o n t o f o r c e s i z e

a n d s t r u c t u r e f o r t h e f u t u r e . T h e r e a l c h a l l e n g e s a r e i n h e a v i e r o p p o n e n t s ( N o r t h K o r e a , ar o g u e P a k i s t a n , I r a n ) a n d m o r e d i s p e r s e d p r o b l e m s ( P a l e s t i n e , t h e u n g o v e r n e d a r e a s , t h ed i c t a t o r s h i p s o f S y r i a , L i b y a e t c . )

P l a n n i n g s h o u l d b e g i n w i t h t h e d e c i s i v e n e s s o f P r e s i d e n t B u s h ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e g l o b a l

w a r o n t e r r o r o n t h e U S S L i n c o l n a n d t h e w i d e r a n g i n g a s s e r t i o n s o f t h e N a t i o n a lS t r a t e g y r e l e a s e d S e p t e m b e r 2 0 , 2 0 0 2 .

T h e f o r c e s t o d a y a r e s t r e t c h e d m u c h f u r t h e r t h a n p e o p l e i n W a s h i n g t o n b e l i e v e .

T h e n u m b e r o f p l a c e s w e c o u l d b e i n v o l v e d i s f a r l a r g e r t h a n a n y o n e i n W a s h i n g t o n

w a n t s t o c o n t e m p l a t e .

T h e n u m b e r o f p e o p l e w h o l i v e i n u n g o v e r n e d a r e a s i s f a r g r e a t e r a n d m o r e d a n g e r o u s

t h a n a n y o n e c u r r e n t l y w a n t s t o r e p o r t .

T h e a m o u n t o f m o n e y a n d s c a l e o f a c t i v i t y u n d e r w a y i n t h e g r a y a r e a s ( p e o p l es m u g g l i n g , i l l e g a l a r m s d e a l s , i l l e g a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l

c r i m e , a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l n a r c o t i c s ) c r e a t e s a s y s t e m w i t h i n w h i c h t e r r o r i s m c a n o p e r a t e

w h i c h i s f a r l a r g e r , m o r e r o b u s t a n d m o r e a g i l e t h a n a n y o n e c o n t e m p l a t e s . T h i s d a r k

u n d e r s i d e o f g l o b a l i z a t i o n i s b e t t e r f u n d e d t h a n t h e p o l i c e , m o r e a g i l e t h a n p u b l i c

b u r e a u c r a c i e s a n d o f t e n b e t t e r e q u i p p e d t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y .

I n 1 9 7 5 S e c r e t a r y o f D e f e n s e R u m s f e l d u s e d t h e f a c t s t o c o n v i n c e t h e p o s t - V i e t N a m ,

p o s t - W a t e r g a t e D e m o c r a t i c C o n g r e s s t h a t t h e w o r l d w a s d a n g e r o u s a n d d e f e n s e s p e n d i n g

h a d t o b e i n c r e a s e d .

T o d a y a s i m i l a r l y c o m p r e h e n s i v e , r e a l i s t i c a n d s t a r k l y c a n d i d a s s e s s m e n t n e e d s t o b ed e v e l o p e d b y t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d s h a r e d w i t h t h e C o n g r e s s a n d w i t h t h e A m e r i c a np e o p l e s o t h e y w i l l u n d e r s t a n d t h e s c a l e o f t h e t h r e a t , t h e c o m p l e x i t y a n d s p e e d o f t h e

m o d e r n w o r l d , a n d t h e a m o u n t w e w i l l h a v e t o i n v e s t t o d e v e l o p t r u l y e f f e c t i v e s y s t e m so f n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y .

involved for its knowledge but the doctrine for war winning should com e from specialists

in policing, urban warfare, and guerrilla operations in the military.

The goal is to give the President the instruments he needs to be able to win if the forcesof Hamas, Islamic Jihad, AI Fatah, etc insist on total war.

IV. S trategic Need 4. Future threats and complex realities rather than lessons learnedfrom Iraq should define the core of A merican intelligence, military and integrated needs

for the next generation.

Iraq and Iran are useful campaigns to study but they have limited application to force sizeand struc ture for the future. The real challenges are in heavier opponents (North Korea, arogue P akistan, Iran) and m ore dispersed problems (Palestine, the ungoverned areas, thedictatorships of Syria, Libya etc.)

Planning should begin with the decisiveness of President Bush’s description of the global

war on terror on the USS Lincoln and the wide ranging assertions of the NationalStrategy released Sep tember 20,2002.

The forces today are stretched much further than people in Washington believe.

