MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2018ME63Docket: Ken-17-408 Argued: March7,2018 Decided: May8,2018

Panel: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Majority: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Concurrence:JABAR,J.

ADOPTIONOFPARKERJ.ALEXANDER,J.

[¶1]ThisappealarisesfromanadoptionproceedingintheDistrictCourt

(Augusta, Nale, J.) following the termination of the parental rights of the

biological parents of Parker J. During the pendency of the child protective

proceedingandfollowingtheterminationofparentalrights,theDepartmentof

Health and Human Services placed Parker in the care of his maternal

grandmother.Beginningapproximatelyayearaftertheterminationofparental

rights, competingpetitions for adoptionofParkerwere filedby (1)Parker’s

paternal grandmother, (2) Parker’smaternal grandmother, and (3) Parker’s

maternalgrandfatherandhiswife.

[¶2]Thecompetingadoptionpetitionswereconsolidated,andahearing

washeldintheDistrictCourt.Atthehearing,

1.Parker’spaternalgrandmotherwasrepresentedbycounsel.Thesameattorney also apparently represented an individual who was in a

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long-term relationship with Parker’s paternal grandmother and whotestified that he wanted to adopt Parker, although he had filed noadoptionpetitionsignifyingacommitmenttoadoption.2. Parker’s maternal grandmother was represented by counsel. Herpetition for adoption was supported by the Department, which wasseparatelyrepresentedbyanassistantattorneygeneralwhoplayedtheprimaryroleinpresentingthecasesupportingadoptionbythematernalgrandmother.ThematernalgrandmotherandtheDepartmentareeachrepresentedbydifferentcounselonthisappeal.3.Parker’smaternalgrandfatherandhiswife,whojointlypetitionedforadoption,wereunrepresentedbutactivelyparticipatedinthehearing.[¶3] The court generally allowed the competing petitioners to fully

present their cases and to examine opposing parties and witnesses at the

hearing.

[¶4] At the conclusionof the three-dayhearing, andwithout takinga

recess,thecourtannounceditsdecisionfromthebench,denyingtheadoption

petitionofthematernalgrandmother,denyingthejointadoptionpetitionofthe

maternalgrandfatherandhiswife, andgranting the adoptionpetitionof the

paternal grandmotherwhile also granting an adoption to the partner of the

paternalgrandmother,althoughthatindividualhadnotpetitionedforadoption

or otherwise signaled any formal commitment to the adoption. The court

requestedthattheprevailingpartyprepareawrittendecisionconsistentwith

thedecisionithadstatedorallyontherecord.

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[¶5]Whenthewrittendecisionwasentered,Parkerwastransferredto

the care of the paternal grandmother and her partner. The maternal

grandmother and the Department petitioned the trial court for a stay of its

orderpendingappeal.Thetrialcourtdeniedthepetition.Althoughallowable

in appellate practice, no petition seeking a stay of the trial court decision

pending appeal was filed with this Court. See M.R. App. P. 6(a)(4);

BangorHistoricTrack,Inc.v.Dep’tofAgric.,Food&RuralRes.,2003ME140,¶¶

9-12,837A.2d129;seealsoRespectMe.PACv.McKee,622F.3d13,15(1stCir.

2010).

[¶6] The Department and the maternal grandmother of Parker now

appeal from the judgment denying the maternal grandmother’s petition to

adoptParker,grantingtheadoptiontoParker’spaternalgrandmotheronher

petition, and also granting adoption, despite the lack of any petition, to the

paternalgrandmother’spartner.Thematernalgrandmothercontends,among

other points on appeal, that the court erred in granting an adoption to the

paternalgrandmother’spartner.

[¶7] Because the paternal grandmother’s partner did not petition for

adoptionandhasnoformalcommitmenttothechildoreven,asconcededat

oral argument, to the paternal grandmother, and because the trial court

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consideredanddecidedthemattertreatingthepaternalgrandmotherandher

partnerasiftheywerejointpetitioners,adecisionthatwecannotnowsever

onappeal,wemustvacatethejudgmentandremandforfurtherproceedings.

