2012 filro cases on wages

8/11/2019 2012 Filro Cases on Wages

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2012 FILRO CASES ON WAGES

Charlie Jao v. BCC Product Sales Inc.G. R. No. 163700 April 18, 2012

Facts of the Case: Petitioner was employed as BCCs comptroller. He was barred from entering his office

and his previous attempts to report to work were frustrated for continued barring for himto enter his workplace.

Petitioner filed for Illegal dismissal, reinstatement plus backwages. Respondent BCC denied that Petitioner was their employee but the employee of Sobien

Foods Corp., a creditor & supplier of BCC. SFC posted Petitioner as one of itscomptrollers in BCC.

The Labor Arbiter rules in favor of petitioner but such order was vacated and remandedby the NLRC where it was found that there was no employer-employee relationshipbetween the petitioner and the respondent.

Issue: Was there employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent? Was thepetitioner validly dismissed? If so, is he entitled to backwages?

SC Ruling: The existence of an employer-employee relationship is a question of fact. Generally, a

re-examination of factual findings cannot be done by the Court acting on a petition forreview on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts but reviews only questions oflaw. Nor may the Court be bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence adduced andconsidered in the proceedings below. This rule is not absolute, however, and admits ofexceptions. For one, the Court may look into factual issues in labor cases when thefactual findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA are conflicting.

To prove his employment with BCC, petitioner offered the following:

(a) BCC Identification Card (ID) issued to him stating his name and his position as"comptroller," and bearing his picture, his signature, and the signature of Ty;(b) a payroll of BCC for the period of October 1-15, 1996 that petitioner approved ascomptroller;(c) various bills and receipts related to expenditures of BCC bearing the signature ofpetitioner;(d) various checks carrying the signatures of petitioner and Ty, and, in some checks, thesignature of petitioner alone;(e) a court order showing that the issuing court considered petitioners ID as proof of hisemployment with BCC;(f) a letter of petitioner dated March 1, 1997 to the Department of Justice on his filing of acriminal case for estafa against Ty for non-payment of wages;(g) affidavits of some employees of BCC attesting that petitioner was their co-employeein BCC; and(h) a notice of raffle dated December 5, 1995 showing that petitioner, being an employeeof BCC, received the notice of raffle in behalf of BCC.

Respondents denied that petitioner was BCCs employee. They affirmed that SFC hadinstalled petitioner as its comptroller in BCC to oversee and supervise SFCs collectionsand the account of BCC to protect SFCs interest; that their issuance of the ID topetitioner was only for the purpose of facilitating his entry into the BCC premises in


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relation to his work of overseeing the financial operations of BCC for SFC; that the IDshould not be considered as evidence of petitioners employment in BCC

It can be deduced from the March 1996 affidavit of petitioner that respondentschallenged his authority to deliver some 158 checks to SFC. Considering that hecontested respondents challenge by pointing to the existing arrangements betweenBCC and SFC, it should be clear that respondents did not exercise the power of controlover him, because he thereby acted for the benefit and in the interest of SFC more thanof BCC.

In addition, petitioner presented no document setting forth the terms of his employmentby BCC.1wphi1 The failure to present such agreement on terms of employment may beunderstandable and expected if he was a common or ordinary laborer who would not

jeopardize his employment by demanding such document from the employer, but maynot square well with his actual status as a highly educated professional.

Petitioners admission that he did not receive his salary for the three months of hisemployment by BCC, as his complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of wages25and the criminal case for estafa he later filed against the respondents for non-payment ofwages26 indicated, further raised grave doubts about his assertion of employment byBCC. If the assertion was true, we are puzzled how he could have remained in BCCsemploy in that period of time despite not being paid the first salary of P20,000.00/month.Moreover, his name did not appear in the payroll of BCC despite him having approvedthe payroll as comptroller.

Lockheed Detective & Watchman Agency v. University of the PhilippinesG.R. No. 185918 April 18, 2012

Facts of the Case Petitioner entered into a contract for security services with respondent University of the

Philippines Several guard assigned to UP filed complaints against Lockheed & UP for payment of

underpaid wages, Overtime pay, premium pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave,night shift differential, 13 th month pay, cash bond and unpaid wages.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that Lockheed & UP solidarily liable.

