2021 me 34 portland chamber - courts.maine.gov
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MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2021ME34Docket: Cum-21-31Argued: May4,2021Decided: July6,2021Panel: MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HUMPHREY,JJ.,andCLIFFORD,ARJ.
PORTLANDREGIONALCHAMBEROFCOMMERCEetal.
v.
CITYOFPORTLANDetal.MEAD,J.
[¶1] Portland Regional Chamber of Commerce and other entities1
(collectively, the Chamber) appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court
(Cumberland County, Warren, J.) granting summary judgment against the
Chamber on its claims that voter-initiated legislation establishing an
emergencyminimumwageinPortlandviolatestheMaineConstitutionandthe
Portland City Code. Caleb Horton and Mario Roberge-Reyes (Intervenors)
cross-appeal from the court’s determination that the emergency minimum
wageprovisionisnoteffectiveuntilJanuary1,2022.Weaffirmthejudgment.
1TheplaintiffsarePortlandRegionalChamberofCommerce;AllianceforAddictionandMental
HealthServices,Maine;Slab,LLC;Nosh,LLC;GrittyMcDuff’s;andPlayItAgainSports.
2
I.BACKGROUND
[¶2] The pertinent facts are not contested and are drawn from the
summary judgment record. See Oceanic Inn, Inc. v. Sloan’s Cove, LLC,
2016ME34, ¶ 25, 133 A.3d 1021. In July 2020, the required number of
Portland voters submitted to the City of Portland a petition in support of a
direct voters’ initiative to amendPortland’sminimumwageordinance. The
initiative included a section incrementally increasing the regular minimum
wage on an annual basis and a provision (the emergency provision) that
provided for a higher minimum wage—one-and-one-half times the regular
minimumwage—whenthegovernorortheCityofPortlanddeclaresastateof
emergency. On November 3, 2020, the City of Portland held its general
municipalelection,andthevotersapprovedtheinitiative;theCityofPortland
releasedtheamendedofficialresultsonNovember6,2020.SeePortland,Me.,
Code § 33.7 (Nov. 3, 2020). The pertinent portions of the newly passed
legislationread:
(b) MinimumWagerate:
(i) Beginning on January 1, 2022, the regularMinimumWageforallEmployees, including,butnotlimitedto,ServiceEmployees,shallberaisedto$13.00perhour;
(ii) Beginning on January 1, 2023, the regularMinimum
WageforallEmployees, including,butnotlimitedto,
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ServiceEmployees,shallberaisedto$14.00perhour;and
(iii) Beginning on January 1, 2024, the regularMinimumWageforallEmployees, including,butnotlimitedto,ServiceEmployees,shallberaisedto$15.00perhour;and
(iv) OnJanuary1,2025andeachJanuary1stthereafter,the
minimumhourlywagethenineffectmustbeincreasedbytheincrease,ifany,inthecostofliving.Theincreasein the cost of living must be measured by thepercentageincrease,ifany,asofAugustofthepreviousyearoverthelevelasofAugustoftheyearprecedingthat year in the Consumer Price Index for All UrbanConsumers, CPI-U, for the Northeast Region, or itssuccessor index, as published by the United StatesDepartmentofLabor,BureauofLaborStatisticsoritssuccessor agency, with the amount of the minimumwageincreaseroundedtothenearestmultipleof5¢.Ifthestateminimumwageestablishedby26M.R.S.§664is increased inexcessof theminimumwage ineffectunderthisordinanceisincreasedtothesameamount,effectiveonthesamedateastheincreaseinthestateminimumwage,andmustbeincreasedinaccordancewiththisordinancethereafter.
....
(g) Effect of Emergency Proclamation. For work performed duringadeclaredemergency, theeffectiveMinimumWage rateestablishedbythisordinanceshallbecalculatedas1.5 timestheregularminimumwagerateundersubsection(b) above. A declared emergency under this ordinance shall includetheperiodoftimeduringwhich:
(i) A proclamation issued pursuant to Chapter 2,
Sec.2-406,ofthiscodedeclaresanemergencytoexist,
4
if such emergency proclamation is geographicallyapplicabletotheEmployee’sworkplace;or
(ii) Aproclamation issuedpursuant to37-BM.R.S. §742
declares an emergency to exist, if such emergencyproclamation is geographically applicable to theEmployee’sworkplace.
Adeclaredemergencyunderthisordinanceshallnotapplytoworkperformed under a teleworking arrangement, as defined under5U.S.C.§6501,allowingtheEmployeetoworkfromhome.
