2006-07-15 rampart reconsidered: lapd's blue ribbon review panel report (2006)

8/14/2019 2006-07-15 Rampart Reconsidered: LAPD's Blue Ribbon Review Panel Report (2006)

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Blue RibbonRant.part ReviewPane l

POIul ChoirConstance L. RicePOIulMembersJan L. HandzlikLaurie L. LevensonStephen A. MansfieldCarol A SobelEdgar Hugh TwinePOIul Members EmeritiErwin ChemerinskyAndrea OrdinMaurice SuhExecutive DirectorKathleen Salvary

Lead InvestigatorBrent A. BraunAdditional!nvestigatorsEusebio BenavidezMorris D. HayesJack KellerPete McGuireMichael Wolf

AdditiolwlStoffKenneth BerlandJenna CobbJohn MathewsPilar MendozaMargaret MiddletonNatasha SaggarRishi SahgalRegina Tuohy

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Spec ia lThanks

Hon.James K.Hahn

Akin Gump StraussI-Iauer & Feld LLPBurke, Williams& Sorenson, LLPGibson, Dunn& Crutcher LLPHowrey LLPLindahl, Sclmabel,Kardassakis & Beck LLPNossaman GurhnerKnox Elliott LLPO'Meiveny & Meyers LLPOrrick, Herrington& Sutcliffe LLPPaul, Hastings, Janofsky& Walker LLPSidleyAustin LLPSkadden, Arps, Slate,Meagher & Flom LLPThe James IrvineFoundation

Linder & AssociatesLos Angeles PoliceFoundationLos Angeles CityPersonnel DepanmentTechnicalllueatAnalysis Group, Inc.

LAPD Office of theInspector GeneralLatin American LawEnforcementAssociationLaw EnforcementAssociation of Asian PacificsLos Angeles PoliceProtective LeagueOscar Joel BryantFoundation

ChiefWilliam j. Bratton

Corina AlarconHon. Lee BacaAndre Birotte,Jr.Merrick BobbRick j. Caruso

Gerald ChaleffWarren M. ChristopherJohnnie L. Cochran, Jr.Hon. Steve CooleyDavid S. Cunningham IIIHon. Rockard j. DelgadilloDonna DenningRichard E. DrooyanPaul EnoxShelley FreemanJames j. FyfeBonifacio Bonny GarciaMichael j. GennacoGigi GordonMichael P.JudgeE. Richard LarsonBarrett S. LittJohn MackCheryl White MasonWinston K. McKessonHon. Cindy MiscikowskiRose M. DchiAnthony PachecoR. Samuel PazRamon L. QuintanaGilbert TRayHon. Ed P. ReyesLael RubinAnthonyAsad ullah SamadAlex SanchezSilvia SaucedoAlan j. SkobinMichael j. StrumwasserRichard TefankKaren WagenerSam uel Walker

Hon. Jack WeissHon. Debra W. YangRoberta YangGregory A. YatesAll of the dedicatedLAPD officers andemployees ~ ' h o gavetheir timemId insightto this Panel inorder to improtlethe departmetlt.

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This report is dedicated iJl memoriam to Edgar Hugh TwiJle

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Content sI In troduc t ion

9 The Road Ahead9 I . THE RAMPART RECOVERY12 Conclus ion 1.1.

T/It New Rampart Lrodrrsnip on d Crime Fighting A/odrl Would HoVf:Prroented CRASH A/iscondud from Metastasizing into 0 Crisis

