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Standing on the First Page of the End of Despair
Transparency in Emerging Syrian Institutions
Hivos-Humanist Institute forCo-operation with DevelopingCountries
www.hivos.org
The Center for Civil Society and Democracy in Syria is an independent Syrian center that seeks to support and strengthen civil society and democracy and promote the values of freedom, justice and coexistence through the analysis of the current situation and developing and implementing solutions.
http://ccsdsyria.org
http://twitter.com/ccsdsyria
https://www.facebook.com/CCSDSYRIA
Principle researcher: Mohammed Aljssem
Field research team: Team of the Center for
Civil Society and Democracy
Translation into English: Walaa Bou Saad
Proofreading and Editing: Josephine Shagwert
Cover design: Sozdar Sido
©
Research supported by:
Copyright 2016, Center for Civil Society and Democracy. All rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the position of the Center for Civil Society and Democracy
What would it mean to liveIn a city whose people were changing Each other’s despair into hope? –You yourself must change it. –What would it feel like to knowYour country was changing? –You yourself must change it. –Though life felt arduousNew and unmapped and strangeWhat would it mean to stand on the firstPage of the end of despair?
From “Dreams Before Waking”,by Adrienne Rich, 1983
Table of Contents
Case study: Al-Atareb City under opposition control .....................................27
Third-Field research methodology ..................................................................
Research objectives ....................................................................................... 29
Target group ...............................................................................................30
Research tools ................................................................................................30
Second- The role of CSOs in fighting corruption and promoting
transparency ...................................................................................................22
Preface ...........................................................................................................10
Introduction ...................................................................................................15
Executive Summary ........................................................................................12
First-The reality of corruption in Syria ............................................................18
Fourth-Features of the sample institutions ...................................................
Fifth- Research results .................................................................................. 39
Sixth-Conclusions and Recommendations ...........................................53
33
CCSD and Transparency Program Background ............................................. 7
29
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7
CCSD and Transparency Program Background
The Center for Civil Society and Democracy is an independent Syrian NGO whose
mission is to support and strengthen civil society and democracy and promote the
values of freedom, justice and coexistence. The organization was founded in 2011
by a group of Syrian civil society activists with a vision of a long term movement
for peace and democracy in Syria. CCSD now supports a network of over 1,500
individual human rights defenders, peace builders, and democracy activists in Syria
and refugee communities who represent more than 150 civil society groups. Our
trainings and campaigns have reached more than 5,000 Syrians.
CCSD’s work to fight corruption and promote transparency in Syria is rooted in
our theory of change. This theory states, ”Deep peace in Syria, which provides
economic, political and social stability for all members of society requires institutions
that apply good governance with full capabilities. This in turn requires a strong
civil society led by organizations that are aware of the role of public advocacy and
monitoring of institutions.”
CCSD’s theory of change is based on a grassroots approach, and thus this is the
applied strategy of the Transparency Program regarding governmental institutions,
civil society organizations (CSO) and the public, with the belief that the latter plays a
crucial role working on different levels to promote transparency within communities.
CCSD’s Transparency Program was initiated in February 2013 and implemented
the following four tools in order to promote the concepts of transparency and
accountability in Syria:
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Research: Conducting studies of the current reality of transparency in Syrian
institutions, as well as research exploring the reality of public accountability
among Syrians. In addition, conducting case studies about the efficiency of
the program’s interventions with the targeted institutions. The purpose of the
research is to prepare effective interventions and use the conclusions as an
advocacy tool to promote transparency.
Training: Workshops targeting the public and CSOs as well as governmental
institutions in order to introduce them to the concepts of corruption, its
manifestations, methods of fighting it, the importance of transparency and its role
in building good governance as well as the significance of public accountability
and how to practice it.
Awareness raising: Campaigns that mainly target the public, with the
participation of local organizations, in order to activate their role in pursuing
public accountably that will consequently lead to reducing corruption.
Evaluation: Field visits for the purpose of tracking the progress in targeted
institutions and working with them to apply transparency criteria in accordance
to their capacities.
CCSD’s Transparency Program has been working in 10 Syrian provinces. The
third and most recent project worked to complete 90 training workshops for
local councils or governmental institutions as well as 30 CSOs and 30 groups
of individuals through the end of 2015. In 2016, the program is planning to build
a network people who will act as a core body to bring institutions interested in
transparency together and to increase the focus on building institutional structures
that will enhance transparency.
1-Local councils function as the civil administration in areas of Syria that are neither under the control of the Syrian government nor of armed extremist groups. They vary widely in terms of size, capacity and level of transparency.
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This research is one of the activities that the Center for Civil Society and Democracy
is carrying out to promote transparency within Syrian institutions. It aims to
understand the situation of transparency in nascent Syrian institutions, and to know
the strengths and the challenges they come up against in applying transparency
within their own institutions. This will be useful in designing interventions that aim
to promote the level of transparency within emerging Syrian institutions.
Transparency Project Manager,
Omar Al-Rawy
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There is more to Syria than military forces and battles, though this is not
immediately apparent to much of the international community, which currently
seems to be focused on ISIS and the flow of refugees to Europe. Five years of
conflict have seen the growth of vibrant civil society in both regime and opposition
controlled areas. More than ever before in Syrian history, civilians have taken
charge of their own lives, desperately trying to bring order, security, sustenance,
services and shelter to their families, friends and communities. Civic associations,
local councils, human rights and other legal advocates, relief organizations, food,
water and service providers, media outlets, professional societies, and economic
development incubators have grown like topsy in the ruins of the Assad regime,
which was among the most opaque, autocratic and corrupt in the world in 2011
when the uprising in Syria began.
This growth of civil society in wartime Syria is one of the country’s saving graces.
As the authors of this fascinating and path-breaking report put it, despite the
humanitarian disaster Syria is standing on the first page of the end of despair,
because it has generated one of the key elements of a more open and democratic
society. Syrians have been ingenious in inventing the institutions that fill the
vacuum collapse of the dictatorship left behind.
But it is fitting that the Center for Civil Society and Democracy (CCSD), itself a civil
society organization, takes nothing for granted. It wants to know how transparent
nongovernmental organizations in Syria are, both in their internal processes and in
their interactions with their beneficiaries and other institutions. This extensive and
perceptive report based on a survey of 280 civil society organizations—including
local councils that provide de facto governance in many areas—is the result. It is
intended to lay the basis for improvements in the future.
Preface
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Considering the extraordinarily difficult conditions in which they operate, the
results are what I would describe as good, even extremely good. The vast majority
of the organizations surveyed have clear internal structures, bylaws, and boards
of directors. They report on and publicize their work and conduct monitoring and
evaluation. Most document their expenses and consult with stakeholders, though
a bit more consultation with beneficiaries would be a good idea. This performance
would be remarkable and praiseworthy even in more stable environments. With
civilians facing daily bombardment, Syrians have reason to hope that the civil
society they have created will serve them well in the future.
That is, if it survives. The first page of the end of despair could also be the last
page, if the dictatorship wins the war and re-imposes the kind of draconian
and opaque rule it enjoyed before 2011. Military defeat could spell the end of
the burgeoning of Syrian civil society that Americans and Europeans should be
anxious and determined to preserve and nurture. Whatever the military outcome,
people of good will everywhere should be thinking about how to preserve, fertilize
and enhance the extraordinary array of institutions that Syrians have generated.