Id.§33.7(b),(g).
[¶3] The City of Portland announced that it would not enforce the
emergencyprovisionuntilJanuary1,2022.OnDecember1,2020,theplaintiffs,
allemployerswithemployeesinPortland,filedacomplaintseekingdeclaratory
reliefagainsttheCityofPortlandandJonJennings,inhisofficialcapacityasCity
ManagerofPortland(collectively,theCity). Theyassertedthattheinitiative
wasinvalidundertheMaineConstitutionandthePortlandCityCodeandthat,
if it was valid, it would not take effect until January 1, 2022. Horton and
Roberge-Reyes,employeesattheWholeFoodsstoreinPortland,weregranted
intervenor status as defendants and cross-plaintiffs; they filed a cross-claim
seeking declaratory relief establishing the effective date of the emergency
provision as December 6, 2020, and injunctive relief compelling the City to
enforceit.
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[¶4]TheChambermovedforsummaryjudgmentonitscomplaint.The
SuperiorCourt concluded that the emergencyprovisionwas validly enacted
pursuanttotheMaineConstitutionandthePortlandCityCode.Itdetermined
thatthehomeruleprovisionintheConstitution, inconjunctionwithstatute,
grantedmunicipalitiesgreaterlegislativeauthorityandthereforeexpandedthe
scopeofdirectinitiatives.Accordingly,itgrantedsummaryjudgmentagainst
the Chamber on its validity claims. The court then determined that the
language of the emergency provision was unambiguous and established an
effectivedateofJanuary1,2022.ItdismissedIntervenors’cross-claims.
[¶5]TheChambertimelyappealedfromthejudgmentdeclaringthatthe
emergencyprovisionwasvalid, and Intervenors timely cross-appealed from
the determination that the emergency provision becomes effective on
January1,2022.See14M.R.S.§1851(2021);M.R.App.P.2B(c)(1).Wegranted
expeditedconsiderationofthisappeal.
II.DISCUSSION
A. Validity
[¶6]TheChamberarguesthattheemergencyprovisionwasnotvalidly
enactedundertheMaineConstitutionandthePortlandCityCodebecausethe
initiativeisnotlimitedtoexclusivelymunicipalaffairs.Itassertsthatthehome
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ruleprovisionoftheConstitutionisirrelevantbecauseitgivesgreaterpower
tomunicipalitiesaspoliticalsubdivisionsoftheStatebutdoesnotexpandthe
scopeofdirectvoters’initiatives.TheCitydefendsthevalidityoftheinitiative.
1. TheMaineConstitution
[¶7]Onappealfromasummaryjudgmentdecision,“wereviewdenovo
thetrialcourt’sinterpretationandapplicationoftherelevantstatutesandlegal
concepts.”Belangerv.Yorke,2020ME24,¶13,226A.3d215(quotationmarks
omitted).Wereviewconstitutionalinterpretationissuesdenovo.Bouchardv.
Dep’tofPub.Safety,2015ME50,¶8,115A.3d92.“Constitutionalprovisions
areaccordedaliberalinterpretationinordertocarryouttheirbroadpurpose,
becausetheyareexpectedto lastovertimeandarecumbersometoamend.”
Allenv.Quinn,459A.2d1098,1102(Me.1983).“[T]heconstitutionalvalidity
of a citizen initiative is evaluated under the ordinary rules of statutory
construction.” League ofWomen Voters v. Sec’y of State, 683A.2d 769, 771
(Me.1996). Accordingly, such laws “carr[y] a heavy presumption of
constitutionality.”Id.
[¶8] Last year we reiterated the purpose and breadth of the direct
initiativepower:
Thebroadpurposeofthedirectinitiativeistheencouragementofparticipatory democracy. By [Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18] the
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people, as sovereign, have retaken unto themselves legislativepower, and that constitutional provision must be liberallyconstrued to facilitate, rather than to handicap, the people’sexerciseoftheirsovereignpowertolegislate.Section18cannotbesaidmerelytopermitthedirectinitiativeoflegislationuponcertainconditions.Rather,itreservestothepeopletherighttolegislatebydirectinitiativeiftheconstitutionalconditionsaresatisfied.
Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Sec’y of State, 2020ME 109, ¶ 15, 237 A.3d 882
(alterations and quotation marks omitted); see League of Women Voters,
683A.2dat771;seealsoOpinionoftheJustices,275A.2d800,803(Me.1971).