I.CASEHISTORY

[¶8]Therecordcontainsthefollowingproceduralhistory.Parkerwas

born drug-affected in May 2013 to his mother and father, who were not

married.Atthetime,Parker’sparentswerelivinginhousingarrangedbythe

paternalgrandmother.Whenhewasapproximatelyfourmonthsold,Parker’s

mother voluntarily placed him with her mother, Parker’s maternal

grandmother.

[¶9] In December 2013, the Department filed a petition for a child

protectionorder.TheDistrictCourt(Dow,J.)grantedthepetitionandissued

anorderplacingParkerinthecustodyoftheDepartment.Parkerremainedin

thecareofhismaternalgrandmother,andtheDepartmentfacilitatedvisitation

withParker’spaternalgrandmother.AfterParker’smotherandfatherfailedto

successfullyengageinreunificationservices,theDepartmentpetitionedforthe

terminationoftheirparentalrightsinJune2015.

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[¶10] Two years after Parker was placed in the custody of the

Department,thecourt(E.Walker,J.)terminatedParker’sparents’rights.1The

courtcontinuedtoholdjudicialreviewandpermanencyplanninghearings,and

Parker remained in the custody of the Department and in the care of his

maternalgrandmother.Therelationshipbetweenthematernalgrandmother

and thepaternalgrandmotherwascontentious. Visitationwith thepaternal

grandmotherceasedforseveralmonthsin2016butlaterresumed.

[¶11] In August 2016, without the consent of the Department, the

paternalgrandmotherfiledapetitiontoadoptParker.See18-AM.R.S.§§9-301

to9-303(2017).Althoughthepetitionformprovidedspaceinseverallocations

for the name of a joint petitioner, the paternal grandmother affirmatively

crossed out the provided spaces, filled in her own name, or wrote “N/A at

present time.” Around the same time, thematernal grandmother signed an

adoptiveplacementagreementwiththeDepartment.

[¶12] InOctober2016, theDepartment consented to adoptionby the

maternalgrandmother,see18-AM.R.S.§9-302(a)(3),andshefiledapetitionto

adoptParker.InMarch2017,Parker’smaternalgrandfatherandhiswifefiled

1Thefatherconsented,inwriting,totheterminationofhisparentalrights.Themother’sparental

rightswereterminatedafternoticeandahearing.

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a petition to adopt Parker. The three competing adoption petitions were

consolidatedforafinalhearing(1)todeterminewhethertheDepartmentacted

unreasonablybywithholdingconsentfromthepaternalgrandmotherorfrom

the maternal grandfather and his wife, and (2)to grant an adoption after

determiningwhichpetitionerwouldservethebestinterestofthechild.

[¶13]Thecourt(Nale,J.)heldathree-dayhearingonJuly11-13,2017.

Thecourtheardthetestimonyofadozenwitnessesandadmittednumerous

exhibits.Oneofthewitnesseswasthepaternalgrandmother’spartneroften

yearswho, ina twoquestionandanswercolloquywithhiscounsel, testified

thathewouldliketoadoptParkerwiththepaternalgrandmother.

[¶14]Atthecloseofevidence,thecourtannounceditsdecisionfromthe

bench, stating oral findings on the record. The court concluded that the

Department acted unreasonably by withholding consent from the paternal

grandmotherandherpartnerandfromthematernalgrandfatherandhiswife.

Thecourtthenconsideredtherequirementsof18-AM.R.S.§9-308(a)(2017)

and found that each of the petitioners had satisfied each of the statutory

requirements. Specifically, the court found that the petition of the paternal

grandmotherandherpartnerwasinorder.

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[¶15] Considering the best interest factors listed in 18-AM.R.S.