Issue: Who is liable to pay the claims of the Guards?

SC Ruling: Lockheed contends that UP has its own separate and distinct juridical entity from the

national government and has its own charter. Thus, it can be sued and be held liable.Moreover, Executive Order No. 714 entitled "Fiscal Control and Management of theFunds of UP" recognizes that "as an institution of higher learning, UP has alwaysgranted full management and control of its affairs including its financial affairs."Therefore, it cannot shield itself from its private contractual liabilities by simply invokingthe public character of its funds. Lockheed also cites several cases wherein it was ruledthat funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued were not exempt fromgarnishment.


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UP is a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government and has thecapacity to sue and be sued. Thus, also like NEA, it cannot evade execution, and itsfunds may be subject to garnishment or levy. However, before execution may be had, aclaim for payment of the judgment award must first be filed with the COA. UnderCommonwealth Act No. 327,22 as amended by Section 26 of P.D. No. 1445, it is theCOA which has primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle "all debts and claims ofany sort" due from or owing the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies andinstrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and theirsubsidiaries. With respect to money claims arising from the implementation of Republic

Act No. 6758, their allowance or disallowance is for COA to decide, subject only to theremedy of appeal by petition for certiorari to this Court.

We cannot subscribe to Lockheeds argument that NEA is not similarly situated with UPbecause the COAs jurisdiction over the latter is only on post -audit basis. A reading ofthe pertinent Commonwealth Act provision clearly shows that it does not make anydistinction as to which of the government subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities,including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries whosedebts should be filed before the COA.

As to the fait accompli argument of Lockheed, contrary to its claim that there is nothingthat can be done since the funds of UP had already been garnished, since thegarnishment was erroneously carried out and did not go through the proper procedure(the filing of a claim with the COA), UP is entitled to reimbursement of the garnishedfunds plus interest of 6% per annum, to be computed from the time of judicial demand tobe reckoned from the time UP filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which occurredright after the withdrawal of the garnished funds from PNB.

Petitioner Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. is ordered to reimburserespondent University of the Philippines the amount of P12,062,398.71 plus interest of6% per annum, to be computed from September 12, 2005 up to the finality of thisDecision, and 12% interest on the entire amount from date of finality of this Decision untilfully paid.

Norkis Distributors Inc. v. Delfin DescallarG.R. No. 185255 March 14, 2012

Facts of the Case: Delfin Descallar was assigned at Iligan branch of Norkis, he became a regular employee

& subsequently became a manager. He went on an absence without leave. Norkis wrote to Delfin regarding his absence and why the records show that he was

rendering undertime work. Delfin explained that he was on officela business and talking to clients On investigation it was later found that Delfin was not actually on official business but

was addressing personal matters. He was subsequently suspended. Delfin was ultimately dismissed for loss of managements confidence and trust.

Issue: Was Delfin Validly dismissed? If so, can he claim for unpaid wages?


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SC Ruling: Loss of trust and confidence as a ground for termination of an employee under Article

282 of the Labor Code requires that the breach of trust be willful, meaning it must bedone intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse. The basicpremise for dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is that the employeesconcerned holds a position of trust and confidence. It is the breach of this trust thatresults in the employers loss of confidence in the employee .

To our mind, the failure to reach the monthly sales quota cannot be considered anintentional and unjustified act of respondent amounting to a willful breach of trust on hispart that would call for his termination based on loss of confidence. This is simply notthe willful breach of trust and confidence contemplated in Article 282(c) of the LaborCode. Indeed, the low sales performance could be attributed to several factors whichare beyond respondents control. To be a valid ground for an employees dismissal, lossof trust and confidence must be based on a willful breach. To repeat, a breach is willfulif it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse.

An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: back wages and reinstatement.The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement isno longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and theemployer, separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitledto either reinstatement if such is viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longerviable, and to back wages.

The normal consequences of respondents illegal dismissal, then, are reinstatementwithout loss of seniority rights, and payment of back wages computed from the timecompensation was withheld from him up to the date of actual reinstatement. Wherereinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one monthsalary for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative. The payment ofseparation pay is in addition to payment of back wages.