And international governments and donors in particular will do well to pay attention
to this issue amidst the cacophony of the Syrian people’s very important needs. If
they hope to see a stable and secure Syria in the future, one of the building blocks
will be this nascent web of interconnected civil society groups, whose legitimacy
and sustainability depend upon their transparency and accountability to their
communities.
Professor Daniel Serwer directs the Conflict Management Program at the Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies. He is also a Scholar at the Middle East Institute.
He tweets @DanielSerwer and blogs at www.peacefare.net
Let’s try to make sure that despair leads to hope, not more despair.
Daniel Serwer
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Transparency is one of the most important tools for stability in communities in
general. The higher the level of transparency, the more the wheel of development
can turn at an accelerated pace, since this involves public monitoring and
accountability, two factors that determine growth and development.
The decline of transparency and the spread of corruption in Syria are two of
the main factors that resulted in a social movement that began by demanding
reform and ended by demanding the overthrow of the ruling power. This makes it
necessary to discuss the issues of transparency and accountability as a culture, as
well as a practice, in order to increase the level of transparency within the Syrian
community.
This research aims to identify the reality of transparency within emerging Syrian
non-governmental institutions, and to draw an image of the related strengths
and weaknesses in order to produce suggestions and recommendations that will
increase the level of transparency within the Syrian institutions that emerged after
the protests in 2011.
This research can be considered exploratory. It collected data on 280 institutions,
23% of which were located outside Syria and 77% of which were in Syria. The
institutions were dealt with in the research regardless of their type, form, geographic
location or focus area(s).
The research employed a short questionnaire as the main data collection tool. The
questions fell into three main categories:
The institutional structures that ensure transparency within the institution.
The relationship between the institution and their beneficiaries.
The relationship between the institution and other institutions.
Executive Summary
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Of the most significant challenges that the field research team came up against
was the precarious security situation, including shelling of civilian areas by the
Syrian government, check points controlled by different armed factions, and
intense clashes on the ground. In addition, the displacement of surveyed groups,
or even field team members, during the questionnaire distribution limited the
team’s ability to access all of the targeted areas, and halted implementation of the
questionnaires in some areas.
The main conclusion of the research is that the level of availability of the institutional
structures that ensure transparency was good overall, with the exception of some
elements. For example, the use of financial reports among the sample group
did not exceed 25%, while the existence of bylaws did not exceed 15% of the
surveyed institutions.
It was found that understanding of the need for a board of directors within the
institutions was weak, as well as the mechanisms of formıng one or its duties
and responsibilities. There was also a weakness in terms of institutions’ internal
transparency in relation to their members and their knowledge of the basic
elements of the institution including the members’ involvement in planning and
decision-making.
As for the relationship with the target audience, there was found to be a weakness
in publicizing the work of the institutions to the public, as well as in understanding
why institutions should publicize their work. The research came up with a set of
recommendations to donor organizations which can play a strong role in promoting
the transparency of their partners, making the criteria of transparency one of the
most important criteria they build into their partnerships.
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Recommendations to the nascent Syrian institutions themselves include the
necessity of focusing on building the institutional structures that contribute to
promoting transparency, and focusing on having and complying with clear internal
policies and procedures. Another recommendation to Syrian institutions is to
include the target audience and partners in the planning process and in evaluating
the work of the organization. Finally, it was recommended that organizations
periodically publicize their projects, activities and financial reports in a clear and
understandable way for everyone.
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Transparency is one of the key tools that helps to ensure the correct course of
development within societies. When transparency is realized at a high level within
the various sectors of a society, it opens the path to opportunities for personal
growth for individuals. It also limits the loss caused by the waste of resources as a
result of corruption and poor planning, which is caused in the first place by a lack
of transparency and accountability. Transparency is the opposite of corruption, and
the higher the level of transparency in a society, the lower the level of corruption,
and thus public indignation, will be.
Corruption is one of the phenomena that occurs in human societies as a whole,
and its spread in societies is one of the most important factors that threaten the
existence of ruling political systems. It puts the social structure under threat of a
state of social instability, as it increases the discontent of individuals toward the
ruling power. One of the main ways it triggers this discontent is by bringing benefits
and gains to influential people at the expense of other members of society.
Corruption is, in its simplest meaning and as defined by Transparency International,
”All actions that involve the misuse of public office for private interest”.
This results in a waste of economic resources, and intensifies social polarization
through the deterioration of equity in income and wealth distribution. This, in turn,
reduces societal efficiency, disrupts development opportunities, and strengthens
the foundations of bad governance through the malignant marriage between
power and wealth. In this situation the goal of governance becomes guaranteeing
the interests of the minority that controls the reins of power and wealth rather
than the public interest. A majority of the society’s members feel marginalized or
excluded, which is a denial of freedom in its broader sense.
2- Transparency International; www.transparency.org.3- The Palestinian Initiative to Deepen International Dialogue and Democracy, Fighting Corruption Is a Basic Demand for Human Development, Jerusalem, 2007, Page 2.
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Introduction
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Corruption is classified in three main categories, namely:
Political corruption: The misuse of political power for personal gain in order to
keep, enhance or enrich either oneself, one’s position or both. The most important
forms of this type of corruption are totalitarian rule; the absence of participation;
lack of accountability; lack of judicial independence; and favoritism in gaining
political positions.
Administrative corruption: The misuse of a public office or power in order to obtain
personal gains illegally. This appears in different forms such as, for example, using
public property for personal purposes, nepotism and favoritism in the employment
process, benefiting from power to gain private interests, etc.
Financial corruption: Overall deviations and violations from the financial rules
and laws of the society. Additionally, violations of the guidelines put in place by the
institutions responsible for financial monitoring. This kind of corruption manifests
in bribery, embezzlement, tax evasion, the allocation of land and the spread of
favoritism and nepotism .
Other types of corruption can be added which appear on the level of governmental
and non-governmental institutions as well as the level of individuals, such as
judicial corruption, economic corruption, social corruption and so on.
The prevalence of corruption is inevitably connected with the nature of the ruling
political system which governs the society. It spreads within authoritarian systems
more than others because of the characteristics embedded in these systems that
protect the ruling parties and those connected with them. These mechanisms
4- UN Development Program, Corruption and Development, New York, 2008, Page 8.5- Administrative corruption, http://www.moqatel.com6- Abduljawad, Fatma, Administrative and Financial Corruption and its Negative Effects on the Iraqi State, General Committee of Tasks, Iraq, http://tax.mof.gov.iq/7- Al-Waelee, Yaser, Administrative Corruption, its Concepts, Reasons, Types, Al-Nabaa Magazine, edition 18, http://annabaa.org/
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6
5
4
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8-Atwan Khodr, The Role of Civil Society Organizations in Fighting Against Corruption, Al-Nahreen University, Baghdad, Page 1.
also protect the ruling parties from being held publicly accountable. Furthermore,
authoritarian systems include and give legitimacy to all the practices that involve
violations against individuals such as the suppression of personal freedom and
independent media, and restricting the flow of information. Under these systems
community issues become connected with national security, and any member
of society who asks for the disclosure of information or for leaders to be held
accountable may be accused of threatening national security.
