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11th Japan-China Joint Opinion Poll Analysis Report on the Comparative Data

（2015）

In Cooperation With:

Japan: Public Opinion Research Institute Corporation

China: Horizon Research Consultation Group

October 22, 2015

The Genron NPO

2


From August to September 2015, The Genron NPO and China International Publishing Group conducted joint

opinion polls targeting the citizens of Japan and China. This is the 11th annual opinion poll and the opinion poll

has been jointly conducted since 2005 when Japan-China relations were at their lowest level. The objective of

the survey is to continuously monitor the state of mutual understanding and perceptions of the Japanese and

Chinese public toward each other, and their changes over time.

The opinion poll in Japan was conducted from September 4 to 28 under the placement (self-administered)

method, targeting men and women over the age of 18 (excluding high school students). The total number of

valid responses obtained was 1,000. The highest levels of educational attainment of the respondents were as

follows: up to junior high school diploma 8.8%, high school diploma 46.5%, junior college/technical college

diploma 17.6%, bachelor’s degree 23.0% and master’s degree 2.0%.

The opinion poll in China was conducted from August 21 to September 7, through the interview method

targeting men and women over the age of 18 in 10 cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Shenyang,

Wuhan, Nanjing, Xian, Qingdao and Zhengzhou. The number of total valid responses obtained was 1,570. The

highest levels of educational attainment of the respondents were as follows: up to junior high school diploma

11.5%, high school/technical high school diploma 40.7%, technical college diploma 25.7%, bachelor’s degree

20.8% and master’s degree 1.2%.

The Genron NPO and China International Publishing Group also conducted separate opinion polls targeting

well-informed persons in both countries. The questions contained were the same as in the public opinion poll

targeting general public. In the expert survey in Japan, questionnaires were sent to about 2,000 people who

have taken part in discussion events or surveys organized by The Genron NPO. Among them were business

leaders, academics, journalists and government officials in Japan. Valid responses obtained were 627.. The

highest levels of educational attainment of the respondents were as follows: bachelor’s degree 67.5% and

master’s degree 24.4%. Unlike general public, 79.9% of the respondents have visited China and 76.4% of them

have Chinese acquaintances to whom they can converse with..

The expert survey in China was based on a sample list generated from the Horizon Research Consultancy

Group panel data, including business leaders, government officials, journalists, experts and public organization

officials. The poll was conducted between August 20 and September 24. Valid responses obtained were 400.

These samples were analyzed as views among well-informed people in China.

＜Survey Overview＞

3


1. Impressions of Each Other’s Country Among Japanese and Chinese Public

■Impressions of Each Other’s Country among Japanese and Chinese Public

The “unfavorable” impression of each other’s country is showing the sign of recovery from the worst level of the

past couple of years. The percentage of Chinese who has a “favorable” impression grew over 10 percentage

points from last year.

The percentage of Japanese who has an “unfavorable” impression (including “relatively unfavorable”) remain

high but has lowered slightly to 88.8% when compared with the highest-ever figure of 93.0% from last year’s

survey.

Of the Chinese respondents, 78.3% express an “unfavorable” impression of Japan, falling below the 80% mark,

down from last year’s 86.8%. In comparison to 2013 when the “unfavorable” impression toward Japan marked

its highest level (2013: 92.8%) since the beginning of the survey, in 2005, this year’s figure shows

14-percentage-point improvement. As another noticeable finding, 21.4% of the Chinese respondents have a

“favorable” impression (including “relatively favorable”) of Japan, which is an increase of over 10 percentage

points from 11.3% in 2014.

【Impressions of Each Other’s Country】

15.1%

11.8%

33.1%

24.1% 26.6%

27.3%

20.8% 15.6%

9.6%

6.8% 10.6%

37.9%

36.4%

66.3%

75.6% 73.2% 72.0%

78.3% 79.3% 90.1%

93.0%

88.8%

11.6%

14.5% 24.4%

27.3%

32.6% 38.3%

28.6% 31.8%

5.2%

11.3%

21.4%

62.9%

56.9%

36.5% 40.6%

65.2%

55.9%

65.9% 64.5%

92.8%

86.8%

78.3%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Japanese Public: Favorable/Relatively Favorable Japanese Public: Unfavorable/Relatively Unfavorable

Chinese Public: Favorable/Relatively Favorable Chinese Public: Unfavorable/Relatively Unfavorable

4


■Reasons Behind the Impressions of Each Other’s Country

“China’s traditional culture and history” are most frequently cited reasons for Japanese people’s favorable

impression of China. “People-to-people exchanges” also contribute to a favorable impression. Many of the

Chinese respondents refer to Japanese people’s character as a reason for their favorable impression of Japan.

On the Japanese side, 35.8% (2014: 38.2%) of the respondents cite their interest in “China’s traditional culture

and history” as reasons for their favorable impression. This is the most frequently mentioned reason. Following

this, 34.0% (2014: 39.7%) of the respondents mention that due to “direct interaction with Chinese people,

particularly with Chinese students in Japan, they are becoming familiar” and it contributes to favorable

impression of China.

As reasons for a favorable impression of Japan, 57.0% (2014: 52.6%) of the Chinese respondents mention that

“Japanese are polite, and have good manners and high cultural standards.” The second most frequently cited

reason is that “Japanese are earnest, diligent and hard-working” with 47.2% (2014: 53.8%). Overall,

satisfactory views of Japanese people’s national character are behind their favorable impression of Japan. A

significant increase can be seen in the reason “because of the remarkable economic growth,” which has grown

17 percentage points to 36.8% from 19.7% last year.

The most frequently mentioned reason for an “unfavorable” impression of China among Japanese people is

“criticism of Japan over historical issues,” (55.1%, 2014: 52.2%). Second is the reason that “China’s actions to

secure resource, energy and food look selfish,” (53.0%, 2014: 52.8%). These are the two reasons mentioned

by the majority of Japanese respondents. The most frequently cited reason from last year’s poll “China’s

actions are incompatible with international rules” came third with 47.9% (2014: 55.1%). The percentage of

those who mentioned that “confrontation continues over the Senkaku Islands” fell to 46.4% (2014: 50.4%),

showing thedecrease for the third consecutive year. A noticeable increase is seen in the reason “China’s

military buildup and non-transparency is evident,” (31.2%, 2014: 39.2%).

As reasons for the unfavorable impression of Japan on the Chinese side, 70.5% of the Chinese respondents

mention “Japan’s lack of a proper apology and remorse over the history of invasion of China.” This is the most

frequently cited reason and increased of over 10 percentage points from 59.6% last year. “Japanese purchase

of the Diaoyu Islands for the nation and fueling the confrontation” is cited by 68.1% (2014: 64.0%). These two

reasons are prominent in comparison to other reasons, as was the case with last year’s survey.

5


【Reasons for Favorable Impression】

Japanese Public

Chinese Public

21.7%

34.0%

35.8%

21.7%

31.1%

13.2%

4.7%

8.5%

10.4%

11.3%

7.5%

0.0%

19.1%

39.7%

38.2%

19.1%

13.2%

5.9%

14.7%

11.8%

7.4%

11.8%

0.0%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

Because as Chinese economy develop, the standard of living hasimproved

Because of direct interaction with Chinese people, particularly withChinese students in Japan, they are becoming familiar

Because I am interested in Chinese traditional culture and Chinesehistory

Because I am interested in current Chinese culture such as music andliterature

Because I am interested in Chinese sightseeing spots and nature

Because Chinese people are earnest and hardworking

Because of the words and actions of Chinese people exhibit a massivescale of their perspective

Because Chinese products are cheap and attractive

Because China has started acting as a great power in the internationalsociety

Others

No particular reason

No response2015

2014

36.8%

47.2%

57.0%

43.0%

40.1%

33.5%

11.6%

11.0%

0.9%

0.0%

0.3%

0.3%

19.7%

53.8%

52.6%

57.2%

41.0%

18.5%

11.0%

2.9%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

Because of the remarkable economic growth

Because Japanese people are earnest and hardworking

Because Japanese people are kind and have good manners and highcultural standards

Because Japanese products are high quality

Because Japan has beautiful environments, seanic landscapes, andmany natural torist spots such as hot springs

Because of the advanced technology from Japan

Because Japanese culture is attractive

Because Japanese society is stable due to its infrastructure and legalsystem

Because Japan has been operating a substantial Oversea DevelopmentAssistance (ODA) for a long time

Others


No response

2015

2014

6


【Reasons for Unfavorable Impression】

Japanese Public

Chinese Public

26.8%

4.7%

55.1%

29.6%

53.0%

39.2%

31.0%

46.4%

47.9%

41.7%

17.1%

11.1%

2.6%

0.1%

25.7%

3.3%

52.2%

28.7%

52.8%

31.2%

29.4%

50.4%

55.1%

41.1%

18.4%

14.5%

2.3%

0.1%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

Different political system

Past acts of aggression

Criticism of Japan over historical issues

Can't understand Chinese people's patriotic acts and views

China's actions to secure resource, energy and food lookselfish

China's military buildup and non transparency is evident

China's action appears to be hegemonic

Confrontation continues over the Senkaku Islands

China's action incompatible with international rules

Chinese media's anti-Japan coverage

Chinese people's entrenched nationalism

Others


No response

2015

2014

70.5%

41.1%

68.1%

33.4%

30.4%

19.8%

15.9%

22.2%

0.2%

0.0%

0.0%

59.6%

41.8%

64.0%

31.3%

31.6%

21.3%

14.5%

17.2%

0.4%

0.0%

0.0%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

Japan's lack of a proper apology and remorse over thehistory of invasion of China

Japan's attempt to besiege China on military, economic andideological fronts in cooperation with the United States

Japanese purchase of the Diaoyu Islands for the nation andfueling the confrontation

Some Japanese politicians' careless remarks

Japanese media's moves to play up China's threat

Japanese people's entrenched nationalism

Japan’s failure to seriously grapple with bilateral relations, focusing only on economic profits

Japan’s arrogant behavior of looking down on China

Others


No response

2015

2014

7


■How the Japanese and Chinese people See the Current State of National Sentiments Toward Each Other’s

Country

Over 70% of the Japanese respondents and over 50% of the Chinese respondents are showing their concern

over the deteriorating national sentiments toward each other’s country that “this is an undesirable situation” and

“the situation needs to be resolved.” Yet, more than 30% of the Chinese respondents observed that “the

situation is natural and can be understood.”

