2nd vdebate 1nc

8/3/2019 2nd vdebate 1NC

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PICCounterplan:United States federal government should deploy space-based lasers in low earthorbit beyond the Earths mesosphere for the purpose of ballistic missile defense and anti-satellite capability.

Use of The before United States Congress inscribes nationalistic geopolitics, creating us-themdichotomiesThrift 2k (Nigel, University of Warwick Vice Chancellor, University of Bristol Professor of Geography, Its the LittleThings, Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought p.383-385)

Let us finally come to one more arena: the arena ofwords. After all, here we might be thought to have the clearest example of representation atwork, the word. Yet,what we do not get from critical geopolitics is a clear enough sense of how words function to bring aboutgeopolitical change and it is not possible to do so as long as geopolitical forces continue to be framed as bigand commanding (with all the masculine overtones). Some ofthe most potent geopolitical forces are, I suspect, lurking in thelittle details of peoples lives, what is carried in the specific variabilities of their activities (Shotter and Billig 1998:23), in the context ofutterances. And these variabilities have immediate consequences. Thus, As Bakhtin notes, and as is confirmed by the work in conversational analysis, we sensitively catch the smallest shift inintonation, the slightest interruption of voices in anything of importance to us in another persons practical everyday discourse. All those verbal sideward glances, reservations, loopholes, hints, thrusts donot slip past our ear, are not foreign to our own lips (Bakhtin 1984:201). And we in turn show our stance to what they do or say also in fleeting bodily reactions, facial expressions, sounds of approval ordisapproval, etc. Indeed, even in the continuously responsive unfolding of non-linguistic activities between ourselves and othersin a dance, in a handshake, or even a mere chance collision on the street

we are actively aware of whether the others motives are, so to speak, in tune or at odds with ours. And in our sense of their attunement or lack of it, we can sense their attitude to us as intimate ordistant, friendly or hostile, deferenti al or arrogant, and so on. (Shotter and Billig 1998:23) Thus, very effective work has been done in disciplines like anthropology and discursive psychology (Billig 1995,

1997) which attempts to provide a sense of hownational identity and an accompanyinggeopolitical stance are inscribed through the smallestof details. Thus, for example, national identity is not accomplished in grand displays which incite the citizen to wave the flag in a fit of patriotic fervourInstead, it goes on in more mundane citations:it is done unobtrusivelyon the margins of conscious awareness bylittle words such as the and we. Each day we read orhear phrases such as the prime minister, the nation, or the weather. The definite article assumes deictically thenational borders. It points to the homeland: but while we, the readers or listeners, understand the pointing, we do not follow it with our consciousness it is aseen but unnoticed feature of our everyday discourse.6 (Shotter and Billig 1998:20) Such work goes some waytowardsunderstanding the deep, often unconscious aggressionswhich lurk behind so much geopolitical reasoning,

which through small details build a sense of us as not like them, and from which political programmes then flow as infractions are identified and made legible.7

In these few brief comments, I hoped to have outlined a parallel agenda for critical geopolitics , one still based on discourse, but on discourseunderstood in a broader way, and one which is less taken in by representation and more attuned to actual practices. In turn, such an agenda leads us away from interpretation of hyperbolic written and

drawn rhetorics (which, I suspect, are often read by only a few and taken in by even fewer) towards the (I hesitate to say real)work of discourse, the constant hum of practicesand their attendant territorializations within which geopower ferments and sometimesboils over.

Geopolitical borders fuel racism and violenceDike 02(Mustafa, University of London Royal Holloway Geography Dept. Human Geography Lecturer, Pera PerasPoros: Longing for Spaces of Hospitality, Theory Culture Society)

Californias Proposition 187 was an attempt to build safe homes for Californians, not for all of them of course. The political abuse of the image of home as a sheltered and safe place drew upon anexclusionary, territorializing, xenophobic, premodern and patriarchal cult of home (Antonopoulos, 1994: 57). It was an elaborate fixing of boundaries, making California a safe home for its legal residents

based on the exclusionary politics of home. Boundaries, evidently, not onlyevoke the idea of hospitality, but ofhostility and racism as well.12 It is important toremember, however, that it is not only the situation of the guest but also the host that needs to be reconsidered since, in the case of immigration, for example, it is both receivingpopulations and immigrants [that] . . . risk mutual transformation, [that] . . . engage and attenuate their home-yearning for each others sakes and for the sake of their political life together (Honig, 1999:203). The point, therefore, is about openings, about keeping open the question of who the people (the demos) is, since the question of democracy always arises at the limit of the demos . . . wherein

native, subject, citizen, or people receives its designation as such from the way the human encounter with the stranger and the strange is assumed (Dillon, 1999: 120 and 96). There is a needto reconsider the boundary , not only as a separator but as a connector as well, where hospitality comes into play pointing beyond the boundaries.There is a need, perhaps, to reflect on what the title words, in Greek, of this text suggest: Pera peras poros: the other side/beyond limit passage; beyond the limits that interdict passage (Baptist,

1999: 102). There is a need, more importantly, if a cosmopolitan approach is to be assumed, to think about hospitality that would be more than cosmopolitical, that would go beyond strictly cosmopolitical

conditions, that would go beyond the interests, authority, and legislation of the state (Derrida, 1999a: 43). To conclude, there is no way, I would argue, to escape the adventof the stranger, to avoid questions and questionings that tremble, if not stir, the socio-political order that once appeared, perhaps, as a safe home. Nor is there a way to avoid the production ofothers.What is more important, instead of reflecting on the ways by which no other would be produced, is to be able to resist processes that produceand reproduce others; processes that stabilize themselves, that close spaces, and that derive their sustainability from the very processof othering itself. Again, what is more important, rather than reflecting on the ways by which to avoid the disturbance of thestranger, is to be able to provide for the social, cultural,institutional, ethical and political spaces where we could learn to engage with and learn from each other, while beingable to constitute our subjectivities free from subordination, in democratic ways. The point, then, is to open spaces, spaces where recognition as well as contestation and conflict can take place.

Furthermore, the point is not merelyto open spaces ; more importantly, it is to keep them open . Hospitality is aimed at such a concern.


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A-SpecThey dont specify their agent thats a voting issue

Kills neg ground they can say the plan is implemented differently than our disads assume which lets themspike out of all our links

Prevents us from knowing how the government works, prevents any policy implementation


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T-IncreaseInterpretation increase requires an expansion on a pre-existing structure.

Buckley et al, 06 - attorney (Jeremiah, Amicus Curiae Brief, Safeco Ins. Co. of America et al v. Charles Burr et al,http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/06-84/06-84.mer.ami.mica.pdf)First, the court said that the ordinary meaning of the word increase is to make something greater, which it believed should not be limited to cases in which a

company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged. 435 F.3d at 1091. Yet the definition offered by the Ninth Circuit compels the opposite

conclusion. Because increase means to make something greater, there must necessarily have been an

existing premium, to which Edos actual premium may be compared, to determine whether an increase occurred. Congresscould have provided that ad-verse action in the insurance context means charging an amount greater than the optimal premium, but instead chose to define adverse

action in terms of an increase. That def-initional choice must be respected, not ignored. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392-93 n.10 (1979) ([a] defin-itionwhich declares what a term means . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated).

Next, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the Insurance Prong includes the words existing or applied for, Congress intended that an increase in any charge forinsurance must apply to all insurance transactions from an initial policy of insurance to a renewal of a long-held policy. 435 F.3d at 1091. This interpretation read

the words exist-ing or applied for in isolation. Other types of adverse action described in the Insurance Prong apply only to situations where a consumer had an

existing policy of insurance, such as a cancellation, reduction, or change in insurance. Each of these forms of adverse action presupposes an already-existing

policy, and under usual canons of statutory construction the term increase also should be construed to apply to increases of an already-existing policy. See Hibbs v.

Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it) (citation omitted).

B. Violation The affirmative doesnt increase an existing program

C.Standards

Ground They steal our ground by creating some program that doesnt exist, we cant expect an affthat doesnt have any pre-existing framework in the government.

Limits They explode the case list, any new program could be created.