§9-308(b)(2017),thecourtgrantedanadoptiontothepaternalgrandmother

andherpartner.Thecourtfoundthatalloftheparties“loveandarelovedby”

Parkerandthat“thereisatremendousamountofaffectionandemotionalties

betweenthepetitionersandthechild.”Thecourtfurtherfoundthatallofthe

parties have the capacity to meet Parker’s needs, but that the paternal

grandmother andherpartnerhave the proper “disposition.” In reaching its

decision,thecourtdidnotconsiderthefour-yearbondbetweenParkerandthe

maternalgrandmotherresultingfromhercaringforParkerafterhewasplaced

withherbytheDepartment.

[¶16] At the court’s request, the paternal grandmother submitted a

proposed final decree of adoption after the hearing. The proposed decree

submitted by the paternal grandmother included a finding that she had the

capacity—“alongwiththesupportandassistanceofherlongtermpartner”—

to meet Parker’s needs, but the proposed decree purported to grant the

adoptiontoheralone.

[¶17]Afterthecourtstateditsdecisionontherecord,thepartiesfiled

several post-judgment motions. The Department filed a motion to stay

pursuanttoM.R.Civ.P.62(a),arguingthattheDepartmentandotherparties

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would likely file an appeal and additional post-judgment motions and that

maintaining the current custody and visitation arrangement would avoid

disruptionofParker’slife.Thematernalgrandmotherfiledaresponsetothe

proposed decree challenging the court’s grant of adoption to the paternal

grandmother’spartnerwhenhedidnotfileapetition,wasnotmarriedtothe

paternalgrandmother,anddidnotlivewithher.Thematernalgrandmother

also filed a motion to reconsider pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 59(e). The court

deniedallofthemotionswithoutcomment.

[¶18]OnAugust15,2017,thecourtissuedawrittenjudgmentgranting

the adoption to the paternal grandmother and her partner. The court

reaffirmed its determination that the Department acted unreasonably by

withholding consent. Reviewing the five statutory considerations, the court

foundthat (1) theDepartmentrelied tooheavilyon theamountof time that

Parker had been in the maternal grandmother’s care, (2) the paternal

grandmother andherpartner aremore financially secure than thematernal

grandmother, (3) theDepartment’sdecisionwas inconsistentwith the facts,

and(4)theharmofleavingParkerinthematernalgrandmother’shomewould

begreaterthantheharmofremovinghim.

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[¶19] The court added that stability was a significant factor in its

determination.Specifically,thecourtfoundthatthepaternalgrandmotherand

herpartnerhavebeen inarelationship foradecade,have lived together for

nearlyadecade,andarefinanciallysecure,whereasthematernalgrandmother

haslivedinmultipleresidencesinrecentyears,hashadseveralmalepartners,

has indicated that shewouldmove out ofMaine, and receives assistance in

caringforParker.Thecourtfoundthat,althoughallofthepetitionershavethe

capacitytoaddressthephysical,medical,andeducationalneedsofParker,the

paternalgrandmotherandherpartnerhavethegreatestcapacity.

[¶20]Afterthecourtentereditswrittendecision,theDepartmenttimely

filedamotionforreconsiderationandforfurtherfindingsoffactpursuantto

M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), 59(e), and 60(b)(6), which the court denied without

comment.TheDepartmentandthematernalgrandmothertimelyfilednotices

ofappeal.See18-AM.R.S.§9-309(2017);M.R.App.P.2A(a),(b)(1),2B(c).

II.LEGALANALYSIS

[¶21] The Department and the maternal grandmother raise several

issuesonappeal. BoththeDepartmentandthematernalgrandmotherargue

that the court abused its discretion in finding that the Department acted

unreasonably by withholding consent from the paternal grandmother. The

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Departmentfurtherarguesthatthecourtabuseditsdiscretionbydenyingits