Democratic systems do not necessarily better prevent corruption, insofar
as “Democracy is not a political system, as much as it is a mechanism and
methodology that involves participation and continuous monitoring in order to
reform the politics and hold it accountable.”
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First-The reality of corruption in Syria
In order to know the current reality of transparency in emerging Syrian civil society
institutions, we have to first begin by describing the general political environment.
This is considered the petri dish for corruption in any society, since we can to
some degree predict the scope and level of corruption within institutions and the
community from the type of ruling political system.
The Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party in Syria came to power on March 8, 1963. From
the beginning it enacted laws and regulations that ensured its continual presence
in power. For example, it passed legislative articles that ensured its status as the
leading party at both the state and the local levels. In addition, it created legal
provisions giving immunity to those in power, including politicians and military
personnel, from any crimes or violations they committed.
“Pursuit of any state security department officers for crimes they commit during their duties assigned to them is not allowed without a formal order issued by their Director.”
Article 16 of the Development of State Security, which was issued by Legislative
Decree Administration Act No. 14, dated January 15, 1969.
The Ba’ath Party in Syria also confiscated and suppressed individual freedoms by
continuing to impose a state of emergency, which has been in effect since 1963.
Under the state of emergency all other political parties and forums were closed,
including all the magazines and newspapers that did not hold the same views as
the Ba’ath Party. In addition, all members of the political opposition were excluded
either by imprisonment, deportation or assassination, beginning with those who
held opposing viewpoints from those held by the Secretary-General of the Ba’ath
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Party. This censure extended to the civil activists associated with opposition
political parties as well as independent civil activists.
In parallel to these suppressive policies, The Syrian Ba’ath Party formed what
was called the National Progressive Front, which included affiliated parties
working under the control of the Ba’ath Party. It also worked to have control over
non-governmental entities, using them to its own advantage and shaping them
in the mold of the government. These included worker, farmer and craftsmen’s
unions. These institutions, who were in favor of the ruling power, took it upon
themselves to mold the thinking of those whose interests they were supposed to
represent, enforcing the thinking of the ruling power. They often played the role of
security officers preventing any movements that may have occurred beyond the
frameworks set in advance by the authority.
The totality of these policies and practices of the Syrian Ba’ath Party strengthened
its power and created a dictatorship deeply rooted in all aspects of society
as well as in the state and its institutions. This generated a pattern of political
corruption, with an authority that held absolute rule without any possibility of
holding it accountable. It was protected by a legal framework, which also resulted
in administrative, financial, legislative and judicial corruption in all of the state
institutions. The corruption also developed a social culture that forced almost all
members of society to adopt a number of coping mechanisms.
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Article IV: The Martial Law Governor or his deputy may issue written orders to impose all or some of the following restrictions and measures, and refer violators to the military courts.
-Restriction of the freedom of people in meeting and accommodation,
mobility or going to specific places or times, and to arrest, as a kind of
precaution, the individual suspected of being dangerous to security and
public order and to allow the investigation of people and places at any time,
and to assign anyone to perform any of the acts.
-Control of messages and intelligence of any kind, and monitoring of
newspapers, publications, files, graphics, radio stations and all means of
expression and advertisement prior to publication, and seizure, confiscation
and/or revocation of their permits and closure of their printing houses.
- Scheduling the opening and closing of public places.
- Withdrawal of weapons, ammunition and explosive materials of different
types, and to order that they be delivered, seized and that weapons stores
be closed.
- Evacuation or isolation of some areas and organization of transportation,
limiting it between different regions.
- Seizure of any property, and imposition of temporary custody of companies
and institutions, and postponement of debt and accrued liabilities, which
are worth what is being seized.
- Identification of penalties for violation of these commands that does not
exceed three years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to three thousand Syrian
pounds, or either of those. If penalties for violation of these provisions are
not identified, they should be punished by imprisonment for no more than
six months and a fine not exceeding five hundred Syrian pounds, or either
of them.
A
B
CD
E
F
G
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Syria is internationally classified as a “non-free country” according to the civil
liberties scale . Its score on the “right of expression and accountability” index is
-1.63.
The table below shows the six indicators of good governance as provided by the
World Bank in 2009. It compares Syria’s actual score in 2009 with the standard
number Syria should achieve in order to be considered a state of good governance.
Table number (1) The indicators of good governance according to the index provided by the World Bank in 2009
Standard Variables Actual
Regulatory quality
Rule of law
Government effectiveness
Voice & Accountability
Political stability
Control of corruption
0.89
3.97
3.08
0.55
2.6
1.51
-1.07
-0.47
-0.61
-1.63
-0.68
-0.96
The image painted above
of the political environment
generated by the ruling
power in Syria explains
the amount of corruption
prevalent in the country.
The lack of accountability,
the protection of violators
by law, the confiscation
of press freedom, and the
restricting of civil liberties
inevitably resulted in high levels of corruption. This was confirmed by Transparency
International, which ranked Syria 127th in the world out of 180 countries for level of
corruption in 2011. They also ranked Syria 15th of all Arabic-speaking countries on
the list of global corruption. The corruption index in Syria rose between 2004 and
2009 from 3.4 to 2.1 degrees (out of 10 degrees).
9- The index from 1 to 7 is used to measure the civil liberties index. 1 is the highest mark and 7 is the lowest mark of liberty. The countries who scored between 1 and 3 as a total average are classified as “free countries”, those who scored between 3 and 5 are classified as “partially free”, and those with scores between 5.5 and 7 are classified as “non-free countries”. Freedom House http://www.arabstats.org
10- Self indicator of governance administration, its elements have been compiled from various sources. It measures the perceptions of the following concepts: free and fair elections, freedom of the press, civil liberties, political rights, the role of the military in politics, change in government, transparency in laws and policies. Estimates range between -2.5 and +2.5 and the higher the value the better. http://www.arabstats.org11- 10 is the highest mark which means the least corrupt. And (1) is lowest mark which means the most corrupt in a system of ten points.
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9 10
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The non-violent protests that started in March 2011 were a public denial of the
authoritarian practices against the people. However, the specific impetus for the
protests were demands for accountability for those who committed violations
against children who were tortured in Dara’a city in one of the state security
branches. The spread of those protests throughout all of Syria’s provinces and
the involvement of a multiplicity of different social categories in them reflects the
common suffering of the Syrian people from corruption.
The Syrian people found themselves in a social revolution not only against the
political dictatorship but also against corruption, which clearly demonstrates the
high level of corruption in the country preceding the uprising, as well as its negative
effects on all members of Syrian society during the reign of the Ba’ath Party.
Second- The role of CSOs in fighting corruption and promoting transparency
According to the World Bank, the definition of civil society is “…the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations…”. Civil society organizations play the role of
defending the rights of individuals, organizing and unifying individual efforts into
collective action in order to achieve their interests. Those organizations carry out
many tasks, some of which are, “…working to achieve democracy within society,
social and political socialization, defending the interests of individuals, mediation
and conciliation, conflict resolution, deepening the affiliation of individuals to their
communities through the maintenance of freedom of expression and achieving the
12- World Bank website, January 20, 2016, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,contentMDK:20101499~menuPK:244752~pagePK:220503~piPK:220476~theSitePK:228717,00.html
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13- Shahada, Husam, The Civil Society, Civil Education Series 6. Citizen House, Beirut, pages 27- 28.
goals that they dream to achieve, filling in the gap in the absence of the state and
its withdrawal, and good governance.” In addition, CSOs express the will of the
people, and protect and achieve most of their interests and aspirations.
