©2015 morningstar, inc. all rights reserved. outlook for china & commodities daniel rohr, cfa...
TRANSCRIPT
©2015 Morningstar, Inc. All rights reserved.
Outlook for China & Commodities
Daniel Rohr, CFADirector, Basic [email protected]
2
Key takeaways
3 Long-term outlook We expect GDP growth of no better than 5% over the next 5 to
10 years.
12 Short-term outlook GDP is already growing at roughly 5%.
16 Beijing’s big choices: Stimulus? Reforms?
Stimulus would make matters worse. Much-needed reforms will be painful and risky.
23 Equity market rescueThe cure is worse than the cold.
29 Currency devaluationBeijing has the motives and means to prevent a sharp
devaluation.
39 Global implications of a weaker ChinaHow the infection spreads
42 Commodities outlookChina ended the last dark age for commodities. It might begin
the next one.
3
Long-term outlookWe expect GDP growth of no better than 5% over the next 5 to 10 years.
4
Balanced growth of 80s and 90s gave way to investment-led growth in the 00s…
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, CEIC, Morningstar
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010
Cum
ulat
ive
real g
row
th
GDP Consumption Investment
5
…resulting in growing imbalances.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, CEIC, Morningstar
51%46% 43%
37% 38%
35%38% 39%
43% 46%
14%15% 15%
14%14%
2% 3% 6% 3%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2014
GDP
com
positio
n
Consumption Investment Government Net exports
6
China’s investment share of GDP is nearly twice the average for its income level.
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
55%
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000
Inve
stm
ent s
hare
of G
DP
GDP per capita (PPP)
Other countries China
Source: World Bank, Morningstar
7
Excess capacity Diminishing Returns Bad Debt Rebalancing
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Russia India Brazil US
Debt
to G
DP
Household Non-financial corporations Financial Government
Source: McKinsey Global Institute
8
China’s investment boom outstrips all precedents.
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Inve
stm
ent s
hare
of G
DP (%
)
Years
China (98-14) Japan (62-81) Korea (84-03) Taiwan (69-88)
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, CEIC, World Bank, Morningstar
9
A “typical” post-boom decade would see China average 4.7% GDP growth…
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
GDP Consumption Investment
Chin
a
Boom "Typical" post boom Our forecast
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
GDP Consumption Investment
Japa
n
Boom Post boom
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
GDP Consumption Investment
Kore
a
Boom Post boom
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
GDP Consumption Investment
Taiw
an
Boom Post boom
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, CEIC, World Bank, Morningstar
10
…but bigger booms tend to end in bigger busts.
J apanKorea
Malaysia
Taiwan
Thailand
China (implied)
China (our outlook)
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
25% 27% 29% 31% 33% 35% 37% 39% 41% 43% 45%
GDP
grow
th in
rebl
aanc
ing
Avg investment share of GDP in boom
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, CEIC, World Bank, Morningstar
11
Attaining 5% GDP growth in the years to come will require significant reforms.
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Consumption Investment Government Net exports
Note: Outlook assumes 1.5% investment growth, 7% household consumption growth, 7.5% government consumption growth, and 2% net export growth.Source: National Bureau of Statistics, CEIC, Morningstar
This is our outlook for average growth to 2022, not a year-by-year forecast.
Our outlook is predicated on significant reforms to bolster consumption and improve investment quality.
12
Short-term outlookGDP is already growing at roughly 5%.
13
We estimate 1H2015 GDP growth at 4.5%.
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
Official Our estimate
Consumption (household & govt) Investment Net exports
Note: We estimate 1% investment growth (official: 5.2%) and 7.3% consumption growth (official: 8.2%). Source: National Bureau of Statistics, CEIC, Morningstar
14
Cement & steel volumes cast doubt on official investment growth rate.
-8.0%
-6.0%
-4.0%
-2.0%
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
2000-2014 CAGR 1H2015
Steel production Cement production Investment (GCF)
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, CEIC, Morningstar
15
Consumption has also slowed more than government figures suggest.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, CEIC, Morningstar
-8.0%
-6.0%
-4.0%
-2.0%
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
Retail sales(nominal)
Retail sales(real)
VAT Automobiles Refrigerators AirConditioners
WashingMachines
InstantNoodles
Beer Soft drinks Cigarettes
Official retail sales growth 1H2015
Production growth 1H2015
Value-added tax1H2015
16
Beijing’s big choices: Stimulus? Reforms?Stimulus would make matters worse. Much-needed reforms will be painful and risky.