13 Conclus ion 1.2.The N _ Rampart Lmdership ondCrime FightingAlodel Hod theFol//jf",ing Kq Attributes

13 Conclus ion 1.3.Tlu New Rampart Lrodrrship on d Crime Fighting A/odrl Hodtlte Following undership Quolities

14 Conc lus ion 1.4.The New Rampart Lmdership ondCrime FightingModel Hodthe Fol/(J(,,,ing Conditions Pll!Udrot

15 Conc lus ion 1.5.TIre New Rampart lLndo-ship and Crime Fighting Mode/Is Nottlte Norm Throughout LAPD

15 Conc lus ion 1.6.The New RBmporf Leadership ondCrime FightingModel Is Unlikely to Lost

16 II . EXTERNAL BARRIERS TO REPLICATING THERAMPART TRANSrORMATION

17 Conclus ion 11.1.Los Angel,s Has An Undffl7sourad, "Thin BIIM Lin," PoliangModel

18 Conclus ion 11.2.TIl' 'Tnin Blu, Lin," Modr/ Suds ProoctM Poliring tnot Dr/MrsContnimnent and Suppl7ssion of Violena in High Crim, Al7os, butNo tPublic Sofety

19 Conclus ion 11.3.Aggll!SsM, Untorgeted ProoetiVt! Poliang Dutroys Publie-Poli Trust

20 Conclus ion 11.4.Th, City Beors Ruponsibilityfo r Foiling to Provid, Ruourrzsfo r a Cifyalide Public Safety Model

20 Conclus ion 11.5.Tne City Has Failed to Heed tile 40 YearOId MtCone CommissionWorning to Fix tn , "SicJn= in tn , CenterofOur City" tnot FuelsPublicPoliu Friction ond Riots

21 Conc lus ion 11.6.Public and Private Institutions Have No t Done Enougn to StabilizeDistl7sSMCommuniti,s

22 Conclus ion 11.7.Communitiu on d Fomiliu Hen;, l\'ot Don, Enougn to Confronton d Counter tne Culture of Violrnu on d Drstruction Otxrtol:ing SomtPoor N,ig/lborilOods

22 Recommenda t i on 11.1.In OrdfftO Inel70u Trust and PubliePolia Coopffotion, LAPD SnouldTransition from ProoctMISuppression Poliring to tnt Hign Rood PoliringDemonstraUd in tile Rnmpdft Division TUl7loround

23 Recommenda t i on 11.2.Tn, City and LAPD SnouldEnd "Tnin Blu, Lin," Poliangond Developo Blu,printfo r Funding on d Providing CityfJI:id, Public Sofety

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23 Recommenda t i on 11.3.The City Should Fulfill the McCone Commission Mandate to End"The Spiml of Failul1!" that Seeds Public-Police Conflict

23 Recommenda t i on 11.4.Public and Privote InstitutionsMust Find and FundMon EffectiveSolutions fo r Improving Conditions in Poor, High Crime Communities

23 Recommenda t i on 11.5.Residents of High Crime Communities Must TaJe Responsibility fo rand Receive Resources Needed to Counter the Cultul1! of Violence

24 III. THE INTERNAL BARRIERS TO REPLICATING THERAMPART TRANSFORMATION: CHANGES NEEDED INLAPD EVEN IF THE EXTERNAL BARRIERS REMAIN

24 Conc lus ion 111.1.Current &forms, While Significant, An Not Sufficient to PreventCOrniption Recurrence, Fix Longstanding Problems or TaJe the RampartTronsformation Department.fJI:ide

25 Conc lus ion 111.2.Supervision Has Improved in Specific Divisions bu tNot Sufficientlyto Prevent Scandal Recurrence

27 Conc lus ion 111.3.Im;estigation Quality Has ImpfVf)ed Significantly, but Remains Uneven

27 Conc lus ion 111.4.Cultuml Factors that Contributed to the CRASH Mindset Remain

30 Conc lus ion 111.5.In Addition to Internal Barriers P o ~ d by Unresolved ProblemsStemmingfrom the CRASH Scandal, Deeper Cultuml Dynamics withinLAPD also BlocJ Solutions to LAPD's Longstanding Problems

