\

21 Army Group

11-26 Sept 1944

OPERATIO II

II

,

jennifer.otto1Line

CJ.P:ERl,.TICN G1UIDEN" 1

qONTENTS

"LAR T I

Seetion He2,din-' PaBo~ Introd: tory 1-4 1

21 (}.onornl 81 tu tion n.nd sethng 1

2. Summary of Second British Army ~tan. Operation ItMAH..Kt,~ GllRllWll. 2-3 3-4

3. The Plnnning end preparation ot 30 Corps for Oper Hon "GARDEN". 5

4- OUtline of 30 Corps Plun for Operation ItG'JID]Nll. 5-16 6-11

5. Orgnnis tion for . ovemen t of 30 Cot'ps Troi'f'io. 17-21 1

6 SunIIlD.ry ot 30 Corps 1.~ ain tene-nee Plan for opern.ti n "GiJID 22-38 13-17

"

~di~ ... to PART I tAl~ppena1x Groupine nd 30 Corps Order of Be.t tlo 18-19

Operetion "Gi.RDEN" 17 September 1944.

ppendix IB' Boundaries - .Axis of b.dv8.nco ond D13posltions, etc. 2()

Appendix ' 0' RJ.. Gds i\..I'JUd Div Task Table 21-24

Allpend1x D' R uspcd 01) Oper1".t ion "GARDEN n 26-27

&IJpon1. IE' Extraot of CEO .30 Corps Signa.l Instruotion. Oporl.l.ti G.A.RlJm". 28-31

Anaoxurc~ to Pi. T I

.L.nnO~.Ir0 1 to Tr~o issucu in oon.1unotion with RJ;. Guara.,

.-PI d.ix '0' ;J'Il\ourlld Division Tc..sk T',bles 25

.nno:uLt'e 1 to l,Ia1n HQ 30 Co ps '}jr Cornrnunicl'l. tiona. 32 nd.ix lEI

bnn0%UI'6 2 to \l/r OonvnunioBtiOtl3 Airborne Corps HQ in UK. 33 .'llpendix 'E' JUlnaXW'e 3 to T/T Communi oat ions fli'ter Airborne Corps HQ Appendix lEt had. lund d. 3j AmlEM.l;["6 4- to ,7/T Communion-Huns Speoial RA. 34 Appendix IE'

Annexure 5 to Fraquoncy lI1lotment Bri tish l\1rborne Corps. 5 AlJl and4 IE'

~ , " v IQ4l) _~ )'D fO. f_~~'

..' A R 'f --ll.

Scction [~~

7. General Situ~:tion on 30 00rps front 17 3c~tecter 1944. 1-4 36

8. t!arre tive 30 C rp C:ll.l 1 .n.1rborne Corps e;w~'..it....on of' OI.;i;;rI: t ion "L;.RK.~ G.Jilllli" pW1.od. 17/26 SeptenbcL' 1941+.. 5-66 37-71

9. Exeoutiun of EoveT:lunt ~l Tr~U'f10 Plon of .30 Corp i';U'"i.n~ Opcrf..:.ticn "},:":.RK.":I' GAl.WEN" 67-79 72-74

10. 30 Cor-fls '.ni 1 3ritish ..1.irburnl3 C,Jrps :.:lministrr, tivo .rr.:::.n;~e. nts. 80-86 75-77

Avpen-Ux IG' H, 3 ~'"nlllJV'JllIcnt Cv(.1;lt.:nt for Opurnt~()n "G"JU~~"4 80-84

i~nll/';:xu[,o 2 t~ Trd'fic. nn 1. I::ovument Con trl.ll urge-nisr tiun ...ppcnlix 'G' for O!)""rl'tiLn "G~:...I.illE.'l1l with Sketch 'f.'

':'r: frio Cuntrol COlilr:unic"~ti ns Not. 85-87

Annoxurm 1 & lA to :.I!ponJix 'L'

Gl,ullin 7 '~nl Or,l.:::r 0f l:nroh GU(1r:ls n1',"is1un. Olll~rnt1un "G" ..]~"

.'.rtlJUl''1:l 96-97

:.nnexurc lB Or ll:i~ Jf 1',' ['ch . 'n C(.;n t ~0 Line. Opurr~ ti JH t":'1 ..lJIlen:Ux II /~. '-t'i) 'i"I" IL'

l' ., 1{ Ir J.Y 113-11811

119-122

',-) 124 . ,' ..... '-l")

- 1 -

INTRODUCTORY

OPERATION It};~ GARDEN"

17 - 26 September 1944

1. _ (n) This Opor:ltion oarried out by Second i~, with 1 British Airborno Corps \.Dlder command, wo.s known as "Operation MARKET GARDEN".

(b) fo avo id contu."don the oporation oarried out by 30 Corps ''13.8 known as ItGARDEN" , and that carried out by Airborne Troops as "MARI

- 2

PAR I

SECTION 1

1. By 11 Septc,ber, the Seconu British Army had co.pleted its quic advance frO.ll th R SElNE, and its "leading formation 'thich \!ould have to be eros cd if a Gonti.. ued t.'rust by the; Second. ~~ rel'O to bo made thro gh the ::EThERIuH VS.

Th :Sriti h L of C "T.'3 no'" approx.imately 400 miles long 4!\fTWERP, J 6896, h1. bee captu:L'e' ut "ras NOT oper' tive, d thu full necessary adn 'ni trativt.: bttlld up . auld only-be E'-Ch.i.OVl; men thi~ and other captur~d c~n .1 ports be .t ~T~lableo Th m' i tcnanc~ link of thu ,-,eond .~, ,v, rhl.i 'cby tL~ nt:lce .:.nry :ldministrati v buil up .0 ld be compl ted, had ta b largely suppl'';!.entcd by road tran..>port rc;sour 83, hich in turn 1 t w(; proviclcd :.;~-:; -~: e ex.pense of lifting f'ighting

formation. A tnu::;1} ,.0 tirno, i ',10.::; vital to prl.ven" the WW.4Y corganising; thi could onl. bv don':' :.f' the tim~ for the ~ dmini. tr3.tivQ build up tor this op,-,' tim va.,., :>ho t..:med., .:.dter card ul con~ideration it wa.::; d0Cidt:J to tah; thi:-, uw Ii. Ii'" .. rdivo risk; subs que ltly fully .justific.:d, the ~et 1 d' tr~ of t ..1) ::;t l.rt of ti: e opl.:ro.tion W '" . dv ced by six d ys,

The op0ratio f,,; t"ilt:; the biGgc~t air orne drop yot to be und r taken by o.irborl e lorma.ti ., , n1'1 1 three corps of th ri tisl S ocond '..rrny rfcn, to ,dven u an J. b.::; d(;ployc~l, 30 Corps lc~ j n in thl centr, d 8 anel 12 Corp \JchL:1o. cd ".Jack, eac}; on flank. Fo).' this reason, it can be ~,u:!.Q t~: t th.; profc"ccl opvr~tion ~;cs unique, 0. althou it had na.ny :n.ntors '"n...; rlC'1 -nth 0 her o!J~~D.tion , thore \'fcr certa.ir. a",pccto v;rllich' 'L'e r.ot ~p licabl

- 3 SECTIO r 2

sm iARY OF SECOND o:lITISH lill11Y a':JIf, OPillU~TION ItM~'.R1CET G."RDEN tl

2. The object of Second ;.rmy, ( ,i l;h Hoorne forces under command after landing), '::as to position itself a trid the rivers I,L ,W~'ill., and ~ER RIJN in thd gen-.:r 1 Clr ,0. GRL.VE 6253 - NIJi.iEGEN 7062 - ..RNH:a1 E 7575

ld to domin te the country to tho YORTH as fnr as the ZUIDER ZEE, thereby cutting off co, mtmio Hons bd 'men' GEru.:llNY and the LOW OUUNTRIES.

T1..SI

- 4

The ta k of this formation, which was to co e under cowl~nd of 30 Corps on landing, was to facilitate the a.dvanc e of 30 Corps as far as the R M.i'J.S. Their function cO'.lld be de cribed as laying down a carp'et, in advance, tc, seize and secure the nodal points on the latter part of 30 Corps main axis.

- ) SIoXiTIUif .3

.TIUN OF 30 CORPS I'QR 0THE H.u'J'-lfHNG

4. The plannjng end P IJpcrution for "C.RDEN" by 30 Corps can be divided into three I>ho.ses:

( a) The C'!sem"bly prior to tho .)perati O'n ( b) Thu break out ( c) Tho thru,,,t tr, contact th0 ulrbornG forces.

I ( a) The ~~. CI bl.v

The ass -..:bly and tho l. arshc..lling of tIle forces bUlor\.; tho opel" tion present 11 umber of unusual points which re worth consideration.

J

The fir.,t point ,,' D.S t~at tho "'SD J:lbly h::..d ts. be so flexible thc..t the Cor:llJia del' ',muld be able t::.o ough fjeri.:JtL'1 bottJ.o \.;~_c..i t DlL~T :l' bEERTI'J"CEN ';hich it ';,a' no L llO:J,jiulc hj i. provo~ Thv third. _0int ','/us t'rlt t'l(; o.ture :if the l)r)cTl,'0gl'HJ:":: 0 ~'lllr)n'Lt ell b ... 1.0.;: vy ',:I,VO" of Ty[lhoon , [11 th"\t, . 1",-.i. U.'UI t.iri ~ '.-,eight J. llt.t' J., the "rlt our '\n infnlltr,r .J1' tho (;ll r :j ...rJ \cure J.vi:.iioli', (",1 orodc

It,_,'ll.h "~l!.~ ,~a.-/ c vrit 11 '.11 nO';Bi,lu :1.,,1,.)

r - u -

SliXJTION 4

OUTLINE OF .30 CORPS a I! FUR 0H:R-_TION IrG~.RDENlI

5. (a) Intentioo

30 Corps '"lad to advanc , VI on or or , n.t maximum speed, an to secure tr u area NU1H'ffiBT Z. 6721 - lliEl.{ E 7~77, both inclusivo.

(b) Groupi.11g and Or' ar (if Battle T .0 0 rd.:r Df ll' ... de for 30 Corps, together ,vith the addi ti0nal -c:C(;up .... und ';,tl'I';. ;m'

- / IH' hjur had bLon fi4 cu pr-visi.:;no.lly for 1300 h-,urs .l. 17 Soptei.! t:r c.n::' thia ',la., to b ~. Lr 'i, .1: ) n.:d I .j.'.f,_ llll 3UO n:o :)'l'l; fru it c _u..;j,vt) 1. '"'11JI-:.I ' 101":, ....: 7... ')j ,:u. : \(Jt11'j "1. on/!; Lig grom..L to ' pO'lli '1 ,juTet:lol1 '.J.itl '1 Briti:. ,.irbun c Di b ion i It..; .r(;'! ITl)i.L2.'lt 0 ~ . "

( ii) Send u.vt h: .l\,,;;nt., t, .j ~('U1'0 ::.~lng' ,,",VI,;. R LJ "'-al, atJ ',). _JJ) 'TR Y. 9107mu 'UTFE1i&- 94: 4. "

.../( iii)

I

- 8

(iii) 'hould bridges (iv ... r either rivers i......S, WilnL or TEDER RLJN hav; be,.m 3.estroyed, bc prepared to carry out an assaul t crossing ~nd bri ging vp

- 9

( e) In addi tiwn t-J tho P TYlJ1 oon uf'fort, ~he nOrT.lal fighter ef art Qr Bj Gr.::)Up W~G aVcil ble 'n th~ role of c~ntinuing, nf'ter thecond ..Jr,!y Hea quart,r. 30 Corps .;1.' .... tr, Llonitor this net sO as to be able tu i:..Jos e ,'), veto i1 any Q13r. nds for support ~.Ubl.ri tted on it ._ ppco.rc t:; 0nJ n&or 30 COl"PS troops. II the even t of tht.: jtLp tHntL c1 s bt:i lUlabl t'j gut the rangu neec sary fo,' ;:i l:lv$'~ toueh vi th thLdr .fmtr 1 at ,~rDY Hea quarters, an. PCP wi t '12 H set -lia;:. availablo at 30 C'Jrps IIcadquartvr The v va;,; 1\1.,,0 ~v ila~Jlc fa uSC.'J.S a .I.1)r'..~rd non vis al control oct by the ~.F Sq ".dr~n Lee-del' when hi.... tr.sk vith tho c')ntact cur wn..~ over.

(c) Ground t- .iT c;eogn.i tie,n

It '/0.::' ~ p~ 1'..:c i t vd t h .t tnl.i groun~ 5itu'" t i on in thi", opero.ti .,. "..oull call for the; xiL.ur~ e..lp1oYl tont 01 11 r. ids to rio; ognition. ;LX rt ngu..cnts -;lerc ..;ud

- 10

(ii) In the case :)f' th0 briJ.ges :...t Glt.JNE und IH l];GEN, H.. .~ . 0. kJ1 efcncc, ,lith ro.dar and se rchlights, , a- t.:;, be provid d b lo.st 1i ht D + 1.

(iii) ...rrrulp;tJ I nts 'ii:::r ' ..d" to COllnter .,:otor Torpedo Boat ctivity ir tile fL.T.E;.:EN urea.

( b) Should. 'TIrE'.: ridge be. r

1 (b) Col.-: unicati",n

(i) Extract 0 csa 50 C rps' Sign~l Iistruction for this operation is t appendix 'E'.

(ii) T t; o.....uni ~ ion., tn3.t ,/~re to be ..,I.,;t 11. or L:irborne Troops n.n~' r or 11 f01'!. .tion", under an opl.;r til g with 30 Corps clurine this operatio 1 are sho m t ' n xure toppendix 'E' ~' follols:

...Jmexu;cc 1 - l'lnir t.;U q arters 30 Corps 'tl/T CD .~,' ic tic.n

":"nnexure 2 - Cor... nit:ution i borne Corps ql lrtcrs in Ul'ITED KINCIX.ll

..'1 0xure 3 - fl/T rj. '.lllnication D.i'ter _. i"!'borne Corps H..:; clquarters ha. 1 J.c.

J~neXllrc 4 - \I/T OL1lIUn i l~l_ i011 Spwvi:>.l Ik.

ote: - one notes on the e.xecution 01' 3i.J orps i 611al plan is sho'im at .L'.ppen ix 'Q tc P'.rt II.

LL~SON

16. (a) FivlJ Contact DetachLents '::ere rovi by 101 U .irbornel,;; Division to IOrkbt...t',j

- 12 SECTIOtor 5

ORGl I&'.TlUN FUrt

,

17. The problcr,l pr~sente:J t::;. the Corps w ., the tactical ove of approxirua.tely 20,000 vehic105 fLl'OSS HCJLk..NDj one route,

supplo~ented by a ~ub~idiary route, ~as ~v~ilablc.

ORG I ~TluN

18. Full details of hu pln d the Ol'ganis"tion set up to deal _lith the prable CU'() shovm at ;:~:?' I1C icct; to Pa.rt II a~ follows:

(a) ~~ppcn ix IG' - irett qt.W.rters .30 CCJ.cps .i'ovement In"'truction for Op !ratian rlGI. EN"

(b) ;..ppcndix 'HI - He aquc:.rtEll'S .30 Corps Traffic and !{ov ant Cantrol Urgn.niso.tic,n.