The percentage of Japanese who observed that “this is an undesirable situation and I have concerns” is 31.0%

(2014: 32.5%) and “the situation is a problem and it needs to be resolved” is mentioned by 43.9% (2014:

46.9%). When combined, over 70% of Japanese indicates their concern over the current states of national

sentiments between Japan and China.

On the Chinese side, 20.7% (2014: 35.2%) responded that “this is an undesirable situation and I have

concerns.” 34.9% (2014: 35.2%) of the Chinese respondents think that “the situation is a problem and it needs

to be resolved”. If combined, the majority of Chinese respondents see the situation as concerns while three in

ten Chinese respondents see that “the situation is natural and it can be understood” (31.5%).

【The Sense of Problem Perception on the Current State】

Japanese Public Chinese Public

A 9.6%

B 31.0%

C 43.9%

D 15.1%

E 0.4%

A 31.5%

B 20.7%

C 34.9%

D 12.7%

E 0.2%

The situation is natural

and can be understood

The situation is a problem

and it needs to be resolved

This is an undesirable

situation, I have concerns

A

C

B

D Don’t know

No response E

8


2. Basic Understanding Between Japan and China

■Matters Associated with Each Other’s Country

Chinese respondents who associate “the Nanjing Massacre” when they think of Japan increase significantly,

indicating the “historical” understanding have come to the fore again in Japan-China relations.

On the question of “what comes to mind when you think of China,” the most common answer among Japanese

respondents was “air pollution” at 36.8%, as was the case with last year (2014: 41.2%) and the second was

“Chinese cuisine,” (33.7%, 2014: 34.0%). “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands” was down to 19.9% from 28.6% last

year, slipping below 20%. This indicates that the issues relating to Senkaku is calming down in the Japanese

national sentiment.

With regard to “what comes to mind when you think of Japan” on the part of Chinese respondents, the most

frequently cited answer was the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands at 50.6%, as was the case with last year (2014:

46.6%). “The Nanjing Massacre” came second most popular, which is also same as last year, but the

percentage has grown sharply to 47.9% from 35.5% in 2014, indicating that the spotlight is again on the

history-related issues for Chinese public. Nevertheless, increases can also be seen in answers, which have no

political/historical implications, such as sakura (cherry blossoms) (35.0%, 2014: 28.2%).

When asked about “Chinese political leaders whom you know,” Mao Zedong remains as the most common

answer among Japanese respondents, with 90.1% (2014: 92.0%), showing that China’s past political leaders

are likely to be recognized by Japanese people. President Xi Jinping is known by 69.8% of the Japanese

respondents, showing an increase of 11 percentage points from 58.8% in 2014.

With regard to “Japanese political leaders whom you know,” Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is referred to by 83.6%

of the Chinese respondents, up from 75.2% last year.

9


【Things Comes to Mind When You Think of Each Other’s Country】


33.7%

13.8%

22.7%

3.2%

3.6%

9.6%

13.4%

21.1%

13.9%

18.9%

10.4%

1.6%

6.3%

2.7%

9.0%

0.8%

29.6%

1.6%

19.9%

36.8%

10.8%

4.6%

0.3%

34.0%

16.5%

22.5%

2.5%

4.1%

6.9%

13.3%

24.1%

11.9%

14.3%

7.9%

0.8%

4.0%

2.0%

9.7%

0.7%

24.8%

1.0%

28.6%

41.2%

9.0%

3.6%

0.1%

0%10%20%30%40%50%

Chinese cuisine

Reasonable daily products

The Great Wall

Views of the Yangtze Riverand the Yellow River

Confucianism and Taoism

Economic development, greateconomic power

Income inequality

Yellow dust

Large population and theOne-Child Policy

The Communist Party ofChina, Communism

Media blackout, censorship

The People's Liberation Army

Second Sino-Japanese War

The Cultural Revolution

Tiananmen Square protestsof 1989

Japan's OverseaDevelopment Assistance to…

Anti-Japan sentiments,demonstrations

Owning nuclear weapon

The Senkaku/Diaoyu issues

Air pollution

Antagonism over territories inthe East China Sea

Others

No response

2015

2014

35.0%

33.9%

16.8%

5.3%

50.6%

15.2%

5.2%

47.9%

16.3%

1.8%

0.6%

0.8%

1.1%

20.7%

1.7%

1.1%

0.8%

0.6%

6.4%

3.7%

5.2%

9.8%

0.0%

0.1%

28.2%

33.6%

16.4%

8.3%

46.6%

12.5%

6.2%

35.5%

9.7%

0.8%

1.9%

3.1%

2.5%

20.5%

4.9%

2.7%

1.8%

1.7%

5.2%

2.9%

18.2%

17.7%

0.0%

0.1%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

Sakura

Electronic Products

Japanese Cuisine

Droppings of atmic bombs onHiroshima and Nagasaki

The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands

Mt. Fuji

Bushido

Nanking Massacre

Yasukuni Shrine

The U.S. army bases

Japan's Oversea DevelopmentAssistance to China

Shinkansen (high-speed bullettrain)

Article 9 of the Japaneseconstitution

Japanese Army before andduring the WWII

Sumo

Scientific technology

The bubble economy

Meiji Restration

Manga, Anime

Fukushima nuclear power plantaccident

Earth quake, tsunami

Japanese cars

Others

No response

2015

2014

10


【Name Recognition of Politicians from Each Other’s Country】


83.6%

23.8%

16.7%

53.3%

6.6%

11.7%

16.0%

4.6%

6.8%

8.1%

0.0%

75.2%

16.3%

10.7%

42.8%

7.6%

9.9%

12.9%

4.8%

4.5%

10.5%

0.6%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Shinzo Abe

Yukio Hatoyama

Yasuo Fukuda

Junichiro Koizumi

Yasuhiro Nakasone

Masayoshi Ohira

Kakuei Tanaka

Shigeru Yoshida

Tomiichi Murayama

None recognized

No response

2015

2014

69.8%

15.2%

63.3%

49.0%

57.9%

51.7%

51.3%

90.1%

4.3%

0.1%

58.8%

10.1%

67.4%

62.7%

61.2%

59.2%

55.8%

92.0%

5.0%

0.0%

0%20%40%60%80%100%

Xi Jinping

Li Keqiang

Hu Jintao

Wen Jiabao

Jiang Zemin

Deng Xiaoping

Zhou Enlai

Mao Zedong

None recognized

No response

2015

2014

11


■Perception of Social/Political Systems of Each Other’s Country

Japanese people view China as a socialist/communist country, which was the same as last year, whereas the

percentage of Chinese who view Japan as a militarist country has increased nearly 10 percentage points from

last year.

Nearly 70% of the Japanese view the socio-political system of China to be socialism/communism (69.0%, 2014:

66.6%). This figure has been relatively consistent for the past 11 years; it has been cited by the large majority

(at about 70%) in the past 10 surveys and has been the most common understanding of China among

Japanese general public.

On the question of Japanese socio-political system, the most frequently cited answer by Chinese respondents

is “militarism” (46.0%), showing a sharp increase by 10 percentage points and surpassing “capitalism,” which

was the most common understanding of Japanese society in last year’s survey (42.9%, 2014: 39.7%).

Fundamental principles, which Japan has upheld since the end of WWII, are cited by only a fraction of

Chinese respondents. For example, “pacifism” is cited by only 9.2% (2014: 10.5%), “democracy” 13.1% (2014:

14.4%) and “the principle of international cooperation” 9.2% (2014: 6.7%).

【Perception of Socio-Political System of Each Other’s Country】


66.6%

6.8%

44.0%

4.1%

39.4%

2.2%

19.9%

1.5%

24.1%

11.3%

0.0%

3.3%

69.0%

7.6%

40.1%

3.6%

35.9%

2.1%

22.6%

2.0%

22.5%

13.7%

0.7%

2.8%

0%20%40%60%80%

Socialism/communism

Capitalism

Totalitarianism (one-party dictatorship)

Democracy

Militarism

Pacifism

Hegemonism

International cooperation

Great power favoritism

Ethnicism

Others

No response

2015

2014

9.2%

25.6%

28.9%

13.1%

46.0%

9.2%

42.9%

11.1%

12.2%

40.1%

0.0%

1.0%

10.5%

37.5%

25.8%

14.4%

36.5%

6.7%

39.7%

16.4%

14.6%

36.7%

0.0%

2.4%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

Pacifism

Nationalism

Ethnicism

Democracy

Militarism

International cooperation

Capitalism

Liberalism

Great power favoritism

Hegemonism

Others

No response

2015

2014

12


3. The Present and Future of Japan-China Relations

■The Present and Future of Japan-China Relations

The perception of present Japan-China relations among the Japanese people has significantly improved since

last year: the percentage of Japanese who view Japan-China relations as “bad” is down by sizable 10

percentage points. The percentage of Chinese people who perceive the relationship with Japan as “bad” has

declined, but the trend toward further improvement has come to a halt.

As to prospects for the future relations between Japan and China, those who foresee a worsening of the

situation have decreased on both sides, whereas Chinese are less confident than Japanese about whether the

bilateral relationship will improve steadily from now on.