New Philippines Skylanders Inc. V. Francisco DakilaG.R. No. 199547 September 24, 2012

Facts of the Case: Dakila was employed by petitioner for 10 years & terminated for cause when the

corporation was sold. Dakila informed the petitioner of his compulsory retirement and sought payment of

retirement benefits pursuant to a CBA, but was not acted upon by petitioner. Dakila filed a complaint for constructive illegal dismissal, non-payment of retirement

benefits & under/non-payment of wages & benefits of a regular employee. Petitioner alleged that Dakila was not their regular employee but a mere consultant.

Issue: Was Dakila validly dismissed? If so, is he entitled for unpaid wages?

SC Ruling: The issue of illegal dismissal is premised on the existence of an employer-employee

relationship between the parties herein. It is essentially a question of fact, beyond theambit of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court unlessthere is a clear showing of palpable error or arbitrary disregard of evidence which doesnot obtain in this case. Records reveal that both the LA and the NLRC, as affirmed by


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the CA, have found substantial evidence to show that respondent Dakila was a regularemployee who was dismissed without cause.

Following Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly dismissed fromwork is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges andto his full backwages computed from the time he was illegally dismissed. However,considering that respondent Dakila was terminated on May 1, 2007, or one (1) day priorto his compulsory retirement on May 2, 2007, his reinstatement is no longer feasible.

Accordingly, the NLRC correctly held him entitled to the payment of his retirementbenefits pursuant to the CBA. On the other hand, his backwages should be computedonly for days prior to his compulsory retirement which in this case is only a day.Consequently, the award of reinstatement wages pending appeal must be deleted forlack of basis.

Superior Packaging Corp. v. Arnel Balagsa Et. Al.G.R. No. 178909 October 10, 2012

Facts of the Case: Petitioner Superior engaged the services of Lancer to provide reliever services to its

business which involves manufacture & sales of industrial and corrugated boxes. Respondents sued for underpayment of wages, non-payment of premium pay, OT pay

and non-payment of salary. The Secretary of Labor conducted an investigation and found: (1) non-presentation of

payrolls and daily time records; (2) non-submission of annual report of safetyorganization; (3) medical and accident/illness reports; (4) non-registration ofestablishment under Rule 1020 of Occupational and Health Standards; and (5) notrained first aide.

The Secretary ordered in favor of the respondents. Petitioner countered that the respondents were not their employees but of Lancer.

Issue: May Superior be held solidarily liable with Lancer for unpaid wages?

SC Ruling: It was the consistent conclusion of the DOLE and the CA that Lancer was not an

independent contractor but was engaged in "labor-only contracting"; hence, thepetitioner was considered an indirect employer of respondents and liable to the latter fortheir unpaid money claims.

At the time of the respondents employment in 1998, the applicable regulation wasDOLE Department Order No. 10, Series of 1997.25 Under said Department Order,labor-only contracting was defined as follows:

Sec. 9. Labor-only contracting. (a) Any person who undertakes to supply workers toan employer shall be deemed to be engaged in labor-only contracting where suchperson:(1) Does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment,machineries, work premises and other materials; and(2) The workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing activities whichare directly related to the principal business or operations of the employer in whichworkers are habitually employed.

Labor-only contracting is prohibited and the person acting as contractor shall beconsidered merely as an agent or intermediary of the employer who shall be


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responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directlyemployed by him.

Finally, a finding that a contractor is a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to declaringthat there is an employer-employee relationship between the principal and theemployees of the supposed contractor, and the "labor only" contractor is considered asa mere agent of the principal, the real employer. The former becomes solidarily liable forall the rightful claims of the employees. The petitioner therefore, being the principalemployer and Lancer, being the labor-only contractor, are solidarily liable forrespondents unpaid money claims.

3D Alert Security & Detective Services v. Rolando NaviaG.R. No. 200653 June 13, 2012

Facts of the Case: Rolando Navia filed an illegal dismissal case against 3D Alert. The Labor Arbiter ruled that his dismissal was illegal and was affirmed by the NLRC. Navia filed an ex-parte motion for computation of backwages & an ex-parte motion for

execution based on the computated backwages. 3D alert appealed the computed backwages, it also averred that the NLRC committed

grave abuse of discretion since there was already a notice of reinstatement. The NLRC ruled that 3D Alert is guilty of bad faith since there was no earnest effort to

reinstate Navia. Such notice of reinstatement was never sent even to Navias counse l.