[¶9] Webeginwith somehistorical context for this case. Effective in
1909,theMaineConstitutionwasamendedtoshiftsomelegislativepowerfrom
theLegislaturetothepeople.SeeFarrisv.Goss,143Me.227,230,60A.2d908
(1948); Const. Res. 1907, ch. 121, approved in 1908. Pursuant to the
amendment, a sufficient number of citizens may directly propose a law by
petitiontotheLegislature,andifitisnotenacted,theLegislaturemustsubmit
thelawtothepeople. Me.Const.art. IV,pt.3,§18. TheMaineConstitution
further provides that this power of direct initiativemay be extended to the
votersofmunicipalities:
Thecitycouncilofanycitymayestablishthedirectinitiativeandpeople’svetofortheelectorsofsuchcityinregardtoitsmunicipalaffairs,providedthattheordinanceestablishingandprovidingthemethodofexercisingsuchdirectinitiativeandpeople’svetoshallnottakeeffectuntilratifiedbyvoteofamajorityoftheelectorsofsaid city, voting thereon at a municipal election. Provided,
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however,thattheLegislaturemayatanytimeprovideauniformmethod for the exercise of the initiative and referendum inmunicipalaffairs.
Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§21.
[¶10] Pursuant to this authority, the Portland City Council enacted a
direct initiative ordinance in 1950. See Portland, Me., Code § 9-36
(May7,1991);seealsoLaFleurv.Frost,146Me.270,272,80A.2d407(1951)
(discussing the passage of the ordinance in 1950). In relevant part, the
ordinanceprovidesthatvotersmaypetitionthecitycounciltosubmittoavote
“anyproposedordinancedealingwithlegislativemattersonmunicipalaffairs.”
Portland,Me.,Code§9-36(a).
[¶11]In1969,theMaineConstitutionwasamendedtoaddthehomerule
provision:“Theinhabitantsofanymunicipalityshallhavethepowertoalter
and amend their charters on all matters, not prohibited by Constitution or
generallaw,whicharelocalandmunicipalincharacter.TheLegislatureshall
prescribetheprocedurebywhichthemunicipalitymaysoact.”Me.Const.art.
VIII,pt.2,§1;seeConst.Res.1969,ch.29,passed in1969. Thisauthority is
manifestedinstatute:“Anymunicipality,bytheadoption,amendmentorrepeal
of ordinances or bylaws, may exercise any power or function which the
Legislaturehaspowertoconferuponit,whichisnotdeniedeitherexpresslyor
9
by clear implication, and exercise any power or function granted to the
municipalitybytheConstitutionofMaine,generallaworcharter.”30-AM.R.S.
§3001(2021).2
[¶12] Turning now to this case, we examine two cases that were
discussedatlengthinargumentsandintheSuperiorCourt’sorder:Burkettv.
Youngs, 135 Me. 459, 199 A. 619 (1938), and Albert v. Town of Fairfield,
597A.2d1353(Me.1991).InBurkett,weconcludedthataresolvepassedby
theBangorCityCounciladdressingappropriationsforschoolfundingwasnot
subjecttoreferendumbecausesomeoftheappropriationswererequiredby
state law, and thus the resolve was not a local affair. 135 Me. at 461-67,
199A.619. InAlbert,we concluded that amunicipal referendumwas valid
whereFairfieldvotersrejectedtheTownCouncil’sdecisiontoacceptastreet
asatownway.597A.2dat1354-55.
[¶13] Bothcasesaredistinguishablefromthefactsandcircumstances
presented in thematterpendingbeforeus. Burkettwasdecidedbefore the
home rule provision was added to Maine’s constitution in 1969, and
furthermore,inthatcase,adirectandpatentconflictexistedbetweenastate
2Title30-AM.R.S.§3001(2021),thecurrentmunicipalhomerulestatute,wasoriginallycodified
at30M.R.S.A. §1917 (Supp.1970); theoriginal statutewas repealedand replaced in1987. SeeP.L.1969, ch. 563 (effectiveMay 9, 1970); P.L. 1987, ch. 737, §§ 2, 106 (effectiveMar. 1, 1989)(codifiedassubsequentlyamendedat30-AM.R.S.§3001).
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fundingmandateandthevoters’initiative,thustakingtheinitiativeoutsidethe
purviewof themunicipal direct initiative authority. See 135Me. at 463-66,
199A.619;Const.Res.1969,ch.29,passedin1969.Albertisdistinguishable
because, in that case, the Legislature had, by statute, expressly granted the
discretionarypowertoacceptatownwaytoamunicipality.597A.2dat1355.