Japanese respondents who view present Japan-China relations as “bad” (including “relatively bad”) was 71.9%,

but this was a significant improvement of over 10 percentage points from 83.4% last year.

The view that the current bilateral relations are “bad” was expressed by 67.2% among Chinese respondents.

This improved from the record high 90.3% in the 2013 survey, but the trend has not shown much improvement

since last year.

For the future prospects of the Japan-China relations, the largest fraction of 42.5% (2014: 34.7%), among

Japanese respondents is expecting the relationship between Japan and China will remain the same. But those

who expect a “worsening” of the situations (including “relatively get worse”) decreased sharply to 24.7% from

36.8% last year. Those who foresee an “improvement” in Japan-China relation grew to 12.7% from 8.0% last

year. This indicates that optimism is emerging in the perception about the course of bilateral relations.

Of the Chinese respondents, those who expect “worsening” of bilateral relation decreased to 41.1% from 49.8%

in the 2014 survey. However, there was no increase in those who expect the situation to improve, indicating that

the Chinese are less confident than the Japanese that the bilateral relationship will improve steadily.

13


【Current State of Japan-China Relations】

【Future of Japan-China Relations】

2.1% 3.7%

6.5% 13.0%

15.0%

22.0%

8.8% 7.4%

2.4% 1.3% 2.4%

74.0% 69.0%

53.1%

46.1%

36.9%

28.7%

51.7% 53.7%

79.7%

83.4%

71.9%

10.5% 10.4%

24.9%

54.3%

72.0% 74.5%

54.5%

42.9%

5.9%

15.0% 12.0%

54.9%

41.2%

24.7%

13.1%

20.5%

18.6%

32.3%

41.0%

90.3%

67.2% 67.2%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Japanese Public: Good/Relatively Good Japanese Public: Bad/Relatively Bad

Chinese Public: Good/Relatively Good Chinese Public: Bad/Relatively Bad

26.9%

18.2%

40.9%

32.3% 31.1%

40.6%

24.0%

20.3%

13.1% 8.0% 12.7% 14.2% 15.2%

7.6%

15.5% 13.0% 11.4% 22.2%

23.6% 28.3%

36.8%

24.7%

42.7% 41.4%

73.1%

81.0%

51.7%

60.2%

44.7%

37.3%

15.1% 17.7% 17.5%

46.6%

20.1% 17.1%

2.7% 4.6% 5.1% 10.7%

18.8%

45.3% 49.8%

41.1%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Japanese Public: Will Improve/Will Probably Improve

Japanese Public: Will Get Worse/Will Probably Get Worse

Chinese Public: Will Improve/Will Probably Improve

Chinese Public: Will Get Worse/Will Probably Get Worse

14


■Obstacles to Development of Japan-China Relations

Both the Japanese and Chinese continue to perceive antagonism over the territorial issues as a major obstacle

to further development of bilateral relations. At the same time, those who are concerned with the lack of mutual

trust between the Japanese and Chinese governments and peoples are on the rise in both countries.

The biggest concern perceived by Japanese in Japan-China relations is “antagonism over territorial issues (the

Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands)” (56.0%), as was the case with last year (2014; 58.6%). The second biggest concern

was the lack of trust between the Japanese and Chinese governments (38.2%, 2014: 35.0%). A lack of trust

between the two countries’ peoples was mentioned by 25.9% (2014: 25.5%). Combined, more than 60% of the

Japanese respondents see the lack of confidence between the governments and the peoples of the two

countries as an obstacle to improving bilateral relations. The second most frequently cited answer in the 2014

survey “China’s historical understanding and historical education,” was mentioned by only 26.3% in this year’s

survey, which shows a sizable decline from 42.9% last year.

On the Chinese side, the largest percentage of respondents (66.4%, 2014: 64.8%) cited the “antagonism over

the territorial issues” as a major obstacle, as was the case with last year. Similar to the findings from the

Japanese opinion poll, more and more Chinese public are concerned about a lack of confidence between the

two governments and peoples, and has been seen as obstacles to improving bilateral relations. When

combined, more than 40% of the Chinese respondents see a lack of trust between the governments (25.5%,

2014: 25.4%) and between Japanese and Chinese people (20.8%, 2014: 15.5%) as problematic.

15


【Barriers to Development of Bilateral Relations】


25.9%

38.2%

26.6%

56.0%

4.9%

4.8%

14.3%

3.9%

24.7%

7.4%

26.3%

3.5%

8.5%

3.6%

24.3%

1.8%

1.3%

25.5%

35.0%

22.0%

58.6%

8.5%

3.4%

9.6%

2.3%

22.0%

6.5%

42.9%

3.7%

12.3%

4.1%

19.5%

1.6%

0.9%

0%20%40%60%80%

Lack of trusting relations betweenJapanese and Chinese peoples

Lack of trust between theJapanese and Chinese

governments

Disputes over marine resources(gas field development in East

China Sea)

Territorial issue (Senkaku/DiaoyuIslands)

Economic friction (i.e. tradebarriers, technology transfer,

intellectual properties)

Japan’s security policy and military buildup

China’s military buildup

Nationalism and anti-Chinesesentiment among Japanese

people

Nationalism and anti-Japanesesentiment among Chinese people

Japan’s historical understanding and historical education

China’s anti-Japanese education

Japanese politicians’ statements inciting anti-Chinese sentiment

Chinese politicians’ statements inciting anti-Japanese sentiment

Anti-Chinese coverage inJapanese media

Anti-Japanese coverage inChinese media

Others

No response

2015

2014

20.8%

25.5%

25.0%

66.4%

15.9%

14.6%

12.0%

11.0%

7.1%

31.5%

9.1%

17.4%

3.6%

7.5%

1.1%

0.0%

0.3%

15.5%

25.4%

30.1%

64.8%

20.1%

17.8%

9.2%

8.4%

3.7%

31.9%

12.5%

14.6%

2.8%

6.6%

0.3%

0.0%

0.3%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

Lack of trusting relations betweenChinese and Japanese peoples

Lack of trust between the Chineseand Japanese governments

Disputes over marine resources(gas field development in the East

China Sea)

Territorial issue (Diaoyu/SenkakuIslands)

Economic friction (i.e. tradebarriers, technology transfer,

intellectual properties)

Change in Japan’s security policy and military buildup

China’s military buildup

Nationalism and anti-Japanesesentiment among Chinese people

Nationalism and anti-Chinesesentiment among Japanese

people

Japan’s historical understanding and historical education

China’s historical understanding and historical education

Japanese politicians’ inappropriate statements and

actions

Chinese politicians’ inappropriate statements and actions

Anti-Chinese coverage inJapanese media

Anti-Japanese coverage inChinese media

Others

No response

2015

2014

16


■How Is the Importance of Japan-China Relations Viewed?

Those who regard Japan-China relations as important is on the rise and has surpassed 70% in both countries.

Japanese respondents who believe that Japan-China relations are “important” (including “relatively important”)

increased from 70.6% last year to 74.4% and from 65.0% last year to 70.1% for Chinese respondents.

As reasons for the importance of Japan-China relations, the largest number, 58.5% (2014: 53.4%), among

Japanese respondents think that because the two countries are important neighbors. The majority (55.2%,

2014: 55.8%) of Japanese respondents also believes that “the cooperation between Japan and China is

indispensable to peace and prosperity in Asia.” The findings indicate that the Japanese recognize the

importance of bilateral relations from a practical point of view.

In contrast, a prominent 66.8% of the Chinese respondents mentioned that the two countries are important

neighbors, an increase of over 20 percentage points from 45.5% for last year, indicating that their awareness

about the importance of Japan-China relations remains as an understanding based on general facts.

【Importance of Japan-China Relations】

17


76.5% 72.6% 73.8%

80.3% 82.1% 81.5%

77.6%

80.3%

74.1% 70.6%

74.4%

4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 3.2%

2.9% 2.5% 4.3% 3.3% 5.9% 7.5% 6.8%

71.2% 67.2%

86.6%

90.1% 92.5%

83.1%

78.4%

72.3%

65.0%

70.1%

8.1% 10.3%

2.3%

5.1% 0.5%

14.8% 15.8%

24.0%

18.7% 14.2%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Japanese Public: Important/Relatively Important Japanese Public: Unimportant/Relatively Unimportant

Chinese Public: Important/Relatively Important Chinese Public: Unimportant/Relatively Unimportant

18


■Effective Measures for Improving Japan-China Relations

Among Japanese respondents, the most popular measure to improve Japan-China relations is the

“strengthening of political and security cooperation.” On the other hand, Chinese think that “the strengthening of

economic relations” is the most effective.

The most common reply among Japanese respondents on effective measures for better Japan-China relations

was the strengthening of political and security relations at 32.6%, which was followed by “promote

cooperation on global issues” (19.1%).

For Chinese respondents, the most common reply was the “strengthening of economic relations” with 31.8%.

Second was the “promotion of civil dialogue and cultural exchange” (22.4%).

【Effective Measures to Improve Japan-China Relations】


10.7%

19.1%

32.6%

18.8%

2.9%

14.8%

1.1%

0%20%40%

31.8%

15.8%

21.3%

22.4%

0.5%

1.8%

6.4%

0% 20% 40%

Strengthen Economic Relations

Promote Cooperation on Global Issues

Strengthen Political and Security Cooperation

Civil Dialogue and Cultural Exchange

Others

Don’t know

No response

19


4. Importance of Relations with Japan/China and Relations with the U.S./South Korea

■Importance of Relations With Japan/China In Comparison Too Relations With the U.S. and Affinity Toward

Respective Countries

When respondents compare importance of relations between Japan and China, and their respective relations

with the United States, the largest percentages of Japanese and Chinese respondents say that “both are

equally important.” But significantly fewer Chinese respondents say that Japan-China relations are more

important.