34 Conc lus ion 111.6.LAPD Can Fix ItselfWhen Change Agent Officers Drive theTronsformation Process

35 Conclus ion 111.7.The Office of Inspector Generalis the Only LAPD Entity f,I:iththe Potential Capacity to Effectively Enforce LAPD Accountabilityooer the Long Term

35 Conclus ion 111.8.The OIG Currently Operates UnderConstraints that Prevent Itfrom Functioning as the Potent ChteJ It ShouldBe

36 Conclus ion 111.9.Discipline Decisions by the Chief of Police An Important Tools fo rImplementing the PolicingShofJI:casedby the New Rampart Model

37 Conclus ion 111.10.The Federal Court and the Consent Decree Are Central to DepartmentAdvancement and Tmnsformation

38 Recommenda t i on 111.1.LAPD Leoden Nud to Forge a Cleor Consensus among Officento Permanently Tmnsition to the High Rond Policing S h o ' l J . 1 c a ~ d inRampart Division Turnaround

39 Recommenda t i on 111.2.The Police Commission Should Significantly Expand the Indq>cndenceand &sources of the Inspector Geneml

39 Recommenda t i on 111.3.LAPD uaders Should Continue to U Discipline as a Tool fo rImplementing the PolicingShofJI:casedby the New Rampart Model

39 Recommenda t i on 111.4.Federal Court Enforcement of the ConSOlt Deem! Should Continuethe Current Focus on Achieving "Real Reform" to Remedy the UnderlyingCauses of the CRASH Crisis

40 Recommenda t i on 111.5.An ExpeditedJoint Action TasJforce Should Chart Actions Needed to MooeLAPD to High RoadPolicing

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46 The Road Behia.d

50 I. LAPD50 Conclusion I . 1.

UPD IJmltrS K",., ofRmgadr Po/mIlK, ExcIJunxofDI'JIgCn'fus,i" RomportDiWio" o" d its CRASH GO"K V"it Y'OfY 840rr CRitSHCrisis ErlIptl'fi

50 Conclusion 1.2.OtMrCRrlSH U"its Had Sillfilor RI'IIl'gad,SlIblts50 Conclusion 1.3.

UPD IJadtrS DidNot rltll'f{lIlIleJ, rlrlrlrus SPif/ WOfll'iqr ofII/,gol Polia"g Tactics by Romport CRASH Offian 1Jtf0rr tk &OIuialErwpml P"hlidy

51 Conclusion 1.4.Prrzll'nrilOlio"0" 0 Co"Pkts of 1"ll'rrsl U"rlumi lld EfftWe

S I I / ~ r o i s j o " andArrollntability in Romport Division51 Conclusion 1.5.

IVllistlNJlOfan IVllo Inll'rapleJanti Cllallmgtri RomportCRASH OffiunWe" Pl/niWoor Igllo"rI

52 Conclusion 1.6.Evide"aCOlltrols Lorhrl r l d ~ l I o " S o f ~ o n l s to Pmxwt TII,ft

63 Conclusion I. 7.LAPD Paikd to Appronrll 1M IIIfJl!Stigotioll ofDfJlg Thl'ftos 0 Polia COfTllplion Cosl'1I:'iln Syslnnic Implicolions

63 Conclusion 1.8.[,l(e1"1l01 uols JroporrliZl'd Ihl' InfJl!SJigotion ofRofod Pun

......p" '"a-- . . . . ._c II I

54 Conclusion 1.9.UPD's Nomport Tosi Forre Foiletl 10 Desigll 011 l/lvl'SIigaliollAppropriote foro Compla. 1l/l/lJi-lkfmrlonl Polia Corf71ptio/l Ca.Je

54 Conclusion 1.10.As 1M Romport TosJ Fora GTnIJ, AlolI] IIItXSligalofY DidNot HI1fJl!Adl'f{lIlIleSiillsand Experielf to COlldlld Imlesh"galio"s into 0 ComplnPoI'-'e COfTllpriOIl &011001

