2016 continuity of operations (coop) terrorism and ... aars/final...1. the title of this document is...

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Florida Hurricane “Kimo” (AAR/IP) - 2016 Statewide COOP/Hurricane Exercise

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

2016 Continuity of Operations (COOP) Terrorism and Hurricane

“Kimo” Full-Scale Exercise After Action Report

May 16-19, 2016

After Action Conference: June 23, 2016

Document Date: June 30, 2016




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Preface 1 State of Florida


PREFACE The 2016 Continuity of Operations (COOP) Terrorism and Hurricane “Kimo” Full-Scale Exercise is sponsored by the Florida Division of Emergency Management (FDEM). The Exercise Plan was produced with input, advice, and assistance from the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) and Florida’s 67 County Emergency Management agencies, which followed the guidance set forth in the FEMA Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). This is an annual event; however, this year the State Emergency Operation Center was relocated to Camp Blanding. The 2016 COOP Terrorism and Hurricane “Kimo” Full-Scale Exercise is an unclassified exercise. The control of information is based more on public sensitivity regarding the nature of the exercise than on the exercise content. This After Action Report gives elected and appointed officials, observers, media personnel, and players from participating organizations the information they need to observe or participate in a response exercise focusing on participants’ emergency response plans, policies, and procedures as they pertain to continuity of operations, terrorism, and a hurricane. All exercise participants should use appropriate guidelines to ensure the proper control of information within their areas of expertise and to protect this material in accordance with current jurisdictional directives. Public release of exercise materials to third parties is at the discretion of the FDEM.



Handling Instructions 2 State of Florida


HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

1. The title of this document is 2016 Continuity of Operations (COOP) Terrorism and Hurricane “Kimo” Full-Scale Exercise After Action Report.

2. The information gathered in this report is For Official Use Only and should be handled as sensitive information. Reproduction of this document, in whole or in part, without prior approval by FDEM is prohibited. The attached materials will be disseminated only on a need-to-know basis.

3. For more information, please consult the following points of contact (POCs):

Lead Continuity of Operations Planner: Wendell Dumas FDEM, State Continuity Program Manager Bureau of Preparedness/Natural Hazards 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, FL 32399 [email protected] Lead Controller: Michael Beha Training and Exercise Controller FDEM, Bureau of Preparedness 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, FL 32399 [email protected] Preparedness Bureau Chief/State Training Officer/Exercise Director: Linda McWhorter FDEM, Bureau of Preparedness State Continuity of Operations Program Manager 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, FL 32399 [email protected]



Contents 3 State of Florida


CONTENTS Preface ........................................................................................................1 Handling Instructions ................................................................................2 Contents ......................................................................................................3 Executive Summary ...................................................................................5 Section 1: Exercise Overview ...................................................................9 Section 2: Exercise Design Summary ................................................... 11

Exercise Purpose and Design ........................................................... 11 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities, and Activities ................................. 11 Exercise Evaluation Guides .............................................................. 13 Scenario Summary ......................................................................... 14 Exercise Schedule .......................................................................... 15

Section 3: Evaluation of Exercise Objectives ...................................... 17 Objective 1: Implementation of the State’s Continuity of Operations Plan .......................................................... 17 Objective 2: Assess the capability of the Relocation Team to establish communications and operations within 6 -12 hours upon arrival at the alternate SEOC site. ......................... 19 Objective 3: Validate the ability of the SERT to assume command and control while relocating to the alternate SEOC. ............. 20 Objective 4: Evaluate the capabilities of all 18 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) to perform mission essential functions from the alternate SEOC upon relocation. ............................ 20 Objective 5: Test the ability to ensure safety and accountability of personnel and visitors at the alternate SEOC site upon relocation. .............................................................. 21 Objective 6: Verify the reconstitution of mission essential functions back to the primary site .................................................... 22

Section 4: Evaluation of Exercise Objectives for Emergency Support Functions .............................................................. 25

ESF 1 & 3 Transportation/Public Works & Engineering ........................ 25 ESF 2 Communications ................................................................... 26 ESF 4/9 Firefighting/Search & Rescue ............................................... 27 ESF 5 Plans ................................................................................... 28 ESF 6 Mass Care ............................................................................ 28



Contents 4 State of Florida


ESF 7 Unified Logistics Section ........................................................ 29 ESF 8 Health and Medical Services ................................................... 30 ESF 10 Environmental Protection ..................................................... 31 ESF 11 Food and Water .................................................................. 32 ESF 12 Energy ............................................................................... 33 ESF 13 Military Support ................................................................. 34 ESF 14 External Affairs ................................................................... 35 ESF 15 Volunteers and Donations..................................................... 36 ESF 16 Law Enforcement and Security .............................................. 37 ESF 17 Agricultural and Animal Services ........................................... 38 ESF 18 Business, Industry & Economic Stabilization ........................... 39

Section 5: Conclusion ............................................................................. 41

Appendix A: Improvement Plan Matrix ............................................... A-1 Appendix B: Acronyms .......................................................................... B-1



Executive Summary 5 State of Florida


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Hurricane “Kimo” - Statewide Continuity of Operations/Hurricane Exercise was developed to test the State’s ability to relocate in real time from the State Emergency Operations Center in Tallahassee to Camp Blanding. The alternate facility, the Camp Blanding Joint Training Center (CBJTC), was first used as a relocation site five years earlier during the Hurricane “Griffin” Statewide Hurricane Exercise.

The purpose of this report is to analyze exercise results, identify strengths to be maintained and built upon, identify potential areas for further improvement, and support development of corrective actions. The After Action Report focuses on the continuity of operations activities in the exercise.

Exercise Objectives

The exercise planning team was led by the Florida Division of Emergency Management. The exercise planning team met periodically to build upon the established framework for the annual statewide hurricane exercise. Based on the exercise planning team’s deliberations, the following objectives were developed for the Hurricane “Kimo” Exercise:

Objective 1: Evaluate the implementation of the State’s Continuity of Operations Plan through a relocation of the State Emergency Response Team to the alternate State Emergency Operations Center in real time. Objective 2: Assess the capability of the Relocation Team to establish communications and operations within 6 -12 hours upon arrival at the alternate site. Objective 3: Validate the ability of the State Emergency Response Team to assume command and control while relocating to the alternate State Emergency Operations Center. Objective 4: Evaluate the capabilities of all 18 Emergency Support Functions to perform mission essential functions from the alternate SEOC upon relocation. Objective 5: Test the ability to ensure safety and accountability of personnel and visitors at the alternate State Emergency Operations Center site upon relocation. Objective 6: Verify the reconstitution of mission essential functions back to the primary site in Tallahassee.





Major Strengths The major strengths identified during this exercise are as follows:

• The State Emergency Response Team successfully relocated the State Emergency Operations Center to the Camp Blanding Joint Training Facility upon activation of the State Continuity of Operations Plan. This activation was completed within the allocated time frame of 6 to 12 hours after arrival.

• Camp Blanding Joint Training Facility is an excellent location for Florida’s Alternate State Emergency Operations Center. It has a functional technical infrastructure and operational support provided by the Florida National Guard.

• The State Emergency Response Team has fixed the numerous technical issues identified five years ago during the previous relocation when the Camp Blanding Joint Training Facility was new. The Florida Division of Emergency Management and the Florida National Guard continue to work together to find solutions to many of Florida’s disaster challenges.

• Accountability was documented in this exercise. This was the first time a reconstitution plan was developed using a phased convoy plan to reconstitute back to Tallahassee. Everyone arrived safely and was accounted for during transition.