In a comparative analysis of affinity toward each other’s country between Japan and China, and their

respective affinity toward the U.S., the majority of Japanese feel a greater affinity toward the U.S. while nearly

half of Chinese feel no affinity toward Japan nor the U.S. Less than 10% of Japanese and Chinese

respondents feel “more affinity toward each other’s country.”

When the importance of Japan-China relations and Japan-U.S. relations are compared, 55.1% (2014: 50.1%)

of Japanese respondents replied that both are equally important. Those who believe that Japan-U.S. relations

are more important came to 34.4% (2014: 36.4%). But those who see Japan-China relations as more important

accounted for only 3.1% (2014: 3.7%).

Of Chinese respondents, the largest number, 49.9%, replied that both relations are equally important, an

increase of almost 10 percentage points from 40.3% in the 2014 survey. Following this, 22.8% (2014: 22.5%) of

Chinese respondents replied that relations between China and the U.S. are more important. The percentage of

those who believe Japan-China relations are more important came to 14.5%, down 8 percentage points from

22.0% last year.

As to affinity toward each other’s country among Japanese and Chinese respondents, and affinity they feel

toward the U.S., 53.5% (2014: 55.7%) of the Japanese respondents felt a greater affinity toward the U.S. 49.6%

of the Chinese respondents felt no affinity toward either Japan or the U.S.,(2014: 44.4%). The percentage of

Japanese and Chinese respondents who feel affinity toward each other’s country remained below 10% on both

sides, 4.4% (2014: 5.6%) among the Japanese and 6.1% (2014: 4.4%).among the Chinese

20


A More affinity felt

toward each other

(China/Japan)

B More affinity felt

toward the U.S.

C Equal affinity felt

toward both

D No affinity felt toward

either

E Don’t know

F No response

【The Importance of Relations with Japan/China and Relations with the United States】

Japanese public Chinese public

【Affinity Between Japan and China, and Toward the U.S.】


A 36.4%

A 34.4%

B 3.7% B 3.1%

C 50.1%

C 55.1%

D 9.8% D 7.4%

E 0.0% E 0.0%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2014

（N=1000)

2015

（N=1000)

A 22.5%

A 22.8%

B 22.0%

B 14.5%

C 40.3%

C 49.9%

D 14.0%

D 12.7%

E 1.2% E 0.1%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2014(N=1539)

2015(N=1570)

A 5.6% A 4.4%

B 55.7%

B 53.5%

C 8.9% C

11.5%

D 19.5%

D 19.4%

E 9.9% E

11.2%

F 0.4% F 0.0%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2014

（N=1000)

2015

（N=1000)

A 4.4% A 6.1%

B 30.7%

B 28.9%

C 11.8%

C 7.5%

D 44.4%

D 49.6%

E 8.4% E 7.8%

F 0.3% F 0.2%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2014(N=1539)

2015(N=1570)

The relations with the

U.S. are more important

than relations with

Japan/China

Both are of equal

importance

A

C

B

D Don’t know

No response E

Relations with

Japan/China are more

important than relations

with the U.S.U.S.

relations

21


■Importance of Japan-China relations and Relations with South Korea and Affinity Toward Respective

Countries

When asked to compare the importance of Japan-China relations and the relationship with South Korea,

Japanese who think “relationship with South Korea is more important” has decreased, accounting for no more

than 10%. For Chinese public, more than three in ten think that China-South Korea relationship is more

important.

On the question of comparing affinity toward each other’s country and toward South Korea, the percentage of

people who feel “more affinity toward South Korea” decreased among Japanese public by 10 percentage points

while the comparative figure has increased among Chinese public by 10 percentage points.

When comparing the importance of Japan-China and Japan-South Korea relations, 54.3% (2014: 47.0%) of

Japanese respondents replied that “both are equally important.” The number of Japanese respondents who

believe Japan-China relations are more important grew to 23.5% from 15.6% in the 2014 survey. In contrast,

those who believe Japan-South Korea relations are more important came only to 6.3%, decreased from 12.4%

a year before.

Although “Both are equally important” was most frequently cited by Chinese respondents, at 43.2% (2014:

43.5%), the reply that “China-South Korea relations are more important” (35.5%, 2014: 33.3%) came second,

far surpassing 9.0% (2014: 6.5%), who see China-Japan relations are more important.

In a comparison of affinity toward each other’s country among Japanese and Chinese respondents, and their

respective affinity toward South Korea, the number of Japanese who feel greater affinity toward South Korea

significantly declined to 26.3% from 37.2% in the 2014 survey. Japanese who feel more affinity toward China is

only 8.8% (2014: 5.0%). The most common choice among Japanese respondents was that they feel no affinity

toward either China or South Korea (39.5%, 2014 31.8%) .

For Chinese, those who feel more affinity toward South Korea have grown almost 10 percentage points to

62.1% from 52.7% a year earlier. Only 4.4% (2014: 3.5%) replied that they feel more affinity toward Japan.

22


A More affinity felt

toward each other

(China/Japan)

B More affinity felt

toward South

Korea

C Equal Affinity felt

toward both

D No Affinity felt

toward either

E Don’t know

F No response

【The Importance of China-Japan Relations and Relations with South Korea】


【Affinity between Japan and China, and toward South Korea】


※2014 Japanese result is from the 2nd Japan-South Korea Joint Opinion Poll (The Genron NPO/EAI)

A 15.6% A

23.5% B

12.4% B 6.3%

C 47.0% C

54.3%

D 24.7% D

15.8%

E 0.3% E 0.1%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2014

（N=1000)

2015

（N=1000)

A 6.5% A 9.0%

B 33.3% B

35.5%

C 43.5% C

43.2%

D 16.1%

D 12.1%

E 0.6% E 0.1%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2014

（N=1539)

2015

（N=1570)

A 5.0% A 8.8%

B 37.2%

B 26.3%

C 10.2%

C 13.5%

D 31.8%

D 39.5%

E 15.8%

E 11.8%

F 0.0% F 0.1%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2014

（N=1000)

2015

（N=1000)

A 3.5% A 4.4%

B 52.7% B

62.1%

C 12.0%

C 6.9%

D 21.8% D

20.9%

E 9.5%

E 5.6% F 0.5% F 0.1%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2014(N=1539)

2015(N=1570)

Japan-South Korea

relations are more

Both are of equal

Japan-China relations

are more important

A

C

B

D

No response E

Don’t know

23


5. Intergovernmental Diplomacy

■Issues That Must Be Discussed at Japan-China Summits

Japanese believe that the Japanese and Chinese leaders should have a broad range of discussions toward

improving the relations at their next summit, whereas Chinese believe that they should discuss specific issues

such as the “territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands” and matters related to their “historical

understandings.”

As to what agenda must be discussed at the next Japan-China summit, the most popular agenda among

Japanese respondents is a “broad range of discussions toward improving relations between the two countries”

with 43.6% (2014: 45.8%).

On the other hand, the most popular agenda for a summit among Chinese respondents is “the territorial dispute

over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands” with 49.7% (2014: 49.2%). This is followed by “issues of historical

understanding” with 38.3% (2014: 38.1%).

24


【Issues That Should Be Discussed At a Japan-China Summit】

20.0%

43.6%

20.1%

21.8%

5.3%

5.1%

24.6%

14.7%

12.5%

1.0%

8.9%

0.4%

20.3%

26.8%

38.3%

18.2%

8.1%

11.1%

49.7%

13.6%

3.4%

0.0%

0.7%

0% 20% 40% 60%

Building trusts between the political leaders of both countries

A broad ranging discussion on how to improve relations betweenboth countries

Issues of historical understanding

Intergovernmental cooperative programs for the future of the bothcountries such as economy and culture

Various public exchange programs

Strengthen cooperative relation on trade and investment, creation ofa free trade zone

The territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

Security risk management, for example, to prevent accidentalconfrontation on the East China Sea or in the airspace over it

Building a peaceful environment in the whole Northeast Asian region

Others

Don't know

No response

Japanese Public

Chinese Public

25


6. Prime Minister Abe’s Statement on the 70th Anniversary of the End of WWII

■Views on the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Statement Issued on the 70th Anniversary of the End

of WWII

Japanese opinion on the Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s statement is divided while over 70% of Chinese

respondents are not satisfied with the statement

Japanese respondents are divided in their views of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s statement to commemorate the

70th anniversary of the end of WWII, issued on August 14, 2015. Those who believe that the statement was

“satisfactory” (including “somewhat satisfactory”) accounted for 32.1%. This surpassed 22.2% for those who

consider the statement was “unsatisfactory” (including “not very satisfactory”). The reply “just can’t say either”

was 23.2% .

In contrast, 74.1% of the Chinese respondents regard that the prime minister’s statement was “unsatisfactory”

(including “not very satisfactory,”) whereas favorable opinion toward the Abe statement (“satisfactory” and

“somewhat satisfactory”) were cited only by 9.5% of the Chinese respondents.

【Views on the Abe Statement on the 70th Anniversary of the End of WWII】

Japanese Public

A 10.5%

B 21.6%

C 23.2%

D 14.8%

E 7.4%

F 22.4%

G 0.1%

A Satisfactory

B Somewhat satisfactory

C Neither

D Not very satisfactory

E Unsatisfactory

F Don’t Know

G No response

26


Chinese Public

A Satisfactory

B Somewhat

satisfactory

C Not very satisfactory

D Unsatisfactory

E Don’t Know

F No response

A 0.5%

B 9.0%

C 42.7%

D 31.4%

E 15.4%

F 1.0%

27


7. Civil-Sector Exchanges

■Views About Visits to Each Other’s Country

Over 60% of respondents on both sides continue to feel that they “do not want to visit” each other’s country.