Voting issue for fairness
http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/06-84/06-84.mer.ami.mica.pdfhttp://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/06-84/06-84.mer.ami.mica.pdf


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T-Development/Exploration

Development is manned projectsLivingston 07 former adjunct professor in the Graduate School of Business at Golden Gate University his doctoral dissertation was titledOuter Space Commerce: Its History and Prospects citing Eric Westling co-author of The Space Elevator and numerous papers on space tech anddevelopment [quals in card] (9/10/07, This Week On The Space Show: Eric Westling, http://www.thespaceshow.com/guest.asp?q=298)

Eric Westling is ascience writer, pundit on science, technology, and economics. He is the co-author of The Space Elevator withDr. Brad Edwards . In addition, Mr. Westling is retired and is a former Army officer and helicopter pilot, civilian Airline Transport Pilot (ATP),

former consultant to many small companies regarding engineering, computer, and business troubleshooting. His most recent papers are onSolar Power Satellites, Economics ofthe Space Elevator, Energyand time lag in the 21st century , and Erics axioms (a list of principlesof science, technology and economics). Mr. Westling stats that Space Development is the only long term answer to the, just starting, energy shortage;

which will otherwise continue until we have an economic collapse. Hebelieves that no-one is doing space development . Instead,we have space technology, not development. NASA has no TRL 10 therefore no plans to developspace . He defines space development as the rapid expansion ofmanned commercial projects inspace.

Violation they weaponize space

Voting issue

limitsAllowing the aff to do anything in space is unpredictable. The aff would race to the smallest possible aff barely related to space. Only

we force the aff to have predictable mechanism thats is the key internal link to education because predictability is a prerequisite to

research and clash.

groundWe lose all space science based generics because they can say earth science, which is perceived very differently Small satellites

dont link to spending or trade off disads.
http://www.thespaceshow.com/guest.asp?q=298http://www.thespaceshow.com/guest.asp?q=298


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Fiat is Extra-TOur interpretation is that affirmative action should be limited to the mandates of theresolution; fiat is not part of that, making it extra topical.

Voting issuePredictability- resolution is all that the negative has to research, allowing theaffirmative to go outside the bounds of the resolution destroys negativeground.Ground- we are prepared to debate the consequences of the aff advocating theresolution, we have reasons why advocating that the USFG should dosomething is bad


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ORS Counterplan

Counterplan: The United States federal government should sign the EU Code of Conduct andsubstantially increase the development of Operationally Responsive Space by developingmilitary launch infrastructure that includes deployment of small satellites, capacity for launchon demand and rapid satellite reconstitution, constellation architecture, improvement of spacesituational awareness, preplanned actions, maneuverability, and hardening of its militarysatellites.

Defensive measures are consistent with a code of conduct but combining it withweaponization will destroy international supportKrepon et al, 11 President of the Henry L. Stimson Center, also Theresa Hitchens, Director of the United Nations Institute for DisarmamentResearch and Michael Katz-Hyman, Research Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center on the Space Security and South Asia Projects (Michael, Towarda Theory of Space Power: Selected Essays, February, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf)

Because the use of weapons in or from space can lead to the loss or impairment of satellites of all major spacepowers, all of whom depend on satellites for military and economic security, we believe it is possible to craft a regime basedon self-interest to avoid turning space into a shooting gallery. This outcome is far more difficult to achieve ifmajor space powers engage in the flight-testing and deployment ofdedicated ASATweapons or space-to-Earth weapons. Wetherefore argue that it would be most unwise for the United States, as the spacepower with the most to lose from the impairment of itssatellites, to initiate these steps. Similar restraint, however, needs to be exercised by other major spacefaring nations, some of which may feelthat the preservation and growth of U.S. spacepower are a threat, or that it is necessary to hold U.S. space assets at risk. The United States is therefore

obliged to clarify to others the risks of initiating actions harmful to U.S. satellites without prompting other spacefaring nations to take the very steps weseek to avoid. Consequently, a preservation and growth strategy for U.S. spacepower also requires a hedging strategy

because, even if the United States makes prudent decisions in space, others may still make foolish choices.Hedging The exercise of restraint from using weapons in space is not easy for the world's most powerful nation or for other nations fearingcatastrophic losses that they believe might be averted by disabling U.S. satellites. How, then, might U.S. spacepower influence the decisions of othernations to leave vulnerable satellites alone? We maintain that a prudent space posture would clarify America's ability to respond purposefully if anothernation interferes with, disables, disrupts, or destroys U.S. satellites, without being the first to take the actions that we wish others to refrain from taking.Thus, our proposed hedging strategy would not include the flight-testing and deployment of dedicated ASAT or on-orbit weapons because such stepswould surely be emulated by others and would increase risks to vital U.S. space assets. Whatever preparations the United States takes to hedge againstattacks on its satellites must be calibrated to maximize freedom of action and access in space. Hedging moves that create an environment where theflight-testing and deployment of space weapons would be a common occurrence would thus be contrary to U.S. military and economic security.

Responsible hedges by the United States include increased situational awareness, redundancy, and cost-effectivehardening of satellites and their links. The strongest hedge the United States possesses is its superior conventional military capabilities,including long-range strike and special operations capabilities. Since an attack on a satellite can be considered an act of war, the United States couldrespond to such an attack by targeting the ground links and launch facilities of the offending nation or the nation that harbors a group carrying out such

hostile acts. Far more punishing responses might be applicable. A hedging strategy is also likely to include ground-based research and development intospace weapons technologies, activities that are under way in major spacefaring nations. The demonstration of dual- or multi-use space technologies thatcould be adapted, if needed, to respond to provocative acts would constitute another element of a responsible hedging strategy. Such technologies couldinclude on-orbit rendezvous, repair, and refueling technologies and other proximity operations. These activities are also essential for expanded scientificand commercial use of space and would be key enabling technologies for long-duration missions such as the return to the Moon and the exploration ofMars. A prudent hedging strategy would also align U.S. military doctrine and declaratory policy with America's national security and economic interest

in preventing weapons in space and ASAT tests. In the context of a proactive Air Force counterspace operations doctrine andofficial disdain for negotiations that might constrain U.S. military options in space, the hedging strategy weadvocate might be perceived as preliminary steps toward the weaponization of space, which we would oppose.Wisehedging strategies would also be accompanied by constructive diplomatic initiatives . The flight-testing ofmultipurpose technologies, the possession of dominant power projection capabilities, and the growing residualU.S. military capabilities to engage in space warfare should provide a sufficient deterrent posture against a"space Pearl Harbor ."4 These capabilities would also clarify that the United States possesses the means to defend its interests in a competitionthat other major space powers claim not to want, as well as to react in a prompt and punishing way against hostile acts against U.S. space assets. If all

responsible spacefaring nations adhere to a "no further ASAT test" regime, and an adversary still carries out a "space Pearl Harbor" by using militarycapabilities designed for other purposes, the United States has the means to respond in kind. U.S. latent or residual space warfare capabilities exceedthose of other spacefaring nations and are growing with the advent of ballistic missile defenses. We maintain that the existence of such capabilitiesconstitutes another element of a hedging strategy, while providing further support for our contention that dedicated ASAT tests and deployments areboth unwise and unnecessary.

More ev.Morgan, 10 - defense policy researcher working in RAND Corporation's Pittsburgh Office. Prior to joiningRAND in January 2003, Dr. Morgan served a 27-year career in the U.S. Air Force (Forrest, Deterrence andFirst-Strike Stability in Space,http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA522541&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA522541&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdfhttp://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA522541&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf


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Ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems that also have ASAT capabilities would likelyaffect first-strikedynamics in space in ways that mirror counterspace weapons. Systems with orbital components that couldattack other satellites would , in a crisis with another spacefaring nation that also had ASAT capabilities, exertpressure on that state to strike first, in an effort to save its own satellites from first-strike losses .16 Similarly,terrestrial-based BMD weapons capable of intercepting satellites, might also be threatening to a spacefaringopponent in a crisis, but first-strike pressures would not be as great as they would be if either of the adversarieshad weapons in orbit.In all of the foregoing cases,brandishing behaviors would make first-strike instability more severe, given spacesystems inherent vulnerabilities , as might explicit deterrent threats if they are not carefully tailored to support

a coherent national strategy to enhance first-strike stability in space.