54 Conclusion 1.11_UPD Foiktl to Ampr Ca.Je !UspotuiIJility /() 0" , I,,'mirillalall' Uyda Tl'OlII AppT"DlKl J101 DiI"tn/ PoaIS. J);rr


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58 Conclus ion 1.18.A Small Il/umMr of LAPD lnustigoton on tne Rampart Task ForcrUndrrminrd tne Criminall1f!)estigations

59 Conc lus ion 1.19.Tne Laci of Cooperation b e t ~ , n LAPD and tne DA's Office HinderedProgress in the Investigations

60 Conc lus ion 1.20.Many Brlieve that j usticr Was II/ot Served

60 Conclus ion 1.21.Conflicts of Intenst Ron througn the Boord of Inquiry

61 Conclus ion 1.22.The Boordof Inquiry Report OmittedCritical Information inIts Discussion of Pcrsonneland Hiring

61 Conclus ion 1.23."Affirmative Action" DidNot Cause tne Rampart CRASH Crisis

62 Conclus ion 1.24.Tne Boom of Inquiry Limitcd l1f!)estigations into tne Extcnt ofMisconduct

62 Conc lus ion 1.25.LAPD Foiled to Issue Follow Up Reports on Incomplete lnustigotion Anos

62 Conclus ion 1.26.LAPD Foiled to Fulfill Its Commitment to Produce on After-Action&porton tire CRASH Crisis

63 Conclus ion 1.27.LAPD Cannot Providean Acceptable Explanationfor tire Failureto Produce tire Aftrr.Action Report

64 Conclus ion 1.28.The Rampart Refotrd Booms of Riglrts Largely Foilrd

65 Conclus ion 1.29.LAPD Foilrd in its Attempt to lnustigote Itzlf in Connection~ , i t n the Rampart CRASH Crisis

66 Recommenda t i on 1.1.The Deportment Should Not Ignon Early Indicoton ofLarger Problems

66 Recommenda t i on 1.2.Develop Conflicts of Interest Policy

66 Recommenda t i on 1.3.ImplementAnti&toliation and Wnistleblower Protections

66 Recommenda t i on 1.4.Dedicate Additional &sources to Protecting Evidence Stomge Facilities67 Recommenda t i on 1.5.

Develop Protocol fo r Investigating Serious PoliceMisconduct Caseas Police COfTUption Cases fJI,itn Systemic Implications

67 Recommenda t i on 1.6.LAPD Should Tmnsfrr Investigation of the Next L a CorruptionCrisis over to a Properly Resourced, Independent, Multi.Agencyl1f!)estigation Force

67 Recommenda t i on 1.7.Prioritize Criminall1f!)estigations

67 Recommenda t i on 1.8.Drjrr Conducting Internal AnolySfl, sucn as the Boord of Inquiry,Until Criminollnustigotions An Lorgrly Completrd

67 Recommenda t i on 1.9.When Conducting on Internal Analysis ofa Lorge.Scole Corruption Crisis,tne Department Snould Conduct an Unlimitrd Assessment of Systems andShould Bring in Outside Experts

68 Recommenda t i on 1.10.Product a Thorougn and Cndible After.Action Reportfo r Public Distribution

68 Recommenda t i on 1.11.The Curnnt Boards of Rights System Should Be Replorrd

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68 II . PROSECUTORIAL AGENCIES68 Conclusion 11.1.

AI IAt Tilllt oflAt CRASH Crisis, 1M DA i Offiu IVaI NoIS.jfItitIlIIJProaehw ilt ils ApproacA locard Polia COlT1lpliolt i . LIn it-gdts CoulJ

69 Conclusion 11.2.TAt D." i Offta DidNot M'fIll1It1J Slaff 1M RH D TosJ Foru Prior10 Ptrn' Dist/oSlIn of IVidtsprtmfCorr.ptio.