motion to stay the judgment pending appeal. The maternal grandmother

argues that the court’s factual findings are not supported by competent

evidence in the record; that the court abused its discretion inweighing the

evidence;and that thecourt’s findingsare insufficient,asamatterof law, to

support the court’sbest interestdetermination. She further argues that the

court erred by granting an adoption to the paternal grandmother’s partner

when he did not petition for adoption. Becausewe conclude that the court

erredingrantinganadoptiontothepaternalgrandmother’spartnerandthata

redetermination of the factual findings is necessary, we reach only that

argumentanddonotaddresstheparties’remainingarguments.2

[¶22] The grant or denial of an adoption petition is among themost

serious and final actions any court can take. Such petitions invoke the

fundamental constitutional rights of petitioners and of the child or children

addressed in the proceeding. The effects, commitments, and relationships

resultingfromthegrantofanadoptionpetitionarelifelong.Accordingly,the

2DespiteanorderissuedbythisCourt(GormanJ.)afterthepartiesfiledtheirnoticesofappeal

requestingbriefingoftheissueofstanding,theDepartmentfailedtoaddressinitsbriefwhetherithadstandingtochallengethetrialcourt’sdenialofitsmotiontostay.Furthermore,theDepartmentdidnotseekanorderfromthisCourttostaythetrialcourt’s judgment. SeeM.R.App.P.6(a)(4).Accordingly,theissueisdeemedwaived.SeeBayviewLoanServicing,LLCv.Bartlett,2014ME37,¶15n.5,87A.3d741.

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procedural prerequisites for adoption are rigorous and must be strictly

followed.

[¶23]“Alegaladoptionresultsifthestatutoryproceduresarefollowed,

but an adoption fails if any essential requirement of the operative adoption

statuteisnotfulfilled.”InreMelissaC.,516A.2d946,947(Me.1986);accord

Blue v. Boisvert, 143 Me. 173, 178, 57 A.2d 498 (1948). Title 18-A M.R.S.

§§9-301 to 9-308 (2017) provides the procedure by which a person may

petitiontoadoptandbywhichacourtmaygrantanadoption.Section9-301

states that a husband and wife jointly or an unmarried person may file a

petition for adoption. Two unmarried persons may jointly petition for

adoption.AdoptionofM.A.,2007ME123,¶31,930A.2d1088. Thepetitionfor

adoption must be sworn to by the petitioner and must include certain

biographical information, statements, and acknowledgments. 18-A M.R.S.

§9-303.

[¶24] Uponthefilingofapetition,thecourtmustorderabackground

checkanddirecttheDepartmenttoconductahomestudyandtomakeareport

to thecourt. 18-AM.R.S.§9-304. Undercertaindefinedcircumstances, the

court may waive the background check and home study requirements. Id.

§9-304(a-1)(1)(i)-(ii), (2). The court may take other measures such as

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appointingaguardianadlitemorrequiringthatthechildliveforoneyearin

thehomeofthepetitionerbeforethepetitionisgranted. Id.§9-304(c), (d).

After “thepetitionerwho filed thepetition”hasbeenheardorhaswaiveda

hearing,thecourtshallgrantanadoptiononlyifthecourtissatisfiedthat

(1) all necessary consents, relinquishments, or terminations ofparentalrightshavebeendulyexecutedandfiledwiththecourt;(2)anadoptionstudy,whenrequiredbysection9-304,hasbeenfiledwiththecourt;(3)alistofalldisbursements,whenrequiredbysection9-306,hasbeenfiledwiththecourt;(4) the petitioner is a suitable adopting parent and desires toestablishaparentandchildrelationshipwiththeadoptee;(5)thebestinterestsoftheadopteeareservedbytheadoption;(5-A) the petitioner has acknowledged that the petitionerunderstandsthatthetransferofthelong-termcareandcustodyofthe child without a court order is prohibited under Title 17-A,section553,subsection1,paragraphsCandD;and(6)allotherrequirementsoftheAdoptionActhavebeenmet.

Id.§9-308(a).