Obama is pursuing space cooperation US multilateral leadership is creating a frameworkagainst weaponizationHuntley, 11 - senior lecturer in the National Security Affairs department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California (Wade, The2011 U.S. National Space Security Policy: Engagement as a Work in Progress, Disarmament Times, Spring, http://disarm.igc.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=429:the-2011-us-national-space-security-policy-engagement-as-a-work-in-progress&catid=154:disarmament-times-spring-2011&Itemid=2)

As is well understood, the space policies of the Bush administration were decidedly oriented toward military security concerns and independent action.The 2006 National Space Policy unabashedly proclaimed the U.S. intention to maintain a dominant position in space indefinitely. This policy orientationdismissed multilateral cooperation as impinging on U.S. freedom of action, throwing weight instead behind a wide range of technology developmentinitiatives founded on the assumption that deployment of weapons in space was, if not already factual, certainly inevitable.2 U.S. commercial and civilengagement was overshadowed by these security concerns, expressed through the tightening of export control restrictions inhibiting a broad range oftechnology sharing. Once again, U.S. space policy was subsumed by other national priorities, in this case dominated by military security concerns. This

background is essential for appreciating howthe space policies of the Obama administration are beginning to genuinelybreak new trails. The U.S. National Space Policy issued in June 2010 has been widely recognized for itscooperative and multilateral tone, including as explicit near-term goals the expansion of international cooperation on all activities andpursuing international as well as national measures to enhance space stability. Particularly notable are the documents emphasis onorienting U.S. leadership toward fostering international cooperation, and its references, in its concluding section, tocooperation with other states and non-state actors in the pursuit of national security space objectives.3 Less broadly noticed was this policys clarity andcoherence in articulating a vision for U.S. space activities on its own terms. The document is organized around core principles, subsidiary goals andimplementing guidelines that exceed its predecessors in delineating a longer-term direction for U.S. space policy that is integrated with, rather thanderivative of, broader U.S. global aims.4 The policy also was generated and issued far earlier in the tenure of the administration than either of its

predecessors, indicating an increased prioritization of attention to space policy at higher levels of policy-making. To some degree, a turn towardmultilateral cooperation in U.S. space policy was to be expected. Chinas 2007 anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) test and the 2009Iridium-Cosmos collision increased awareness of the challenge of space debris and the need for better global information sharing on space situational

awareness (SSA).5 Also, new budget realities and unpromising technological developments have scaled backambitions in some quarters for solving U.S. space security concerns with new independent capabilities. Finally, theObama administration has pursued a more cooperative disposition across a wide range of global policy challenges, from Iranian nuclear ambitions toglobal climate change. But the improved clarity of vision in the 2010 Space Policy suggests that the emphasis on fostering global cooperation on space-

related activities is more grounded in deliberate foresight than sailing the prevailing political winds. The 2011 National Security SpaceStrategy, released February 4, is best interpreted against this background of the Obama administrations turn toward

both greater international space cooperation and greater attention to space policy in general. This first-of-its-kind strategic statementculminates a congressionally mandated space posture review.6 The initial section portraying the strategic environment to which U.S. security policymust be responsive highlights the growing problems of space debris, orbital congestion and coordination among a growing number of space actors notstate-based security threats per se. The Security Space Strategy features the objective of a stable space environment in which nations exercise sharedresponsibility.7 Specific provisions intended to implement this strategy, relevant to the preceding observations, include:8 The strategy presents a fullsection on Partnering with Responsible Nations, International Organizations, and Commercial Firms. This category is not wholly multilateral in thetraditional sense, displaying a symbiosis of alliance-building and collective cooperation not always carefully distinguished; i.e., The United States willlead in building coalitions of like-minded space-faring nations and, where appropriate, work with international institutions to do so. The strategyintends to encourage responsible behavior in space and lead by the power of example, a significant observation given the tendency of U.S. policy-

makers (as noted above) not to expect quid pro quo responses to cooperative gestures. Also, the strategy states the U.S. will supportdevelopment of data standards, best practices, transparency and confidence-building measures, and norms ofbehavior for responsible space operations. [italics added] In the context of the section on Preventing and Deterring Aggression, thestrategy similarly intends to support diplomatic efforts to promote norms of responsible behavior in space as well as pursue international partnerships

that encourage potential adversary restraint, along with other measures. This emphasis on norm-building and the role of examplesuggests a near-term endorsement of the development of codes of conduct for space activities (such as the recentlyrevised European Union Code of Conduct, discussed below),whether or not such concord leads to more formal arms controlarrangements in the longer-term. The Department of Defense is directed to foster cooperative SSA relationships ,and to expand provision of safety of flight services to U.S. Government agencies, other nations, and commercial firms. Greater SSA information sharinghas been a key suggestion for fostering international cooperation; the U.S. possesses globally superior SSA capabilities, but restricts the sharing of this

information on the basis of national security concerns.9 Hence, this nominal commitment is significant in its own right. The strategy commitsto reforming export controls. In particular, as new opportunities arise for international collaboration, a revised export control system willbetter enable the domestic firms competing for these contracts. As noted above, the oppressive impact of current U.S. export controls not only impinges


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on U.S. commercial space actors but also epitomizes the high degree to which U.S. policy has subsumed commercial and civil interests to nationalsecurity concerns. The strategy appears to acknowledge this connection and commit to remedy it. The most assertive passages of the statement aremoderated with community-building intent. For example, the strategys section on Preventing and Deterring Aggression concludes that the U.S. willretain the right and capabilities to respond in self-defense, should deterrence fail, but immediately adds that the U.S. will use force in a manner that isconsistent with longstanding principles of international law, treaties to which the United States is a party, and the inherent right of self defense. Theconcluding and most conflict-oriented section of the strategy opens by noting that some actors may still believe counterspace actions could providemilitary advantage. Counterspace capabilities, unarticulated in the document, include ASATs, ground-based directed energy weapons and satellitetransmission jamming. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy Gregory Schulte explained at the strategys rollout that China is aprincipal concern in this regard, but so is the proliferation of these technologies: If Ethiopia can jam a commercial satellite, you have to worry whatothers can do.10 This section of the strategy does not, however, call for maintaining options to develop complementary space conflict capabilities.Rather, the strategy asserts that the U.S. must be prepared to fight through a degraded environment, and identifies resilience and space protectionas the key criteria. The preceding survey of elements of the 2011 National Security Space Strategy is deliberately selective, highlighting those elements

expressing consistency with the 2010 National Space Policys bend toward fostering greater international collaboration. Perhaps as striking as theprevalence of such passages, however, is the absence of expressed intention even couched in hedging language tosustain or expand the kind ofindependent space-based military capabilities that were the centerpiece of the prioradministrations aims (if not its accomplishments). Again, to some extent this turn in tone is overdetermined by extenuating global circumstances. Butone must still be struck by the degree to which developments such as the Chinese ASAT test have not ignited the kind of response one might have

anticipated only a few short years after Donald Rumsfelds notorious warning of a space Pearl Harbor.11 The most immediate significanceof the National Security Space Strategy is likely the signals its sends concerning U.S. policy toward the recentlyrevised E uropean U nion Code of Conduct .12 The strategy did not explicitly endorse this EU initiative, but Mr. Schulte, at the February 4presentation of the strategy, highlighted the initiative as a potential way to promote transparency and confidence-building measures, which tend to bevoluntary as opposed to legally binding. A week earlier, Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance,stated at the Conference on Disarmament that the administration was nearing a decision on whether the U.S. would sign on to the code, and whatmodifications might be required in order to do so.13 As U.S. interest in the Code of Conduct has increased, debates over its provisions and its

relationship to the Outer Space Treaty have intensified. These policy movements toward multilateral engagement andcommitment to behavioral standards (even if non-binding) mark a sharp departure from the stiff resistance to

curtailing U.S. freedom of action in the previous administration, and have accordingly generated resistance from congressionaopponents on just those terms. Prior to the release of the National Security Space Strategy, a group of 37 Republican senators led by Arizona Senator JonKyl issued a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton expressing concern over a potential multilateral commitment that might limitdevelopment and/or deployment of space-based missile defense interceptors and ASAT-defeating systems.14 Critics also decried the strategys emphasison the old fallacious assumption that the power of example will prevent adversaries from doing the United States harm, and endorsed maintaining thegoal of U.S. retention of a dominant position in military and intelligence space capabilities.15 In fact, the administrations warming toward normativecommitments in general and the EU Code of Conduct in particular are in part intended to forestall pressure for more formal and binding measuresthat would definitively cut off the hedge of unilateral U.S. weapons development options.16 The balance of U.S. debate may have shifted toward greater

international cooperation, but the terms of the debate remain the same. In sum, the National Security Space Strategy appears tomark not only a swing in U.S. policy toward greater global engagement but also, and more importantly, a step towardgreater long-term coherence in thinking concerning the core goals of U.S. space activities . Even supporters of thegeneral directions of the strategy noted its more-than-expected breadth of thought.17 But if this reading is sound, the strategy is still but one step on along road, and ongoing debates over the role of U.S. space policy vis--vis broader national security interests will insure that road is bumpy. Suggestingsuch limitations, Mr. Schulte acknowledged that the classified version of the strategy is only four pages longer than the released version, indicating thatmore specific guidelines for military implementation of the strategy remain to be developed.18 Many devils may lurk in these details.