69 Conclusion 11.3.TAt DA i Offia's d'uJ Nol Adtqlll1ltly Sloffo.d S.pm;ist IAt Tria/,Pita 01111Sds tq_1 },'tnTogtlhOtlS of RBfad Pnn

70 Conclusion 11.4.TAe IlIltrrogorioll Prouss of h r a Was FJa-J

71 Conclusion 11.5.7k DA i Offitt 1V0ntnfOilier" 10 Drodop I I Fair SllIIulardftlr DtltrMiltiltg cAtlAtr CtlJtVirtitlJlS SAtlMId SllIttd

71 Conclusion 11.6.IlItlllhtrl tl f1M Dil 's Offiu RNall Flittg O v u ~ A t l m t dhy JkScllkoflhCRASH Crisis

71 Conclusion 11.7.TAt DIl 's Spuial Prost.t:Mliolt Ttnm 1I'0nt&1 Hard itt CltalltttgittgEnvironmtnllo PursUt CostS Tltf!)' Tltoug/tl Viuble

72 Conclusion 11.8.AlulIY ProSKulion TtIIm Aftmlxrs Rt.t:1I11u1Bt'ing VnucCl/slomtd10 lilt CllUlkngts ofProsn:uting Polia Offiars

72 Conclusion 11.9.7 'lu DA sOffice Did Nol ApIMar 10 Adequaldy Consider lite Mtllls0/ Tuntillg rlttsf' Cases OV f f to all IlIdtpmdmt Pro=tillg Agmcy

72 Conclusion 11.10.Tht DA's O//iceDid Not Follow Up 011 Al l 0 / P e r t ~ ' Alltgati01ls,in port OteuMSII LAPD Did Nol Submil Full Submissions

",,,,p"""'__ C_'' ' ' . V

73 Conclusion II.11.Th COllltlJ's CNil GraltdJilT] Fuikd 10 Prodll


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79 Recommendat ion 11.2.Prosecutor! Should Develop Mort Robust Checks and IntefUntionson Police Perjury andMiscondut:t

79 Recommendat ion 11.3.ProslXutorial Agencies Should Improve Inter-Agency Coordination

79 Recommendat ion 11.4.A Standing Task Foree Should Be Created ~ , i t h Federal an d LocalAuthorities to Coordinate Investigation of Police Corruption Case

80 Recommendat ion 11.5.Proseeutorial Agrneies Should Improve Trainingfor HandlingPolice Corruption Cases

80 Recommendat ion 11.6.Federal ProSIXutOrs Should Be Prepared to Handle Local Police MisconductCases ~ , i t h o u t Being Gvuly Reliant on DOl Washington

80 Recommendat ion 11.7.The LAPD and the City Attorney's Offict Should Improve InformationDisclosure Proasses

81 Act ions and Solut ions

82 Aftcl 'notcs

Appendices included in separate document

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Conclus ion 1.2.The New Rampart Leadership and Crime Fighting ModelHad the FollowilJg Key AttributesThe Panel ident if ied and officers confirmed th e following keyattributes of the new Rampart leadership and crime fighting model: Crime fighting strategies based on good use of data, adv"Jnced

criminology, and a problem solving policing vision that goesbeyond tactics and arrests.

Critical thinking prized over obedience and rote applicationof rules. Sophisticated use of technology. Problem solving mentality. Firm bu t fair supervision. Officers are rewarded for helping th e community solve

problems that generate crime and enlist ing community helpto fight crime. Officers know how to engage local leaders and community

members in crime prevention and crime fighting withoutalienating or endangering them.

Officers know how to interact professionally and productivelywith gang intervention workers and with gang members.

Officers are taught how to conduct public agency jointplanning, secure priv"Jte sector participation in specific projectsand win corporate backing and donations.

