2008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos

56Sec. 1, Art. IIINo person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of lawnor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTYInherent in sovereignty, and therefore not even required to be conferred by the Constitution, are the police, eminent domain, and taxation powers. The Bill of Rights, notably the due process, equal protection and non-impairment clauses, is a means of limiting the exercise of these powers by imposing on the State the obligation to protect individual rights. The Bill of Rights is addressed to the State, notably the government, telling it what it cannot do to the individual.

A. DUE PROCESS OF LAWThat which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.Applies to all persons, without regard to any difference in race, color or nationalityArtificial persons—covered but only insofar as their property is concerned.Extends to aliensIncludes the means of livelihood“Responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.”(Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association vs. City of Manila, 20 SCRA849)Life—includes the right of an individual to his body in its completeness, free from dismemberment, and extends to the use of God-given faculties which make life enjoyable.Liberty—includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. x x x It includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660)Property—is anything that come under the right of ownership and be the subject of contract. It represents more than the things a person owns; it includes the right to secure, use and dispose of them. Public office is not a property which one may acquire a vested right, it is nevertheless a protected right. (Bince vs. COMELEC, 218 SCRA 782)

Scope/Aspects of Due Process:1. Procedural Due e Process—the method or manner by which the law is enforced. It serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of the government.Requisites: (non-criminal cases)a. An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine matter before it;b. Jurisdiction properly acquired over person of defendant and over property which is the subject matter of the proceeding;c. Opportunity to be heard; andd. Judgment rendered upon lawful hearing and based on evidence adduced.

Impartial Court or Tribunal—Judges must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.

In Anzaldo vs. Clave—Jacobo Clave, acting as Chairman of CSC, rendered a decision against petitioner. When petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, the same Jacobo Clave, but this time acting as Presidential Executive Assistant, upheld his own earlier decision. The SC held that this violates fundamental fairness required by due process. A public officer who decided the case should not be the same person to decide it on appeal because he cannot be an impartial judge.

People vs. Mendenilla (2001), judges have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence, and have the duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses and address the points overlooked by counsel. Questions which merely clear up dubious points and elicit relevant evidence are within the prerogative of a judge to ask.

Sec. 14 (1), Art. III—No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. ---This is procedural due process in criminal casesRequisites of Criminal Due Process:a. Accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction;b. Accused is proceeded against under the orderly processes of law;c. Accused is given notice and opportunity to be heard;d. Judgment rendered within authority of constitutional lawIf the prosecution produces the conviction based on untrue evidence, then it is guilty of depriving the accused of due process. Thus false testimony can be questioned by the accused regardless of the time that lapsed.(Mejia vs. Pamaran, No. L-56741, April 15, 1988)

2. Substantive Due Process—it requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable and just. This serves as a restriction on the government’s law and rule-making powers; a prohibition of arbitrary laws.

The heart to substantive due process is the “reasonableness”, or the absence of exercise of arbitrary power. These are necessarily relative concepts which depend on the circumstances of every case.

As a general rule, when the State acts to interfere with life, liberty, or property, the presumption is that the action is valid. In rare cases, as in “prior restraint”, there is a presumption of invalidity.

Requisites:a. Interest of the public;

b. Means employed are reasonably necessary for accomplishment of purpose and not unduly oppressive.

The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest,arbitrarily interfere with private business or impose unusual and unnecessaryrestrictions upon lawful occupations.

Void-for-vagueness Rule—a criminal statute that fails to give a person ofordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by thestatute, or is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictionsis void for vagueness. The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is theinjustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he isgiven no fair warning.

A law is “vague” as not to satisfy the due process need for notice when it lackscomprehensible standards that “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess asto its meaning and differ as to its application” or is so indefinite that “it encouragesarbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.”It is injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature ofwhich he is given no fair warning.It is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 aspects:1. It violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the partiestargeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and2. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisionsand become an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.The act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified byeither saving clause or by construction. (People vs. Dela Piedra, 350 SCRA 163,January 24, 2001)

Overbreadth Doctrine—decrees that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area ofprotected freedoms.Facial Challenge—a facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statuteand to one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon protectedspeech.“On its face” invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on theground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities areconstitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversyrequirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concretefactual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.

Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986), Motion for reconsideration. xxx[T]he clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not tothe requirement of publication itself, w/c cannot in any event be omitted. This clausedoes not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately uponapproval, or on any other date, w/o its previous publication.Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretionprovide that the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or extended.It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may bedispensed w/ altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due processinsofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to governit.

Conclusive presumption of knowledge of the law.-- The conclusive presumption thatevery person knows the law presupposes that the law has been published if thepresumption is to have any legal justification at all.The term laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of generalapplication, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there aresome that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to aparticular individual, like a relative of Pres. Marcos who was decreed instantnaturalization.

RULE: All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shallbe published as a condition for their effectivity, w/c shall begin 15 days after publicationunless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.Coverage: Covered by this rule are PDs and EOs promulgated by the Pres. inthe exercise of legislative powers. Administrative rules and regulations must also bepublished if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a validdelegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, i.e., regulating onlythe personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued byadministrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by theirsubordinates in the performance of their duties.Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose isto inform the public of the contents of the laws. The mere mention of the numberof the PD, the title of such decree, its whereabouts, the supposed date ofeffectivity, and in a mere supplement of the OG cannot satisfy the publicationrequirement. This is not even substantial compliance.Publication of laws is part of substantive due process. It is imperative to the validity oflaws, PDs, EOs, Administrative rules and regulations except interpretative legislations.(Tañada vs. Tuvera, No. L-63915, December 29, 1986)

Notes: In the original case Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985), the SC ruled thatas a matter of substantive due process, any law must be published before the people can beexpected to observe them. But, according to a split decision, publication need not be madein the Official Gazette. It is enough that it be published in a newspaper of general circulation.After the EDSA revolution, upon the reconstitution of the SC, the originaljudgment was reconsidered, and the SC now ruled that publication must be made in theOfficial Gazette, pursuant to CA 638 and the Civil Code, unless a law "provides otherwise"that is, a different mode of publication.What must be published are (1) all laws of general application, and even those not ofgeneral application like (2) private laws affecting only particular individuals, e.g., legislativegrant of citizenship, (3) laws of local application, and (4) rules and regulations of asubstantive character. This means not only the title but the entire law. When? Forthwith, thatis, immediately. Where? Only in the Official Gazette

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion (2000), an extraditee is not entitled to notice andhearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. PD 1069 affords anextraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition isfiled in court. During the evaluation stage, right to know is withheld to accommodate themore compelling interest of the State—to prevent escape of potential extradite whichmay be precipitated by premature information on the basis of the request for extradition.

Roxas vs. Vasquez (2001), lack of notice to, participation of complainants at theREINVESTIGATION does not render the resolution of the Ombudsman null and void.(But in preliminary investigation, their participation is needed.)

Exceptions to Notice and Hearing RequirementsPhilcomsat vs. Alcuaz (1989)—without conducting any hearing, NTC orderedPHILCOMSAT to reduce its rates by 15%. PHILCOMSAT challenged the validity of theorder on the ground that it is an exercise of a quasi-judicial power without the requiredhearing. NTC replied that the order was merely interlocutory. The SC held that fixingrates is quasi-judicial in nature. Hence, unlike in the exercise of quasi-legislative power,it must be preceded by a hearing. The fact of the order being merely interlocutory doesnot alter the situation because for all practical purposes it is final as to the periodcovered.

BUT, in Radio Communications vs. NTC (1990)—the Court upheld the temporaryrates granted by the NTC asserting that the law allows the NTC to approve temporaryrate requested by public service agency provided hearings are held within 30 daysthereafter.As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of proceduraldue process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its QUASIJUDICIALfunction.In the exercise of its EXECUTIVE or LEGISLATIVE functions, such as issuing rules andregulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice andhearing.

Suntay vs. People (1957)—the passport of a person sought for the commission of acrime may be cancelled without notice and hearing.Equitable Banking Corp. vs. Calderon, G.R. No. 156168, December 14, 2004, the Scruled that no malice or bad faith attended the Bank’s dishonor of Calderon’s credit card,inasmuch as the dishonor was justified under its Credit Card Agreement which providedthat the cardholder agreed not to exceed his approved credit limit, otherwise the cardprivilege would be automatically suspended without notice to the cardholder.Appeal and due process—Appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process; generally, it may beallowed or denied by the legislature in its discretion. But where the Constitution gives aperson the right to appeal, denial of the right to appeal constitutes a violation of dueprocess. Where there is statutory grant of the right to appeal, denial of that remedy alsoconstitutes a denial of due process.Preliminary Investigation and due process—Preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a rightconferred by statute (Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28,2003). It may be waived expressly or by failure to invoke it (Benedicto vs. CA, G.R.No. 125359, September 4, 2001). The right may be forfeited by inaction, and cannot beinvoked for the first time on appeal (People vs. Lagao, G.R. No. 118457, April 8,1997).Go vs. CA, 206 SCRA 138, when there is statutory grant of the right topreliminary investigation, denial of the same is an infringement of the due processclause. The right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal ortechnical. To deny it to the petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right todue process. (Yusop vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 138859-60, February 22, 2001)Prejudicial Publicity—

To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proofthat the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by thebarrage of publicity. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity…because these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. (Webb vs. De Leon,1995)

Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counselduring an administrative inquiry?