Issue: Was 3D Alert in Bad Faith? Can Navia recover his wages?

SC Ruling: Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that in case there is an order of reinstatement,

the employer must admit the dismissed employee under the same terms and conditions,or merely reinstate the employee in the payroll. The order shall be immediatelyexecutory. Thus, 3rd Alert cannot escape liability by simply invoking that Navia did notreport for work. The law states that the employer must still reinstate the employee in thepayroll. Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalentto one (1) month salary for every year of service could be awarded as an alternative.

Also, the main issue of this case, finding Navia to have been illegally dismissed, hasalready attained finality. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere,and it is essential for an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a

judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of theverdict.6 The order is to reinstate Navia; sadly, the mere execution of this judgment hasto even reach the highest court of the land, thereby frustrating the entire judicial process.This justifies the treble costs we now impose against 3rd Alert.

"It is settled that in actions for recovery of wages or where an employee was forced tolitigate and incur expenses to protect his right and interest, he is entitled to an award ofattorney's fees."8 Navia, having been comp elled to litigate due to 3rd Alerts failure tosatisfy his valid claim, is also entitled to attorney's fees of ten percent (10%) of the totalaward at the time of actual payment, following prevailing jurisprudence.


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Eastern Mediterranean Maritime LTD. & Ageman Manning Agency v. Anislao Sunio et.al.

G.R. No. 154213 August 23, 2012

Facts of the Case: Respondents were former crewmwmbers of MT Seadance, a vessel owned by Eastern

Mediterranean Maritime and manned and operated bny Agemar Manning Agency. While respondents were still aboard the vessel they experienced delays in payment of

wages, remittance of allowances & were not paid for work rendered and overtime pay. The ITF found that their wages were below the prevailing rate and ordered petitioners

pay the appropriate rate. The respondents were repatriated. Thereafter they filed a complaint for disciplinary

action for reimbursement of wage increases in the workers assistance & adjudicationoffice of the POEA.

R.A. 8042 was subsequently pass during the pendency of the complaint which vestedoriginal & exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising out of employer-employeerelationship of OFW with the Labor Arbiter.

Issue: Who has jurisdiction over the case?

SC Ruling: Petitioners position that Repub lic Act No. 8042 should not be applied retroactively to the

review of the POEAs decision dismissing their complaint against respondents has nosupport in jurisprudence. Although, as a rule, all laws are prospective in applicationunless the contrary is expressly provided,8 or unless the law is procedural or curative innature,9 there is no serious question about the retroactive applicability of Republic ActNo. 8042 to the appeal of the POEAs decision on petitioners disciplinary action againstrespondents. In a way, Republic Act No. 8042 was a procedural law due to its providingor omitting guidelines on appeal. A law is procedural, according to De Los Santos v.Vda. De Mangubat,10 when it

Refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order thatcourts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legalconception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation ofstatues they may be given retroactive effect on acti ons pending and undetermined atthe time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel thathe is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

Republic Act No. 8042 applies to petitioner s complaint by virtue of the case being thenstill pending or undetermined at the time of the laws passage, there being no vestedrights in rules of procedure.11 They could not validly insist that the reckoning period toascertain which law or rule should apply was the time when the disciplinary complaintwas originally filed in the POEA in 1993. Moreover, Republic Act No. 8042 and itsimplementing rules and regulations were already in effect when petitioners took theirappeal. A statute that eliminates the right to appeal and considers the judgmentrendered final and unappealable only destroys the right to appeal, but not the right toprosecute an appeal that has been perfected prior to its passage, for, at that stage, theright to appeal has already vested and cannot be impaired.12 Conversely and byanalogy, an appeal that is perfected when a new statute affecting appellate jurisdictioncomes into effect should comply with the provisions of the new law, unless otherwise


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provided by the new law. Relevantly, petitioners need to be reminded that the right toappeal from a decision is a privilege established by positive laws, which, uponauthorizing the taking of the appeal, point out the cases in which it is proper to presentthe appeal, the procedure to be observed, and the courts by which the appeal is to beproceeded with and resolved.13 This is why we consistently hold that the right to appealis statutory in character, and is available only if granted by law or statute.