Conclus ion 1.3.The New Rampart Leadership and Crime Fighting Model Hadthe Following Leadership QualitiesAs noted above, excellent supervision was a c ri tic al factor in th eRampart Division's success. TIle supervisors who transformed theRampart Division share anum ber o f leadership qualities. All of th esupervIsors: Use inspirational leadership that sets clear expectations, invests

in officers and treats them humanely and fairly. Do not micromanage bu r advise and help officers succeed. Have high persuasion abilities, assess people accurately and

navig'Jte department politics well. Are fluent in the LAPD culture and unders tand what is good

about it and what has been bad about it. Have evolved beyond old culmre's negative aspects like th e

bunker menta li ty , b lind loyalty, "ends justify the means"thinking, toleration of bnnal and harsh tactics, and "search anddestroy" policing that alienates the community.

Have replaced traditional "u s versus them" xenophobia withcollaboration and a joint planning mindset.

Have a substantive policing background that has earned th erespect of rank and file by promoting after doing actual streetwork and no t promoting dispropor tionately through paperknowledge and tests .

Know officers' strengths and weaknesses and how to put themin jobs they will be good at .

Know which officers will create good teams that solve problems. Cross barriers raised by rank, LAPD hierarchies, specialized

units and cliques to find the smartes t problem solvers withrecords of effective crime fighting.

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PERFORMANCE EVA LUAT IONS

Prior reports nored serious defICiencies in LAPD performance evaluations. Interviewees for this report repeated thc samc obsen-J'tions that useful evaluation is rare (0 non-existent. Thc taskforceshould untangle the structural and cultul""JllYJITiers to solving thislongstanding critical path problem or find anothcr systcm fordcfining success and evaluating performmce.RETAL IAT ION AND WH IS TL EB LOWER PROTEC TIO N

In !:ate 2005, LArD drafted and issued the departmcnt's first antiretal iation pol icy with whistleblo\l"er protection systems.Implementation of the policy should resoh'e conflicting \iews ofthe existence . definit ion and scope of retaliation. The policyshould be vetted by outside experts who ha\'c studicd thisproblem. and it should be c10sdy monitored for effectiveness andfor abuse by officers seeking (0 use the policy as a shield a ~ i n s tdeserved discipline and for adequacy of enforcement staff(currently only two sergeants have this dUlY). I\t thc samc time,LAPD needs to examine how its systems for job hiring, disciplineand promotion get hijacked (0 support retaliation against officersviewed as disloyal or orherwise labeled as rejects. 'laskforcemembers should ex.:tlnine the capacity, skills and ph.ccmcnt of staffassigned to CJrry oU[ [he new retaliation policy.CONFL ICTS

The problems with conflicts within LArD arc discussed in detailThe Road Behind section of this report. The taskforce shouldexamine current conflicts policies and dcvelop a conflicts policylhat ends the kind of alarming conflicrs documented in lhis report.

RAC IAL TENS ION

The taskforce should examine internal racial rifts and find ways (0decode and defuse them with cr


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80 ......part....,"""',da_".. ~ . ... .....Recommendat ion 11.5.Prosect/tonal Agencies Should Improve Training/or Handling PoliceCorruption Cases

on DO] Washington. 1lle local U.S. Attorney's Office should beable to respond to police misconduct cases as quickly as possible inany manner it deems appropriate.

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As discussed above, many of t he D ep uty DAs working on theRampart CRASH prosecutions found themselves unprepared forthe unique challenges attendant to prosecuting police officers. TheDistrict Attorney's Off ice should develop a protocol for Investigating and prosecuting large-scale police corruption cases.Moreover, th e District Attorney's Office should improve its trainingfor handling police corruption case s. All members of th e DistrictAttorney's Office should receive training regarding t he unique challenges of investigating and prosecuting law enforcement officers.This training should include case stud ies and presentations by prosecutors who have handled police corruption cases, including thosewho handled the Rampart CRASH cr imina l cases . The trainingshould also include discussion of how to effectively use the grandjut)' in investigating suspected officer perjut)' and other misconduct.In addition, the training should address th e unique LybargerlCarrityproblems that arise in police misconduct cases. Moreover, th e DA'sOffice should develop protocols for taking pleas and granting immu-nity for testimony that may implicate federal offenses.Federal prosecutors and investigators should receive ongomgtraining on th e operations of t he LAPD so they can respond quicklyto allegations of police misconduct.