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The “Damascus Spring” is the name given to the period of intense opposition activism and tentative political liberalization that followed the death of Hafez al-Assad in the year 2000. It was characterized by the establishment of informal political forums whose demands were formally announced first in the “Statement of 99” in September 2000 and then in the “Statement of 1,000” the following January. The former was a petition signed by 99 prominent intellectuals demanding “political and intellectual pluralism” under “rule of law,” The latter statement, signed by 1,000 of Syria’s intelligentsia, was a more insistent demand for a multiparty democracy and the lifting of the 1963 State of Emergency. The movement never called for regime change nor challenged the legitimacy of Bashar al-Assad’s succession to the presidency. Although these declarations were not officially recognized by the regime, the authorities announced a series of reformist measures in the months following Bashar al-Assad’s succession. Several amnesties were declared, marked most notably by the release of hundreds of political prisoners after the closing of Mezze prison in November 2000. Several human rights organizations reemerged or were established in order to urge the regime to continue its cautious steps toward reform, and the authorities did not counter or prevent the rapid proliferation of civil society organizations as they had previously done. Al-Assad also took some steps toward diversifying authoritarian control in the autumn of 2000 by allowing the six constituent parties of the governing National Progressive Front to open provincial offices and to produce their own newspapers. However, these minor reforms were soon withdrawn and the opposition movement was crushed in the name of national unity and stability. Carnegie Middle East Center http://carnegie-mec.org
Regarding the promotion of transparency and fighting against corruption, civil
society institutions play their role on three levels:
First: Promoting integrity and fighting against corruption within civil society
institutions themselves, since the spread of corruption within these institutions
effects their legitimacy.
14- The Coalition for Accountability and Integrity (AMAN), the civil society in the Arab Countries and its role in fighting corruption. Page 10.
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Second: Tackling corruption within society through their activities and the
watchdog role they play in monitoring the government and other institutions.
Third: Building public awareness for all members of society.
As outlined above, it was very difficult to develop NGOs in Syria before 2011
independent of the ruling authority. What existed was a group of organizations that
were structurally related to the authority in addition to some charities that provided
aid for people in need. However, even these activities were conducted under the
supervision of the authority. In addition, there were other civil society associations
such as cultural forums that formed after the Damascus Spring in 2000 which were
threatened with being banned. Many of the political and civil activists associated
with this nascent movement were detained afterwards.
However, along with the beginning of the peaceful Syrian uprising against
authoritarian rule in 2011, many civil society organizations came to life independently
from the political authority. Many of these carried the burden of organizing protests
and demonstrations against the Assad government. In addition, they initiated work
in nearly every field promoting the civil movement.
The gradual absence of the governmental institutions from all of the protesting
areas and the enforcement of partial or total blockade on those areas led to a
vacuum in public service sectors. This, in turn led to a more effective role for
emerging civil society institutions as well as Local Councils as they took on the
management of the areas no longer under government control.
As the blockade and siege of the protesting areas grew tighter and more widespread,
the newly established organizations increasingly found it difficult to fulfill basic
needs due to lack of funds, and also as a result of their lack of institutional capacity
as fledgling groups. Accordingly, there was weak awareness about transparency
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in theory and practice within the newly established organizations. Subsequently
there was public outrage among individuals because of the widespread corruption
among these institutions- see the case study from Al-Atareb City. In particular,
this was due to the absence of a legal authority to mediate conflicts, monitoring
committees, and a general lack of public accountability. One of the main sources
of this lack of accountability was the weak culture of participation, which was
enforced under Ba’ath Party authority and has remained rooted in Syrian society.
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Case study: Al-Atareb City under opposition control
In Al-Atareb City, located in the countryside surrounding the city of Aleppo in northern
Syria, there has been ongoing tension between local relief organizations and the Local
Council on the one hand and members of the local public on the other hand. The conflict
developed to the point where there were accusations of corruption from each side about
the other. After an intervention by Aman Network*, the conflicting parties were brought
together and the main problems facing the area were defined. The problems were
identified as follows:
. The absence of a judicial/legal authority for arbitrating local conflicts.
. The absence of a unified executive authority on the ground led to the inability to
separate civilian affairs from the control of armed groups.
. Continual accusations of betrayal toward the relief organizations because of the
lack of transparency and their failure to distribute food baskets among people.
. The lack of trust between the Local Council and their constituency because of the
insufficient services that were provided.
. Service problems such as power outages and water shortages, leading to
continuous conflicts and clashes among people.
The most important outputs and agreements of the meeting that was held included:
Establishing a Union of CSOs in Al-Atareb and its rural surrounding areas.
• Establishing a committee to monitor local relief work as well as setting criteria
• Taking steps to establish a civil court consisting of Syrian civilians and key
*Aman Network is a Syrian network of volunteers consisting of active figures and grassroots leaders. In Arabic “aman” means “safety”, and the network manages and resolves local conflicts, or works to avoid them, in order to achieve social stability and security and to enhance a culture of co-existence.
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3
4
5
•
to distribute humanitarian aid in the area.
religious figures, and ensuring the legitimacy of such a court by backing up
its decisions with the military.
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As mentioned above, in the Syrian situation the role of emerging CSOs evolved
from that of a mediator organizing and defending public efforts into filling the gap
resulting from the absence of governmental institutions.
Accordingly, this role led to a shift in the position of emerging CSOs in terms of their
dealings with individuals. Thus, this research was built on the assumption that the
emerging CSOs appeared in response to the need for alternatives to governmental
institutions. However, the lack of a history of institutional work and the lack of
transparency in culture, theory and practice produced a weakness in those areas.
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Third-Field research methodologyResearch objectives:
- Capture the current reality of transparency within non-governmental Syrian
institutions.
- Create a baseline to show strengths and weaknesses in terms of transparency
within institutions.
- Offer recommendations and suggestions that can increase the level of
transparency in emerging Syrian institutions.
- Contribute in supporting the strategic plan of CCSD’s Transparency Program
in order to promote the capacity of nascent Syrian institutions in the field of
transparency and fighting corruption.
Exploratory research was considered the best methodology in order to study the
Syrian case due to current changes in response to the crisis. These may include
radical changes in daily customs and practices. Additionally, the fact that different
areas of the country are controlled by conflicting armed forces creates immense
difficulties in accessing and moving between to certain areas. Consequently, it
was impossible to acquire the needed information to conduct a methodologically
precise study representative of the original communities, particularly because of
15- The term “crisis” is employed in this research to describe the situation in Syria for the past five years. The research team discussed whether the best terminology would be “revolution”, “war”, or other terms. The term “war”, for example, does not encompass the entire context and history of the current situation, which was initiated as a widespread popular movement with non-violent demands for political change. The team agreed that what is happening in Syria is a political and social crisis. In addition, this term is used by the UN and its agencies in describing the Syrian case.