Multilateral cooperation against weaponization is vital to preventing miscalculation, first strikeincentives and global warHitchens, 8 president of the Center for Defense Information (Theresa, Space Wars - Coming to the Sky Near You?, Scientific American,February, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=space-wars-coming-to-the-sky-near-you)

Perhaps of even greater concern is that several other nations , including one of Chinas regional rivals, India,may feel compelled to seekoffensive as well as defensive capabilities in space. The U.S. trade journal Defense News, forinstance, quoted unidentified Indian defense officials as stating that their country had already begun developing its own kinetic-energy (nonexplosive,

hit-to-kill) and laser-based antisatellite weapons. If India goes down that path, its archrival Pakistan will probably followsuit. Like India, Pakistan has a well-developed ballistic missile program, including medium-range missiles that could launch an antisatellite system.Even Japan, the third major Asian power, might join such a space race. In June 2007 the National Diet of Japan began considering a billbacked by the current Fukuda government that would permit the development of satellites for military and national security purposes. As for Russia, inthe wake of the Chinese test President Vladimir Putin reiterated Moscows stance against the weaponization of space. At the same time, though, he

refused to criticize Beijings actions and blamed the U.S. instead. The American efforts to build a missile defense system, Putin charged, and theincreasingly aggressive American plans for a military position in space were prompting Chinas moves. Yet Russia itself, as a major spacefaring power

that has incorporated satellites into its national security structure, would be hard-pressed to forgo entering an arms race in space. Given theproliferation of spacefaring entities, proponents of a robust space warfare strategy believe that arming theheavens is inevitable and that it would be best for the U.S. to get there first with firepower. Antisatellite and space-basedweapons, they argue, will be necessary not only to defend U.S. military and commercial satellites but also to deny any future adversary the use of space

capabilities to enhance the performance of its forces on the battlefield.Yet any arms race in space would almost inevitablydestabilize the balance of power and thereby multiply the risk s of global conflict . In such headlong competitionwhetherin space or elsewhereequilibrium among the adversaries would be virtually impossible to maintain. Even if themajor powers did achieve stability, that reality would still provide no guarantee that both sides would perceiveit to be so. The moment one side saw itself to be slipping behind the other, the first side would be stronglytempted to launch a preemptive strike, before things got even worse. Ironically, the same would hold for the side that perceived itself to


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have gained an advantage. Again, there would be strong temptation to strike first, before the adversary could catch up.Finally, a space weapons race would ratchet up the chances that a mere technological mistake could trigger a

battle . After all, in the distant void, reliably distinguishing an intentional act from an accidental one would behighly problematic. Hit-to-Kill Interceptors According to assessments by U.S. military and intelligence officials as well as by independent expertsthe Chinese probably destroyed their weather satellite with a kinetic-energy vehicle boosted by a two-stage medium-range ballistic missile.Technologically, launching such direct-ascent antisatellite weapons is one of the simplest ways to take out a satellite. About a dozen nations andconsortia can reach low Earth orbit (between roughly 100 and 2,000 kilometers, or 60 to 1,250 miles, high) with a medium-range missile; eight of thosecountries can reach geostationary orbit (about 36,000 kilometers, or 22,000 miles, above Earth). But the real technical hurdle to making a hit-to-killvehicle is not launch capacity; it is the precision maneuverability and guidance technology needed to steer the vehicle into its target. Just how well Chinahas mastered those techniques is unclear. Because the weather satellite was still operating when it was destroyed, the Chinese operators would haveknown its exact location at all times. Ground-Based Lasers The test of Chinas direct-ascent antisatellite device came on the heels of press reports in

September 2006 that the Chinese had also managed to paint, or illuminate, U.S. spy satellites with a ground-based laser [see lower box on page 83].Was Beijing actually trying to blind or otherwise damage the satellites? No one knows, and no consensus seems to have emerged in official Washingtoncircles about the Chinese intent. Perhaps China was simply testing how well its network of low-power laser-ranging stations could track American orbitalobservation platforms. Even so, the test was provocative. Not all satellites have to be electronically fried to be put out of commission. A 1997 test of thearmys MIRACL system (for midinfrared advanced chemical laser) showed that satellites designed to collect optical images can be temporarily disrupteddazzledby low-power beams. It follows that among the satellites vulnerable to such an attack are the orbital spies. The U.S. and the former SovietUnion began experimenting with laser-based antisatellite weapons in the 1970s. Engineers in both countries have focused on the many problems ofbuilding high-power laser systems that could reliably destroy low-flying satellites from the ground. Such systems could be guided by adaptive optics:deformable mirrors that can continuously compensate for atmospheric distortions. But tremendous amounts of energy would be needed to feed high-power lasers, and even then the range and effectiveness of the beams would be severely limited by dispersion, by attenuation as they passed throughsmoke or clouds, and by the difficulty of keeping the beams on-target long enough to do damage. During the development of the SDI, the U.S. conductedseveral laser experiments from Hawaii, including a test in which a beam was bounced off a mirror mounted on a satellite. Laser experiments continue atthe Starfire Optical Range at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico. Pentagon budget documents from fiscal years 2004 through 2007 listedantisatellite operations among the goals of the Starfire research, but that language was removed from budget documents in fiscal year 2008 afterCongress made inquiries. The Starfire system incorporates adaptive optics that narrow the outgoing laser beam and thus increase the density of itspower. That capability is not required for imagery or tracking, further suggesting that Starfire could be used as a weapon. Yet despite decades of work,battle-ready versions of directed-energy weapons still seem far away. An air force planning document, for instance, predicted in 2003 that a ground-based weapon able to propagate laser beams through the atmosphere to [stun or kill low Earth orbit] satellites could be available between 2015 and2030. Given the current state of research, even those dates seem optimistic. Co-orbital Satellites Recent advances in miniaturized sensors, powerfulonboard computers and efficient rocket thrusters have made a third kind of antisatellite technology increasingly feasible: the offensive microsatellite.One example that demonstrates the potential is the air forces experimental satellite series (XSS) project, which is developing microsatellites intended toconduct autonomous proximity operations around larger satellites. The first two microsatellites in the program, the XSS-10 and XSS-11, were launchedin 2003 and 2005. Though ostensibly intended to inspect larger satellites, such microsatellites could also ram target satellites or carry explosives ordirected-energy payloads such as radio-frequency jamming systems or high-powered microwave emitters. Air force budget documents show that the XSSeffort is tied to a program called Advanced Weapons Technology, which is dedicated to research on military laser and microwave systems. During thecold war the Soviet Union developed, tested and even declared operational a co-orbital antisatellite systema maneuverable interceptor with anexplosive payload that was launched by missile into an orbit near a target satellite in low Earth orbit. In effect, the device was a smart space mine, but iwas last demonstrated in 1982 and is probably no longer working. Today such an interceptor would likely be a microsatellite that could be parked in anorbit that would cross the orbits of several of its potential targets. It could then be activated on command during a close encounter. In 2005 the air forcedescribed a program that would provide localized space situational awareness and anomaly characterization for friendly host satellites ingeostationary orbit. The program is dubbed ANGELS (for autonomous nanosatellite guardian for evaluating local space), and the budget line believed torepresent it focuses on acquiring high value space asset defensive capabilities, including a warning sensor for detection of a direct ascent or co-orbitalvehicle. It is clear that such guardian nanosatellites could also serve as offensive weapons if they were maneuvered close to enemy satellites. And the list

goes on. A parasitic satellite would shadow or even attach itself to a target in geostationary orbit. Farsat, which was mentioned in an appendix to the[Donald] Rumsfeld Space Commission report in 2001, would be placed in a storage orbit (perhaps with many microsatellites housed inside) relativelyfar from its target but ready to be maneuvered in for a kill. Finally, the air force proposed some time ago a space-based radio-frequency weapon system,which would be a constellation of satellites containing high-power radio-frequency transmitters that possess the capability to disrupt/destroy/disable awide variety of electronics and national-level command and control systems. Air force planning documents from 2003 envisioned that such atechnology would emerge after 2015. But outside experts think that orbital radio-frequency and microwave weapons are technically feasible today andcould be deployed in the relatively near future. Space Bombers Though not by definition a space weapon, the Pentagons Common AeroVehicle/Hypersonic Technology Vehicle (often called CAV) enters into this discussion because, like an ICBM, it would travel through space to strikeEarth-bound targets. An unpowered but highly maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicle, the CAV would be deployed from a future hypersonic space planeswoop down into the atmosphere from orbit and drop conventional bombs on ground targets. Congress recently began funding the project but, to avoidstoking a potential arms race in space, has prohibited any work to place weapons on the CAV. Although engineers are making steady progress on the keytechnologies for the CAV program, both the vehicle and its space plane mothership are still likely decades off. Some of the congressional sensitivity to thedesign of the CAV may have arisen from another, much more controversial space weapons concept with parallel goals: hypervelocity rod bundles thatwould be dropped to Earth from orbital platforms. For decades air force planners have been thinking about placing weapons in orbit that could striketerrestrial targets, particularly buried, hardened bunkers and caches of weapons of mass destruction. Commonly called rods from God, the bundleswould be made up of large tungsten rods, each as long as six meters (20 feet) and 30 centimeters (12 inches) across. Each rod would be hurled downwardfrom an orbiting spacecraft and guided to its target at tremendous speed. Both high costs and the laws of physics, however, challenge their feasibility.