Recommendat ion 11.6.Federal Prosect/tors Should Be Prepared to Handle Local PoliceMisC01Jduct Cases without BeiNg Overly Reli(J1Jt ON DOl WashiNgtoNThe U. S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles should be a le rt and beprepa red to handle police misconduct cases involving LAPD orother local law enforcement agencies without being overly reliant

Recommendat ion 11.7.The LAPD and the City Attorney's Office Should Improve In/ormationDisclosure ProcessesIn order to address th e concerns about Brady and Pitc!uss motionsdiscussed above, the LAPD and City Attorney's Office shouldexpedite th e release of materials ordered disclosed by th e court andensure that they are produced in a complete and organized manner.Moreover, LAPD must provide adequate and confidential access toits f iles for Deputy District Attorneys and their investigators.

. . . . . .pa r t ...,. . . . . .da_ ... .. o .... . . . . . . . . . . 8 1

Act ionsAnd So lu t ions

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CIiII Wili. . J. B.-mn,P1i1r.a.Il .,:!APO(All: ilnisin Br.ICllt,J 1. ZlIl4)

Iwanted to come back into policing. particularly ina large city. to show that police do count. Secondly.however. was the missed opportunity of New York City.where we got crime down so dramatically. we showedthat with the right am ount of police. policing in anappropriate fashion. you could not only reduce crime, butyou could improve relations, particularly with the minor-ity community, at the same time ... You can have it bothand at the same time. And I desperately want to be ableto prove that concept. Because we have been the flashpoint we the police, for most of the racial violence inthe past century. Wouldn't it be wonderful if we were infact ~ catalyst for ~ healing?

This section of the report is blank because while this Panel canpoint out missed issues, st3te findings ~ m suggest recommend;:t-tions, it cannot draft proposals to change LAPD systems that will beaccepted by th e rank an d file an ddepartment leadership. Those changesmust be co-developed with LAP D 'sleaders ~ m officers who underst;:md th edirection that th e department mustmove to chart its best future.TIle Pand has r ecommended tha t thePolice Commission direct the Chief ofPolice to immediately appoint an dcharge an Action Taskforce of LAPDchange agents who already are forgingsignificant changes in LAPD operat ion s and culture, leaders of the rankand file and outside experts to co-draftwith th e Panel th e blueprint thataddresses the issues outlined in thisreport. That blueprint will become th eact ion agenda and text for this sectionand the final cha pter of Chief Bratton'sPlan ojActionjor the Los Angeles That Isand the Los Angeles That Could Be. Then the work that will checkcorruption, fix LAPD's longstanding problems and permanentlyse t a course toward th e policing showcased in th e Rampart transformation can begin.


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104. They explained that in instances where Perez admined to committingperjury regarding thOISe drug offenses., those instances would be in the Brodydatabase. However. narcotia; offenses that did not implicate theft or perjury orsome other act of "moral turpitude" would not be included.105. The California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice. which was

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created by the California Senate in 2004. has been charged with: reviewing th ead ministration ofcriminal justice in California and determining the extent towhich that process has failed in the past. resulting in wrongful executions or thewrongful convictions; examining ways of providing safeguards to prevent theconviction of the innocent; and making recommendations for improling the fairadministration of criminal justice in California. The Commission has stated thatit wj]] make recommendations regarding witness misidentification; false confes-sions; use of jailhouse informants; incompetence of defense counsel: prosecutorialmisconduct; problems with scientifIC evidence; and th e fair administration of th edeath penalry.

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2006-07-15 rampart reconsidered: lapd's blue ribbon review panel report (2006)

Documents