15
the continual displacements due to the crisis. This research grew out of the main
question: what is the current level of transparency within emerging Syrian institutions following the social protest movement initiated in 2011?
1
2
3
4
30
Target group
The group targeted in this survey is Syrian civil society organizations (CSOs),
regardless of their type, structure or field of work. The lack of a clear, unified form
for Syrian CSOs after the crisis causes difficulty in classifying these institutions,
which has forced the research team to adopt a general, indefinite term to express
any institutional body that provides services for people in different areas, whether
under government control or under the control of other armed groups. For the
purpose of this research, the term CSO encompasses local councils (LCs) as
well as formal and informal groups in the fields of development, medicine, relief,
education, human rights, etc. This research is based mainly on the survey that
CCSD team conducted inside Syria and in the neighboring countries.
Research tools
The case study is the best research tool to approach the topic of transparency
in institutions. However, due to the conditions of the current crisis and some
considerations related to the research period, resources and the inability to
physically reach most of the institutions due to restricted movement within the
country, a short interview questionnaire was used as the main tool to collect
the data from the target group. The tool was designed to take into account the
security situation and the psychological state of the individuals who live within this
situation of crisis.
16- Due to the nature of their emergence and the conditions of the Syrian crisis, LCs are classified here as Syrian CSOs, whereas normally LCs would be considered governmental institutions because they are engaged in administrating their areas.
16
31
The design of the questionnaire directed at CSOs was based on the seven transp-
arency indicators adopted by the Aman Coalition for Integrity and Accountability,
and they are as follows:
Providing clear documents about the objectives of the work, approach and
programs, and making this information available to the constituency or target
group.
Providing the constituency or target group with information about the main
internal systems, organizational structure and budget.
Allowing access to the organizations plans and engaging the constituency or
target group in developing and commenting on the plans.
Coordinating the institution‘s activities and programs with the local partners or
targeted audience.
Introducing the constituency or target group to the institution‘s activities and
programs as well as to the ways they can access its services.
Publishing periodic reports about the institution‘s activities, funds and
partnerships.
Having a general policy for the disclosure of information to the public.
In designing the research there was a focus on the aspect of internal administrative/
institutional capacity based on the assumption that most Syrian CSOs are newly
established, with no more than three years of existence. This is in addition to
the fact that groups in the Syrian context suffered from an environment of low
transparency even before the crisis as well as a lack of awareness in general on this
topic. Thus, the research focused on the administrative and institutional structures
that ensure transparency as well as the positive relationship between institutions
and other stakeholders such as donors, beneficiaries, partners, and non-partner
institutions. The questions were designed in three main categories:
17- Aman Coalition for Integrity and Accountability is a civil society movement that seeks to fight against corruption and promote transparency, accountability and integrity within the Palestinian community. http://www.aman-palestine.org/
17
32
The second one measured the relationship between the institution and their
beneficiaries.
The third one measured the relationship between the institution and other
institutions.
Challenges faced by the field research team
The unstable security situation, for example the increase in the fighting and
displacement during the questionnaire distribution, restricted the field team’s
movement and hindered their ability to reach all the target areas. For this reason,
the questionnaire could not be distributed at all in some areas.
Some organizations did not trust the questionnaire for fear that it may be related
to government intelligence services. Additionally, some feared that the level of
corruption in their institutions might be exposed.
The first one measured the existence of institutional structures that ensure
transparency within the institution.
33
Fourth-Features of the sample institutionsGeographic distribution of the institutionsThe total number of the institutions targeted by the questionnaire was 280. Twenty-
three percent of respondents were located outside of Syria in Turkey, Lebanon,
and Iraqi Kurdistan. The majority, at 77%, were located inside Syria in nine of the
country’s fourteen provinces as shown in Figure (2). The percentage of responses
varied in relation to the possibility of movement of the research field team to
conduct the interviews.
Figure (2): Distribution of institutions according to province
ALHASAKA
ALEPPO
IDLIB
HAMA
DARAA
DAMASCUS
DAMASCUS COUNTRYSID
E
ALRAQQA
DEIRALZOR
TURKEY
KURDSTANIR
AQ
LEBANON
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
46
62
42
32
119
4 27
40
4
21
Focus areas of the sample institutions:In response to the questions related to their focus areas, more than half of the
respondents, or roughly 56%, indicated that their institutions are working in more
than one field. For example, one institution may simultaneously work in relief,
development, media, documentation and/or law. Due to the almost complete
absence of governmental institutions resulting from the current crisis, it is clear that
many Syrian CSOs have taken on a broad spectrum of activities in order to meet
the urgent and increasing needs of the population in many different life sectors.
The following table clarifies the distribution of the sample institutions according to
their focus area based on the respondents’ answers:
34
Table (2): Distribution of the sample according to focus area
Focus Area %Frequency of Response
Media
ReliefDevelopmentLegal
Medical
Civic
No answer
Total
More than one focus area
12 4.27 %7.47 %
9.61 %
2.14 %
4.63 %
9.25 %
6.76 %
55.87 %
100 %
2127
6
13
2619
156
280
Due to this mix in the focus areas
of the majority of the respondents,
we attempted to design another
categorization of the institutions
according to the general trend of
their programs and activities. The
following Figure (3) illustrates the
division of institutions according
to their work in six broad areas.
However, despite this categorization,
it is still an insufficient description for
many institutions given their work in
more than one area.
Defining the institutionsMedia institutions: Specialized
in covering news and delivering it,
and shedding light on issues that
concern the Syrian public. Includes
newspapers, magazines, radio
stations and programs, etc.
Development institutions: Concerned with economic empowerment and
economic development projects in order to create jobs/livelihoods, as well as job
training for individuals to provide them with marketable skills.
Civic institutions: Concerned with individuals‘ capacity building and their
intellectual and cognitive skill development, as well as raising the educational level
within civil society and conducting advocacy and lobbying campaigns for change.
Relief institutions: Concerned with providing basic humanitarian assistance
such as food baskets, money and other basic materials.
Legal institutions: Concerned with documentation of violations, defending the
rights of detainees, and constitutional and legal accountability in Syria.
1.8 2.9 3.9 4.34.6
13.9
25.4
43.2
Figure Number (3): Division of Sampled Institutions According to Focus Area
Medical Development Legal Media Educational Service Relief Civic
35
Service institutions: Concerned with rebuilding infrastructure and supervising
the provision of the main services such as water, electricity, bakeries and medical
centers. Most of these institutions are local councils.
In comparing the survey responses to the framework of categories developed in
the research, we find that civil organizations’ members were not able to identify
their exact field of work. This seems to be because many CSOs are still ignorant
of their specific roles, which may be due to the lack of knowledge in the civil work
culture that preceded 2011.
As for the institution’s goals and their consistency and harmony with the programs
and projects, which illustrate the degree of development of newly established
NGOs, we find that:
78% of the CSOs have relatively defined goals while 17% do not have defined
goals. Instead they have general goals that more closely resemble a vision
statement. Two percent do not have any goals; neither defined nor general.
As mentioned above, this is to be expected because the majority of Syrian CSOs
are newly formed. However, it is important to measure the level of clarity of groups’
goals because this is an indicator of their ability to be accountable for the work
they do. If goals are not clearly defined, or if activities are not directly linked with
stated goals, there will not be a strong way to measure the work of each group.