[¶25] Here, the paternal grandmother’s partner did not file, either

individuallyorjointly,apetitiontoadoptParker.Seeid.§9-301.Thepaternal

grandmotherpurposelyomittedthenameofajointpetitionerbycrossingout

thespacesprovidedforajointpetitioner’snameandbywritingthattherewas

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nojointpetitioner“at[the]presenttime,”eventhoughsheandherpartnerhad

beeninarelationshipforadecadewhenshefiledthepetition.Thecourtand

thepartiesproceededtotrialas if thepaternalgrandmother’spartnerwasa

petitioner; however, it was not until the third day of trial that the paternal

grandmother’spartnerfirstexpressedtothecourtaninterestinbecomingan

adoptiveparent.Theissuewasnotaddressedduringhiscross-examinationby

theDepartment,andthematernalgrandmotherdidnotcross-examinehimat

all.Infact,theissuewasraisedforthefirsttimeinthematernalgrandmother’s

post-trial response to the paternal grandmother’s proposed decree. In a

hearingtodeterminethebestinterestofachildandtoestablishparentalrights,

itisconcerningthatnoneofthepartiesraisedthisissuepriortoorduringthe

trial.

[¶26] Nevertheless, the trial court was required to ensure that all

conditionsoftheAdoptionActhadbeenmet.Seeid.§9-308(a)(6).Although

the trial court purported to have reviewed a petition filed by the paternal

grandmotherandherpartnerandconcludedthatthatpetitionwas“inorder,”

thepaternalgrandmother’spartnerdidnotfileapetitionorjointhepaternal

grandmother’spetitionasrequiredbysections9-301and9-303.Thepaternal

grandmother’spartner’s testimony—thathe intended toestablishaparental

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relationshipwithParker—isinsufficienttoestablishhisstatusasapetitioner.

See18-AM.R.S.§9-102(i)(2017)(defininga“petitioner”as“apersonfilinga

petitiontoadoptanadultorchild,andincludesbothpetitionersunderajoint

petition,exceptasotherwiseprovided”).

[¶27] If testimony alonewere sufficient,without filing a petition and

undergoingtherigorousprehearingreviewrequiredbylaw,anywitnessatthe

hearingcouldhaveexpressedadesiretobecomeanadoptiveparentandthe

courtwouldhavebeenrequiredtoentertainthatrequest.Suchalowstandard

would lead to absurd results and would not comply with the rigorous

requirementsoftheAdoptionAct.

[¶28]Becausethepaternalgrandmother’spartnerdidnotfileapetition,

hedidnotundergoamandatorybackgroundcheckorparticipate in ahome

study,andtherecorddoesnotincludeawaiveroftheserequirements.3Seeid.

§9-304. Furthermore, by not filing a petition, the paternal grandmother’s

partnerdidnotsubmitaconfidentialstatementtoaccompanythepetitionfor

adoption.Theconfidentialstatementwouldhaveprovidedinformationabout,

interalia,hisfamilyhistoryandfinancialresourcesandobligations,including

3Thetrialcourtfileindicatesthatbackgroundchecksforboththepaternalgrandmotherandher

partnerwerenotrequestedandreceiveduntilafterthetrialcourtentereditswrittenjudgment.Thisinformationwasnotbeforethetrialcourt,and,thus,isnotapartoftherecordonappeal.

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his marital history, income, net worth, real property holdings, and ongoing

supportobligations,ifany.

[¶29]Thetrialcourt’sbestinterestdeterminationrelied,inpart,onthe

combined financial resources of the paternal grandmother and her partner.

The evidence in the record, however, falls materially short regarding the

paternal grandmother’s partner’s financial resources and obligations.

Cf.AdoptionofIsabelleT.,2017ME220,¶¶45-46,175A.3d639. Thereport

submittedbythecourt-appointedguardianadlitemindicatedthatthepaternal

grandmother’spartnerhaspreviouslybeenmarriedfourtimes,hasonechild,

and owns several parcels of real property. The paternal grandmother’s

partner’stestimonyontheseissueswaslimited.Moreover,asconcededatoral

argument,therecorddoesnotindicatethatthepaternalgrandmother’spartner

hasanyobligationtofinanciallysupporther.Althoughitisappropriatefora

trial court to consider a prospective adoptive parent’s support system in

determiningthebestinterestofthechild,itistheexclusiveresponsibilityofthe

adoptiveparentorparentstomeetthechild’sneeds.Therefore,thecourterred

byconsideringthepaternalgrandmother’spartner’sfinancialresourceswhen

he was not a petitioner and is not obligated to support the paternal

grandmother.

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[¶30] Because the court’s decision was based on its erroneous

assumptionthatthepaternalgrandmother’spartnerwasapetitioner,andthat

errorisnotharmless,wevacatethejudgmentandremandthemattertothe

DistrictCourtforaredeterminationofthefindingsandforareconsiderationof

itsdecision.SeeRemickv.Martin,2014ME120,¶10,103A.3d552.Because

weremandforthecourttoreconsideritsdecisionfreeoftheerrorweaddress

inthisopinion,wedonotreachtheotherchallengestothejudgment,including,

forexample,theassertionoftheDepartmentandthematernalgrandmother

that the court erred as a matter of law by concluding that the Department

unreasonably withheld its consent to the paternal grandmother’s petition,

whentheDepartment’spositionwassupportedbyexperttestimonyandbythe

guardian ad litem, and given Parker’s long-term stable placement with the

maternalgrandmother.

Theentryis:

Judgment vacated. Remanded for furtherproceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion.

JABAR,J.,concurring

[¶31] I concur, but I write separately to discuss what I believe is a

shortcoming in18-AM.R.S.§9-302(2017). Specifically, section9-302(a)(3)

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failstoadequatelyaddresstheDepartment’sobligationincaseswheremore

thanonesuitablepartypetitionstoadoptachildplacedintheDepartment’s

custody.WemusteitherinterpretthestatutetoallowtheDepartmenttogive

consent to each suitable party that has petitioned to adopt the child, or the

Legislaturemustactinordertoremedythedeficiencywithinsection9-302.

A. TheStatuteandtheDepartment’sInterpretation [¶32]Thestatuteatissueinthiscaseprovides,inrelevantpart,

§9-302.Consentforadoption

(a) Before an adoption is granted, written consent to theadoptionmustbegivenby:....

(3)Thepersonoragencyhavinglegalcustodyorguardianshipof the child or towhom the child has been surrendered andreleased,exceptthattheperson’soragency’slackofconsent,ifadjudgedunreasonablebyajudgeofprobate,maybeoverruledbythejudge. Inorderforthejudgetofindthatthepersonoragency acted unreasonably in withholding consent, thepetitionermustprove,byapreponderanceoftheevidence,thatthepersonoragencyactedunreasonably.Thecourtmayholdapretrialconferencetodeterminewhowillproceed. Thecourtmaydeterminethateventhoughtheburdenofproofisonthepetitioner,thepersonoragencyshouldproceedifthepersonoragency has important facts necessary to the petitioner inpresenting thepetitioner’scase. The judgeshall consider thefollowing:

(i)Whetherthepersonoragencydeterminedtheneedsandinterestsofthechild;

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(ii)Whetherthepersonoragencydeterminedtheabilityof thepetitioner andotherprospective families tomeetthechild’sneeds;(iii) Whether the person or agency made the decisionconsistentwiththefacts;(iv) Whether the harm of removing the child from thechild’scurrentplacementoutweighsanyinadequaciesofthatplacement;and(v) All other factors that have a bearing on adetermination of the reasonableness of the person’s oragency’sdecisioninwithholdingconsent.

....

A petition for adoption must be pending before a consent isexecuted.

ThestatuteaswrittenfailstosetforthaprocedurefortheDepartmenttofollow

inthosecaseswhere,likethiscase,morethanonesuitablepetitionerseeksto

adopt a child. Although section 9-302(a)(3)(ii) contemplates a situation in

whichother“prospectivefamilies”mightexist,nopartofthestatuteclarifies

whether the Department may, or may not, grant consent tomore than one

prospective suitable family. Because the Department and the court have

distinct roles in adoption proceedings, the Department should not have to

decide which of several suitable parties should be given consent to the

exclusionoftheothers;itisforthecourttodecidewhichpetitionerwouldserve

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the child’s best interest. See Adoption of Paisley, 2018ME 19, ¶ 31,

178A.3d1228.