But those who “would like to visit” each other’s country increased in both country. In particular, the percentage

of Chinese respondents who want to visit Japan shows a significant increase by 13 percentage points.

Of the Japanese respondents, 32.9% answered that they “would like to visit China,” a slight increase from

29.6% a year earlier. The percentage of Japanese respondents who “do not want to visit” China decreased to

67.0%, from 70.4% last year.

Chinese respondents who said that they “would like to visit Japan” accounted for 35.7%, a significant increase

from 22.5% a year before. There is also a decrease in the percentage of Chinese who “do not want to visit”

Japan (63.2%, 2014: 72.6%).

As reasons for Japanese people’s desire to visit China, 69.0% of respondents said that they wish to visit

“historical and cultural sites,” while 66.9% of them said they want to visit“ natural and sightseeing spots.” These

tourism-related reasons were prominent for Japanese respondents.

As for reasons why Chinese people want desire to visit Japan, as many as 88.0% of respondents replied that

they wish to visit “natural and tourist spots” in Japan. One interesting finding was that 36.3% of the Chinese

respondents mentioned shopping as a purpose for visit to Japan, which surpassed the corresponding figure of

16.4% for Japanese respondents who want to visit China for shopping.

【Desire to Visit Each Other’s Country】


C 0.1%

C 0.0%

B 67.0%

B 70.4%

A 32.9%

A 29.6%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

20152014

C 1.1% C 4.8%

B 63.2%

B 72.6%

A 35.7%

A 22.5%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

20152014

Yes, I would like

to visit

A

C

B No, I don’t want

to visit

No response

28


■Views About People-To-People Exchange Among Japanese and Chinese Peoples

Respondents on both sides were divided over whether the current people-to-people exchanges are active

between Japan and China. Nevertheless, nearly 70% of the Japanese and nearly 80% of the Chinese see that

such exchanges are important for improving and developing relations between Japan and China.

Evaluations as to whether the current state of people-to-people exchanges are active, Japanese respondents

are divided with 36.5% viewing the situation as “not active” (including “not very active”) and 34.1% viewing the

situation as “active” (including “somewhat active”). The reply “Don’t know” accounted for29.1%. Similarly,

Chinese respondents were divided over the current state of these exchanges, with 47.9% saying the

exchange is “not active” and44.0% replying it is “active.”

On the question of whether people-to-people and civil-sector exchanges would contribute to developing

Japan-China relations, 67.1% (2014: 64.4%) of Japanese respondents see that people-to-people exchanges

are “important” (including “relatively important”). The comparable figure on the part of Chinese respondents has

grown by over 13 percentage points to 76.9% from 63.4% in the 2014 survey.

When asked about the reasons for the view that civil-sector exchanges are important, 71.7% (2014: 70.7%) of

the Japanese said they create “Mutual understanding between the publics of the two countries” and 66.2%

(2014: 66.8%) referred to “Deeper understanding of each other’s country.”

“Deeper understanding of each other’s country” was most frequently cited on the part of Chinese respondents,

with the percentage increased almost 20 percentage points to 51.9% from 32.3% a year before. In last year’s

survey, the largest number, 56.7%,of Chinese respondents noted that civil-sector exchanges will become “a

base for expanding the common benefits for both countries.” But the percentage declined in the latest survey to

43.3%.

【Importance of Civil/People-to-People Exchange Between Japan and China】


A 26.2%

A 16.4%

B 50.7%

B 47.0%

C 8.8%

C 16.0%

D 11.0%

D 13.9%

E 3.1% E 6.0%

F 0.3% F 0.8%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2015(N=1570)

2014(N=1539)

A 28.9%

A 28.1%

B 38.2%

B 36.3%

C 26.9%

C 27.8%

D 2.6% D 3.8% E 3.2% E 3.9% F 0.2% F 0.1%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2015(N=1000)

2014(N=1000) Important

Unimportant

Relatively important

A

C

B

D Relatively unimportant

E

No response

Neither / Depends

F

29


8. Historical Issues Between Japan and China

■ Implications of historical issues on the Japan-China relations

As to the implications of historical issues on the Japan-China relations, there has been a decline in the number

of Japanese people who see that “regardless of the state of the Japan-China relations, it would be difficult to

resolve the historical issues.” Instead, an optimistic view such as “the historical issues will be gradually

resolved, as relations between the two countries develop” is increasing. Conversely, optimistic views about the

course of relations between the two countries are decreasing in China: More people give greater emphasis on

the solution on the historical issues, noting that “China-Japan will not develop unless the historical issues are

resolved.”

As to Japan-China relations and historical issues between the two countries, the largest number of Japanese

respondents noted that “it would be difficult to resolve the historical issues, regardless of situations in

Japan-China relations” (35.3%), but there has been a decrease from 42.7% for last year. By contrast, 29.4% of

the Japanese observed that “as relations between the two countries develop, the historical issues will be

gradually resolved.” This was an increase from 22.2% for the previous year, indicating an emergence of

optimistic views in Japanese public opinion.

On the Chinese side, the percentage of those who believe that “China-Japan relations will not develop unless

the historical issues are resolved” grew significantly to47.0% from 31.4% in 2014. Consequently, the optimistic

view that “the historical issues will be gradually resolved as relations between Japan and China develop,” which

was the most frequently cited answer in last year’s survey, decreased by 7 percentage points to 27.6% from

34.1% last year. Thus, unlike the optimism seen in Japanese opinion, more Chinese people are giving

importance to solution of the historical issues.

As for historical issues that must be resolved between Japan and China, 56.1% (2014: 56.0%) of the Japanese

respondents cited “China’s anti-Japanese education and descriptions unfavorable to Japan in school textbooks.

But Japan’s view about its invasion of Asian countries in the wartime years was mentioned by 32.2% of the

Japanese, up from 25.7% for last year, indicating that an increasing number of Japanese see Japan’s attitude

itself as a problem.

On the Chinese side, 56.2% of respondents noted that Japan should respect the established theory about its

history of invasion in the wartime years, a sharp increase from 42.0% for last year. Further, 54.3% of the

Chinese called for Japan’s remorse and a serious apology over the history of invasion, as against 54.8% in last

year’s survey. Thus, issues related to Japan’s wartime acts were frequently cited by Chinese respondents.

30


【Development of Japan-China Relations and the Historical Issues】


A Relations will not

develop if issues of

historical understanding

are not resolved

B As relations

develop, issues of

historical

understanding will be

gradually resolved

D Don’t know

E No response C Regardless of the

situation in Japan-China

relations, it will be difficult

to resolve issues of

historical understanding*

A 20.7%

A 17.0%

B 29.4%

B 22.2%

C 35.3%

C 42.7%

D 14.6%

D 18.0%

E 0.0%

E 0.1%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2015

2014

A 47.0%

A 31.4%

B 27.6%

B 34.1%

C 20.6%

C 26.9%

D 4.6%

D 7.5%

E 0.2%

E 0.1%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2015

2014

※In 2014, it was ”Even if relations develop, it will be difficult to resolve issues of historical understanding”

31


【Historical Issues That Should Be Resolved】


32.2%

15.4%

23.2%

13.7%

11.3%

13.0%

7.2%

56.1%

28.5%

37.9%

2.3%

1.2%

15.8%

0.2%

25.7%

16.8%

23.6%

17.3%

13.4%

13.5%

5.3%

56.0%

33.9%

43.1%

2.7%

1.9%

16.9%

0.0%

0%20%40%60%

Japan’s perception of its invasions of China in the 20th century

The depiction of history intextbooks in Japanese schools

The lack of reparations by Japanon WWII, comfort women, and

forced labor

Japan's perception on NanjingMassacre

Japanese Politician's remarks onChina

Japanese media's news coverageof China

The lack of apology on thehistorical events by Japan

Anti-Japan education and thedepictions of history in textbooks in

Chinese schools

Chinese politicians' remarks onJapan

The Chinese media’s news coverage of Japan

Others

There are no more major issues tobe resolved

Don't know

No response2015

2014

56.2%

49.5%

45.2%

54.3%

22.2%

27.8%

9.6%

15.5%

4.8%

0.0%

0.1%

2.2%

0.1%

42.0%

51.7%

47.8%

54.8%

28.1%

30.5%

10.1%

16.9%

3.6%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

2.0%

0% 20% 40% 60%

The need for Japan to respect theChinese understandings of the war

of invasion

The need for history education tobe fair and objective in China

The need for Japan to makereparation for forced labor and

comfort women

The need for Japan to recognizeand apologize for its past invasions

The need for history education tobe fair and objective in China

The need for Japanese politiciansto refrain from inappropriate

remarks or behavior

The need for Chinese politicians torefrain from inappropriate remarks

or behavior

The need for the Japanese mediato practice fair and objective news

coverage of Japan

The need for the Chinese media topractice fair and objective news

coverage of Japan

Others

There are no more major issues tobe resolved

Don't know

No response2015

2014

32


■Japanese Prime Ministers’ Visits to Yasukuni Shrine

Nearly 70% of the Japanese see that Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine are acceptable, but

fewer Japanese believe that it is acceptable if the prime minister visits the shrine in an official capacity.. On the

Chinese side, over 60% of respondents maintain that the Japanese prime minister should not visit Yasukuni

Shrine, even if the visit was made as a private citizen.

A large majority of Japanese public see a prime minister’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine as acceptable. When

combined, close to 70% of Japanese respondents express their acceptance of the prime minister’s visit to

Yasukuni Shrine (including “if the visit is made as private citizen). That said, the percentage of Japanese

respondents who see that the prime minister’s official visit to the shrine is acceptable has declined from 47.7%

(2014) to 33.5%.

In contrast, 60.2% (2014: 59.5%) of the Chinese maintain that the Japanese prime minister should not visit the

shrine, regardless of if it was in an official capacity or as a private citizen.