TORlGR.-.BiY

'19.. Tnpogr"phic

- . .5 SECT-oN 6

22. . eferencl.' to 30 C01.J.5 01'-01:' 01' Bt..ttlo,(bJ?Pl.'ndix r_~' 1 Part r), for operation 11:,1. RET G.t..RD:::l;" id,l sh(). t'r.t th._ii. 0 eration 1 a'1d lllD.intenancc cor~ 't',l.;nt far cxcce ed those dxpect,d tc e or 11ally executed by ~ Cor -3 S t~ff and. Sur-vices.

ho outline l,lD,in tenc.lICC Plan t .... ! lvet the:}\.: crJ!J.m.itr.lents is as shchn belo

/ 23. (a) U1 till '16 .::>0 tenbcr, 11 i'"r: "'tions and vorp 1'roo S . ere tJ rE:nain "u ~cd on 160 11.0 in BRUSSELS &'!'cC'., cl!'l .,.unition would C ,::;n ti ue 1; J b. lruWl1 frou "If 0 6 ~~rr.w !~o

- 14

26. (a) ~~l_ f(/~aJ,;',:in" 'Gr~, orOvr(:Ki to carry, as a r:1iniJ,RlT' d0uble seC~jn::1 lint; holtl:lL1g of 25 pounder, and. 11 a ..unit ion fOr progr3.l.J:J.e '17/18 Sel-'t~.~bcr r' tc be 1'avm frcrn 161 EMC.

(b} u'ling to the 0;> lender ;jtocks 1 01 at I 'Ja-1hea , (later to be held o.t 161 (; l.:>repc-.:cu to acccvt Corp::; ta, ks fr,r f'ivo:: 11'\tOOI"5 01 tn~.ll )ort for nn u .. :'fi L; 1 h r II ,.1.

28. FrO),l D till D -I- 5, tht.: l',l!.'l.ati 'lIS of Briti.h .,ir0rn0 Corps 'lOre to be ~. ''l.' .It~ inc -:.,}..: air by Fvrtros. 0"" Stil'lil1['fI an,l Dakota aire 1.". t. PI' wisiDt -, !;, t\1. I J H

- '15 iJrVI:.nu;~ --"--...;;:.::::.-...;:;.;;......;~---'-........:---'-.;:",;.,:...:..;.:-:.:~::.....;:.::..;:;....:::.....::...:::...:...

29. ]U:lintul1o.ncu by air ~1El.f:, tr, ).; v".:ll'ried 0 t by St' rlings and D leotun, ~1.11 :L':i n 'fer "tLJ btl iJ:...;O 1 I)n prc- et(;'rL.ineu c,.' .uJity de. ands. 'l'hu lr0~ on j) + 'I hnw:;v ur ';IC., tr. b - entir (;.1, ' . ~.U! i ti on.

Tho ::i",o.l.>ornu T~ il '.n. V.. I'; rry Co 'urthlv lJ It[;, UVI C tJ. \, -."; te, 1.J'.' illL U.: 1 y into Fi eld J.bul ,ee,; ()1' )J ,.)0 "1. ,>r ,l.~ t to 3 ,:11 1 10 CCS. i.!r'v:.l.Uu::-.tion "by "'ir '

---

- 16

33. lIrQl1MCe utures ";/(;' t:J U~ ... ceived by both roa d air, anj arr u:y at ENGHIEN J 54.

3 110 t0r:S of 'I.cJn: cc stor",::: .. ere l~.:J.c'l .~t b:I.YEUX in three bricks of about 54 tr:...,. e~e; ShcrtuGc of' tran" 'ort impo ed SOLe

cl_y in ,f;tti ,g tn\.,_,c brick.... tu the I~,u. urI.;, .J D dny.

35. In sU .. 'r:!, t.he X'rD.!1't: ..0nt i';I 0~:a.i.1..' ':1l1 z:e ,)Vo,,; Y 'Jere as f ",no\',s:

( 0.) Repair (i) I~ tl t,; IN. rl::.. sta..:;es 1 Gt ~ ethan OOl; Brigade 1,IorkshoJ

'\.':1. to IL'VU ,:itJ .;.D.~h [)I";.ation.

(ii) C'L' o.in fr'r:i:lD.tion \f'.Jrk:3hopu \erIJ trJ lc.......in rJn \ eels, whilGt the ~'UJ: :lJ.nl ,:ere to ;:;tay i th

- 17

Uth0r uto.Ct .Lents ~'l')' . Iso depl0 re , J.JGving un.lur Corps or erti.

FVST':.L,

....1'

---

- 18 .ltPPENDIX ';.'1. I Tv P.:4lT I

CRuUPJNG ;'JI::;) '--':tillER UF B.hTTLE (j:;:)EH.l~TIUN "1!13.KET C:.rmEN"

17 SEPI'ElviBER 19Lf-4

GH0UPlliG

Additi,:,nal troop!.; LUl.Lr COf.":'18,n' of fOrr;1ttions, wi thin and operating \iii th 30 0'-;1'';>5, for f),oration 111\ 'JU

- 19 (ii) 4lr nTrt. J ',' t unc1

.....

- 22

(g) rnce issue in conjunction with Ri Gds '. rnd Div Tu"'k Tu'oles dD.tcd 16 S p 44 i ho' ns II J' nnexurc" 1 tc this Appen ix.

2. cd. Lrty Rolling B~

(D.) Units tuki , p t (il Opening 'Line 84" e Rcgt

(ii Line bb 7 :.:c'd Regt (iii Lin' cc 64 ;cd Regt

(b) Co-ords E .r Ht

.'1. 439110 503149" 30 X. 438349 50':515 .30 m Y. 41~062.9 506470 25 t1 Z. 439863 506835 25 m

(0) 84 :,:0 7 .,:cd 64' ed inu~ 10 - :,iinu", 9 u b - cc

:.iinus 9 - .:inu 3 dd bb or: j'inu' 8

-.'inus 7 dd c.... c

irn.w 7 6 f - .' (.. ~J'~nu 6 :::h. 5 cc f-:.rinu'" 5 - :,:inus 1~ g hh ff j;"inu3 4- - .r'J. us 3, gc; hh ii -, 'irn ' 3 - ..:ir: s 2 jj hh ii :inu", 2.

-:.rinus I jj kk ii

_Li 1 0 jj kk 11 0 - 1 k.1

- 23

(g) Trace issuod in conjunction ~lith ~ Gds j~~d Div Task T~bloG dated 16 Sap 44 i~ sho,m "-Annexure 1 to this ...'pp ndix.

3. TUlE:D CONes, ~..._-.... -

Ser ial Unit Tgt

T" from

0 to Ro.te i .in Remarks

1. ' 86 Fd 2801 G 5 lORJ.1.liL HE

2.. 151 Fd 2813 0 5 II II

3. 86 Fd 2802. 5 10 " II

4. 151 Fd. 2814 5 10 II 11

5. 86 Fd 2803 10 15 11 II

6. 151 Fd 2815 10 15 II I'

7. ~o Fd ono Bty 2804 0 15 II 'II

8. 90 Fel One Dty ,

9. 90 F

816

- 24 5. LIST OF 00 ROS ':i: tHo. E. Ht. (I. ) 2801 438950 502150 ~ 30

11-37950 501800 30 438800 503450 30 438370 502500 30

2803 439450 502850 503750-438850

2804 437100 503300 35 35436650 503580

2805 436150 35 35435960

2806 [1-35510 35 35435220

2807 442050 501000 .30 001'10 (BOT on Tr co) 2808 442 00 500000 35 CONe (NOT on Trace)

1l-;J.700 5011.;.40 STO~TI( 1600 (~ on Trace) .

2810 W500 508200 5 2dl1 440.350 5 6980 25 2812 437370 506234 25 2813 438750 499900 35

438600 501250 35 2814 439000 500750 35

439000 502150 35 ~815 440600 502560 .35

439250 502200 .35 41+0000 508300 25

2817 441800 509450 25 2818 44800C 50 000 (NOT 011 T:cucc) 2819 449800 510900 2320 442800 513030 25 2821 4')5200 50525 ?822 4.33350 504230 30 2823 41+2200 25 2 24 li40500 25 2825 438800 5152:>0 30 2826 4372.00 514300 30 l827 434200 511650 25

D. L. ,J,.'l,.. jylc.jor R. i 16 Sop 41+ D. ;:. \. .. J' , GdD Arud Div

1130 B hrs

- 26

RE ASP"'CT OF OPE

SCOPE OF T' K

1. Tho prol'le \ f'lcinz the !, in the IlG.ARDJ1,NfI Opel' tion was entirely one of' bric..g' " A xl.rt fronl the four major obstacles of tho tEUSE, ;.lEUSE -. ',','A.\I. 03.1'1'11, '):"" and NEDER RIJN there were, at least, two sizeable water obJtn lcp> bc ....or"' "Ghe ;. liSE 1'1(1'" l' ached, namely, the WILHELV,INA Cnn, . nd t .~ ~iiTD r;ILI~~, VART OaMI.

PL4.1 lTNG

2. (a) Although t " '.; 'borne forces '-'Jere bcin') dropped ':1th the object of ~ pturin~ tho bridges int ct, engineer pl~nning hud to bo baned on the Y'Oi'.::t C so.... Wh0N ~ll obstClcles "fould have to be bri(l.ccd.

(b) Another facto .... in .=-lD...'1l1ing \~''''-S till t Ctlthough tho brid e mi ht bd bloY.n, the :.l..irborne forcl,s might bo in P0S~l.' sian of' the sitos rnd routvs in betweel, so thtt \;urk could be ~~ried out on all bridgeD s~~ultnneously if rafts ~~rQ ~sed to ferry bridgin,,; Gauipment for". ard. .

ORGAl'n:s' TION AND CONTROL

3. In order to !loet ~hcsc COl. ,litrnont", D. I gc onoinol,;r forou ,,;as 58 ambled :...t BOm'" LEO: )ID undor ~...h" Corp

- 27 - .

BE CORPS PLAN

7. 'Ii th the knowludge that thi., bridgi \" as at BOURG LEOPOLD and could be c'tlled for. "~d on priority, no bridging was put in to the order of march xccpt a ",nnll 3.l'P.ount under th0 direct cOliU'"nond of the Guard Ar our d Division; this ,":as sufficient to bridg0 small obst C103 on th route ~d to provide Asgault Boat nd Rafts to get the leading troops Qnd t~s over the ~~jor obstacles ~hould the bridges be blown, but held by our o,.,.n Airborne Troops.

BRIDGING COW S

8. Plnns ':1 re, thervforc, Tn.:: d0 to form prc- rrnngcd columns to moet vnrioU3 contingcncioG of n major bridging co ~itment. These colurrms were ivan code- os and convoy serial nunl)crs so that they could be call0( fory/ere. by the Traffic Control orgnnis< tion vhcn requirca. The columns so constituted ~cre, roughly, as follows :

(a) Columns to providc bridge., ~d r:~tG over cach obstacle on thf. 1.ssUl"1ptio that all bridgoD '.vere blovm but held by o'l.:r troop , :omc1 th t bridgin over each obst cle would take pJ.'1.ce 'lt the s:x e tiw'.

(b) Colunn~ to p ovic1c the full scale of r. tG and bri es for individ.l::l obst:...cles "'hould f'ny one be blovm and held by our 0\\ troops.

(c) ColUJi1113 to rrovide 'lssault equipwcnt and initial bridging .U1d rni't for cach in ividuCll obsta.ele should it be held by the e e .y.

(d) Columns to IJro ide uuplic'ltc bridgoa over ch river should the exLtin bri

- 28

,

APPENDIX I E I TlP.t\P,T I

CSv 2~ ~OIi.?S S~Gn __~STB.UQl'I.91LNO. 12 ll2..-~.~d_iE conjunc'~icn \,ith 30 Corps 0E Instr NQ:L.

. poration . IIG-. DEN II)

n'lTENTION

4-. To provide c mns for op"r _tien -. ulKET-GJ

..rETROD /

5. Tor..nal Oorps ccmn Vlill e . ',~intai cd 1[; 110\'m at Atmexul.'e 1. 15/19 H fill keep set on Corps ,. econdi.~ry Het until they ._ aS3 to oomd 506 ReT.

6. Special cemns for l.-.u ,illT ~E foJ.lrYI (soc c1:;,fl.g:cams Qt l",nnexures 2 Q.l.1d 3).

(i) Two lillks, A9 0 r'1 _~ll, Ot;;t..ed ,.~~n Second ;'Z'T:\Y - 3C rCorps - Br , irborne Corps in me Thes0 0 nlready

established. When comns h:!,vo con establish'd -;.Ii th AirboI'l e C rp" ai' - r' l1"'J" p_ oj, 0 S ,;il1 h~ ma.int ino': 011 .rhichc- {, of" 9 or .' n i.-; the better.

(ii) One link (05; 30 Oor11 - Dr .:drborr.e C::. . _. 10,1 US /v

:.irbornc Di ,.,~ in SeoN/d .rn.:;y' - 1"tO Second ,~rnw. T...'o British o[cr'ltcrs 11, vo be n D,tt'lChco to 101 US

~ir orne iv to ere on 05. (iii) One ink (Cr~) .i.:' in 3"'0011_ .. rl"':fy - T'1C S~c nd j rmy - 30

Corps - Dr '~ irbC':'~ll(l Corps "

(iv) 101 US ,".irhrrne Di\ i'-' ,n inE: "C HI 3) VO:!1JG. 0110 .....h 193 ',Ii th US r~ .r~tol' -1;;0 -.'or:c n 014 to the ~'.irborre Div Guard s :ts of 101 U9 ..irbC>:"l1C: iv, 8~ U.~ "'.ir crr.c Div and 1 Dr J\.il'l.: 0 11

- 29

(viii) One 76 Set ....Iith crew will move wi th D1~ & Q1 G Br ;.irborne o rps to \'!ork on 06 to 1 c Br j irborne Ccrps in UK. This set will be vd th Rear 30 Corps until Airborne 0 rps seaborne tail joins Moin Airborne Corps HQ.

(ix) ":"s soon as se borne tail of Br :'-irborne Corps HQ joins Br :.irborne Oorps HQ, a (me-to -one link vI/ill be established between Rear 30 Oorps and Br J..irborne Oorps. Second Army is providing the set at Rear 3f\ Corps. Det ils of freq and linksign will follow.

Frcquencies.

(i) For det "led ~ allotment see Annexurc 5. (ii) Frcq list~ will be in use in Second Army as follows :

3 Corps Oorps Lis t ~~ 8 Corps II B

12 Corps 0II Gds l.nnd Div }. d Div List f... 11 ;,;rmd Div II B 7 i rnd Div 11 0

5r: ( ) Div Inf Div List A II D43 Div II15 (8) Div B' II 053 Di. v

3 Br Div II B 4 i,lind Bdo Indep Bdo List C 8 ',rmc1 Bele AII

8. Codes.

() General. Airborne finns hold only ;.irborne Code keys and therefore ground frons cO!:1Jl1Unica. ting with Airborne frons will t:tlways use l.irborne keys.