[¶33]Unfortunately,inthiscase,theDepartmentfeltthatithadtomake

a choice among competing suitable parties. The assistant program

administratorfortheOfficeofChildandFamilyServicesstatedatthehearing

thathebelievedtheDepartmentcanprovideconsenttoonlyoneparty.There

isnoreasonwhy,followingtheterminationoftheparentalrightsoftheparents,

theDepartmentcouldnothavegivenconsenttoall threepetitioningparties.

Then, the courtwould have been in the position to decidewhich petitioner

wouldservethechild’sbestinterest.Iftherearenumerouspartiesrequesting

anadoption,andoneofthemisnotsuitable,theDepartmentcanandshould

withholdconsent.However,wheremorethanonesuitablepetitionerexists,as

here,theDepartmentcanandshouldprovideitsconsenttoallsuitableparties.

Inthiscase,thereisnoquestionthatifanyofthethreegrandparentswerethe

onlypetitioningparty,theDepartmentwouldhavegranteditsconsent.Itwas

onlybecausetheDepartmentmistakenlybelievedthatithadtomakeachoice

thatitwithheldconsenttotheothertwopetitioners.

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B. TheResultoftheDepartment’sInterpretation

[¶34] ThispositiontakenbytheDepartmentforcesittopickwinners

andloserswhenthereareseveralsuitableparties,andasaresultofchoosing

sides,theDepartmentputsitsthumbonthescaleinfavorofthepartythatit

selects.ThechosenpartythenhastheweightandresourcesoftheStateonits

side, anddue to theDepartment’s earlyposition in a given case, the chosen

partygainsanunfairadvantage.Inthiscase,duetotheDepartment’sdecision

tochoose thematernalgrandmotherearlyon, shewasaffordedagreatdeal

morecontactwiththechildduringthependencyofthecase.Theguardianad

litem’sreportincludedthefollowingsynopsis:

[Thematernalgrandmother]hasbeen[thechild’s]primarycaregiver, almost since his birth. It is difficult to overstate theimportance of this factor. . . . Further, that [the paternalgrandmother and her partner] actively sought to be as involvedwith [the child] as they could be. For a period of time, hewasspendingovernightsandnearlyhalfofeachweekwiththem.Overtheirstrenuousobjection,somecombinationof[theDepartment]and [thematernal grandmother] severely curtailed that contact.Forawhile, itdwindled toalmostnothinguntilanorderby [theDistrictCourt]establishedregularvisitationlatelastyear.Itmaywellbethatthecurtailmentoftheircontactwasanunwarrantedmistake.

Thecourt,afterreadingthisportionofthereportaloud,statedontherecord,

“Thatbothersme.Ibelievethatarushtojudgmentwasmade.Ibelievethata

mistakewasmade.”AsaresultoftheDepartment’searlyinterventiononthe

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maternalgrandmother’sbehalf,shebecametheprimarycaregiverofthechild,

andthisexclusiverelationshipledtomanyofthewitnessesindicatingthatthe

reason they thought that thematernal grandmotherwas thebest choice for

adoptionwasduetotheamountoftimehehadalreadyspentwiththematernal

grandmother.Specifically,theclinicalpsychologistandoneoftheguardiansad

litem indicated that all three potential partieswere adequate to parent the

child.However,bothtestifiedthatitwouldbebestforthechildtoremainwith

thematernalgrandmotherbecausehehadbeenlivingwithherthroughoutthis

case.