When Republic Act No. 8042 withheld the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC in respectof cases decided by the POEA, the appellate jurisdiction was vested in the Secretary ofLabor in accordance with his power of supervision and control under Section 38(1),Chapter 7, Title II, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, to wit:

Section 38. Definition of Administrative Relationship. Unless otherwise expresslystated in the Code or in other laws defining the special relationships of particularagencies, administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows:

Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to act directlywhenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct theperformance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modifyacts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the executionof plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specificlaw governing the relationship of particular agencies, the word "control" shall encompasssupervision and control as defined in this paragraph.

Peoples Broadcasting Service (Bombo Radyo) v. Secretary of Labor and Employment G.R. No. 179652 March 6, 2012

Facts of the Case: Private respondent Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint, before the DOLE regional office

against petitioner for illegal deduction, non-payment of service incentive leave,13 th month pay, holiday pay & restday and illegal dimunition of benefits, delayed payment ofwages & non-coverage of the SSS, Pag-ibig & Philhealth.

It was found by the DOLE Regional Director that Juezan was an employee of petitioner& ordered that he is entitled to money claims.

Issue: Who has jurisdiction to determine employer-employee relationship? Is the privaterespondent entitled to backwages?

SC Ruling: Under Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, the DOLE is fully

empowered to make a determination as to the existence of an employer-employeerelationship in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power, subject to judicialreview, not review by the NLRC.

There is a view that despite Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730,there is still a threshold amount set by Arts. 129 and 217 of the Labor Code when moneyclaims are involved, i.e., that if it is for PhP 5,000 and below, the jurisdiction is with theregional director of the DOLE, under Art. 129, and if the amount involved exceeds PhP


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5,000, the jurisdiction is with the labor arbiter, under Art. 217. The view states thatdespite the wording of Art. 128(b), this would only apply in the course of regularinspections undertaken by the DOLE, as differentiated from cases under Arts. 129 and217, which originate from complaints. There are several cases, however, where theCourt has ruled that Art. 128(b) has been amended to expand the powers of the DOLESecretary and his duly authorized representatives by RA 7730. In these cases, the Courtresolved that the DOLE had the jurisdiction, despite the amount of the money claimsinvolved. Furthermore, in these cases, the inspection held by the DOLE regional directorwas prompted specifically by a complaint. Therefore, the initiation of a case through acomplaint does not divest the DOLE Secretary or his duly authorized representative of

jurisdiction under Art. 128(b).

To recapitulate, if a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the laborstandards provisions of the Labor Code or other labor legislation, and there is a findingby the DOLE that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, the DOLEexercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that there is noemployer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a complaintis filed with the DOLE, and it is accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the

jurisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code, whichprovides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over those casesinvolving wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other terms and conditions ofemployment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement. If a complaint is filed with theNLRC, and there is still an existing employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction isproperly with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE, however, may still be questionedthrough a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In the present case, the finding of the DOLE Regional Director that there was anemployer-employee relationship has been subjected to review by this Court, with thefinding being that there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioner andprivate respondent, based on the evidence presented. Private respondent presentedself-serving allegations as well as self-defeating evidence.10 The findings of theRegional Director were not based on substantial evidence, and private respondent failedto prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship. The DOLE had no

jurisdiction over the case, as there was no employer-employee relationship present.Thus, the dismissal of the complaint against petitioner is proper.

Jomar Verdadero v. Barney Auto lines Group of Companies and Transportation Inc.G.R. No. 195428 August 29, 2012

Facts of the Case:

Jomar Verdadero was a bus conductor for Barney autolines. On Kanuary 27, 2008 analtercation between Verdadero & Atty. Gerardo Gimenez, Barney autolines disciplinaryofficer. The altercation was because Verdadero did not give Atty. Gimenez & his wife afree fide in the bus contrary to company policy.

Verdadero was asked to write an apology letter. He did not comply, due to such non-compliance, he believed that he was dismissed.


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He filed a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter claiming non-payment ofholiday pay, 13 th month pay, separation pay, retirement pay, moral & exemplarydamages, backwages and reinstatement.

Issue: was Verdadero validly dismissed? If so, is he entitled to backwages?

SC Ruling: Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work, because "continued

employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving ademotion in rank or a diminution in pay" and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal indisguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not,constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility,or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that itcould foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment.