Althoughbothcasesarehelpful,neitherestablishedbright-line,authoritative
criteria as amatter of precedent, andneither controls this case. SeeAlbert,
597A.2dat1354-55;Burkett,135Me.at463-67,199A.619.
[¶14] We disagree with the Chamber’s assertion that the home rule
provision is irrelevant to this case. Both thehomeruleanddirect initiative
provisionsarepartofthestructurethatgrantsauthoritytomunicipalitiesand
voterstolegislatewithrespecttomunicipalaffairs.SeeMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,
§21;id.art.VIII,pt.2,§1.TheCityfirstgavelegislativeauthoritytothevoters
byenactingitsdirectinitiativeordinance.Portland,Me.,Code§9-36.Afterthe
Cityenactedthatordinance,theStateimbuedmunicipalitieswithmorepowers
by virtue of the home rule provisions. SeeMe. Const. art. VIII, pt. 2, § 1;
30-AM.R.S.§3001.Thebroadsweepofthehomeruleprovisiongrantingthe
powerof “[t]he inhabitantsofanymunicipality . . . toalterandamend their
chartersonallmatters,notprohibitedbyConstitutionorgenerallaw”sweeps
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inthepreexistingrightofvoters’directinitiatives.SeeMe.Const.art.VIII,pt.2,
§1.Accordingly,therightsofmunicipalitiestolegislatepursuanttothehome
rule provisions are coextensive with the rights of the voters under direct
initiatives.
[¶15] TheChambercorrectlypointsout that thehomeruleprovision
providesauthoritytomunicipalitiesaspoliticalsubdivisionsoftheState.See
Me.Const.art.VIII,pt.2,§1;30-AM.R.S.§3001.And,indeed,astheChamber
argues,individualelectorsarenotpoliticalsubdivisions.Aswehaveexplained,
however, it is the relationship between the home rule and direct initiative
provisions thatgiveselectors theauthority to legislate in this instance. The
homeruleprovisionof theMaineConstitutiongrants legislativeauthorityto
municipalitieswithrespecttomunicipalaffairs.SeeMe.Const.art.VIII,pt.2,
§1.Priortotheenactmentofthehomeruleprovision,municipalitieshadthe
preexisting constitutional authority to empower their voters to legislate by
directinitiative.SeeMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§21.Ourdecisiontodaydoesnot
purporttocharacterizeindividualsaspoliticalsubdivisions.Buttheyneednot
be inordertoexercisetheir legislativeauthorityasestablishedintheMaine
Constitution.
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[¶16]Thehomeruleprovisionexpresslylimitswhatmunicipalitiesmay
legislateconcerningtomatters“notprohibitedbyConstitutionorgenerallaw.”
Me.Const.art.VIII,pt.2,§1.IninstanceswheretheLegislaturehasspecifically
providedthatparticularsubjectmattersarethesoleprovinceoftheState,they
arethenclearlyoutsidethescopeofthehomeruleprovisionbecausetheyare
“prohibitedbyConstitutionorgenerallaw.”Id.Theremayalsobeinstances,
however, where the Legislature has impliedly occupied the field in specific
subject areas. See30-AM.R.S. § 3001. Given their fact-specific nature, such
instancesmustbeevaluatedonacase-by-casebasisbyexaminingthelanguage
oftheordinanceandanystatutesenactedbytheLegislature.
[¶17] Theconstitutionalgrant toelectorsof thepower to legislateby
direct initiative and by people’s veto uses the language “in regard to its
municipalaffairs”tolimitthescopeofthesubjectmatterofadirectinitiative,
Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§21,butthislanguagedoesnotprohibitvotersfrom
enacting a direct initiative to increase minimum wages beyond that set by
statute. The local minimum wage is among the issues encompassed by
municipal legislative authority because that authority has not been denied
expresslyorimplicitlybytheConstitutionorgenerallaw.SeeMe.Const.art.
VIII, pt. 2, § 1; 30-A M.R.S. §3001; 26 M.R.S. §664 (2021) (establishing
13
statewideminimumwage). Indeed,thePortlandCityCodepresentlyreflects
thisunderstanding.SeePortland,Me.,Code§33.1(Jan.1,2016)(“[T]opromote
thehealth,safetyandwelfareofitscitizensandpursuanttoandconsistentwith
26 M.R.S. §664, the City Council of the City of Portland, Maine hereby
establishesthefollowingminimumwageordinanceapplicabletoallEmployers
andEmployeeswithintheCityofPortland.”).