17
Many argue China has “room” to stimulate, citing low inflation.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, CEIC, Morningstar
90.0
92.0
94.0
96.0
98.0
100.0
102.0
104.0
106.0
108.0
110.0CPI CPI ex. Food and Energy PPI
18
More cuts to reserve requirement ratio (RRR) and benchmark rates are likely…
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0Benchmark lending rate (1 yr) Benchmark deposit rate (1 yr)
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24RRR RRR (large banks) RRR (small banks)
Source: People's Bank of China, CEIC, Morningstar
19
…but the PBoC can’t “push on a string”
Source: People's Bank of China, CEIC, Morningstar
45.0
50.0
55.0
60.0
65.0
70.0
75.0
80.0
Ban
king
Clim
ate
Inde
x
Loan demand - manufacturing Loan demand - non-manufacturing
20
Falling prices reflect a surfeit of supply, not a shortage of demand
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
90%
95%
100%
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
1,400,000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Steel production (kt) Excess capacity (kt) Capacity utilization
Source: China Electricity Council, China Iron and Steel Association, CEIC, Morningstar
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
800,000
900,000
1,000,000
199
6
199
7
199
8
199
9
200
0
200
1
200
2
200
3
200
4
200
5
200
6
200
7
200
8
200
9
201
0
201
1
201
2
201
3
201
4
2015
M8
Thermal power capacity (MWh) Average utilization (hours)
21
Stimulus is a shot of whiskey to cure a hangover.
Overinvestment
Excess supply
&Diminishing returns
Prices fall &
Economy slows
Bad debt accumulat
es
Stimulus
22
Reforms will be necessary, but painful. Example: Credit
Status quo
► SOEs and local governments receive preferential credit access.
Costs of the status quo
► SOEs and local governments are largely responsible for China’s overinvestment and inefficient capital allocation.
► As long as they carry Beijing’s implicit backing, they will continue to receive preferential credit access.
► Excess capacity and bad debt will continue to build.
Benefits of reform
► Allocating credit according to market principles would eliminate the wealth transfer that hinders household consumption and starves private enterprise of capital.
Risks of reform
► Removing implicit backing would require a major SOE or local government default.
► Credit would be re-priced on a massive scale.
23
Equity market rescueThe cure is worse than the cold.
24
Stock market rout didn't pose a major threat to consumer spending.
Source: People's Bank of China, National Bureau of Statistics, CEIC, Morningstar
63%7%
8%
1%
12%
9%
Chinese household financial assets, December 2013
Bank deposits
Cash
Stocks
Bonds
Insurance
Other
8.0
8.5
9.0
9.5
10.0
10.5
11.0
11.5
12.0
12.5
13.0
Reta
il sa
les gr
owth
Real Nominal
Nominal retail sales decelerated throughout bull market of June 2014 to June 2015.
25
Nor did it hamper corporate access to capital.
Source: People's Bank of China, CEIC, Morningstar
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
RMB loans Foreign currency loans Entrusted loans Trust loans Undiscounted bankersacceptances
Corporate bonds Equity issuance
New
TSF
, YTD
Jun
e 20
15
26
Panicked government intervention failed to prop up shares
Source: Shanghai Stock Exchange, CEIC, Morningstar
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite
June 12 Peak5,166
July 8 Intervention
3,507
Sept 303,053
27
China’s equity markets are cheap at a glance, but less so upon further examination
Source: Shanghai Stock Exchange, CEIC, Morningstar
0.0x
5.0x
10.0x
15.0x
20.0x
25.0x
30.0xShanghai SE P/E
0.0x
10.0x
20.0x
30.0x
40.0x
50.0x
60.0x
70.0x
80.0x
90.0x
100.0xShanghai SE P/E by sector, Aug 2015
Weighted avg15.8x
Financials
7.9x
28
Consequences of Beijing’s failed intervention
1. Intervention casts doubt on key reforms.
► Questionable commitment to President Xi’s pledge to cede a "decisive role" to the market
► Real reform of China's credit and currency markets, which are far larger and more important to the real economy than the stock market, looks increasingly doubtful.