No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing andin the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodialinvestigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in acriminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry.While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin toa criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in anadministrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the natureof charges and of the respondent’s capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests onsuch body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an administrativeproceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not.Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations becausesuch inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that meritdisciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose ofmaintain the dignity of government service.The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by theConstitution or law. (Lumiqued vs. Exevea, 282 SCRA 125)

Is an extraditee entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrantof arrest once the petition for extradition is filed in court? Both on statutory and constitutional grounds, the answer is “no”. In Government ofUSA vs. Hon. Puruganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002:1. On the basis of Extradition LawSec. 6 of PD 1069—Extradition Law, uses the word “immediate” to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered “immediate”. The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of impairing a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant or arrest should be issued.By using the phrase “if it appears”, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such an early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression—aprima facie finding—sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.

2. On the basis of the ConstitutionEven Sec. 2 of Article III does not require a notice and hearing before theissuance of a warrant of arrest.To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitutionitself requires only examination--under oath or affirmation—of complainants andthe witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear theaccused before the issuance of warrant of arrest.

B. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE—The equal protection of the law is embraced in the concept of due process, asevery unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It hasnonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Section 1 of Article III to provide fora more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from thegovernment. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due processclause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality orprejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.It simply requires that all persons or things, similarly situated should be treatedalike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in otherwords, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustlydiscriminate against others.It does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or thingswithout distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where,for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, wouldbenefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requiresis equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Byclassification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certainparticulars and different from all others in these same particulars. (Philippine Judges

Who are protected—all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Natural and juridical personsare entitled to this guarantee; but with respect to artificial persons, they enjoy theprotection only insofar as their property is concerned.Scope:Political, Economic and Social Equality

In Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937), the SC upheld the validity ofthe law which nationalized the retail trade. For the protection of the law can beobserved by the national interest.But there are areas where aliens cannot be kept away for the simple reason thatthey cannot be deprived of a common means of livelihood, especially when they areadmitted to the country as immigrants.Valid Classification:Persons or things ostensibly similarly situated may, nonetheless, be treateddifferently if there is a basis for valid classification. The requisites are:1. Classification must be based on substantial distinctions which make for realdifferences;2. The distinction must be germane to the purpose of the law—the distinctions which

are the bases for the classification should have a reasonable relation to the purpose ofthe law;3. Not limited to existing conditions only; and4. It must apply to all members of the same class.

Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, The withdrawal of frankingprivileges formerly granted to the judiciary but remained with the executive andlegislative departments, was declared unconstitutional, because the three branches ofgovernment are similarly situated.Villegas vs. Hui Chiong, the ordinance imposing a work permit fee of P50.00 upon allaliens desirous of obtaining employment in the City of Manila was declaredunconstitutional, because the fee imposed was unreasonable and excessive, and itfailed to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens whowere required to pay it.

Sexual DiscriminationPhil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386, female domesticworking abroad were in a class by themselves because of the special risks to whichtheir class was exposed.Administration of JusticeChavez vs. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1988, Special grant of exemption infavor of the Marcoses as contained in the agreement entered into by PCGG withMarcos Family to compromise the ill-gotten wealth cases (exempt from all taxes) filedby the former against the latter is a CLASS LEGISLATION, vilative of the equalprotection clause.Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999, petitioner’s andintervenor’s right to equal protection was not violated by the enactment of RA 8249because the law was not directed only to Kuratong Baleleng cases. Every classificationmade by law is presumed reasonable, and the party who challenges the law mustpresent proof of arbitrariness.Public PolicyCeniza vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763, The law excluding residents of Mandaue Cityfrom voting for provincial candidates was justified “as a matter of legislative discretion”and that equal protection would be violated only if group within the city were allowed tovote while others were not.

Olivares vs. Sandiganbayan, 248 SCRA 700, when the mayor issued permit in favorof unidentified vendors while imposing numerous requirements upon Baclaran CreditCooperatives, he violated the equal protection clause when failed to show that the twowere not similarly situated.Tiu vs. CA, G.R. No. 127410, January 20, 1999, the executive order granting tax andduty incentives only to business and residents within the “secured area” of SubicSpecial Economic Zone and denying them to those who live within the zone but outsidesuch “fenced in” territory is VALID.The Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents. It is enoughthat all persons under like circumstances or conditions are given the same privilegesand required to follow the same obligations.Classification based on valid and reasonable standards does not violate theequal protection clause.International School Alliance of Educators vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845,June 1, 2000, there were no reasonable distinctions between the services rendered by“foreign-hires” and “local-hires” as to justify the disparity in salaries paid to thoseteachers.

Relative Constitutionality:Central Bank Employees Association vs. BSP, G.R. No. 148208, December 15,2004, the constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by amere comparison of its provisions of the Constitution since the statute may beconstitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in application to another.A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of alteredcircumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary orconfiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open toinquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.In Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), the SC upheld the validity of sec. 4 ofBatas Blg. 52 disqualifying retired elective local officials who have received retirementbenefits and would have been 65 years old at the start of the term. It does not violateequal protection, for it gives younger blood the opportunity to run the local government.In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), however, the disqualification of candidatesconvicted or simply charged with national security offenses was struck down asunconstitutional, for violating the presumption of innocence and thus ultimately theequal political protection.

Sec. 2, Article IIISearches and SeizuresThe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effectsagainst unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for anypurpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shallissue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge afterexamination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses hemay produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and thepersons or things to be seized.

Scope: The protection is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused ofcrime or not. Artificial persons are also entitled to the guarantee, although they may berequired to open their books of accounts for examination by the State in the exercise ofpolice and taxing powers.The right is personal; it may be invoked only by the person entitled to it(Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383). As such, the right may be waived eitherexpressly or impliedly, but the waiver must be made by the person whose right isinvaded, not by one who is not duly authorized to effect such waiver. (People vs.Damaso, 212 SCRA 457)

SEARCH WARRANT—may be said to particularly describe the things to be seizedwhen the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; orwhen the description expresses a conclusion of fact, not of law, by which the warrantofficer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things describedare limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant isbeing issued.WARRANT OFARREST—said to particularly describe the person to be seized if itcontains the name of the person to be arrested.

Requisites of a valid warrant:1. It must be based upon probable cause—such facts and circumstancesantecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient toinduce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof.It consists of a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstancessufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing accused to becommitting the offense or to be guilty of the offense. For a search warrant—such facts and circumstances which would lead areasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committedand that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought tobe searched. (Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800) For a warrant of arrest—such facts and circumstances which would lead areasonably and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by theperson sought to be arrested (Webb vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23,1995)

In Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 385 (1967), 42 search warrants were issuedfor alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, the Tariff and Customs Code, the NIRC, andthe Revised Penal Code. The SC voided the warrants on the ground that it wasimpossible for the judge to have found probable cause in view of the number of lawsalleged to have been violated by the petitioner. How could he even know whatparticular provision of each law had been violated? If he did not know this, how could itbe determined if the person against whom the warrant was issued was probably guiltythereof? In truth, this was a fishing expedition, which violated the sanctity of domicileand privacy of communications. To establish the requirement of probable cause, therule is: One crime, one warrant.

2. The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge.The judge shall:a. Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documentssubmitted by the public prosecutor regarding the existence of probablecause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; orb. If the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard theprosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavitsof witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence ofprobable cause.Under the 1987 Constitution, only a judge can issue a warrant; the offensive andmuch abused phrase "and other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" in the1973 Constitution has been removed.

Search warrant Warrant of arrest The judge must personally examined in the form of searching Q&As, in writing and under oath, the complainantand any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them. The determination of probable cause depends to a large extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge who It is not necessary that the judge should personally examine thecomplainant and his witnesses; the judge would simply personally review the initial determination of theprosecutor to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. Judge determines the probability, not the certainty, of the guilt of the accusedconducted the required examination of the applicant and the witnesses. and, in so doing, he need not conduct ade novo hearing.

3. The determination must be made after examination under oath or affirmation ofthe complainant and the witnesses he may produce.The examination conducted by the judge takes the form of searching questions.The requirement that the judge must personally examine the complainantand his witnesses means that the actual examination cannot be delegated to someoneelse, like the clerk of court.

So said the Court in Bache and Co. (Phil) v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971).In this case, when the BIR agent and his witnesses arrived in court in the middle of ahearing, the judge suspended the hearing and directed the branch clerk to examine andtake the testimony of the witnesses in his chambers. After he was through with thehearing, he went back to his chambers and finding that the examination was finished,

asked the BIR agent and his witnesses if they affirmed what they what they testified to,after which he issued the search warrant in question.The determination of the reasonableness of the judicial warrant must be basedon the affidavit of one who has personal knowledge of the facts to which he testifies.The testimony cannot be based on mere belief. Neither can it be based on a report.Otherwise, the warrant is void.

Thus, in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, (1984), reiterating the 1937 case ofRodriguez v. Villamiel, the testimony based on a military report that the newspaper WeForum was used for subversive were held to be not a personal knowledge and so wasinadmissible.

Likewise, in Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541 (1985), the testimony based oninvestigation reports that certain items in the Philippine Times were subversive wereheld to be not personal knowledge, and thus the search warrant issued was not valid.

4. It must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or thingsto be seized.Search warrant Warrant of arrest The description of the property to beseized need not be technically accuratenor necessarily precise, and its nature willnecessarily vary according to whether theidentity of the property or its character is amatter of concern; the description is General warrants are proscribed andunconstitutional. However, a John DoeWarrant (a warrant for the apprehensionof a person whose true name is unknown)satisfies the constitutional requireme3nt ofparticularity if there is some descriptiorequired to be specific only insofar as thecircumstances will allow.personae which will enable the officer toidentify the accused.Failure to state with particularity the place to be searched and items to be seizedmakes the warrant used for fishing evidence (a general warrant) which is void.

In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, the description which read "subversive documents,leaflets, papers to promote the objective of the Movement for a Free Philippines, theLight a Fire Movement, and the April 6 Movement" were held not to be particulardescriptions, thus making the warrant a general warrant.

In Corro v. Lising, the search and seizure of "printed copies and dummies ofPhilippine Times, subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets,banners, and typewriters, tape recorders, etc." was again invalidated for the descriptionwas not at all particular or specific, thus making the warrants general warrants.When it comes to printed matters, the offensive material need not be set out infull. It is enough if it specifies the issues and the title of the articles. The instruction toseize "subversive materials" is not valid because the determination of whether amaterial is subversive or not is not for the police officer to decide; no unfettereddiscretion must be granted to him.The matter is different if goods were searched and seized because of theirintrinsic quality (as when they are stolen or smuggled), than if the goods were searchedfor the ideas they contain (as when a "subversive newspaper is sought). In the lattercase, a more detailed description of the physical features of the item is required to avoiddelegating the appreciation of ideas, and thus threaten free expression.

Properties subject to Seizure:1. Property subject of the offense;2. Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and3. Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.Permissible Area of Search

In People vs. Hindoy, G.R. No. 132662, May 10, 2002, the warrantless search andseizure as an incident to a lawful arrest may extend beyond the person of the onearrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.Admissibility of Illegally Seized EvidenceArticles illegally seized are not admissible as evidence. The rule has beenconstitutionally affirmed in Section 3(2), Article III, which provides that such evidence “shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.” Such evidence is the fruit ofthe poisonous tree. However, it is submitted that it may nonetheless be used in thejudicial or administrative action that may be filed against the officer responsible for itsillegal seizure.It has also been held that where the accused did not raise the issue of theadmissibility of the evidence against him on the ground that it had been illegally seized,such omission constitutes a waiver of the protection granted by Section 3, and theillegally seized evidence could then be admitted against him. (People vs. Exala, 221SCRA 494)

WARRANTLESS ARREST—1. When a person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is

attempting to commit an offense;2. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believebased on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to bearrested has committed it; and3. When the person to be arrested is an escapee or a detention prisoner. (Section5, Rule 113, Rules of Criminal Procedure)The Rule requires that the accused perform some overt act that would indicatethat he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.The officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about tocommit an offense must have personal knowledge of the fact. The offense must also becommitted in his presence or within his view. (People vs. Tudtud & Bolong, G.R. No.144037, September 26, 2003)

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES(a) When search is made of moving vehiclesThe reason is the person may escape easily if a warrant has to be applied forthe mean time. In the Tariff and Customs Code, customs agents are specificallyauthorized to search and seize vehicles even without a warrant.Checkpoints are valid in some instances depending on the purpose (e.g.apprehend a suspected criminal) and the circumstances (e.g. probable cause that thecriminal is inside the car). There is no question that when a child has been reportedkidnapped in a community, the police can stop all cars and check if the detained child isin any one of them.(b) When search is an incident to a valid arrest.

Rule 126, Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest-- A person lawfullyarrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used asproof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.A person arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything thatproves the commission of the offense. It follows that the search can only be madewithin the area of control of the arrested person, and within the time of the arrest.

In Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, 139 SCRA 152 (1985), Milagros Roque and CynthiaNolasco were arrested at the intersection of Mayon and Margal Streets in QC at 11:30a.m., having been wanted as high officers of the CPP. At 12:00 noon, Roque'sapartment located 2 blocks away, was searched and some documents seized. The SCat first held that the search was valid even if the warrant issued was void for failing todescribe with particularity the things to be seized, because it was an incident of a validarrest.But after the EDSA revolution, the reconstituted SC granted the motion forreconsideration and held that just because there was a valid arrest did not mean thatthe search was likewise valid. To be valid, the search must be "incidental" to the arrest,i.e., not separated by time or place from the arrest. If the basis for allowing incidentalsearches is looked into, one can see that this situation is not one involving a validincidental search.The law allows the arresting officer to search a person validly arrested (byfrisking him for instance) because (1) a weapon held by the arrested person may beturned against his captor and (2) he may destroy the proof of the crime, if the arrestedofficer has to first apply for a search warrant from a judge.If, in the Nolasco case, the search was conducted 30 minutes after the arrest,there is no longer any danger that the captured may turn against the captor; and if thedocuments in the apartment were 2 blocks away, the search would no longer bejustified since there is no way for Roque to go back to the apartment and destroy thedocuments, having been arrested already.

In People vs. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432, while a contemporaneous searchof a person arrested may be effected to discover dangerous weapons or proofs orimplements used in the commission of the crime and which search may extend to thearea within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon orevidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search. The process cannotbe reversed.In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines thevalidity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majorityof these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting asearch. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before asearch can be made—the process cannot be reversed.

In the case of People vs. Go, 354 SCRA 338 (2001), the police saw the guntucked in appellant’s waist when he stood up. The gun was plainly visible. No searchwas conducted as none was necessary. Accused-appellant could not show any licensefor the firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was in effectcommitting a crime in the presence of the police officers. No warrant of arrest wasnecessary in such a situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under theRules.As a consequence of appellant’s valid warrantless arrest, he may be lawfullysearched for dangerous weapons or anything which may used as proof of thecommission of an offense, without a search warrant, as provided in Rule 126, Section

12. This is a valid search incidental to a lawful arrest. The subsequent discovery in hiscar of drug paraphernalia and the crystalline substance, which, was later identified as

shabu, though in a distant place from where the illegal possession of firearms wascommitted, cannot be said to have been made during an illegal. As such, the seizeditems do not fall within the exclusionary clause. Hence, not being fruits of the poisonoustree, the objects found at the scene of the crime, such as the firearm, the shabu and thedrug paraphernalia, can be used as evidenced against appellant. Besides, it has beenheld that drugs discovered as a result of a consented search is admissible in evidence.

In People vs. Molina, 352 SCRA 174 (2001), to constitute a valid in flagrantedelito arrest, two (2) requisites must concur: 1) the person to be arrested must executean overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or isattempting to commit a crime; and 2) such overt act is done in the presence or withinthe view of the arresting officer.

In People vs. Estrella, G.R. Nos. 138539-40, January 21, 2003, the arrestingofficer may take from the arrested individual any money or property found upon thelatter’s person that which:1. Was used in the commission of the crime;2. Was the fruit of the crime;3. May provide the person arrested with the means of committing violence orescaping;4. May be used in evidence in the trial of the case.The search, however, must be contemporaneous to the arrest and made within apermissible area of search.Requisite: the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause ineffecting the arrest which could be considered as one in cadence with the instances ofpermissible arrest enumerated in Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

In the case of People vs. Montilla, G.R. No. 123872, January 30, 1998, theofficer could reasonably assume—since the informant was by their side and had soinformed them and pointed out the culprit—that the drugs were in the appellant’sluggage, and it would have been irresponsible, if not downright absurd, for them toadopt a “wait-and-see” attitude at the risk of eventually losing their quarry.(c) When things seized are within plain view of a searching party

People vs. Hedishi Suzuki, G.R. No. 120670, October 23, 2003, whenever the rightagainst unreasonable search and seizure is challenged, an individual may choosebetween invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent tothe search and seizure. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixedformula but is to be resolved according to the facts of the case.

Plain View Doctrine—finds application only when the incriminating nature of the objectis in the “plain view” of the police officer.The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an intrusion or properly be in aposition from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawfulintrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed tosight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the objectseized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and thereforecannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents,whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious toan observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, ifthe package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that itcontains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must beimmediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence ofa crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. (People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA668)

Requisites:1. Valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in which the police arelegally present in the pursuit of their official duties;2. The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the rightto be where they are;3. The evidence must be immediately apparent; and4. Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.(d) Stop-and-FriskIt is defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop acitizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons where a police officerobserves an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of hisexperience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he isdealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigatingthis behavior he identified himself as a policeman and make reasonable inquiries, andwhere nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fearfor his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself or others in thearea to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in anattempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.The interest of effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer toapproach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes ofinvestigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause

to make an actual arrest.

Requisites for Stop-and-Frisk1. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make the initial inquiries,approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct,in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons.2. The apprehending officer must have a genuine reason to warrant the belief thatthe person to be held has weapons or contraband concealed about him. It should, therefore, be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede thearrest for the principle of stop-and-frisk to apply.(e) When there is a valid express waiver made voluntarily and intelligently.Waiver cannot be implied from the fact that the person consented or did notobject to the search, for it many happen that he did so only out of respect for theauthorities. The waiver must be expressly made. It must be given by the person whoseright is violated.

In People vs. Bongcarawan, G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002, the shabu in thebaggage of the accused was found by (private) security officers of the interislandpassenger vessel who then reported the matter to the Philippine Coast Guard. Thesearch and seizure of the suitcase and contraband items were carried out withoutgovernment intervention. Accordingly, the exclusionary rule may not be invoked.(f) Searches of vessel and aircraft for violation of fishery, immigration and customs law(g) Searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders for violation ofimmigration and smuggling laws (h) Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary andbuilding regulations(i) Conduct of “areal target zoning” and “saturation drive” in the exercise of militarypowers of the President(j) Visual search at checkpoints

Constitutionality of checkpoints and "areal target zonings"; doctrine of exigentcircumstancesThe constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is apersonal right and can be invoked only by those whose rights have been infringed, orthreatened to be infringed.Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable arenot forbidden. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and areconducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routinecheckpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists’ right to “free passage withoutinterruption,” but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention oftravellers during which the vehicle’s occupants are required to answer a brief questionor two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to abody search and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routinechecks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonablesearch. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even lessintrusive.The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced bythe COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputizedagents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purposefor which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said periodwould know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their maliciousdesigns.There is no need for checkpoints to be announced. Not only it would beimpractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban. Even so, badgesof legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred from their fixed location and theregularized manner in which they are operated. (People vs. Usana, 323 SCRA 754)Knock and Announce Principle—General Rule: Police officers are obliged to give notice, show their authority anddemand that they be allowed entry. They may only break open any outer or inner dooror window of a house to execute the search warrant if, after such notice and demand,such officers are refused entry to the place of directed search.

Exceptions: Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when:1. A party whose premises or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon demand,to open it;2. When such person already knew of the identity of the officers and of their authority andpersons;3. When the officers are justified in the honest belief that there is an imminent peril to life orlimb;4. When those in the premises, aware of the presence of someone outside, are thenengaged in an activity which justifies the officers to believe that an escape or thedestruction of evidence is being attempted. (People vs. Huang Zhen Hua and Lee,G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004)

In People vs. Marti, 193 SCRA 57, the constitutional protection againstunreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person frominterference by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed by privateindividuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.Do the ordinary right against unreasonable searches and seizures apply to searchesconducted at the airport pursuant to routine airport security procedures? In the case of People vs. Leila Johnson, G.R. No. 138881, December 18,

2000, persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure oftheir persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjectiveexpectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize asreasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increasedconcern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at thenation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass throughmetal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage, are routinelysubjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspiciousobjects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There islittle question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, thegravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associatedwith airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public addresssystems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, ifany prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutionalprotection against warrantless searches and se izures d o not apply to routine airportprocedures.

People vs. Susan Canton, G.R. No. 148825, December 27, 2002, a search madepursuant to a routine airport security procedure is allowed under RA 6235, whichprovides that every airline ticket shall contain a condition that hand-carried luggage,etc., shall be subject to search, and this condition shall form part of the contractbetween the passenger and the air carrier. To limit the action of the airport securitypersonnel to simply refusing the passenger entry into the aircraft and sending her home(as suggested by the appellant), and thereby depriving the security personnel of “abilityand facility to act accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in light of suchcircumstances, would be sanctioned impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement,to the detriment of the society.” The strip search in the ladies’ room was justified underthe circumstances.Procedure for Seizure of Pornographic Materials:To justify a warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest mustbe on account of a crime having been committed;1. There must be a criminal charge against the person for purveying the pornomaterials;2. Application for search warrant must be obtained from the judge;3. Materials must be brought to court in the prosecution of the accused for the crimecharged;4. Determination whether the items confiscated are pornographic materials;5. Judgment rendered by the court. (Pita vs. CA, 178 SCRA 362)

Sec. 3, Article III(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable exceptupon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwiseas prescribed by law.(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall beinadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.The guarantee includes within the mantle of its protection tangible, as well asintangible objects. (See RA 4200 below)Exceptions to inviolability:1. Lawful order of the court;2. When public safety or orders requires otherwise, as may be provided by law.Is there a constitutional right to privacy?Yes. The essence of privacy is “the right to be left alone”. It is expressly recognized inSection 3(1) of Article III. Other facts of the right to privacy are protected in variousprovisions of the Bill of Rights, i.e., Sections 1 (right to due process clause), 2 (rightagainst unreasonable searches and seizures), 6 (right to liberty of abode and ofchanging the same, as well as the right to travel), 8 (freedom of association) and 17(right against self-incrimination). (Ople vs. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1988)Zones of privacy recognized and protected in our laws:1. The Civil Code provides that “every person shall respect the dignity, personality,privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons” and punishes asactionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacyof another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individualliable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person,and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications.2. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, therevelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling.3. Anti-Wiretapping Law (RA 4200)—invasion of privacy.4. S ecrecy of Bank Deposits (RA 1405)5. I ntellectual Property Law (RA 8293)6. R ules of Court—on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy ofcertain information [Sec. 24, Rule 130(c), Revised Rules on Evidence]

RA 4200 Anti-Wire Tapping ActIt prohibits any person not being authorized by all parties to any privatecommunication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device orarrangement to secretly overhear, intercept or record the same, or to communicate thecontent thereof to any person.The use of said record may be permitted in the following instances:1. In civil or criminal proceedings involving certain specified offenses principallyaffecting national security; and2. When authorized by the court which may be issued under the following

conditions:a. The constitutional requirements for the issuance of a warrant should becomplied with; andb. The authority shall be effective only for sixty (60) days.Any evidence obtained in violation of this law is not admissible in any proceeding.RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorizedby all parties to any private communication, to secretly record such communications bymeans of a tape recorder. The law does not make any distinction. A telephoneextension is not among the devices covered by this law. (Gaanan vs. IAC, 145 SCRA112)Navarro vs. CA, G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999, two local media men in LucenaCity went to the police station to report alleged indecent show in one nightestablishment in the City. At the station, there was a heated argument between policeofficer Navarro and Lingan, one of the two media men, which led to fisticuffs. Lingan felland his head hit the pavement which caused his death. During the trial, Jalbuena, theother media man, testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voicerecording he had made of the heated discussion at the police station between accusedpolice officer Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which was taken without theknowledge of the two. The SC held that Jalbuena’s testimony is confirmed by the voicerecording he had made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of RA4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law prohibitsthe overhearing, intercepting or recording of private communications. Since theexchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording isnot prohibited.Exempted acts:A. Use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminalinvestigation or trial of offenses mentioned below: [Secs. 1, par. 2]B. Any peace officer, who is authorized by the written order of the Court (RTCwithin whose territorial jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to beexecuted), to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in cases involving thecrimes of: [Sec. 3, par. 1]1. treason2. espionage3. provoking war and disloyalty in case of war4. piracy5. mutiny in the high seas6. rebellion7. conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion8. inciting rebellion9. sedition10. conspiracy to commit sedition11. inciting to sedition12 kidnapping as defined by the RPC13.violations of CA 616, punishing espionage and other offenses againstnational securityThe WRITTEN ORDER shall only be issued or granted upon written applicationwith the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses hemay produce and must show:a) That there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimesenumerated herein has been committed or is being committed provided, that in casesinvolving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, incitingto rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, such authority shall be granted onlyupon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actuallybeen or are being committed;Page 827/12/2008 ¥say822008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramosb) That there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence may be obtainedessential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of,any of such crimes;c) That there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.Contents:1. The identity of the person or persons whose communications, conversations,discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in thecase of telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line and the telephonenumber involved and its location;2. The identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or recordthe communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words;3. The offense or offenses sought to be committed or prevented; and4. The period of the authorization.Effectivity: The authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the orderwhich shall not exceed 60 days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extendedor renewed by the court upon being satisfied that such extension or renewal is in thepublic interest.Procedure: All recordings made under court authorization within 48 hours after theexpiration of the period fixed in the order:1. Shall be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package;2. shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer granted such