Opportunities for Improvement The primary areas for improvement identified throughout the exercise are as follows:

• The transportation plan for the relocation of emergency management personnel from Tallahassee to Camp Blanding needs additional work. The four-phase system tried during this exercise has potential, but needs additional procedural refinement.

• The Florida Hurricane “Kimo” Full Scale Exercise provided all Emergency Support Functions an opportunity to review their Continuity of Operations Plans. All Emergency Support Functions should add any lessons learned and update their plans, operating guidelines, and check lists.

• Each Emergency Support Function needs to identify additional staff members that could be available to work in the State Emergency Operations Center, either in Tallahassee or at Camp Blanding. Having a sufficient number of trained personnel is important to maintaining a sustained operation. In the case of a large-scale activation, statewide mutual aid agreements and EMAC are available for additional staff and resources. During any activation, having adequate staffing is an important consideration.





Discussion The exercise was a successful test of the State’s ability to relocate the State Emergency Operations Center to an alternate facility and transfer operations and control of operations. A four phased system was used to convey a State Emergency Response Team staff of over one hundred from Tallahassee to Camp Blanding. A variety of procedures were used to account for all personnel. Initial set up allowed for the accommodation of personnel within the allocated time line of 6 to 12 hours after arrival. The Camp Blanding Joint Training Facility is an excellent location for an Alternate State Emergency Operations Center. It has technical infrastructure and operational support provided by the Florida National Guard. Upon arrival, State Emergency Response Team members checked in and were assigned a room. At the conclusion of the first day, a briefing was held to provide safety information and provide an orientation to operations at Camp Blanding. This is the third Statewide Hurricane Exercise to relocate the State Emergency Response Team to Camp Blanding. Five years ago, the Team relocated to a new, just opened Camp Blanding Joint Training Facility. This year, the Team did not experience the technical issues experienced five years ago when the Joint Training Facility was new. The Florida Division of Emergency Management and the Florida National Guard have worked together to find solutions to many previously identified technical problems. The exercise provided many opportunities for the Emergency Support Functions to test their plans, guidelines and checklists for both routine operations and for relocating during an activation of the state continuity of operations plan for the State Emergency Operations Center. All Emergency Support Functions should add any lessons learned and update their plans, operating guidelines, and check lists. It has been a number of years since a major hurricane has resulted in a full activation of the State Emergency Operations Center. Each year the Statewide Hurricane Exercise provides valuable training experience each Emergency Support Function. Each needs to identify additional staff members that could be available work in the State Emergency Operations Center, either in Tallahassee or at Camp Blanding. Having a sufficient number of trained personnel is important to maintaining a sustained operation. Ongoing technical issues include: Wi-Fi, printing, personal Wi-Fi connections, and hard line telephone drops.





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Section 1: Exercise Overview 9 State of Florida


SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW

Exercise Name 2016 Continuity of Operations (COOP) Terrorism and Hurricane “Kimo” Full-Scale Exercise

Exercise Dates May 16-19, 2016

Scope

Exercise play will begin on May 16, 2016 and end on May 19, 2016, as determined by the Exercise Director. The exercise will be played eight (8) hours per day at all exercise locations. On Monday, May 16, 2016 the exercise will be initiated by a credible terrorist threat near the State Capitol in Tallahassee, FL that requires the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), along with various agencies and organizations, to respond in accordance with established plans, policies and procedures. In response to the terrorist threat, essential personnel will also be required to relocate to Camp Blanding Joint Training Center (CBJTC) due to activation of the Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan. As play progresses, participants will be required to perform response activities, relocation, and preparation for a hurricane. Play may end prior to schedule end of exercise should the Exercise Director, Lead Controller, Evaluation Team and SERT Chief determine that all objectives and performance criteria have been addressed to such an extent as to enable evaluators to complete their assessment.

Mission Area(s)

• Protection • Response

Core Capabilities

• Operational Coordination • Critical Transportation • Intelligence and Information Sharing • Operational Communications • On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement

Objectives

Objective 1: Evaluate the implementation of the State’s Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) through a relocation of the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) to the alternate State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) in real time. Objective 2: Assess the capability of the Relocation Team to establish



Section 1: Exercise Overview 10 State of Florida


communications and operations within 6 hours upon arrival at the alternate SEOC site. Objective 3: Validate the ability of the SERT to assume command and control while relocating to the alternate SEOC. Objective 4: Evaluate the capabilities of all 18 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) to perform mission essential functions from the alternate SEOC upon relocation. Objective 5: Test the ability to ensure safety and accountability of personnel and visitors at the alternate SEOC site upon relocation. Objective 6: Verify the reconstitution of mission essential functions back to the primary site (SEOC, Tallahassee, FL).

Threat or Hazard Terrorism and Hurricane

Scenario

Throughout the following days, May 9-13, 2016 reports of possible credible threats in the North Florida/Panhandle area have been received by the Florida Fusion Centers. The Florida Division of Emergency Management has been monitoring these messages along with trusted agents in order to prepare for a potential attack.

While reports of credible threats have been sent to trusted agents the eleventh tropical depression of the season has formed on May 15, 2016 at 2:00 PM near the Windward Islands. The Depression is moving toward the west near 22 mph. This general motion is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. Some strengthening is forecast during the next 24 hours. The Depression could become a tropical storm tonight or on Monday.

On Monday, May 16, 2016 at 5:00 AM the depression has upgraded to the eleventh tropical storm of the season. The depression is moving toward the west-northwest near 24 mph. This general motion is expected to continue for the next 48 hours.



Section 2: Exercise Design 11 State of Florida


SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN Exercise Purpose and Design The primary purpose of this exercise was to assess the Division of Emergency Management and the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP). The exercise was designed to achieve this goal via coordination of a real-time relocation of the SERT to Camp Blanding, which serves as the alternate State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) site. There was also an emphasis on the coordination of response activities between the State and county governments in response to parts of the State that have been impacted by Hurricane “Kimo”. The activation of the State Logistics Response Center (SLRC) will also be evaluated. This exercise will also be used to train and orient new employees and existing SERT members on their mission essential emergency support functions related to a COOP relocation of the SEOC in response to a major hurricane impact.

Exercise Objectives, Capabilities, and Activities Capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items that were derived from the Target Capabilities List (TCL). The capabilities listed below form the foundation for the organization of all objectives and observations in this exercise. Additionally, each capability is linked to several corresponding activities and tasks to provide additional detail. Based upon the identified exercise objectives below, the exercise planning team has decided to establish the following objectives for this exercise: Objective 1: Evaluate the implementation of the State’s Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) through a relocation of the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) to the alternate State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) in real time. Core Capability: Operational Coordination

1. Ensure safety and accountability of personnel upon relocation at the alternate site. 2. Procedures implemented to ensure safety, health and well-being of staff during relocation

of staff during Phase 1. 3. Mobilization, deployment and convoy activities and procedures. 4. Assess the capabilities and procedures for the 4 step time phases approach

Objective 2: Assess the capability of the Relocation Team to establish communications and operations within 6 -12 hours upon arrival at the alternate SEOC site. Core Capability: Operational Communication

1. Can communications be re-established with deployed and non-deployed staff? 2. What are some of the procedures and plans that include guidance for communications?