The num ber of places we could be involved is far larger than anyone in Washingtonwants to contemplate.

The number of people who live in ungoverned areas is far greater and more dangerous

than anyone currently wants to report.

The am ount of money and scale of activity underway in the gray areas (peoplesmuggling, illegal arms deals, illegal international transportation, traditional internationalcrime, and international narcotics) creates a system w ithin which terrorism can operatewhich is far larger, more robust and more agile than anyone contemplates. This darkunderside of globalization is better funded than th e police, more agile than publicbureaucracies and often better equipped technologically.

In 1975 Secretary of Defense Rum sfeld used the facts to convince the post-Viet Nam,

post-Watergate Democratic Congress that the world w as dangerous and defense spendinghad to be increased.

Today a similarly comprehensive, realistic and starkly candid assessment needs to bedeveloped by the Administration and shared with the Congress and with the Americanpeople so they will understand the scale of the threat, the complexity and speed of the

modern world, and the am ount we will have to invest to develop truly effective systemsof national security.

involved for its knowledge but the doctrine for war winning should come from specialists

in policing, urban warfare, and guerrilla operations in the military.

The goal is to give the President the instruments he needs to be able to win if the forces

ofHamas, Islamic Jihad, Al Fatah, etc insist on total war.

IV. Strategic Need 4. Future threats and complex realities rather than lessons learned

from Iraq should define the core ofAmerican intelligence, military and integrated needs

for the next generation.

Iraq and Iran are useful campaigns to study but they have limited application to force size

and structure for the future. The real challenges are in heavier opponents (North Korea, a

rogue Pakistan, Iran) and more dispersed problems (Palestine, the ungoverned areas, the

dictatorships ofSyria, Libya etc.)

Planning should begin with the decisiveness ofPresident Bush's description ofthe global

war on terror on the USS Lincoln and the wide ranging assertions ofthe National

Strategy released September 20,2002.

The forces today are stretched much further than people in Washington believe.

The number ofplaces we could be involved is far larger than anyone in Washington

wants to contemplate.

The number of people who live in ungoverned areas is far greater and more dangerous

than anyone currently wants to report.

The amount ofmoney and scale of activity underway in the gray areas (peoplesmuggling, illegal arms deals, illegal international transportation, traditional international

crime, and international narcotics) creates a system within which terrorism can operate

which is far larger, more robust and more agile than anyone contemplates. This dark

underside of globalization is better funded than the police, more agile than public

bureaucracies and often better equipped technologically.

In 1975 Secretary ofDefense Rumsfeld used the facts to convince the post-Viet Nam,

post-Watergate Democratic Congress that the world was dangerous and defense spending

had to be increased.

Todaya similarly comprehensive, realistic and starkly candid assessment needs to bedeveloped by the Administration and shared with the Congress and with the American

people so they will understand the scale of the threat, the complexity and speed of the

modem world, and the amount we will have to invest to develop truly effective systems

ofnational security.



T h i s m a y b e t h e m o s t d i f f i c u l t c h a l l e n g e w e f a c e a n d i t m a y t a k e m o r e p o l i t i c a l a n db u r e a u c r a t i c c o u r a g e t o c o n f r o n t t h a n a n y o t h e r s t r a t e g i c n e c e s s i t y .

T h e f i f t h s t r a t e g i c n e c e s s i t y i s t o t r a n s f o r m t h e A r m y i n t o a n i n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h i s a t t h e

c e n t e r o f j o i n t n e s s . T h i s i s a m u c h b i g g e r c h a l l e n g e t h a n s i m p l y b r i n g i n g t h e A r m y i n t o

j o i n t n e s s . T h e A r m y ' s i n s t i n c t t h a t c o m p l e x w a r f a r e r e q u i r e s l a n d f o r c e s i s e x a c t l y r i g h t .

T h e A r m y ' s i n s t i n c t t h a t i n t h e e n d a l l t h e o t h e r s e r v i c e s m a y e n d u p s u p p o r t i n g g r o u n d

f o r c e s i s a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y r i g h t .

H o w e v e r t h i s i s a n a r g u m e n t f o r j o i n t n e s s a t t h e h e a r t o f t h e A r m y a n d n o t a t i t s

p e r i p h e r y .

T h i s r e q u i r e s t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f j o i n t t a c t i c s a n d e f f e c t i v e f i r e s s o t h e e n t i r e p r o c e s s

f r o m d a y o n e i s s e a m l e s s l y j o i n t .

