VIVAS v. BSP and PDIC

703 scra 290

August 7, 2013

FACTS: Petitioner ECBI was placed under receivership due to severe financial difficulties it was experiencing pursuant to MB Resolution 276. It was in accordance with the recommendation of the ISD of the BSP during its general examination of the books and records of ECBI. In addition, the latter was prohibited from doing business in the Philippines. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition before the SC assailing Resolution 276 and ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the Monetary Board of BSP for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking business and for placing it under receivership.

ISSUE: WON the petition for prohibition is proper in the case at bar.

RULING: The Court ruled in the negative.

The petitioner availed of the wrong remedy. The Monetary Board (MB) issued Resolution 276 in the exercise of its power under RA 7653. Under Section 30 thereof, any act of the MB placing a bank under conservatorship, receivership or liquidation may not be restrained or set aside except on a petition for certiorari. Granting that a petition for prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy under the circumstances obtaining. Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law, and confines them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. Its office is to restrain subordinate courts, tribunals or persons from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance. In our jurisdiction, the rule on prohibition is enshrined in Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.

Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which would direct the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished. Though couched in imprecise terms, this petition for prohibition apparently seeks to prevent the acts of closing of ECBI and placing it under receivership. Resolution No. 276, however, had already been issued by the MB and the closure of ECBI and its placement under receivership by the PDIC were already accomplished. Apparently, the remedy of prohibition is no longer appropriate. Settled is the rule that prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli.

The petition is dismissed.

LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD v. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,

706 SCRA 675

October 2, 2013

FACTS: LTFRB accredited UNITRANS as one of the insurance providers and the parties had a five-year contract embodied in a MOA. Respondent Stronghold was the lead insurer of UNITRANS. Before the MOA would expire and after its term was extended, LTFRB thrice opened bidding for the accreditation of new insurance providers. In each round of bidding, LTFRB required a minimum peso capitalization for the lead and member insurers. Respondent Stronghold participated in all three biddings but failed to qualify in the third as its capitalization was below the minimum. Consequently, LTFRB excluded Stronghold’s group from the pool of qualified bidders. Before LTFRB could select the winning bids, Stronghold sought a writ of prohibition from the CA to enjoin LTFRB from opening the bid documents of participating bidders and to nullify the bidding proceedings. Stronghold theorized that "per insurer" basis for reckoning compliance with the minimum capital requirement under the Third Reference violated not only its right of first refusal under the First MOA but also its right to equal protection under the Constitution. The CA merely required the petitioner to file comment. This allowed LTFRB to declare the winners of the bidding and sign the contract with two new groups of insurers. The CA then found merit in Stronghold’s petition and nullified the third round of bidding and ruled that the petitioner gravely abused its discretion in disqualifying Stronghold from the third round of bidding. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 45

ISSUE: WON the issuance of writ of prohibition by the CA is proper.

RULING: The Court ruled in the negative.

The LTFRB committed no grave abuse of discretion. The writ of prohibition lies upon a showing that the assailed proceedings "are conducted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." It is the extra-jurisdictional nature of the contested proceedings that grounds the issuance of the writ, enjoining a tribunal or officer from further acting on the matter before it. In its petition before the CA, Stronghold made no claim that LTFRB lacked jurisdiction to implement the Program or to issue the References. Rather, it rested its case on the theory that LTFRB acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the latter required a minimum capital requirement on a "per insurer" basis. Such requirement was considered by the CA as LTFRB had abused its discretion and the release of Third Reference and made effective in undue haste as issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." This is error, procedurally and substantially. In the first place, the standard under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of prohibition is "grave abuse of discretion" and not mere "abuse of discretion." The difference is not a simple matter of semantics. The writs governed by Rule 65 – certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition – are extraordinary remedies designed to correct not mere errors of judgment but errors of jurisdiction. Unlike the first category of errors which the lower tribunal commits in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the latter class of errors is committed by a lower tribunal devoid of jurisdiction or, alternatively, for exercising jurisdiction in an "arbitrary or despotic manner." By conflating "abuse of discretion" with "grave abuse of discretion," the CA failed to follow the rigorous standard of Rule 65, diluting its office of correcting only jurisdictional errors.