3. Does the SERT possess communication capabilities that support senior leadership while transitioning to Camp Blanding?

4. Did the SERT possess communication capabilities that support the relocation team? Objective 3: Validate the ability of the SERT to assume command and control while relocating to the alternate SEOC. Core Capability: Operational Coordination

1. Did SERT transitioned responsibilities from the SEOC facility to deployed staff , once they arrived at the alternate facility

2. Was the transition done when staff arrived or prior to arrival? Objective 4: Evaluate the capabilities of all 18 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) to perform mission essential functions from the alternate SEOC upon relocation. Core Capability: Operational Coordination

1. Continue agency essential functions during a wide range of emergencies 2. Can the ESF’s attain operational capability at the alternate site within 6-12 hours 3. What process does the ESF’s have in place? 4. Does ESF’s have standard operating guidelines or standard operating plans

Objective 5: Test the ability to ensure safety and accountability of personnel and visitors at the alternate SEOC site upon relocation. Core Capability: Operational Coordination

1. Did the agency established procedures for accounting for employees in the event of an emergency

2. Does the alternate facility include considerations for health and safety 3. Are there security measures for staff such as access and control 4. Are there provisions for food, medical and transportation at the alternate site 5. Did the Agency established procedures for the orientation of staff

Objective 6: Verify the reconstitution of mission essential functions back to the primary site (SEOC, Tallahassee, FL). Core Capability: Operational Coordination

1. Does the SERT have procedures for phasing down operations and returning staff, and equipment to SEOC?

2. Agency coordinated and preplanned the phase approach for reconstitution? 3. Agency developed procedures to inform staff that the threat no longer existed. 4. Agency developed procedures to verify that vital records were available restored facility.





EXERCISE EVALUATION GUIDES EEGs assist evaluators in collecting relevant exercise observations. EEGs document exercise objectives and aligned core capabilities, capability targets, and critical tasks. Each EEG provides evaluators with information on what they should expect to see demonstrated in their functional area. The EEGs, coupled with Participant Feedback Forms and Hot Wash notes, are used to evaluate the exercise and compile the After-Action Report (AAR).

Performed without

Challenges (P)

The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s) and did not negatively impact the performance of other activities. Performance of this activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, and it was conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws.

Performed with Some Challenges

(S)

The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s) and did not negatively impact the performance of other activities. Performance of this activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, and it was conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws. However, opportunities to enhance effectiveness and/or efficiency were identified.

Performed with Major Challenges

(M)

The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s), but some or all of the following were observed: demonstrated performance had a negative impact on the performance of other activities; contributed to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers; and/or was not conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws.

Unable to be Performed (U)

The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were not performed in a manner that achieved the objective(s).

These Performance Ratings will be applied to each of the six exercise objectives. Objective four is specific for each Emergency Support Function and is evaluated for each ESF. The evaluations were primarily conducted by staff from the following regional planning councils: North Central Florida Regional Planning Council, Apalachee Regional Planning Council, and West Florida Regional Planning Council. The Exercise Evaluation Guides were developed by the Florida Division of Emergency Management to test specific aspects of the Division’s Continuity of Operations Plan.





Scenario Summary Throughout the following week of May 9, 2016, reports of credible threats in the North Florida and the Florida Panhandle area have been released by the Florida Fusion Centers to authorized personnel. The Florida Division of Emergency Management has been monitoring these messages along with trusted agents in order to prepare for a potential attack to an unknown area. While reports of credible threats have been sent to trusted agents the eleventh tropical depression of the season has formed on May 15, 2016 at 2:00 PM near the Windward Islands. The Depression is moving toward the west near 22 mph. This general motion is expected to continue for the next 24 hours. Some strengthening is forecast during the next 24 hours. The Depression could become a tropical storm tonight or on Monday.

On Monday, May 16, 2016 at 5:00 AM the depression has upgraded to the eleventh tropical storm of the season. The depression is moving toward the west-northwest near 24 mph. This general motion is expected to continue for the next 48 hours.





EXERCISE SCHEDULE

Time Personnel Activity Location May 13-15, 2016

8:00AM – 5:00PM

Exercise Staff Site Set-up, Exercise Weather Forecast released and Credible Threats received.

SEOC (Tallahassee, FL)

May 16, 2016

6:00AM Relocation Team and Evaluators Deployed to Camp Blanding to set-up the facility.

Camp Blanding (Starke, FL)

8:00AM Exercise Participants Exercise messaging received for essential personnel to report to the SEOC.


9:00AM Exercise Participants Credible Threat/Weather Briefing


10:00AM Exercise Controllers, Participants and Evaluators

Report to Camp Blanding Exercise Site(s)

1:00PM-3:00PM

Exercise Controllers, Evaluators, and Participants

Registration/Check-in for Exercise

Old Cafeteria (Starke, FL)

3:30PM-4:30PM


Welcome/Safety Briefing/Player’s Briefing

RTI Auditorium (Starke, FL)

4:30PM-5:00PM


Set-up work areas Exercise Sites

May 17, 2015

8:00AM to 8:45AM

All Weather Briefing Branch/Section Chief Briefings

CBJTC (Starke, FL)

8:45AM to 4:00PM

All Exercise Starts Exercise Site(s)

4:00PM to 5:00PM

All Weather Briefing Branch/Section Chief Briefings Hot Wash End Day 2

CBJTC (Starke, FL)





Time Personnel Activity Location

May 18, 2015

8:00AM to 8:45AM

All Weather Briefing Branch/Section Chief Briefings

CBJTC (Starke, FL)

8:45AM to 4:00PM

All Exercise Starts Exercise Site(s)

4:00PM to 5:00PM

All Weather Briefing Branch/Section Chief Briefings Hot Wash End Day 3

CBJTC (Starke, FL)

May 19, 2015

8:45AM to 12:00PM

All Site breakdown/reconstitute back to the SEOC

Exercise Site(s)

2:00PM All Report In and Final Brief SEOC (Tallahassee, FL)



Section 3: Evaluation of Exercise Objectives 17 State of Florida


SECTION 3: EVALUATION OF EXERCISE OBJECTIVES This section of the report reviews the performance of the exercised capabilities, activities, and tasks. In this section, observations are organized by Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and associated activities. The capabilities linked to the exercise objectives of Florida Hurricane “Kimo” – Statewide COOP/Hurricane Exercise are listed below, followed by corresponding exercise activity summaries. Each evaluation summary includes related observations, which include references, analysis, and possibly recommendations. Each of the exercise objectives was evaluated with the following rating system:

EVALUATION OF EXERCISE OBJECTIVES Objective 1: Evaluate the implementation of the State’s Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) through a relocation of the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) to the alternate State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) in real time. Core Capability: Operational Coordination Rating: P – Performed Without Challenges / S – Performed with Some Challenges

1. Ensure safety and accountability of personnel upon relocation at the alternate site. Rating: P – Performed Without Challenges. Once the people had arrived at Camp Blanding there were a number of procedures in place to ensure accountability. It appears that if someone went missing that there are a number of steps that would indicate that they are missing. Check-in procedures included a roll call prior to leaving, a planned stop along the way, check-in at the front gate, check-in for a room, and a sign-in sheet in the alternate SEOC site each day. There needs to be procedures in place so that these lists are cross checked and there is verification that everyone is accounted for once they arrive at Camp Blanding.