Ensuring that the projectiles do not burn up or deform from reentry friction while sustaining a precise, nearly vertical flight path would be extremelydifficult. Calculations indicate that the nonexplosive rods would probably be no more effective than more conventional munitions. Furthermore, theexpense of lofting the heavy projectiles into orbit would be exorbitant. Thus, despite continued interest in them, rods from God seem to fall into therealm of science fiction. Obstacles to Space Weapons What, then, is holding the U.S. (and other nations) back from a full-bore pursuit of space weapons?The countervailing pressures are threefold: political opposition, technological challenges and high costs. The American body politic is deeply dividedover the wisdom of making space warfare a part of the national military strategy. The risks are manifold. I remarked earlier on the general instabilities ofan arms race, but there is a further issue of stability among the nuclear powers. Early-warning and spy satellites have traditionally played a crucial role inreducing fears of a surprise nuclear attack. But if antisatellite weapons disabled those eyes-in-the-sky, the resulting uncertainty and distrust couldrapidly lead to catastrophe. One of the most serious technological challenges posed by space weapons is the proliferation of space debris, to which Ialluded earlier. According to investigators at the air force, NASA and Celestrak (an independent space-monitoring Web site), the Chinese antisatellitetest left more than 2,000 pieces of junk, baseball-size and larger, orbiting the globe in a cloud that lies between about 200 kilometers (125 miles) and4,000 kilometers (2,500 miles) above Earths surface. Perhaps another 150,000 objects that are a centimeter (half an inch) across and larger werereleased. High orbital velocities make even tiny pieces of space junk dangerous to spacecraft of all kinds. And ground stations cannot reliably monitor ortrack objects smaller than about five centimeters (two inches) across in low Earth orbit (around a meter in geostationary orbit), a capability that mightenable satellites to maneuver out of the way. To avoid being damaged by the Chinese space debris, in fact, two U.S. satellites had to alter course. Anyshooting war in space would raise the specter of a polluted space environment no longer navigable by Earth-orbiting satellites. Basing weapons in orbit


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also presents difficult technical obstacles. They would be just as vulnerable as satellites are to all kinds of outside agents: space debris, projectiles,electromagnetic signals, even natural micrometeoroids. Shielding space weapons against such threats would also be impractical, mostly becauseshielding is bulky and adds mass, thereby greatly increasing launch costs. Orbital weapons would be mostly autonomous mechanisms, which wouldmake operational errors and failures likely. The paths of objects in orbit are relatively easy to predict, which would make hiding large weaponsproblematic. And because satellites in low Earth orbit are overhead for only a few minutes at a time, keeping one of them constantly in range wouldrequire many weapons. Finally, getting into space and operating there is extremely expensive: between $2,000 and $10,000 a pound to reach low Earthorbit and between $15,000 and $20,000 a pound for geostationary orbit. Each space-based weapon would require replacement every seven to 15 years,and in-orbit repairs would not be cheap, either. Alternatives to Space Warfare Given the risks of space warfare to national and international security, aswell as the technical and financial hurdles that must be overcome, it would seem only prudent for spacefaring nations to find ways to prevent an arms

race in space. The U.S. focus has been to reduce the vulnerability of its satellite fleet and explore alternatives to its dependenceon satellite services. Most other space-capable countries are instead seeking multilateral diplomatic and legal

measures . The options range from treaties that would ban antisatellite and space-based weapons to voluntarymeasures that would help build transparency and mutual confidence. The Bush administration has adamantly opposed anyform of negotiations regarding space weapons. Opponents of multilateral space weapons agreements contend that others (particularly China) will sign upbut build secret arsenals at the same time, because such treaty violations cannot be detected. They argue further that the U.S. cannot sit idly as potential

adversaries gain spaceborne resources that could enhance their terrestrial combat capabilities. Proponents of international treaties counter that failureto negotiate such agreements entails real opportunity costs.An arms race in space may end up compromisingthe security of all nations, including that of the U.S., while it stretches the economic capacities of the competitors to the breaking point. Andwhereas many advocates of a space weapons ban concede that it will be difficult to construct a fully verifiable treatybecause space technology can beused for both military and civilian endseffective treaties already exist that do not require strict verification. A good example is the Biological WeaponsConvention. Certainly a prohibition on the testing and use (as opposed to the deployment) of the most dangerous class of near-term space weaponsdestructive (as opposed to jamming) antisatellite systemswould be easily verifiable, because earthbound observers can readily detect orbital debris.

Furthermore, any party to a treaty would know that all its space launches would be tracked from the ground, andany suspicious object in orbit would promptly be labeled as such . The international outcry that would ensuefrom such overt treaty violations could deter would-be violators. Since the mid-1990s, however, progress on

establishing a new multilateral space regime has lagged. The U.S. has blocked efforts at the United Nations Conferenceon Disarmament in Geneva to begin negotiations on a treaty to ban space weapons. China, meanwhile, has refused to accept anything less. Hence,intermediate measures such as voluntary confidence-building, space traffic control or a code of responsible conduct for spacefaring nations have

remained stalled. Space warfare is not inevitable. But the recent policy shift in the U.S. and Chinas provocativeactions have highlighted the fact that the world is approaching a crossroads. Countries must come to grips with their strongself-interest in preventing the testing and use of orbital weapons. The nations of Earth must soon decide whether it is possible to sustain thepredominantly peaceful human space exploration that has already lasted half a century. The likely alternative would be unacceptable to all.


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ESA CPCounterplan: The European Space Agency should should deploy space-based lasers in low earthorbit beyond the Earths mesosphere for the purpose of ballistic missile defense and anti-satellite capability.

Counterplan solves the caseBrauer and Monte 05 (Gerard and Luca del, Gerard is the head of the ESA, European Space Research and Developmentfor the Security andMilitary Sectors pdf)

The above described scenario suggests that the potential contribution ofESA in the framework of a European network of technical

agencies in support of a European security/defence system for the time framework 2013-2015, could be thestep wise development of a balanced mix of top-down and bottom-up initiatives complementing each other. Onthe one hand there is a recognized need for the collaboration and eventually for the convergence of these two approaches in the short-medium time, on

the other hand there is the responsibility of national Governments for the security of their citizens . Nationallyownedassets are going to be the main tools for security and defence, but these assets need to be linked by usingcommonly agreed standards and by a commonly owned basic infrastructures. Some elements of the future architecture arebeing discussed by the European Member States interested in space. The definition of future situation awareness capabilities must be a shortterm goal. The development ofmulti/hyper-spectral, radar, optical, infrared sensors and platforms will be necessary to supportthe security user communities.. Today, the next generation of these systems is far from being mature. Their development should becoordinated from the very beginning. ESA, the organisation charged with developing the major European spaceprogrammes, possesses the overall set of capabilities in the definition and conduct of space infrastructureprogrammes and in the definition of technology preparation and accompaniment programmes. It has an intimateknowledge of the industrial fabric and the capabilities available in Europe. Through its programmes, ESA has access to all categories ofspace applications and possesses ground facilities and space systems, which could be made available in supportof specific applications with defence relevance (launchers, observation and telecommunications satellites, test and operations facilities,etc.). The Agency is the primary source of institutional contracts in a number of applications areas and in the R&D field. Being anintergovernmental agency with a programme remit, ESA has demonstrated its ability to establish cooperative