[¶18] Thefactthatanordinancethat isotherwisedirectedtomatters
within the geographical confines of themunicipalitymay affect nonresident
individualsorentitieswhohaveemploymentorbusinessinterestswithinthe
municipality does not mean that it loses its characterization as “local and
municipal.” The key inquiry is whether the ordinance provision is
fundamentallylocalorstatewideinitsscope.SeeMe.Const.art.VIII,pt.2,§1;
30-AM.R.S.§3001;Sch.Comm.ofTownofYorkv.TownofYork,626A.2d935,
939(Me.1993). Weconclude that the initiativeat issuewith itsemergency
multiplier provision, found in Portland City Code § 33.7(g), falls into the
categoryoflocalormunicipalaffairsandwasvalidlyenactedpursuanttothe
MaineConstitution.
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2. PortlandCityCode
[¶19] We review “legal issues concerning the interpretation of the
[Portland]CityCode...denovoforerrorsoflaw.”FriendsofCong.SquarePark
v.CityofPortland,2014ME63,¶7,91A.3d601.PursuanttotheCityCode,
Portlandvotersmaypetitionthecitycounciltosubmittoavote“anyproposed
ordinancedealingwithlegislativemattersonmunicipalaffairs.”Portland,Me.,
Code§9-36(a).
[¶20]AswiththeChamber’sconstitutionalargument,itsargumentthat
theemergencyprovisiondoesnotrelateto“municipalaffairs”asprovidedin
the Portland City Code fails. Although Portland’s original direct initiative
ordinancewasadoptedbeforethehomeruleprovisions,seeLaFleur,146Me.
at272,80A.2d407;Const.Res.1969,ch.29,passedin1969,themeaningand
scopeof“municipalaffairs”intheordinancehasevolvedalongsidetherelated
law,includingtheadoptionofthehomeruleprovision.See,e.g.,Me.Const.art.
VIII, pt. 2, § 1; 30-AM.R.S. §3001;Sch. Comm. of Townof York, 626A.2d at
938-39. As we have explained with respect to the Maine Constitution, the
15
emergencyprovisionhererelatestomunicipalaffairs. Therefore, it likewise
doesnotrunafoulofPortland’sdirectinitiativeordinance.3
[¶21] Moreover, theordinance that empowersPortlandelectorswith
directinitiativeauthorityisapredominantlyproceduralprovision;itexplains
how a petition for a direct initiative is to be filed.4 See Portland, Me.,
3 ChamberofCommerceasserted in theSuperiorCourt that theemergencyprovisiondidnot
relate to“legislativematters”assetout inPortland’sCityCode,seePortland,Me.,Code§9-36(a)(May7,1991),butithasabandonedthatargumentonappeal.4ThetextofPortlandCityCode§9-36reads: Sec.9-36.Howinvoked. (a) Ingeneral.Thesubmissiontothevoteofthepeopleofanyproposed
ordinance dealing with legislative matters on municipal affairs or of any such ordinanceenactedbythecitycouncilandwhichhasnotyetgoneintoeffect,maybe accomplished by the presentation of a petition therefor to the city council in the manner hereinafter provided and signed by at least one thousand five hundred (1,500)voters.Thesubmissionofaproposedordinance,oramendmentorrepeal,in wholeorinpart,ofanordinancealreadyineffectshallbehereinafterreferredtoas the direct initiation of legislation or “initiative.” The submission of a petition to overrideanyordinancepassedbythecitycouncilbutwhichhasnotyetgoneinto effectshallbehereinafterreferredtoasthe“people’sveto.” (b) Applicability. Neither this article, nor ordinances dealing with
appropriations,taxlevy,orwithwagesorhoursofcityemployeesshallbesubjectto theinitiativeand“people’sveto”referendumprovisionshereinestablished. (c) Petitionprocedure.Anyten(10)registeredvotersofthecitymayfile
withthecityclerkanaffidavitstating:
(1) That the ten (10) registered voters will constitute the petitioners’ committee;
(2) Thenamesandaddressesoftheten(10)registeredvoters;
(3) Theaddresstowhichallnoticestothecommitteearetobesent;and
(4) Thattheten(10)registeredvoterswillcirculatethepetitionandfile itinproperform.