2. Procedures implemented to ensure safety, health and well-being of staff during relocation of staff during Phase 1. Rating: S – Performed with Some Challenges. There were several procedures in place to ensure the safety, health, and well-being of staff during the relocation. Vehicles were instructed to drive with their lights on for safety for the duration of the trip in the convoy. Drivers were expressly told to remain under the speed limit and not to use

Ratings Key P – Performed without Challenges S – Performed with Some Challenges M – Performed with Major Challenges U – Unable to be Performed





their cell phones while driving. All staff met prior to deploying to discuss the route and waypoint to be used. One instance where an individual driving alone in a car was called to be asked why they were lagging behind in the convoy had a state issued cell phone and could communicate hands-free via speaker phone. There was also to be a scheduled stop for staff comfort at the Busy Bee gas station in Live Oak which is a deviation of the original COOP that had the convoy stop at the common Rest Area. Drivers were also instructed to not use their cell phone unless they were using them “hands-free.” One recommendation for consideration might be having portable short range walkie-talkies for each vehicle in the convoy, or have protocols that mandate vehicles travel with at least 2 people in each car to allow for open communication. Some ESF’S cancelled because of unforeseen circumstances such as staff cancelling at the last moment, most vehicles had 2 persons and SUV/vans had 3 people. There were guidelines established for travel purposes that 2 people per car, however some departments had their own state vehicles that incurred travel expenses.

3. Mobilization, deployment and convoy activities and procedures. Rating: S – Performed with Some Challenges. The fact that this was a planned exercise and not a real world scenario made for some interesting issues regarding the deployment of the convoy. The objective was to ensure that essential staff was on the first 3 waves. The decision was made for leadership to leave in the last wave to test the transition of command and control to the State Forward SERT. Using rental cars provided an opportunity to actually test the capability of Enterprise (new vender) by giving them some advance notice since the week before a significant amount of cars were rented in advance for travel to the Governor’s Hurricane Conference. This allowed Enterprise to be assessed for their capability and procedures. If this was a real world event, there were no issues or shortfalls concerning rentals. Previous COOP Exercises have taken advantage of preposition vehicles, and if this was a real world event other options include contracts for buses, state vehicles, and staff could drive their vehicles and receive reimbursement.

4. Assess the capabilities and procedures for the 4 step time phases approach. Rating: S – Performed with Some Challenges. It is recognized that the four phase approach to convoying was a new method being tried during this exercise and the refinement of the travel process is the largest identify opportunity for improvement. It is also recognized that with the convoy system that everyone arrived safely and no one was lost with the accountability system, and everyone arrived at the CBJTF in time for the 4:00 pm briefing.





Almost all of the SERT leadership was deployed in the last phase. This offered security because if the alternate SEOC was compromised before their arrival they could alternate their course to another back up location. However, if the SEOC in Tallahassee had been compromised it would have still contained most of the leadership. The phased concept to the COOP was effective overall, since it allowed for the Information Technology systems to be set up and prepared before the bulk of staff arrived needing it. It also allowed Camp Blanding to not become overwhelmed by the full force of SEOC staff arriving at the same time. The facility was fully prepared and operational on time and within the 6 to 12 hour timeframe of the plan. Staff worked well together throughout the initial COOP. Everyone arrived safely to Camp Blanding. Staff received guidance and information prior to the Exercise including an April 6th site visit at the alternate site and a 3 hour COOP orientation on April 19th. This was a first for an actual site visit with a briefing for the ESF’s and essential staff. This included a complete walk through of the facility, grounds and billeting. Several hours were spent at Camp Blanding. A three to four hour COOP orientation training that included training on the phase approach was provided on April 19, 2016 at the Supreme Court. This included a presentation on Drive-Away Kits. Accountability was an emphasis for this exercise. Camp Blanding staff conducted registration, collected DEM forms, distributed room keys and maintained a list of who was on base. Accountability procedures included staff attending a brief out prior to departure to the CBJTF. During that briefing, sign in sheets were used to keep track of departing personnel. During the phased approach, the team leads had a list with phone numbers for all staff in their convoy. During the rest stop, team leads called back to report their status and accountability. Each day of the exercise, sign in sheets were passed around for accountability. If people had to return early for work they provided an email of their status and provided that information during check-out.

Objective 2: Assess the capability of the Relocation Team to establish communications and operations within 6 -12 hours upon arrival at the alternate SEOC site. Core Capability: Operational Communication Rating: P – Performed without Challenges

1. Can communications be re-established with deployed and non-deployed staff? Communications was established successfully between deployed and non-deployed staff within 6-12 hours. A variety of communication methods were available including





telephones, radios, email, internet, and satellite connections in mobile command vehicles.

2. What are some of the procedures and plans that include guidance for communications? The Florida Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, Emergency Support Function Annexes, and Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) are the most relevant. Many ESFs had additional guidelines, procedures and checklists.

1. Does the SERT possess communication capabilities that support senior leadership while transitioning to Camp Blanding? Varieties of mobile communication methods were available to support senior leadership including telephones, radios, email, and internet access in mobile command vehicles. Accessing some of these would be facilitated if more than one person was in a vehicle.

2. Did the SERT possess communication capabilities that support the relocation team? The relocation team had a variety of technology available to support the relocation of the State Emergency Operations Center. Much of the technology needed to support a COOP effort of this scale is already in place at the CBJTC. It appears that both the Division and the National Guard have made a considerable effort of working together to supply a facility that can be used as the alternate State Emergency Operations Center. This deployment went extremely smoother than the relocation five years ago when the CBJTC was first built. Five years ago there were significant difficulties to overcome with the overall Wi-Fi and internet system needed to support relocation operations. This year there minor communication problems with printers and telephones that were corrected.

Objective 3: Validate the ability of the SERT to assume command and control while relocating to the alternate SEOC. Core Capability: Operational Coordination Rating: P – Performed without Challenges

1. Did SERT transitioned responsibilities from the SEOC facility to deployed staff, once they arrived at the alternate facility The SERT responsibilities were transferred to deployed staff at 9:14 am after arrival at Camp Blanding.

2. Was the transition done when staff arrived or prior to arrival?





The transition occurred after the arrival of the Relocation Team, which departed Tallahassee at 6:00 am.

Objective 4: Evaluate the capabilities of all 18 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) to perform mission essential functions from the alternate SEOC upon relocation. Core Capability: Operational Coordination Rating: Evaluated for each Emergency Support Function in Next Section

1. Continue agency essential functions during a wide range of emergencies 2. Can the ESF’s attain operational capability at the alternate site within 6-12 hours 3. What process does the ESF’s have in place 4. Does ESF’s have standard operating guidelines or standard operating plans

This objective is evaluated in detail in the next section for each Emergency Support Function. Overall, the COOP operation went very smoothly with a minimal number of problems. Objective 5: Test the ability to ensure safety and accountability of personnel and visitors at the alternate SEOC site upon relocation. Core Capability: Operational Coordination

1. Did the agency established procedures for accounting for employees in the event of an emergency Rating: S – Performed with Some Challenges. Overall, the Division did a good job of maintaining accountability for employees while relocating a significant number of people to Camp Blanding. The Division knew the names of anticipated staff and provided this list to the front gate for arrival. At this time identification cards were checked. There was some confusion with some agencies where the initial check in station was located. Before leaving, staff was required to complete a travel authorization form. When arriving at check-in, predetermined billeting assignments were distributed.

2. Does the alternate facility include considerations for health and safety? Rating: P – Performed without Challenges. It was apparent that health and safety were a top priority while operations were conducted at Camp Blanding. Everyone was required to attend the safety briefing held the first day. This included instructions on who to contact in an emergency and everyone was given an emergency card with appropriate telephone numbers. The hazards present at Camp Blanding were reviewed along with safety regulations such as where to jog and no talking on the phone while driving. Adequate hydration was also a priority during this field deployment. Bottled water was





available at all locations. It was also provided to staff prior to and after completing travel.

3. Are there security measures for staff such as access and control Rating: P – Performed without Challenges. Camp Blanding is a National Guard Base and does have a high level of security and access control. Arriving staff had to show identifications and be included on a list of authorized staff.