36
Table (3) illustrates the types of goals mentioned by the respondents to the
questionnaire, classified by level of clarity of goals.
Table (3): What are the goals your institutions seeks to achieve?
Do not have Goals General goals Definite Goals
A center that works to build the capacities of young people and strengthen their talents, providing them with academic education.Diagnose the psychological states that children suffer from, such as PTSD, referring them to a specialist.
As a magazine, we seek to develop the magazine in order to be able to compete with other magazines.
Provide job opportunities for medical staff (written by a medical center)
Continuity and expansion
To gain the people’s trust To provide services to the largest number of people.
--
Building an aware and educated society
To provide services for the public.
Alleviate the suffering of our people.
Spreading awareness and education, and encouraging the publishing of newspapers and magazines that match with a media code of conduct. Training and qualifying journalists in coordination with civil organizations.
We seek to deliver the voice of the truth, cover all field events transparently, and to deliver the suffering of the Syrian people to Tv channels and newspapers - either local, Arabic or international.
The institution seeks to improve education, especially in the professional sector and to provide individuals with jobs in order to make a living.
To bring the people together by word of truth, resolve conflict resolution before they worsen, supervise the local council and monitor the fairness in aid distribution, supervise the available resources and how they are
37
Seventy percent of the projects included in this research demonstrated coherence
between their projects and their goals, meaning that 70% of the institutions
with definite goals have harmony between their goals and the projects they are
implementing. The following table (4) illustrates some examples of projects that
are not linked with their goals:
Table (4) Examples from survey responses about the projects and goals
Goals
Activating civil society’s role in the area
Kurdish heritage preservation
- Organizing the work of the CSOs in Hama - Transferring the work of CSOs from individual work into institutional work. - Forming a body that includes all the existing CSOs in Hama.
Projects not directly related to the goals
Many projects in relief and development (distributing flour to the bakeries, medical and preventive programs, food materials and other supplies) and building capacities.
The majority of the programs are related to direct service provision and humanitarian aid, rather than activating civil society’s role.
Projects in the field of nursing, music and courses for students.
While music and some courses are related to the goals, other projects are not; the projects do not seem to be chosen based on their direct relation to the goal.
Consumer foundation project, vegetable company, bridge project, clothes and baskets projects.
The majority of the programs are related to direct service provision and humanitarian aid, rather than the stated goals.
1
2
3
38
Lack of clear goals is considered to be a problem that Syrian institutions still
suffer from, as is lack of direct relationship between goals and projects, though
progress has been made in the previous four years. The environment in which
these institutions were established encouraged a lack of specialization in the
roles that each institution played. At the same time, the main sources of funding
for emerging Syrian institutions have for the most part been allocated to specific
focus areas, contributing to a dynamic in which these institutions choose to work
in many different fields in order to access restricted funding sources. After four
years of the crisis this research found that most of the surveyed Syrian institutions
have begun to more clearly specify their goals, which is demonstrated through the
activities and projects they are implementing on the ground.
39
Fifth- Research resultsBasic institutional structuresFigure number (4) reflects the main institutional structures that, when in place,
guarantee more transparency in institutions. These include: financial reports for the
institutions as a whole, financial reports for activities, documentation of expenses,
documentation of activities, evaluation of activities and overall work, work plans,
Board of Directors, bylaws and internal controls documents, and organizational
structure.
91% of the sample institutions had an organizational structure.
82% of the institutions had bylaws and internal controls documents.
Board of Directors 84% of the institutions had a Board of Directors, while 16% did not have one.
Interestingly, 40% of the institutions working in the human rights field and 33%
of media institutions did not have a board.
As a method to form a Board of Directors, 42% of the surveyed institutions
used elections, 12% selected based on candidates’ previous experience, and
11% used recommendations, followed by appointment and selection.
25
83
91
92
91
70
84
82
91
75
15
7
7
9
28
15
16
7
0
2
1
0
0
3
1
2
1
financial reports for institutions
financial reports for activities
documenting expenses
documenting activities
activities and work assessment
work plan
board of directors
bylaws
organizational structure
Figure Number (4): Presence of Institutional Structures
YES NO I don’t know
40
» Our bylaws made the team’s founders members in the Board of Directors that
meets weekly. They share 80% of their meeting minutes. This is because some
details cannot be announced for several reasons. However, this does not affect
the transparency much»
One response from a questionnaire participant
Regarding the efficacy of the Board of Directors, 77% of participants responded
that the Board meets on a frequent basis, with 57% responding that the Board
meets more than twice annually. However, 5% responded that the Board does not
meet, and 2% responded that they do not know whether the Board meets or not.
Work plans
70% of the surveyed institutions responded that they have work plans, including
time frames. Twenty-eight percent did not have work plans, and 3% did not
know whether there were work plans in their institutions or not.
40% of the institutions working in the human rights field did not have work
plans, as well as 38% of relief institutions and 36% of service institutions. Such
institutions do not have a work plan probably due to the increasing and changing
needs in different areas as a result to the ongoing crisis which makes it difficult
to predict. Twenty-one percent of civic institutions did not have work plans.
41
51% of the sample
institutions depend on
consultations with staff
and volunteers to build a
work plan, while 19% of
institutions consult with
members the public.
Seventeen percent use
consultations with other organizations, and 12% depend on surveys (48% use
one method to build plans, 22% use two, 30% use three methods).
The idea of analyzing
the methods of work
plan creation is that this
partially reflects levels
of participation, which
in turn expresses the
level of transparency in
institutions. Participatory
design of work plans,
which was measured at
roughly 31%, represents how much people are consulted and the degree to which
their opinions are taken into account. On the other hand, the fact that half of the
surveyed institutions depend on a single method to build a work plan reflects
weak planning. For optimal transparency and accountability they would ideally
use every available method when designing work plans, in order to ensure an
inclusive process that reflects real needs in their communities. This saves time,
effort and money by gathering more information and better reflecting the needs
and knowledge of a larger number of people.
60
62
64
79
40
38
36
21
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Law
Relief
Service
Civil
Figure Number (5): Presence of a work plan in Syrian institutions according to focus area
Has a plan No Plan
0102030405060
Consultationswith staff
Consultationswith
beneficiaries
Consultationswith otherinstitutions
Investigativestudies
51
191712
Figure Number (6): Institutions’ work plans are built upon:
42
249 out of 280 institutions possessed their own media outlets – e.g., means
through which to publicly share information with their constituencies/
communities. The most used media outlet amongst the sample group was
social media. Forty-six percent of the surveyed institutions used Facebook
while 21% used websites. Information display boards and printed materials
were used by 11%. Seven percent use a YouTube channel. Two percent use
radio and these were all media institutions.
The results showed that
42% of the institutions
employ only one media
outlet, 31% use two, and
19% use three.
Seven percent have
publicly shared their
administrative structure,
6% their Bylaws, 3% their
financial reports and 3% their employment advertisements.
We found that the most commonly used media tools were Facebook and
YouTube. If there was a total dependence on those communication tools it is
possible that there would be less access to target audiences, especially local
targets, as there are difficulties in internet access in many areas. This, in turn,
would increase the gap between institutions providing services and their target
groups.
