Fi hti i tFi hti i t B t tB t tFighting against Fighting against BotnetBotnet

MaXMaXMaXMaX( maxoverpro@gmail.com )( maxoverpro@gmail.com )

www.CodeEngn.com2010 4th CodeEngn ReverseEngineering Conference

AgendaAgenda

• Introduction to Botnet.

• Botnet History.

• Recent Botnet Trends.

• Botnet Life Cycle.

• Botnet Communication.

• Use of Botnets.

• Botnet Economics.

• Botnet Analysis.

• Botnet detection and responseBotnet detection and response.

• Demonstration.

Introduction to Introduction to BotnetBotnet

BotBot( Zombie, Robot )( Zombie, Robot ) :

Bot

In an automated way to perform functions for the program.

BotBot ClientClient :

Infected machine.

BotnetBotnet : BotnetBots connected to a particular channel.( IRC, HTTP, P2P, WEB, I.M )

- Controlled by Botmaster or Botherder.

C&C 1

Botmaster

Botherder

BotmasterBotmaster or or BotherderBotherder :

Can control the group remotely.

C&C-1

C&C-2

C&C(Command and Control ) C&C(Command and Control ) :

- Communication channel for Command and Control.

Introduction to Introduction to BotnetBotnet

Like it!

BotnetJ iJoin

…Bot Update

Botmaster BotBot Update

0-Day

BotnetBotnet HistoryHistory

BotnetBotnet HistoryHistory

1988 Invention of IRC

1989 Greg Lindahl ( GMBot/Hunt the Wumpus - IRCBot )

1993 Eggdrop ( IRC Bot )

1999 Remote Control Trojan ( PrettyPark, SubSeven, NetBus )

2000 GTBot ( Based on the mIRC )

2002 SDBot, AgoBot, Gaobot ( Backdoor , Kill-AV, Hidden, Downloader, Payload )

2003 SpyBot, Rbot ( Keylogging, Spyware, Weak Password, Packing )

2004 PolyBot( Polymorphic )

2005 MyDoom ( mass email worm with BOT IRC and C&C ), Zeus

2007 StormWorm

2008 Waledac, Conficker

2009 Mariposa

Recent Recent BotnetBotnet TrendsTrends

BotnetBotnet Life CycleLife Cycle

Rallying /Rallying / Listen /Listen / Command :Command :ExploitationExploitation

Rallying /Rallying /Secure Secure BotnetBotnet

Listen / Listen / PayloadPayload

Command : Command : Erase Erase

•• Malicious Code.Malicious Code.•• UnpatchedUnpatched VulnerabilitiesVulnerabilities

•• Join Join BotnetBotnet•• Kill AntiKill Anti VirusVirus

•• BotnetBotnet command.command.•• PayloadPayload

•• Erase Evidence.Erase Evidence.•• BotBot•• UnpatchedUnpatched Vulnerabilities.Vulnerabilities.

•• Backdoor.Backdoor.•• Worm.Worm.•• Remote Access Trojans.Remote Access Trojans.•• Password Guessing.Password Guessing.

•• Kill AntiKill Anti--VirusVirus•• HiddenHidden•• DownloaderDownloader•• RootkitRootkit

•• PayloadPayload•• UpdateUpdate

•• BotBot

BotnetBotnet CommunicationCommunication (Infection Channel)(Infection Channel)

• E-MailE Mail• Instant Messenger• Social NetworkSocial Network• Downloader ( Malicious Site )• P2PP2P• File shareing

BotnetBotnet CommunicationCommunication (Topology)(Topology)

Star Multi-Server Hierarchical

RandomFast-flux

Random

BotnetBotnet CommunicationCommunication (Protocols)(Protocols)

IRC HTTP

P2P I.M…

Use of Use of BotnetBotnet

• PhishingPhishing

• Spam

• DDoS

• Click FraudClick Fraud

• Adware/Spyware Install

• Information theft

• Keystroke Logging• Keystroke Logging

• Stealing information or files

BotnetBotnet EconomicsEconomics

$1~$500/

Identity collectorWebSite

WebSite DeveloperOrWebSite Hacker

$200~2000/Site

Account&Credit card

Shop mall

$200~2000/Site

Malware Writer Malware Distributor. Victim UserVictim User Shop mall Information

$300~$3500/Malware$25~50/Update

Botnet Owner Payment Service$10/Million

$200/H Resellers$200/Hour

Spammers

BotnetBotnet AnalysisAnalysis

BotnetBotnet AnalysisAnalysis

SpamBotSpamBot WormWorm DownloaderDownloader Data StealerData Stealer

•• MegaMega--DD•• RustockRustock•• Waledac•• SrizbiSrizbi

•• Storm WormStorm Worm•• ConfickerConficker•• StrationStration•• KoobfaceKoobface