[¶35] Another problem with the Department’s early choice was the

failuretoconsiderotherpotentiallybetterplacements.Oneguardianadlitem

neverconsideredtheothertwosetsofgrandparentsbecausetheDepartment

had alreadymade a decision regarding thematernal grandmother, and, she

stated,herprimaryconcern“isnotnecessarilytotrytodiscernbetterpreferred

placementsfor[thechild],ifwhereheisseemslikealovingandsuitablehome.”

Theultimategoal,however,isthechild’sbestinterest,notmerelyanacceptable

interest.

[¶36] It is easy to see how the maternal grandmother’s extensive

contact—to thedetrimentandexclusionof theothergrandparents, inwhich

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theDepartmentplayedasignificantrole—ledmanyofthewitnessestofavor

adoptionbythematernalgrandmother. Therewasnoreasoninthiscaseto

deprive theother lovingandcapablegrandparentsofextensivecontactwith

thechildduringthependencyofthecase.Oneguardianadlitemandthecourt

agreed,stating that in a “perfectworld,” timecouldhavebeendividedmore

equallybetweenallthreepetitioners.

[¶37]Althoughinthiscasethecourtrecognizedtheearlyrolethatthe

Departmentplayed,anddidultimatelyfindforthepaternalgrandmother,such

anoutcomewillnotalwaysbeforthcoming.Inmanycases,theDepartment’s

earlydecisiontoweigh inonthesideofoneofthecompetingpartieswould

unfairlysupportoneparty’spetitionoveranother’s.4Suchadecision,andthe

deprivation of access to the child that it results in, could have a significant

impactonthewitnesses’perceptionofwhichpetitionerhasadeeperbondwith

4 In fact, in our recent caseAdoptionof Paisley, that is exactlywhathappened. 2018ME19,

178A.3d1228.InPaisley,theDepartmentdelayedandequivocatedinitsgrantingofconsentwhentherewasmorethanonesuitablepetitioner,andultimately,weconcludedthatitswithholdingofconsentwasunreasonable.Id.¶¶13-17,30.SpeakingtotheDepartment’sdelay,theChiefJusticestated that “had the Department acted more expeditiously and more assertively to establish arelationshipbetweenPaisleyandthefamily[thatPaisleyhadnotbeenplacedwithduringthecase],”theoutcomemaywellhavebeendifferentforPaisley.Id.¶38(Saufley,C.J.,concurring).AlthoughParker’s case is not overlaid by the same kinship considerationsweaddressed in Paisley’s case,because any placement for Parkerwill be a kinship placement, theDepartment’swithholding ofconsent when there are multiple suitable petitioners is nonetheless problematic whenever itdeprivessuitablepetitionersofvisitationandaccesstothechildduringthependencyofthecase.

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thechild,andultimately,thecourt’sdecisiononwhichplacementwouldserve

thechild’sbestinterest.

[¶38]Ibelievethecourt’sdecisionwascorrectastothethreecompeting

grandparents.Thecourtfoundthatallofthepartiesloveandarelovedbythe

childandthatallthreepartieshavethecapacitytoadoptthechild.Thecourt

properly consideredall of thenecessary factors andultimately found that it

wouldbeinthechild’sbestinteresttobeadoptedbythepaternalgrandmother

and her partner. In this respect, I disagree with the Court that the issue

surroundingthewithholdingofconsentforthepaternalgrandmothershould

bereconsideredonremand.Court’sOpinion¶30.

[¶39] Although the parties litigated the case as if the paternal

grandmotherandherpartnerwererequestingadoption,IagreewiththeCourt

thatitisnecessarytoremandinordertocorrecttherecordandsecuremore

information regarding the paternal grandmother’s partner and his

commitmenttoParker.

24

Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellant Department of Health and Human Services Deirdre M. Smith, Esq., Carolyn Liegner, Stud. Atty., and Kurt Peterson, Stud. Atty. (orally), Cumberland Legal Aid Clinic, Portland, for appellant maternal grandmother Dennis L. Jones, Esq. (orally), Farmingdale, for appellees paternal grandmother and her partner Augusta District Court docket numbers FM-2016-272, 384 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY