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http://aas.sagepub.comAdministration & Society

DOI: 10.1177/0095399707311649 2008;

2008; 40; 25 originally published online Jan 4,Administration & SocietyYagil Levy and Shlomo Mizrahi

Relations: The Israeli ExperienceAlternative Politics and the Transformation of SocietyMilitary

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Alternative Politics andthe Transformation ofSocietyMilitary RelationsThe Israeli ExperienceYagil LevyShlomo MizrahiBen-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel

This article attempts to explain transformations in militarysociety relationsusing models developed in the context of political participation and sociallearning. The authors suggest that patterns of alternative politics might evolvefrom the undermining of the republican contract, that is, the exchangebetween citizens military sacrifice and the rights and rewards granted to themby the state. This situation creates growing dissatisfaction among citizens thatmay trigger collective action, even among soldiers. Barriers to internal bargainingwithin the military generate modes of alternative politics in the militarysocietyrealm. Drawing from the case of Israel, the authors illustrate these strategies byfocusing on conscientious objection, gray refusal, reservists rebellions, anda direct form of civilian monitoring of the army.

Keywords: alternative politics; republican contract; societymilitary relations;Israel

This article attempts to explain transformations in militarysocietyrelations using models developed in the context of political participationand social learning. Traditionally, analyses of these relations have neglectedthe conceptual context of political participation as an analytical tool to tacklemilitarysociety relations. A large body of literature has focused on howmilitary service triggers political participation by empowering the groupsserving in the military to convert their military participation into politicalparticipation (see, e.g., Krebs, 2006; Porter, 1994; Tilly, 1997; Vasquez, 2005).

Administration & SocietyVolume 40 Number 1

March 2008 25-53 2008 Sage Publications

10.1177/0095399707311649http://aas.sagepub.com

hosted athttp://online.sagepub.com

25

Authors Note: We would like to thank the editor and the referees for their helpful comments.Both authors contributed equally to this study. Please address correspondence to Shlomo Mizrahi,Department of Public Policy and Administration, School of Management, Ben-GurionUniversity of the Negev, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel; e-mail: [email protected].


Other studies have focused on how relations between the military and socialgroups staffing its ranks reflect the power relations in the broader society,with the patterns of collective action that those relations entail. Modes ofbargaining between the military and the groups are patterned by externalpower relations and significantly affect the policies of recruitment (for dif-ferent perspectives, see Enloe, 1980; Kier, 1995).

Nevertheless, scholars have refrained from combining these avenues ofresearch and utilizing the theoretical concepts of collective action. Combinedanalysis will go beyond the previously established argument that militaryservice stimulates external state-groups bargaining and, at the same time,stimulates internal bargaining between the military command and the socialgroups staffing the ranks. Going one step further, it is argued in this article thatbarriers to internal bargaining within the military that cannot be externalizedto the sphere of state-groups bargaining due to external barriers generatemodes of alternative politics.

The core argument in the general framework can be summarized as fol-lows. Alternative politics is the result of the undermining of what is termedthe republican contract, that is, the exchange between the willingness ofcitizens to sacrifice their lives and wealth by bearing the costs of war and thepreparations for it in return for civil, social, and political rights as well asother rewards granted to them by the state. This situation creates growingdissatisfaction among citizens with respect to their relations with the army andtheir obligations to it. From their perspective, the investment is relativelygreater than their return. We suggest that in such situations, citizens first try toimprove their outcomes through conventional channels of influence by utiliz-ing a wide range of strategies of collective action and bargaininginternal andexternal alikewith the states civil institutions as well as with the army.These strategies are aimed primarily at decreasing their burden or increasingtheir return. However, when citizens feel that these avenues have been exhaustedand that they are effectively blocked both externally and internally, they arelikely to turn to other strategies of alternative politics that combine exit andvoice in a way that pressures the government through semilegal or illegalactivities.

The framework elaborated in this article attempts to identify the condi-tions for the evolution of such a strategy, which we term quasi-exit behavioror alternative politics. The significant components in this framework arethe political culture and the processes of collective learning. The nature ofthe political culture strongly influences the choices people make betweenvarious strategies, and the processes of collective learning explain how values,behavior, and strategies spread from one area of life to another. We suggest

26 Administration & Society


that such a framework can basically be applied to any society. We thenapply the framework to the case of Israel.

In the Israeli version of the republican contract, the middle class, compris-ing mostly secular Ashkenazi Jews (Jews of European descent), has historicallybeen successful in exchanging its military burden for social dominance.However, in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the ensuing erosionof the armys status, which dovetailed with the materialization and global-ization of Israeli society, many members of this middle class began to feela sense that the republican contract had not been working for them andhence were gradually distancing from the military. The military used itspower to block channels of influence, so disgruntled Israelis adopted aquasi-exit strategy, an approach that has been internalized in Israeli politicalculture and ultimately spread to all areas of life through a process of collectivelearning.

Specifically, we illustrate how strategies such as conscientious objection,gray refusal, reservists rebellion, and the activities of groups such as MachsomWatch (machsom being the Hebrew word for checkpoint) evolved as a partof the general trend toward alternative politics that spread to many areas oflife in Israeli society.

Methodologically, we use the two-step approach for case studies aspartly designed by Yin (1993). First, we define a conceptual framework toexplain the evolvement of alternative politics from the republican contract.Then, we illustrate a set of theoretical dynamics through a single case.Single cases are most often used to confirm or challenge a theory, or to rep-resent a unique or extreme case. Israel helps to analyze a case study of ademocratic republic with an army whose members are conscripted througha universal draft. Given that alternative politics is a reactive strategy to acentralized, blocked environment, and that democracies are generally moretolerant of alternative politics than authoritarian regimes are, the Israelicase would seem to be an appropriate case study. As such, the article offersa study of a typical, standard example of a wider category to which the find-ings can be generalized. Within the context of a single case study, multiplesources of evidence backed by illustrations from other societies support thetrustworthiness of the conclusions.

The article proceeds as follows. The next section presents the theoreticalframework, which connects the republican contract to alternative politics.Then we present the Israeli case and the transformation of societymilitaryrelations toward and through alternative politics. We conclude the analysisby presenting the main insights of the research and the possible applicationto other cases.

Levy, Mizrahi / Alternative Politics 27


The Republican Contract and theEvolution of Alternative Politics

In this section, we explain the development of societymilitary relationsas the evolution of a republican contract and then show how it is modifiedin modern societies. The second part of the section suggests a frameworkfor analyzing the response of citizens to such processes and the impact ofthese strategies on the states military policy.

The Republican ContractProtection is the main service the state provides its citizens. Nevertheless,

protection is not supplied for free but in exchange for military participation,which takes the shape of military service and taxation for military funding.The state is inclined to demand an excessive price for its services as a meansof retaining surplus value in the form of increased internal control, whereascitizens prefer purchasing protection at the lowest price (Lake, 1992).

Accordingly, two main strategies are at the states disposal. First, the statecan artificially increase demand for its protection services by exaggeratingthe foreign threats from which it allegedly needs to protect society (Lake,1992; Tilly, 1992). Second, and especially whenever the first strategy hasproven ineffective, the state will reward its citizens for their military sacrifice,both as soldiers and taxpayers. Modes of bargaining indeed typified theformation of the modern military. Consequently, the republican contracthas been formed.

Historically, the nation-state was founded on the republican order thatestablished a reciprocal relationship between the state and its citizens,according to which citizens were willing to sacrifice their lives and wealth bybearing the costs of war and the preparations for it in return for civil, social,and political rights granted to them by the state. Seeing military sacrifice asthe supreme civic obligation fits neatly with the republican tradition thatascribed great value to active participation in democratic politics in order topromote the common good (Oldfield, 1990). This exchange of sacrifice forrewards laid the foundation for Western democratization and the creation ofthe welfare state. By definition, therefore, modern military service fulfilled ahistorical role in defining the boundaries of citizenship by equating it withbearing arms. It is against this background that the army became a historicalmechanism of mobility for social groups (Burk, 1995; Tilly, 1997).

At the same time, the citizen-soldier embodied the republican model ofthe transfer of sovereignty from the ruler to the community of citizens that



staffed and politically controlled the military. The interweaving of democ-ratization with mass conscription generated networks of interpersonalcommitment in which compliance with the draft rested on the citizens faithin the trustworthiness and legitimacy of the democratic government (Levy,1997). Relations of trust are especially critical inasmuch as the dispensingof weaponry to the civilian population as citizen-soldiers might jeopardizethe principles of Hobbesian contractualism. Loss of trust might causeuncontrolled use of the weapons (see Dolman, 1995).

Based on an exchange of social resources for military sacrifice, the republicanorder was a veiled arrangement between the state and leading groups of itscitizens. This arrangement did not require ongoing bargaining, in particularbecause it was universal in nature, at least at the declarative and formal level,in that it posited a uniform set of criteria for military service based on universal,not attributive, principles for recruitment and promotion. Accordingly, thisarrangement assured a high level of obligatory citizenship, that is, internal-izing the states authority while also internalizing the reciprocal relationsestablished by the state with its citizens (Giddens, 1985). Consequently,Western nations enjoyed a high degree of autonomy in maintaining massarmies and waging wars, an autonomy that in turn enhanced the statesinternal control.

This pattern of exchange is modified when the gains made in the militaryare socially devalued relative to the level of sacrifice. Several sets of conditionsmay bring this situation about. First, leading groups may come to believethat the security provided by the state is too materially or morally expensiveand as such is disproportional to the purported threats. For example, as thecold war drew to a close, the value of defense was pushed to the bottom ofthe scale of social priorities in European countries (Inglehart, 1977, p. 49).Sentiments of this kind reflect the states failure to artificially increase thedemand for its protection services by amplifying external threats (in Lakes[1992] terms).

Second, and similarly, the states failure to provide protection, evident ina military defeat or blunder, exemplifies another form of asymmetric burden(see, e.g., the case of Argentina; Zagorski, 1994).

Third, leading groups may (implicitly or explicitly) claim breach ofcontract, especially following the erosion of the republican criterion for thedistribution of social goods and the justification for social dominancewith military sacrifice at the center. Erosion of this sort was experienced byupper-middle-class groups in the United States and Western Europe fromthe 1950s onwards. Whereas the equation of soldiering with citizenship tra-ditionally generated social mobility, as soon as groups attained a status of



their own that was no longer conditional on military sacrifice, they lostmuch of their interest in serving in the army (Burk, 1995), especially whensocial benefits remained stable or even declined asymmetrically relative tothe heavy military burden. Moreover, military sacrifice became increasinglyincongruent with ever more widespread postmaterialist values and trendstoward globalization in Western societies, and the concomitant ascendancyof the market society, highlighting market-based individualistic values overnational ones. Hence, the legitimation system was being reconstituted.More so than others, upper-middle-class groups internalized the culturalchange that the diminished military threat brought about by the waning ofthe cold war wrought and became increasingly disinclined to serve in themilitary.

Claims voiced by social groups to modify the republican contract are,therefore, originated in the groups subjective perception that asymmetricalstructure of rewards versus sacrifice is formed, and hence there is a roomfor negotiation over the terms of the contract. Under the above conditions,sensitivity to the asymmetric equation between sacrifice and rewards ismore likely to emerge. Availability of resources and changes in the oppor-tunities for collective action will lead to action (see Tilly, 1978). Differentstrategies may then be employed as a means to reconstitute the republicancontract by either decreasing the burden or increasing the return. In the nextsubsection, we explain these strategies in the context of Hirschmans (1970)framework regarding exit, voice, and loyalty.

Citizen Dissatisfaction and the Evolutionof Alternative Politics

The question we address in this article refers to the strategies adopted bycitizens and interest groups in response to the changing nature of the relationsbetween them and the army. More specifically, we examine the circum-stances that may lead them to adopt a do-it-yourself approach and decideon their own how they will treat the obligations imposed on them by the armyand the state.

As explained earlier, the starting point is the undermining of the republi-can contract, which creates growing dissatisfaction among citizens regardingtheir relations with the army. As Hirschman (1970) indicated, dissatisfiedcitizens may respond in two basic waysvoice and exit.

The choice between these alternatives depends heavily on the availabilityof a good alternative outside the organizational framework. Good alternativesincrease the likelihood that citizens will react strongly to any dissatisfaction.



Those who belong to the lower socioeconomic stratum of society usuallyhave fewer alternatives, so their responses are likely to be more conservativein nature. As we will see, limited alternatives breed passivity, that is, loyaltyor neglect (Lyons & Lowery, 1986).

The voice option is clearly the most straightforward and widespread indemocratic societies, yet there are many situations in which citizens respondwith a certain type of exit. The issue of exit has long been discussed in theliterature. It is now customary to assume that in addition to the ultimate exitstrategy of physically leaving the society by emigration, there are othermodes of exit behavior in which citizens engage while remaining in the societyin which they live. Examples of such behavior include passive acceptanceof the situation combined with social alienation, that is, neglect (Lehman-Wilzig, 1991; Lyons & Lowery, 1986; Rosbult & Lowery, 1985). Besidesneglect, which includes an indifference to social issues, there are alternativemodes of behavior that correspond to the concept of quasi-exit behavior.

Lehman-Wilzig (1991) suggests that there may be a strategy betweenexit and voice that was missed by Hirschman in his seminal work. Such astrategy, which he terms alternative politics or quasi-exit, includes bypassingthe traditional system of governmental services and establishing alternativesocial and economic networks to offer what the official political systemcannot, or will not, provide. Lehman-Wilzig identifies two preconditions forthe evolution of such a strategy. First, on the governmental level, a necessarycondition for the emergence of alternative politics is the inability or unwill-ingness of the authorities to provide the services demanded by the public,either due to economic crisis and increasing deficits (e.g., Sweden, UnitedStates, France, and Great Britain toward the late 1970s and early 1980s) ordue to government failure and inefficiencies. Second, a countrys populationneeds a fairly high level of education to know how to set up, coordinate,supervise, and maintain alternative systems as well as enough economicresources to finance such a system. Given these two conditions, alternativepolitics will materialize when the political system is largely unresponsiveto the wishes and demands of its citizens.

In this article, we suggest that the concepts of quasi-exit behavior andalternative politics may apply not only to an alternative method for providingservices but also to alternative modes of consuming public services. In thecontext of protection as a public service provided by the state, a quasi-exitbehavior would mean recognizing the high costs associated with it, under-standing how it is produced, and becoming familiar with possible alternativesto this method of production. Those who serve as soldiers and pay taxes tofinance the services that provide this protection are the most likely to utilizethis quasi-exit behavior (Lake, 1992).



Indeed, there are cases where citizens cannot or do not want to exit orprotest (voice)generally because they believe that conventional democraticinfluence channels are blocked. There may be various reasons for the evolu-tion of such a belief, that is, the decline of traditional power groups such astrade unions (Pierson, 1995), a direct governmental policy of weakening theopposition (Tarrow, 1994), structural factors such as strong centralization thatsignificantly weaken the voice option (Pierson, 1995), and economic crisesthat significantly reduce the governments ability to respond positively tocitizens demands (Lehman-Wilzig, 1991). The degree to which influencechannels are open can be measured by citizens views regarding what Tarrowterms the political opportunity structure. The following are the specificaspects of political systems that affect the structuring of collective action andprotest activity: (a) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalizedpolitical system; (b) the stability of that broad set of elite alignments thattypically undergird a polity; (c) the presence of elite allies; and (d) the statescapacity and propensity for repression (Tarrow, 1994).

However, this process also entails a mechanism through which citizensgradually internalize the structural conditions and the available strategies.In a recent paper, Mantzavinos, North, and Shariq (2004) adopt an approachthat views human learning as a continuous process in which the individualis constantly engaged in learning ways to solve problemseither existingones or new ones. Solutions to given problems are formed using a mentalmodel, that is, a coherent but transitory set of rules that enables people to makepredictions about the environment based on available knowledge. A beliefis formed when environmental feedback confirms the same mental modelso many times that it becomes stabilized. A belief system is defined as theinterconnection of beliefs (Mantzavinos, 2001; Mantzavinos et al., 2004).

We suggest that when citizens believe that a given political opportunitystructure does not allow conventional democratic channels of influence tomaterialize, they look for alternative ways to improve policy outcomes andpolitical performance. In the terms outlined by Mantzavinos et al. (2004),people attempt to find new ways to solve social problems, which after aprocess of collective learning may also lead to the transformation of thebelief system. In our context, citizens attempt to find new ways to solve theproblem of the violation of the republican contract. It follows that individ-uals learn existing or new ways to solve problems through direct interactionwith the environment. Therefore, norms, values, and ideas transmitted to theindividual through cultural and educational mechanisms play a significantrole in the learning process and the creation of mental models.

This learning mechanism implies that citizens are strongly influenced bystructural factors and the political culture of a given society when forming



their strategies. They do not necessarily apply cost-benefit calculations tochoosing the best alternative but rather examine the alternatives via culturalfilters (adaptive rationality, as termed by Johnston, 1995). Historical choices,analogies, metaphors, and precedents are invoked to guide their choice.Thus, cultural filters simplify reality, restrict the range of possible decisions,determine what is taken for granted and what may be debated, and create arepertoire of scripts that the army is comfortable shaping.

When strong centralization motivates the belief that influence channelsare blocked and that the strategies of exit and voice are not available, citi-zens are pushed toward quasi-exit strategies. The exact type of strategies isinfluenced by the nature of the political culture, that is, the level of plural-ity in the society and the legitimacy that social values give to each strategy,and by the extent to which the republican contract is undermined. Furthermore,because quasi-exit strategies are usually the result of weak and inefficientgovernment, the government tends to respond positively rather than suppressthese initiatives although these strategies counter the governments monopolyand authority. When this pattern happens repeatedly, citizens are furtherencouraged to utilize quasi-exit strategies.

Empirical evidence shows that in situations similar to those characterizedabove, people often adopt a do-it-yourself approach, which can also be under-stood as a quasi-exit strategy. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) point to a set ofinformal norms (blat) that have emerged in the Soviet Unionset up by indi-viduals and personal networks to provide basic needsthat created incentivesto behave in ways that alter the substantive effect of formal rules without directlyviolating them. They also characterize substitutive informal institutionssuchas alternative methods of providing public goods in rural northern Peru and inrural Chinaas attempts at achieving what formal institutions were designed,but fail, to achieve. Such informal institutions emerge where state structuresare weak or lack authority.

Applying this general setting to militarysociety relations, the reconstitu-tion of the republican contract may ultimately lead to any one of the strategiesdiscussed above. The exit strategy is avoiding military service through bar-gaining power, particularly by middle-class groups, even within the termsof compulsory service. Such a strategy was employed by middle-classgroups in the United States after World War II. The second strategy is voice,taking the form of protest groups, organized by former soldiers and others,which draw support from those who have asymmetrically shouldered themilitary burden.

A combined exit/voice strategy is one in which groups condition theirmilitary participation and bargain over those conditions with the state or the



military. Most common are forms of monetary bargaining over the terms ofmilitary service, which gradually form what Moskos (1977) called the transi-tion from institution to occupation. This is the shift from obligation tocontractualism in the citizens relations vis--vis the state. At this stage, thepattern of exchange, which has been previously internalized as an unques-tionable civilian pattern, is converted into an exchange that takes the formof open and even direct bargaining. Both strategies, and the combination ofthem, are employed as a means of reducing the military burden (e.g., draftevasion) or increasing the return (e.g., improving military benefits). It wasthis pattern of bargaining that gradually led most Western states to bring anend to the draft and move toward a voluntary, professional army. Indeed,efforts to impose the burdens of military service have often been resisted inmany ways at the personal level; we, however, refer to more organized or grouppatterns that show themselves when the basic sacrificereward symmetry isunder question.

However, when groups feel that these strategies have been exhausted orthat they are effectively blocked both externally and internally, they are likelyto turn to strategies of alternative politics that combine exit and voice in theform of semilegal or illegal activities, that is, a quasi-exit strategy. As we laterillustrate, forms of conscientious objection best exemplify this pattern.

The Evolution of Alternative Politics in theSocietyMilitary DomainThe Israeli Experience

In this section, we explain the background of the evolution of alternativepolitics in Israel as a central mode of political participation and an alternativemethod of providing public services. We then focus on the unique implica-tions of this development on the relations between society and the army.

Alternative Politics in IsraelIsraeli society and political culture were shaped under the British man-

date in Palestine from 1917-1948. As explained elsewhere (Mizrahi &Meydani, 2003), the Jewish community in Palestine under the British man-date had a relatively large measure of autonomy in managing its own affairsin most fields of life (Arian, 1997; Horowitz & Lissak, 1978; 1989; Migdal,2001; Shprinzak, 1986). The Jewish leadership, elected via a relativelyindependent political system, created its own organizations, separate fromthose of both the British authorities and the Arab community, to accelerate



economic development, provide public services such as health, education,and welfare, and develop an infrastructure such as electricity, roads, watersupply, and building construction. Thus, the idea that the Jewish communityshould not trust others and had to create its own institutions and organiza-tions gradually became a building block of the Zionist ethos. At the sametime, facing significant threats from the Arab population and a British banon widespread Jewish immigration, as well as the aspiration to expandJewish settlement in Palestine, the Jewish leadership gradually built illegalparamilitary forces that had three main goals: fighting the Arab paramilitaryforces, organizing illegal Jewish immigration, and establishing and defendingillegal settlements. These channels of activity were not only alternative butalso illegal as far as British mandatory law was concerned. The politicalculture passed down to generations of Israelis included the idea that actingvia unilateral initiatives that might skirt the letter of the law, and sometimeseven operate outside formal regulatory structures, is not only permitted butactually serves national goals. To a large extent, this became the modusoperandi of Israeli society (Lehman-Wilzig, 1992; Migdal, 2001; Shprinzak,1986).

Due to a high level of centralization, the Jewish, and later the Israeli, insti-tutional setting enabled politicians to repress similar initiatives directedtoward the Jewish, or Israeli, system itself (Aharoni, 1998; Horowitz &Lissak, 1989; Shprinzak, 1986). Yet, as explained elsewhere, in the 1970s and1980s the central systems consistently failed to respond to the demand forpublic services (Ben-Porat & Mizrahi, 2005; Mizrahi & Meydani, 2003).Faced with a situation that they interpreted as blocked influence channels,significant groups in Israeli society turned back to a problem-solvingapproach they knew wellunilateral initiatives and alternative politics.

Specifically, during the 1980s and 1990s, many groups and individuals inIsraeli society employed noninstitutionalized initiatives to create alternatives,often illegal or semilegal, to governmental services. The 1980s were charac-terized by a significant growth in the black-market economyparticularlythe illegal trade in foreign currency (Bruno, 1993), gray-market medicinethe semilegal, private supply of health services using public facilities(Chernichovsky, 1991), gray-market educationthe employment of pri-vately paid teachers and the evolution of independent private schools (Yogev,1999), and pirate cable televisionall of which were alternatives to inadequategovernmental services (Lehman-Wilzig, 1992). These processes intensifiedduring the 1990s, when unilateral initiatives and alternative politics wereexpanded to other policy areas such as internal security (Zinger, 2004),social welfare (Gidron, Bar, & Katz, 2003), and even the policy toward the



ArabIsraeli conflict (Ben-Porat & Mizrahi, 2005). Indeed, during the 1990sit became clear that for the most part, only initiatives of this kind could helppeople access the services they needed (Mizrahi & Meydani, 2003).Furthermore, the Israeli government responded positively to these initia-tives by changing its policies in the direction demanded by the groups. Inthis process, the legislative and the executive branches of government wereweakened, whereas the supreme court, which enjoyed public legitimacyand trust, gained considerable strength (Barzilai, 1999; Mizrahi & Meydani,2003).

The prevalence of alternative politics in Israeli society and the learningprocesses the society has undergone also encouraged the evolution of quasi-exit strategies and alternative politics in the area of societymilitary relationswhen the republican contract was violated.

The Israeli Republican Contract and Its ModificationJewish Israeli society has assimilated the republican principle of the

citizen-soldier as a core value deeply ingrained through compulsory servicefor all Jewish men and women in the IDF (Israel Defense Forces). Ashkenazisecular middle-class Jews formed the core of this service as the group thatfounded the army, staffed its upper echelons, and was identified with itsachievements. Due to the republican ethos that defined Israeli societysdevotion to the military effort as a supreme social value, military servicebecame a decisive standard by which rights were awarded to individualsand groups that were portrayed as acting in the service of the state (Shafir& Peled, 2002). Male Ashkenazi warriors identified with the glorificationof the military and succeeded in translating their dominance in the militaryinto what was regarded as legitimate social dominance, through which theywere granted preferential social status relative to the groups that were rele-gated to peripheral status in the military, primarily immigrants fromMuslim countries (Mizrachim). IsraeliPalestinian citizens were completelyexcluded from military service, a situation that reinforced their low socialstatus in Israeli society. Ashkenazi groups also preferentially enjoyed theother material fruits of war, such as the availability of a cheap Palestinianlabor force and Palestinian property and the growth of the militaryindustrialcomplex, all of which served as engines of economic growth. As long as itadvanced its social status, the secular Ashkenazi group supported the mili-taristic ideology (see Ben-Eliezer, 1998) because the trade-off of sacrificingfor the army brought with it many social rewards (Levy, 2003). Conceptually,the Israeli version of the republican contract embodies a broader form of



exchange. Military sacrifice was traded not just for formal rights but alsofor social dominance.

Under these conditions, with the dominant group benefiting from the stateof war, government agencies were greatly empowered to internalize theirvision of the external political world as a threatening one while often ignor-ing dovish signals that the Arab world transmitted to Israel. In turn, thispower led to an increase in the states relative autonomy in implementingpolicies that might otherwise have been debated politically (Levy, 1997).

The essential premises underpinning the contract were changed since the1973 Yom Kippur War. Several factors were at work in a manner that createdan asymmetric system of sacrifice versus rewards: The weakness demon-strated by the army in the Yom Kippur War that was amplified in the failuresin the First Lebanon War (1982-1985) and in the first Intifada (1987-1993)contributed to the erosion of its prestige and thus denied the Ashkenazis muchof their symbolic power as omnipotent warriors. Furthermore, unlike previ-ous wars, which had led to an expansion of the Israeli economy, the YomKippur War brought financial crisis, thus reducing the material rewards theAshkenazi secular middle class received for bearing the burden of war.Furthermore, the real cost of the security product actually increased. Theneed to rehabilitate the army after the Yom Kippur War added to the publicsfiscal burden by increasing external and internal government debts and ele-vated the investment in security to the peak of about 30% of the GDP in1974-1976 from around 20% during the former period. Similarly, the burdenof military service was made even more onerous because the humanresources of both the regular and reserve soldiers were utilized more fre-quently and more heavily (Barnett, 1992, p. 185-209).

In addition, the motivation to make such sacrifices had also declined dueto the growing materialist, consumerist ethos among the middle class. Thisethos was itself a consequence of the economic fruits of the 1967 Six-DayWar together with the rise of economic globalization, which gradually tookhold of Israeli society and transformed it into a market society. The ethosof the market economy eroded the armys role in defining the social hierar-chy. The value of ones contribution to the state through military servicewas no longer necessarily the criterion that would determine the distribu-tion of social goods and justify the social domination of a particular group.Instead, individual achievement replaced the test of statism (see Ram,2005). Yet, this cultural change could alter the equation of sacrifice versusrewards only in part had the level of other variablesthe level of burdenand the military prestigeremained solid. Furthermore, the profile ofsocial reward was even farther eroded as groups that did not serve in the



army, or who made a lesser contributionsuch as the ultra-Orthodox Jews,Palestinian citizens of Israel, and womenwere now able to collect someachievements not based on the test of military service but rather based ontheir own political power, wrapped in the liberal discourse of citizenship.Nothing was more symbolic of this change than the decisions made byYitzhak Rabins government (in the early 1990s) to drop the requirementfor military service as a basic condition for employment in the public sec-tor and to extend the payment of child benefits to everyone, regardless oftheir service in the military (see Aronoff, 1999, p. 44). Whereas theAshkenazis retained their social dominance, it came at a higher price, whilein a market society their social status relied less and less on their militarysacrifice. In short, the state was demanding a higher payment for reducedreturns, thereby creating conditions to reconstitute the terms of the republi-can contract.

A reduction in the legitimacy of sacrifice among the Ashkenazis was theresult. As a dominant group that had exhausted its ability to reap more sig-nificant benefits from military service, Ashkenazis focused on the otherside of the equation, namely, reducing the military burden or increasing theimmediate return for military service. A drop in the motivation was there-fore the first reaction and was evident in several patterns: a slow and con-tinual decline in the general willingness to enlist, particularly in combatunits; fewer volunteers for officers training; a rise in the number of poten-tial recruits purposely trying to alter their medical profilewhich deter-mines the soldiers qualification to perform his or her dutiesin order toavoid combat duty; a rise in the number of enlistees requesting to serve ata base close to their home; and a significant increase in the number ofyoungsters dropping out before and during their service on the grounds ofapparent mental illness (for various aspects of this issue, see Mayseless,1993; Nevo & Shor, 2002, pp. 9-35).

Peripheral and religious groups that had previously been relegated toperipheral status in the armys ranks came to fill the vacuum created by thesecular Ashkenazi middle classs partial abandonment of combat units. Forthese groups, the traditional foundations of the republican contract still boresignificance relative to other, less accessible social avenues that renderedobsolete for more privileged groups, the groups that created new sources ofsocial capital. The peripheral and religious groups saw the IDF as a path-way for legitimately attaining social and political rights and privileges. Inaddition, they could also advance their nationalist goals and portray them-selves as the new, true patriots. It was especially so as the IDF still retainedmuch of its social value (see below). Yet, these groups expectations drew



upon their historical image of the military, although their integration withinwhich did not necessarily prove effective as a real corridor for social mobil-ity. Indeed, ultra-Orthodox groups, who had been disappointed by theirinability to gain recognition or attain a worthy status in the army, lever-aged their political empowerment to set up alternative tracks of mobility.Differentiated statuses meant differentiated modes of political action.

Indications of this social change in the military makeup can be found inthe social composition of the militarys casualties in combat in the OccupiedTerritories during the al-Aqsa Intifada (2000-2005). A drop was observedin the proportion of Ashkenazi casualties from about 48% in the first weekof the First Lebanon War (1982) to about 28% in the al-Aqsa Intifada, aconsiderably larger decline than the relative decrease in this stratums gen-eral demographic weight (Levy, 2006). It is worth noting that in keepingwith the myth that portrays the peoples army as being above ethno-classdivisions in Israeli society, no official statistics are available regarding therepresentation of different groups. Therefore, the demographic compositionof the army must be inferred from other indications, such as the demographicanalysis of the social origins of casualties in war.

In terms of voice, Ashkenazi groups led protests and peace movementsthat eroded the states internal autonomy in executing military policies (seeHelman, 1999). Pure exit patterns typified a segment of the middle-class,secular Ashkenazi Jews who left the country following the 1973 YomKippur War (Shavit, Cohen, Stier, & Bolotin, 1999). Exit/voice strategieswere utilized in various ways to legally evade military service or at least toavoid combat roles through patterns of internal bargaining (Levy, Lomsky-Feder, & Harel, 2007).

More significant, however, was the quasi-exit strategy in the sense thatinfluence channels did not entirely open, although the Yom Kippur War cre-ated a political opportunity structure utilized by several groups to voice theirgrievances against the state. Politicalcultural institutionalized barriers remainedin force at several levels. First, the republican political culture is a two-edgedsword: It offers a template for political rhetoric that equates military servicewith rights and thus serves minority groups as much as dominant groups(Krebs, 2006). At the same time, the republican rhetoric also sets up culturalbarriers to collective action, whose standard-bearers are inclined to use com-munitarian discourse and employ national symbols (Lainer-Vos, 2006). InIsrael, although military service had lost much of its social value for theAshkenazi upper-middle class, republican rhetoric was still in force. For thedominant groups, although the market ethoses gradually legitimized their socialstatus, the republican rhetoric was still utilized as a means of blocking the



upward mobility of mainly ultra-Orthodox groups and nonmobile Mizrachimby presenting them as free-riders evading military service. Furthermore,as later indications revealed, the low levels of social legitimacy for makingmilitary sacrifices did not correspond to the high levels of political legiti-macy for using force on which the republican discourse relied and whichempowered the IDF (see Arian, Atmor, & Hadar, 2007). Hence, the remnantsof the republican discourse discouraged most of the groups from a total exitin the form of evading mandatory military service en masse. Groups, par-ticularly those with ideologically loaded values, were then constrained toembark on a road of quasi-exit, believing this was the most effective way toclaim their rights within the framework of the still powerful, albeit declin-ing, republican discourse. Second, despite the criticism and the erosion inits social status, the IDF remained a central institution that enjoyed thehighest rates of public confidence (Vigoda-Gadot & Mizrahi, 2005, p. 17).Third, the military has been portrayed as an organization that is relativelyshielded from effective political monitoring. Images conjured up by thephrase, when the al-Aqsa Intifada broke out, that the IDF instigated asilent putsch (Shelah, 2003, pp. 63-82) filtered down into the public dis-course and deterred from direct confrontation with the IDF. In sum, onemay see indications for politicalcultural change but not a total and imme-diate breakdown of the military symbols. Military sacrifice retained onlypart of its rhetorical powernot enough as social and symbolic capital forthe dominant groups but enough to be used as an attempt to block othersand even the Ashkenazis themselves from total exit. In other words,although the IDF lost much of its social power, it retained much of its polit-ical power that could work as a blocking mechanism to conventional formsof collective action.

We should emphasize that the strong presence of alternative politics inIsraeli society also triggered learning processes in the militarysocietyarena, meaning that the nature of the political culture can help explaintrends such as those outlined below. The Ashkenazi groups did not explic-itly contend that the republican contract had been broken. However, it issafe to assume that had the IDF and the wars from 1973 onward producedthe sort of prestige and economic growth that were in evidence before 1973in exchange for a reduced military burden, the sense that the contract hadbeen undermined would not have emerged.

Alternative explanations have been offered, other than the concept of themodified contract, to explain the decline in the motivation to serve or the emer-gence of protest politics. These explanations have largely drawn on the declineof the republican discourse in the wake of globalization and liberalization (see



mainly Ram, 2005; Shafir & Peled, 2002). This article does not attempt toaffirm or refute this explanation but to go one step beyond by offering twoadvantages: first, it integrates these explanations within broader social-culturalprocesses that give weight to other factors, such as the level of militaryburden, to enlighten the dynamics of the republican contract. Second,although others explained the attitudinal and cultural changes toward indi-vidualization, plurality, and decentralization, they refrained from explainingwhat would lead citizens to adopt the semilegal or illegal strategies of alter-native politics to solve social problems. This article links the drop in moti-vation of the leading group with the more structural traits of the politicalsystem that inhibited specific patterns of collective action.

Quasi-Exit Strategies of Alternative Politics This section outlines some forms of alternative politics that have been

expressed in militarysociety relations and that embody quasi-exit strategies.

1. Conscientious ObjectionThe IDF is more than simply a conscripted military. Israelis have long

viewed the IDF as the peoples army, a crucial institution both for thedefense of the state and the self-image of the nation. According to the mythsurrounding the military, conscription applies to almost everyone in IsraeliJewish societymen and women, native-born citizens and new immigrantsalike. Furthermore, the IDF cultivated its image as a universal, demilita-rized military that stands above the sectarian divisions of society. Underthese conditions, politicalcultural barriers have always repressed any senseof challenging the totality of military service and even blocked the poten-tial for bargaining over the political terms of military service.

Such barriers notwithstanding, Yesh Gvul (Hebrew for there is a limit,which is a play on words because the Hebrew word gvul also means bor-der), the first Israeli conscientious objection movement, emerged duringthe Lebanon War (1982) initiated by Israel and was composed mainly ofsecular Ashkenazi reservists. It was a response to what the group perceivedas the unprecedented war of choice that contrasted sharply with previouswars, which had been perceived as wars of no choice that were forcedupon Israel. Culturally constrained by the republican repertoire, Yesh Gvulmembers were not pacifists but rather called for the right to selectivelyrefuse to serve (Lainer-Vos, 2006, pp. 286-287). In other words, the groupwanted to bargain with the military over the political terms of military



service, a demand that far exceeded the tolerance limits of the militarycommand, which put many of the refusniks, that is, those who formallydeclared their refusal to serve in Lebanon, in jail.

In our terms, Yesh Gvul embarked on a strategy of quasi-exit as long asthe group refrained from a total exit from military service. At the sametime, it utilized a tactic other than simply voicing against the war before orafter service, a pattern that was much more common.

Alternative politics of this sort thrived under the conditions in which theconventional channels of influence were seemingly blocked. Just as formalbargaining with the military went beyond the established format of militaryreservists relations, so too did changes in political activism come aboutwith the recognition that political channels were unresponsive to the public.Two phenomena merit attention in this regard. First, Peace Now, the leadingpeace and protest movement, which had been constituted on reservists,sheltered the military from the political debate as conscription policieswere not part of its repertoire. Furthermore, this movement even negatedthe option of refusal (Lainer-Vos, 2006, p. 286). Conversely, the Europeanpacifist movements in the early 1980s (such as in France, Italy, andGermany) struggled to improve the profile of conscientious objection ratherthan focusing on ending conscription itself. The result was a small numberof conscientious objectors and practices of disobedience (Ajangiz, 2002).In other words, European peace movements made those who objected to themilitary believe that they could influence the ruling powers through exist-ing channels, and thus reduced the likelihood of alternative politics.

Second, Yesh Gvul found itself maneuvering between its ideology ofconscience politics and the left-wing parties (mainly the Labor Party asopposed to the ruling Likud Party). Leftist parties supported the initialphase of the war and later only vaguely condemned the extended targets ofthe war, but strongly condemned Yesh Gvul. Yesh Gvul, however, attemptedto draw its supporters from the very constituency of these parties. Hence,the slippery approach of yes to military service and no to Lebanon.Stronger opposition to the war could have balanced refusal-oriented senti-ments by opening established channels for political protest.

A similar scenario repeated itself time and time again when the firstIntifada broke out in 1987with Yesh Gvul at the forefrontand when theAl-Aqsa Intifada generated the renewal of Israeli occupation of the West Bank(2002). This time, however, Yesh Gvul was joined by Courage to Refuse, amovement that selectively refused to serve in the Occupied Territories in whatits members perceived as a battle aimed at expanding Jewish settlements at theexpense of oppressing the local Palestinian population and working against



Israels security interests. Courage to Refuse distinguished itself from YeshGvul by positioning itself at the heart of the Zionist-left camp (Dloomy,2005, p. 713). Within this framework of illegal political action, more than280 members of Courage to Refuse have, in fact, been court-martialed andjailed for periods of up to 35 days (see Courage to Refuse, http://www.seruv.org.il/english/default.asp).

Again, with high rates of public support for the governments militarypolicies, which have been portrayed as a battle against Palestinian terror,the moderate left wing had effectively been swept away and the opportuni-ties for institutionalized collective action aimed at curbing military policieswere limited. Hence, the movement adopted a quasi-exit strategy.

Unlike previous displays of disobedience, the refusal of groups such asCourage to Refuse and other groups consisting of high-ranking officers,pilots, and members of elite units to serve in the Occupied Territories wereconsidered more effective. Subsequently, Dov Weisglass, a senior advisor toPrime Minister Sharon, testified that this widening phenomenon was amongthe factors that brought about Sharons reversal of policy from warfare to theDisengagement Plan of 2005 (Shavit, 2004). Thus, as explained in the con-ceptual framework, alternative politics have proven themselves effective.

2. Gray RefusalWhereas explicit refusal may demand a high personal cost, gray refusal is

far more widespread, and hence more painful, from the IDFs perspective.In this case, soldiers express their discomfort with sensitive missions thatmight involve attacks against civilians, negotiate with their commanders,and have themselves removed from the assignment. This negotiation isconducted quietly, often without the knowledge of senior commanders. Althoughexplicit refusal affects the symbolic power of the military, as it increases itspermeability to politics, gray refusal might affect the militarys operationalcapabilities if this informal phenomenon becomes widespread and thusreduces the number of fully operational combatants.

The gray form exemplifies a quasi-exit strategy more than the stan-dard refusal. The former utilizes voice, as soldier-citizens loudly protestagainst military policies, concurrently with exit. Alternatively, the grayrefuseniks achieve their goal of having a clean conscience without voice,and thus without paying any significant cost. Exit is partially in evidencebecause the individual keeps his place in the military unit while at the sametime essentially selecting his missions, that is, partly exiting from the ordinaryframework. This strategy is a type of maneuvering between two blocked



channels: explicit refusal, which is not tolerated by the military and thereforepenalized, and the perceived futile institutional collective action aimed atmoderating military policies. Indeed, middle-class groups, formerly the back-bone of the peace coalition, reacted to the Al-Aqsa Intifada with a passivitymixed with the delegitimization of the institutionalized peace organizations.

Furthermore, military service in Israel is not only a legal obligationimbued with symbolic meaning. It also creates a community that is experi-enced by its members as overlapping with society (Helman, 1997). Withinthis structure, the military unit as a cohesive group plays a key role in dis-ciplining its members and mitigating imported political values that may bein dissonance with military policy. Exit, under these conditions, is costly insocial terms, hence the elegance of gray refusal. And hence, the amplifiedweight of the voice raised by the standard refuseniks, who could have optedfor the silent, gray form of protest. Against this backdrop, it is not difficultto understand why the IDF command, concerned about the growth of thisphenomenon during the al-Aqsa Intifada, managed to control the threat byavoiding massive and direct confrontation with it, in part by tolerating grayrefusal. In this manner, the IDF portrayed the gray refuseniks as a smallgroup of extremists who did not challenge the consensual peoples army(Dloomy, 2005, p. 708).

It is little wonder that gray refusal has come to be used particularly inthe IDF. Other conscripted militaries in democracies allow conscientiousrefusal by offering alternative tracks to military service, such as the civilianservice in Germany. Although gray refusal is significant in the Russianarmed forces, it is not as much the result of widespread antimilitarism as itis a result of the violations of the human rights of the conscripts (Speck,2005). On the other hand, volunteer forces by their very nature generallyscreen out those whose ideology does not fit with military service.

During the first Intifada (1987-1993), the assumption that the number ofrefuseniks, particularly the gray ones, might grow with the intensification ofthe IDFs suppressive actions played a role in moderating military policies(see Lehman-Wilzig, 1992, p. 143). During the al-Aqsa Intifada, it was estimatedthat there were 10 gray refuseniks for every soldier who officially refusedto serve (Dloomy, 2005, p. 706). It also became known that gray refusal waswidespread in the air force with the mounting protest against air attacksagainst the civilian population (see ynet, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2767679,00.html [Hebrew]).

We may infer from Dov Weisglasss testimony that the protest of thepilots had a tremendous impact on Sharons political moves.

Likewise, gray refusal was expressed in the 2005 Disengagement Plan,with the evacuation of Jewish settlements it entailed. Religious soldiers, for



whom the IDFs role in the dismantling of settlements caused a crisis offaith, refrained from explicit refusal (only several dozen refused to take partin the mission), in large part due to informal agreements that removed themfrom the mission. Here, it was not the classic form of gray refusal but anew form through which units with a high representation of religious sol-diers were distanced from the mission in order to avert an ideologicaldilemma (Cohen, 2007, p. 109). Though the mission was carried out effec-tively, the IDF was forced to moderate its professional values and changeits deployment to reflect the political priorities of its soldiers.

3. Reservists RebellionIn 1999, reserve pilots staged what was effectively a revolt when they

refused to fly until complete insurance coverage was provided for pilots whowere injured during service and for their families (Levy, 2003, pp. 253-255).In 2001, this revolt widened and included some commanders of reserve bat-talions. Although an arrangement was reached, there is no doubt that areservists refusal to carry out a mission constitutes a violation of militarydiscipline and, as such, is illegal.

Yet, reservists, in this case middle-class young people with organizationalskills and access to political networks, opted for this form of alternativepolitics over other, more institutionalized forms. To a large extent, this quasi-exit form of action embodied the crisis of confidence between the reservistsand the IDF senior command that had begun in the mid-1990s.

Traditionally, the IDF drew its strength from the reserve units, which formthe bulk of the armed forces, under a law stipulating that Israeli (Jewish)males must perform reserve duty until their late 40s. The emerging contra-diction we observed between the materialization of the middle class andlengthy reserve service was also reflected in a gradual reduction in the reserveduty, beginning in the mid-1980s, primarily for economic reasons. This ten-dency reduced the equal distribution of burden to a point where only a minor-ity were shouldering the main burden of reserve service. Reaching its peakduring the mid-1990s, this trend not only eroded the reservistsmotivation butalso encouraged unprecedented organizing by reservists.

This conjunction of a motivation crisis with new models of collectiveaction only helped expose, and at the same time encourage, new forms ofbargaining between reservists and the military command. Avoidance of militaryservice, shortening the period of service due to apparent health problems,difficulties in imposing discipline, and the gray forms of disobediencedescribed above were among the types of bargaining. At the same time,



reservists increased their criticism by claiming unequal distribution of theburden among and within units, unfair treatment of reservists, and exploita-tion of reservists as cheap labor in unnecessary administrative tasks.

The foundations have therefore been laid for illegal action by those whobelieve the formal channels are, for all practical purposes, blocked. Veryoften the reservists activists express themselves in the rhetoric of frustration,passivity, and failure in a number of venues, the most prominent of whichis the Hapashim (Hebrew for simple soldiers) Forum (http://ipaper.co.il/cgi-bin/v.cgi). Even the option of forming ad hoc coalitions with politiciansto promote reservists interests was seriously exhausted only in the 2000s.It is against this backdrop that the rebellions mentioned above took place.

The rebellion of soldiers in a conscript military and their refusal to fightis not a new phenomenon. As the case of Vietnam indicates, the draft sys-tem, which blocked alternative routes to rebellions, together with the lackof awareness of the antiwar movements about the actual state of fighting,spurred the emergence of GI underground newspapers (see Lewes, 2003).In Israel, the remains of the notion that Israel is a nation fighting for its verysurvival still constrain other forms of rebellion.

In the long term, however, the new forms of protest propelled the IDFand the government to reform the reserve service. Advocates of the reformclaimed adamantly that refraining from taking strong measures might leadto the collapse of the reserve system (Lubin, 2001), or at least warned thegovernment about the crisis this system faced (Heiman et al., 2004).Consequently, in 2005 the government adopted a reform plan that wouldreduce the load on army reserve soldiers by reducing the age to which theyhad to serve to 40, deploying reserves in emergencies only, shortening theannual period of service, and releasing thousands of soldiers from theservice (Braverman Committee, 2005). Again, alternative politics provedmore effective in bargaining than the established methods.

4. Machsom WatchA Unique Model of Civilian MonitoringMachsom Watch (Checkpoint Watch) is a civil rights movement con-

sisting exclusively of women. It was founded in 2001, inspired by reportsof human rights abuses of Palestinians at the many checkpoints the IDF hadset up throughout the West Bank allegedly to perform security checks onthe Palestinian population. Machsom Watch monitored the behavior of sol-diers and police at the checkpoints through which Palestinians enter Israelto ensure that their human and civil rights were protected, and reported theresults of their observations. Their primary modus operandum was to stand



at each of the main checkpoints observing how Palestinian civilians weretreated by the soldiers. Perceived patterns of abuse and humiliation weredocumented and reported, and very often activists intervened with the sol-diers on site or even helped Palestinians in their interactions with the IDF.Four hundred Jewish women, most of whom are middle-class, professionalwomen, were active in the volunteer organization during the mid-2000s(see http://www.machsomwatch.org/eng/aboutUsEng&lang=eng).

Seen from the perspective of the changing republican contract, the veryentry of the organization into the military scene largely resulted from the par-tial exit of many male, middle-class, secular Ashkenazis from combat roles,the consequence of the undermined contract. Had the secular Ashkenazi exitnot occurred, the more dovish Ashkenazi group might have increased itspresence at the checkpoints and hence improved its ability to inform the highcommand from within of any wrongdoings by soldiers and even to rallypublic opinion through its social networks, as it had often done in the past. Inother words, the exit of the male group triggered the entrance of the femalegroup, whose social background was for the most part identical.

Symbolically, as Machsom Watch activists state on their Web site, theirquiet but assertive presence at checkpoints is a direct challenge to thedominant militaristic discourse that prevails in Israeli society. Indeed,women watchers have often clashed with their watched men.

Conceptually, Machsom Watch offers a unique model of civilian monitor-ing of the military. As an alternative to the customary model of monitoring bywhich civilian groups raise issues and approach the political arena throughthe media, interests groups, and politicians, Machsom Watch has taken anactive part in the monitoring process. Military practices are directly observed.To a large extent, the very presence of women with access to the IDFssenior command and to the media helped restrain the soldiers conduct. Simplysaid, Machsom Watch performed direct, unmediated monitoring over oneof the most sensitive areas of military operation. It is no wonder that thewomen, naturally estranged from male-made militarism, were accused ofdisrupting the work of the soldiers at the checkpoints, work whose goal wasto curb terrorism (Stannard, 2005).

Machsom Watch embodies the quasi-exit form of alternative politics.Pure exit would mean a withdrawal from public politics, as typified by theIsraeli middle class, especially in regard to civilian supervision of thearmed forces (Levy, 2006). On the other hand, the organization did notrestrict itself only to voice, as it did not simply protest against military prac-tices in the West Bank. It is safe to assume that it is precisely the samemood of apathy that brings many members of the upper-middle class to exit



the public sphere that directed Machsom Watch away from futile voicing infavor of this quasi-exit, albeit absolutely legal, mode of action.

Beyond the direct mode of monitoring, by documenting the soldiersbehav-ior, the organizations efforts have proved instrumental in attracting mediaattention and challenging the overall concept of checkpoints. Consequently, thearmy has displayed more sensitivity, improved its monitoring mechanisms,and increased its supervision to counter civilian criticism more effectively.Three main steps are worth noting.

First, the IDF increased the level of communication by placing anArabic-speaking officer or noncommissioned officer at every checkpoint(Israels Prime Ministers Office, 2002). Second, in 2002 the IDF estab-lished the Volunteers Unit, composed of mature, veteran reservists, whojoined the young, conscripted soldiers to help them operate the checkpointsmore sensitively (Buchbut, 2006). Third, in 2005 the Israeli governmentinitiated the civilianization of the crossing points between Israel and theWest Bank to deliberately reduce friction between Palestinian citizens andIsraeli soldiers at the checkpoints (Ben, 2005).

In short, this pattern of alternative politics has proven instrumental notonly in tightening civilian control over the military at a level that exceedsthe direct monitoring of Machsom Watch but also brought about a slightchange in the policies themselves. Though the checkpoints remained inforce, their management has been improved.

Conclusion

In this article, we combined several analytical tools to study alternativepolitics in societymilitary relations. Research can benefit from the mlangeof approaches that combine military sociologywhich examines the linksbetween internal patterns of bargaining within the military and externalpatterns of collective action in the broader societytogether with the conceptualtools of alternative politics that have stemmed from Hirschmans (1970) writing.We maintained that barriers to internal bargaining within the militarythosethat cannot be externalized to the sphere of state-groups bargaining due toexternal barriersgenerate modes of alternative politics.

Treating Israel as a case study for exploring these concepts, this articleillustrated how the dissatisfaction of actors in the military engenders pat-terns of alternative politics provided the actors realize that they cannotovercome fundamental problems by utilizing conventional channels ofinfluence because of structural obstacles inherent in those channels. Such a



realization is part of a learning process, which in itself is motivated bystructural and cultural factors. The article discussed the major processesthat led to the formation of a political culture characterized by unilateralinitiatives, often illegal, quasi-exit behaviors, and alternative politics.Alternative politics, in the form of quasi-exit strategies, exemplify the bal-ance between exit and voice and the combination of both strategies.

Applying this general setting to militarysociety relations, changes in thefoundations of the republican contract may lead to any one of the strategiesdiscussed above. When strong centralization causes the public to believethat channels of influence are blocked and ineffective and the strategies of exitand voice are not available, citizens are pushed toward quasi-exit strategies.The exact type of these strategies is influenced by the nature of the politicalculture, that is, the level of plurality in the society, the legitimacy that socialvalues confer on each strategy, and the extent to which the republican con-tract is undermined. Generalizing from the Israeli case, we may expect, forexample, that a decrease in the economic values of the contract will leadindividuals to perform quasi-exit strategies that will compensate for thisdecrease, whereas a decrease in political rights or values will motivatequasi-exit strategies that will compensate for this loss, as long as in bothcases politicalcultural barriers obstruct exit or make voice futile.

When soldiers who have ideological objections to their missions cannotenter into a dialog about their grievances within the military, and at thesame time feel their grievances are not sufficiently addressed by civilianpoliticians, they adopt conscientious objection. For them, this approachstrikes a balance between defection and gray refusal without voice or voic-ing their protest upon their release from military service. A similar dilemmais resolved in another way by the gray refuseniks, who, to avoid the per-sonal cost, opt for a selective exit rather than voice with explicit refusal.Likewise, reservists who feel they are being discriminated against relativeto their peers who do not serve and feel ignored by civilian politicians butstill feel obliged to honor their military commitments may embark on analternative politics strategy that takes the form of a revolt. Finally, the activistsof Machsom Watch believe that neither reliance on internal military networksof information or bargainingdue to the exit of more moderate social groupsfrom combat rolesnor the reliance on institutional, voice-producedmodes of civilian supervision of the IDF will bring about the restraint ofaggressive behavior at the checkpoints. Hence, their unique model of civilianmonitoring. In each case, had internal or external channels of influencebeen opened, the groups would have probably acted otherwise or been lesseffective in garnering support.



Theoretically, this argument illustrates how the power relations withinthe military and power relations in the ambient society coalesce and workas a web with mutual influences on each other. Having argued for thismutuality, we went beyond existing approaches that focus solely on the uni-directional path of influence from the society to the military or vice versa.Even though we used Israel as a case study, we believe that the article offersa broader conceptual framework because it deals with patterns that exist inother societies, not just in Israel. Gray refusal in the Israeli context mayhave some unique features but also typifies other militaries, for example,the above-mentioned Russian army. Conscientious objection, rebelliousgroups bargaining internally within the military, and active and innovativestrategies by civil rights movements vis--vis the military are evident inother militaries as well. In particular, drafted militaries may stimulate similarpatterns as the very constraints of this recruitment model lay the foundationsfor alternative politics. In each case, our analysis traced the origins of thesequasi-exit patterns to what we conceptualized as barriers to internal bar-gaining within the military that coalesced with external barriers.

Alternative politics thus contribute both to the study of politicsbyidentifying the role of the military in stimulating collective actionand tothe study of militarysociety relationsby borrowing the advanced exit-voice terms of Hirschman.

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Yagil Levy teaches in the Department of Public Policy and Administration and the Division ofMilitary and Security at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. His current research interestsinclude the theoretical aspects of societymilitary relations and the linkage between Israelswar/peace policies and the social structure of the military. He is the author of Trial and Error:Israels Route from War to De-Escalation (State University of New York Press, 1997); TheOther Army of IsraelMaterialist Militarism in Israel (Yediot Achronot Books, 2003, inHebrew); From Peoples Army to Army of the Peripheries (Carmel Publications, 2007, inHebrew); Israels Materialist Militarism (Rowman & Littlefield-Lexington Books, 2007); andco-author of Israel Since 1980 (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming in 2008, with GuyBen-Porat et al).

Shlomo Mizrahi is a senior lecturer and chair of the Department of Public Policy andAdministration at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. His research interests include publicpolicy, public sector performance, public choice and game theory, collective action, bargain-ing and conflict resolution. His recent publications include Political Participation via theJudicial System: Exit, Voice and Quasi-Exit in Israeli Society, Israel Studies (co-authoredwith Assaf Meydani, 2003); The Political Economy of Water Policy in Israel: Theory andPractice, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis (2004); Political Culture, AlternativePolitics and Foreign Policy: The Case of Israel, Policy Sciences (co-authored with Guy Ben-Porat, 2005); and co-author of Israel Since 1980 (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming in2008, with Guy Ben-Porat et al).



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