2. Failure to implement key reforms heightens the risk of a debt crisis and diminishes the economy's long-term growth trajectory
► Reforms will be critical if China is to address mounting structural problems and transition to a more sustainable consumption-oriented growth model.
3. Failure to halt the rout risks denting party’s credibility as an economic steward.
► Confidence in the party's ability to manage the economy is partly self-fulfilling.
► So, too, would be a loss of confidence.
► Faltering faith in the government's ability to "deliver" economic growth would have serious real-world implications, including tighter credit, reduced investment, and greater market volatility.
29
Currency devaluationBeijing has the motives and means to prevent a sharp devaluation.
30
RMB had strengthened dramatically in real effective terms since 2010
Source: Bank for International Settlements, CEIC, Morningstar
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
01-2
010
03-2
010
05-2
010
07-2
010
09-2
010
11-2
010
01-2
011
03-2
011
05-2
011
07-2
011
09-2
011
11-2
011
01-2
012
03-2
012
05-2
012
07-2
012
09-2
012
11-2
012
01-2
013
03-2
013
05-2
013
07-2
013
09-2
013
11-2
013
01-2
014
03-2
014
05-2
014
07-2
014
09-2
014
11-2
014
01-2
015
03-2
015
05-2
015
07-2
015
REER
, 201
0=10
0
China Australia Brazil Euro area India Japan United States
31
PPP-based analysis suggests RMB could be 30% overvalued.
Source: World Bank, Morningstar
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1,000 10,000
PPP
conv
ersion
fact
or
Log GDP per capita (current int'l $)
All other countries China Expon. (All other countries)
Overvalued vs. USD
Undervalued vs. USD
32
Following initial devaluation, PBoC reestablished a de facto peg at 6.40.
Source: China Foreign Exchange Trading Center, CEIC, Morningstar
-1.0%
-0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
7/1/2014 8/1/2014 9/1/2014 10/1/2014 11/1/2014 12/1/2014 1/1/2015 2/1/2015 3/1/2015 4/1/2015 5/1/2015 6/1/2015 7/1/2015 8/1/2015 9/1/2015
Onshore OTC discount to official fix (%) Offshore discount to fix (%)
PBoC cuts official fix to 6.23 from 6.12
PBoC says it will take cues from OTC market when setting fix
PBoC begins to intervene in onshore OTC market to prop up RMB
PBoC and state-owned banks begin to intervene in offshore market
33
Beijing is unlikely to ignite a currency war in a bid to stimulate exports.
4.00
4.50
5.00
5.50
6.00
6.50
7.00
7.50
8.00
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
9.0%
10.0%
1/1/
2007
4/1/
2007
7/1/
2007
10/1
/200
7
1/1/
2008
4/1/
2008
7/1/
2008
10/1
/200
8
1/1/
2009
4/1/
2009
7/1/
2009
10/1
/200
9
1/1/
2010
4/1/
2010
7/1/
2010
10/1
/201
0
1/1/
2011
4/1/
2011
7/1/
2011
10/1
/201
1
1/1/
2012
4/1/
2012
7/1/
2012
10/1
/201
2
1/1/
2013
4/1/
2013
7/1/
2013
10/1
/201
3
1/1/
2014
4/1/
2014
7/1/
2014
10/1
/201
4
Net export share of GDP (left) USDCNY (right)
Beijing refrained from devaluing in financial crisis despite net exports being nearly 8% of GDP in 2008.
Net exports are now less than 3% of Chinese GDP.
Source: China Foreign Exchange Trading Center, CEIC, Morningstar
34
Beijing’s main motives suggest dramatic devaluation unlikely
1. RMB internationalization
► Beijing wants greater share of global trade settled in RMB and more important role for RMB assets in global portfolios.
► Inclusion in IMF's Special Drawing Rights basket would be a major milestone and would require the RMB's value to be determined by market forces.
► Freer-floating RMB is a necessary step toward long-term goal of RMB internationalization.
► Significant (30%+) devaluation would be a major setback.
35
Beijing’s main motives suggest dramatic devaluation unlikely (cont’d)
2. Curtail capital outflows
► Capital has been flowing out of China since summer 2014.
► Capital outflows undermine the PBoC's RRR cuts, which pump money into the economy.