(b) Oode Signs.

Row Regintcrs of . irborne fnms havc Dlrc\.qy been distributed. Code signs for use on spcciDJ. links [U'c dct iled by seq).lence nd rDW nur,iber .vi th ,a' schedule of wireless n-vts at ~nnexure 5. Cr-pi 5 of a speci"l ,.irborne Code Si Extract e attnched at Annexure 6 (not inc1u od). Ground frons must realise th"t I irborne fmns kno",' only the code signs of irborne fums rmd do not undcrstund Second Lrmy code siens. ,hen making contact on Guexd ~vcs or using RT codes, if it is necessary to indicntc the names of ground f~s th~y ust, contrary to normal ractice, be encoded in SLIDEX.

It is il ort nt thut the usc of SLIDEX to coneee~ the names of frons i reduced to the minimum.

(c) SLIDEX & W.FL.,\Y. IJ.irbornc Tps "LID I X cl 11 ;.PLI.Y keys hnve already been distributed nd keys for lurthor pcrious follow. These SLIDEX keys will be used with; normal Br 1, ry SLIDEX cords for comn to Dr l~irborne fmns do 'Ill to and incl Div level of ..t irborne fmns. ilhen using SLIDEX to US _ irborne Diva, 1.irbornc Tps SLIDEX keys \ ill be used with~' erican SLIDEX cnrd

(d)!~uthcnticution

(d) \.Uthcntication.

For 'l;he pu:cj?osc of m ing ccntact on Div or Corps Guard aves or for uthenticD.tion on the ccmns to be set up

between srcund an ~irbol~e fmns, Coniliined ~uthentication Syt . COB 122, Serial ~6, VQll be used uith the sheet for the 'loy concu::rJca. 'l'he first ..etho of authentication det iled in CCBP.0122 ~ill be used. ~irborne frons \vill understanu no other Ine~ns ('i' "uthentication.

CEHER.

9. The following ne :.L'ime P~.G linkf,; "will b", hl)lr.

HoI c. Out Tc.blc P d Number

Spera at S -cond "'cn!W 204Main Second ".LT"!Y 205 'dain Ji.cbornc Corps 2 6

~. ain 21 \.rmy Op 207 "3 ic1j.~c1 DiV 208

4-3 ('.'i) Div 209 Tee Second _. r,: 210

0p~rc ~t 30 Corps 211 Ibin Y Corps 123

(ii) Three-r1":'l

seconu .rmy 13 (.30 Co C 368 + 30 Corps 14- (-=>ocon"l .~rr:cr 369

101 US "',irbcrne Div 15 (1 i~irbornc Div 370!l30 Corps os (30 Corps 367 + Second '" n:ry to (SecolJd :u:rv 383 82 U hirborne Div folloy (.52 (L) Div 384

30 Corps 371 (G s i nnel Div '36 Second . , y 372 +(101 :IS ".irborne Di v 37 ,i..lin "..irbornc vorps 37) (~p"rc ....t 30 Corps 38!lGdS ;..n.a iv 3033 !T(1s J..x d ri + 82 US ;.irbornu Div 34 + I Dr ;.irb me Bi-r 31 Spo.re t 30 Corps 35 Sp~c. t 30 Corps 32

Pads ~3Xked I.,. t aro "Lcttur '1ds ll for ,-:hich instrs to use have been issued throur..;h ciph r e nnels.

(iii) S ecial .:.ir orne Doubl Trn sposition Ciph.r h'ls been istribut.:. down to nd inel } IJvcl or u,.c in tho event

of lr1.ter'11 eiph(;r C('J:ln \',ri t _ Br : irbornc frons being required. Distributio. ';.1i thin Br :.ll'born.... .lmns is n.s fellows

HQ Br :. irbornc Ccrps (U:1ir:, R ar :mr ,'Ji'CE) He: 1 "',irborn~ Div :In,' a.ll bde55. HI, 52(L) Div ~nd ',\11 bc.1es HC' 1 Polish Im1c Pnr~ Due

(iv ) It is hoped to :r1.' vi, ( 112098 (US cirher Id"\chino) for 3 Corps, G

- .3'1

UK "'hcu10 be rout..; to the.. It is particularly important ~bct th~ correct eooe si n is used.

10. Zone ;. tilnc cOJnvS into force ')300 17 Scp 1:..'.;..

11. H hour is 171400;.

i2. ;,CK.

(Signeo) X X ' X X

Ti. of igno.tUJ.'c l9055.5 .. , . Brigadier Chi.",f Si~1 cl Officer

30 Corps

..

ANNEl:J TP:,> RE

7,'iit'I.W TP5 . i. I;Je:r INTi R.c.ff'T

Z(,B f05

2105 F.D.:>

100 All .BDt.

KEY ~I)(. U~ COR.P~

",,();, ARt Ie :Jl\

IbO f Me.

t\DM Po.':lr

SODtY

(,~ ARMD DI~

SO INf TP':' 'W)::>t

MARKfT ANNt.X:Jil 2 CO APPENDIX 'f.' t~ P...n- [

'W IT COIYlNS -- AIRBORNf. COR ::) H,Q IN UK

u.s STj LfGNO

.BRITfSH ::;15

A NE'll.UR:f.. .3 to APPENDIX. 't: t;, i{,,-r I

/ /

TAC 5t.CONC: ARMY F4j7? ~'5/JO'5 f85

/

j~71//l1/17!(177;

'::--v/3J /:1til'

MAIN 5

MARKET AN!'ttXUR 4 [() APPNDIX t' to P..,-t

wiT COMN5 - SP-ECIAL R. A

ez. us ~IRBOR.Nt~ 'OIO~ ARTY COMO ~of:S3 '---+------_.~

II II I ~ ~I

I I I I I I

t 20/bb (lJ5 M'ER.rlTOI o Bl\lTISH -';ET~

:~WEXURE 5 to CSO 30 Corps .ANNEXURE 5 tollPmmrx IE' Sig lustr No.12 Part I. Net Time of No. Designation of Net Freg Control sta Opening Outstas Remarks Sequence & Row NlJrl)ers. 05 B1' il.i1'borne Oorps nI, 1 2420 "ain .30 Oorps H - 1 hr Main Br Airborne Corps Fl5 RG9

j,iain Second J..1'r:ry F4 R72 101 US l-.irborne Div F15 Rl5 Tn.c Second.b.rmy F4 R72 + i.ff'ix 5

Q Supply link 1 day night

4595 .5085

Hain Br J'i.irborne H heu1' Cc.cpt;

Rear Br .hirborne Oorps 1 r.irborne Div

]'15 Rl7 to folIo\'.

11"" 8: (J..1G Br .b.irborne Corps F15 i1.}J+ 08 Br ~..i1'born~ CDrps Rl2 3435 in Second ~'..rI1\Y H - 1 r...r JL;J.in J._irborne Corps F15 RlO

Lain 30 C0rps E6 R Too Sec0nd .~rny listE:ning FI5 RIO -+ .Ll.ff'ix 5

CIO Corps Guarcl\ia.ve 4J.00 as required F15 R14 014 i V' Guard ,. ave 4050 .air. 30 Corps I - 1 hr 1 31' l..irborne Div

82 US .t',.irborne Di v FlB BIO

in u68

101 US .lirbornc Div HlO R51 ~ Gds .l..:n:rl Div E9 Rl1 I ~~9 Second J>.1'cy UK link 1 4790 i"ab Scc0nd ;"1'my in Nain 30 Corps E6 R3I

2900 opor::tion 131' J',.irbornc Corps (UK) F15 R5 .k11 Secr,nd Armv UK link 2 4460 I,tain Second r.rr.w in Br ~"'irborne Corps (UK) E4 R32

]980 operation J.iain 30 Corps. ~6 R31 . ,iv J..rty Net 4160 CR;~ Gds Lrrr:d Div H hour .3 FOOs (Airborne) E20

E20 R66 R70

HQ 101 US ..:i.irborne Div Fd Arty E20 HIO .

R90 R19

HQ 82 US .i~irbo:me Div Fd l'..rty BIO R53 11ed Arty Net . 4130 84:MOO Regt H hGur Set with fwd tps 101 US ~~ir

borne Div HIO R30 Set with fwd tps 82 US ~~ir

borne Div BI0 R48

., .36

1:' '. H 'I: .1~

GENERAL SITU.,'.L'"\Cl'1 m:)O C9l---; FHQr:T 17 SEFTEMBER 1944-.

DISPOSrI'ION ;.ND B~~fY ..:lIV)TX 1. (a) ~positio~

The dispositions 01' jO::;O~5 l:~rior to opere. t5.on II MiJUa:'l' G;ffiDEN ll on 17 Septemh"Y' n:ce 8ho\'r(l ,''It ;"l)penuix In I to P3rt 1.

(b) EnemY ~ctivi~ During '~hc pre"i us .'.;-8 hOP.. ..:; ther'e h?-,] beGn li ttlc eneu\y 2.ctivi ":l 011 the; Corp;;, fror,t, oth':.r t:hon local infiltrtion end /'tr '~.. ::i<

Tho; 00:'1)5 bri'..gehccC! 0'\T~~' thu j'\1Euu.!~ - 33C1.11 C::L'1al was firl:-I~r r... n-:1 stron[jly ~\;;1:1 by 50 (N) DivisiorJ (231 IJ ,f~11t:>.7 Brit'. dB), br:'ckeu by c~.ements of the GU~'.Ids Armoured l):i."risi')n~ ~r~h(: &rH..~'Y put i!1 r:. nurnb0r of strong counter (Ht:l'J~~fJ : g ..h'st ":hf, br i.c1[S(;hc3.J, "tnt rJirectec1 his n "in effort ,11 to tb' 12 Gorps bridi3ehead OVd~ the MEUSE - ESC,',Il\' Cam'l at C'-!'il'L1..;I, 0888 .

It VI(\S estir:l'1'cci th.'):' the ( Jl)lTiY st:C8n~th' 0.':1 30 Cor;-s front, which ';I'lS to (:;llJOSC th0 b:r.cck ,_'ut frou th", bridgeher'd, wC'..S rl~)I,~l'('{i1!':.:~t,.'.Ly :3::.X iiJ.I"') '~ry h~tt,::l:Lion{~ back,')Q. by :1bou t 20 : ..1?Vs .-m'l ."'.. do ~.',)!! Ci. :;(~ f:i, i)ld t'.nd rnecl:i-'_ll.: ',runs. The ntmb_l'.,jf.' ,]8 );'l'L~j on ~:1'.: Corps front ','1'),"; no't 0~tim.:l'ted to be n:an,:i, ;i~"'i.lc th(~ xr."csc j~C 01' tc.nks '.: s suspected but nei; con'':i.:.... ;1v L

BRItGE srru~.

2. The bri,lS8 s: ':~U'\U:Oll ':/,',:;:;h','l: 'l':, c n rCj,('r[:s ::1howcc1 that all the princip"\l brir:j,,(';~~ ('0',:'" 1:al~ !::~ .:1 :;:!tc:c o''u.st;.~cl'~s on the Corps 3xis of ,J.JV'[JC2 ,.'c:c; i.nt: :.,:~

Corps Troop,] HF .~: ~ ': )I..; It:Go..;(1 ". C:'.GSS l~O sUJ::_l'-m ntm'Y bridge over thE: JviEU8~~ .. :,:, ('i.rj' , ,; 'IJ",:r, '.-.i..th'i.l1 the e,:dstin l bridGehead, thereby cc.sin[~ ~\']I() r '1: ;.')~: cut.

3. The '(b~1' '-j"'!,> rinG ... i.' i1 ": 11:i.

- j/

GrtOUl'm TR00:i2.

5. -'- t 1310 hour::;, Con ~m(l. r JJ Corps 5'1':/ toot the c:irbornc Urap \.'''1S proeCQr ill", '1CcoJ:'Llln[, to 1-:1 11, "1'1-: the oruo!" to the Gunrd::; }..rnourccl D:i. vision '.:~8 r.\i vcn to :rVcuck: ~~t 1435 hourso 5 GuurcJs ;,rr.,oured Brig~:c1c ....,"'I't ,. ::oll:i.n~ '\1)~ .'c.:(,l'(>",! b~~rr"Gc l)f six fic:lc1 rcgir;1Crlts ':.re,s put (loVin cov'~ri".i~ l,CC)(\ y;,:.r,1s d thor side of the EINDnOV'EN ro~d. T~l::'::; l:,.3'(;cc1 .1.'01' 2C ,..;i"utcs 'md was This ',wicht ~)f ~UI)portinc fire, Cl.ccom J:.:tni,;(: boY ':'CCln' :~tLlck, h:l\': thG desir-urI ef1' ,ct, JIld by 1815 hours the m.IS i GU~.l\.Tl) Graul)) , t/~inst ',/c."lk.0ning Ol))osi tion, h.:lLl crossed C sll-"lll :!'iv1 =--rtv:i..::il.clli 11, ~,1 to f1 ght s~~v:,~Qly to cffuct their bre~,.k out L'ror.l th'J 'b:d, [;nhv\(~ ;';::;+;')' ,li"h,,(. ov(,r the. ;"'USE - ESC1;'ur Cnn;:U. Durine thu Ilcri\xl ()f th

-y bridgehead but had made ~o hlpression. Further. his continuous attncks ~'1erc c form::.tions was up to schedule, e..nel loss of aircr~ft h~c oeen.negliGible.

FL~.N1{S.

7. On ?IJ Corps RIGHr, B Corps .arc prepnrinG to bridGe ,lith 3 Ent ish Division E:IST of the Corps bound~ryI thereby Cr::1\p.ng off enen:\}r o.ttention from 30 Carpal thrust. I

On tho LEl"'r, 12 Corps orl1crccl n night attack 0nc1 this was successful, [\ brid[')1c"'.ld beinG osbblishGU over 'the MEUSE - ESC:.U'f Cano.l, v-li th .the object of ost:,blishin~ I} Clnss 9 bridgc by enrly morning 18 Septs h:Jd reported th'lt (hIrinG the pcric\d 16/17 ScpteF.lb\~r, cnouiY re!\ction on their front hnc been consic1cr::.ble.

1.ffi SUPFORT.

8. During 17 Septcmbl";r 5~ sorties werc flovm by 83 Group in :3Upport of the u;round trcops. :. ttacks by Typhoons o.lon~; the EllIDHOVEN rO!ld \/cr~ continuous from 1450 to 1850 hours. Those

ctt~cks assistcd~osenin~up s~ne of the stiff 0ncn~ positions in the -,'/OOUS 011 each side of the V;l.I

- 39

moved wi th 30 Corps n.no was previously briefea, wi th the primory tasks of receiving by ':liP, (very high freclucncy), a Tac ") report, from ~. specially bri8f~d recce aircraft, of the DCCur~CY or otherv:iso of the i.irborne drops to 0m,ble tihc CQrps Cor.nn&.nder to decide on his zero hour. This i;1; did '~mc1 o.lso I'0ceivcc1 Tc,c R inform'oticn from other r8connaissanae aircr~ft during the operation.