T h i s a l s o r e q u i r e s p r o f o u n d l y r e s h a p i n g t h e A r m y ' s p e r s o n n e l s y s t e m t o g e t r i d o f t h e

1 9 1 7 i n d i v i d u a I r e p l a c e m e n t s y s t e m a n d m o v e t o a u n i t p r e p a r e d n e s s s y s t e m m o r e l i k e

t h e N a v y a n d t h e M a r i n e C o r p s .

I f t h e n e w A r m y t e a m i s i n s t r u c t e d t o b e g i n w i t h j o i n t n e s s a n d t h e n t h i n k t h r o u g h t h e

r e d e s i g n o f t h e A r m y a d r a s t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t o u t c o m e w i l l r e s u l t t h a n i f t h e t e a m i s t o l d t o

r e t h i n k t h e A r m y w i t h j o i n t n e s s a s o n e o f t h e g o a l s .

F i r s t c o m e s i m m e r s i o n i n j o i n t n e s s a n d t h e n c o m e s d e s i g n o f t h e n e w 2 1 s t c e n t u r y A r m y .

T h i s i s t h e o n l y w a y t o g e t t o a n e f f e c t i v e j o i n t f o r c e i n t h e n e x t d e c a d e .

T h e s i x t h s t r a t e g i c n e c e s s i t y i s a b r i e f i n g o n t h e f i r s t t w o y e a r s o f t h e w a r a n d w h e r e

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s m u s t g o f r o m h e r e .

T h e f i r s t s t e p i s t o c o m b i n e t h e l e s s o n s l e a r n e d f r o m 9 / 1 1 , A f g h a n i s t a n , a n d I r a q w i t h t h e

e m e r g i n g t h r e a t s a n d r e a l i t i e s a r o u n d t h e w o r l d i n t o a s i n g l e b r i e f i n g f o r t h e c o n g r e s s , t h en e w s m e d i a a n d t h e c o u n t r y .

B e g i n n i n g i n m i d - S e p t e m b e r t h e C o n g r e s s s h o u l d b e t h o r o u g h l y b r i e f e d o n t h e f i r s t t w o

y e a r s o f t h e w a r w i t h t e r r o r i s m a n d w e a p o n s o f m a s s m u r d e r . T h e b r i e f i n g s h o u l d g o o n

t o o u t l i n e t h e c u r r e n t t h r e a t s t o s e c u r i t y a n d t o o u t l i n e t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s s t r a t e g i e s f o r

d e f e a t i n g t h e s e t h r e a t s . F i n a l l y , t h e b r i e f i n g s h o u l d o u t l i n e a p o s i t i v e v i s i o n o f a f u t u r e o f

s a f e t y , h e a l t h , p r o s p e r i t y a n d f r e e d o m f o r a l l p e o p l e i n a w o r l d i n w h i c h t e r r o r i s m a n d

w e a p o n s o f m a s s m u r d e r a r e o p p o s e d a n d d e f e a t e d b y v i r t u a l l y e v e r y o n e i n a s t r a t e g i cc o a l i t i o n o f t h e w i l l i n g .

T h e e n t i r e i n f o r m a t i o n c a m p a i g n o f t h e f u t u r e ( w h i c h h a s t o b e a n i n t e g r a l p a r t o fd e v e l o p i n g t h e I n t e g r a t e d d o c t r i n e a n d s y s t e m m e n t i o n e d i n s t r a t e g i c n e c e s s i t y t w o a b o v e

( s e c o n d c a m p a i g n s ) d e p e n d s o n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n .

This may be the most difficult challenge we face and it may take more political andbureaucratic courage to confront than any other strategic necessity.

V. The fifth strategic necessity is to transform the Army into an institution which is at the

center of jointness. This is a much bigger challenge than simply bringing the Army into

jointness. The A rmy’s instinct that complex warfare requires land forces is exactly right.The A rmy’s instinct that in the end all the other services may end up supporting groundforces is almost certainly right.

However this is an argument for jointness at the heart of the Army and not at itsperiphery.

This requires the development of joint tactics and effective fires so the entire processfrom day one is seamlessly joint.

This also requires profoundly reshaping the Army’s personnel system to get rid of the1917 individual replacement system and move to a unit preparedness system m ore likethe Navy and the M arine Corps.

If the new Army team is instructed to begin with jointness and then think through theredesign of the A rmy a drastically different outcome will result than if the team is told torethink the Army w ith jointness as one of the goals.

First comes immersion in jointness and then com es design of the new 21st century Army.

This is the only way to get to an effective joint force in the next decade.

VI. The sixth strategic necessity is a briefing on the first two years of the war and where

the United States must go from here.