► De facto dollar peg exacerbates capital outflows because it short-circuits the pricing mechanism that normally rebalances capital flows.
► Beijing hopes modest devaluation will relieve pressure.
► A large devaluation would risk triggering significant outflows
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
1Q13 2Q13 3Q13 4Q13 1Q14 2Q14 3Q14 4Q14 1Q15 2Q15USD
bill
ions
Net capital flows
Source: People’s Bank of China, CEIC, Morningstar
36
De-pegging could exacerbate capital outflows in the short term.
► Much will depend on market expectations regarding the pace and magnitude of future devaluation.
► If the market expects a fairly stable RMB, the incentive for capital flight wanes.
► If the market expects the RMB to weaken significantly, capital outflows would surge as investors look to get ahead of the move.
► Beijing is clearly aware of this risk, which is why:
1. PBoC took pains to assert that “there is no basis for persistent depreciation of RMB”
2. PBoC threatened to “severely punish illegal FX transactions…[to] maintain a compliant and orderly capital flow.“
37
Defending the peg: Beijing’s reserves are massive on an absolute basis…
Source: People's Bank of China, CEIC, Morningstar
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
USD
bill
ions
Official reserve assets
38
…but appear more modest relative to the IMF’s reserve adequacy guidelines.
Source: IMF, People's Bank of China, General Administration of Customs, CEIC, Morningstar
IMF’s adequacy guidelines assess reserves against:
1. Export income► Reflects loss due to a drop in external
demand or terms of trade shock. ► Target reserves: 10% of exports (fixed
exchange rate) or 5% (floating)
2. Broad money supply► Captures residents’ capital flight from
liquidation of domestic assets► Target reserves: 10% or 5% of M2
3. Short-term debt► Reflects debt rollover risks► Target reserves: 30% of ST debt
4. Other liabilities► Reflects other portfolio outflows (e.g.,
equity & LT debt)► Target reserves: 20% or 15% of other
liabilities
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
Adequate reserves (low) Adequate reserves (high) Actual reserves
USD
bill
ions
Exports M2 ST debt Other liabilities Actual
39
Global implications of a weaker ChinaHow the infection spreads
40
How the infection spreads
Source: Morningstar
Chinese economy
slows
Exports to China fall
Economy weakens
Currency depreciate
s
Capital flight
Economy weakens
Defaults on USD
debt
Economy weakens
41
Top exporters to China
Note: Red text denotes countries where GDP impact of falling exports to China exceeds 0.5%.Source: General Administration of Customs, World Bank, CEIC, Morningstar
TTM July, billion USD as % GDP % change YTD
Korea 183 13.0% -7.3%
Japan 153 3.3% -11.2%
USA 152 0.9% -7.2%
Taiwan 149 30.5% -3.7%
Germany 97 2.5% -13.4%
Australia 83 5.7% -25.8%
Malaysia 54 16.7% -4.1%
Brazil 44 1.9% -23.6%
Switzerland 40 5.8% -4.1%
Saudi Arabia 39 5.2% -34.2%
Thailand 38 10.1% -3.6%
Russia 36 2.0% -20.9%
South Africa 35 10.0% -40.1%
Singapore 30 9.6% -6.8%
Canada 26 1.5% 5.6%
France 26 0.9% -9.2%
Vietnam 22 12.0% 22.1%
Angola 22 16.7% -47.7%
United Kingdom 22 0.7% -15.3%
Philippines 21 7.2% -4.1%
Indonesia 20 2.3% -27.4%
Chile 20 7.7% -10.5%
Iran 20 4.7% -42.5%
Exports to China
42
Commodities outlookChina ended the last dark age for commodities.It might begin the next one.
43
From 1980 to 2000, global mined commodity demand grew less than 1% annually.
50
100
150
200
250
300
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
GDP Steel
1980-1990 CAGRGDP: 3.2%Steel: 0.7%
1990-2000 CAGRGDP: 2.8%Steel: 0.9%
2000-2014 CAGRGDP: 2.5%Steel: 4.9%
Source: World Steel Association, World Bank, Morningstar
44
Metal prices are back at 1980 levels in real terms.