ENEMY;,m-dTI.Y..!11. 9- ~lthough tho 0noffi put up ~ fairly strong fiGhter force, .he ".'las eithor unnblc or un',lilling to ir)tcrf(;r~ with thE; airborne operations or the clos.: support 3fforde 'i to our ground troops by 83 Group IL....T!'.

10. In swnmsry it can be said tha t an excellent 5itudion hail been createJ. The v;holc Corps "::I.S poiseo. to ':ldva.ncc in ~rry order, thereby riivin[; the; r~)(luircd flexibility shou1l1 the orc)cr of m::-:rch h"vc to be nltcrcd. Tho oowbined 2round~nd c.irbornc Ott~ok3 had gOJiC c.ccording to pl:~, complete surprise h2.J been ~:.chievud, 2

GENERhL SITU:.:r ION

11. The settinr; f'OT' opL.rE).~ion:: (In 18 September WIJ.S th,:,t the enemy h.d effeet'.:.:d rcn o:r.';'erly,;ith 1,-,:,.~\:il ,Juri l1g the pr6vious niE:ht, the. t he W,::l.S in .ly

- 41

E4.2l3, due NORTH of V;,LKENS'i'i'JJID E4108, ':::-,5 rGpo1'ted by 2 HeR to be firmly held. i ... CllO-WfXY bridse over C:-I s:.,-,ll river jUl;\t SOU~lH of ViJl:t Gu~,:nls J~J:,[. {ured F.E re~ sources w(;re rlGT to be used, [IS th~ route W~::; 'tlcclU, tc for the clivisiol1 ,,rhich was kcepitlL its brL1ging rE:J30UrCes for the ;,iIIIIELiV;Il'J..:, C~al. During this pericd th(Jrc '1::l.S no enClI\y air ~ctivity C\nd our O',~[J r-ir cover W~S Gpcr~tive.

EventucJ.ly, ,-1.,J..:Sl' ':/Us reported clear, but tho:; cneIT\Y again il:1pOsed delay f .nx.\ CL ccmcrete s tr')l~L poir t two miles to the NORTH. Mco.nwhile, ~rmourc(2 COl'S of' 2 HCR were cxplorine, 1.~htJ "ari

- '2.

'l'helJridi;O 5i tu:.:. tion "i0.5 'ch'\t the Gu"rds "~.nnoured Division ':u;;re buildinG 2., cl.',~ss 40 bric\:::,c over the cnnal ,~t ZON E4425 and this Ylr'-Sto be COJnl)lGtGd by first light morning 19 September so that the armoured thrust tow:J.rds G};",NE E6253 could be continued. 82 US ~'~irborne Division h:1c1 CC'..' tur(:>J int;::.ct the briDGe CIt G-ll;cVE. The bridge s' 8. t NLJ) ..ECEIJ 2.11 (1 ..:J.1NH81,[ ..',ere ',lso rc)?ortcc1 'to be i nt::' ct but not yet securt:l.~ by c,lcr.1Emts cf 82 US ~:~irborne Division ~nd 1 Dritish ;drborne Divisiun. 101 liS ;drbornc DivisioD rcnorted th~t ill1 the rer.winin2; bric1Ges" :'.cross th" ..'1ter Qust

(d) Since the sk,rt of the 0i'c!") ticn) j~irbornc Corps reported th~t they l'w c~ t.:3.kcn D."b:,U t 90C prisoners of Y:5.r 'but thr.t their o.m c,3.sunl tics \'10'1.'(5 bccinning to mount up.j

15. DurirlL,; the \'.'hole In.y the wco..ther \".'::18 the limiting factor, 0.3 it W:,'lS bD.cl both cv{;r -:::'irfielr}s :;J1U the b:' tt Ie. t\rC 'S.; con sGquent1y, the ~roun() tro.:;.Js of' the lc:\din...': LriL'\do of the G-uar3.s ;.rr::ourcd Division did not U?t the f:lClnlC cl~'s8 ~J.I)(: intin::cto support thjt they hllc1 received on the ~~;r.:;vious ,:1,'W. In cdJi,tion, tho g:counu. 5i tuation llClckec:! the cl:"'.rity ';'111ich on the pr-.:vious day h:~d cn~bl

-44SECTION 1!

GENERAL SITUKl IC!'r

18. The situation y clements of 9 SS ,Divisicn ond Flak troops. 'l'hey wcrll also holding the SOUTH end of the NLn~m:GI!.'N bridge over the River '.:Ii1..:'.L. 'l'he bridGe wo.s int~ct and ::Ilthough pro-pared for demolition th(; leads had been cut, it wos subsec~ently found, by Dutch partisans. This \:~lS indeed luoky as it wns not

/until

'

'J./'

- 4:) -

Ulltil lnte the:, followinl3 dcy thai; th~ bridge ','I' s fin:llly seized and hold by combin,;d Dri tLlh - US clem 'nts.

To cleLU' th: "bridGe, i?l cc.,mbin:ld Gu~~rjs :J.nIloured Division D.J1cl 82 U~; .' irborrJo DiviGion c,tt~ck \':DS pLumed emc1 put in at 15(:') hours. This att[lck, 18::1 by the GHEN,:J)IEn GU:'JICG Group whc ms.de an atte,npt k frrcc c.. IIbli tz ll cro13sing over the NIJhEGEH bridge VIi th tanks, was net successful. The en my ocd pl"lced S? guns en the SOUTH und of th..:, briCl;3c i.llJd hel-} :\ number of strr.nrcpoints, including COncrG1;e :pillbo::c~~, on th,~ SoutflGrn end. ~rhG GU;.:dffi lQ3t ':\ number of t;~l"l;~S, [mC! Glthcu;.~ll they -:'ttCT,Jrt,:. d ':.-1. th "tl10j.r infBDtry to by-p8..sS th0 i:c:DprrCchl:e tc the bridce, they ocula mo..lcc no hC3d':'ny. ,i.ttcmpts to gCit furth:.:r OOS(;l"I:",tion 'll.'lcl inf0l'n:~tioll .:to to th;:; '~n':ir:",y strength "jere m:-..de by sp0ci,1 f.,.rt:i.,;;,; of infDntry ',,he climbc:d up to the rO'Jfs of' the highG"st hOllS S ",Id :i.'rcf!i ':..hich 'chcy ~nipca fmC. shot ::It the (:)n01!'\Y. By 11..~[, t li ,~_J,t tbe '~tt 'c;CK held ,kfi1'11 tj1y f~,i 18d :,\]1 d the cnell\Y werG still j.r. ~~~Jsc;c::l~;ioTl ':It' the SOU'!.'H end rot' the' bridgo, which ~~s still ~nt~ct.

;. t 17);:' h('lr~, lie: J01ertcrs 30 Oorps i,L:.in, :lCcoffiy:'\.nied by 44 ROY,',L '1';JIt..S ::r,a ';;;v) SF:Y r'lovc,d from the 'tmG1fl'EL 3483 i'.rcc.. tc procecd to I,)J.,I)EN -;-055 'lrua, \lhich it eli''\ no+: reach, o\':ing tc enelTV' ground ~,nd ::til' '~cti(ml until the Gv(mh1!~ of 20 September, h~vins be,~n in tr:m:-"i t u~' t11e l..~in i'Y.is fer 24 hours, ~'.na h ving tQ}cI;n r-~rt in Cl sh""c.. r.ction to cIcCi!' thr~ ~:is.

:,1; 19CO hO\lrf5 ,the encT:W '\ttclckc'd ',Ii th t:mlcs, "'Iith ::~ hca.vy .sup-perting prcgr.'..rrlr. I,; oti tho ;~ON bridg0, ,"-,nrl i ts :\J"G;~, in "?:n Elfff"lr,t to cut our L of 0, but this ~ttack ',J"~S :3UCCi..~s::li'ull~/ li\~lc1 by 41~ ROY;'L T.:J.fKS ::md 501 riOT of th;.: 101 US ,loit'borl).;; Divi~, ion.

21. 'i:C, ,I;her 'i'r''.:, '\G",in th..) lililitin[: f"ctoX'. Both over drfields ;Hld (1V'...~ tile b;.\t He '),rG:'. i t ',:~'."; b

- 4_6

18 "cptol,'li-,cr ',:

- l.r7

The Division's c~ uc:.ltics ",-:or" cstimr:.tod :,3 betwe'Gn 500 :nO. 700.

FLAl\TJ\S

24. The, ,:;it\.li~tion un both th0 8 '8.nd 12 Co:C'ps r"ront2 W~l3 Unt only limited '.r:i.v:mcc:::l IF'.d bLen m~.(~c: owin; to the ~lifficu1'c i1',turo of the; country Ylh:i-cl~- th ~ .:n

- 1.;:8

SECTION 8

:'El ,'R,.".L SI~U;'.TIOH

25. Thero ":0rc; tb..ro l ) m:tin con,sider:, tionc. ':,-hich ',.'ere the b(~~;is of operf'.tionc for t;~.s uhy. Pir:~t, it:r:t3 i:rnpf.r:'.t:i.ve to zocvre the tl!J: u2G.N bri pC, :'.11d if thi::; cou.1d not be done, then an '~s:;D.ul t cro3sinJ3 would. h.;:-.vo to be lU1ucrt:'-kcn. . ;)econdly~ on tho RIc-AIT flank the; 13 i tUfltini1 ':'''',;3 cr-,U::) :.i.nJ~ ~1omc ;-~nxict.Y, ....s 82 U: j /'.irbol'nc Divi,.ion '::.;Y'U bcin~~ t.b.re,.:tcmc-d fron the ~1~ ."- ."',rex., ~,rJd it ,',','.3 B.ppnre?1t thd, the cncmy,.-\t: huildin up in the Hj:;r,Cli.:.UD ?ORE~T E 8551 .:cre:-t. .. I,'1.stly, t.he overric1inr- ncccs:dty i or :'ul:"fiVing the 1 Br~ tish .\:i.rborr~l' Division \',,",S ob',riouc, ''.8 tl'K: l'r:.:i.J.ur~; of cOlmr.unic['.tions h~-.d prevented ny ;,S;~"';~)::;':l.:.n '.~ of tho truo s i t1J.'cticn.r

26. In SUIJ'li'l-.ry~ the t .sk:::; Unt 'wero 'l.llot-cc.u to th~ form:'..tions of 30 Corps. for 0pt;r=~tions to t-;kc pl::-.cc 20 .icptcnbc:':' '::o~'e 1;'3 follo\'.'s :

(.--:.) Gu~,rds ,:.rr~our.cd Division

( , \ ~I 'ro rl;;"umc froj.. 82 '_irborn Rcgi!'1('nt), respon3 ibiJ.:i_ty of :'..t fll':..;t li~r-,-t ~o .) .:!>t;,.~mbcr.

(h) 32 '. 'rc'b ,rif" it..; "... ,... to be: in iHIP:30rl; of 82 US J\irbornc iv:.;ion 'U'1Cl to ".ct ~'" r ::'o'biJc: l'e~1CrV(; for /

. ad',mec of' .r.: ',::~T fl~' .k 'lnd '~1.{;o to h-I r(:;;~)o:nsible I for dcfcnc of th

- 49

which \"f.'.$ beIicV0d to cont:i,in ,M, Sy/i tchbox for' the d(~l""Oli t ion of the bridgos), ',vhil:,;; 13C Inf:-:.ntry ..~riJ"..dc of 4-3 Division \':~

- 5c'-

ThiD subsequent~y turned O~lt to be tho '('ail':,Tly bridge but it sCr\red '\8 a sign.l for tho ~P=lt_D'::"r(;, ','iho ";O",C by then f'if:hting on the

,! .ppro[~chcs to t'~iC ):'0'10 hTi(l:-~" to ilttorr~t Tu.s11 t1.cties.

Jci: 1950 ho'- ~Cl ti-b.nk Guns ',!1:i.>:.ppcrs of 1~ Field . 'quadron, cros:.;C'cL tne 600 :. ,1'. r: s.l)'1.."1 of the bri&ge "..nd Joined. up yrith the: liS r-~.rC\.troops.

'l'he :ranitioD ,i",-~ :lOon :~ "b.'Ll!lf:.thLn(;c) by the !"tcl.cli tion of tf..11ks and inf~llltry frOT, tJL IRt..., T (m, 1 S ~roup, " .n(~ ty 2815 hOUl'G il elos", "bridgcho;l.d. \:')p, fi:!.'I~l.ly ,.-::: t--,'b1if'hcd.

. ...

1": r into th,r. ,OOK'~ 72~1. ....It]H 11" th..:: .ti;.ck,' '.'~;r, 11 J.'L, tlt0Y :."l:t'\,,; 'lrol.ll.ilcGo no owin' to the: clo~;l~ n'd:') 'IJ of' .:;: ..~ to tl u 1 n Il."i l"i fJ;: ,T . 1'\,:. T':'j. .... Jl.... .' t '1il'/ic 1 t .1'01' 01.,1' ttJ'ols to "(~ out "ll\l 01J1.;t:i.li ir:t1Ql'l. ,tj Oll. r'mth 'r ~'()llr 1

',~ 1'1" L:.: n J. :~;cribud ',bOVt:, .~ :l!L;.lj' ",l:,c "ulll ',iOOI~ .t \,l.~.ch. ''',:'',; lL:portl.Jd to 1) . ',;l~ .(;',t~~ oc-' t.:') (;t:.CU'll Rv"JiJ~nt:]. it '::j . .'O l;lJ rt .. tl t;1. c ',~H' il-f' ':.,:.; bl.il'1" huilt 1.t cn .. Iii.I.') -:'ld.all .:Oll 1 jlL'o'rl\lJly 'e: 1 ;',i, ,i'o: ".!'(; '!~:fO"Cil r, the''; G'.. t'Ol:'GC,; , \ l~r co nentr' ..tdl 'i. the. ;iCI1'.:,]]) :u' .r., 7852

. . /It

- 51

It W!1.S oStiD"..t0C. thflt t\s the two villagus of ?100K r. 7251 and CUTIC E 714-9 In.y "1t the ana of the throe rnt:i.:in reinforcclfcnt routes from GEEl00 that the enemy would reinforce in this ~rGt:!. anel hold on to these points, and this 8ubsoqucmtly proved to bo correct

.To meet this thre:,t, COLDSTREAl" GUARDS Group froJj) the Gu.nr

~'},o situ', tiO~l "~~ ru": xJs :my r.)~'.;jor onomy thJ:,~,t t to th) r',):cps ".xi..; ".nrl L of C \'.' \..~ not ,~t thic strqe i~fP"~rcnt, , ... thO'.l[L :\ t '.',,:; knoY,'i" th-. t "l con::; iclcr:-..lilo force of the Gno); 1','.~ cst''.__~li;-:l0d to thu ':,':E0' of the ,1...xis. Thb tl'J.I'(V!,t, bo\;cvc2.',. it ','l:'3 hope '.7ould be Jot by the t\'i0 ,.1"'.r in r fm.'m,~Hons, 8 ",nc1 1? Corps )YI':king r:::. thor ~ .. .t'0 :c'er'Vl.' pro: ,~,-'." t111".n they h~\'.l in the p~.st. ,'.'hich 1no. be0n slol'! O\':i1"n t,. tl e

- Y3

SECTION (3

)0 CO G OPER~TIJNS 21 SEPTE.1DER

GENERAL SITU! TION

32. '.'i th the. C':'.pb.lrC'; of' the 1..:I,) " ;1;N briclge int:ect :;.nd a decre~lsc of' onG!l\Y n.et.ivi-:y s;:; t' N' :r.1~CEl\"! E 7062, it ,'fEW hoped that '1 quick brc::\k, out f'rc). U, lir:it () hY'idpchu:ld ".crO$O tho l'!}3DT~R HIJN would be :.lchievcd.