The first step is to combine the lessons learned from 9/11, Afghanistan, and Iraq with theemerging threats and realities around the world into a single briefing for the congress, the

news media and the country.

Beginning in mid-September the Congress should be thoroughly briefed on the first twoyears of the war with terrorism and weapons of mass m urder. The briefing should go onto outline the current threats to security and to outline the President’s strategies fordefeating these threats. Finally, the briefing shou ld outline a positive vision of a fu ture ofsafety, health, prosperity and freedom for all people in a world in w hich terrorism and

weapons o f mass murder are opposed and defeated by virtually everyone in a strategiccoalition o f the w illing.

The entire information campaign of the future (which has to be an integral part ofdeveloping the Integrated doctrine and system m entioned in strategic necessity two above(second campaigns)depends on the development of this presentation.

· ,

This may be the most difficult challenge we face and it may take more political and

bureaucratic courage to confront than any other strategie necessity.

V. The fifth strategie necessity is to transform the Army into an institution which is at the

center of jointness. This is a much bigger challenge than simply bringing the Army into

jointness. The Army's instinct that complex warfare requires land forces is exactly right.

The Army's instinct that in the end all the other services may end up supporting ground

forces is almost certainly right.

However this is an argument for jointness at the heart ofthe Army and not at its

periphery.

This requires the development of joint tactics and effective fires so the entire process

from day one is seamlessly joint.

This also requires profoundly reshaping the Army's personnel system to get rid ofthe

1917 individual replacement system and move to a unit preparedness systemmore like

the Navy and the Marine Corps.

Ifthe new Army team is instructed to begin withjointness and then think through the

redesign of the Army a drastically different outcome will result than if the team is told to

rethink the Army with jointness as one of the goals.

First comes immersion injointness and then comes design ofthe new 21st century Army.

This is the only way to get to an effective joint force in the next decade.

VI. The sixth strategie necessity is a briefing on the first two years of the war and where

the United States must go from here.

The first step is to combine the lessons leamed from 9/11, Afghanistan, and Iraq with the

emerging threats and realities around the world into a single briefing for the congress, the

news media and the country.

Beginning in mid-September the Congress should be thoroughly briefed on the first two

years ofthe war with terrorism and weapons ofmass murder. The briefing should go on

to outline the current threats to security and to outline the President's strategies for

defeating these threats. Finally, the briefing should outline a positive vision of a future of

safety, health, prosperity and freedom for all people in a world in which terrorism and

weapons ofmass murder are opposed and defeated by virtually everyone in a strategiecoalition of the willing.

The entire information campaign ofthe future (which has to be an integral part of

developing the Integrated doctrine and system mentioned in strategie necessity two above

(second campaigns)depends on the development ofthis presentation.



M e m b e r s o f C o n g r e s s , r e p o r t e r s , a n d c i t i z e n s a l l n e e d a c o h e r e n t s i n g l e e x p l a n a t i o n o f

w h a t h a s h a p p e n e d , w h a t w e h a v e l e a r n e d f r o m i t , w h a t t h r e a t e n s u s a n d w h a t w e a r e

g o i n g t o d o a b o u t i t a n d t h e m e t r i c s a p p r o p r i a t e t o m e a s u r e s u c c e s s i n t h e f u t u r e .

I n S e p t e m b e r t h e r e w i l l s t i l l b e g r e a t i n t e r e s t i n t h e l e s s o n s l e a r n e d a n d t h e y a r e t h el o g i c a l h o o k a s a t w o y e a r s a f t e r r e v i e w o f p h a s e o n e o f t h e g l o b a l w a r . B y J a n u a r y t h e

l e s s o n s w i l l b e i n t h e p a s t a n d t h e C o n g r e s s w i l l b e f o c u s e d o n p o l i t i c s a n d e l e c t i o n s .

T h e r e i s a w i n d o w o f a b o u t t h r e e m o n t h s i n w h i c h t h i s c a n b e a c h i e v e d .

T h i s i s p o t e n t i a l l y a n e n o r m o u s m o b i l i z e r o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , s u p p o r t a n d r e s o u r c e s .

W i t h o u t i t p e o p l e w i l l d e v e l o p t h e i r o w n m o d e l s a n d t h e i r o w n m e t r i c s f o r s u c c e s s a n dt h e s i t u a t i o n w i l l b e d r a m a t i c a l l y m o r e m u d d l e d .