In this case, Verdadero cannot be deemed constructively dismissed. Records do notshow any demotion in rank or a diminution in pay made against him. Neither was thereany act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain committed by BALGCO againstVerdadero which would justify or force him to terminate his employment from thecompany.

It is to be emphasized that the abovementioned acts should have been committed by theemployer against the employee. Unlawful acts committed by a co-employee will notbring the matter within the ambit of constructive dismissal.

On Reinstatement and Backwages, Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended,provides:

Art. 279. Security of tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall notterminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by thisTitle. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatementwithout loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive ofallowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from thetime his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.(As amended by Section 34, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)

Reinstatement and backwages are reliefs available to an illegally dismissed employee.Reinstatement restores the employee who was unjustly dismissed to the position fromwhich he was removed, that is, to his status quo ante dismissal, while the grant ofbackwages allows the same employee to recover from the employer that which he hadlost by way of wages as a result of his dismissal. These twin remedies - reinstatementand payment of backwages - make the dismissed employee whole who can then lookforward to continued employment. Thus, do these two remedies give meaning andsubstance to the constitutional right of labor to security of tenure.34

In the case at bench, considering that there has been no dismissal at all, there can be noreinstatement.1wphi1 One cannot be reinstated to a position he is still holding. As thereis no reinstatement to speak of, Verdadero cannot invoke the doctrine of strainedrelations. It is only applied when there is an order for reinstatement that is no longerfeasible. In the same vein, no separation pay can be awarded as it is given only in lieu ofreinstatement. Consequently, there is likewise no justification for the award ofbackwages. The CA was correct in ruling against the payment of backwages followingthe "no work, no pay" principle.


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Vivian Ramirez et. al. v. Mar Fishing CompanyG.R. No. 168208 June 13, 2012

Facts of the Case: Respondent is engaged in the business of fishing and catching tuna. It sold its principal

assets to Miramar Fishing Co. Respondent informed its employees that it is closing the business. The Recognized union of the respondent Mar Fishing Workers Unon & Miramar

entered into a memorandum of agreement that the latter shall absorb the respondentsrank & file employees without loss of seniority rights.

The employees of the respondent were never absorbed by Miramar Fishing Company.

Issue: who would be liable for the employees monetary claims?

SC Ruling: Basing their conclusion on the Memorandum of Agreement and Supplemental

Agreement between Miramar and Mar Fishings labor union, as well as the GeneralInformation Sheets and Company Profiles of the two companies, petitioners assert thatMiramar simply took over the operations of Mar Fishing. In addition, they assert thatthese companies are one and the same entity, given the commonality of their directorsand the similarity of their business venture in tuna canning plant operations.

At the fore, the question of whether one corporation is merely an alter ego of another is

purely one of fact generally beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. In any case, given onlythese bare reiterations, this Court sustains the ruling of the LA as affirmed by the NLRCthat Miramar and Mar Fishing are separate and distinct entities, based on the markeddifferences in their stock ownership. Also , the fact that Mar Fishings officers remainedas such in Miramar does not by itself warrant a conclusion that the two companies areone and the same. As this Court held in Sesbreo v. Court of Appeals, the mereshowing that the corporations had a common director sitting in all the boards withoutmore does not authorize disregarding their separate juridical personalities.

Neither can the veil of corporate fiction between the two companies be pierced by the

rest of petitioners submissions, namely, the all eged take-over by Miramar of MarFishings operations and the evident similarity of their businesses. At this point, it bearsemphasizing that since piercing the veil of corporate fiction is frowned upon, those whoseek to pierce the veil must clearly establish that the separate and distinct personalitiesof the corporations are set up to justify a wrong, protect a fraud, or perpetrate adeception.This, unfortunately, petitioners have failed to do. In Indophil Textile MillWorkers Union vs. Calica, we ruled thus

In the case at bar, petitioner seeks to pierce the veil of corporate entity of Acrylic,alleging that the creation of the corporation is a devi[c]e to evade the application of theCBA between petitioner Union and private respondent company. While we do notdiscount the possibility of the similarities of the businesses of private respondent and

Acrylic, neither are we inclined to apply the doctrine invoked by petitioner in granting therelief sought. The fact that the businesses of private respondent and Acrylic are related,that some of the employees of the private respondent are the same persons manning


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2012 filro cases on wages

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