The lJII.:;uit:,.'hili.1 7062 - Ji:r:--,':, 7070,. If stronJ opposition l.ct, r.- nl' t,; \!':~O v' ui':.i.:;:i.on wilJ. H::lkc Gvcry ~ffort to fon

- 54

( iv) BO\mcbry bc-nvcen Gu''..rds J\rmourccl Division ,-end 4-3 Division, when the l[~ttcr :,.(lv, nce, wiJ.l be., inclusive 43 Division, line of r~ilwQY from NIJ}~C~ to NEDER RI.JN ::\.t 7176 subject to :-cris rights mentioned p~ragraph (a) (ii) ~bove.

( v) Concentr:ato rer.;~inder Division, n.s it --,rrives, in o.rea Qstride road from bridge 6760 - i~lusivc GR.:JlE.

GROUND 'rROOPS

34. By the morning of ,21 Soptcm)cr, elemonts of the 5 Guards ;.rmoured Brigo.d.o less ',','3L:::r-f GU;',JIDS Group, which wc:.s still gu~>.rc1ing the GRieVE bridge, were ':lcll. csto.blishcd on the NORTH bank of the R Vl.t,lJ" and were prcp:u-cd to push on \':i th ffi..'UCimwn spaec1 to .!JlliHE'Ui in relief of 1 Airborne Division.' To ensuro LEFT fl~~~ prot~ction, 2 HCR sent out po-troIs to OSS E 4754 - s'HERTOGENBOSCH E 324-6 ~d also from Glli\VE - UDEN. Thoso putrols reported th~t the enemy were passing throu::;h TIEL 4268 and thc.t they were withdrawing EAST .liong the NORTH bank of the R 'iiIJJ.J. It ~'ns, no.,. Ll.pparcnt th.::\.t the enemy were well cst~hlished in the urea NORTH and SOUTH of ELST, which they appe~red to be holdinrr in strength. About 20 t~nks

h~d been reported by T~ctic~l Reconn~iss~ce to be rrovinr in a southerly direction in tho direction of i~M. ~ prisoner of w~r

fro~ the P~zer Jaeger Battalion ~tated that they h~d no orders to att.3.ck but merely to (lig in in the ELST CU'0o., ,?..nd it ,y,% now apparent thf'..t the enemy ~l8.s determined to prevent us reqching , ....'lliHEjf.

.4n added difficulty was th~t o.lthough it h,.c1 been confirmed th~t the rQilway bridgo ',':1:,8T of the NIJI,iEGEN ron.J. brid~c was rl Cla.ss 40 bridge, owing to cnel Y ::l.C tivity directed 'c,z;l.instit from the NORTH

b~nk, it was L~os8iblc to zet tr\ffic on to it. The, pproClches were weakened and blocked by disablcdta.nks and vehicles; ~ considerable Cl...rrx:nmt of work would have to be done before tanks could be got n.cross. This was undertaken by Corys 'l'roops RE.

Durin13 the morning, 130 Inf2ntry Brig["',do of 43 Division h

- 55

Pro;rcss by the armour ',Hl.3 slow :\5 it r.r~s compellec1to keep to tht~ :cowl which iJapoGGk '1. I:!. lkl:1~dod from the GeIT.':Gn Carill7l:-J''.llur th'~ t this cc~.s,j. The G0~l:"n.n Co fJ1';\.'\Jlclor granted. thL; concu8Gion ,'lnd ,:.lso ':110\':(~"" om' ,jcc'9s to drive out ':U1d collect :);"'Lcu:.l tiCG :":1(1 tl,cru,j'JG-.:r ,)V'-'Cll{ltU t~cm into thcA_RNJ-lJ~]'l h08pit:,~o It if ci' interost t.o :note th;'ltI both :British And Gor~"'.n c:\3u;"il-ti0!3 ''.Cj:U GV:lcu'l.t

- ~6 ,~t 171J.. h0tl.!3, pliO t ".:a l,hir"i.3. On the Poli:..;r. Pf'_r~chute Eri~.lt~ '.>,' ,. LrO_) C 1:1 the .~;x,-,.::, 1:,.' ~d'ClU. NOHT': of EL:1' 7070. !It; LJ'Op took l?l~.oe l1(.; .....rer to :LLST, ::nd hCt:lcQ the L.'ncny posi tionn, th'~n ,'.'.S intended owin:; tel hcf'.vy e:nO!"y fl~. Thu r(;~ult of thi:=: \'1',,:, trnt the Polish P:~r-:\ehutc Br.i::~..lc "

suffcru~ ~ nwnDcr of c~~u~lticn ~d'it took' time to ~olloct ~-...nc.l concuntr:'.tG thcr~ :i.11. the ~r{J, froT': which they WGre to c1'o;:;r. to rGinforce 1 Briti::;h ;~irborne Divi.,ion. i;.s h s ~.lrG'.J.y b0:m n~.rr~:te(1) the ;.djut:mt ROy:tl En":ineors 1 Airbornl; Di.v".Gicn hr.!.. G~~iu. th:it help munt rc' ch the; diviaion \'Ii thin t\,u n:.:xt ~4. i ow':::; othcr"'lise he; fe::.rccl th"lt ."..:.1 !\ fi!.;htin? T'or!.:'1tion it \'!oul~l cC['.S(;t-O exi:.3t. Food .:'.11el

~\rm;\uni t:Lon ':J(;;ru .-.~r.in in sr.ort supply due to the clifficul ty of :Iropyi.w~ th\JSC: con ;:ou.i tius into C\. clroppi)"l-G zone which, of l"'..CC(;;::; ~; Light j\.nti-: . rcrrtft Guns.

38. .. . /to

- 57 _.

to a line roughly EAST and WEST of EINDHOVEN. Reports from both indicated that the enemy "~s fighting vary h~d) and th~t he was defending every important to"n xnd villaGe, ,~d ~~G ~ofusing to give ground unless pushed out. Thi~, coupled with the 1 ck of ro~ds, blo~~ bridges and restricted oreas for de;ployrnent, h'td made the role of flank protection to 30 Corps difficult.

SECTION 3

30 CORPS

r;SNERAL SIT1LTIOH

39. It ',.-"3 nO\m:j::,tlt';r ",nd t}j(; (lci'"nC0 of t1Je HJ.'j:l~(~P.N 'h.!.:.iil.~., 11l1CkJ.' co.!u,:nd 69 r .. J 1 L,i. .J.... ,) flu.

( i)

.. 5:;1 '.

(c) 69 Inf2...ntry Bri~.-~'d.c.: Group (50 (N) Divisio~.:_ (i) To relieve 130 Infantry Brig:-d.;::- Gro'.lp~ 4-;5 Division, of

0.11 brid[;o :c:3sponsibilitics of '..:rc:'j~;i:lgs between NI,Ji,lEGEN ;1nd GRAVE.

(ii) To "-ssumc C0r;121~,n(i of the HOY'\.!J NETHEnIamS Brig:~d0 for t;'\~~ks 2.hO\vn iTl (b) (iii) 0,b~vc,

(d) Rt\ was to be grouIX!c.l on COrp3 lovel in suppurt ot 4S Division opcr:),tion.

( is) f.ir support by Typhoons ~,-nd borr:bcrs '.::-.3 to ~w i'..:'::"3'.Jtcd llgainst the cnClny on the ,l)OUTH bllnk of t~w 2":SD:IC IlI.m Y.'BST of !,p.m!EH.

GROUND TROOPS

4h At first lL ,ht, p'''.~.:ro18 of 2 HCR ('~'. ;.'~':".:".: (, en th.") ';.'E~"T fln.nk of our forces cst'~1.hli8h(;d ir, th,] llliEK E 5851 'll'.-... :"''' (,1 :,0. -!;!ic SOUTH bank of the NEDER RIJN in at(;L'.. 6876 ~md 1Jy 0800 hCJ.'G t.ld' '.i:n: : ;1U. , rivC:":1 out .. "t ;,bout this til;JC, it ':;....." il'-:o:'I.\:1>..:(l. to Pllfih :.' "''lbU~'- ..::.:,l'J';Ii'1 G::>li.~,i~ting of the 5 DeLI, with ,'~ ~C]Uf~dron of ~~/7 DG- unuur (".'. ,::,),':L ";-- ~:l"':-:: up ,:;i.-th the Palco in the :',XV,"'. of DlU:FL :,rv'l, .-;::> t',hli;)l~ tllv ,~:(':~," ;:.; J:' .:-:~;; :':,OUTH b~'.nk of th8 I

- bU

129 InfCl.ntry Bri~,~ '8 C~roup \dv. mciI1f TH up the main NLT);:I::GSN - "..Rt'~HE~ ro'..(l h".d r" do little rro:;ress ,.;( inst strong opposition, ?.nd O'.;inC to th...; diff iClllty of dcployin off tho ro"\d. By lnst li",ht tho.)' ",'iere h-lltl,;cl on tho line of tho 675 ~!orthin~. "'i. t 1300 hours the cne: jT cut the. Corpn L uf C rO.:l.d-lin.1

- 61

AIR SUPPORT

4-3. Fl.yi~ condihonS wore much improved mld 500 sorties were flown in the gener:1l I),ree:t N1.1 of i.RNHEH. 104 of those were o.rmcd

. roconnaissLmces in the general area. N'il of ARNHEM clown to vENLO E 9109.

Tactical Reconnaissance h~d reported on the eyenin~ of 22/23 Septernber t thD.t there wns a oolwnn of 100 mixed vehicles- in VENLO itself, and tho.t the enemy were dir,g:j.ng-in in that arcn.o

Attacks were ID-'l{le in support of 1 British Airborne Division on a big factory in the ~'lRNHEH arc!,'.. fro:-:: which tho cnorw \,'fero sniping Md observing the Airborne defence perimeter. The f'a.ctory '"fUR effectively attacked by 24 Typhoons and enemy activity from this ~0~ ceased.

TD.rgets moving up to D.ttC\cK the rnn.in Corps ;;x::.;, wore nlso atta.cked.

FLANKS

44. On the LEFT, 12 Corps hf'.d their fOr\'!w.'d elcumts im of EINDHOVEN whilo 8 Corps continued to push slowl;)' :forw:i.n~ towarcl.:; HEIJ.~(lND 5522'. On both fronts h:.1rd filrhting h'ld to..kcn pl::wc, ''..:1tl it '::as D.pparont th2,t the onemy, helped by tho cOtmtry, w~s cap~b10 of 3ti~1 ~~~osing considerable dolay on tho ftdvn.ncc of both Corpso Thus the on('rr~y 1"rm

. 62 - .

:3'::CTION 8

GENER':.L SITULTION

45. The :--iroblc:" no\".- confrontir.: thIJ Corp~ ':".s, f irs'bly to continue o,t,'Gr,,-tions to SCCl.1rG ARNI:!'::, :.:;c:ccncll:/ to ~,;ct r>2i:nf'orC8;nents I".ncl :mppl ies to 1 British .:'~irborne Div:Lsion, thi:z:dly to ole..r ',T),cl. th';,1 koep open their L of C. Finally, ~,S tt18 cnc":..:y .:;';::;, rGportcd t" 'Lc; ll:r'inEine: bnks SOUTH fro;r, .~i1J.\lJm~:!, it \':'10 os~-;cn,t;i'\1 to Gn~tJr(; the 38Q"l.1'-:i ty .)1' the: HIGHT flt'Jlk of the '::,:';.L bri 'gchc

- 63

(b) 43 Diviston

(i) Retain one briG~dc ~ro~) in ~rGa R Dj~ bridgohend, enlilrging this tow

By 1430 hour~-;, h'o t,~'.tt~:lionG of 130 Inf'lntry -'ricrule \"lere just Ghort of' the SOUTH h'1.11k of' the lfEDER RIJN -:-..nd 11-3 DivisirmnJ. ReconnaissD..nce [L\";r;i;ncnt v;,s cff(;ctivcly screenin:' thQ CorPs J.EFT flnnk betwoen tho Hivcr3 NEDE~ ruJK~w-.cl '".t'_c1,. ;~t 17QO hours, 214 Infc.ntry Brigp..dc h'.'l.d. lL';.unchcd .,n c~ tt;:.ck em ~1:.JT from tho '!"LEST rmd by 2200 hours they h~~c.l re:\.chec1, '~,nd '."orv fichtir..r: .iIi, the '-Jestern outskirts of the vill~gc. Here ~ housc-t0-house D,ttle took pl~cc D..nd before ~y progross could be ~~".c.c it \\,:18 Ll e'-~sc of clc;Cl.rinr the villr~gc hOt:G.nc. 1 JSrb::>rnc COr"j!s, r~::;sumo\l rUDpoi1sil~ iIity f or the GRi.VE bridge ffi1d the bridge just :NE of it. 43 Div:i.::;).,)n's hold on the SOUTH bonk of the R NEDEH rtIJ}T in the ~)E.EL ~ ':"~;':'l. h'-1.(-:' boen m~int,inod. Movement WD.n still uncleI' con:>t::Lnt obscrY,-'..tion

- 65

(c) 101 US ~irbornG Division This Division continuod to be F>.ctivcly enployucl in decline 'Nith tbe t.;nc,mw "cut" to the Corps L of C ~md its subsequent di3ruption ::tC".i'J. ".ftor ropair

.hIR SUPPORT

50. The we'lthcr \'r"s ~.g;dn cloudy, ~\ncl this, couplo,} "-lith the landing of the r;liClGI' c;lmilcnts of 82 US Air1)orno Divi::>ion ~nc.. th() Poles of' the Poli3h P:.r'-:..chutc Bri~iHlo, inturfcrc

- 66

30 CORFS OFm1..I;.TI0NS 24 SEPmmER

52. The eneqy had continued in his attei.~pts to cut the Co,rps L of C and to climinato the perll.let~r held by the British .ii.irborne ' DivisilY'l the previous d~. In addition, the enen;y was trying to reinforce the iJmHEM area from the El',ST and WEST, using the railway trm UTRECHT to E},ll,!ERICH E 9700. Tanks had been seen moving along the NuRTH bank of the R NEDER RL.TN from the 'direction EiiST of illiENEN E 5175 so' as to counter any attel':1.pt that ;.light be I~ade to cross the NEIER RLrN. Cyclist troops ...ere reported to have been moved SvUTH to the :area 5576. The enewy had thickened I,lp his resistance to the EAST and he was also diSt';ing-in on th0 N0RTH bank of tne NEDER RIJN in the vicinity where the rivers NlIDER RLJN and NEDER WlJ.L approach each other.