4. Are there provisions for food, medical and transportation at the alternate site? Rating: P – Performed without Challenges. There were adequate provisions for food, medical, and transportation available at the site. There were limited options available for food on base since the cafeteria was closed, but nearby restaurants were available in both Starke and Middleburg. Waffle House provided lunch one day and there was a dinner opportunity available on base one night. Clay County has an EMS station on base.

5. Did the Agency established procedures for the orientation of staff

P – Performed without Challenges. Staff orientation included being provided an Exercise Plan that contained information about the exercise as well as information on Camp Blanding. This is in addition to the orientation briefing held the first day which was attended by all SERT members.

Objective 6: Verify the reconstitution of mission essential functions back to the primary site (SEOC, Tallahassee, FL). Core Capability: Operational Coordination Rating: P – Performed without Challenges

1. Does the SERT have procedures for phasing down operations and returning staff, and equipment to SEOC? During the briefing the first day, the staff was instructed to begin planning now for the demobilization and reconstitution back at the State Emergency Operations Center in Tallahassee. This included checking out of the rooms, turning in your keys, and making sure that you are marked on the list of people leaving Camp Blanding. The phasing down operation was based on a comprehensive assessment that the threat that resulted in the need to relocate has been eliminated and that it has been verified that it is unlikely to return. State Authority was transferred back to the local people that remained in Tallahassee.





2. Agency coordinated and preplanned the phase approach for reconstitution? The waves being used to return were scheduled to depart at 8:30, 8:45, 9:00, and 9:15 am. The first stop was to be at the I-10 rest area just west of the I-75 interchange. All staff was directed to report to the SEOC by 1:00 pm. If not returning to Tallahassee, staff should report to the State Watch Office that they have safely completed their travel.

3. Agency developed procedures to inform staff that the threat no longer existed.

The procedures and agencies that would verify that the threat no longer existed and was unlikely to return was included in the final brief. A reconstitution plan was developed and approved. The plan was available to all in EM Constellation, with each ESF being advised how to access to this database.

4. Agency developed procedures to verify that vital records were available restored facility.

The procedures for shutting down and demobilizing the alternate state emergency operations center were included in the final brief. The majority of the vital records associated with this response are available in EM Constellation and they are readily accessible.





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Section 4: Evaluation of Exercise Objectives For Emergency Support Functions 25 State of Florida


SECTION 4: EVALUATION OF EXERCISE OBJECTIVES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

This section of the report reviews the performance of the exercised capabilities, activities, and tasks. In this section, observations are organized by Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and associated activities. The capabilities linked to the exercise objectives of Florida Hurricane “Kimo” – Statewide COOP/Hurricane Exercise are listed below, followed by corresponding exercise activity summaries. Each ESF summary includes related observations, which include references, analysis, and recommendations.

ESF 1 & 3: TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC WORKS & ENGINEERING Summary: Transportation and Public Works performed their mission assignments in an efficient and effective manner. Cooperation was a key to their success. Rating: P – Performed without Challenges

1. Continue agency essential functions during a wide range of emergencies

ESF 1-Transportation was able to perform essential functions, their response is certainly situational but they seem to be able to adapt to any transportation needs including the suspension of tolls on toll roads to aide in evacuation.

2. Can the ESF attain operational capability at the alternate site within 6-12 hours?

They were able to become operational with a few challenges. The Incident Management Team (IMT) out of Gainesville did not have appropriate usernames or passwords to access the server at the ALT SEOC. Similarly, everyone from the IMT was participating as a first timer at a state COOP exercise and as such only had a base level knowledge to provide support, therefore training was an issue and that was what a portion of Tuesday was dedicated to.

3. What process does the ESF have in place?

ESF’s 1 and 3 are in the process of developing a new method and process for COOP protocols. Staff at FDOT in Tallahassee is collaborating with their other districts and IMT’s to help provide better coverage in the case of a COOP. To accomplish this cross over, the IMT in Gainesville will be sufficiently trained. In

Ratings Key P – Performed without Challenges S – Performed with Some Challenges M – Performed with Major Challenges U – Unable to be Performed





an emergency or in a situation where the Tallahassee staff cannot make it to the Alternate SEOC, the IMT can be the first to arrive and set up the stations and when the Tallahassee staff arrives they can provide back up support or take over the operations.

4. Does the ESF have standard operating guidelines or standard operating plans/checklist?

As mentioned above ESF 1&3 are in the process of developing a new joint plan or checklist between the DOT and the IMT’s in order to become more productive and have better coverage in the case of a real world scenario.

ESF 2: COMMUNICATIONS Summary: The Communications Section was able to provide a variety of resources and support for the communications needs of the State Emergency Response Team. Rating: P – Performed without Challenges


ESF 2-Communications was able to perform essential functions for a wide range of emergencies. Additional communications resources were available but were not deployed as part of this exercise. For example, a cache of 85 radios was available if needed. The first convey of the travel to Camp Blanding had SLERS radios in the vehicles.


ESF 2-Communications was fully operational by that time frame. Operational capabilities also included supporting communications and problem solving.


The processes they have in place are in their SOP. Resources in place to support communications processes also includes, 35 cell phones, 6 Wi-Fi hot spots, 4 lines of Voice Over Internet Process (VOIP) telephone, suit case radios, and a variety of other equipment.

4. Does the ESF have standard operating guidelines or standard operating

plans/checklist? Yes, they are operating from their list of Guidelines.





ESF 4 & 9: FIREFIGHTING AND SEARCH & RESCUE Summary: Firefighting and Search & Rescue collaborated effectively throughout the exercise. ESF 4/9 was staffed the State Fire Marshal's office and representatives of the Florida Fire Chiefs Association. In addition to the assigned space within the CBJTF, ESF 4/9 also had one mobile command vehicle available at the alternate SEOC. The vehicle was used during the exercise to coordinate with activities being conducted at the Florida State Fire College. Rating: P – Performed without Challenges


This ESF brought a Mobile Command Vehicle to support additional staff. This increased the number of seats from one on the floor and two in the ESF work area to four state fire marshals and two Florida Fire Chiefs Association staff. The staff noted that they need a cloud or secure drop box for their agencies to access. It was stated that cloud access cannot be attained outside of the office. These issues did not cause an inability to function.


This ESF did not state any issues. Additionally, ESF 4&9 were adding an additional outside exercise during the same time.


During this COOP, the Florida Fire Chiefs Association and Fire Marshall were represented with a number of individuals. This included a law enforcement representative to handle arson. This primary focus for this ESF during the week was to improve the Incident Management Team’s ability to respond to needs as stated by a representative of the State Fire Marshall’s office.


The ESF has SOPs and each agency also has their own SOPs. Between the Florida Fire Chief Association and the Fire Marshall, there were a number of staff that seemed able to meet the needs of missions as assigned.





ESF 5: PLANS Summary: The Plans Section was able to provide a variety of support for the planning needs of the State Emergency Response Team. The initiation of the demobilization process was also supported by ESF 5. RATING: P – PERFORMED WITHOUT CHALLENGES


The Plans Section was able to conduct essential functions and was not impeded by the COOP operations. The technological demands of this section are greater than average due to operating the GATOR geographic information system and support for EM Constellation.


The desired timeline of being operation within 6 to 12 hours after arrival was achieved. During the previous COOP to Camp Blanding, one area of improvement identified was that the GATOR system was not utilized to its fullest capability. This year this was not a problem, where many standard mapping products are available and fewer special requests are needed. A second opportunity identified five years ago for improvement involved difficulties with scheduling meetings. This was not an issue this year.