V I I . T h e s e v e n t h s t r a t e g i c n e c e s s i t y i s t o e s t a b l i s h a s y s t e m o f D o D d e t a i l e e s t h r o u g h o u t

t h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t a n d w h e r e p o s s i b l e a s o v e r s e a s d e t a c h e d p e r s o n n e l f o r f o r e i g n

g o v e r n m e n t s t o b o t h m a x i m i z e D o D ' s i n f l u e n c e o n d e b a t e s a n d t o m a x i m i z e t h e f l o w o f

i n f o r m a t i o n t o D o D .

I t h a s b e e n a s i g n i f i c a n t m i s t a k e t o y i e l d t h e t e r r i t o r y a t N S C a n d e l s e w h e r e t o t h e S t a t e

D e p a r t m e n t a n d o t h e r i n t e r e s t s . T h e r e s u l t h a s b e e n a m u c h m o r e l i m i t e d r e a c h b y t h eD e f e n s e s y s t e m i n t o t h e p o l i c y m a k i n g a p p a r a t u s .

W h a t i s r e a l l y n e e d e d i s t h e o p p o s i t e a p p r o a c h .

T h e r e s h o u l d b e a c o n s c i o u s s y s t e m a t i c s t r a t e g y f o r s e n d i n g g o o d p e o p l e t o e v e r y p o i n t i nt h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t a n d t o a s m a n y c o n t a c t s w i t h f o r e i g n g o v e r n m e n t s a s p o s s i b l e .

T h i s r e q u i r e s c a r r y i n g e x t r a o f f i c e r s a n d s e n i o r n c o s o n t h e r o l l s b u t i n t h e l o n g r u n i t w i l lp a y a t r e m e n d o u s d i v i d e n d i n c o m m u n i c a t i n g t h e d e f e n s e s y s t e m ' s v i e w s , v a l u e s , a n d

p r a c t i c e s .

. * .Mem bers of C ongress, reporters, and citizens all need a coherent single explanation of

wh at has happened, what we have learned from it, what threatens us and what w e aregoing to do abou t it and the metrics appropriate to m easure success in the future.

In S eptember there will still be great interest in the lessons learned and they are thelogical hook as a two years after review of phase one of the global war. By January the

lessons will be in the past and the Cong ress will be focused on politics and elections.

There is a window of about three months in which this can be achieved.

This is potentially an enormo us mobilizer of understanding, support and resources.Without it people will develop their own mo dels and their own metrics for su ccess andthe situation will be d ramatically more mud dled.

VII. Th e seventh strategic necessity is to establish a system of DoD detailees throughoutthe federal government and where possible a s overseas detached personnel for foreigngovernments to both maximize DoD ’s influence on debates and to maximize the flow of

information to DoD .

It has been a significant mistake to yield the territory at NSC and elsewhere to the StateDepartment and o ther interests. The result has been a much more limited reach by theDefense system into the policy making apparatus.

W hat is really needed is the opposite approach.

There sh ould be a conscious systematic strategy for sending good people to every point inthe federal government and to as many contacts with foreign governm ents as possible.

This requires carrying extra officers and senior ncos on the rolls but in the lon g run t willpay a tremendous dividend in comm unicating the defense system’s views, values, andpractices.

· .

Members ofCongress, reporters, and citizens all need a coherent single explanation of

what has happened, what we have leamed from it, what threatens us and what we are

going to do about it and the metries appropriate to measure success in the future.

In September there will still be great interest in the lessons leamed and they are the

logical hook as a two years after review ofphase one ofthe global war. By January the

lessons will be in the past and the Congress will be focused on politics and eleetions.

There is a window of about three months in whieh this ean be aehieved.

This is potentially an enormous mobilizer ofunderstanding, support and resourees.

Without it people will develop their own models and their own metries for sueeess and

the situation will be dramatieally more muddled.

VII. The seventh strategie neeessity is to establish a system ofDoD detailees throughout

the federal govemment and where possible as overseas detaehed personnel for foreign

govemments to both maximize DoD's influence on debates and to maximize the flow of

information to DoD.

It has been a significant mistake to yield the territory at NSC and elsewhere to the State

Department and other interests. The result has been a mueh more limited reaeh by the

Defense system into the poliey making apparatus.

What is really needed is the opposite approach.

There should be a eonseious systematie strategy for sending good people to every point in

the federal govemment and to as many eontaets with foreign govemments as possible.

This requires earrying extra offieers and senior ncos on the rolls but in the long ron it willpay a tremendous dividend in eommunieating the defense system's views, values, and

praetices.

2003-07-29 to larry di rita re gingrich paper- memo attachment

Documents