TASKS

53. The tasks for opera~~ions on 24 September as allotted by 30 Corps are as shown at A..ppendi:v; 'u l "

GROUND TRlJOJ:S BET'I'{EEN 6~HNtIFl,~ lJ'l'D N!Jl;[EGl!:i---- -_._--

J

54. 43 Division continued its ~fforts tu drive the enemy out of ZLST, but he had reinforc.:::d 'tr..is 3.l'0a 'in th both tanks and infantry fran JffiNHEM. So fierce 'iro.s the f"ighting in t'lis area. that 214 Brigade group did not reach the centre -of the villabc until 1400 hours. By this time they Vlere ncor the I,1air. rond NuRTH and SlJUTHthrough ELST itself and had elements a.crOS:l i t~ Dy 18.st light, the greater part of ELST had been cleared ~JY 2'l4 nri;~ade, and 7 SUi LI had secured ELST railway station and 1 WLJRCESTERS on the LEFT was estaulished just SOUTH of ELST. There ~e~e, however, still elaoents of the enemy clinging on to the NE end of the 'Tillage. The rJain opposition was f'rClil snipers ana Spand.aus, who wer0 '\7011 concealed. in alL10st every house.

The glider el~aent of the ?Glish Parachute Brigade, which had landed in the GRAVE area on tho afternoon of 23 Septel~ber,.:V7,~re taken up to 130 Infantry Brigade's a.rea by 1600 hours 24 September, so that they could be ferried across that night to reinforce 1 Bri tish Airborne Division.

Un the S~UTH bank of the NEDER RLJN, . the enemy's reaction on the front of 5 DLI wa.s c")nsid3rabl~,. n.s he was prllsumably apprehensive of '-,ur hlakin[; an at.tenp-t tn estalJ1ish a bridgehead in this area. The capacity of the rO~3 leading to 5 teLl area was very limited, in full view of the cnc,'\Y, and only narro.... crossings existed; thus it was difficult to set the assault boats and DmGVs required to terry rein.fr)rcements and. sup:,.,lics down to the river side. If' any orossing was -1;0 ~\e a';;ter.\pted in daylight, Comrilander 43 Division asked for a full allotment of m:ioke to cover such en operation.

At 1600 hours, the ~IELSH GtLJIDS Group a.ttempted to take BEMMJiL 7367 but found it strongly held-:- The enel:\y was Ill0St deterr,lined'in his'resistance, and by last light, the VIELSH GUlJIDS Group were short of' their obj \;'Cti... e ant! were established in, the area 730665 to 720695, and SlJUTH of !3E',2'i:c.L 7367.

GRvUND TRWPS 0PElu~T:ING uN 'l'HE L' LJ~..Q

55. The enany again O\.lt the Corps Main axis SUUTH of VEGllEL at 1630 hours and all traffic CCt-l3i..:d... This tir,le the attack came in frol:\ tho WEST of- the axis and .....':\..'3 uade lJy elOl,lcnts of 6 Parachute Regiment, which had b6en by-passed in th~ ori~inal drive for NLThiIi.GEN. Tho eocll\}' aeain cr.lp10Yod. tanks and infantry and a few SF guns. / .

DurJ.ng

- 67 DurinG t;1C nil:ht C1' 2j /24 ~3el:-t';j ll.,c.;r th-..: rve.a ..-ms again sholled end l! urtarc:d. .3 nil 'r, ;\[\.J.rtT~- of \lECFEL.

56. (c.) 1 Dritish ~.h..1Joi.'n':: :-Ji,risinn 1 British J~-l.l'l:)(,rnc ~)i vision hud c~ntinued to ~ndure heavy canunltics ,~'.l1d t.:ncJ.\y att::l.ck~ v/hich i t h~.j been vii thstanding fQr the./; ast wcek. Their Divisional peri,,1

- 6el

1l. co"sidern.ule fDrGe of l:lt::diu.;;l bombers attacked t::J.rgets in the ;.RNHE2:'l area.

:ENEMY ..:~CTIVITY

58. The NIJ1:iEGIiN bridge \itS covurcd by S~i tfires and these provided a lone and spirited series of do~ fiGhts over the NLn,iaGEN uroa where they ~et a 8tron~ f8rce of ~v 1908 and Me 1095. Several

en~;w aircraft were seen to go devm. '

- 69

GEj'IEiLL Sn'U~~TIuN

59. ,iy 0(1';; it ',{-W ~-{ "",;.L, Gxt.(;r:lint~ this by .r~licvinc 4j Divi~ion of rus~on3ibility for inclusive l':L:>T, ./ilC~J c:\~,tt...;;-'d.

( iii) Continu(; ~Jr(;scn.l.; r -'f : iJrtnc'..i :J :JLUlC':': t tI.::;k::;, includinc taf:ks tc. E...ST and. ',;~:;::)'i' ~>~...;' i G1LV.l!:, :3,_,UT){ frrjLi H L:.A.S, unti 1 rJli Gvcd ~JY "'.r.'l'ivr.. l 5;~ Divi siDn ieoe~, :nt\is sane,) Regil..ent.

(b) 43 Divi:Jion ( i) :C":1:'0,;

GRuUND TRUufS

61. J~t 03L..5 hour::;> 130 J:riL:t.L of 45 Division r~l,)orted that tho; 1+ I'.0RSETS had fore t::(: a Gr03Gb ,. OV

- 71

.':"lthough ,'lctivity ',;!.p,im,t t:1e 82 US Division \'/0-6 not very ncticeoble, there ','/ore eigns th:\t they W8rc preparing to counter

[ltt~ck on this Divi21on' t;: RIGI-E fl')nk in th!1t '1rea.

64-. The l.Iriori ty \'IfJ,S still em the ::.RNHF.il sector. .. very larGe number of t\:c~;ctD 'cou?lcl tho ilcrimotcr of the ..:..irborne Division V/ore eng9.geo V":1'"'l fl~~nkJ 12 Ccrps h'1d reported that tho mu~n (\Xis of :1d~'mec i'lQi.rm of S']' O;~D:~'1RI)DE VIas still Nor clear Md the rr-)m,-:i~2er of' l;h~ (~I\Y ...!

- 72

SEC'IrOi'/ 9

f 'HE EXECUT ION OF THE .t-.LAY

67. (e) In gencr31 tho ~ L:n 'iOr)~e-.:d very well, and provec itself' flexible to meet .-~ll t:lctic8.l si tuetions. During the course of the QJ:.:e:cG.tioi.1 the ~L:

73

(li) 69 l1rigFlr'c, )+50 vehicles, Esc;~ur.i.' C"n~l to 3'..' OEDEl\llWDE.

(iii) 50 Divisiol1, lcn;~ 69 Brig3r-d.n[ throueh yriority column~. '

PHOVCST

71. fi,)intslllen, l

- 74

75. Scme v~hicl~~ ~nd cQ~ipm8nt of TCPs verc destroyed by enGmy uomLinc. :, .c cscrvc I"lU:: t be hela irmcJi~.tcly ,~v,,\il'~ble.

SPEED Oj~ i,;OVtj :::ENT

76. . The speed of cmy convey Clc;Jer.os on the splo..c1c for thi.~ tro.ffic.

(b) :, coruni t)!)i~nt not cOTl:.;idere'1 in the lllnnnin['; sta,r;:;o Y{(\5 R'.p tr':l.f'fic. During the j:criod um1er rovieu, :).t least 1,OC)(; WJ.!' vchiclcG USCr' the Axis to ElliDHOVEH nnd l~ter to GRtWE. This priorit:>, :nust be fl-cce;,Jted if we :JrE: to h'lve ,-,dequnte nir cQver for ::m op8r~tiu{l of this n.'"\turc. lUi}' ir.ust mDke their (lel~nl1ds in time for thelll to be incorpor'ltecl in the controllinG ;,rJ'lY j;\orrnQtion Pb..n.

7B. ;.. tct-;l of 25,280 vchic18s h-;c1 l)ccn 1l.:.l,s30Cl up the axis from 1900 he llrs '19 Sept8ijl1H)r 194-1+ to 2359 hours 26 SCl-'tember , 'i 941+.

This Tn0Ve,,)0Tlt tllck :,l,')c0 r]urini~ 3m/en (Jays runninr;, 1. e. ::'.n :~vcro.De of 3,610 vehicles :. (by.

79. (."') !,1ecent '''.!':,,_;rdi-:,ns ()f' .30 Corps hl1vc ~.:roved the neccssi 'bJ for ~ hi~h1y efficicrJt 'L'r~l'.Cic Control or;::>..nisation to de:':.l ',:i th l!,~r ::0 sc::.lo T:1C.vr:;.)cn ts on ro[\.(ls.

(b) ProvQst rcsuurCGS in the Corps 1U'e not co,p~~I)lc of proviilinc the personnel ':'.nCl cotrrnunic~,tions requircc.1. It hl'l5 :'.l\'lttys bccm foun:1 nccess:'..r.f to fona an "3.

------

I

- 75 S.20TWN 10

30 CUR?.:; AND 1 BRI'I'ISH Alflli01{l'fE CORPa p,:;, .~:rr:: L.:5'l'iLT!VE .t'JUuiJ\;GE./LENTS ..,

80. The admini.st!'ativc ar:can(;;l;;ments that were .nade fOr this opLration ;i.ave o.ln::':;,.d.'l been outlined in Part I, Section 6, It is noV{ i)r\)jJo~3eri .~" (;,xro. inv t"e. nlll..:.n a~pect'J of these arrangements vii th a vitr;/ to :3cciJl,9; h0~1 1;n

- 7j (b) 18 30ptrsr..bGr. v... lng tv inaccurate dr"pping, due to tho

iLten.3C cnClJ,:.i flc.k, 1;;-.0 r(;su. ~ly of 1 i3ritish ..~irborne Corps 'tiM nl)t su::ces.;ful :.1 tl the l:lajuri ty of containors ','/ur ... drf; J:'J.;;d cO the

- 77

(e) 23 So}.:tellib8';:~ ~):Iing to the L of C beinG cle':lred, translJort tlB,t hnd be@ GeJlt ,)n the 21 S0~:;tumber tc the 82 US .:,irborne Divisicn dclivcrcG its lc~d. The four platoons carrying J:'JL continuwc1 their journey nnd delivered their load to 162 J.'~C. j!'urther composi to II u.interJ;"\l1ce pnclm were also dCspctci:lec1 tc.. 'ooth tiS Divisions. During tr~e night, S0ven pldoonn of' I.{nin Amrrn.mi tion Ne.tures were despatched by Oorps 'Ql from BOUllG LEOi-DLD to stock 162 m~c at 'GRAV3. 3 ond "10 QOS vrerc eutnbli:.;llcd 3t l'lI,1i~l.I~GEH 'lnd 163 Field Ambulonce moved forli,~:!'u t" DJ.~L 6875 to uoal with Airborne c8.Bual tics' cvccud '0 ov.r ;~ l\f::1;DER RUN in DUi~rIS.

(r) 24 Se'otomber. On tho L of' C beine rustored, Hear Headquarters .30 Corpo moved, but the L of C '::o.s 2..gcli:'.l cut nt 1200 hours on 211- i3cpt)mber, rmd Re'),r Ccrps were mr\rocne,l SOUTH of the I cut' in the VI~('J.IEL area, t0gether wi th three of the onmu:oi tion pl.':J.tOOl1S deSllotched the previous night; in addi tion, NOH'nl: of the t cut', the four platoons which had delivered 8J:mlUl1i ticn ',:ere ,1150 prev(,mtcd from returning, together wi til 30m; cf t.h(; four !'ll~toons nhich had delivercd POL. 82 US ,\irbornE' Division' G i.::revious dGYs maintenance requirements ---,ere '"\leo held up JOlf.PH of the I cut. ' The Ge:crnan OUPl11.y dunp r.t eGS continued to be me-de considerc.ble usc of tr:;. I:luct C::)rpn troo~G' requiroments nnd to supplement Divisions' dl'limlling rC30urees. Vlhilst dr:~\:inG from this dump, i,:hc S.)COllt~ lirlU ~i.:.s0 Oompcmy of the 8 ;l.I:mourcd Brigo'rlc rou ~ea GllClTlY olemcnts \100 ':lere also trying to use the dump, ~lnc1, m'tel killine several of the enemy took 75 prisoners 01: 'fIe'x. The supply s1 tUi..:.tion :.~t All:W RC''ldhe~d Wr.\S not [pea C\.t this time but thG Corps '.'/0rc ..,1110 to maintcin themselves to the extent of 4GO,OOO r~'l;iolls even though the mC\1n bi\l4U1cing items, i, e. tutl, sug"r, 11i lk ond eigare tt(J~ were unprocU1'able Jill D..vailnble OorD:) tr'mcr>ort :..'esources ";terc ooncentrated on the tnak of building up stocks iTI 161 FHC to the mo.x1mum, as forward rnn.intenancc ',I:~S impossible.

(g) 25 September.

86. The total number of prisonurs of \lar that were captured by the foxmntions \',Ii thin 30 Oorp:..; during the period 17 to 26 September, was as follows:-

Ufficcrs CRs

Guards .i.rrnou.red Vivision 10 140

43 Divi Gian 11 500

50 Division 5 400

'rot'\l 26 1,040

- 78 ;.PPENDIX I G' to

p;u~ II.

30 CORIS l:LOVEJ,iEUr llTGrr:':'UC'..l'ION I-'OR OPER;1T ION I GARDEN I

1. General,

'rhi:" instruction is to bu rood, in conjunct~on with 30 Corps 0peration Instructicm-i';o. 24, cxtra.cts of' .:hich 3X'e included under Section 4- of' this report.

2. ;.xes of ;.dV[~ll

30 Corps is ,:dv~mciI:8 on one j':i-::in Axis as loiii iloYllJ in 30 Corps l"'Peration Instruction Le. 24. (Sec :.ppcndix IB' 10 P'U't r).

The subsic1i8.ry :'lxis \lill '"l.ssint the ['. dvancc t:'ctically and may provide a most ir.J:Jortant ;Jlt,,;rrJ 'tive route should the f.l:lln axis or any pv.rt of it prove unq.st-.blc. It \',ill NOf hov,,-~ vcr Tn:ltcrially increase thc oVvr~ll speed of I:lOVCment.

3. Qrdcr 01: .l,1~'trch ~nd 'l.'imil~

J'" t ':.nne:h."Ure 1 is s; tuble showinr, grou)ine ef forntr;-. tions und units fer mOYCffint.

~rhe tc.blc is arra.rti~eu 111 the urller of march, but it r;mst be appreciated t11;~'t this >,,riLI. "l')ry in aecordnnee ':Ii th the tactical situation.

Gur..rc1z Arl,lOUred Divisicm ':!ill h0WeVGr ~\llvancc o.t I L" hour.

Sl' fer 011 zeri.::lls, (1

.. 79

therond. Follo~ing scriul~ vall NOT oass this point excc}?t under provi:Jions of' (c) (i) and (ii.) above. In any case, it i~ essential that all serials start to move again punctunlly at o6qO hourn. If this is NOT done the order of m:_reh wi.ll be disarrarlged ~Ind ch:ws is likely to ensue.

N.o li';,hts '0"1111 be ''lllowed on the mnin ;)xi5 by niE"pt.

No Ol~Gtl !'ire Hill be lit by night on the main Qxis oX' in its imnediate vicinity.