This includes planning processes for using the appropriate NIMS forms and processes, and templates for morning and afternoon briefings.


The Section has a variety of procedures and plans in place to accomplish the overall mission of the SERT planning needs.

ESF 6: MASS CARE Summary: ESF 6 capabilities and performance during the exercise created an environment to educate and cross-train the limited on-site staff. This ensured prioritization with continuity of ESF 6 mission critical functions.





RATING: P – PERFORMED WITHOUT CHALLENGES


ESF 6 was able to address the needs of all missions in a timely fashion. The Human Services Branch successfully was able to hold a conference call the second day and each subsequent day at 10:00 am with all critical community partners. There were 14 members of Human Services Branch on the first conference call. Most responders within ESF 6/11 are in leadership within their own agencies. This could affect the ability for long-term staffing of the ESFs because the staff may be needed within their home agencies. An action item is to identify two – three deep staff that could be designated to train up to staff the Human Services Branch to provide better coverage for ESFs 6/11 & 15/17.


ESFs 6/11 and 15/17 had staff in place by 4:00 pm. ESF 15 only had one person, but this was communicated to SERT staff and could have been supplemented with other personnel in an actual deployment.


The ESF was able to use their standard processes to accomplish assigned tasks. The Branch staff was in tight quarters in the one assigned room. Having the ability to have a remote office close to the CBJTF for other administrative functions during the shift would have been helpful.


Procedures are available on-line, on a flash drive and were printed before relocating. Mass Care procedures are in a designated folder at the lead agency to allow for rapid deployment. They were last updated in February, 2014. An action item identified is that each of the agencies in the Human Services Branch have COOP plans, the ESF wants to develop check lists for any staff activating the ESF.

UNIFIED LOGISTICS SECTION Summary: The Unified Logistics Section is informally divided into two parts: Internal Logistics and External Logistics. This evaluation covers internal logistics involving the setup





and operation at Camp Blanding. No problems were encountered that couldn’t be addressed. RATING: P – PERFORMED WITHOUT CHALLENGES


The Logistics Section was able to conduct essential functions and was not impeded by the COOP operations. The technological demands of this section are greater than average due to being involved with supporting the set-up, operation, and demobilization of the remote operation.


The desired timeline of being operation within 6 to 12 hours after arrival was achieved. During the previous COOP to Camp Blanding, there were numerous technological issues that have been resolved during the past five years. One item identified that greatly improved connectivity was a separate network plug for use by the State Emergency Response Team


The Section has a variety of processes in place to accomplish its mission.


The Section has a variety of procedures and plans in place to accomplish the overall mission of the SERT logistics needs.

ESF 8: HEALTH AND MEDICAL SERVICES Summary: Overall, ESF 8 was able to successfully relocate to the alternate SEOC and accomplish their missions during the exercise. ESF 8 successfully coordinated the COOP of an additional Tallahassee branch office to an alternate location during the exercise. The Florida Department of Health was able to maximize the results from the exercise by conducting additional off-site activities coordinated with the exercise participants located at the alternate state EOC. RATING: P – PERFORMED WITHOUT CHALLENGES

1. Continue agency essential functions during a wide range of emergencies.





Essential agency functions were handled for a wide range of response activities. The Sim Cell included a number of issues that needed to be handled by the ESF 8.

• Was able to conduct essential functions of ESF 8 using support from central

office staff. • Space was adequate for temporary short term. • Additional space will be need for expanded team during prolonged deployment.

Consider setting aside rooms in adjacent building. • Need an uninterrupted power supply at the CBJTC. There were too many power

interruptions that caused equipment operation problems. 2. Can the ESF’s attain operational capability at the alternate site within 6-12 hours?

No major issues were identified with technology needed to conduct mission. However, it did take about 24 hours to obtain print capabilities. Printer room or network is needed.

3. What process does the ESF’s have in place?

ESF 8 has own resources- laptops, internet hotspot, and a virtual private network. A turtle phone was needed to conduct conference calls. The DoH travel pre-authorization process does not work in an undeclared disaster.

4. Does ESF’s have standard operating guidelines or standard operating plans?

The following operating guidelines and plans were observed: ESF 8 SOP, Appendix 8 of CEMP, and DOH Continuity of Operations Plan. Also on hand were play books for specific hazards, such as weather or disease outbreak.

ESF 10: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Summary: ESF 10 was able to successfully relocate to the alternate SEOC and accomplish their missions during the exercise. The team was able to successfully work with other ESFs in tasking resources to complex incidents. The exercise provided a very useful training opportunity and helped identify additional training and COOP needs for all ESF 10 team members. RATING: P – PERFORMED WITHOUT CHALLENGES


ESF 10 was able to facilitate the needs of all missions in a timely fashion. They were





able to complete missions involving drinking water, wastewater, stand lands, parks. They moved fuel to flood free zones, lowered dam levels and communicated with the EPA and Coast Guard, among other tasks.


ESF 10 was fully functional after receiving their hardware from IT. These laptops were taken Monday by IT and returned Tuesday, this is longer than a 12-hour gap. While this was planned in the exercise, it took longer than the allocated time. They did not trust the reliability of the landlines so they relied on cell phones.


ESF 10 used their support staff in the Coast Guard and the FDOT staff to accomplish missions. Staff called back to support staff at various FDEP districts after determining who an appropriate contact would be based on mission criteria.


ESF 10 had a checklist to follow as well as a list of contact phone numbers.

ESF 11: FOOD & WATER Summary: ESF 11 was successful with regards to COOP Implementation, including the arrival and accountability of staff and no delays with standing up operations. RATING: P – PERFORMED WITHOUT CHALLENGES












P- Procedures available on-line, on flash drive and hard-copy printed before relocating. Mass Care procedures are in a designated folder at the lead agency to allow for rapid deployment. They were last updated in February, 2014. An action item identified is that each of the agencies in the Human Services Branch have COOP plans, the ESF wants to develop check lists for any staff activating the ESF.

ESF 12: ENERGY Summary: ESF 12 performed well and completed many missions involving fuel and energy through successful coordination with partnering ESFs. RATING: P – PERFORMED WITHOUT CHALLENGES


ESF 12 Fuels is able to function under a wide range of emergencies; under a real world scenario they would actually be able to reroute fuel trucks to the appropriate locations as necessary, however in the exercise they were able to simulate it and still function. ESF 12 Energy is also able to function accordingly


ESF 12 Fuels was fully operational within that time frame. Their only issues were Wi-Fi connectivity. Many ESF’s had to use their own mobile hot spots because the Bandwidth was incapable of supporting all functions, but that shouldn’t reflect





on the ESF’s capabilities. They were good to go minus current infrastructure issues. EST 12 Energy was also up and operational within the allotted time.


The ESF 12 Fuels use their CEMP as their standard operating procedure. I was not privy to their exact process except to be told their use their CEMP and “ESF Blue Book” for their guide. ESF 12 Energy had their own document in place that they used for their process


The ESF has the CEMP, the “ESF Blue Book” for ESF 12 Fuels, and ESF 12 Energy had their checklist as well.

ESF 13: MILITARY SUPPORT Summary: Overall, ESF 13 performed well during the exercise. COOP activities, including the establishment of connectivity with the SERT within 6 to 12 hours were successful. RATING: P – PERFORMED WITHOUT CHALLENGES


ESF-13 has been fully capable of completing all essential functions during the exercise scenario. The ESF-13 personnel reported no major issues with their ability to function, however did comment on the fact that they do not have enough computers or desk space in their assigned office to accommodate their personnel.