Given that over 80% of the institutions that currently share information publicly
almost exclusively use digital means (e.g., Facebook, YouTube, etc.), it is likely
that they do not reach their local targets perfectly.
01020304050
46
2111 11 9
2
Figure Number (7): Do you have your own media outlet?
Public information sharing
43
Figure(8): What have you shared information about
Vacancies FinancialReports
Regulations AdministrativeStructure
Projects YouImplement
Activities
50 50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
31
7633
50% of the total sample
group have publicly
shared information about
their specific activities
and 31% have publicly
shared information about
their projects in general.
In other words, over 80%
of the surveyed groups publicly share information about their projects and activities,
which are the two topics most relevant to their constituencies/beneficiaries.
Concerning the number of items that Syrian institutions publicly share information
about, we found that 44% share two of the items above, 10% share three and
7% share four. Thirty-nine percent share only one item.
In addition, an important finding is that no more than 3% of the surveyed groups
have publicly shared their financial reports. Not publishing financial reports that
clarify incomes and expenses effects the mutual trust between the institution
and the targeted individuals. This will increase the potential for public outrage
due to lack of information, because it creates ambiguity about the institution’s
mechanisms of work.
Monitoring and Evaluation 91% of the surveyed institutions evaluate their activities and work, while 9%
do not. Fourteen percent of the service institutions indicated that they do
not evaluate their work, as well as 11% of human rights institutions, 9% of
development institutions and 8% of civic and relief institutions.
44
91% of the surveyed institutions document their activities in reports. The majority
of these, or 41% of the total, were described as reports about the performance
of activities. Thirty-two percent of the reports were described as media reports,
and 25% were financial reports that display the activity expenses.
Figure(9): Most common reports in Syrianinstitutions
Activity Reports Media Reports Financial Reports
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
42
32
26
We observed that 42% of the institutions used two types of reports, 32% use
one type, and 24% of institutions use three types (financial, media and activity
reports).Figure(10): Number of report types used by
Syrian instituions
One type Two types Three types
45
43
32
25
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
From the results above, we see that the participation of local people in the activities
that the institutions conduct is high. This is positive evidence of community
participation. However, when institutions were asked if they have received any
complaints, we observed that 46% have not receivted complaints. This statistic
Documenting Activities
45
brings into question the level of participation, given that the ongoing crisis creates
infinite needs, foremost of which are basic needs. When there is a crisis in meeting
basic needs, it is normal for there to be complaints on a large scale. The most
common method to receive complaints was found to be through direct interaction
with people (e.g., direct meetings or complaint boxes), not though virtual
interaction. This indicates the need for more direct local interaction with targets
groups rather than through virtual media, in spite of that fact that the latter is
important for sharing the goals and views of institution on a large scale. Regarding
the responses about not publishing reports, this reflects obvious weakness in
transparency culture in emerging Syrian institutions.
Figure(11): Who reads the reports?
Manager Partners Donors Beneficiaries
35
28
16
21
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
82% of institutions write
financial reports about the
projects that they conduct,
15% do not write financial
reports and 2% do not know
if there are reports.
70% percent of institutions
document their Board of
Directors’ meetings with
Relationship with other institutions 84% of the surveyed institutions partner in some activities with other institutions,
while 16% do not enter into partnerships.
56% expressed dissatisfaction in some way (e.g., complaints on Facebook,
etc.) about the activities of other institutions in their areas, whereas 41% did not.
The reasons for the dissatisfaction varied: 32% of the surveyed institutions
publicly complained about the alleged corruption and negligence of other
institutions; 31% asked for clarification of the policy in service distribution; 17%
asked to hold periodic meetings to discuss problems; 9% asked for disclosure
of the criteria of employment; 6% asked for the disclosure of the budgets and
how they were spent and 6% asked about the donors.
46
minutes, 10% do not document, 5% do not know whether there are meeting
minutes. The remaining 15% did not respond.
58% of the surveyed institutions indicated that the Board meeting minutes are
read by the members of the group, while 35% of them responded that they are
not. Six percent did not know if minutes are read by members.
Figure(12): Do staff read the Board meetingminutes?
Yes No Ido not know
59
35
6
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Documentation in general is considered good for newly established institutions.
Documentation not only preserves the institution’s history, it also increases the
trust and confidence of donors and/or partner institution. Documentation for
donors and partners reflects some extent of transparency to those stakeholders,
but it is possible that there could still be a low level of internal transparency in the
institution. This, in turn, reflects some kind of weakness in institutional culture in
the people in charge of these institutions. It also threats the legitimacy of institution
within its local community in front of their constituencies.
Relationship with constituencies/beneficiaries75% of the surveyed institutions conducted activities with the participationof local people in their areas.
47
46% received complaints from local people about the services they provide,
while 46% did not receive any complaints. 7% did not know if their institutions
received any complaints.
44% receive complaints through listening to local people, 10% through a
complaints box, 11% through feedback on Facebook and 9% through the
institution’s emails.
38% of the institutions reported that they deal with complaints by holding
meetings for staff and volunteers to discuss the complaint. 23% deal with the
received complaints at once, and 12% through inviting local people to discuss
the problem.
77% of institutions do not publicly share information with people, while 20%
do. When they were asked about the reason for not sharing information they
cited security concerns, concerns about people›s reactions/rumors. Some
responded that some information is private and should not be shared, that
people are not interested in reading the reports, or they do not understand the
information when it is shared.
48
Table (5) Some of the reasons cited for not publicly sharing information
Security concerns, demanding support [unclear meaning], fear from some militias.
Financial reports are private documents and only internal parties involved in the projects should read them.
Financial reports are private documents and only internal parties involved in the projects should read them.
Only donors and the staff of the institution would be interested in such topics, so there is no need to share things with the public.
Because accusations of betrayal is a culture.
To avoid mistakes that the irresponsible may commit..
Not to give a space for rumors.
For work confidentiality.
It is not possible for the time being because of instability, if the situation becomes more stable we don’t mind publishing anything concerning financial or other topics
Publishing them may cause problems.
It is an internal issue, it is not a commercial project, it is a project to provide services with operating systems.
We see no need to publish things and no one demanded it except for donors.
The donor sometimes does not like us to tell about the money sometimes.
Because our financial support is obvious and nothing is hidden.
This will create conflicts among people and false accusations. Whoever wants to read it, s/he has the right to do that.
Because it is voluntary and non-governmental and there is no finance.
We were not asked to do that.
Because people are not interested in that and we show [financial reports] to the donors about projects and members.
Lack of people›s awareness about transparency.
So there won›t be accusations of betrayal.
It is necessary for people to see it, even if they see, they will not understand the details.
We see no need to publish because we, as a board, take our legitimacy from people›s trust. However, we do not mind when they ask about it so there will be no doubt about the board members› integrity.
49
60% of institutions depend on evaluation questionnaires in consulting people,
20% depend on discussion sessions , 12% depend on consultation sessions ,
7% depend on forums.
19- Discussion sessions are defined as sessions held with beneficiaries in order to discuss topics and problems that concern them. 20- Consultation sessions are defined as sessions with people experienced in the relevant field.