7. Rear,vOId 1'raff'i c

Re~.rw

- 80 .. 1.i\lNEXURE 1 to' ;",?PENDIX IGI to PfffiT II

F0!'O",ti,'D or Unit resI:('ns1 ble for Group

A dan. tional 'l'roo~3 unJ.or Cor..l::and or lJ..'1.:lcr Ccm::'.anl1. f 1r I::ovroent

Serial NUl':-lber [i

Destination Ar~oxU:&. t8 r.umber ot

vehicles

Apr..rox- Remarks ~

- 81

Forr.1ation J'~dc1i tioIlr~' . Sorial Des ti- Approx- ~ppro:lG-or Unit Troops l.J1l(ler Nunbers nation iuate ir.~ate responsible COIT

- 02

Forl.lation h.dd.itional . .. s~ciar Dcsti- .....pprox- l'..pprox .~Rema.rks or Unit Troops \.K'l&r, Nur.tcrS nation inate iunte responsible CQi.li u.:.nd or ntUJber tine for Group under of veh- pas t

oor.r.lD.nd for iclea post l:1ovcr,en t .'

( a) (b) I, . (01. __ :< '(d) (f) ( g) Tao 43 Troop' 236 .I>nn.: K 304 :~"J~N1IE:\r 49 10 Division Tank Battery' and Tae 8 . NORTH

_.~ ...f.rnoured .. '

Driga..c1e - -.~

dn .351, 70 Incl 70 RlL$o Rogir.lent a. 1.... 112 Field Regil:1ent 43 Divisional K306 do 110 RE Group

64 Hed.iUD Survey Troop

- .

ReconnaissMoe K .307 do 18 2 and tprbour Parties

214 Bri3adc l~I'!";ICoUred K 308 do '675 13~ Inol100 DUKW~ Group Regiuent and 22 IU.SO

8 z'~rnourod Jrieado

RN vriCado K309 do 339 65

Divisional Troop 236 i..nti- K 31.0 do 238 50 Headquortcrs Tnnk D.;:~ttcry 15 and Head- FDS quar-tcrs 8 ~rr-uOured Brigado 179 Field RN l.rtillory K 311 do 442 90 Incl 100 Rh.SC Re~ir.lent 48 Survey 94 Field !3attery ReeiTDnt 419 Heavy , .' Bo.ttery .\

129 Drieo.dc i>.rr:Dured .. K 312 129 Incl 100 I>tJXWS .. _~_Group.. Rcgif.len t .-Md 25-RASe

lcos Squadron Bridging K.313 do .. 16 3 Platoon 207 Field Park Cor.lpan~ 61 l1cconn Detaohuent L 500 .ARNHEM 177 35 . ai.ssanco 508 OOllpany RCLri .lent rt.~C 5 E Y0J.1KS L 'SOO do 273 55 Bridgehead

Group Detacnuent

113 ~iiL do 1'14 25 RCe:L1 \cnt less ~JD.ttery

U 502 do 11 2 ,

'.

une Troo:) 557 M .503 do 20 .. '2 ,$ Dn.tte2' 3 CCB J300 .illmIDII 70 15

and NvilTH

- S3 -,' .,

Additional Seriel Desti-Fonnation or Unit responsible o~ Group

(a) 10 CCS

Seaborne Tail IBt

69 Brigade Gr.oup

M~n Headquarters 50 Division Group 151 Brigade Group

Rear Hoadquarters 50 Division Group

2,31 Brigade G~oup

Rear Headquarters 30 Corps

Se~borne tc ITail

US Airborne Tail

162 }liC Guards l~rmoured

.Division iLdI:li.ni stJ;~" tive Grp~p 43 Division ~~dninistra-tive Group 50 Division

. Ji.c1r.iinistra.tive Group

Approx- .ripproxirnato ' imate nwnber time

of.. past ve1"licles poin t

'.....

. (e) 70

. .

( f) 15

195

754

4-0 ,

150

27.5 55

882 180

/319 165

630

3.50

125

70

202 45

1OCO

300

200

Go

850

1,71

170

.55

ROOlaX'ks

(g)

incl 1 liiU..iFS

. ,..

. '.,' .'.......

" . !

"

. ,

Troops 'Jllc1er. NumCommand"or bers under cOnr.'&8Jld for

-

movement (b) (0)

N ;10

-' '#

C 5~1,

86 Field Regi:", r.'len t less 3 batteries Battery 7 hfediwn Regjment;

7 .Mediun less one battery

7 t:cdi.um Regi[lent Artillery Platoon

J,.ir Troops Headquarters Reconnaissance 1~2 RiC

i ..

i. "

' It

',. " ~.

B oohelqn ..110 Li~~ Re gin6n t

p 530 to

P 537

P54.0 to

P544

P 560 to

P 565

P 570 to

P 579.

P580 to

p 583.

Q 700

s 800

U100o-'

T 830

nation

, .

( d) ARNHEM

and NORTH ~I

..i.RNHE'J and NORTH

do

do

do

do

do

~fIE}.t

?

?

IC900 ? to ;.'

K 949 !3attery 75 anti- P 950 '1 Tank Hcgiuent to .

P 9~5 . 165 lWt.. Regi- 12,} I.dh. Hegioert V 1100 ? 200 40 ~ll D uent 113 k~ Regir.1~ to , echelon

324 Coupany RASO V 1'1103

- 84

The followinG serials will be phased in as required according to progress .of opcratiJnal und tactic~l situation.

Formation Serial or Unit Nuubers responsible for Groul?

(a) (b)

Hain Headquarter~l 30 Corps

F 250

RE Group HiiRRY it 733-7l~1

JTI\i

MICF...li.EL

l::JETE.R .

RICF",illD

.':iL:"URICE;

GEORGE

SPIKE

JOHN

TO.i

FlUID

BILL

DEHTRlJ:i

i.-n~GIE

B~.sIL

R 742-746

H 747-754

a 755-760

R 761-760

.:"pproxina.te ~pproxima.t e Remarks nUl,lber .. of .tir;t~ _past vehieloJs

( c)

370

878

483

.380

536

766

R 769-775 1110

n 776-778 566

R 779-784 1486

R 785-790 1146

~t 72f)-722 300

R 72.0-722 ' 300

R 723-726 419

R 723-726 419

R 727-728 109

H 729-732 .: .316

post

( d) ( e) .- ..

75

180

95

75

105

150

220

115

300

230

60

60

85'

85

25 r

65

-

- 85 i~.NNEXURE .2. to iLUP.ENDIX I Gt

TRilFFIC Xtm n:>VE,'ENT OONl'HOL ORG~:Jrrs.ATION FOR OPER.-ION t G..UIDEH. t

ORGANISATION OF I,DVEirlENT

1. Contro!. of movement ""ill bc exercised through 30 corps Trilffio Offioe.. . This Offioe ,.-rill co established initially o.t Main HQ 30 corps, passing to Rear 30 Corps ,,,hen i\'ln.in 30 Corps moves forward.

When Rear 30 corps Doves foX".-ro.rcl, Trttffic Office will r.enw.in at 30 Corps Adn post until ordered forward.

2. The organisa.tion within HQ ,30 corps for ca.llitlg for-mlrd of movement groups is as 1'o11o\"[s :

(a) G (SD) Ere-uch tl111 control prioritics for movcncnt on the Ma.in Axis nnd Hill gj.vo necessary instructions to the Traffic Office.

(b) TrD.i'fic Office '\"lill iSbUC ncccssury, Llovcmcn"t orders and Dulce [.11 nrrc.ULCGCnt~~ 1':;1" tllC implcl':'lento.tion of tho, movc.

ORGiJT~s..j,TION OF TR..."]'FIC CONTROL

3. Tra.ffic Control ",{ill pc Qxercised through regulating HQ's and TOP's.

4. Rcgulatin[:; HQs' .-lillcn.ch be i:.. charge of a certain aaotol" of the Main Axis and ...-ri11 control certain TCPs.

The location of these is as 1'0110".'5 :

(a)' ROGUlating HQ No. 1 -. Briclge over MEUSE - ESC.I'1tJT Canal.

TCPs -:~ 1';EUSJ

- 86

8. code signs~ ,f~~quencies, etc, will be issued by esa 30 corps,

COt.iPOSITlON OF REGU"'J..A1':lliG tiQ c-.nd ~CPs

l

9. (a) Regula.tin,~ HQ - ~sonnel One senior oi'ficer One Noo

l hree wireless operators

Equipment One ~iruless vehicle Jeep or Car.

~ ..... (b) TOPs - Pcr3'or\.llct One nffiocr ! :.

- One senior 1'-00 Three .:ireless operators 'rwo regimental DRs Half Section Provost Cook Recovery ?crsorrncl

Equi~1mcnt One \"iirclcss vehicle, ylith t~vo bal~ of batteries and chargine set. Four gallons clear petrol One 15 CYit domestic vehicle One Hocovery vehicle Provost motor cycles

Cooki~ facilitieo

roSITIONING AND :i.{OVE~.E'i:r OF TePs J\ED ~DGUiNr1lJG n:qn

10. TOPs and Regulating HQs will move into positiun as ordered by HQ 30 corps. Those for;fard of Corl's SP ",Jill move behind Guards Arnoured Division and \fill drop off on arrival at their respective destinations.

OJDE NAI,fES

11. Each TOP will be knO\Jl1 by the code name I T.l\IQ:;J follo-ilCU by ,a pln.oe code name of the to","!h in "i:hich it is lOf1llted.

- ...

- - -

/T.1.'~~ \ ........ J /

2.

3.

-

'. /

.. .,

.' "'/ ,

\ I --"

..- ...........

" .t \.../:

..,-. , \ ( ;

:r

.-

SKmOH tAt .. 10 APHNDIX

TRAFFIC CUlTROL NET

TCP TARE MALVOLIO

TOP NL'J}{ID]N TARE BELCH

TCP ESCHAREN ~ TYDALT

TOP VEHEL

TARE \f'ULSEY

Gp II 6187

TOP S'l' OEDENRODE TARE CODWED

TC? EINIHOvm

TiaRE BRUTUS

TCP VALIaNSWllARD

TARE GLPNOOWER

Gp I

TCP ESCAUT nUIroE

TARE BRIDGE

HmHTEL CROSS ROO

" -", No.3 RID HQ "

...6.EASY

(~';--.-/

TP

TO ANNEXURE 2 tGt TO B\RT I

( "

Rear 30 Corps will oontrol one to one link to No.1 Reg HQ until No. 2 Reg HQ opens. TOPs R/T it oonditions t'a.vourable. Control may order Cftl. Reg HQs and 30 Corps will be OW.

REAR 30 OORl?S .60HARLIE

MAll{ 30

CORm 6 BAKER

AIM 6 FOX

Controi Sta.tion

5603

- 88

JSPalIDIX I H I to PJ~T II

.--=--.- - ...

.

GSO I (L) ..

.

GSO II (Ops) GSO TIl . '~

1. Responsibiliti~5 ;

GSO I (L) -,

Gsa rr(ops)

DAQMG

. SORE

GpU III (Cam)

.A.fH

" .(Cam)

(a) Co-ord'inatir;n' of movernc;;nt and traffic control.

.-,. f ."0

(b) i ...vailahili ty of route,:;. ( c) Liai30n with Ops~ (,'"

.. ) O;;:-ero.ticmal situation. (b) Inf'o:"'l1w i;i.:-.Jll en ~Lntj.:d:~atej opero.ti(inal moves. ( c-) ( a) Datai1s ,f r.)I:.t-0S U~ lL'~ Ccrps c0ntroL (a) Co-ord:iz:.:>.ti.:in :_f m:Jvll\en:; ;mt'l.. i3 sue

ci: f.I,)V

- 89 APPENDIX 'J 't~ PART II

TOPOGRl\PHlGAL AFPRECIATION OF THE AXE OF ADV.\NCE AND OF RIVERS \VAAL AND NEDER itIJN

WESTERN ~\XIS

1. (a) ESCAUT Canal - EINDHOVEN

First class road 25 - 30 ft wide with a tarrnacadam surfaco and ample grass verges in most places. Parts of the road, however, are embanked and flanked by ditches. Deployment is difficult except in sandy woodland areas

. immediately on either side ~f the road between Vl~NSWAJ~J and EINDHOVEN. This stretch is also sui. table for the dispersal of vehicles, a5 there are manY wooded stretches which also are most suitable for the defence.

(b) EINDHOVEN Exoept for the main NORTH - SOUTH road, the streets are tort uous and narrrm.

( 0) EINDHOVEN - GRAVE Shewn as first class rand, ~idth 20 - 30 rt, but in places the road surface is very bad. Deployment pnssihle along most of 'ita length except between ZON 4426 and ST OEDENRODE 42.32 where the surrounding country is peaty., and in the neighbourhood (If GRAVE where the road is embanked with ditches ~n either sida.

The bridge over the WILHEUSINA Canal is a claSS 40, but oan only take single line traffio. That over the ZUID VIILLEM; VAARl' Canal at 4736 is shewn on a German map, corrected to March 1943, nS h.wing ~ ,1laximuill lond capaci ty of 16 tons.

The loop at ST C!b"'DENRODE can be by-pllssed by :1 new rna-d, (not shewn on the 1: 100,000 mapa), from 424317 to the cross rOads at 427322.

(d) GRAVE t~ NIJr,lEGEN First class road with concrete surf'nce, 20 - 30 ft wide, and two cycle tracks, 5 ft wide ~ flanked by broad grass verges.

From GRAVE to 6459 the road crosses the MEUSE volley p()ld.~;r6 which (Ire intersected by hedgl;ls, trees Jnd (Ii tches, except for a. stretch on an embankment h,'\lf-:l-milc ench side from the t:~USE bridges. F'.t'l"m 6459 the rood followe' the rnilw~ through country dotted with clmnps of tree~ ('r bushes, :md vHl:1S. Alml)s t the whnle of thf: rond i8 dr:min..'\ted by tho high ground SOUTH nnd EAST of NIJ1"~GEN. Between GRAVE ;md NI.JMEGEN there nrc film dry 80ils except for two belts of wet clay, one i'or two miles NORTH of GRAVE and the othor a m~ile long at 652600.

( e) NIJ1'-ffiGEN to ARNHEl-i. The old road via ELST 7070 vari~8 from 20 ft tn 40 ft in width. The SUrf':\CIJ is conCl'ete for me-st of the way,

th~ugl. parts nre of rolled clinker. /The road

- 9c The road crosses thc';{"iwLT.J river by 11 nevI bridge. 716631, to LENT 7164, and t r:::verses the CiTJcn cultivn.ted plai,il to the lO\"ler RHINE through fL1J~ "pen fields lined wi th deep ditches, ana 610n11 scattered. orchD.:':'ds nonr the villages. The road is raisod abou.t h to' 6"i'c,; t ahove tho surrow1ding country. Finn dry, Sa"'1dy ~oiL 'fr13CS alo~lg tho.:! roadside and the orcharCls nffnrd ':;he oniy cover ~:s far ds WT. whilst deploynont is ljmitud to E'13Ve).~11 sE;condary roads.