【Japanese Prime Ministers’ Visits to Yasukuni Shrine】


A 33.5% A

40.7%

B 32.5% B

27.5%

C 15.7%

C 15.0%

D 18.2%

D 16.7%

E 0.1% E 0.1%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

20152014A

5.6% A

8.2%

B 20.1%

B 20.9%

C 60.2%

C 59.5%

D 13.6%

D 10.7%

E 0.5% E 0.6%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

20152014

No problem

Not acceptable even if the visit

is made as a private citizen

No problem if the visit is made

as a private citizen

A

C

B

D Don’t know

No response E

33


9. Territorial Dispute and Military Threats in East Asia

■Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and Territorial Dispute

In response to a question on how to resolve the territorial dispute between the two countries, the largest

percentage of Japanese respondents called for “both countries to promptly proceed toward negotiations in

order to resolve their issues through peaceful means.” On the Chinese side, the largest percentage of

respondents maintains that “China should strengthen its effective control over the area in order to protect the

territory,” but the number has declined from last year. The percentage of Chinese who call for “both countries to

promptly proceed toward negotiations in order to resolve their issues through peaceful means” grew over 10

percentage points to 43.6% from 32.6% last year.

The largest number of Japanese respondents (46.2%, 2014: 48.4%) called on “both countries to promptly

proceed toward negotiations in order to resolve their issues through peaceful means,” as was the case with last

year.

In contrast, 58.2% of Chinese respondents maintained that “China should strengthen its effective control over

the area in order to protect the territory.” While showing the 5 percentage point decrease from 63.7% (2014),

this was still the most frequently cited answer by the Chinese. The number of respondents who hope that “both

countries should promptly proceed toward negotiations in order to resolve their issues through peaceful means”

has increased over 10 percentage points from 32.6% in last year’s survey to 43.6% this year.

34


【How Should the Territorial Dispute Be Resolved?】


50.3%

58.2%

43.6%

22.5%

14.5%

15.6%

4.5%

0.1%

47.1%

63.7%

32.6%

26.1%

13.5%

13.7%

0.9%

0.3%

0% 20% 40% 60%

Through diplomaticnegotiation, Japan should be

made to acknowledge theexistence of the territorial

dispute

In order to protect theterritory, China should

strengthen its effective controlover the area

Both countries should engagein prompt negotiations,

aiming at a peacefulresolution of the issue

Prevention of an armedconflict must come before anyhasty attempts to resolve the

issue

The issue should be shelvedover the long term and

instead focus should be onjoint development

The matter should be taken tothe International Court ofJustice to be resolved in

accordance with internationallaw

Don't know

No response2015

2014

27.1%

46.2%

23.2%

7.5%

33.3%

11.4%

0.0%

22.7%

48.4%

27.1%

8.7%

41.2%

3.7%

0.5%

0%20%40%60%

In order to protect theterritory, Japan should

strengthen its effective control

Both countries shouldpromptly proceed towardnegotiations in order to

resolve their issues throughpeaceful means

Prevention of an armedconflict must come before anyhasty attempts to resolve the

issue

The issue should be shelvedover the long term and

instead focus should be onjoint development

The matter should be taken tothe International Court ofJustice to be resolved in

accordance with internationallaw

Don't know

No response2015

2014

35


■The Possibility of Military Conflict Between Japan and China Over Territorial Issues

As to whether a military conflict will occur between Japan and China over the disputed territories, the largest

number, approximately 40%, of Japanese respondents see it is not likely, as was the case last year. The

percentage of Chinese who do not foresee a military conflict between the two countries increased 12

percentage points from last year and the Chinese who expect such a conflict decreased to 40% from 50% last

year.

Regarding the possibility of a military conflict between the two countries following their rivalry over the

Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the largest number, 38.8% (2014: 38.0%), among Japanese respondents took a view

that such a conflict is not likely, as was the case for last year. Still, the 34.2% (2014: 32.9%) of Japanese are

unsure as they selected “Don’t know.” Those who expect a military conflict to occur “in the future” or “in a few

years’ time” accounted for 26.9% (2014: 29.0%).

On the Chinese side, 41.3% of the respondents foresee a military conflict occurring “in the future” or “in a few

years’ time” combined. showing a decline by 12 percentage points from 53.4% in the 2014 survey. Conversely,

those who expect no military conflict have increased 12 percentage points to 39.2% from 27.4% for last year.

【Possibility of Military Conflict between Japan & China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islets】


A 10.2% A 11.2%

B 31.1% B

42.2%

C 39.2% C

27.4%

D 19.2%

D 19.0%

E 0.3% E 0.3%

20152014

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

A 2.9% A 2.9%

B 24.0%

B 26.1%

C 38.8%

C 38.0%

D 34.2%

D 32.9%

E 0.1% E 0.1%

20152014

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

A There will be conflict

within a few years

B There will be conflict

in the future

C There will not be

conflict in the future

D Don’t know

E No response

36


■Perception on Military Threats

Japan and China feel one of the strongest military threats come from each other. In particular, Japan has

become the country from which the highest number of Chinese people perceives military threats, surpassing

the number of people sees the United States as threat.

The survey found that 68.3% of the Japanese respondents believe there is a country or a region that can be

regarded as a military threat to Japan. A comparable figure for Chinese respondents was 60.3%.

An additional question was posed to those respondents who replied there is a military threat to their country.

They were asked to specify countries or regions from which they feel military threats. Among Japanese

respondents, the most frequently cited country was North Korea with 75.0%. This was followed by China with

68.1%. These two countries far surpassed other answers.

The largest number of Chinese respondents (81.8%) cited Japan as a military threat. This was more than those

who feel military threats from the U.S. (73.8%), which was the most frequently cited country last year. Due to

the change in survey questions and structure this year, a simple comparison cannot be made, but the last

year’s figure for Japan was 55.2% and the U.S. was 57.8% as the question was asked to every respondents,

not limited those who .answered that there is a country poses military threats to their countries.

Japanese respondents who feel military threats from China were asked the reasons why they hold such views.

The largest number, 72.5%, cited this is due to the fact that “Chinese vessels’ repeatedly intruding into Japan’s

territorial waters around the disputed islands.” Second most frequent answer was “the existence of disputes

over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and undersea resources between the two countries” (61.7%). A noticeable

increase was seen for the answer that “Chinese military power is already strong,” up about 10 percentage

points to 41.3% from 31.9% a year earlier.

Chinese respondents who feel a military threat from Japan were asked about the reasons for their view. The

largest number, 64.1%, maintained that “Japan has contained China militarily in cooperation with the U.S.”

Those who mentioned Japan’s recent passage of a series of laws enabling it to exercise the right to collective

self-defense, when necessary, accounted for only 13.2%.

37


【Is there any countries and regions poses military threats to your country?】


【Countries and Regions That Are Military Threats】


A 68.3%

B 11.7%

C 20.0%

D 0.0%

A 60.3%

B 31.0%

C 8.7%

D 0.0%

68.1%

13.2%

75.0%

24.5%

0.7%

0.3%

9.8%

6.1%

0.6%

1.0%

0.0%

0%20%40%60%80%100%

2015

81.8%

4.8%

7.1%

8.6%

17.1%

16.3%

7.7%

73.8%

4.4%

0.2%

0.2%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2015

China/Japan

South Korea

North Korea

Russia

India

Middle East

The United States

EU

Others

No response

Viet Nam

A Yes

B No

C Don’t know

D No response

38


10. Economic Relations between Japan and China

■Japan-China economic relations

When asked about economic relations between Japan and China, the largest percentage of Japanese

respondents observed that it would be difficult to build “win-win” relationships between the two countries, as

was the case last year, although the view that such relationships can be established has increased in Japanese

public opinion. Conversely, in China, although this was the most frequently cited answer last year, those who

are optimistic that such relationship can be built decreased in Chinese public opinion from last year. By

contrast, the Chinese who take a negative view toward “win-win” relationships has increased. As to the course

of economic and trade relations between the two countries, 60% of the Japanese and 70% of the Chinese

sounded negative about whether the current chilly situation will improve.

Asked about economic relations between Japan and China, the largest percentage of Japanese respondents

observed that it will be “difficult” (including “relatively difficult”) to build “win-win” relationships because the

Japanese and Chinese economies are in competition. This was the same as in last year’s survey, but the

percentage was down to 38.0% from 47.1% a year ago. In the meantime, the percentage of those who think

that “win-win” relationships can be built (including “relatively think so”) because the two countries’ economies

are mutually complementary grew to 27.7% from 20.1% a year ago.

Conversely, 51.1% of Chinese respondents observed that “win-win” relationships can be built because the two

countries’ economies are mutually complementary. This was the most frequently cited answer, but the

percentage fell from 62.8% for last year. By contrast, those who believe that it will be difficult to build “win-win”

relationships between the two countries increased to 43.3% from 28.7% a year earlier.

On the course of economic and trade relations between Japan and China, 41.9% of Japanese respondents

replied that their economic and trade relations will shrink (“significantly” and “slightly” combined) from now on.

The view that there will be no change was supported by 18.1% of the respondents. When combined, 60.0% of

the Japanese foresaw no improvement in the current chilly situation in the immediate future.

On the Chinese side, 43.5% of the respondents expected that economic and trade relations will shrink while

27.8% of them foresaw no change in the current situation. When combined, 71.3% of the Chinese saw no

bright prospects for the future of economic and trade relations between the two countries.

About what must be done to develop economic and trade relations between Japan and China, 62.9% of the

Japanese and 50.3% of the Chinese cited an improvement in intergovernmental relations between the two

countries. Thus, the two countries’ peoples equally believe that betterment of relations between the Japanese

39


and Chinese governments is the foremost challenge facing the two countries. Among Chinese respondents,

31.9% replied that steady efforts should be made to strengthen economic activities by private businesses.