ESF-13’s ability to attain operational capacity at the alternate site within 6-12 hours is dependent on the ability of the IT team to ensure the equipment is set up properly and in a timely manner. Personnel are able to become operational immediately upon entering an operational facility.


ESF-13 does not deploy with the team from the SEOC. The primary contact of ESF-13, Captain DeLeon deploys with the team from the SEOC and calls in support staff as needed. The support staff arrives on scene as directed and immediately become





operational immediately barring any technical failures.


ESF-13 has a COOP plan as well as SOG. These documents are separate, although upon playing in this exercise, ESF-13 personnel would like to include the COOP plan in the OSG document. All personnel seemed up-to-date and well-informed regarding the procedures and expectations of ESF-13.

ESF 14: EXTERNAL AFFAIRS Summary: ESF 14 staff effectively performed their mission essential duties at the CBJTC. Staff demonstrated the ability to facilitate the news media visits and to answer questions effectively during on-camera interviews. RATING: P – PERFORMED WITHOUT CHALLENGES


ESF-14 has been fully capable of completing all essential functions during the exercise scenario. The ESF-14 personnel did not report any major issues with equipment or functionality.

2. Can the ESF attain operational capability at the alternate site within 6-12 hours? ESF-14’s ability to become operational within 6-12 hours is dependent on the ability of the IT team to set up the equipment. ESF-14 can become operational immediately upon entering a functional facility.

3. What process does the ESF have in place? ESF-14 remains in near constant contact with information personnel in Tallahassee. They ensure that no information is given out without being vetted through the PIO and ensuring that all information is accurate and originates from creditable sources.






ESF-14 operates from the CEMP plan, which dictated the operation guidelines for the ESF personnel. These guidelines are discussed at regular meetings.

ESF 15: VOLUNTEERS AND DONATIONS Summary: ESF 15 staff successfully implemented COOP procedures and effectively performed their mission essential duties while operating out of the CBJTC. RATING: P – PERFORMED WITHOUT CHALLENGES








Procedures were available on-line, on flash drive and hard-copy printed before relocating. Mass Care procedures are in a designated folder at the lead agency to allow for rapid deployment. They were last updated in February, 2014. An action





item identified is that each of the agencies in the Human Services Branch have COOP plans, the ESF wants to develop check lists for any staff activating the ESF.

ESF 16: LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY Summary: ESF 16 successfully implemented COOP protocols and effectively coordinated with partner ESFs to complete its exercise missions. The ESF had very limited interaction with its federal counterparts in this exercise, but expressed the likelihood of increased federal coordination in a real event. ESF 16 used a mobile command vehicle at the exercise. RATING: P – PERFORMED WITHOUT CHALLENGES


This ESF was able to perform such functions. However, due to the extremely reduced number of agencies represented from an event at the SEOC, the staff stated increased challenges in full functionality. The staff was reduced from about 16 agencies represented to around 5. This ESF was given under 20 missions to complete. It was stated by the coordinator that he would have preferred many more, using 200 as a reference point to stay active during the entire COOP. They could have been more productive by looking for unassigned missions and starting them early.


Each agency relied on their own communication methods/technology combined with the use of EMC to communicate needs to accomplish missions. The agencies utilized personal WI-FI devices and cell phones to facilitate communication. None of the agencies involved with ESF 16 used the landline or the Internet at the CBJTC.


The agencies tied in to their individual agency resources and responded to requests as they came up. ESF 16 is a reactive ESF primarily and cannot do much prior to requests other than be on standby. Prior to emergency events, local law enforcement generally are able to handle events. Additionally, unlike other ESFs, these agencies all brought their own state issued hardware (computers, etc.) and did not have to wait to be supplied DEM laptops. If a large event occurs, ESF 16 relies on IMT to arrange hotels and other needs. Agencies can shift from other locations to cater to increased needs. ESF 16 relies on partner agencies to determine how to allocate assets, they do not communicate directly with local forces.






This ESF does not have a checklist. They rely on agency SOP’s to proceed and respond to tasks as provided. Additionally, existing mutual aid agreements and others guide operations.

ESF 17: AGRICULTURAL AND ANIMAL SERVICES Summary: Extensive pre-planning allowed ESF 17 to successfully implemented COOP protocols including relocation and set-up. RATING: P – PERFORMED WITHOUT CHALLENGES


ESF 17 was able to address the needs of all missions in a timely fashion. The Human Services Branch successfully was able to hold a conference call the second day and each subsequent day at 10:00 am with all critical community partners. There were 14 members of Human Services Branch on the first conference call. Most responders within ESF 6/11 are in leadership within their own agencies. This could affect the ability for long-term staffing of the ESFs because the staff may be needed within their home agencies. An action item is to identify two – three deep staff that could be designated to train up to staff the Human Services Branch to provide better coverage for ESFs 6/11 & 15/17. Performed with Some Challenges


ESFs 6/11 and 15/17 had staff in place by 4:00 pm. ESF 15 only had one person, but this was communicated to SERT staff and could have been supplemented with other personnel in an actual deployment. Performed Without Challenges


The ESF was able to use their standard processes to accomplish assigned tasks. The Branch staff was in tight quarters in the one assigned room. Having the ability to have a remote office close to the CBJTF for other administrative functions during the shift would have been helpful. Performed with Some Challenges






Procedures are available on-line, on a flash drive and hard-copy printed before relocating. Mass Care procedures are in a designated folder at the lead agency to allow for rapid deployment. They were last updated in February, 2014. An action item identified is that each of the agencies in the Human Services Branch have COOP plans, the ESF wants to develop check lists for any staff activating the ESF. Performed with Some Challenges

ESF 18: BUSINESS, INDUSTRY AND ECONOMIC STABILIZATION RATING: P – PERFORMED WITHOUT CHALLENGES Summary: ESF 18 successfully implemented COOP protocols and effectively coordinated with partner ESFs to complete its exercise missions. The Florida Virtual Business Emergency Operations Center (FLVBEOC) is a key part of their operation.


The ESF was able to carry out its essential functions at the COOP location. This ESF works primarily with industry groups more so than with state agencies. The ESF was staffed with two people. It was reported that the desired goal is to put together three teams to ensure that there is sufficient staff for sustained operations.


The ESF was able to attain operational capability within the allotted time frame.


Technology plays a critical role in disasters and ESF 18 utilizes a variety of tools to capture data, share information with both public and private partners. The Florida Virtual Business Emergency Operations Center (FLVBEOC) is a key part of their operation. The ESF has a process for documenting available resources when not under the threat of a hurricane.


ESF 18 had written guidelines to help direct its operations - Business, Industry, &





Economic Stabilization Standard Operating Guidelines. This document was updated in April 2016. It was reported that this exercise is being used to evaluate some of the changes made in the last update.



Section 5: Conclusion 41 State of Florida


SECTION 5: CONCLUSION The Hurricane “Kimo” - Statewide Continuity of Operations/Hurricane Exercise was developed to test the State’s ability to relocate in real time from the State Emergency Operations Center in Tallahassee to Camp Blanding.

The alternate facility, the Camp Blanding Joint Training Center (CBJTC), had been tested as a relocation site five years earlier during the Hurricane Griffin Statewide Hurricane Exercise.

The purpose of this report is to analyze exercise results, identify strengths to be maintained and built upon, identify potential areas for further improvement, and support development of corrective actions. The After Action Report focuses on the continuity of operations activities in the exercise. The major strengths identified during this exercise are as follows:

• The State Emergency Response Team successfully relocated the State Emergency Operations Center to the Camp Blanding Joint Training Facility upon activation of the State Continuity of Operations Plan. This activation was completed within the allocated time frame of 6 to 12 hours after arrival.