At 715737, a ne'.~' r0ad 1 uads to ~"Rl\!Hm:: via a now bridge over the Im1cr RHINE .at 740707, Th. ronU is believed to bev still under com;truotio;l. 17. ~hould 1'>e capnble of taking tracked vehicles, b\lt tlws8 v/ould hG,ve to by-pass two

inc~plete "flj- ove:C11 ' tri

- 91 Banks,

The banks are flat over a con~iderable stretch; they are covered,with gravel nnd peat; the fields and heaths which back the banks offer little cover; woods seldom approaoh wi thin 550 ,verda of the bank; on the left bank there ,are concrete casemates at every 220 yards.

( b) RIVER \VAAL

General

The River I{AIJ., is the most important shipping channel of the RHINE by VJhich ships can reach the RUlffi area from tho estuery ports of the NETHERLANDS. 1'hu river flows through polderland, whioh gives place to river terraces in t~c upper reach near NI~~IDGEN. The river has a oonstant seasonal variation which is felt along the whole stretch, as there are no locks. Low water is in September October. '

Dimensions

Width (at nonaal low water): normally 850 feet. Depth varies according to the seasonal levels of the RHINE.

Banks

Normally dyked along each bank, exoept at points where there ,is a quay, loadil~ ~tage, or port.

(0)' RIVER NEDER RIJN Dimensions

Width at .illNHEM: tlpproximately 300 [("et. In winter the width of the river may incre3so to 1640 fect.

Depth 3 - 11;. feet.

Current

The tide is notiocable as for as ~.mORG (E 27). Banks

'rho river is fairly constricted between dyk~6 along tho river b[,I,nkc. ThGSO dykes fire n01'r.;elly of earthen construction, reinfor~cd n~ intervals by atone setts.

There is noruully a towpath along one bank, though the path frequently chllnge~; from one bank to the other.

'fhere io littlu cOv~r on uither bank of tho Rivor EAST and \IE3T of .J.UlHEM.

- 93 -.:.P.l?EHDIX I LIt0

.... ....

... ~- P;J1T II

-;- ." -: ~ i- l'iJ\IN EX'IT~\.CTS GDS .'JtbJ) DIV 00 NO 12 ~l

INFORl'.IATION 15 Sep 44-- .~ 'i~xxxxxi;q.:ro;Xxxxxxxxxxx

, ' ..... _-

INTENrrI~ 5. Gas .Ari1'Xl. Div ,./ill adv at' HI hr' it max'irnum S -PEl ed t 0 fire a ~1iElVI and, by-passing IJ:."ELDOORN, will dOl'llinqtu the Cirea from incl NUt~SPEE'l' to excl .:\PELDOORN.

1~T-HOD

6. GroUping. ahd 'Ordex:-Sf :.::i.r("\h ~ . l

" '

,Groupibg and Order of :lhrch c.re shown f;lt Annexure 1. ','

7. .Air Sp

(8) Allotment of Tentacles ( i) .. One conta0t oar under Li.ireet div' control for

P~~se I then pa~~ing to 2 HCR

(ii) One tent~nle to 32 Gds Rde One tentacle to Div IlQ

(b) .30 Corps will r.lointni n a Fw~ Control Post in order to moni tOl~al1 calls for :;ir sp so th'lt should npPo/lls frail: ourselves or 'the .Airbo:::-nc C0ry.s conflict or endanger the l:;thc.r~ :.\ v8tiJ ')nn il~lr..edi~tely be it1pOsed.

(0) Ground to Air Reco~nition Hill 'b;~ nccess',ry ']Ul:i~ this OPt During' the rupid Ddv, , cerise rlllorr:3'~

- 94 AA Bde fer their anti-river craft role at NIJMEX;.EN. :FWd tps will give every assistance to enable this det to get into ection at the e,arliest possible moment., beginning on D Day, and continuing Wltil further orders. "

9. Airfds

The airfda nt EINDHOVEN 4-210 and VOrKEL 5640 are urgeny1y required by RAF. Tps from whichever Me reach these airfde f1_t, will paSs a report on their condition wi th the highest prio'~.

Arrnngements for taking over will then be nade with'al! speed.

10. B CE 30 Corps will control all bridging ops, sufficient eqpt

being carried initially to provide crossing over the oarials, ,up to and incl R MAriS, end ferries for t~e rivers WAAJ., and NEDER ~JN.

It is possible that DUID1s and DDs will also be employed on these crossings should bra not be available.

11. Div Tasks

Gds ArInd Divwill corry out its task in two phases: ...

PHASE I

( a) On the at'ternoon of D Day, Gds :~T:lc1 Div with 5 Gds Arrr.d Bde leading will capture ViI,LKENSWAAJID 4-108.

(b) The adv will be preceded by full arty sp as coord by ORA

(c) As the ad\" outstops the ranee of arty sp this will be taken up by TYPliOONS on u pro-nrra~ed plan.

(d) Two bns 50 (N) Div will move forward behind leading tps, ~Btride the main nxis, to proteot the flanks and

subsequ~ntly take over VAI1

- 95

12. }~~~~~~~y:.adr:J instrs will bEl issued separately. , .,

INTERCOMN

13. Location of HQs .-..-..

Div HQ will be locnted in the area of the Fnctory 3695 before the COJranencemcnt of Phose I) thereafter will move by lEFT CL.

14. LOs

(a) 2 HeR will provide 10 '1Ii th WT set to report to HQ 101 US ;~r~orne Divas soon as contact is made. ,He will remain until such time as relioved by LO from HQ 30 Corps.

(b) 2 HOB. will also provide LOs with 82 US Airborne .Div and 1 Brit Airborne Di.v from the time contact is firat BJ;\incd until such time as the tail of the main body of Gds Art1d Div MS passed through their area.

15. ACK

:Orders were alao written on Recognitio~ .~ and Passwords between .\irborne Forces and Ground Troops.

j,!.ethod of desp::i tch SDR '"

",

, ,

- 96 ~lliNEXURE 1 to itpPENDIX ILl to PART II

CROUPING- AND ORDER OF J.lARCH

1. (8) SP - JOES Br 3596 (b) Speed - Best possible (c) Densi ty - 60 vtm (d) Halts - jllien ~onsidered essential by Bdc Comd, whD

will infonn this HQ (e) Lts - Full. at discretion of oomds.

- '

(a) Div will move on one CL as fat' as VALKENSW)..ARD 4108, subsequuntly on two 'CL~ 'until GRAVE 6213, woon Div will again move on one CL.

. . (b) Ord... l.~ of March and Grouping for RIGHT and LEFT eLs and Ordor of lfuarch on one OL are att at Annexures lA and IB respectlveJy. Order o March on one OL is liuble to alterntion by GOO ohould tho op situa~ion demand.

3. As the preliminary adv is depondent on ops to be carried out by S:Gds l~d Bde, it is impossible to give timings acrose SP. As n, resUlt of' this, and with the exception of 5 Gds .iirmd Bde~" no' 'unit will leave its present h~rbour area until ordered through this HQ. Eao~ unit will B end an offr t 0 the unit preced.ing it on the order of march in order to

(a) Give warning of move of preceding serial (shoUld this HQ order several units to follow each other), and

(b) Ensure that there is no blocking of ra to SF This offr will have "liT sat.

4. Afl~ will arrange TOPe at X rds 3493, X rds 3595 and when the op situation warrantn, at X rde 415083.

5. . 190/73 A tk bty will be under cornel 2 HeR and will be allotted to the two sqna of 2 HOn re8por~ible for the protection of A Echs 5 Gda iU'lnd Bde and 32 Gde Bela, and Rl.sC vehs.

\ ) )

dNNEmRE JA 'ID ~ENDIX It'

ORDER OF MABCH ID -GROUPING PART II

_RIGHT CL LEFT CL Flllry'Unit No of Vchs No of VchslE!i~

----

.One sqn 2 F.GR ~ 40 One sqn 2 HeR 40 5 Gds h.lUd Bde Gp, (less 1 ..J.r_ul QOIDM. GDS) 461. 32. Gds B1.c Gp 344

.Ii~h,:!1}~cr c~::.d_ ~'.th_ ,,!~.~c~-::~ 3 IG 125 1 An:lt:. OOIDl.i GOO 127

-153 Fd ~c:gt, 'Plu~. one sec 84 M0:: Regt 130 2 1&.rnc1 ~!~ cce ':!(;. 127 :mo btys ?..l ,,~-t~: '?::3t (O~lC SP, '55 l"d I:.cgt, r}JI,>. one ~cc 8)~~ I:~cd Rcgt 116

,0~lO tr:l.cJ.;or cl;.;'c'wn) 6J 21 Ii tk Regt, I).ess t ':,.) -Dt;i So r 0::-,0 S!? 19 Lt Fd ..:.00 40 and one to','rod) 60

with in sp 128 Fd ~b 38 14 Fd Sqn, incl br lorries 64

2 HCR, (less four sqns)- : 40 T-dtb-_}~~ \D Div HQ, (~Bch, to incl 8 Civil ~ff~irs vehs) 15B -, - 015 Fd Sqn, ,(incl 14- bI' lorries) (,I-j- -..J liP 20

-84 I.ted Regt, (less t\'iO aecs) 170 94 ~ Rezt, (loss dcts) 40 Recce P;l.rty 100 A.'I. Bdc Elci:J.ents 100 ~ .Boo 81 1.48 Fd Pk Sqn _ 2.C II Fd Coy~ (incl 72 br lorrias) 113 AOP (Portee) 16

pOne sqn 2. HeR .with, Wldar co::. for nov and protection, .4 Echs 5 G

- 9B -

.. iiNNEXURE 1B to .."U'PENDIX. t L' to PART II

ORDER OF ~.iiillCH ON ONE eL

SOl' No

Fr.m/Unit No of Vehs

Tim0 Past Point (inol

5OJ~ lbrgin)

REl/L1RKS

1 j

5 Gds M.I'ud ~l1o, 32

. C~ Bda, 2 UGH. :.lnd Rll 282 36

16 Ono sqn 2 HeR \/i th, under cuud for 1:\oVC a.nd prutcction

Rj~ vehs 440 55

- 99

SEJRET APPENDIX 1M' 16 September 1944 to PART II

t,iAIlq EXTRACTS

52 "(NORTHUMBERLAl'ID) DIVISION OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO )6 OPERATION IIGARDEN"

INFORMATION

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

9. 50 (N) Division will :(a) Send detacronent to secure a crossing over R IJSSEL at

DOESBURG E 9081.

(b) Advance and secure high ground to the NORTH of ARNHEM keeping cont~ct vnth the Northerr. troops of 1 British Airborne Division.

(c) Be aVuilable as Corps reserve. 'METHOD

10. Grouping

(a) 50 (N) Division ~il1 bo tiroupod for the advance in aocordD.nce vn. th Appondix ID' (Not included).

(b) GroUping will commence as soon as possiblo and will be completed by 1800 hr~ 18 September as far as the tactical situation permits.

11. Order of Mllrch

The anticipated order of rnarch ,nthin the Division and the probable date of"movoment is as folloTIs:

61 Raoee Roginlent D + 2 Br~dgchuad Detachmont D + "2 69 Brigndc Group D + 3 Main Divisional Group D + 3 151 Brigade Group " D + 3 Rear Divisional Group D + 3 231 Brigadc Group D + 3 50 (N) Divisional Administrativ

- 100 -", .

p.os~;'iblc. L.ca.ding .:lnd r"n.r vehicles ront be ma.rked with Group Scr:i..::.l NUL1bcrs. Scrin.l NUI:lbers n.llotted to units 'iiithin eroups viill NOT be lll.l.rkf:;d on vehicles unless tho unit

i~ OrdGi.'0U to nove se:Xl.r:ltclyfi-or;i its group ... .r

(c) R~:-tc ~ ~f inOVCT:lcnt -dcpcni~ -60 -tactlc:ll situn tion bU~ i:t- "is hoped to be at a.pproxir~~a.1(el:l .35 'Ttm and 10 mih.

(d) Nip,ht ItlOvu;.icnt. 1'h(;rc ',',ill be NO r.lovcraent on the r.l3.in axis during tho hours of d.:l.rkneDs, c.:xcopt:

(i) Wh.:::rc it is ['~ t3.ct ic~tl noccss i ty. (ii) Whon a Group Cor.lr.landcr is satisfied th.:l.t his group can .._.

co.plote its movo, \iithcut.disrupting trof'fic arrangeLl.cnts, ..:ithin h/o hours of lc..::;t light. .

(c) Lc.1.guoring. Groups le.1.Guering for th.c night viill probn.bly hllvo to do so on tho ):~ir. ron.d o"../inG to the nature of the ground, though it. :.lD:'J be poss ible for thou to pull off into :ldjaccnt fields. '_ If units luo.ve the road to lca.guer thoy \nll leave a representative on the rond to indi~te the point ~h~rc the tail of the colw.m ~~s vhcn it started to leave the road. Follo~ing seria.ls ~ill NOT pass this point except under provision of (d) above. In ::iny C:J.:;C it is essenticd th.'1t all serials sta.rt to Illove- ago-in punctu"lly at 0600 hours. If thin is NOT done the ordor of i.mrch -.lill bo disarrc..nged nnd chaos is li!>:ely to" . annual

( f) Li.o:ht s. NO light:.; \'1111 bo pu rr;llt tG d o.n~\ no open firos vlill be 1it "by night.

(8) RiJa.r,/ard trn.ffic. No rel.l.r;m.~d traffio other than tho rorc3t i.liniJ"::ur.l for COl:li.land and loca.l Ill.intcn~;.nc(J will be "plJr, d. t ted on the Lain cueis.

(h) ~nh Diucipline. Th8 3uccess of the op,-,ration ",/ill depend upon the :3pued ()f' tho n;dv

- 1Q1

i6. Supplies and POL 11.11 uni ts will carry four dAys rD, tions, and full tanks plus

200 miles reservo POL in unit transport.

17. ilJi1I.llmition

~\11 first line of all natures ,n11 be curried less those natures dotailed by fon-.l-3.tion CO!.1f.undcrs.

18. Roplcnisru.wnt

(a) As there ,rill be; no baclC'.-..].rd j,\oveJ:l

- 1.02 -

Theso sections \',ill be proparod' to hold Co:\sual tios and siok for a perioel of up to 3 d..'1.ys.

(0) 3 CCS will be es~bli5hed ~lRlllHEr:i 7577. 10 CCS "~ll be ustablishod NI~t~GEN 7162.

.,~

(f) Ono section of'163 Field ~~,bulnnco is establishinn ~ stagine . post at ST OEDENRODE 4332.

(g) A CCS \"lill bo cs~blishod at BOURG LEOPOLD c\.s a stc.ging post. 21. ORD

-

~~ dotachl,lont of 50 (N) Division Orti Fd Pk \/ill tr.:l.vel "with Roar HQ 50 (N) Division and ,./i11 btJ locntcd in th.:: ~rea. of Rco.r Division. All indents on the Ord :F'd Pk will bo put through this de tachr.~ont.

22. '~

(0.) Rooovery sections froi.' 1Jrieo.o.c YlOrkshops vlill ror:uin undor co~~~nd,rospoctivo bri~Qdes.

(b) Vehicles \-Ihioh bren.k dovm ,'lill, if possible, bo towed for;"ard to final destination. Should this not be po