【Economic Relations between Japan and China】

Agree with A 10.1%

Agree with A 28.7%

Tend to agree with A 17.6%

Tend to agree with A 22.4%

Tend to agree with B 25.8%

Tend to agree with B 25.2%

Agree with B 12.2%

Agree with B 18.1%

Don’t know 34.1%

Don’t know 5.5%

No response 0.2%

No response 0.2%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Japanese Public

Chinse Public

Ａ

Economic relations between the two

countries complement one another,

thus a win-win relationship can be

constructed

Ｂ

Economic relations between the two

countries compete against one

another, thus a win-win relationship

cannot be constructed

40


■The Advisability of Japan’s Role in AIIB and the Framework of Economic Partnership in East Asia

Regarding the advisability of Japan’s participation in the Chines-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

(AIIB), about 30% of respondents on both sides replied that they are satisfied with Japan’s decision not to join

the Bank. Only 3.9% of Japanese respondents maintained that Japan should have participated in the bank

while the view was expressed by 23.8% of Chinese respondents.

As to the advisability of Japan’s participation in the AIIB, the most common answer among Japanese

respondents was “just can’t say either way” with 39.3%. Those who are satisfied with Japan’s decision to refrain

from the undertaking accounted for 31.9%, far surpassing 3.9% for those who replied to the contrary.

The most common answer among Chinese respondents was that “Japan’s should not have joined” with 33.9%,

whereas 23.8% of them replied that “Japan should have participated” in the bank. The 31.5% of Chinese

respondents said that they “have not heard about the AIIB.”

Asked about what kind of a framework is necessary for economic cooperation for the future of Japan, 50.3% of

Japanese respondents are unsure about which framework is necessary, only responded that they “don’t know”.

On the Chinese side, about 30% of respondents supported the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership,

the Trans-Pacific Partnership and a free-trade agreement between Japan, China and South Korea as desirable

frameworks for economic cooperation. The RCEP was favored by 35.5% of the Chinese, TPP by 33.9% and the

trilateral trade agreement by 34.0%.

【Should Japan have joined AIIB?】

Japanese Public

A 3.9%

B 31.9%

C 39.3%

D 24.4%

E 0.5%

A Japan should have joined

B Japan should not join

C Neither

D Haven’t heard about AIIB

E No response

41


Chinese Public

【Desirable frameworks for East Asian Economic Cooperation】

A 23.8%

B 33.9%

C 31.5%

D 10.3%

E 0.4%

7.5%

14.2%

21.1%

27.3%

3.9%

50.3%

0.0%

0%20%40%60%

2015

26.6%

34.0%

35.5%

33.9%

9.8%

12.4%

0.4%

0% 20% 40% 60%

2015

Japan Chin FTA

None of above

Don’t know

TPP

No response

RCEP

Japan-China South Korea FTA

A Japan should have joined

B Japan should not join

C Haven’t heard about AIIB

D Don’t Know

E No response

42


11. Coexistence/Coprosperity and Cooperation Between Japan and China

■Is Coexistence/Co-prosperity Possible Between Japan and China?

About 60% of Japanese and nearly half of Chinese pin hopes on peaceful coexistence/prosperity between

Japan and China, but they are not confident that such relations can be truly realized. Around 20% of

respondents on both sides foresee that the current tough relations between the two countries will continue.

Around half of respondents on both sides, 58.0% of Japanese and 46.7% of Chinese, pin hopes on peaceful

coexistence/prosperity relations between Japan and China, but they are not confident that such relations can

be truly realized. Comparable figures in last year’s survey were 54.6% for Japanese respondents and 50.3% for

Chinese respondents. The view that peaceful coexistence/prosperity relations can be realized was favored by

only 19.4% of the Chinese (2014: 16.5%) and 8.2% of the Japanese (2014: 7.8%). The answer that the current

tough relations between the two countries will continue was cited by 19.6% of the Japanese (2014: 17.3%) and

24.8% of the Japanese (2014: 20.7%).

【The Possibility of Coexistence and Prosperity】


A 8.2%

B 58.0%

C 19.6%

D 14.2%

E 0.0%

A 19.4%

B 46.7%

C 24.8%

D 8.9%

E 0.2%

A Peaceful coexistence and

prosperity are possible

B Wish to have peaceful

coexistence and prosperity,

but not sure if they will be

realized

C Confrontation will continue

D Don’t know

E No response

43


■Expectations for Cooperative Relations Between Japan and China

The view that Japan and China should work together toward resolving challenges between the two countries,

and those facing Asia is favored by 60% of Japanese and 50% of Chinese. But about 30% of Chinese

disagreed with the view.

The survey found that 64.4% of Japanese respondents and 54.3% of Chinese respondents are “in favor”

(including “relatively in favor”) of the view that Japan and China should work together toward resolving

challenges between the two countries, and those facing Asia. Comparable figures in last year’s survey were

66.1% for Japanese respondents and 52.2% for Chinese respondents. But 29.3% of Chinese respondents

replied that they “disagree” (including “relatively disagree”), as against 33.5% for last year.

As specific areas of cooperation, the largest number, 67.7%, among Japanese respondents cited environmental

issues, including air pollution (85.6% last year). Three other fields were also mentioned by more than 40% of

respondents: North Korea’s nuclear development was cited by 50.9% (67.3% last year), security in food by

46.4% (80.2% last year) and the maintenance of peace in Northeast Asia by 39.8% (59.6% last year). The

findings indicated Japanese people’s interest in cooperation with China for specific issues. Alternatives that

showed a noticeable increase included tourism, which was cited by 29.3% of the Japanese respondents, up

from 18.5% a year ago.

For the Chinese, the most frequently cited answer was the maintenance of peace in Northeast Asia, but the

percentage remained below 40%, standing at 37.3% (2014: 37.8%). Two other alternatives were also cited by

over 30% of respondents: the strengthening of cooperative relations in such fields as trade and investment, and

formation of free-trade zones was referred to by 35.1% (2014: 29.1%) while 30.7% of respondents called for

cooperation in energy-saving technology and recyclable energy sources, including wind power and solar power

generation (2014: 28.6%). Just like the findings on the Japanese side, a significant increase was seen in the

percentage of respondents citing tourism, which doubled from 8.3% to 17.0%.

44


【Strengthening of Japan-China Cooperation】


A 31.6%

A 28.8%

B 34.5%

B 35.6%

C 4.8% C 5.1%

D 2.9% D 2.8% E 7.1% E 6.5%

F 18.9%

F 21.1%

G 0.2% G 0.1%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2014 2015

A 10.9%

A 15.7%

B 41.3%

B 38.6%

C 18.6%

C 15.9%

D 14.9%

D 13.4%

E 10.3%

E 12.2%

F 3.6% F 4.0% G 0.3% G 0.2%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2014 2015

In favor

Relatively against

Relatively in favor

A

C

B

D Against

Indifferent

Don’t know

E

F

No response G

45


12. Influence of Japan and China in Asia in the Next 10 Years

■How Will Japan and China’s Influence Change in Asia in the Next 10 Years?

When asked whether Japan’s clout in the political, economic, military and cultural fields in Asia will change in

the next 10 years, the largest percentage of Japanese respondents replied that they foresee no change.

Respondents on the Chinese side rather expect Japan’s influence to become larger in the military and

economic fields.

On questions about possible changes in China’s influence, Japanese respondents expect no change in China’s

cultural influence. But its influence in all other fields was expected to become larger. Chinese respondents

expect China’s influence to become larger in all four fields.

When asked about Japan’s political influence in Asia in the next 10 years, the largest number (45.1%) of

Japanese respondents expect no change, while 23.2% of them see that the political influence “will increase”

(including “will increase to some extent”) and 15.0% of them expect the political influence to “decrease”

(including “will decrease to some extent”). On the Chinese side, 38.9% of respondents think the Japan’s

political influence will become larger while 35.5% of them expect the influence to remain at the current level.

On Japan’s economic influence, the largest number (34.9%) among Japanese respondents expect Japan’s

economic influence to remain at the present level while those who expect the influence to increase was 30.7%.

Turning to the Chinese result, 39.8% of Chinese respondents expect the influence to become larger, surpassing

33.4% for those who foresee no change.

The Japanese and Chinese opinion on Japanese military influence shows the biggest contrast. The view that

the Japan’s military influence to be at the current level was the most common opinion of Japanese respondents

(46.4%). 23.0% of the Japanese see the influence will increase and only 11.3% of the Japanese respondents

expect it to decrease. On the Chinese side, 46.0% of respondents expect Japan’s military influence to become

larger, outdoing corresponding figures for their views about the future of Japan’s influence in three other fields.

The answer “no change” accounted for 33.6% while 17.2% of Chinese respondents expect Japan’s military

influence to become smaller.

Finally, on cultural influence, the largest number, 46.2%, among Japanese respondents foresaw no change in

Japan’s cultural influence. 34.8% expect the influence to become larger. A scarce 4.2% of Japanese expect the

Japanese cultural influence to become smaller. On the part of Chinese, the largest number, 43.1%, foresaw no

change, followed by 31.8% for those who expect the influence to become larger.

Now, turning to Chinese influence, as to the course of China’s political influence in the next 10 years, 52.0% of

Japanese respondents expect the influence to become larger. A similar expectation was aired by an even loftier

46


88.7% of respondents on the Chinese side.

China’s economic influence was expected to become larger by 48.1% of Japanese respondents. The

percentage of Chinese respondents who foresee the country’s economic influence becoming larger came to

84.7%.

Of Japanese respondents, 64.2% expect China’s military influence to become larger, surpassing comparable

figures for Japanese who expect expansion for China’s influence in the three other fields. Of Chinese

respondents, 84.1% expect the military influence to become larger.