16
Uponfilingofsaidaffidavitbyten(10)suchvoters,thecityclerkshallhaveseven(7)
calendardaystopreparetheproperpetitionformspursuanttosection9-37below witha copyof the submittedordinanceeitherprintedon thepetitionorattached theretoandshallprovidesuchpetitiontomembersofthepetitioners’committeeand toanyotherregisteredcityvoterwhowishes to circulate it. The petition may be circulatedforsignaturebyregisteredvotersofthecityforeighty(80)calendardays fromtheoriginaldateof issuanceofthepetition,whichdateshallbenotedbythe clerkoneachblankform;provided,however,thatanypetitionforthe“people’sveto” ofanordinancenotineffectmustbefiledwiththecityclerkpriortotheeffectivedate ofsaidordinanceorwithinthirty(30)calendardaysafterpassagebythecitycouncil, whicheverisless.Any“people’sveto”petitionnotsofiledisvoid.Allprovisionsas tothefilingandtheformofpetitionsinthisarticle,otherthantheaforementioned timeframe,shallapplytobothinitiativeand“people’sveto”petitions. (d) Filingofpetition.Thepetitionmustbereturnedtothecityclerkfor
filingbycloseofbusinesswithineighty(80)calendardaysfromthedateofissuance thereof. IftheeightiethdayisaSaturday,Sundayorholiday,saidpetitionshallbe filedbythecloseofbusinessofthenextimmediatebusinessday.Allpetitionforms not so submitted are void. The petition forms shall be assembled as one (1) instrument, with each page numbered, attached to a written statement from the petitioners’committeestatingthenumberofpetition formsbeing filed. Theclerk shallcertifythedateoffilingandthenumberofformsreturned. (e) Verificationofpetition.
(1) Withinfifteen(15)calendardaysafterthepetitionisfiled,theclerk shall complete a certificate as to its sufficiency, specifying, if it is insufficient,theparticularswhichrenderitdefective.Theclerkshall promptlysendacopyofthecertificatetothepetitioners’committee bycertifiedmail,returnreceiptrequested,orbyhand-delivery,and shallfileacopywiththecitycouncil.
(2) A petition certified insufficient may be amended once, if the petitioners’committeefilesawrittennoticeofintentiontoamendit withtheclerkwithineight(8)calendardaysaftermailingbycertified mail, return receipt requested, or hand-delivery of the copy of the clerk’scertificate.Withinten(10)calendardaysafterthisnoticeof intentionisfiled,thepetitioners’committeemayfileasupplementary petitiontocorrecttechnicaldeficienciesintheoriginalwhichshall,in form and content, comply with the requirements for an original petitionbutwhichshallnotcontainadditionalsignaturesofvoters.
(3) Withinfive(5)calendardaysafterasupplementarypetitionisfiled, theclerkshallcompleteandfileacertificateastoitssufficiencyinthe mannerprovidedforinanoriginalpetition.
17
Code§9-36. Subsection a imbues voters with legislative authority, and
subsectionsc through faddresshowadirect initiativemaybeachieved. Id.
§9-36(a),(c)-(f).Theremainingsubsectionspecificallyexcludesmattersthat
are not subject to direct initiative. Id. § 9-36(b). Consequently, the direct
initiativeordinance—exceptwithrespect tosubsectionb—merely facilitates
thesubstantivelawthatexistsandthatmayevolveseparateandapartfromthe
procedure.Insum,thetopicsonwhichmunicipalitieshavetheprerogativeto
legislatehaveevolved,andtheproceduresestablishedbyPortlandCityCode
§9-36arenotlimitedtothetopicsexistingatthetimeofitspromulgation.
(4) Anypetitionfinallydeterminedtobe insufficient isvoid. Theclerk shall stamp the petition void and seal and retain it in themanner requiredforsecretballots.
(5) Theclerk’sdecisionastothesufficiencyofthepetitionsshallbeafinal determination,reviewableasprovidedbylaw.
(f) Hearing. At its firstregularmeetingafterreceiptofareport thata
petition is sufficient and has at least one thousand five hundred (1,500) valid signaturesoftheregisteredvotersofthecity,thecitycouncilshallsetadateforpublic hearing, which hearing shall be held within thirty (30) calendar days thereafter. Noticeofthehearingshallbepublishedinanewspaperhavinggeneralcirculationin thecityatleastten(10)calendardayspriortothehearingandshallcontainthetext ofthepetition.Asprovidedbysection9-39,thecitycouncilshalltakethenecessary steps to submit to the voters of the city the ordinance proposed in the petition; providedthat,inthecaseofthe“people’sveto”referendum,theentirerepealbythe citycounciloftheordinancesoughttobereferredand,inthecaseoftheinitiative,the passagebythecitycouncilofthedesiredordinanceshallputanendtoallproceedings underthepetition.