Spouses Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales of the Department of Justice

688 scra 109

January 8, 2013

Facts:

The petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso Delos Angeles and his associates after the petitioners were defrauded in a business venture. Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary issued Department Order 182 which directs all prosecutors in the country to forward all cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate action. However, in a separate order which is Memorandum dated March 2009, it was said that cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles et. al of the Legacy Group of Companies in Cagayan De Oro City need not be sent anymore to the Secretariat of DOJ in Manila. Because of such DOJ orders, the complaint of petitioners was forwarded to the secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ in Manila. Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing to the respondent Secretary of justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing the department Order and the Memorandum, which according to the violated their right to due process, right to equal protection of the law and right to speedy disposition of the cases. The petitioners opined that orders were unconstitutional or exempting from coverage cases already filed and pending at the Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan De Oro City. They contended that the assailed issuances should cover only future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al, not those already being investigated. They maintained that DO 182 was issued in violation of the prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed issuances can be given retroactive effect.

held:

Yes. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but operates only in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation already existing rights. The retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, no vested right generally attaches to or arises from procedural law.

DOLOT V PAJE, ETC., ET AL

703 scra 6502013

Facts:

Petitioner Maricris D. Dolot, together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the oFcers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog, ±led a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and attorney’s fees with the RTC of Sorsogon. The petition contained the following pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to ²ooding and landslides, and confronted with the environmental dangers of ²ood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have the required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the Presidential Management Sta³ and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of the people of Matnog ; (7) the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code. Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others. The case was referred to the RTC of Sorsogon, being the designated environmental court. In the Order, the case was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: Won failure to furnish copy of petition is a fatal defect?

Held:

The court held that failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a fatal defect such that the case should be dismissed. The RTC could have just required the petitioners to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents. It should be remembered that “courts are not enslaved by technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard.

Garcia v. CA689 SCRA 329

January 28, 2013

Facts:Private respondent Rudy Tesoro (Tesoro), among others, was found liable for the flawed

bidding process of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) regarding the construction of the GSIS Iloilo City Field Office (GSIS-ICFO) Building. He was the Senior Vice-President of the Field Operations Group (SVP-FOG) of GSIS when the anomalous act/s transpired.

Tesoro was formally charged on February 19, 2004 with Gross Neglect of Duty, Grave Misconduct and/or Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations under the pertinent provision of the Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to the pertinent provision of Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 99-1936. During the pendency of GSIS’s formal investigation, Tesoro filed a Petition with Prayer for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the CA. Petitioner Winston Garcia (Garcia), as President and General Manager of GSIS, ruled Tesoro administratively liable in his Decision dated May 24, 2006 (Adm. Case No. 04-001). Tesoro filed a motion for reconsideration of such decision but was denied by Garcia. Garcia filed his Comment in the CA then Tesoro filed his reply to such. Aside from the petition filed by Tesoro in the CA, he also appealed the order of preventive suspension as well as Garcia’s decision to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

In the meantime, upon reevaluation, the GSIS Physical Resources Bids and Awards Committee (PRBAC) declared a “failure of bidding” pursuant to Sec. 41 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of of R.A. 9184; the contract for the construction of the GSIS-ICFO building entered into by Embrocal with Tesoro was null and void ab initio. Thus, Embrocal should return the mobilization fees illegally released to it. The COA Regional Legal and Adjudication Office later issued a Notice of Disallowance of the amount released to Embrocal as mobilization fee. Tesoro, among others, was found liable for the disallowed sum; he has not filed any motion for reconsideration of the said disallowance. Then the CA modified the Formal Charge dated February 19, 2004 and Garcia’s Decision dated May 24, 2004. Tesoro received CA’s decision on April 22, 2005; he filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File the Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the lawyer in charge of the case, Atty. Violeta C.F. Quintos of the Investigation Unit, had to immediately take a flight to Cebu City on April 24, 2005 because her father died; she is expected to report for work on May 5, 2005. The motion for reconsideration was filed on May 16, 2005. Tesoro filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment and Writ of Execution. He likewise filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Appeal in CSC. The CA denied petitioner’s motion for extension to file a motion for reconsideration and merely noted private respondent’s motion. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Issue: WON petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the correct remedy?

Ruling:No. Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the correct remedy.

Based on the facts the CA thus exceeded its certiorari jurisdiction when it reviewed the alleged errors of the disciplining authority not only in finding a prima facie case against the private respondent but also in determining his guilt. This despite the fact that the rendition of the decision in Adm. Case No. 04-001 by the disciplining authority (GSIS) was earlier brought to the attention of the CA.

A certiorari proceeding is limited in scope and narrow in character. The special civil action for certiorari lies only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and not a petition for certiorari.

Considering that the CA did not declare any act of the petitioner to have been exercised without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, the grant of relief to private respondent by sentencing him to a lower offense with reduced penalty cannot be sustained. Whether the private respondent may be held liable for Gross Neglect of Duty as stated in the Formal Charge or for the lower offense of Simple Neglect of Duty should be properly threshed out in Adm. Case No. 04-001 and thereafter in a timely appeal to the Civil Service Commission, not in the certiorari proceedings before the CA seeking nullification of the Formal Charge and preventive suspension order.

Sang-an v. Equator Knights Detective and Security Agency, Inc.690 SCRA 534

February 13, 2013

Facts:Jonathan Sang-an (Sang-an), as Assistant Operation Manager of respondent Equator Knights

Detective and Security Agency, Inc. (Equator), was, among others, in charge of safekeeping Equator’s firearms. Equator discovered that two (2) firearms were missing from its inventory which led to Sang-an’s temporary suspension pending further investigation. While Sang-an was under suspension, a security guard from Equator was apprehended by policemen for violating the COMELEC’ gun ban rule. The security guard stated in his affidavit that Sang-an issued to him the unlicensed firearm.

Sang-an filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal suspension with prayer for reinstatement while Equator argued that Sang-an’s dismissal was not illegal; it was a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code. LA dismissed the complaint. Sang-an appealed to the NLRC which sustained the findings of the LA that there had been just cause for Sang-an’s dismissal but he had been denied his right to due process when he was dismissed. NLRC denied Equator’s motion for reconsideration prompting the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA. CA reversed NLRC’s decision; it reinstated the LA’s decision dismissing Sang-an’s complaint. Sang-an filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari contending that when Equator filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC, it failed to post a cash or surety bond as required by Article 223 of the Labor Code. Without complying with this condition, the petition for certiorari should have been dismissed outright.

Issue: WON the posting of a cash or surety bond is required for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA?

Ruling:No. The posting of a cash or surety bond is not required for the filing of a petition

for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA.

The requirement of a cash or surety bond as provided under Article 223 of the Labor Code only applies to appeals from the orders of the LA to the NLRC. It does not apply to special civil actions such as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In fact, nowhere under Rule 65 does it state that a bond is required for the filing of the petition.

A petition for certiorari is an original and independent action and is not part of the proceedings that resulted in the judgment or order assailed before the CA. It deals with the issue of jurisdiction, and may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court or tribunal prior to an appeal from the judgment, or to a final judgment where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy provided by law or by the rules.

(JASMIN MARAMAG PART)

SKIP

A. Dongson v. Rapid 704 scra 56

B. Republic v. Roque 706 scra 273

Digital Telecoms v. Cantos

710 SCRA 514

November 25, 2013

Facts: In a Decision, the CA found no merit in the appeal. First, it noted that the dismissal of the case for indirect contempt by the RTC amounted to an acquittal from which an appeal is not allowed.The respondent’s act of issuing the warrants of levy did not constitute indirect contempt since the final Decision issued in said case was not directed against him but to the Mayor and the Chief of the Permit and License Division of Balayan, Batangas.

Issue

1. WON a case for indirect contempt which is dismissed by the lower court would amount to acquittal

2. WON the respondent cannot be held in contempt for refusing to abide by the decision.

Held:

1. Yes.. Indeed, contempt is not a criminal offense. However, a charge for contempt of court partakes of the nature of a criminal action. Rules that govern criminal prosecutions strictly apply to a prosecution for contempt. In fact, Section 11 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides that the appeal in indirect contempt proceedings may be taken as in criminal cases. This Court has held that an alleged contemner should be accorded the same rights as that of an accused. Thus, the dismissal of the indirect contempt charge against respondent amounts to an acquittal, which effectively bars a second prosecution.

2. Yes. the acts of respondent in issuing the Warrants of Levy and in effecting the public auction sale of petitioner’s real properties, were neither intended to undermine the authority of the court nor resulted to disobedience to the lawful orders of Branch IX. He merely performed a ministerial function.

Lozada v. Zerrudo

695 SCRA 374

April 10, 2013

Facts: Respondent Sermonia and Zerrudo who were employees of the judiciary took the record sheets and humiliated the complainant who is a security guard. Almost 2 years have occurred yet respondent did no file their respective comment despite many extension of time was granted to them with regard to the complaint filed in the OCA. The OCA also considered the relevant fact that respondents Zerrudo and Sermonia are either facing other administrative complaints or have been previously penalized by the Court. Hence, it was recommended that respondents Zerrudo and Sermonia be found guilty of the offense charged and accordingly suspended for six (6) months without pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely by the Court.

Issue: WON the conduct of employees of the judiciary, particularly those in the first and second level courts, must be circumscribed by the proper and ethical standards.

Held: Yes. the conduct required of court personnel must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility since the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work therein, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel.

General v. Urro

646 SCRA 657

2012

Facts:

Petitioner filed the present petition for quo warranto, questioning the validity of the respondents appointments mainly on the ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments.

The petitioner claims that Roces was supposed to serve a full term of six years counted from the date of her appointment. Since she failed to finish her six-year term, then the petitioner is entitled to serve this unexpired portion.

Issue:

Whether or not the appointments were valid

Ruling:

Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority. The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail.

Arquero vs CA

658 SCRA 70

2012

Facts:

Petitioner filed the Petition for Quo Warranto before the RTC of Palawan against public and private respondents. Petitioner argued that the designation of private respondent deprived her of her right to exercise her function and perform her duties in violation of her right to security of tenure. Considering that petitioner was appointed in a permanent capacity, she insisted that private respondent’s designation as OIC of the PNS is null and void there being no vacancy to the position. Petitioner thus prayed that the RTC issue an order granting the writ of quo warranto enjoining private respondent from assuming the position of OIC of the PNS.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA is correct in reversing the RTC decision

Ruling:

Yes.

A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office. It may be brought by the Republic of the Philippines or by the person claiming to be entitled to such office.

petitioner failed to establish her right to the contested position. Therefore, the dismissal of her quo warranto petition is in order

DE CASTRO v. CARLOS696 scra 400

April 16, 2013

FACTS:

A Petition for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto under Rule 66 was filed by De Castro seeking to oust respondent Carlos from the position of assistant Manager for Operations of the MMDA. The service vehicle and the office space previously assigned to him were withdrawn and assigned to other employees.

Petitioner was later offered the position of Director IV of MMDA Public Health and Safety Services and/or MMDA consultant. He turned down the offer, claiming that it was a demotion in rank. President Aquino appointed respondent as the new AGMO of the MMDA.

Article 8 sec. 5(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that SC has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of this court is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of the CA and RTC and does not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed. "A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise a franchise or an office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well-founded, or if his right to enjoy the privilege has been forfeited." Where the action is filed by a private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner is correct in filing a writ of quo warranto against the respondent.

RULING:

No. Firmly established by law and jurisprudence that a permanent appointment in the civil service is issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which the appointment is made in accordance with law and the rules issued pursuant thereto. An appointment is permanent where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, and it is temporary where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position except only the appropriate civil service eligibility.

In a quo warranto proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent a showing of that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial.

REPUBLIC v. LEGASPI SR670 SCRA 110April 18, 2012

FACTS:

Rosalina Libo-on accomplished a letter of intent signifying her willingness to sell a property. A Deed of Definite Sale was executed by the parties whereby Rosalina, with the conformity of her then tenant, Vicente Libo-on, sold the property in favor of UP. As a consequence, UP immediately took possession of the property and, in line with its educational development plan, started building thereon road networks, infrastructure and school facilities. The record shows that further use and development of the property was subsequently taken up at the 1093 rd meeting of the UP Board of Regents. Rosalina wrote a letter, informing UPV that she was rescinding the sale of the subject parcel on the ground that she was no longer the owner of the property by way of barter or exchange in favor of respondents Rodolfo Legaspi et al.

UP filed a complaint for eminent domain against the respondents with the RTC. RTC granted petitioner’s motion to continue its possession. Though later on RTC reversed its decision. Aggrieved, Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus on the ground of grave abuse of discretion attended the denial of the expropriation. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. ISSUE:

WON CA erred in denying the expropriation and affirming the decision of the RTC.

RULING:

Yes. We find the petition impressed with merit.Expropriation or the exercise of the power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the

state and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully delegated to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation. Governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings therefor consist of two (2) stages: (a) the condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use; and, (b) the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners

NPC VS ILETO

676 SCRA 107

2012

FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a complaint, which was subsequently amended, seeking to expropriate certain parcels of land in Bulacan, in connection with its Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line project. To determine the issue of just compensation, the RTC constituted a team of commissioners Heirs of Sofia Mangahas and the NPC filed with the RTC a jointly executed compromise agreement where they agreed that NPC would acquire 13,855 square meters of the 95,445 square meter property owned by the Heirs of Sofia Mangahas. In turn, the NPC would pay the Heirs of Sofia Mangahas the total amount of P3,463,750.00 as just compensation for the property, with an assessed value of P250.00 per square meter. Sps. Florimon V. Ileto and Rowena Nolasco, the Sps. Valero and the Brillos manifested their consent to the recommended price of P250.00 per square meter. The RTC found the compromise agreement to be proper, and rendered a partial decision approving it However, the CA held that the RTC erred when it fixed the valuation of the other expropriated lands at P250.00, distinguishing the lands owned by the Heirs of Sofia Mangahas from the other expropriated lands, based on their classification. The CA thus computed the value of the other expropriated lands owned by the Sps. Ileto,

ISSUE: WON the court erred in the expropriation.

HELD: We cannot affirm the RTC’s decision in fixing just compensation of all the subject properties at P250.00 per square meter, for lack of legal or factual basis. To determine the just compensation to be paid to the landowner, the nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion. In the present case, the RTC made a determination that all the properties subject of the NPC’s expropriation complaint, regardless of their location or classification, should be valued at P250.00 per square meter. In arriving at this valuation, It is apparent from this RTC explanation that Commissioner Tayag and Commissioner Villacorta based their recommendation for just compensation of all the properties in question solely on the value fixed in the compromise agreement between the NPC and the Heirs of Sofia Mangahas. But in accepting this recommendation, the RTC failed to take into consideration the fact that the property subject of the compromise agreement is located in Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan, while the other properties subject of the RTC’s decision are located in other municipalities in Bulacan. Even worse, the commissioners’ recommended valuation is not supported by any corroborative evidence, such as sworn declarations of realtors in the area concerned and tax declarations or zonal valuation from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It does not even appear from the records that the commissioners conducted any ocular inspections to determine the location, nature, character, condition, and other specific features of the expropriated lands that should have been taken into account before making their recommendation. we find that the trial court arbitrarily fixed the amount of just compensation due

the landowners at P250.00 per square meter. Thus, the Court has no alternative but to remand the case to the court of origin for the proper determination of just compensation.

NDC V. YCLA

712 SCRA 550

2013

FACTS: In order to complete its 69 KV Calapan-Mamburao Island Grid Project in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, NPC had to construct transmission lines that would traverse several private properties, including the said parcels of land owned by YCLA. NPC filed a Complaint for expropriation with the RTC against YCLA and several other individuals. The NPC sought the expropriation of a portion of the parcels of land owned by the said defendants for the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way over areas that would be affected by the construction of transmission lines. The portion of YCLAs properties that would be affected by the construction of NPCs transmission lines has an aggregate area of 5,846 square meters. YCLA filed its Answer, alleging that the Complaint should be dismissed outright due to NPCs failure to allege the public use for the intended expropriation of its properties. The RTC pointed out that the Board of Commissioners Report, which recommended that the amount of just compensation be fixed at P 500.00 per sq m, was arrived at without conducting an ocular inspection of the subject properties. That, upon YCLAs request, the Board of Commissioners subsequently conducted an ocular inspection of the subject properties, which prompted them to revise their earlier recommendation.NPC appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in relying on the recommendation of the Board of Commissioners as regards the amount of just compensation. NPC claimed that the amount of P1,000.00 per sq m recommended by the Board of Commissioners as the reasonable amount of just compensation, which was adopted by the RTC, is too excessive considering that the subject properties were barren and undeveloped agricultural lands at the time it instituted the action for expropriation. The CA held that the RTCs determination of the amount of just compensation was reasonable notwithstanding that it was merely based on the Report submitted by the Board of Commissioners. The RTC pointed out that there was no showing that the said Report was tainted with irregularity, fraud or bias. Nevertheless, the CA modified the award rendered by the RTC, by fixing the amount of just compensation to P900.00 per sq m instead of P1,000.00 per sq m, since YCLA only sought an award of P900.00 per sq m as just compensation for the subject properties in the proceedings before the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC and the CA had sufficient basis in arriving at the questioned amount of just compensation of the subject properties.

HELD: RTC and CA decisions set aside.In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be a

sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.It is settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. In this case, in arriving at the amount of just compensation, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily on the Board of Commissioners Report, which, in turn, was arrived at after conducting an ocular inspection of the subject properties. However, the Board of Commissioners recommendation as to the amount of just compensation was based on the prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003. What escaped the attention of the lower courts is that the prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003 cannot be used to determine the amount of just compensation considering that the Complaint for expropriation was filed by NPC on December 2, 1997. Further, the Court notes that the Board of Commissioners, in its Report, merely alleged that its members arrived at the amount of P1,000.00 per sq m as just compensation for the subject properties based on actual sales, presumably of surrounding parcels of land, and on the opinion of reliable persons that were interviewed. However, the Report dated September 15, 2003 is not supported by any corroborative documents such as sworn declarations of the reliable persons that were supposedly interviewed.

Dolot vs Paje

703 scra 650August 27, 2013

Facts:

Maricris Dolot filed a petition that sometime in 2009 they protested that an ore mining company in the municipality of Matnog violated a number of laws including not having a permit and Republic Act no. 7076. The petitioners find it their right to protect the environment. The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated environmental court. In the Order dated September 16, 2011, the case was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-8338.

Held:

Yes it has and RTC cannot solely rely on SC.A.O. No. 7 and Admin Circular No. 23-2008 whether it has jurisdiction over the case. None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by law.It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings. By virtue of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC. Particularly, Section 21 thereof provides that the RTCs shall exercise original jurisdiction – in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions. Hence, the filing by the Republic of the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation impleading Teofilo, Vidal, LANDTRADE, and AZIMUTH, is not necessarily an admission that the parcels of land sought to be expropriated are privately owned. At most, the Republic merely acknowledged in its Supplemental Complaint that there are private persons also claiming ownership of the parcels of land. The Republic can still consistently assert, in both actions for expropriation and reversion, that the subject parcels of land are part of the public domain. In sum, the RTC-Branch 1 erred in dismissing the original Complaint and disallowing the Supplemental Complaint in Civil Case No. 106. The Court reverses and sets aside the Resolutions dated July 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005 of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case 106, and reinstates the Complaint for Reversion of the Republic.

DELA PEÑA v. AVILA

665 scra 553

February 8, 2012

FACTS:

In view of Gemma’s failure to pay the principal as well as the accumulated interest and penalties on the loans she obtained, FEBTC-BPI caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted over the property. As the highest bidder at the public auction conducted in the premises, FEBTC-BPI later consolidated its ownership over the realty and caused the same to be titled in its name under TCT No. 415392 of the Marikina registry.14

On 25 September 1999, the Dela Peñas filed a supplemental complaint, impleading FEBTC-BPI as additional defendant. Calling attention to Antonia’s 3 March 1998 Affidavit of Adverse Claim and the Notice of Lis Pendens they purportedly caused to be annotated on TCT No. 337834 on 10 December 1999, the Dela Peñas alleged that FEBTC-BPI was in bad faith when it purchased the property at public auction on 15 March 1999.

On 18 December 2007, the RTC went on to render a Decision Brushing aside FEBTC-BPI’s claim of good faith, Aggrieved, FEBTC-BPI perfected the appeal. On 31 March 2009 the CA’s Second Division rendered the herein assailed decision, reversing the RTC’s appealed decision.S

ISSUE:

WON foreclosure is proper.

HELD:

Since foreclosure of the mortgage is but the necessary consequence of non-payment of the mortgage debt FEBTC-BPI was, likewise, acting well within its rights as mortgagee when it foreclosed the real estate mortgage on the property upon Gemma’s failure to pay the loans secured thereby. Executed on 26 November 1997, the mortgage predated Antonia’s filing of an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the Register of Deeds of Marikina on 3 March 1998 and the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on TCT No. 337834 on 10 December 1999. "The mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfilment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. When the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee consequently has the right to foreclose the mortgage, sell the property, and apply the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of the unpaid loan.

SPOUSES DELOS SANTOS v. METROPOLITAN BANK ANDTRUST COMPANY

684 scra 410

October 24, 2012

FACTS:The petitioners took out several loans totaling P12M from Metrobank, Davao City Branch; the proceeds of which they would use in constructing a hotel on their land located in Davao City. They executed various promissory notes covering the loans, and constituted a mortgage over their parcel of land to secure the performance of their obligation.

Subsequently, Metrobank sought the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage after the petitioners defaulted in their installment payments. Prior to the scheduled foreclosure sale, the petitioners filed in the RTC a complaint with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction alleging that they were not in default of their obligations. In the meantime, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the foreclosure sale. After hearing on notice, the RTC issued its order dated May 2, 2000, granting the petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary injunction. This was reversed upon Metrobank’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners were entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction.HELD:NO. The foreclosure of a mortgage is but a necessary consequence of the non-payment of an obligation secured by the mortgage. Where the parties have stipulated in their agreement, mortgage contract and promissory note that the mortgagee is authorized to foreclose the mortgage upon the mortgagor's default, the mortgagee has a clear right to the foreclosure in case of the mortgagor's default. Thereby, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the application of the mortgagor will be improper. Mindful that an injunction would be a limitation upon the freedom of action of Metrobank, the RTC justifiably refused to grant the petitioners' application for the writ of preliminary injunction. We underscore that the writ could be granted only if the RTC was fully satisfied that the law permitted it and the emergency demanded it. That, needless to state, was not true herein.

.

United Coconut Planters Bank v. Lumbo

712 scra 21711 December 2013

FACTS:

The case involves the institution of an extrajudicial foreclosure over the property of the respondents located in Boracay, including the improvements thereon, by UCPB. UCPB emerged as the highest bidder. Thereafter, it successfully registered the subject property under its name as well as facilitated the consolidation of the title over the same when the respondents failed to redeem it within the prescribed period. The respondents filed for the annulment of foreclosure, legal accounting and injunction against the consolidation of title and damages. During the pendency of the case, UCPB filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession to recover possession of the property, which was granted by the RTC. The writ of possession was served on the respondents with a demand for them to peacefully vacate the property. Although the possession of the property was turned over to UCPB respondents were allowed to temporarily remain on the property for humanitarian reasons. Respondents then filed with the same RTC a petition to cancel the writ of possession and to set aside the foreclosure sale. RTC denied said application. As such, respondents appealed to the CA. CA granted respondent’s petition. Aggrieved, petitioner went to SC for recourse.

ISSUE: Whether or not the implementation of a writ of possession issued pursuant to Act No. 3135 at the instance of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property in whose name the title has been consolidated can be prevented by an injunctive writ?

HELD:

No. SC explained that in an extrajudicial foreclosure the purchaser at the foreclosure sale may apply ex parte with the RTC of the province or place where the property or any part of it is situated, to give the purchaser possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor should it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of Act No. 3135; and the RTC, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession be issued, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall then execute said order immediately. The application for a writ of possession by the purchaser in a foreclosure sale conducted under Act No. 3135 is ex parte and summary in nature, brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice being sent by the court to any person adverse in interest. The relief is granted even without giving an opportunity to be heard to the person against whom the relief is sought. 16 Its nature as an ex parte petition under Act No. 3135, as amended, renders the application for the issuance of a writ of possession a non-litigious proceeding. Indeed, the grant of the writ of possession is but a ministerial act on the part of the issuing court, because its issuance is a matter of right on the part of the purchaser.

SC also underscored that the reckoning of the period of redemption by the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest starts from the registration of the sale in the Register of Deeds. Although Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended, specifies that the period of redemption starts from and after the date of the sale, jurisprudence has since settled that such period is more appropriately reckoned from the date of registration. If the redemption period expires without the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest redeeming the foreclosed property within one year from the registration of the

sale with the Register of Deeds, the title over the property consolidates in the purchaser. The consolidation confirms the purchaser as the owner entitled to the possession of the property without any need for him to file the bond required under Section 7 of Act No. 3135. The issuance of a writ of possession to the purchaser becomes a matter of right upon the consolidation of title in his name, while the mortgagor, by failing to redeem, loses all interest in the property.

(CARL CORTEZ PART)

Casilang v. Casilang

Jem Martin Part

Leovereras v. Valdez 652 scra 61