ventures at European level . Under its leadership the space sector has indeed come to be seen as a pioneer and an acknowledged model for theprocess of European integration. The optional programme, a tried and tested legal form, provides a basis for a flexible model of cooperation betweenStates, one which accommodates the participants specific objectives and constraints while at the same time allowing resources to be pooled and commonrules to be applied. In practice, the Agencys contribution to the emergence of a space component for the European defence policy and the ensuingactivities may take many forms. These may be classified in accordance with the level of Agency involvement and the extent to which the activity

concerned is defence-specific. A first group of activities are those concerned with optimising synergies in technologies and infrastructures. ESA hasstarted consultations with the defence entities on technological priorities and critical technologies of interest to

both communities with a view to coordinating preparatory work and upstream research activity. Therequirements emerging in this way from the defence entities should be incorporated in the European space

technologies master plan. The consultation process could be extended to test and operations facilities to ensure more effective investmentplanning on all sides and avoid unwarranted duplication. Another possibility to be considered is the development by the Agency of dedicated dual useprogrammes or the availability of Agencys infrastructures for defence uses (one example might be a demonstration of data relay between an Agencysatellite and a military aircraft). The Agency might, lastly, be assigned responsibility for developing prototypes, demonstrators or space borneinfrastructure components to serve defence requirements.


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Counterplan

Counterplan: The United States federal government should adopt a systematicmethodology for the continuous development of official doctrine of deploying andusing space-based lasers in low earth orbit beyond the Earths mesosphere for thepurpose of ballistic missile defense and anti-satellite capability in relation to historicalmilitary experience, innovation in new technologies, new geopolitical encounters, and

the emergence of new threats.

ONLY a dynamic open-doctrine approach to policy-making capable of learning lessons fromexperience and integrating new strategic concepts can allow the plan to become adaptive to newscenarios and facilitate effective force structure. ONLY the counterplan allows for therestricted mission to be an effective war-fighting instrument post-plan by developing adynamic framework approach RATHER THAN any durable eternal mandateTemple 92 Lt Col L. Parker Temple III, (USAF, Retired (USAFA; MBA, University of Northern Colorado; MS, West Coast University), is a privateconsultant on space policy and programs. Of Machine Guns, Yellow Brick Roads, and Doctrine Airpower Journal, Summer

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj92/sum92/temple.htm SW)

We now have the end objective in sight. The incorporation of frameworks as described here will both help us write better doctrine and, just as

importantly, help us interpret whatever history we read to determine its usefulness for ourselves. Unfortunately,we do not now have a

doctrine that is developed according to the framework approach. The current draft of AFM 1-1 has taken a giant step forward byincorporating historical examples and vignettes, as many of us have encouraged in the past.19 Frameworks offer the only valid methodfor doctrine development. Each new war does not necessarily improve our ability to wage war successfully. Koreaand Vietnam were not improvements on our success in World War II. Whether they could have been is moot; they were not because doctrinehad not adequatelyaccounted for the increased political dimension of the latter wars. Lessons learned in warsdo not moveinexorably toward perfect understanding. Methodologies that cause us to believe we will eventuallyachieve perfect principles of war are dangerous. Each warhas elements from previous wars, but in an essentiallynewframework. Unless doctrine is dynamic enough to recognize changes in frameworks, it will not enhance ourchances ofsuccess.Writing successful doctrine requires recognizing, judging, and describing how the Air Force operates in sucha way that we can observe and assess the changes as frameworks evolve and come into contact with otherframeworks. The Air Force's frameworks were modified by the development and fielding of stealth technology in both Tactical Air Command (TAC)and Strategic Air Command (SAC); it also necessitated modification of the framework of anyone who might be an enemy, since they would have to try to

counter stealth. In this case, we are forcing the rest of the world to react to a revolutionary new technology. As we force others to adapt toour new framework,we cannot wait and adapt to their changing frameworks.We must stay intenselyaware of the status of the frameworks of potential enemies as an important aspect of professional military education.

Without this, there would be little hope for recognizing the areas where doctrine would help exploit weaknessesin the adversaryand where the adversary might exploit our ownweaknesses. Doctrine must be at once historicaland futuristic. It must be historical to understand how the framework came to be what it is. Once we understand why it has become what it is,we

will be able to understand what elements of the framework will need to be changed in order for us to meet thefuture, to stay ahead of technology, or to change aspects of the present framework that we do not like. Suppose we object to the size andweight of present military satellites and believe we should spend resources to develop lightsats instead. Before rushing ahead, we should beable to findin an adequate space doctrine just how we came to have such large satellites--and we should do this in termsclear enough to understand what is required to reduce their size and what is lost in downsizingwithout adverselyaffecting other aspects of the Air Force's space business. An adequate doctrine would also allow us to judge if smaller satellites areeven a good idea once we understand the subject. Operation Desert Storm provides an excellent example for doctrinal framework evaluation. The

doctrinal frameworks we might compare it to are the Vietnam War and the North African campaign in World War II. Both have common elements tocarry forward into the framework for Desert Storm. Some of the same problems faced Field Marshals Erwin Rommel and Bernard Montgomery (heat,water shortages, and sand). But I submit that what we actually saw was the crossing of a significant framework boundary. Although it will take more

serious thinking, judgment indicates the new framework must be built on the basis of the three key elements ofprecision guided munitions, the vast flow of information (public, private, and military), and the tight integration of all USand allied forces. Precision guided munitions were not new to Desert Storm; however, never before had they been used in such numbers (manytimes the total number used in the entire Vietnam War), with such intensity (a few months versus years for the Vietnam War) and with such devastatingeffects. Precision guided munitions hold the potential to be Sir George Milne's machine guns of the latter half of the twentieth century in terms of

doctrinal impact. No war in history ever had so much information flowing. It will take some time to comprehendthe impact of the vast amount of information from mass media, from command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I)systems in the military, and from other sources and to fold them into doctrine. However, the information revolution of Desert Storm is just asimportant doctrinally as the precision guided munitions within the new framework. The integration of forces was also a key to success. It was truly ashowpiece for aerial warfare, but it took the synergism of land, sea, air, and space forces to prosecute the war with such overwhelming effect on the
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enemy. The use of frameworks would also cause us to examine other aspects of the war. Before we claim thedecisiveness of air power, we ought to realize that the symmetry of numbers was not evident in the tactics ,resources used, technology, training, and in virtually every metric we could apply. The coalition fought a lopsided war because it tookadvantage of the three key elements enumerated and because the Iraqis could not. The use of precision guided munitions and the information to employ

them being readily available were a major asymmetry in Desert Storm. Judgment indicates thatbefore we derive a doctrine that assertsthe ascendancyof air power (as Billy Mitchell and Giulio Douhet would have had us do 60 years ago),we must understand Desert Storm interms of its framework. Frameworks will allow us to build doctrine that helps us anticipate the changes in war

before they occur by interpreting our enemy's altering frameworks rather than waiting and adapting afterwards. Ina time of decreasing budgets,we need a doctrine incorporating lessons learned from Desert Storm to select where to

take cuts and perhaps tojustify budget increases to meet the challenges of peace. As Unger's approach makes clear, we needboth science and art together, as provided by the concept of frameworks.

Closed doctrine cant apply to new warfare -- leads to miscalc as new technology develops WWI proves

Temple 92 Lt Col L. Parker Temple III, (USAF, Retired (USAFA; MBA, University of Northern Colorado; MS, West Coast University), is a privateconsultant on space policy and programs. Of Machine Guns, Yellow Brick Roads, and Doctrine Airpower Journal, Summer

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj92/sum92/temple.htm

First, we must recognize that AFM 1-1 must be changed. If we remain tied to its 1984 structure, we will have a doctrine manual but no doctrine withwhich to meet the challenges ahead. Second, we must pick a starting point in a dynamic world (today would be good), describing the framework of theAir Force as it has come to be. This includes the operation of the Air Force's frameworks, the underlying structures of these frameworks, and why the AirForce is structured the way it is for the various political, military, and economic reasons that actually underlie its present form. Simply describing thefour-star commands is inadequate. We must tie the evolution of the Air Force to its history and judge what is good or bad about that legacy. Explicit

historical reference couples meaning to doctrine and understanding when changes occur. Third,we must give insight into the role ofweapon systems as they apply either within the existing framework or as they change the existing framework. Stealth or the StrategicDefense Initiative are instances in which the existing framework will cease to apply, and frameworks explain why this is so. Largely because of the

strength and vision of its leaders, the Air Force has not drifted aimlessly since its inception. Butwe cannot always count on being so lucky.We must be able to bring people on board quicklyin the case ofa national emergency. The lessons of World War I's "Peacefor All Time" aftermath must not be forgotten. Nor can we continue to fool ourselves that our people understand the AirForce's frameworks well enough to avoid unwise or frivolous resource expenditures. Now is the time to devoteour best and most experienced minds to the development of an adequate doctrine before wemake mistakesmore devastating than the British in regard to the machine gun in 1914
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Solvency

NASA is part of a conspiracy using their space program to uphold the premise that the Earth is round.

Space travel is impossible and photos are doctored.

Jack W. Administrator Flat Earth Forums, 2008 (The Flat Earth Society, Flat Earth FAQ, Dec 12,http://www.theflatearthsociety.org/forum/index.php?topic=11211.0, Accessed: 6/22/11, SL)

Q: "What about satellites? How do they orbit the Earth?" A: Since sustained spaceflight is not possible, satellites cannot orbit the Earth.

The signals we supposedly receive from them are either broadcast from towers or any number of possible pseudolites.However, temporary space-flight is possible. Space Exploration and Government Q: "NASA and other world space agencies have pictures of the Earth from

space, and in those pictures the Earth is clearly a globe; in this day and age, hasn't it been proven beyond any doubt that the Earth is round?" A: NASA andthe rest of the world's space agencies who claim to have been to space are involved in a Conspiracy to keep the shape of

the Earth hidden . The pictures are faked using simple imaging software. Q: "Are you saying NASA had Photoshop in the 1960s?" A:Of course not. Back then the pictures taken were of far lower quality and were likely produced using analog means. Q: "Why has no one taken a photo of the

Earth that proves it is flat?" A: Only those connected to the Conspiracy have access to heights from which the shape of the

Earth can be discerned. Also, nobody has been to the edge of the Earth and lived; conditions on the Ice Wall get

increasingly treacherous the further you get out, and navigation methods become unreliable that far south. It isalso

possible that the Conspiracy is guarding the edge to prevent people from getting too close to the truth. Q: "How did NASA

create these images with the computer technology available at the time?" A: NASA did not send rockets into space; instead, they spent a

fraction of their funding on develop ing increasingly advanced computers and imaging software to cover their lies.

PLEASE NOTE: This means that pictures confirming the roundness or flatness of the Earth DO NOT CONSTITUTE VALID

PROOF. Q: "What is the motive behind this Conspiracy?" A: Although theirmain objective can only be speculated upon, the most favored

theory is that of financial gain. In a nutshell, it would logically cost much less to fake a space program than to actually have

one , so those in on the Conspiracy profit from the funding NASA and other space agencies receive from thegovernment. Q: "If you're not sure about the motive, why do you say there is a conspiracy?" A: Well it's quite simple really; if the Earth is in fact flat,then the space agencies must be lying when they say it isn't. Q: "No one could possibly pull off such a conspiracy successfully." A: Actually, they could. Q:

"How are the world governments organized to carry out this conspiracy?" A: Only those governments with space agencies that have

actually been to space and produced round pictures of the Earth need be in on the Conspiracy. And even in those cases

only a limited number of people within those governments need necessarily be involved. For the most part, even those in the

highest positions of these governments are probably unaware of the Conspiracy. Q: "Why has this site not been shut down by thegovernment?" A: Not enough people take this site seriously for it to be perceived as a threat by those involved in the Conspiracy. Shutting it down, however,might open them up to suspicion. Q: "There's no way the government could possibly guard the entire Ice Wall! It would take too many men! Millions of

men!" A: Not really. You could do it with a few hundred men and some basic equipment. But even so there's no reason to assume the Ice Wall is guarded; the

harsh conditions of the region make it very difficult to reach anyway. Q: "Why is NASA's space shuttle runway curved?" A: It was specially constructed by

NASA to be so. After all, NASA is at the heart of the conspiracy.

Earth is flat and covered by a dome no space travel possible oceans prove vote neg on presumption

Shenton, president of the Flat Earth Society, 1998 (Daniel, Why the Earth is Flat, The Flat Earth Society,http://www.alaska.net/~clund/e_djublonskopf/Flatearthsociety.htm, SL)

Water. Regardless of which train of thought you follow, it covers over seventy-five percent of our planet's surface. And the

atmosphere, also a fluid, covers the entire surface. The difference is why. While flat-Earthers know that the ocean is really

just a large bowl, (with great sheets of ice around the edges to hold the ocean back ), and the atmosphere is contained by

a large dome , the backwards "round-Earth" way of thinking would have you believe that all those trillions of gallons of

water and air just "stick" to the planet's surface.

Weaponization wont deter global conflict

Coffelt, 5 Lt. Colonal; thesis to the school of advanced air and space studies (Christopher A, THE BEST DEFENSE: CHARTING THE FUTURE OFUS SPACESTRATEGY AND POLICY. A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies For Completion of the Graduation Requirements

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. June 2005.)

Second, the argument goes further, asserting that being in such a position enables the US to provide protection from ballistic missile launches, air raids, and even

land invasions by aggressor nations against their neighbors. It envisions that this may even allow the US to put an end , once and for all , tointerstate conflict.287 ABM discussions in the MIRV and SDI case studies reveal the weaknesses in this argument. A ssuming one could deploy a

perfect, impenetrable defensive shield that also had the capability to affect other targets in space, in the air, on land, or at sea,

there is no evidence that such a capability would have any ability to prevent cross border incursions or conflicts.

T he monopoly on nuclear weapons did not prevent such acts , therefore , why would the US assume that orbiting space

weaponry would? Analyses of these cases indicate that deployment of an impenetrable defense is also highly unlikely . E ven if the

US could de deploy a system that was 99.9999% reliable , these machines still will have some associated , finite mean time

between failures. Essentially, the question becomes when not if . T he US would certainly not find itself in a tenable

position if it had publicly stated it would shoot down all ballistic missile launches only to experience a system failure or simply miss when country a fired a missileon country b. World opinion would be more apt to believe the US allowed the impact of country as missile on country bs sovereign territory vice the truth that the

system simply malfunctioned. T he US would immediately be viewed as having taken a side in the conflict and would be subject to
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the accompanying strategic implications of that perceived support or non - support. Therefore, there is no evidence to support a

conclusion or belief that an offensive space strategy enabled by orbital weapons would be welcomed by the rest of the

international community who would accept the US as the benevolent trustee of space .

Soft weapons such as satellite jammers solve power projection avoids debris and spending DAs

Day, 5 -- associate editor of Raumfahrt Concret (german aerospace magazine) and on Space Studies Board of the National Research Council/National Academy ofSciences (Dwayne, the space review, June 6, Blunt arrows: the limited utility of ASATs. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/388/1) CMR

There are also numerous downsides to traditional kinetic ASAT weapons. They generate debris , for starters,making orbits that the United

States needs to use unhealthy for our own satellites. The United States might also find itself in a situation where it is more

desirable to temporarily shut down an adversarys satellite than to permanently do so. For these and other reasons the U nited

S tates increasingly favors softer methods of denying an enemys space assets than blowing their satellites out of the sky

Jamming or incapacitating them is the ideal option. If the U nited St ates can destroy a ground station with an existing

cruise missile, that would prove far more cost effective than spending billions to develop an ASAT capability. Why developa new weapon when existing ones can already do the job?
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/388/1http://www.thespacereview.com/article/388/1


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Russia AdvantageCohen evidence is from 96 no brink to Russia inevitably rising up

Cohen is only descriptive of if Russia became a hegemon in the world no evidence saying theyre trying tonow

No risk of a bioterror attack, and there wont be retaliation - your evidence is hype

Matishak 10 (Martin, Global Security Newswire, U.S. Unlikely to Respond to Biological Threat With NuclearStrike, Experts Say, 4-29, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100429_7133.php)