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B. EffectiveDate
[¶22]Havingconcludedthattheemergencyprovisionintheinitiativeis
valid,wemust also determine its effective date. Intervenors argue that the
effectivedatefornewordinancesestablishedbyordinance,seePortland,Me.,
Code § 9-42 (May7,1991), thirty days from the date of the official results,
appliestotheemergencyprovision,makingtheeffectivedatefallinDecember
2020.Alternatively,theyassertthatifthelanguageisambiguous,thenitshould
be read to establish a December 2020 effective date to comport with the
understandingandexpectationsofthepartiesandvoters.Theyalsoarguethat
weshouldconsider theballotquestiontoconstruetheplain languageof the
emergency provision. The Chamber and the City contend that the plain
language of the emergency provision establishes an effective date of
January1,2022.
[¶23] “Interpretationof [an] [o]rdinance is aquestionof law thatwe
reviewdenovo.” Fitanidesv.CityofSaco,2015ME32,¶13,113A.3d1088.
“Wefirstdetermineifthelanguageoftheordinanceisplainandunambiguous.”
Olsonv.TownofYarmouth,2018ME27,¶16,179A.3d920.Weinterpretthe
ordinanceaccordingly,“unlesstheresultisillogicalorabsurd.”Wawenock,LLC
v.Dep’tofTransp.,2018ME83,¶7,187A.3d609(quotationmarksomitted).
19
Languageisambiguouswhenit“canreasonablybeinterpretedinmorethan
oneway.”Id.(quotationmarksomitted).
[¶24] We construe words in an ordinance according to their plain
meaningand“construeundefinedorambiguoustermsreasonablywithregard
toboththeobjectssoughttobeobtainedandtothegeneralstructureofthe
ordinanceasawhole.”Fitanides,2015ME32,¶13,113A.3d1088(quotation
marksomitted).Weseek“togiveeffecttolegislativeintent,andifthemeaning
ofthe[ordinance]isclearonitsface,thenweneednotlookbeyondthewords
themselves.”JadeRealtyCorp.v.TownofEliot,2008ME80,¶7,946A.2d408
(quotationmarksomitted).
[¶25]Here,thelanguageoftheemergencyprovisionisunambiguouson
its face and therefore we need not go beyond the text. See Fitanides,
2015ME32, ¶ 13, 113 A.3d 1088; Jade Realty Corp., 2008 ME 80, ¶ 7,
946A.2d408. The emergency provision in Portland City Code § 33.7(g)
provides the timing of the minimum wage increases by cross-reference to
subsectionb:“theeffectiveMinimumWagerateestablishedbythisordinance
shall be calculated as 1.5 times the regular minimum wage rate under
subsection(b)above.”Subsectionbisfurtherdividedintofoursubsections,the
firstofwhichstates,“BeginningonJanuary1,2022,theregularMinimumWage
20
forallEmployees...shallberaisedto$13.00perhour.”Id.§33.7(b)(i).Each
subsequentsubsectionbeginswith the followingyearandraises theregular
minimumwageby$1.00perhour,withanincreasebasedonthecostofliving
aftera$15.00minimumwageisreached.Id.§33.7(b)(ii)-(iv).
[¶26]Thenewlypassedlegislationdoesnotexplicitlystateaneffective
date fortheemergencyprovision. See id.§33.7. Nevertheless, theordinary
meaningofthetextestablishesthatthenewminimumwageratecomesinto
effect on January 1, 2022, and increases incrementally thereafter. See id.
§33.7(b);Fitanides,2015ME32,¶13,113A.3d1088.Becausetheemergency
provision cross-references subsection b to establish the effective minimum
wagerateforcomputingtheemergencyminimumwage,thefirsteffectivedate
is established there. See Portland, Me., Code § 33.7(g). In subsection b,
subsection b(i) appears first, and the text provides that the subsection is
effective as of January 1, 2022. Id. § 33.7(b)(i). Thus, the effective date of
subsectiongisalsoJanuary1,2022. Becausetheemergencyprovisionitself
providesaneffectivedate,PortlandCityCode§9-42doesnotapply.
[¶27] We reject Intervenors’ argument that Portland City Code
§33.7(b)(iv)supportsaneffectivedatefortheimpositionofthenewminimum
wage provisions in December 2020. That subsection begins: “On
21
January1,2025 and each January 1st thereafter, theminimum hourlywage
thenineffectmustbeincreasedbytheincrease,ifany,inthecostofliving.”Id.