authority stating the number of recordings made, the dates and times covered by eachrecording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit and certifyingthat no duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with thecourt;3. shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence or theircontents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted exceptupon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or personswhose conversations or communications have been recorded.PENALTYAny person who violates the provisions of this Act, shall, upon conviction, bepunished by:1. imprisonment for not less than 6 months or more than 6 years; and2. with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from publicoffice if the offender be a public official at the time of the commission of theoffense; andPage 837/12/2008 ¥say832008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos3. If the offender is an alien, he shall be subject to deportation proceedings.ADMISSIBILITYAny communication or spoken word, or the existence contents, substance,purport, effect or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information thereincontained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of this Act shall not beadmissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative hearing orinvestigation.Exclusionary RuleArt. III, Sec. 3. xxx(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this (privacy of communication andcorrespondence) or the preceding section (unreasonable searches and seizures) shallbe inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.One of the remedies of one who was victimized by an illegal search is to ask forthe suppression of the things seized and the evidence illegally taken.The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of any evidence obtained in violation ofSections 2 and 3 (1), Art. III for "any purpose" and in "any proceeding." The evidence isabsolutely useless. This has not always been the case.In Moncado v. People's Court (1948), the SC, following the U.S. case of WolfV. Colorado, rules that evidence illegally obtained is not necessarily excluded if isotherwise admissible under the rules of evidence. In such case, the evidence admitted,without prejudice to any criminal, civil or administrative liability of the officer who illegallyseized it. In other words, the admissibility of the evidence is not effected by the illegalityof the means by which it was acquired.It was in Stonehill v. Diokno, supra, following the U.S. case of Maop v. Ohio1969, when the exclusionary rule was first adopted in the Philippines, the SC noting thatthe total suppression of the thing seized is the only effective means of ensuring theconstitutional right which it seeks to preserve. The Court noted, the insufficiency of theother remedies (e.g. action for damages, criminal punishment, resistance), especially inthe Philippines where violations were committed by those in power and were thusequipped with the pardoning power to water down the gravity of the other penaltiesimposed to violators of those constitutional rights.The victim may or may not get back the thing seized, depending on whether it iscontraband or not. It the thing is contraband, it would not be returned, and only itssuppression can be asked for. But if the thing is legal, the party can ask for its return,even if no criminal prosecution has yet been filed, as in the Stonehill case.Page 847/12/2008 ¥say842008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles RamosCivil Action for DamagesA civil case for damages can also be filed pursuant to Article 32 of the Civil Code.In Aberca v. Ver, the SC held that even if the privilege of the writ is suspended,the court can nevertheless entertain an action not only against the task force but evenagainst the top ranking officials who ordered the seizure, to recover damages for theillegal searches and seizures made in a despotic manner. By so doing, one canindirectly inquire into the validity of the suspension of the privilege.Ramirez vs. CA, 248 SCRA 590, RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal forany person, not authorized by all parties to any private communication, to secretlyrecord such communications by means of a tape recorder. The law does not make adistinction.Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699, the right may be invoked against the wife who went tothe clinic of her husband and there took documents consisting of privatecommunications between her husband and his alleged paramour.Should in camera inspection of bank accounts be allowed? Before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case beforea court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, theinspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of

competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified tobe present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the accountidentified in the pending case.In Union Bank vs. CA, Section 2 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, asamended, declares bank deposit to be absolutely confidential except:1. In an examination made in the course of special or general examination of abank that is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfiedthat there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularityhas been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look into deposit toestablish such fraud or irregularity;2. In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conductits regular audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes only and theresults thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank;3. Upon written permission of the depositor;4. In case of impeachment;5. Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty ofpublic officials; or6. In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of thelitigation.In the case of Marquez vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001, there isPage 857/12/2008 ¥say852008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramosyet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is aninvestigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of theOmbudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally chargeAmado Lagdameo, et al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending casein court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.Human Security Act of 2007Section 3, HAS of 2007, provides that the authorities may, upon a written orderof the Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form,kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and trackingdevices, or with the use of any suitable ways and means for that purpose, anycommunication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written wordsbetween members of terrorist group. Provided, That surveillance, interception andrecording of communications between lawyers and clients, doctor and patients,journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence shall not beauthorized.Sec. 4, Article IIINo law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or thepress, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition thegovernment for redress of grievances.The rule on privileged communications has its genesis not in the nation’s penalcode but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and ofthe press. As early as 1918, in US vs. Cañete, 38 Phil 253, the SC ruled thatpublications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by theconstitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right cannot beabolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in thestatute punishing libel. (Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1)The freedom to speak includes the right to be silent. This freedom includes alsoincludes the right to an audience, in the sense that the State cannot prohibit the peoplefrom hearing what a person has to say, whatever be the quality of his thoughts. Thisright, however, is not demandable against those unwilling to listen, who may not beherded by the government into a captive audience.Types of Privileged Communications:1. Absolutely privileged communications—those which are not actionable evenif the author acted in bad faith. An example is found in Article VI, Section 11which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate inPage 867/12/2008 ¥say862008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramosthe Congress or in any Committee thereof.2. Qualifiedly privileged communications—those contained defamatoryimputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without goodintention or justifiable motive. To this genre belong “private communications” and“fair and true report without any comments or remarks.”Freedom of Expression—Aspect:1. Freedom from censorship or prior restraint; and2. Freedom from subsequent punishment.Free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publiclyand truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and punishment. There isto be no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liabilitywhether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt

proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil thatCongress has a right to prevent. (Chavez vs. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 168338, February15, 2008)Restrictions on Free Speech:1. Content-based Restrictions—are imposed because of the content of thespeech itself; distort public debate, have improper motivation, and are usuallyimposed because of fear how people will react to a particular speech.Subject to the Clear-and-Present danger Rule TestIn Sanidad vs. COMELEC, a rule prohibiting columnists, commentators,and announcers from campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscitemust have compelling reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strictscrutiny.These restrictions are censorial and therefore they bear a heavypresumption of constitutional validity. In addition, they will be tested for possibleoverbreadth and vagueness.2. Content-neutral Restrictions—are those which are not concerned with thecontent of the speech.The clear-and-present danger rule is inappropriate as a test fordetermining the constitutional validity of laws.Tests for a valid Governmental Interference:Page 877/12/2008 ¥say872008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos1. Clear and Present Danger Rule—when words are used in such circumstanceand of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that will bring aboutsubstantive evil that state has the right to prevent.2. Dangerous Tendency Rule—words uttered create a dangerous tendency of anevil which State has the right to prevent.3. Balancing of Interest Test—when particular conduct is regulated in interest ofpublic order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partialabridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of the 2conflicting interests demand greater protection under the particularcircumstances presented.In the case of Adiong vs. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 713, the SC held that theposting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other movingvehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of thecitizens becomes crucial in this kind of propaganda, not the financial resources of thecandidate. The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on hispersonal property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachmentof his liberties. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” placeswhether public or private except in authorized areas designated by the COMELECbecomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.Doctrine of Fair Comment—Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute avalid defense in an action for libel or slander. It means that while in general everydiscreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man ispresumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation isdeemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against apublic person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that suchdiscreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a falseallegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is anexpression of opinion, based on established facts, it is immaterial that the opinionhappens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably inferred from the facts. (Borjalvs. CA, 301 SCRA 1)Right to Assemble and Petition GovernmentThe right to assemble is not subject to prior restraint and may not be conditionedupon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities.However, the right must be exercised in such a way as will not prejudice the publicwelfare.If assembly is to be held at a public place, permit for the use of such place, andPage 887/12/2008 ¥say882008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramosnot for the assembly itself may be validly required. Power of local officials is merely forregulation and not for prohibition. (Primicias vs. Fugoso, L-1800, January 27, 1948)Permit for public assembly is not necessary if meeting is to be held in:a. A private place;b. The campus of a government-owned or operated educational institution; orc. A freedom park.The provisions of BP 880 (Public Assembly Act of 1985) are not absolute ban onpublic assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner ofthe assemblies. The Court referred to it as content-neutral regulation.Test for Lawful Assembly:1. Purpose Test—the purpose for which the assembly is held regardless of the

auspices under which it is organized; and2. Auspices Test.In the case of Bayan vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, CalibratedPre-emptive Response (CPR) serves no valid purpose if it means the something else.Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself,namely, maximum tolerance, which specifically means “the highest degree of restraintthat the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during apublic assembly or in dispersal of the same.Sec. 5, Article IIINo law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting thefree exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious professionand worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Noreligious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.Religion—any specific system of belief, worship, conduct, etc., often involving a code ofethics and a philosophyIt is a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to hisCreator. (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil 201)Freedom of Religion—1. Non-Establishment ClauseScope:a. State cannot set-up church;b. Cannot pass laws which aid one religion, all religions or prefer one overanother;c. Nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will;norPage 897/12/2008 ¥say892008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramosd. Force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.2. Freedom of Religious Belief and WorshipDual aspect of Freedom of Religious Belief and Worship:a. Freedom to believe—absolute as long as the belief is confined within therealm of thought; andb. Freedom to act on one’s belief—subject to regulation where the belief istranslated into external acts that affect the public welfare.Ecclesiastical Affair—it involves the relationship between the church and its membersand relates to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of thecongregation to which the state cannot meddle.Benevolent Neutrality—recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals andinterest but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extentpossible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated bylaws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality basedon religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.Three (3)-Step process of the compelling State Interest Test1. Has the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise ofreligion?2. Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement ofreligious liberty?3. Has the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least intrusive meanspossible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary toachieve the legitimate goal of the state? (Estrada vs. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006)Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent, 219 SCRA 256, to compel students to takepart in a flag ceremony when it is against their religious beliefs will violate their religiousfreedom. Petitioners have the right to refuse to salute to the Philippine flag on accountof their religious freedom.Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529, the INC’s postulate that its religious freedomis per se beyond review of the MTRCB should be rejected. Its public broadcast on TV ofits religious programs brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is amedium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The exercise of religiousfreedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and presentdanger of a substantive evil which the State is duty-bound to prevent, i.e., seriousdetriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or publicwelfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberalmind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is andPage 907/12/2008 ¥say902008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramoscontinues to be a volatile area of concern in our society today. “For sure, we shallcontinue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to aheightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of aman. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not standstill.”

Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 144801, March 10, 2005,expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matterbest left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of saidinstitution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authoritiesin the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for themembers of the religious institution/organization to conform to just church regulations.Religious TestsThe constitutional prohibition against religious tests is aimed against clandestineattempts on the part of the government to prevent a person from exercising his civil orpolitical rights because of his religious beliefs.Sec. 6, Article IIIThe liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by lawshall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the rightto travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, orpublic health, as may be provided by law.Liberty of Abode and TravelThe purpose of the guaranty is to further emphasize the individual’s liberty assafeguarded in general terms by the due process clause. Liberty under that clauseincludes the right to choose one’s residence, to leave it whenever he pleases, and totravel where he wills.Limitation on Liberty of Abode: upon Lawful order of the courtRestrictions on Right to Travel:1. Interest of national security;2. Public safety;3. Public health; or4. Any person on bail.In Caunca vs. Salazar, 82 Phil 851, a maid has the right to transfer to anotherresidence even if she had not yet paid the amount advanced for her transportation fromthe province by an employment agency which was then effectively detaining her.Page 917/12/2008 ¥say912008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles RamosVillavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil 778, the Mayor of Manila was not sustained by theSC when he deported some 170 women of ill-repute to Davao, for the admittedlycommendable purpose of ridding the city for serious moral and health problems. Thesewomen are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the sameconstitutional guarantees as are other citizens—to change their domicile from Manila toanother locality.Rubi vs. Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660, the respondents were justified in requiring themembers of certain non-Christian tribes to reside in a reservation, for their bettereducation, advancement and protection. The measure was held to be a legitimateexercise of police power.Lorenzo vs. Director of Health, 50 Phil 595, health officers may restrict access tocontaminated areas and also quarantine those already exposed to the disease soughtto be contained.Zemel vs. Rusk, 381 US 1, the Secretary of State may regulate or even prohibit thetravel of citizens to hostile countries to prevent possible international misunderstandingand conflict.Section 26 of HAS of 2007—cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and theperson charged with the crime of terrorism as therein defined is entitled to bail and ifgranted the same, the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the right totravel of the accused to within the municipality or city where he resides or where thecase is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety.Sec. 7, Article IIIThe right of the people to information on matters of public concerned shall berecognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertainingto official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government researchdata used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizens, subjectto such limitations as may be provided by law.Right of the People to Information on Matters of Public ConcernThe citizen has a right to know what is going on in the country and in hisPage 927/12/2008 ¥say922008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramosgovernment so he can express his views thereon knowledgeably and intelligently. Onecannot question the extravagance of the government, for example, if is deniedexamination of official vouchers. A citizen may not expose anomaly if those responsiblefor it may validly prevent him from investigating their activities. In the interest of truthand fairness, the citizen should not be made to guess only at what is being done bypublic functionaries and to base his views and conclusions on mere rumors, half-truths,conjectures and even canards.Recognized restrictions:1. National security matters and intelligence information—this jurisdictionrecognizes the common law holding that there is a governmental privilege

against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military,diplomatic and other national security matters;2. Trade or industrial secrets—(pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code, RA8293 and other related laws and banking transactions—pursuant to the Secrecyof Bank Deposits Act, RA 1405);3. Criminal matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecutionand the detention of criminals, which courts may not inquire into prior to sucharrest, detention and prosecution; and4. Other confidential information. The Ethical Standards Act further prohibitspublic officials and employees from using or divulging “confidential or classifiedinformation to the public.” [Section 7 (c), RA 6713] Other acknowledgedlimitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed doorCabinet meetings and executive sessions of either House of congress, as well asthe internal deliberations of the SC. (Chavez vs. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744)Rights guaranteed:1. Right to information on matters of public concern; and2. Corollary right of access to official records and documentsBA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 177271 and 177314, May 4, 2007, the right toinformation is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or thecitizens to be precise. The people’s right to know is limited to matters of public concernand is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policyof full disclosure is confined to transactions involving “public interest’ and is subject toreasonable conditions prescribed by law.Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRa 256—the information sought must be “mattersof public concern,” access to which may be limited by law. The information sought bypetitioners is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasan PambansaPage 937/12/2008 ¥say932008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramosbelonging to the opposition were able to secure ‘clean’ loans from the GSIS immediatelybefore the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First LadyImelda Marcos. x x x The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the publicoffice held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter ofpublic interest and concern.Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, the SC affirmed the right of the petitioner tosecure from the Civil Service Commission information regarding the civil serviceeligibility of certain persons employed in the health department of the Cebu Citygovernment.Sec. 8, Article IIIThe right of the people, including those employed in the public and privatesectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary tolaw shall not be abridged.Right to Form associations—shall not be impaired without due process of law;guarantees the right not to join an association. (Sta. Clara Homeowners Associationvs. Gaston, G.R. No. 141961, January 23, 2002)This right is especially meaningful in a free society because a man is by naturegregarious. His disposition to mix with others of the same persuasions, interests orobjectives is guaranteed by this provision. It also expressly guarantees to thoseemployed in the public and private sectors the right to form unions.This right is available also to those in the government sectors.It is a settled in jurisprudence that, in general, workers in the public sectors donot enjoy the right to strike. The general rule in the past and up to present is that the‘terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any politicalsubdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law.’ x x x. Since the terms andconditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot usethe same weapons employed by the workers in the private sector to secure concessionsfrom their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is thatindustrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations betweenprivate employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. x x x Ingovernment employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly givendelegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms andconditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrativecirculars, rules and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements. (Allianceof Concerned Government Workers vs. Ministry of Labor and Employment, 124SCRA 1)In the case of Jacinto vs. CA, 281 SCRA 657, the SC held that petitioners werePage 947/12/2008 ¥say942008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramosnot penalized for the exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition thegovernment for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil Service Commission foundthem guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having absentedthemselves without proper authority, from their school during regular school days, inorder to participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the nonholding

of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for which they wereresponsible. Had petitioners availed themselves of their free time—recess, afterclasses, weekends or holidays—to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with theproper authorities within the bounds of law, no one—not the DECS, the CSC or eventhe SC—could have held them liable for the valid exercise of their constitutionallyguaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting from theiractivity necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled bythe prohibition against strikes by government workers. Their act by their nature wasenjoined by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, for which they must, therefore,be made answerable.GSIS vs. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, G. R. No. 170132, December 6,2006, it was against the backdrop of the provisions of the Constitution that the Courtresolved that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concertedand unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government employees to organizeis limited to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.It may be, as the appellate court urged, that the freedom of expression and assemblyand the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances stand on a levelhigher than economic and other liberties.Sec. 9, Article IIIPrivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.(See discussions Under Eminent Domain)Sec. 10, Article IIINo law impairing the obligation of contract shall be passed.The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject tothe police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them beestablished by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time totime, as the general well-being of the community may require, or the circumstances maychange, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.The purpose of the impairment clause is to safeguard the integrity of validcontractual agreements against unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, theyshould be respected by the legislature and not tampered with by subsequent laws thatwill change the intention of the parties or modify their rights and obligations. The will ofPage 957/12/2008 ¥say952008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramosthe obligor and the obligee must be observed; the obligation of their contract must notbe impaired.However, the protection of the impairment clause is not absolute. There areinstances when contracts valid at the time of their conclusion may become invalid, orsome of their provisions may be rendered inoperative or illegal, by virtue of superveninglegislation.Limitations:1. Police power—prevails over contracts;2. Eminent domain—may impair obligation of contracts; and3. Taxation—cannot impair obligation of contracts.Impairment—anything that diminishes the efficacy of a contractThere is impairment when there is change in the terms of a legal contractbetween parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions,or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something differentfrom that provided in its terms. (Clemons vs. Nolting, No. 17959, January 24, 1922)Hon. Heherson Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 162243, November29, 2006, in unequivocal terms, the SC have consistently held that such licensesconcerning the harvesting of timber in the country’s forests cannot be consideredcontracts that would bind the Government regardless of changes in policy and thedemands of public interest and welfare. Since timber licenses are not contracts, thenon-impairment clause cannot be invoked.Sec. 11, Article IIIFree access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legalassistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.Inspired by t social justice policy and covered by the equal protection clause, thisrule has been implemented by several provisions of the Rules of Court in favor of thepauper litigant. The IBP provides deserving indigents with free legal aid, includingrepresentation in court, and similar services available from the DOJ to litigants whocannot afford retained counsel, like the accused in a criminal case who can ask for theassistance of counsel de officio. There are also private legal assistance organizationsnow functioning for the benefit of penurious clients who otherwise might be unable toresort to the courts of justice because only of their misfortune of being poor. Thisprovision makes them the equal of the rich before the law.Sec. 12, Article III(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shallhave the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have aPage 967/12/2008 ¥say962008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos

competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If theperson cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided withone. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presenceof counsel.(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means whichvitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereofshall be inadmissible in evidence against him.(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of thissection as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture orsimilar practices, and their families.Rights of an Accused under Custodial InvestigationExist only in custodial interrogationAvailable when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crimebut has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into policecustody, the police carry out a process of interrogation that tend to elicit incriminatingstatements.Custodial Investigation—Any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has beentaken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.It shall include the practice of issuing “invitation” to a person who is investigatedin connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice tothe liability of the “inviting” officer for any violation of the law. (RA 7438)People vs. Lugod, G.R. No. 136253, February 21, 2001, the accused shouldhave been entitled to Miranda rights, because even assuming that he was not yet underinterrogation at the time he was brought to the police station, his confession was elicitedby a police officer who promised to help him if he told the truth. Furthermore, when heallegedly pointed out the body of the victim, the atmosphere was highly intimidating andnot conducive to a spontaneous response as the whole police force and nearly 100townspeople escorted him there. Not having the benefit of counsel and not having beeninformed of his rights, the confession is inadmissible.Miranda rights—(Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436)x x x The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use ofPage 977/12/2008 ¥say972008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramosprocedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incriminations. By custodialinterrogation, it means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has beentaken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As forthe procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised toinformed accused-persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity toexercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must bewarned that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used asevidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained orappointed. The defendant may waive effectuations of these rights, provided the waiver is madevoluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stageof the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be noquestioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does notwish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may haveanswered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him ofthe right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorneyand thereafter consents to be questioned.Applies only from the moment the investigating officer begins to ask questions for thepurpose of eliciting admissions, confessions or any information from the accused.People vs. Baloloy, G.R. No. 140740, April 12, 2002, it was held that this guaranteedoes not apply to spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by theauthorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admitted havingcommitted the offense. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by asuspect before he was placed under custodial investigation. In this case, the narrationbefore the Barangay Captain prior to custodial investigation was admissible inevidence, but not the admissions made before Judge Dicon, inasmuch as thequestioning by the judge was done after the suspect had been arrested and suchquestioning already constituted custodial investigation.Rights guaranteed:1. Right to remain silent;2. Right to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choiceat all stages of the investigation;Independent and competent counsel—willing to safeguard the constitutional rights ofthe accused3. Right to be informed of such rights;Rationale:a. to make him aware of it;b. to overcome the inherent pressure o the interrogating atmosphere; andc. to show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize hisprivilege should he choose to invoke it.

4. Right to be provided with counsel, if the person cannot afford one;These rights cannot be waives except in writing and in the presence of counsel; it is notrequired in a police-line up as the latter is not part of a custodial inquest.Page 987/12/2008 ¥say982008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos5. No torture, force, etc. which vitiate free will shall be used;6. Secret detention places are prohibited; and7. Confession/admissions obtained in violation of rights are inadmissible inevidence.Ways of identifying the suspects During Custodial Investigation:1. Show-ups (out-of-court identification)—where the suspect alone is brought faceto face with the witness for identification;People vs. Escordial, G.R. Nos. 138934-35, January 16, 2002, the accused,having become the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed toby a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, it was held that whenthe out-of-court identification was conducted by the police, the accused wasalready under custodial investigation.2. Mug shots—where photographs are shown to the witness to identify thesuspect; and3. Police Line ups—where a witness identifies the suspect from a group ofpersons lined up for the purpose. It is not considered a part of any custodialinquest because it is conducted before that stage of investigation is reached(People vs. Bravo, G.R. No. 135562, November 22, 1999). The process hasnot yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory stage, and it is usually thewitness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in thecourse of the line-up (People vs. Amestuzo, July 12, 2001).Factors in Resolving the Admissibility of and Relying on Out-of-Court Identification ofSuspects: TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES TEST1. The witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;2. The witness’ degree of attention at that time;3. The accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;4. The level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;5. The length of time between the crime and the identification; and6. The suggestiveness of the identification procedure.Two (2) kinds of Involuntary or Coerced Confessions:1. Those which are the product of 3rd degree methods such as torture, force,violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12;and2. Those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings.Extrajudicial Confessions—are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence ofconclusive evidence showing the declarant’s consent in executing the same has beenvitiated, such confession will be sustained.To be admissible, it must be:1. Voluntary;2. Made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;Page 997/12/2008 ¥say992008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos3. Express; and4. In writing.Investigations not considered custodial interrogation1. Those conducted by an audit examiner2. Those conducted by the Court Administrator3. Those conducted by the employerFor the reason that these people are not law enforcement officersHowever, in the case of People vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 131131, June 21, 2001, after anaudit, the accused was summoned to appear before the Assistant Accountant ofMetroBank and, in the course of the interview, accused admitted having issued thesubject cashier’s checks without any legitimate transaction, the written confession washeld admissible in evidence inasmuch as the interview did not constitute custodialinvestigation.Ladiana vs. People, G.R. No. 144293, December 24, 2002, the counter-affidavitsubmitted by the respondent during preliminary investigation is admissible becausepreliminary investigation is not part of custodial investigation. The interrogation by thepolice, if any would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal casein court or in the public prosecutor’s office.Spontaneous statements—those elicited through questioning by law enforcementofficers, but given in an ordinary manner where the appellant verbally admits to havingcommitted the offense, are admissible. (People vs. Guillermo, G.R. No. 147786,January 20, 2004)WAIVER—It must be in writing and made in the presence of the counsel. The burden ofproving that there was a valid waiver rests on the prosecution. The presumption of

official duty has been regularly performed cannot prevail over the presumption ofinnocence.What may be waived?1. Right to remain silent2. Right to counselExclusionary Rule—Confession or admission obtained in violation of Sections 12 and 17 of Article IIIshall be inadmissible in evidence.Fruit of the poisonous tree—once the primary source is shown to have been lawfullyobtained, any secondary or derivative evidence derived from it is inadmissible.Evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain otherPage 1007/12/2008 ¥say1002008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramosevidence because the originally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequentlyobtained.Sec. 13, Article IIIAll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusionperpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable bysufficient sureties, or be released or recognizance as may be provided by law.The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.Right to BailBail—the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished byhim or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court as may berequired. The right to bail may be invoked by any person once detention commences evenif no formal charges have yet to be filed; It can availed of by a person who is in custody of law or otherwise deprived of hisliberty; Suspension of the writ of the privilege of habeas corpus does not suspend theright to bail; Even when the accused has previously jumped bail, still he cannot be denied bailbefore conviction if it is a matter of right. The remedy is to increase the amount ofbail; Right to bail has not been recognized and is not available to the military.Standards for fixing amount of bail:1. Financial ability of the accused;2. Nature and circumstances of the offense;3. Penalty for the offense charged;4. Character and reputation of the accused;5. Age and health of the accused;6. Weight of evidence against the accused;7. Probability of appearance at trial;8. Forfeiture of other bonds by him;9. He was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and10.Pendency of other cases where he is also under bail.Bail as a matter of right—All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficientsureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law:Page 1017/12/2008 ¥say1012008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos1. Before or after conviction by the MTC; and2. Before convictio n by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusionperpetua or life imprisonment.3. The evidence of guilt is not strong.Bail when discretionary—1. U pon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusionperpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accusedto bail.2. The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisionalliberty after the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consentof the bondsman.3. If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not morethan 20 years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously grantedshall be cancelled, upon showing by the following or other similar circumstances:a. That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, orhas committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteracion;b. That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legalconfinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bailwithout valid justification;c. That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, orunder conditional pardon;

d. That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicates the probabilityof flight if released on bail; ore. That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, theaccused may commit another crime.Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion—reasonable notice of hearing isrequired to be given to the prosecutor, or at least he must be asked for hisrecommendation, because in fixing the amount of bail, the judge is required to take intoaccount a number of factors.When bail shall be denied— No person, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution, shall be admittedto bail if:a. Charged with capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetuaor life imprisonment; andb. Evidence of guilt is strong. When the accused is charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetuaor higher, a hearing on the motion for bail must be conducted by the judge todetermine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.Page 1027/12/2008 ¥say1022008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos Without a hearing, the judge could not possibly asses the weight of the evidenceagainst the accused before granting the latter’s application for bail.(See the cases of Government of USA vs. Hon. Purganan andGovernment of Hongkong vs. Judge Olalia)Sec. 14, Article III(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due processof law.(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until thecontrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself andcounsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation againsthim, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face toface, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnessesand the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trialmay proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that hehas been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.Rights of the Accused:1. Criminal due process:a. Opportunity to be heard in court of competent jurisdiction;b. The accused must proceed against under orderly processes of law;c. He must be given notice and opportunity to be heard; andd. The judgment rendered was within the authority of a constitutional law.2. Presumption of innocence—Every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be takeninto account. The proof against him must not be permitted to swayjudgment and the presumption that official duty was regularly performedcannot, by itself, prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence.3. Right to be heard by himself and counsel4. Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against himObjectives:a. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against himas will enable him to make the defense;b. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against afurther prosecution for the same cause; andc. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether theyare sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.Page 1037/12/2008 ¥say1032008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles RamosDescription, not designation, of the offense is controlling.Void-for-Vagueness Rule—the accused is denied the right to be informed of thecharge against him, and to due process as well, where the statute itself iscouched in such indefinite language that it is not possible for men of ordinaryintelligence to determine therefrom what acts or omissions are punished and,hence, shall be avoided.Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001, everylegislative measure is presumed constitutional. Petitioner failed to discharge theburden to overcome the presumption of constitutionality.5. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial—Impartial—the judge must not be bias and not motivated by malice or bad faith6. Right to meet witness face to face—Witnesses not submitted for cross-examination are not admissible as evidence.However, right to cross-examination may be waived.7. Right to compulsory process to secure attendance of witnesses and productionof evidence