•• BredolabBredolab •• ZeusZeus

•• SrizbiSrizbi•• CutwailCutwail•• KrakenKraken•• GrumGrum•• XarvesterXarvester•• BagleBagle

•• KoobfaceKoobface

BagleBagle•• MaazbenMaazben•• LethicLethic

BotnetBotnet Analysis / Analysis / KoobfaceKoobface

BotnetBotnet Analysis / Analysis / BredolabBredolab

1St Bredolab : MS07-017 ( GDI Local Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability ) / CVE-2006-57582nd Bredolab : MS08-025 ( Windows Kernel Usermode Callback Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability ) / CVE-2008-10843rd Bredolab : Flo Allo s local sers ith the SeDeb gPri ilegge pri ilege to e ec te arbitar code as kernel / CVE 2004 23393rd Bredolab : Flow Allows local users with the SeDebugPrivilegge privilege to execute arbitary code as kernel / CVE-2004-2339

BotnetBotnet Analysis / ZeusAnalysis / Zeus

NameServerZeus C&C

BotnetBotnet detection and responsedetection and response

• Anti-VirusAnti Virus

• IDSIDS

• IPSIPS

• F/WF/W

• C&C Down.C&C Down.

• ~-….….

BotnetBotnet AnalysisAnalysis

BotnetBotnet AnalysisAnalysis

[1] B C i i T l i U d di h i i i f b C d d C l G Oll[1] Botnet Communication Topologies, Understanding the intricacies of botnet Command-and-Control , Gunter Ollmann,VP of Research, Damballa, Inc.

[2] Spam declines after hosting company shut-down, by Robert Vamosi[3] Botnets, the killer web app, Craig A.Schiller, Jim Binkley, Dvidd Harley, Gadi Evron, Tony Bradley, Carsten Willems, Michael Cross[4] The economics of botnets, Yuri Namestnikov[4] The economics of botnets, Yuri Namestnikov[5] Botnet Communications and Detection, HKCERT[6] Cyber Attack Trend and Botnet, S.C.Leung[7] FastFlux&Zeus, Roman hussy[8] Botnet Mitigation Methods, Kris Seeburn[9] B A k T d S S S CERT I[9] Botnets Attacks Trends, S.S.Sarma, CERT-In[10] Botnet and Mass DDoS Attack, Heejo Lee, Hyunsang Choi, Korea University[11] A Taxonomy of Botnet Structures, David Dagon, Guofei Gu, Christopher P. Lee, Wenke Lee, Georgia Institute of Techonology[12] Bashing Botnets, Conficker Kills and other Service Improvements, Tom Le[13] Botnet Detection and Response Technology, Mi Joo Kim[13] Botnet Detection and Response Technology, Mi Joo Kim[14] Modeling Botnet Propagation Using Time Zones, David Dagon, Ciff Zou, Wenke Lee, Georgia Institute of Techonology[15] Botnet Detection and Response, The Network is the infection, David Dagon, Georgia Institute of Techonology[16] Web 2.0 Botnet Evolution KOOBFACE Revisited, Jonell Baltazar, TrendMicro[17] The Business of Cybercrime / A complex Business Model, TrendMicro[18] Th R l F f KOOBFACE Th L W b 2 0 B E l i d J ll B l J C R Fl T dMi[18] The Real Face of KOOBFACE : The Largest Web 2.0 Botnet Explained, Jonell Baltazar, Joey Costoya, RyanFlores, TrendMicro[19] Cutwail Botnet, Alice Decker, David Sancho, Louciif Kharouni, Max Goncharov, Robert McArdle, TrendMicro[20] Infiltrating WALEDAC Botnet’s Covert Operations, Jonell Baltazar, Joey Costoya, RyanFlores, TrendMicro[21] BREDOLAB’s Sudden Rise in Prominence, David Sancho, TrendMicro[22] Walowdac – Analysis of a Peer-to-Peer Botnet, Ben Stock, Jan Gobel, Markus Engelberth, Felix C. Freiling, Thorsten Holz[22] Walowdac Analysis of a Peer to Peer Botnet, Ben Stock, Jan Gobel, Markus Engelberth, Felix C. Freiling, Thorsten Holz

Q&A?Q&A?

Thank you!Thank you!

www.CodeEngn.com2010 4th CodeEngn ReverseEngineering Conference