Finally, China’s cultural influence was expected to be unchanged by 52.1% of Japanese respondents. Those

who expect the influence to become larger accounted for only 17.8%. The number of Chinese respondents who

expect the cultural influence to become larger came to as many as 74.3%, but this was down about 10

percentage points, when compared to figures for expectations of a larger influence in other fields.

47


【Japan’s influence in Asia】

＜Political Influence＞

＜Economic Influence＞

＜Military Influence＞

＜Cultural Influence＞

23.2%

38.9%

45.1%

35.5%

15.0%

22.2%

Will increase/will increase to some extent

Will remain at the same level Will decrease/will decrease to some extent

30.7%

39.8%

34.9%

33.4%

20.0%

24.2%



23.0%

46.0%

46.4%

33.6%

11.3%

17.2%



34.8%

31.8%

46.2%

43.1%

4.2%

22.0%



Japanese Public

Chinese Public

Japanese Public

Chinese Public

Japanese Public

Chinese Public

Japanese Public

Chinese Public

48


【China’s influence in Asia】

＜Political Influence＞

＜Economic Influence＞

＜Military Influence＞

＜Cultural Influence＞

52.0%

88.7%

24.0%

9.2%

7.2%

1.1%



48.1%

84.7%

19.0%

13.2%

16.9%

1.5%



64.2%

84.1%

18.0%

13.4%

2.9%

1.7%



17.8%

74.3%

52.1%

22.5%

11.8%

2.2%



Japanese Public

Chinese Public

Japanese Public

Chinese Public

Japanese Public

Chinese Public

Japanese Public

Chinese Public

49


13. Values to be Pursued in East Asia

■The Most Important Values That Must Be Pursued in East Asia

As the most important value that must be pursued in East Asia, “peace” was mentioned by 70% of Japanese

respondents and 60% of Chinese respondents. Following this, about 40% of respondents on both sides cited

“cooperation and prosperity” as the second most important value.

As the most important value that must be pursued for the future of East Asia, “peace” was cited by 72.0% of

Japanese respondents and 59.6% of Chinese respondents. Then, 41.6% of the Japanese and 39.6% of the

Chinese mentioned “cooperation and prosperity” as the second most important value. The perceptions

expressed by Japanese and Chinese respondents proved to be similar on the question of values to be shared

in the wider region.

【Values that must be upheld in East Asia】


59.6%

39.6%

22.8%

13.9%

17.0%

7.8%

13.9%

13.4%

0.0%

1.5%

0.0%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

2015

Rule of law

Peace

Cooperation and prosperity

Democracy

Human rights

Respect for diversity

Others

Don’t know

No response

Freedom

72.0%

41.6%

8.3%

6.1%

5.4%

8.0%

16.5%

17.3%

0.1%

5.0%

0.0%

0%20%40%60%80%

2015

Equality

50


14. Media Coverage and Public Opinion on the Internet in Japan and China

■Japan-China relations and the media environment in Japan and China

As to whether media coverage in each country contributes to improving Japan-China relations, and promoting

mutual understanding between the Japanese and Chinese publics, over 70% of Chinese respondents replied in

the affirmative. But a comparable figure on the Japanese side came to a meager 30%.

As many as over 70% of the Chinese respondents feel that Chinese media reports on Japan-China relations

and Japan are objective and impartial. By contrast, only less than 20% of the Japanese respondents feel so

about Japanese media reports of Japan-China relations and China.

As to whether media coverage in China contributes to improving Japan-China relations, and promoting mutual

understanding between the Japanese and Chinese publics, 73.2% of Chinese respondents replied that the

Chinese media is “very” or “somewhat contributory,” indicating a high level of satisfaction among Chinese

toward their country’s media coverage of Japan and Japan-China relations.

Conversely, favorable view of Japanese media coverage were expressed only by 33.1% of the Japanese

respondents. The reply that the Japanese media coverage is rather adversely affecting the situation came to

14.4%.

The percentage of Chinese respondents who observe the Chinese media coverage about Japan-China

relations as objective and impartial remained high at 75.9% (2014: 73.9%).

The majority (50.3%,2014: 42.4%) of Japanese respondents replied they “don’t know” if the Japanese media

coverage of Japan-China relations is objective and impartial. Those who feel the Japanese media coverage is

objective and impartial came only to 19.5%, down from 26.8% last year. 30.1% (30.5%) of the Japanese

respondents do not think the Japanese media coverage is objective or impartial.

51


【The Media’s Contribution Toward Japan-China Relations】


A 4.6%

B 28.5%

C 22.6%

D 14.4%

E 29.7%

F 0.2%

A 9.7%

B 63.5%

C 17.8%

D 2.3%

E 6.4%

F 0.3% A Very contributory

B Somewhat contributory

C Not contributory

D Adversary

affecting/damaging the

Relations

E Don’t know

F No response

52


【Objectivity and Impartiality of the Media in Own Country】

35.0%

31.0% 31.2%

25.4% 23.4%

25.4% 26.8%

19.5%

26.0% 24.6%

28.0% 25.9% 23.9% 25.1%

30.5% 30.1%

38.6%

44.1%

40.5%

48.7%

52.5% 49.4%

42.4%

50.3%

72.3% 72.5%

61.8%

70.3%

64.4%

84.5%

73.9% 75.9%

7.1%

17.6%

29.3%

17.4% 21.6%

7.5% 13.3%

14.8% 16.1%

8.9% 10.5%

14.0%

8.0%

11.7% 9.2%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Japanese Public: Objective and impartial

Japanese Public: Neither Objective nor Impartial

Japanese Public: Neither/Don't know

Chinese Public: Objective and impartial

Chinese Public: Neither Objective nor Impartial

Chinese Public: Neither/Don't know

53


■Does Opinions on the Internet Represent General Public’s Views?

The largest number (40%) of Japanese respondents doubt that opinions on the Internet “appropriately reflect”

the general public’s views representatively. Conversely, over 80% of Chinese respondents believe the opinion

on the Internet “properly reflects” the people’s view in China.

Of the Japanese respondents, 38.9% of them view public opinion on the Internet as not appropriately reflecting

people’s views. Those who believe the opinion on the Internet “appropriately reflects” (including “basically

reflects”) the people’s view came to 29.5%. On the Chinese side, the large majority (84.4%) of the respondents

believe that the opinion on the Internet “appropriately reflects” the people’s view.

【Do Opinions on the Internet Reflect Public Opinion?】


A 3.7%

B 25.8%

C 30.4% D

8.5%

E 31.4%

F 0.2%

A 18.1%

B 66.3%

C 8.3%

D 1.2%

E 5.6%

F 0.5%

A appropriately reflect public

opinion

B appropriately reflect public

opinion to some extent

B do not really reflect public

opinion appropriately

C do not appropriately reflect

public opinion at all

D Don’t know

E No response

54


15. Background of Mutual Understanding Between Japan and China

■The Degree of Direct Interaction Between Japanese and Chinese Publics

Of Japanese respondents, only about 10% have visited China and about 20% of them “have close friends in

China” or “have Chinese acquaintances with whom they can converse with.” In the Chinese results, the

percentage of Chinese respondents who have visited Japan grew slightly to 7.9% from 6.4% last year.

Furthermore, the percentage of Chinese respondents replied that they have “close friends” in Japan or have

“Japanese acquaintances with whom they can converse with” shows an increase from 3.1% a year ago to

7.3%.

The number of Japanese respondents who have visited China came to 15.1% (2014: 14.3%). Those who have

“close friends” in China or “Chinese friends with whom they can converse with” came to 19.2% (2014: 21.1%).

There were no major changes from last year in these results.

On the question of information source on China, as many as 95.8% (2014: 96.5%) of the Japanese

respondents depend on Japanese media coverage of China and Japan-China relations as a major information

source. The large majority (75.8%, 2014: 76.1%) cite TV as their main source of information. This pattern also

remained the same from last year.

On the Chinese side, 7.9% of the respondents replied they have visited Japan, an slight increase from 6.4%

(2014). The percentage of Chinese who have “close friends” in Japan or “Japanese acquaintances with whom

they can converse with” grew to 7.3% from 3.1% in the 2014 survey.

Japan-related information sources are diversifying among Chinese people. Although Chinese media coverage

was cited by 89.6% (2014: 91.4%) of the Chinese respondents, 57.6% of them receive information from

Chinese TV dramas, information programs and films (2014: 61.4%), 30.1% (2014: 37.4%) from Chinese books

(including textbooks) 15.7% (2014:14.3%) from Japanese media reports. Chinese also use the Internet and

SNS sites as sources of information more actively than Japanese.

55


【Experience of visiting Each Other’s Countries】


【Friends or Acquaintances in Each Other’s Countries】


C 0.0%

C 0.0%

B 84.9%

B 85.7%

A 15.1%

A 14.3%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

20152014

C 0.1% C 0.3%

B 92.0%

B 93.3%

A 7.9%

A 6.4%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

20152014

A Yes, I have been

to Japan/China before

B No, I haven’t been

to Japan

C No response

C 0.0% D 0.3%

C 80.8%

C 78.6%

B 15.1% B

16.2%

A 4.1% A 4.9%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

20152014

D 0.8% D 1.2%

C 91.9%

C 95.7%

B 5.4%

B 2.7%

A 1.9% A 0.4%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

20152014

I have close friends in one

other’s country

I have never had any

acquaintances from

one another’s country

I have acquaintances

whom I can converse with

A

C

B

D No response

56


＜Please direct your queries on the survey to＞

Registered Non-profit Organization The Genron NPO

1-20-7 Nihonbashi, Chuo-ku, Tokyo Japan 103-0027

email：[email protected]

201570th anniversary of the end of wwii, issued on august 14, 2015. those who believe that the...

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