Index weights for base metals and iron ore: 27% Al, 38% Cu, 19% Fe, 2% Pb, 8% Ni, 2% Sn, 4% ZnIndex weights for precious metals: 78% Au, 19% Ag, 3% PtSource: World Bank, Morningstar
0
50
100
150
200
250
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Base metals & iron ore Precious metals
1980-1990 CAGRBase: -1.6%
Precious: -7.9% 1990-2000 CAGRBase: -1.3%
Precious: -2.2%
2000-2012 CAGRBase: 7.9%
Precious: 12.9%
2012-2015 CAGRBase: -18.2%
Precious: -13.0%
45
China ended a 20 year dark age for mined commodities.
-3.0%
-2.0%
-1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
Dem
and
CAGR,
200
2-20
12
World with China World without China
Source: Various, World Bank, Morningstar
46
China now dominates global demand for most commodities.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Coal(thermal)
Aluminum Steel* Lead Copper Zinc Nickel GCF (PPP) Platinum Gold Potash PalladiumGDP (PPP) Oil Diamonds Uranium
Chin
a sh
are
of g
loba
l dem
and
2012 2002
Source: Various, World Bank, Morningstar
47
Iron ore | China’s steel demand has faltered amid the real estate downturn.
-16.8%
0.2%
5.2%
-1.2% -1.8%
-10.1%
-0.1%
-20.0%
-15.0%
-10.0%
-5.0%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
Floor spacestarted
Autos Ships Refrigerators Steelproduction
Iron ore(domestic)
Iron ore(imports)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
USD
per
tonn
e
RMB
per t
onne
Wire HRC CRC Iron ore (right axis)
Chinese steel demand drivers
Chinese iron ore supply
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China Iron and Steel Association, CEIC, Morningstar
48
Iron ore | China’s steel consumption has already peaked.
49
Iron ore | But China’s steel stock will continue to grow….
50
Coal |Plunging Chinese import demand has dragged down seaborne prices.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1/1/
2014
2/1/
2014
3/1/
2014
4/1/
2014
5/1/
2014
6/1/
2014
7/1/
2014
8/1/
2014
9/1/
2014
10/1
/201
4
11/1
/201
4
12/1
/201
4
1/1/
2015
2/1/
2015
3/1/
2015
4/1/
2015
5/1/
2015
6/1/
2015
7/1/
2015
8/1/
2015
RMB
per t
onne
USD
per
tonn
e
RotterdamNewcastleRichards BayIndonesiaChina domestic (right axis)
9% 9% 11%6%
52%
4%
0%
20%
-3%
-11%
3%
-1%
18%
-5%
-34%-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Total Coal-fired All others Domestic Imports
2008-13 CAGR 2014 7M2015
Chinese electricity production
Chinese coal volume
Source: China Electricity Council, China National Bureau of Statistics, China General Administration of Customs, CEIC, Morningstar
Coal | China’s power demand will remain weak amid economic rebalancing.
51
52
Coal |Coal will continue to lose share in China amid low power demand growth.
53
Copper |Key copper end-markets have weakened in China.
Source: CEIC, NBS, Morningstar
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Floor Space Under Construction Elec Transmission Auto production
2013 2014 2015 ytd
2.00
2.20
2.40
2.60
2.80
3.00
3.20
3.40
3.60
3.80Cu price USD/lb
54
Copper |Chinese demand surged over the past decade, while falling elsewhere
Source: ICSG, World Bank, Morningstar
0
5,000,000
10,000,000
15,000,000
20,000,000
25,000,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Refin
ed cop
per c
onsu
mpt
ion
(tonn
es)
World ex China China
55
Copper |We expect Chinese demand growth to wane amid economic rebalancing
Source: ICSG, World Bank, Morningstar
China 2013
China 2000
-
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000
Cu in
tens
ity o
f GDP
GDP/capita
56
Uranium | Japan has begun to restart its nuclear reactors
57
Uranium | China’s reactor fleet will quadruple in size in 10 years
58
Uranium | Prices must rise to incentivize new supply
59
Uranium | Uranium is a second chance at the China growth story
60
Agriculture| China now eats more like a rich country than a poor one.
61
Agriculture | India’s caloric gains in the next decade will exceed China’s of the last decade.
62
Agriculture| Africa’s caloric intake will rise by nearly the total caloric intake of the US.
63
Agriculture | Crop yields must rise to meet Indian and African food demand.
64
Agriculture | Potash demand growth to 2025: 2.8% annually (2005-2015: 2.7%)