WASHINGTON -- The U nited S tates is not likely to use nuclear force to respond to a biological weaponsthreat , even though the Obama administration left open that option in its recent update to the nation's nuclear weapons policy, experts say(See GSN, April 22). "The notion that we are in imminent danger of confronting a scenario in which hundreds ofthousands of people are dying in the streets of New Yorkas a consequence of a biological weapons attack isfanciful," said Michael Moodie, a consultant who served as assistant director for multilateral affairs in the U.S. Arms Control andDisarmament Agency during the George H.W. Bush administration. Scenarios in which the United States suffers masscasualties as a result of such an event seem "to be taking the discussion out of the realm of reality and into onethat is hypothetical and that has no meaning in the real world where this kind of exchange is just not going to happen,"Moodie said this week in a telephone interview. "There are a lot of threat mongers who talk about devastatingbiological

attacks that could kill tens of thousands, if not millions of Americans," according to Jonathan Tucker, a senior fellow with the James MartinCenter for Nonproliferation Studies. "But in fact, no country out there today has anything close to what the SovietUnion had in terms of mass-casualty biological warfare capability.Advances in biotechnology are unlikely to change thatsituation, at least for the foreseeable future." No terrorist group would be capable of pulling off a massive

biological attack , nor would it be deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation, he added. The biological threat provision was addressed inthe Defense Department-led Nuclear Posture Review, a restructuring of U.S. nuclear strategy, forces and readiness. The Obama administrationpledged in the review that the United States would not conduct nuclear strikes on non-nuclear states that are in compliance with globalnonproliferation regimes. However, the 72-page document contains a caveat that would allow Washington to set aside that policy, dubbed"negative security assurance," if it appeared that biological weapons had been made dangerous enough to cause major harm to the United States."Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of biotechnology development, the United States reserves the right tomake any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S.capacities to counter that threat," the posture review report says. The caveat was included in the document because "in theory, biologicalweapons could kill millions of people," Gary Samore, senior White House coordinator for WMD counterterrorism and arms control, said lastweek after an event at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Asked if the White House had identified a particular technologicalthreshold that could provoke a nuclear strike, Samore replied: "No, and if we did we obviously would not be willing to put it out becausecountries would say, 'Oh, we can go right up to this level and it won't change policy.'" "It's deliberately ambiguous," he told Global SecurityNewswire. The document's key qualifications have become a lightning rod for criticism by Republican lawmakers who argue they eliminate thecountry's previous policy of "calculated ambiguity," in which U.S. leaders left open the possibility of executing a nuclear strike in response to

virtually any hostile action against the United States or its allies (see GSN, April 15). Yet experts say there are a number ofreasons why the United States is not likely to use a nuclear weapon to eliminate a non-nuclear threat. Itcould prove difficult for U.S. leaders to come up with a list of appropriate targets to strike with a nuclear warheadfollowing a biological or chemical event, former Defense Undersecretary for Policy Walter Slocombe said during a recent panel discussion at theHudson Institute. "I don't think nuclear weapons are necessary to deter these kinds of attacks given U.S. dominance in conventional militaryforce," according to Gregory Koblentz, deputy director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University in Northern Virginia."There's a bigger downside to the nuclear nonproliferation side of the ledger for threatening to use nuclear weapons in those circumstances thanthere is the benefit of actually deterring a chemical or biological attack," Koblentz said during a recent panel discussion at the James Martin

Center. The nonproliferation benefits for restricting the role of strategic weapons to deterring nuclearattacks outweigh the "marginal" reduction in the country's ability to stem the use of biological weapons, hesaid. In addition, the United States has efforts in place to defend against chemical and biological attacks such as vaccines and other medical

countermeasures, he argued. "We have ways to mitigate the consequences of these attacks," Koblentz told the audience.

"There's no way to mitigate the effects of a nuclear weapon." Regardless of the declaratory policy, the U.S. nuclear arsenalwill always provide a "residual deterrent" against mass-casualty biological or chemical attacks, according to Tucker. "If a biological or chemicalattack against the United States was of such a magnitude as to potentially warrant a nuclear response, no attacker could be confident that theU.S. -- in the heat of the moment -- would not retaliate with nuclear weapons, even if its declaratory policy is not to do so," he told GSN this weekduring a telephone interview. Political Benefits Experts are unsure what, if any, political benefit the country or President Barack Obama'ssweeping nuclear nonproliferation agenda will gain from the posture review's biological weapons caveat. The report's reservation "was anunnecessary dilution of the strengthened negative security and a counterproductive elevation of biological weapons to the same strategic domain

as nuclear weapons," Koblentz told GSN by e-mail this week. "The United States has nothing to gain by promoting theconcept of the biological weapons as 'the poor man's atomic bomb,'" he added.

Bostrom evidence doesnt have a warrant and hes only descriptive of what the Cold War brought into theworld, he says all nuclear wars cause extinction


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Even if weaponization is inevitable, there is a substantial advantage to US inaction letting other countries go first

gives us international political cover

Coffelt, 5 Lt. Colonal; thesis to the school of advanced air and space studies (Christopher A, THE BEST DEFENSE: CHARTING THE FUTURE OFUS SPACESTRATEGY AND POLICY. A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies For Completion of the Graduation Requirements

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. June 2005.)

S putnik s launch bestowed the honor and prestige of being first in orbit upon the S oviet U nion , but was fortuitous for

U nited States policy makers , as well . Whether or not the soviets beat the United States outright or the United States allowed the soviets to go first is

irrelevant. The critical point is the soviets didgo first. I n one stroke , S putnik solved the complicated , politically charged overflight issue

that us policy makers grappled with and could not resolve. T his enabled the U nited S tates to pursue its spacereconnaissance program free from the legal and policy quagmire that accompanied launching first, and avoided appearing as an aggressor. Responding to thesoviet capability fueled and legitimized the United States spending on its space program, 291 and garnered unprecedented public support. Robust funding

complemented by international legitimacy and public support provided the united states space program a significant advantage. I f , as some argue ,

weaponization of space is truly inevitable, the United S tates should manage risk , research and develop in secret ,

allow an adversary to cross the weapons in space threshold first, and reap the s putnik- like rewards of being a close

second. In spite of the apparent advantages this strategy offers, it is likely much easier said than done. Advocating or supporting any second-follower strategy wouldbe an extremely difficult position for an elected official or military officer, considering the US clear, longstanding preference for positive action and offensive

solutions.

If realism is true and inevitable, other countries, including Russia, will try to weaponize space and resist U.S.domination even if the Plan is done you dont solve

Russia will only build ASATs as a response to the USthey advocate arms control

Isachenkov 09 [Vladamir, Staff writer @ the Associated Press, Associated Press, Russia Building anti-satellite weapons, March 5, 2009,LexisNexis, DavidK]

Russia is working on anti-satellite weapons to match technologies developed byother nations and will speed upmodernization of its nuclear forces, a deputy defense minister was quoted as saying today. The statement by Gen. Valentin Popovkin signaled thegovernment's intention to pursue its ambitious plans to strengthen the military despite the money crunchcaused by a worsening financial crisis. He said the military will procure enough new missiles to deploy nearPoland if the US goes ahead with its European missile defense plans. Popovkin said Russia continues to oppose aspace arms race but will respond to moves made by other countries, according to Russian news reports. "We can't sit back

and quietly watch others doing that; such work is being conducted in Russia," Popovkin was quoted as saying. Russiaalready has some "basic, key elements" of such weapons, he said without elaboration. Popovkin, who previously was the chief of Russian military SpaceForces, reportedly made the statement at a news conference in response to a question about US and Chinese tests of anti-satellite weapons. In February2008, a US Navy ship launched a missile that hit a dying spy satellite. The test boosted the credibility of missile defense advocates. In 2007, China

destroyed one of its own defunct satellites with a ballistic missile. The Kremlin has criticized US plans for space-based weapons,saying they could trigger a new arms race. Russia and China have pushed for an international agreement banning space weapons, buttheir proposals have been rejected by the United States.

Their 1AC Doleman evidence says other countries wouldnt weaponize space because it costs too much money proves other countries wont

No way for weaponization to deter bioweapons from being used Russia could give it to terrorists


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Hegemony AdvantageInherent checks and their evidence has an economic incentive to say space is being weaponized

Mueller, 6 (Karl, PhD and Political Scientist @ RAND, Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space, March 10th, Washington Roundtable on Science and PublicPolicy, http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=408, EMM) Note: These paragraphs are from a section addressing common misconceptions about space. Thus, the

opening sentence Space is already so militarized that weaponizing it wont be a big deal is a statement the author is attempting to refute.

2. Space is already so militarized that weaponizing it wont be a big deal. This is a political matter: its consequently true only if people believe it Like it or not,

the norm of space sanctuary is real. The second misconception is that the transition from space not being weaponized to

being weaponized may be a gray, indistinct thing. It is not true that it is not going to be a big political deal when it

happens, even if we dont know exactly what form it will take. People with eng

2nd vdebate 1nc

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