2019
From the results above, we see that the participation of local people in the activities
that the institutions conduct is high. This is positive evidence of community
participation. However, when institutions were asked if they have received any
complaints, we observed that 46% have not received complaints. This statistic
brings into question the level of participation, given that the ongoing crisis creates
infinite needs, foremost of which are basic needs. When there is a crisis in meeting
basic needs, it is normal for there to be complaints on a large scale.
The most common method to receive complaints was found to be through direct
interaction with people (e.g., direct meetings or complaint boxes), not though
virtual interaction. This indicates the need for more direct local interaction with
targets groups rather than through virtual media, in spite of that fact that the latter
is important for sharing the goals and views of institution on a large scale.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
AssessmentQuestionnaires
DiscussionSessions
ConsultationSessions
Seminars None of theAbove
60
2012
71
Figure (13): Consultation occurs through:
50
Regarding the responses about not publishing reports, this reflects obvious
weakness in transparency culture in emerging Syrian institutions.
84% of the surveyed institutions partner in some activities with other institutions,
while 16% do not enter into partnerships.
56% expressed dissatisfaction in some way (e.g., complaints on Facebook,
etc.) about the activities of other institutions in their areas, whereas 41% did not.
The reasons for the dissatisfaction varied: 32% of the surveyed institutions
publicly complained about the alleged corruption and negligence of other
institutions; 31% asked for clarification of the policy in service distribution; 17%
asked to hold periodic meetings to discuss problems; 9% asked for disclosure
of the criteria of employment; 6% asked for the disclosure of the budgets and
how they were spent and 6% asked about the donors.
Figure(14): What is the main reason for your dissatisfactionwith the institutions in your area?
6 6
9
17
31 3235
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Lack ofdisclosure of
funders
Lack ofdisclosure ofbudgets and
spending
Lack ofdisclosure ofthe criteria
foremployment
Lack ofperiodic
meetings todiscuss
problems
Lack of clarityabout
distribution ofservices
Corruption ornegligence
Relationship with other institutions
51
As noted above, the percentage of partnership with other institutions was very
good considering the Syrian context in which individualism mostly prevails due
to the previous experience under the dictatorship of the Syrian government. Fifty
percent of the surveyed institutions expressed dissatisfaction with the practices of
other institutions in their areas. This can be considered a positive result because
the negative experience under the Syrian government, in which corruption was not
addressed.
52
Table (6) Other reasons for dissatisfaction mentioned in responses to the questionnaire
Ethnic reasons.
Utilizing of the name of our organization by some organization.
The answer to this question is sensitive and there are other reasons I cannot mention due to their sensitivity.
Misbehavior with the public.
Inefficiency in management, the lack of expertise and the presence of some kind of nepotism.
Weakness of performance and organization.
Lack of protecting the historical sites by the competent bodies.
Lack of supervision and monitoring.
Lack of support.
False promises.
We have protested against the work of some relief institutions because of their misbehavior with the citizens and to demand for the people’s rights.
No need to protest because our work is private and voluntary with no funds.
To demand for the local council to put a plan for electricity through a questionnaire that was distributed by the organization.
A local protocol should be signed by the donors and CSOs in order to put pressure on them and to change the work mechanisms completely.
Aligned to a certain party..
Slow movement at work because of work pressure.
Discrimination and prejudice.
Wrong policies in administration.
The relationship with the factions.
Asking for salaries.
Violations against civilians by some military factions.
Delaying the meetings because the staff are busy since most of them are volunteers.
Some organizations get funds from donors and give it to the military instead of civilians, protests against the policies of some organizations.
Identifying the problems and responsibilities.
There have been protests against the local council and its methods of work.
53
Sixth-Conclusions and RecommendationsFrom the previous results, we conclude that emerging Syrian institutions need
programs for empowerment and capacity building. These are the most important
elements to ensure a higher level of transparency within these institutions.
Recommendations for donors and international organizations: - Support a long-term program to train emerging Syrian institutions on strategic
planning, participatory planning, the effective management of programs,
transparency and accountability, and include monitoring & evaluation as an
essential element of training.
- Leverage existing relationships and partnerships with Syrian institutions to
improve the governance of these institutions, as an integral part of donors’
work with their Syrian partners.
- Support deep and long-term research that sheds light on the progress
of transparency in emerging Syrian institutions, and which highlight the
weaknesses in order to overcome them. Share the outcomes of such research
with the donor organizations.
- Introduce Syrian organizations to the governance systems of international
institutions through learning sessions. Arrange short or intermediate exchange
visits in order to get acquainted closely with the mechanisms of those
institutions.
- Support Syrian institutions who are working in the transparency field or trying
to apply transparency in their work to gather in a conference that focuses on
how to reach the highest levels of transparency, taking into account the factors
that are unique to Syrian institutions and their context.
1
2
3
4
5
54
Recommendations for emerging Syrian institutions:
- Adopt the values of transparency and accountability in theory and practice
- Direct focus to building institutional structures that make up the foundation of
a high level of transparency.
-Work on experience-sharing in the field of governance and applying
transparency and accountability within the institution’s administrative systems.
- Focus on having specific policies and measures within Syrian organizations
and adhere to those policies.
- Include the targeted groups and partners in the planning process and in the
evaluation of the organization’s work.
- Publicly share information periodically all of the organization’s projects,
activities and financial reports in a clear way for the audience.
1
2
3
4
5
6
within the organization’s policies and its practical measures.
55
The references used in this research:
Aman Coalition for Integrity and Accountability, Civil Society in the Arab
Countries and its Role in Fighting against Corruption.
The United Nations Development Program, Corruption and Development, New
York, 2008.
The Palestinian Initiative to Deepen International Dialogue and Democracy
http://www.aman-palestine.org/
Shahade, Hosam, Civil Society, Civic Education Series 6, Bait AL-Mouaten,
Beirut.
Abduljawad, Fatma. Administrative and Financial Corruption and its Negative
Effects on the Iraqi State, General Committee of Tasks, Iraq,
http://tax.mof.gov.iq/
Atwan Khodr. The Role of the Civil Society Organizations in Fighting Against
Corruption, Al-Nahreen University, Baghdad.
Administrative corruption, http://www.moqatel.com
Al-Waelee, Yaser. Administrative Corruption, its Concepts, Reasons, Types, Al-
Nabaa Magazine, Edition 18, http://annabaa.org/
56
Table Title Page
1 Governance indicators in Syria, according to the World Bank 21
2 Distribution of the sample according to focus area 34
3 What are the goals your institution seeks to achieve? 36
4 Examples from survey responses about the projects and goals 37
5 Some of the reasons cited for not publicly sharing information 48
6Other reasons for dissatisfaction mentioned in responses to the
questionnairee 52
Table No.
Index of Tables
Figure No. Figure Title Page
1 Map clarifying the roles of civil society 23
2 Distribution of institutions by province 33
3 Division of sampled institutions by focus area 34
4 Presence of institutional structures 39
5 Presence of a work plan 41
6 Work plans are built upon 41
7 Do you have your own media outlet 42
8 What have you shared information about 43
9 Most common reports in Syrian institutions 44
10 Number of report types used by Syrian institutions 44
11 Who reads the reports 45
12 Do staff read the Board meeting minutes 46
13 Consultation occurs through 49
14 What is the reason for your dissatisfaction with the institutions in your area 50