• Camp Blanding Joint Training Facility is an excellent location for Florida’s Alternate State Emergency Operations Center. It has a functional technical infrastructure and operational support provided by the Florida National Guard.

• The State Emergency Response Team has fixed the numerous technical issues identified five years ago during the previous relocation when the Camp Blanding Joint Training Facility was new. The Florida Division of Emergency Management and the Florida National Guard continue to work together to find solutions to many of Florida’s disaster challenges.

• Accountability was documented in this exercise. This was the first time a reconstitution plan was developed using a phased convoy plan to reconstitute back to Tallahassee. Everyone arrived safely and was accounted for during transition.

Opportunities for Improvement The primary areas for improvement identified throughout the exercise are as follows:

• The transportation plan for the relocation of emergency management personnel from Tallahassee to Camp Blanding needs additional work. The four-phase system tried during this exercise has potential, but needs additional procedural refinement.

• The Florida Hurricane “Kimo” Full Scale Exercise provided all Emergency Support Functions an opportunity to review their Continuity of Operations Plans. All





Emergency Support Functions should add any lessons learned and update their plans, operating guidelines, and check lists.

• Each Emergency Support Function needs to identify additional staff members that could be available to work in the State Emergency Operations Center, either in Tallahassee or at Camp Blanding. Having a sufficient number of trained personnel is important to maintaining a sustained operation. In the case of a large-scale activation, statewide mutual aid agreements and EMAC are available for additional staff and resources. During any activation, having adequate staffing is an important consideration.

Discussion The exercise was a successful test of the State’s ability to relocate the State Emergency Operations Center to an alternate facility and transfer operations and control of operations. A four phased system was used to convey a State Emergency Response Team staff of over one hundred from Tallahassee to Camp Blanding. A variety of procedures were used to account for all personnel. Initial set up allowed for the accommodation of personnel within the allocated time line of 6 to 12 hours after arrival. The Camp Blanding Joint Training Facility is an excellent location for an Alternate State Emergency Operations Center. It has technical infrastructure and operational support provided by the Florida National Guard. Upon arrival, State Emergency Response Team members checked in and were assigned a room. At the conclusion of the first day, a briefing was held to provide safety information and provide an orientation to operations at Camp Blanding. This is the third Statewide Hurricane Exercise to relocate the State Emergency Response Team to Camp Blanding. Five years ago, the Team relocated to a new, just opened Camp Blanding Joint Training Facility. This year, the Team did not experience the technical issues experienced five years ago when the Joint Training Facility was new. The Florida Division of Emergency Management and the Florida National Guard have worked together to find solutions to many previously identified technical problems. The exercise provided many opportunities for the Emergency Support Functions to test their plans, guidelines and checklists for both routine operations and for relocating during an activation of the state continuity of operations plan for the State Emergency Operations Center. All Emergency Support Functions should add any lessons learned and update their plans, operating guidelines, and check lists. It has been a number of years since a major hurricane has resulted in a full activation of the State Emergency Operations Center. Each year the Statewide Hurricane Exercise provides valuable training experience each Emergency Support Function. Each needs to identify additional staff members that could be available work in the State Emergency Operations Center, either in Tallahassee or at Camp Blanding. Having a sufficient number of trained personnel is important





to maintaining a sustained operation. Ongoing technical issues include: Wi-Fi, printing, personal Wi-Fi connections, and hard line telephone drops. Overall, the relocation to Camp Blanding was very successful.





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Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) After Action Report/Improvement Plan Florida Hurricane Griffin (AAR/IP) Statewide COOP/Hurricane Exercise

Appendix A: Improvement Plan Matrix A-1 State of Florida


APPENDIX A: IMPROVEMENT PLAN MATRIX

Exercise Objective Observation Recommendation Core

Capability Primary

Responsible Agency

Agency POC Completion Date

Objective 1

There were operational difficulties with the four phased convoy system for traveling to the alternate location.

Review and update the procedures for convoying to an alternate location

Operational Coordination,

Critical Transportation

Florida Division of Emergency

Management, State Continuity Program

Wendell Dumas, State

Continuity Program Manager

12/31/2016

Objective 1

Personnel accountability information was collected at various stages of travel to the alternate location.

Review and update the procedures for maintaining personnel accountability while traveling to an alternate location.

Operational Coordination,

Critical Transportation





12/31/2016

Objective 2

Many technological problems have been solved since the relocation five years ago.

The Florida Division of Emergency Management and the Florida National Guard should continue working together to enhance operational capabilities at the Camp Blanding Joint Training Facility.

Operational Coordination, Operational

Communications





12/31/2016



Appendix B: Acronyms B-2 State of Florida FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Exercise Objective Observation Recommendation Core

Capability Primary

Responsible Agency

Agency POC Completion Date

Objective 4

This exercise provided a learning environment to use and evaluate existing emergency plans.

All Emergency Support Functions should add any lessons learned and update their plans, operating guidelines, and check lists.

Operational Coordination





12/31/2016

Objective 4

Having a sufficient number of trained personnel is important to maintaining the sustained operation of all Emergency Support Functions.

Each Emergency Support Function needs to identify additional staff members that could be available work in the State Emergency Operations Center, either in Tallahassee or at Camp Blanding.

Operational Coordination





12/31/2016


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) After Action Report/Improvement Plan Florida Hurricane Griffin (AAR/IP) Statewide COOP/Hurricane Exercise

Appendix B: Acronyms B-1 State of Florida


APPENDIX B: ACRONYMS

Acronym Meaning A AAM After-Action Meeting AAR After-Action Report AHIMT All Hazards Incident Management Team AORs Area of Responsibility B BAPS Budget Amendment Processing System C CBJTC Camp Blanding Joint Training Center C/E Controller/Evaluator COOP Continuity of Operations D DHS Department of Homeland Security DoD Department of Defense E EEG Exercise Evaluation Guide EMS Emergency Medical Services EOC Emergency Operations Center ESF Emergency Support Function EXPLAN Exercise Plan F FDEM Florida Division of Emergency Management FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FFCA Florida Fire Chiefs Association FLAIR Florida Financial and Information Resource FLNG Florida National Guard FOCUS Financial Operations and Core Utilities Suite G H HSEEP Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program I ID Identification IOT in order to




Acronym Meaning IP Improvement Plan J JIC Joint Information Center J-METL Joint-Mission Essential Task List CBJTC Joint Operations Center Training Facility JOG Joint Operations Group JOP Joint Planning Group JOPP Joint Operation Planning Process JROSI Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration JSG Joint Support Group K L LASPBS Legislative Appropriation System/Planning and Budgeting System LNO Liaison Officer M MDMP Military Decision Making Process MEOC Mobile Emergency Operations Center MOU Memorandum of Understanding MSEL Master Scenario Events List N NIMS National Incident Management System O P PIO Public Information Officer PMB Patient Movement Branch POC Point of Contact POD Point of Distribution Q R S SCAT Staff Coordination Assistance Team SERT State Emergency Response Teams SEOC State Emergency Operations Center SERP State Emergency Response Plan SFM State Fire Marshall




Acronym Meaning SIMCELL Simulation Cell SITREP Situation Report SNS Strategic National Stockpile SME Subject Matter Expert SOG Standard Operating Guidelines SOP Standard Operating Procedure T U UASI Urban Area Security Initiative UC Unified Command USAR Urban Search and Rescue V VIPs Very Important Persons VOAD Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters W X Y Z

2016 continuity of operations (coop) terrorism and ... aars/final...1. the title of this document is...

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