8. Trial in Absentia After arraignment; Due notice; and Absence is unjustified.Plea of guilt to a capital offense—1. There must be searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the fullcomprehension of the consequences thereof;2. Presentation of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degreeof his culpability;3. The accused must be asked if he desire to present evidence on his behalf andallow him to do so if he so desires.Sec. 15, Article IIIThe privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in casesof invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires.(Relate this to Section 18, Article VII)Page 1047/12/2008 ¥say1042008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles RamosWrit of habeas corpus—A writ issued by the court directed to a person detaining another, commandinghim to produce the body of the prisoner at designated time and place, with the day andcause of his capture and detention, to do, to submit to, and to receive whatever court orjudge awarding writ shall consider in his behalf.It lies only where the restraint of a person’s liberty has been judicially adjudged tobe illegal or unlawful.A petition for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows thatpetitioner is being detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully. A restrictive custodyand monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation bytheir superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. (SP02 Manalo vs.PNP Chief Calderon, G.R. No. 178920, October 15, 2007)Sec. 16, Article IIIAll persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before alljudicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.Enriquez vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174902-06, February 15, 2008,this right, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated when the proceedings areattended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.The concept of speedy disposition of cases is relative or flexible. A simplemathematical computation of the time involved is insufficient. The facts andcircumstances peculiar to each case must be examined. In ascertaining whether theright to a speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the following factors must beconsidered:1. The length of delay;2. The reasons for the delay;3. The assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and4. The prejudice caused by the delay. (Tilendo vs. Ombudsman andSandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165975, September 13, 2007)Sec. 17, Article IIINo person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.Right against self-incrimination—Availability:Not only in criminal prosecutions but also in all other government proceedings,Page 1057/12/2008 ¥say1052008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramosincluding civil actions and administrative or legislative investigationsMay be claimed not only by accused but by any witness to whom anincriminating question is addressed.Scope:It applies only against testimonial compulsion and production of documents,papers and chattels in court except when books of account are to be examined inexercise of power of taxation and police power.Two (2) types of Immunity Statutes:1. Transactional Immunity Statute—testimony of any person or whose possessionof documents or other evidence necessary or convenient to determine the truth inany investigation conducted is immune from criminal prosecution for an offenseto which such compelled testimony relates; and2. Use Immunity Statute—prohibits the use of a witness’ compelled testimony andits fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness.Sec. 18, Article III(1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs andaspirations.(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for acrime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.Right against Involuntary Servitude

It is a condition where one is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, andagainst his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not.General Rule: No involuntary servitude shall exist.Exceptions:1. As punishment for a crime whereof one has been duly convicted;2. Service in defense of the State;3. Naval enlistment;4. Posse commitatus;5. Return to work order in industries affected with public interest; and6. Patria potestas.Sec. 19, Article III(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhumanpunishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, forcompelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafterPage 1067/12/2008 ¥say1062008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramosprovides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced toreclusion perpetua.(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment againstany prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penalfacilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.Prohibited PunishmentsMere severity does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. To violateconstitutional guarantee, penalty must be flagrant and plainly oppressive,disproportionate to nature of offense as to shock senses of community.Sec. 20, Article IIINo person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.Coverage:1. Debt—any civil obligation arising from contract2. Poll tax—a specific sum levied upon any person belonging to a certain classwithout regard to property or occupation.A tax is not a debt since it is an obligation arising from law hence, its non-paymentmay be validly punished with imprisonment.Sec. 21, Article IIINo person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. Ifan act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under eithershall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.Right against Double JeopardyRequisites:1. A valid complaint or information;2. Filed before competent court;3. To which defendant has pleaded; and4. Defendant was previously acquitted or convicted or the case dismissed orotherwise terminated without his express consent.Two (2) types:1. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense;2. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal undereither shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven:1. A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;2. The second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offenseincludes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the firstPage 1077/12/2008 ¥say1072008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramosinformation, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.Legal Jeopardy Attaches Only:1. Upon a valid indictment;2. Before a competent court;3. After arraignment;4. When a valid plea has been entered and5. The case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent ofthe accused.General Rule: Dismissal of action, when made at the instance of the accused, does notput the accused in first jeopardy.Exceptions:1. When ground for dismissal is insufficiency of evidence; or2. When the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged as to violate the rightof the accused of a speedy trial.Crimes covered:1. Same offense; or attempt to commit or frustration thereof or for any offensewhich necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged inoriginal complaint or information; and

2. When an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittalunder either shall bar another prosecution for the same act.Doctrine of Supervening Event—prosecution for another offense if subsequentdevelopment changes the character of the first indictment under which he may havealready been charged or convicted.Conviction of accused shall not bar another prosecution for an offense whichnecessarily includes the offense originally charged when:1. Graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same actor omission;2. Facts constituting graver offense arose or discovered only after filing offormer complaint or information; and3. Plea of guilty to lesser offense was made without the consent of prosecutor oroffended party.Cabo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169509, June 16, 2006, for double jeopardy toattach, the case against the accused must have been dismissed or otherwiseterminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a validinformation sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded to the saidcharge.Page 1087/12/2008 ¥say1082008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles RamosPeople vs. Perlita J. Tria-Tirona, et al., G.R. No. 130106, July 15, 2006, after trial onthe merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground ofdouble jeopardy. The only exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is wherethere is finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process.Sec. 22, Article IIINo ex-post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.Right against Ex-Post Facto Law and Bill of AttainderEx-Post Facto Law—The equivalent of the impairment clause in criminal matters is the prohibitionagainst the passage of the ex post facto law. This is because the ex post facto law, likethe law impairing the obligation of the contracts, operates retroactively to affectantecedent acts. A law can never be considered ex post facto as long as it operatesprospectively since its structures would cover only offenses committed after and notbefore its enactment. Basically, an ex post facto law is one that would make a previousact criminal although it was not so at the time it was committed.Kinds:1. Law criminalizing act done before its passage;Example: A law passed in 1990 raising the age of seduction from 18 to 25years, effective 19802. Law aggravating penalty for crime committed before passage;Example: A law passed in 2000 designating the crime of homicide throughreckless imprudence as murder, effective 19903. Law that changes punishment, and inflicts greater or more severe punishmentthan the law annexed to the crime when committed;Example: A law passed in 2000 increasing the penalty for libel from prisioncorreccional to prision mayor, effective 19904. Law altering legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony thanlaw required at the time of commission, in order to convict accused;Example: A law passed in 2000 requiring for conviction merely preponderanceof evidence instead of proof beyond reasonable doubt, effective 19905. Law assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes apenalty of deprivation of right for something which when done was lawful; andExample: A law passed in 2000 depriving professionals of the right to practicefor failure or refusal to vote, effective 1990.6. Law depriving accused of some lawful protection to which he had been entitled,such a protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of a proclamation ofamnesty.Page 1097/12/2008 ¥say1092008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials, www.pinoylaw.net, etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles RamosExample: A law passed in 2000 lengthening the period for prescription ofblackmail from 5 to 10 years, effective 1990.Characteristics:1. It refers to criminal matters;2. It is retroactive in application; and3. It works to the prejudice of the accused.In the case of US vs. Gomez Colonel, 12 Phil 279, an information for adulteryfiled by the prosecutor was dismissed by the SC on the ground that at the time of thealleged commission of the offense, prosecution could be commenced only on complaintof the offended spouse. It was held that the amendatory law permitting the prosecutor toinitiate the charge was ex post facto.Bill of Attainder—It is a legislative act that inflicts punishment without trial

It is a legislative declaration of guiltEssential:1. Specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals;2. The imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise; and3. Lack of judicial trial.It substitute legislative fiat for a judicial determination of guilt. Thus, it is onlywhen a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable membersof a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without judicial trial that itbecomes a bill of attainder.