§33.7(b)(iv). It then provides that if the stateminimumwage is increased
abovethe localminimumwage ineffectundertheordinance, “theminimum
wageunderthisordinance is increasedtothesameamount,effectiveonthe
samedateastheincreaseinthestateminimumwage.”Id.Themostnatural
reading of this subsection—particularly considering the newly passed
legislation’s structure establishing annual, chronological increases, see
Fitanides,2015ME32,¶13,113A.3d1088—isthatitdoesnotprovidefora
local minimum wage beginning in December 2020, and there is no local
minimum wage until subsection b(i) comes into effect because the newly
passedlegislationrepealedthepreviouslocalminimumwage.
[¶28]Furthermore,theordinaryuseof“thereafter”inthefirstsentence
conveys that theprecedingsubsectionsmust takeeffect firstgiventhat they
appear chronologically. See Portland, Me., Code § 33.7(b)(iv). After that
sentence, subsection b(iv) provides that the state minimumwage will take
effectifitishigher.Seeid.Thisschedulemostnaturallymeansthatsubsection
b(iv)isnotyetineffect,andtherefore,itcannotbethesourceofaneffective
datebeforethefirsteffectivedateofJanuary1,2022,insubsectionb(i). See
22
Fitanides,2015ME32,¶13,113A.3d1088.Thisresultisneitherillogicalnor
absurd,seeWawenock,LLC,2018ME83,¶7,187A.3d609,becausethereare
valid reasons for delaying application of the emergency provision.5
NotwithstandingIntervenors’insistencethatweconsidertheballotquestionin
interpreting theordinance,wedonotexamineanyextrinsicevidence in the
absenceof textualambiguity, and there isno suchambiguityhere. See Jade
Realty Corp., 2008 ME 80, ¶ 7, 946 A.2d 408. Accordingly, the emergency
provisioniseffectiveasofthedatesetinPortlandCityCode§33.7(b)(i),which
isJanuary1,2022.
Theentryis:
Judgmentaffirmed. JohnJ.Aromando,Esq.(orally),JamesR.Erwin,Esq.,JoshuaD.Dunlap,Esq.,andSara A. Murphy, Esq., Pierce Atwood LLP, Portland, for appellants PortlandRegional Chamber of Commerce; Alliance for Addiction and Mental HealthServices,Maine;Slab,LLC;Nosh,LLC;GrittyMcDuff’s;andPlayItAgainSportsShelbyH.Leighton,Esq.(orally),ValerieZ.Wicks,Esq.,andDavidG.Webbert,Esq., Johnson, Webbert & Garvan, LLP, Augusta, for cross-appellants CalebHortonandMarioRoberge-ReyesDawnM.Harmon,Esq.,andJasonCaron,Esq.(orally),PerkinsThompson,P.A.,Portland,forappelleesCityofPortlandandJonJennings
5Forexample,Portland’sminimumwagechapterprovidesasoneofitspurposesthat“phasingin
thewageincreaseovertimewillallowbusinessestoadjustandresultinreasonableannualincreasesinexpenses.”Portland,Me.,Code§33.1(Jan.1,2016).
23
Kasia S. Park, Esq., Jeana M. McCormick, Esq., and Sara P. Cressey, Esq.,Drummond Woodsum, Portland, for amicus curiae Maine Association forCommunityServiceProvidersBenjaminK.Grant,Esq.,McTeagueHigbee,Topsham, foramici curiaeMaineAFL-CIO, Maine Center for Economic Policy, The Proper Cup, Maine StateBuilding & Construction Trades Council, Southern Maine Workers’ Center,PeopleFirstPortland,MaineSmallBusinessCoalition,andPortlandHuntandAlpineClubJohn R. Brautigam, Esq., John R. Brautigam, Esq., LLC, Falmouth; BenjaminGaines,Esq.,GainesLaw,LLC,Portland;andZacharyL.Heiden,Esq.,andEmmaE.Bond,Esq.,AmericanCivilLibertiesUnionofMaineFoundation,Portland,foramicicuriaeAmericanCivilLibertiesUnionofMaineFoundationandLeagueofWomenVotersofMaineGerald F. Petruccelli, Esq., Petruccelli, Martin & Haddow, LLP, Portland, foramicuscurieMaineStateChamberofCommerceCumberlandCountySuperiorCourtdocketnumberCV-2020-518FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY